Holding

The permission granted by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation to construct multi‑storeyed buildings was not illegal, and the delayed public‑interest petition was barred, so the appeals are allowed.

Summary

The appellants, builders of multi‑storeyed apartments in Koramangala, Bangalore, obtained licences from the City Municipal Corporation to construct up to three floors. A residents' association filed a public‑interest petition seeking cancellation of the licences and demolition of the building, alleging strain on public amenities and that the licences were ultra vires. The High Court had directed demolition, but the Supreme Court held that the licences were valid under the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, the Bangalore Development Authority Act, the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act and the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, and that no statutory ceiling prohibited such construction. The Court also emphasized that the petition was filed after an inordinate delay, creating a third‑party interest, and that PIL jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, allowed the appeals, and refused demolition, noting no cost order.

Issues considered

The validity of the building licences issued by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation for multi‑storeyed construction.
Whether the lease‑cum‑sale agreement and subsequent absolute sale deed imposed any restriction on constructing multi‑storeyed buildings.
Whether the public‑interest petition was maintainable in view of delay, laches and third‑party interest.
Whether the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, Section 505, or any other statutory provision barred the construction.

Legislation cited

Subjects

public interest litigationmunicipal lawbuilding licencemulti‑storeyed buildingdelaylacheslease‑cum‑sale agreementthird‑party interestsection 505section 226

Judgment

A R & M TRUST
v.
KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP AND ORS.

JANUARY 19, 2005

B [ASHOK BHAN AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]

Municipal Laws:

Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976-City of Bangalore
C Improvement Act, 1945-Banga/ore Development Authority Act, 1976 -
Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961-Multi-storeyed and multi-
apartment buildings-Construction of-Licence issued by Respondent-
Corporation to owners of sites for constructing mu/ti-storeyed building-
Bui/ding at completion stage-Writ petition filed by Residents of locality seeking
D cancellation of licence for construction of mu/ti-storeyed buildings and
demolition thereof on the ground that they are causing strain on public
amenities-High Court ordered demolition-On appeal, held, there is no
illegality in granting permission for raising multi-storeyed building-The
condition that only one dwelling house should be constructed is in the lease
agreement but on execution of sale deed, lessee becomes absolute owner of
E the site and the prohibition comes to an end- Thereafter there is no restriction
in any of the statutes and municipal laws as to construction of mu/ti-storeyed
building-Thus High Court not justified in cancelling the licence.

Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/e 226:

F Public Interest Litigation-Invocation of writ jurisdiction-Held to be
invoked only sparingly in very rare cases involving public interest-Meant for
downtrodden and not for publicity or private ends-Courts not to issue
directions without understanding the implication.

Public Interest Litigation-Delay/Laches in filing-Effect of-Heid, courts
G not to come lo rescue ofperson who is not vigilant of his rights-Delay is also
fatal when third party interest is created

Jn the city of Bangalore, Karnataka, construction of new buildings
are regulated by various statutes and municipal laws. Appellants, builders-
H 582
R & M TRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP 583
)
owners of sites submitted plan for construction of multi-storeyed A
apartments. Authorities granted licences to build the same. Thereafter
construction commenced. Substantial portion of building had been
constructed when Corporation issued letter to the builders to stop
construction in view of decision in Pee Kay Construction case*.
Construction remained suspended for some time. On various
representations of appellants, Corporation pei mitted them to resume B
construction.

Some house owners and residents of the locality filed Public Interest
Petition challenging the validity of licence to build higher floors and
seeking direction to demolish the building already constructed on the C
ground that menace of multi-storeyed and multi-apartments was
increasing resulting in strain on the public amenities. Single Judge held
licences to be illegal but dismissed the petition for delay and laches.
Division Bench disagreed and directed demolition. Aggrieved against this
order, Builders and bona fide purchasers of flats in the building came up
in appeal contending that there was no illegality in the licences granted D
by the Corporation and that the Public Interest petition cannot be
entertained at this belated stage.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: I.I. The permission granted by the Municipal Corporation E
for constructing multi storeyed building is not in violation of any of the
provisions of Governing Acts and the Rules. [604-F)

l.2. The development and planning of the City of Bangalore and
construction of building were governed by the City of Bangalore
Improvement Act, 1945, Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, F
Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, Karnataka Municipal
Corporation Act, 1976 and rules made thereunder. As per the City of
Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945, schemes are prepared by the Board
and after preparation of the scheme and obtaining necessary approval
from the Government, allotments are made as per Rules and Bye-laws. G
The sites are allotted as per City of Bangalore Improvement (Allotment
of Sites) Rules, 1964. Looking to the scheme of the Act, the Rules and the
!4
terms and conditions of the lease-cum-sale agreement, it transpires that
once an allotment is made to the lessee and he make~ all payments then
after the payment the lessee/vendor shall at the end of ten years sell the
property to the lessee/purchaser and the lessee/purchaser will get the sale H
+
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A deed registered and the lessee will have absolute right. So long as the
building is not constructed under lease agreement, the lessee is neither
entitled to alienate the property, nor shall he sub-divide the property or
construct more than one dwelling house on it. These restrictions are there
so long as the complete sale agreement is not executed.
[590-H; 591-A; 595-E; 601-F; 60·?-AJ
B
1.3. As soon as the lease agreement is executed conforming full title
to the lessee, then the conditions of the lease cum sale agreement come to
an end and the lessee acquires full right to deal with the said prop1~rty.
After acquiring this full right the lessee has right to alienate the property
C and there is no further hurdle or condition like not to construct multi-
storeyed building or multi-dwelling house. The only condition that hE: will
construct only one dwelling house is contained in the lease cum sale
agreement and so long as the full rights are not transferred to the lessee-
purchaser, this condition would survive and after the sale is made, this
condition will no longer survive and conditions contained in absolutE: sale
D deed will govern. If the lessee or his successor wants to raise a construction,
then the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act will come
into play and he has to obtain prior sanction for construction of the
building. As soon as the permission is granted by the Corporation, he is
to abide by those conditions along with the condition laid down in absolute
E sale deed. [602-B, C, D-El

l .4. The only condition laid down in absolute sale deed is that
building to be constructed shall be used for human habitation and it shall
not allow any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not,
used as a shop or warehouse or for manufacturing operation. There is no
F condition that one cannot raise any multi-storeyed building over the
schedule property. [603-D-EJ

2. There are no provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation
Act or Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 where any ceiling
has been applied on the construction of the multi-storeyed building.
G Therefore, Municipal Corporation has not committed any illegal1ity in
granting permission to the appellant for raising construction up to third
floor. [604-El
••
*Pee Kay Constructions v. Chadrashekar Hegde, ILR ( 1989) 1

Karnataka 241, overruled.
H
R & MTRUST"· KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP 585
Chandrashekar Hegde v. B.C.C., ILR (1988) Karnataka 356, referred A
to.

3.1. The sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation must be
invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the
persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity. Courts
should be very slow in entertaining petitions involving publi.: interest in B
very rare cases where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is
meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the downtrodden and
not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common
for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the
rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. C
This has become very handy to the developers and in matters of public
contracts. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilize the
service of the innocent people or organization in filing public interest
litigation. The Courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions
without understanding the implication and giving a handle in the hands
of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the courts should not exercise D
this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in very rare and few cases
involving public interest of large number of people who cannot afford
litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities.
(604-G; 605-A-CJ

Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., SLP (C) E
No. 26269 of 2004 decided on 14.12.2004, relied on.

Ba/co Employees" Union (Regd) v. Union of India and Ors., [2002[ 2
SCC 333; State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhai/al Bhai and Ors., AIR
(1964) SC 1006; Rabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., F
AIR (1970) SC 470; Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports and Ors., AIR (1970) SC 769; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The
International Airport Authority ofIndia and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 1628; Ashok
Kumar Mishra and Anr. v. Collector, Raipur and Ors., AIR (1980) SC 112
and State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, [1995[ 4 SCC 683, referred to.
G
3.2. Delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The third party interest
created on account of delay cannot be disturbed. In the instant case, the
construction was already started by the appellants in 1987 and building
had come up to three floors. Thereafter it was stopped in 1988 and in
March, 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The Writ Petition H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A was filed in November, 1991; meanwhile almost construction was complete.
Therefore, delay was fatal as rightly held by the Sing;e Judge. [610-B, Cf

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1415of1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.7.98 of the Karnataka High
B Court in W.A. No. 1955/93 and W.A. No. 777 of 1993.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 1416 and 1417 of 1999.

Uday Holla and T.R. Andhyarujina, B. Prasad, A.S. Bhasme, K..T. ,..
C Anantharaman, R. Jawaharlal, Atul Bhatia, Vasudevan Raghavan, R.Jagannath
Goulay, P. Narasimhan, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, K. Lingaraja
and E.C. Vidya Sagar for the Appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A.K. MATHUR, J. This appeal and connected appeals were filed against
D the order passed by the Division Bench of the Kamataka High Court dated
2nd July, 1998 whereby the Division Bench disposed of Writ Appeal No.
1955 of 1993 alongwith Writ Appeal No. 777 of 1993.
Facts which are necessary for disposal of these appeals are - the
Respondent Association Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group filed a Public
E Interest petition challenging the building licence issued for construction of
multi-storeyed/ multi-apartments on Site Nos. 403 and 443 in llnd and lllrd
Cross in III Block, Koramangala Layout, Bangalore, on the ground that it is
illegal, void and prayed for quashing of the licence and direction to demolish
the building already constructed on the site. It was submitted that the residents
p in the area had acquired sites and built houses on the understanding and
under the bona fide belief that the lay out would be developed and maintained
in accordance with law. Grievance of the Association was, the menace of
multi-storeyed and multi-apartments buildings in the Bangalore city particularly
in Koramangala lay-out which is considered to be a posh and prestigious lay-
out, had been increasing. Many property developers, investors in buildings
G and speculators in real estate were alleged to have started their activities
which are detrimental to the quality of life of the residents of the area. Multi-
storeyed buildings and multi-apartment buildings were causing strain on the
public amenities. It was alleged that the property developers by using their ••
influence and money are getting licences against the statutory prohibitions.
H The appellant relied upon the decision given in case of Chandrashekar Hegde
R& MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.)587

v. B.C.C., ILR (I 988) Karnataka 356, (Single Bench) to contend that the A
Corporation was not empowered to grant licences to the owners of the sites
to build multi-storeyed and multi-family dwelling units. It was alleged that
the scheme under the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, I 945 and Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 provided for construction of residential
houses and not for exploitation of those sites for construction of buildings in
violation of law and with the object of inflating the money market of the B
builders. It was alleged that in Writ Petition No. 7599 of I 987, the Kamataka
High Court directed the Corporation not to issue licences to any third party
for putting up multi-storeyed and multi-family dwelling apartments in the
sites allotted by the B.D.A. It was further alleged that after the judgment in
December, I 987, one of the appellants represented to Respondent Nos. I and C
2 to re-examine the licences already issued for putting up multi-storeyed
building and multi-family apartments in the light of the law laid down by the
Kamataka High Court. In response to that, respondent sent communications
to all the licensees to stop further construction. The Writ Appeal No. 306 of
1988 filed against the order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by the
Division Bench on 14th December, 1988 which is noted as Pee Kay D
Constructions v. Chandrashekar Hegde, ILR (1989) Kamataka, 241.

In this background, the present Public Interest Litigation was filed which
came up before a single Judge. In this petition, the building licence No. LP
169/87-88 issued in favour of Respondent No. 4 i.e. Mis R & M Trust by E
Respondent No. I - the Corporation of the City of Bangalore, for construction·
of multi-storey building was stopped by letter dated 4.4.1988. This letter was
withdrawn by Respondent No. 3 i.e. Deputy Director of Town Planning
Corporation of the City of Bangalore, by its letter dated 26th March, 1991.
On receipt of this letter, Appellant /Respondent No. 4 resumed the construction.
This action of the Respondent No. 3 permitting the Appellant /Respondent F
No. 4 to proceed with the construction was challenged to be arbitrary, illegal,
unjustified and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution besides being in
violation of law, by the Respondent Association, alleging that issue of licence
in favour of Appellant/Respondent No. 4 is illegal and without jurisdiction.
The following prayers were made in the Writ Petition which reads as under: G

(i) Call for records from Respondents I to 3 pertaining to building
licence issued in R-1 's No. LP. 353/87-88 for putting up a Multi-
t •
storyed/Multi-apartment building on Site No. 443, III Cross, III
Block, Koramangal, Bangalore - 560 034;
(ii) Declare as illegal and void building licence No. LP. 353/87-88 H
\

~

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A issued by R-1 for the construction of a Multi-storyed/Multi-
apartment building on Site No. 443, III Cross, III Block,
Koramangala, Bangalore - 560 034;
(iii) Direct R-1 to demolish the construction already put up on Site
No. 443, III Cross, Ill Block, Koramangala, Bangalore - 560 034
B by having recourse to Section 321 of the K.M.C. Act, I 973
(Karnataka Oct I4 of I977) and other related provisions of that
Act; and
(iv) Grant such other or further relief that this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit under the circumstances including costs."
c This was contested by the Respondents and the learned single Judge
after hearing the parties held - "I have no hesitation to hold that licences
granted to Respondent No. 4 in these Writ Petitions are contrary to law in
view of the law laid down in the case of Pee Kay Constructions."

D But the learned Single Judge felt that the petition filed by the Writ
Petitioner suffered from !aches and delay and, therefore, dismissed the Writ
Petition on the grounds of delay and !aches. It was observed that the dismissal
of Writ Petitions will not prevent the Corporation from taking any action
permissible under the law. Aggrieved against the present order passed by the
learned Single Judge, the present Writ Appeal was filed _and it was alleged
E that the Writ Petition does not suffer from any delay or !aches nor any third
party interest was created. However, the respondents contested this Writ
Appeal, they did not file the appeal against the aforesaid order but submitted
that the law laid down in Pee Kay Constructions case (Supra) was not a good
law and the learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that licence
F granted to respondents was contrary to law. The Division Bench after hearing
the parties observed that the law laid down in Chandrashekar Hegde v.
B.C.C., !LR (1988) Karnataka 356 and Pee Kay Constructions case (Supra)
is correct law. Thereafter, the Division Bench examined the question of delay
and !aches. After reviewing the facts the Division Bench held that there is no
delay and !aches in preferring the writ petition. It was held that building

.
G licence was issued in favour of appellant-builder on 19th August, 1987 and
on 3rd October, 1987. The Commencement Certificate was issued on 13th
October, 1987 and 23rd November, 1987 and the Chandra Shekhar Hegde 's
Case was decided on I4/15/l 6th December, 1987 wherein it was held that the '
Corporation was not justified in granting licence to the owners of the sites to
H put up multi-storyed/multi-family dwelling units and the appeal was dismissed
-+
R& MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCEGROUP[A.K. MATHUR,J.]589

on 14th December, 1988. On 4th April, 1988, the Respondent Corporation A
issued a letter to the builders directing them to stop construction. The
construction remained suspended upto 26th March, 1991, when letter was
issued to builder revoking to stop construction order, permitting them to
proceed with the construction. This Writ Petition was filed in the first week
of November, 1991, as public interest litigation. The explanation for the
delay was that the office bearers made enquiries from the office of Corporation B
the reasons for withdrawing of direction to stop work but in vain, met the
authorities of Corporation Respondent No.3 on several occasions and then by
a letter dated 7th October, 1991, requested to furnish the copies of certificate
but the copies were not furnished. They protested that there was no justifiable
reason for such withdrawal. They also explained that the building is permitted C
to be constructed at Site No.403 which is a narrow road, the residents of area
will be subjected to great inconvenience but without any result. It was also
contended that the third party right had not been created. After the grant of
permission, the construction proceeded. However, Appellant/Respondent in
their turn submitted that the third party interest had already been created
because the 4th Respondent has issued shares on 21st May, 1988 and some D
of the flats have been sold out. However, Division Bench did not accept the
plea of the third party interest being created in the matter. The Division
Bench observed that when the original files of Corporation were summoned
by the Court, it was found that between 4th April, 1988 and 14th February,
1991 nothing transpired. However, the builder on 14th February, 1991 E
requested for permission to complete the construction mainly on the ground
that substantial amount has been spent on purchase of site and on construction
of ground with three floor building. This letter was perused by the Deputy
Director of Town Planning on 20th March, 1991 which was submitted to
Commissioner on 21st March, 1991. It was observed that all similar cases be
put up where building is completed with full structural work as per sanctioned F
plan prior to judgment. It was found that there was no note by the Deputy
Director regarding Appellant/Respondent. Thereafter on 25th March, 1991,
the order was passed by the Commissioner that he perused the note and
discuss the matter with CE and the DDTP and considered the matter, he
directed that the notice be withdrawn and permission be accorded to complete G
the building as per sanctioned plan. The Division Bench observed that these
notes clearly show non-application of mind and that the action of the

•• respondent was not in accordance with law and was passed without giving
any reasons. Thereafter, the Division Bench concluded that the view taken by
the learned Single Judge is right that the licence granted in favour of
Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 is contrary to law and liable to be quashed. The H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A Division Bench further held that they did not agree with the view taken by
the learned Single Judge that the Writ Petition suffered from delay and laches
and accordingly, allowed the Writ Appeal, set aside the order of learned
Single Judge dismissing the same on the ground of delay and laches and
affirmed the finding that the licence granted in favour of Respondent Nos. 4
B and 5 is illegal and quashed the licence issued in favour of Repondent-
builder, and also quashed the order of Respondent Corporation dated 26th
March, 1991 allowing Respondent-builder to continue with the construction
and directed Respondent No. I to demolish the illegal construction put up on
Site Nos. 403 and 443. It was further directed that the construction as raised
by them is illegal and they were liable to bear the expenses for demolition ,.
C of the construction and Respondent Nos. I and 3 are liable to pay costs to
the writ petitioner.

Aggrieved by this order, the present special leave petitions were filed
and leave was granted and operation of the order was stayed.

D The learned counsel for the appellant has seriously raised the objection
of entertaining this belated Public Interest Litigation and he submitted that
this was nothing but abuse of the process of the Court. Secondly, he submitted
that the licence which had been granted for construction by the Respondent-
Corporation was fully justified and no illegality was committed.

E All the three appeals Civil Appeal No. 1415 of 1999, Civil Appeal No.
1416 of 1999 and Civil Appeal No. 1417 of 1999 arise against the order
passed by the Division Bench. Civil Appeal No. 1417 of 1999 have been
filed by bona fide purchasers of flats in the building, whereas CA 1415/99
& CA 1416/99 have been filed by builders ..

F Now, in order to appreciate the contention raised by the appellants, it
may be necessary to dilate upon some facts of CA 1415/99. Property No.
443, 2nd Cross, 3rd Block, Koramangala Extension, Bangalore, was allotted
by the City Improvement Trust Board to Dr. Alice Duraiswamy on 4th March,
1971 and he was also put up in possession of this schedule land. The Bangalore
G Development Authority, successors in interest of City Improvement Trust
Board sold the schedule land in favour of Dr. Alice Duraisamy under a
registered Sale Deed dated 27th March, 1981. Dr. Alice Duraiswamy then
sold the land in favour of one Mis Batra Developments under a registered
Sale Deed dated 12th June, 1987. The development and planning of the City
of Bangalore and construction of the building thereon were governed by the
H Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, the Outline Development Plan
R& MTRUST''- KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.J 59 J

and the Comprehensive Development Plan as well as the Zoning Regulations A
framed thereunder. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore also framed
Bye-Laws in conformity with the Development Plan and the Zoning
Regulations. In accordance, therewith, Mis Batra Developments applied for
and obtained licence from the Corporation of the City of Bangalore for
construction of basement, ground and three upper floors on 3rd October,
1987. And thereafter, the construction commenced and by 3rd April, 1988, B
the basement and ground floor of the building had been completed. On 4th
April, 1988, the construction was stopped on the basis of the decision of the
Kamataka High Court in Pee Kay Constructions Case. Thereafter, the High
Court of Karnataka in a case known as Happy Home Builders Case held that
when once a licence is granted by the Corporation Authorities, the Corporation C
cannot stop construction of building. Mis Batra Developments thereafter made
a representation to the Corporation Authorities and submitted that the
substantial portion of the building has been completed and considerable
investment have been made and the licence granted thereof is in accordance
with the Building Plan and therefore, they may be permitted to complete the
construction. The Corporation Authorities after taking into consideration the D
representation, permitted Mis Batra Developments to proceed with the
construction. Mis Batra Development entered into an agreement of sale with
Mis Raj Trust on 16th June, 1989. Consequent to the said agreement under
the Development Agreement dated 8th May, 1991 between Mis Raj Trust
and the appellant, the construction proceeded. When the building was E
practically completed during November, 1991, the present Writ Petition was
filed challenging the very licence issued on 3rd October, 1987. The learned
Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground of !aches. It was
pointed out that the building was occupied by 12 families and the grant of
licence has been declared to be invalid after 11 years, but the Division Bench
did not agree and directed demolition of building on the basis of Pee Kay F
Constructions case. Therefore, the question now arises for our consideration
is whether the issue of licence on 3rd October, 1987 by Corporation was
valid or not.

Similarly, in the another Civil Appeal No. 1416 of 1999, the question
of law is identical but facts are little different. In this case, on 16th July, G
1969, City Improvement Trust Board allotted a site bearing No. 403,
Kormangala measuring 80' x 120 (9600 sq.ft.) (Schedule property) to Mr.
U.L. Nagraj. On 13th July, 1982, absolute Sale Deed was executed bv
Bangalore Development Authority in favour of Mr. U.L. Nagraj with follr·
conditions:
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A "That the schedule site shall be held by the second party and enjoyed _.
the rents and profits etc. received thereof, be enjoyed subject to the following
conditions:-

(!) The building to be constructed shall be used whole for human
habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building
B whether attached thereto or not used as a shop or a building of
warehouse or building in which manufactory are conducted by
mechanical power or otherwise."
Thereafter, on 4th March, 1982/16th April, 1987, a Sale Deed executed
by Mr. U.L. Nagraj in favour of Mrs. Ratna Lachman Bhojwani. Mrs. Ratna
C Lachman Bhojwani sold schedule property in favour of the appellant. On
17th August, I 987, the plan was approved for construction of ground plus
three upper floors plus mezzanine floor. A licence was issued by the
Corporation of City of Bangalore. The plan was sanctioned for a period of
two years as per orders of the Commissioner from 17th August, 1987 to 16th
August, I 989. One of the conditions was that the construction should be done
D within two years. The appellant started the construction immediately. On
13th October, 1987, the Commencement Certificate was issued, as per Building
Bye-Laws. On 21st May, I988, a share certificate was issued entitled them
to ownership offlats .. Then, on 4th April, 1988 the B.C.C. asked the respondent
to stop the work in the light of Pee Kay Constructions case. It was alleged
E by appellant that the entire building except the terrace of last floor had been
completed. On 29th March, 1989, another decision was given by the Karnataka
high Court in the case of Happy Home Builders wherein it was held that the
construction have been carried out in pursuance of the sanction given by the
B.C.C. and Corporation is estopped from stopping such construction. This
order of learned Single Judge was affirmed by Division Bench which reads
F as under :
"Delay of 14 days in filing W.A. Nos. 1145 to 1151 of 1989 and
18 days in filing of W.A. No. 1182/89 is condoned as sufficient cause
is shown.

G 2. We have heard the learned counsel and find that in the
circumstances of this case, without going into the question of the
powers of the authorities to grant licence contrary to section 505 of
the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge can be sustained on the ground that there has been an
••
unexplained delay on the part of the Corporation in taking timely
H action against the builders/owners. The Corporation is estopped from
R&MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIG!LANCEGROUP[A.K. MATHUR,J.] 593

taking any action in view of its own conduct in allowing the builders A
to raise construction on the basis of the licences which were granted
in contravention of the provisions of Section 505 and in allowing the
building to be occupied.

3. In this view of the matter, we find that the judgment of the
learned Single judge, without expressing any opinion on the question B
of law, does not call for interference. Consequently the appeals are
dismissed. However time is granted to the Corporation for compliance
of the judgment of the learned Single Judge upto 5th August, 1989."
...
On the basis of this judgment a representation was made by appellant
& Corporation revoked their letter of stopping construction. That gave rise to C
present PIL.

It is also relevant to mention here that a Special leave Petition was filed
against the Pee Kay Constructions Case before this Court and this Court
disposed of that S.L.P. without going into the merits of the judgment of the
High Court. The order of the High Court was modified in following terms : D
"Leave granted.

After hearing counsel for both the parties and giving them
sufficient time to obtain instructions, we are of the opinion that, in
the circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to go into the merits E
of the judgment of the High Court but that the judgment of the High
Court be modified as set out below.

It is a fact that the appellants have constructed two floors of the
building : the ground floor and the first floor alongwith the basement.
In our opinion, the interests of justice require that they should not be F
asked to demolish it. It is enough if they are restrained from
constructing a second and third floor as originally planned.

The High Court has also held that the appellants can have only
one residential unit on the site. Counsel for the respondents points out
that the appellants have submitted a revised plan to the Corporation, G
subsequent to the judgment of the High Court, by which they seek
approval of the construction of a single residential unit on the ground
floor and a single residential unit on the first floor, and that, in the
circumstances, they will not object to this revised plan being approved.
On the other hand, counsel for the appellant requests that he may be H
t

594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A allowed to construct three residential units on the ground floor and
the first floor as originally planned. After hearing both sides at some
length, we are of the opinion that the appellants may be permitted to
have two (not three) residential units on each of the two floors. There
should however be no construction above and beyond the first floor
B of the property and the property should not be used for any purpose
other than residential purpose. We direct accordingly. This is an
arrangement broadly agreed to by both the parties.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as
to costs.
c We direct that the revised plan submitted to the Corporation by
the appellants subsequent to the decision of the High Court but
modified so as to have two flats or apartments on each of the floors
instead of one be approved by the Corporation and the authorities.
Constructions on the site will stand otherwise restricted on the lines
D already indicated above."

The S.L.P. was accordingly disposed of but the ratio laid down in the I
Pee Kay Constructions case was not examined by this Court on merit. In fact,
the S.L.P. was disposed of with the agreement of both the parties.

E And the third C.A. No. 1417 of 1999 was filed by Motor Industries
Company Limited who have purchased two flats in this building for about
Rs. 21.1 "lakhs on 21.2.1994 and the same are in occupation of its employees.
It is alleged that the petitioner who had bought these flats, was neither aware
of the controversy pertaining to the building nor about any order by any
court. It was also alleged that the number of persons has purchased flats in
F this residential building and they are facing the similar predicament. Hence,
these three appeals are before us for the final disposal.

Before we address to the questions raised with regard to the
maintainability of the present public interest litigation and the delay in filing
the same, we may examine necessary provisions of law bearing on the subject.
G The first Act with which we are concerned is the Karnataka Town and Country
Planning Act, 1961 ( hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1961 ). This
Act primarily deals with the planned growth of land use and development
and for the making and execution of Town Planning Scheme in the State of
Karnataka. By this Act the entire planning of State governed and the Town
H Planning Schemes are made for development of the State. Development plan
R& MTRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MA THUR, J.J595

means Outline Development Plan or Comprehensive Development Plan A
prepared under this Act. Section 14 of the Act lays down enforcement of the
outline development plan and the regulations. It says that from the date when
this Act come into force every land use, every change in land use and every
development in the area covered by the plan shall confonn to the provisions
of this Act, the Outline Development Plan and the regulations. It further
stipulates that no such change in land use or development shall .be made B
except with the written permission of the Planning Authority. Therefore, the
whole purpose of this Act is the plan development of the State.

The next is the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 (hereinafter
to be referred to as the 'Act of 1945') and the Rules framed therein with C
which we are concerned, are known as the City of Bangalore Improvement
(Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Rules
of 1964 '). We are primarily concerned with this Act and the Rules,
subsequently this Act of 1945 and Rules of 1964 have been repealed and
they have been replaced by the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976,
and the Bangalore Development Authority (Allotment of Sites ) Rules, 1982. D
The entire controversy centres around these Acts and the Rules. The third
Act with which we are concerned is the Karnataka Municipal Corporations
Act, 1976. Under this Act the Bangalore Municipal Corporation granted
pennission to the appellant for raising one plus three floors. As per the Act
of 1945 , allotment was to be made with conditions that they will have to E
deposit certain amount and then they will construct and complete the building
in the manner provided. As per the Act of 1945 schemes are prepared by the
Board and after preparation of the scheme and obtaining necessary approval
from the Government, allotments are made as per the Rules and Bye-laws.
The sites are allotted as per Rule 5 of the Rules of 1964. The allottees are
treated as lessee under Rule 6. Rule 7 deals with the applications for allotment F
v.· in Form I and after completion of necessary deposits those who are eligible
for allotment, sites are allotted to them under Rule I 0. Rule 17 deals with the
conditions of allotment and sale of site. Under sub-rule (4), after all other
fonnalities have been made i.e. payment of the lease money, allottee is
intimated about the actual measurement of the site and particulars thereof and G
a lease"cum-sale agreement in Form II is executed by the allottee and the
Board and the same is required to be registered by the allottee after constructing
the building on the site in accordance with the plans and designs approved
by the Board. It further stipulates that in case it is considered necessary to
add any additional conditions in the agreement the Board may make such
additions. It also lays down that the approval of the City of Bangalore H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) I S.C.R.

A Municipal Corporation for the plans and designs shall be necessary when the ~
lay-out in which the site is situated is transferred to the control of the said
Corporation. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 17 says that the allottee shall comply with
the conditions on the agreement executed by him and the Buildings and other
bye-laws of the Board for the time being in force. Under Sub-rule (6) the
allottee has to construct the house within a period of two years and if the
B building is not constructed within the said period of allotment, the Board
reserves the right to revoke the agreement. Sub-rule (7) lays down that the
site or the building constructed on the plot shall not be alienated during the

c
period of tenancy. Relevant rules which have bearing on the subject read as
~: .
"17. Conditions of allotment and sale of site.-

xx xx xx

(4) After payment under sub-rule (2) is made the Board shall
intimate the allottee the actual measurement of the site and the
D particulars thereof and a lease-cum-sale agreement in Fonn II shall
thereafter be executed by the allottee and the Board and registered by
the allottee. If the agreement is not executed within forty-five days
after the Board has intimated the actual measurement and particulars
of the site to the allottee, the earnest money paid by the allottee may
E be forfeited, the allotment ofthe site may be cancelled, and the amount
paid by the allottee after deducting the earnest money refunded to
him. Every allottee shall construct a building on the site in accordance
with the plans and designs approved by the Board. If in any case it
is considered necessary to add any additional conditions in the
agreement the Board may make such additions. Approval of the City
F of Bangalore Municipal Corporation for the plans and designs shall
be necessary when the lay-out in which the site is situated is transferred
to the control of the said Corporation.

(5) The allottee shall comply with the conditions on the agreement
executed by him-and the Buildings and other ·bye-laws of the Board
G for the'tim.c_~ing in.force.
0
(6) The aHottee shall construct a building within a period of two
·years from the date of execution of the agreement or such extended
period as the Board may in any specified case by written order penn it.
If the building is not constructed within the said period the allotment
H
R& MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCEGROUP[A.K. MATHUR,J.J597

may be cancelled, the agreement revoked, the lease determined and A
the allottee evicted from the site by the Board, and after forfeiting
twelve and a half per cent of the value of the site paid by the allottee,
the Board shall refund the balance to the allottee.

(7) The site or the building constructed thereon shall not be
alienated during the period of the tenancy." B
The lease agreement is required to be executed in Form IL This lease
agreement is called Lease-cum-sale agreement. Form II of the lease agreement
reads as under :

"FORM NO.II c
[See rule .....]

LEASE-cum-SALE AGREEMENT

An Agreement made this ............. day of.. ................ 196
D
BETWEEN the City of Bangalore Improvement Trust Board,
.. Bangalore, hereinafter called the LessorN endor which term shall
wherever the context so permits, mean and include its successors in
interest and assigns of the ONE PART and ........... hereinafter called
Lessee/Purchaser (which term shall wherever the context so permits
mean and include his/ her heirs, executors, administrators and legal E
representatives) of the Other PART;

Whereas the City of Bangalore Improvement Trust Board
advertised for sale building sites in ............. Extension;

And Whereas one of such building site is Site No ........ more fully F
described in the Schedule hereunder and referred to as Property;

And Whereas there were negotiation between the Lessee/ Purchaser
on the one and the LessorN endor on the other for allowing the Lessee/
Purchaser to occupy the property as Lessee until the Payment in full
of the price of the aforesaid site as might be fixed by the Lesser/ G
Vendor as hereinafter provided;

f • And Whereas the Lessor/ Vendor agreed to do so subject to the
terms and conditions specified in the City of Bangalore Improvement
(Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964, and the terms and conditions
hereinafter contained; H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A And Whereas thus the Lessor/ Vendor has agreed to lease the
property and the Lessee /Purchaser has agreed to take it on lease
subject to the terms and conditions specified in the said Rules and the
terms and conditions specified hereunder;

Now this indenture witnesseth :
B
I. The Lessee/ Purchaser is hereby put in possession of the property
and the Lessee/ Purchaser shall occupy the property as a tenant thereof
for a period often years from (Here enter the date of giving possession)
.........or in the event of the lease being determined earlier till the date
of such termination. The amount deposited by the Lessee /Purchaser
c towards the value of the property shall, during the period of tenancy,
be held by the Lessor/Vendor as security deposit for the due
performance of the terms and conditions of these presents.

"2. The Lessee/Purchaser shall pay a sum of rupees .............. per
D year as rent on or before ..... commencing from ............ "

3. The Lessee/Purchaser shall construct a building in the property
as per plans, designs and conditions to be approved by the Lessee/
Vendor and in conformity with the provisions of the City of Bangalore
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, and the bye-laws made there under
E within two years from the date of this agreement

Provided that where the Lessor/Vendor for sufficient reasons
extends in any particular case the time for construction of such
building, the Lessee/Purchaser shall construct the building within such
extended period.
F 4. The Lessee/Purchaser shall not sub-divide the property or
construct more than one dwelling house on it;

The expression "dwelling house" means a building constructed to
be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include any
apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not, used as a
G shop or a building of warehouse or building in which manufactory
operations are conducted by mechanical power or otherwise.

5. The Lessee/Purchaser shall not alienate the site or the building ••
that may be constructed thereon during the period of the tenancy. The
Lessor/Vendor may, however, permit the mortgage of the right, title
H
R & MTRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J] 599

and interest of the Lessee/Purchaser in favour of the Government of A
Mysore, the Central Government or bodies corporation like the Mysore
Housing Board of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Housing
Co-operative Societies or Banks to secure moneys advanced by such
Governments or bodies for the construction of the building

6. The Lessee/Purchaser agrees that the Lessor/ Vendor may take B
over possession of the property with the structure thereon if there is
any misrepresentation in the application for allotment of site.

7. The property shall not be put to any use except as a residential
building without the consent in writing of Lessor/Vendor.

8. The Lessee/Purchaser shall be liable to pay all outgoings with
c
reference to the property including taxes due to the Government and
the Municipal Corporation of Bangalore.

9. On matters not specifically stipulated in these presents the
Lessor/Vendor shall be entitled to give directions to the Lessee/ D
Purchaser which the Lessee/ Purchaser shall carry out and default in
carrying out such direct5ions will be a breach of conditions of these
presents.

10. In the event of the Lessee/Purchaser committing default in the
payment of rent or committing breach of any of the conditions of this E
agreement or the provisions of the City of Bangalore Improvement
(Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964, the Lessor/Vendor may determine
the tenancy at any time after giving the Lessee/Purchaser fifteen days'
notice ending with the month of the tenancy, and take possession of
the property. The Lessor/Vendor may also forfeit twelve and a half
percent of the amount treated as security deposit under clause 1 of F
these presents.

11. At the end of ten years referred to in clause 1 the total
amount of rent paid by the Lessee/Purchaser for the period of the
tenancy shall be adjusted towards the balance of the value of the G
property.

12. If the Lessee/Purchaser has performed all the conditions
mentioned herein and committed no breach thereof the Lessor/Vendor
shall, at the end of ten years referred to in clause 1, sell the property
to the Lessee/ Purchaser and all attendant expenses in connection H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A with such sale such as stamp duty, registration charges, etc., shall be
borne by the Lessee/Purchaser.

13. On complying with the terms and conditions of this agreement
in the manner stated above but not otherwise the LessorIV end or shall
be obliged to execute the sale deed in favour of the Lessee/Purchaser.
B
14. The Lessee/Purchaser hereby also confirms that this agreement
shall be subject to the terms and conditions specified in the City of
Bangalore Improvement (Allotment of Sites) Rules, 1964, and agreed
to by the Lessee/Purchaser in his/her application for allotmmt of the
site.
c
15. In case the Lessee/Purchaser is evicted under clause 9 he shall
not be entitled to claim from the Lessor/ Vendor any compensation
towards the value of the improvements or the superstructure erected
by him on the scheduled property by virtue of and in pursuance of
these presents.
D
16. It is also agreed between the parties hereto that Rs ......... .
(Rupees ........... ) in the hands of the Lesser/Vendor received by them
from the Lessee/Purchaser shall be held by them as security for any
loss or expense that the LessorIV end or may be put to in connection
with any legal proceedings including eviction proceedings that may
E be taken against the Lessee/Purchaser and all such expenses shall be
appropriated by the LessorIV endor from and out of the moneys of the
Lessee/Purchaser held in their hands.

THE SCHEDULE

F SITE No ...... formed by the City of Bangalore Improvement Trust
Board in Block No .......... .in the ............ Extension.
Site bounded on East by ;
West by ;
G North by ;

South by ;
,,. .
And measuring east to west... ...... North to south .......... .

In all measuring ......... Square Feet.
H
R&MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR,J.160]

> In witness whereof the parties have affixed their signatures to this A
Agreement.

Chairman

The City of Bangalore Improvement Trus Board

Witnesses : B
I.
2.
Lessee/Purchaser
Witnesses : c
I.
2.

The conditions which have been set out in the lease agreement and
which is relevant for our purpose is condition No. 4. Condition No. 4 has D
... already been reproduced above which provides that lessee/purchaser shall not
sub-divide the property or construct more than one dwelling house. Condition
No. 12 says if the Lessee/Purchaser has performed all the conditions mentioned
herein and committed no breach thereof the Lessor/Vendor shall, at the end
of ten years referred to in clause 1, sell the property to the Lessee/Purchaser
and all attendant expenses in connection with such sale such as stamp duty,
E
registration charges, etc., shall be borne by the Lessee/ Purchaser. Condition
No. 13 says that on complying with the terms and conditions of this agreement
in the manner stated above but not otherwise the Lessor/Vendor shall be
obliged to execute the sale deed in favour of the Lessee/Purchaser. Therefore,
looking to the scheme of the Act, the Rules and the terms and conditions of F
the lease cum sale agreement, it transpires that once an allotment is made to
the lessee and he makes all payments then after the payment the Lesser/
Vendor shall at the end of ten years sell the property to the Lessee/ Purchaser
and the Lessee/Purchaser will get the sale deed registered. Therefore, if all
the conditions of the lease agreement are fulfilled, at the end of the stipulated
period of ten years then outright agreement of sale shall be executed by the G
Lessor/Vendor with the Lessee/Purchaser and the lessee will have absolute
!
• right. The lease agreement also says that during the currency of the lease, the
Lessee/Purchaser shall abide by the terms and conditions of the lease. As per
condition 17 (7) reproduced above, the Lessee/Purchaser shall not alienate
the property during the period of tenancy. Once all the payments have been H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.

A fulfilled by the lessee, then the land is registered in favour of the lessee by
the lessor and the lessee becomes absolute owner of the land. So long as the
\building is not constructed under condition No. 4 of the agreement the lessee
is neither entitled to alienate the property under condition 17 (7), nor shall
be sub-divide the property or construct more than one dwelling house on it.
B These restrictions are there so long as the complete sale agreement is not
executed under condition No. 12 of the lease-cum-sale agreement. As soon
as the lease agreement is executed conforming full title to the lessee, then the
conditions of the lease cum sale agreement come to an end and the lessee
acquires full right to deal with the said property in accordance with the Act
and the Rules bearing on the subject. After acquiring this full right the lessee
C has right to alienate the property or whenever either lessee or his successor
wants to construct a building thereon he can do so in accordance with the
provisions oflaw. Condition No. 4 of the lease agreement was only to survive
so long as the lessee continued to be lessee as his rights of lessee are restricted
i.e. he cannot alienate the property nor can he subdivide the property and he
has to construct one dwelling house. The moment the lease cum sale agreement
D is executed after following the conditions of the lease as laid down, then
there is no further hurdle or condition like not to construct multi-storeyed
building or multi-dwelling house. The only condition that he will construct
only one dwelling house is contained in Condition No. 4 of the lease cum
sale agreement and so long as the full rights are not transferred to the lessee-
E purchaser, this condition would survive and after the sale is made, this
condition will no longer survive and conditions contained in absolute sale
deed will govern. If the lessee or his successor wants to raise a construction,
then the provisions of the Kamataka Municipal Corporation Act will come
into play and he has to obtain prior sanction for construction of the building.
As soon as the permission is granted by the Corporation, then he is to abide
F by those conditions along with the condition laid down in absolute sale deed.
Now, adverting to the facts in C.A. No. 1416of1999, an absolute sale
deed was executed on 13.7.1982 in favour of U.L. Nagaraj after he constructed
the house. The only condition which was incorporated in Clause 2 of the sale
G deed reads as i.;nder :

"The building to be constructed shall be used wholly for human
habitation and shall not include any apartments to the building whether
attached thereto or not used as a shop or a building or warehouse or
building in which manufactory operations are conducted by mechanical
H power or otherwise."
R& MTRUSTv. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 603

Therefore, the only condition was that it shall be used for human habitation A
and it shall not allow any apartments to the building whether attached thereto
or not , used as a shop or a building or warehouse or for manufacturing
operation. There is no condition that one cannot raise any multi-storeyed
building over the schedule property. The condition not to have more than one
dwelling house was the condition No. 4 of the lease cum sale agreement but B
that condition has not been repeated when the absolute sale was made in
favour of a party. As such, the condition No. 4 of the lease cum sale agreement
survived during the currency of that agreement. As soon as absolute sale is
made then prohibition comes to an end. The lease cum sale agreement was
to continue for a period of ten years or till all the conditions are fulfilled. The
moment the conditions laid down in the lease cum sale agreement are fulfilled C
i.e. the entire money is paid and the registration is done and thereafter final
absolute sale agreement is executed then the so called lease cum sale agreement
comes to an end and the condition No. 4 cannot subsequently guide the sale
purchase agreement. The sale purchase agreement has its own tenns and
conditions and the condition as reproduced above, only says that the building D
to be constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not
include any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not used
as a shop or a building or warehouse or used for manufactory operations by
mechanical power. Therefore, in this final agreement which has come to be
executed and which has been registered the condition is that the building has
to be used for human habitation and there is no prohibition contained therein E
that it cannot raise multi-storeyed building. In this connection, much emphasis
was laid on the decision in Pee Kay Constructions case. With respect we do
not see any condition under the provisions of the Act and the Rules which
prohibits raising of multi-storeyed building after final sale agreement has
been executed. This condition was to remain in force so long as the absolute F
agreement has not been executed. The condition to construct one dwelling
house was only so long as the other conditions laid down in the lease agreement
were not complied and final sale agreement has not been executed. Therefore
condition 17(4) lays down that within 10 years the lessee-purchaser has to
complete all the formalities or earlier than 10 years , then in that case, the
final agreement for absolute purchase could be executed. Once the final G
agreement is executed then the lessee- purchaser becomes absolute owner of
the schedule property and he has to abide by the conditions of the final
agreement for sale and other provisions bearing on the subject. The final
agreement only contains the condition that th~ lessee purchaser should use
the schedule property for human dwelling purpose and it will not be used in H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 1 S.C.R.

A apartment of that building for purpose of shop or for warehouse or for
manufacturing process, therefore, the view taken in Pee Kay Constructions
case cannot be said to be a good law.

Learned counsel for the respondents has tried to raise certain objections
that in the final agreement the expression "apartment" has been used which
B shows that there cannot be more than one dwelling house. We regret to say
that this interpretation does not bear out in the face of the language used in
the clause 2 of the final agreement which says that the building to be
constructed shall be used wholly for human habitation and shall not include
any apartments to the building whether attached thereto or not for shop or
C warehouse or manufacturing purposes but that does not make out a case for
prohibition of raising of the multi-storeyed building. Once the Municipal
Corporation has permitted to raise construction more than three floor then
this condition for construction will hold good and they are not contrary to
any of the provisions of the Act. Section 505 of the Karnataka Municipal
Corporation Act, 1976 only says that the Corporation shall exercise power in
D confonnity with the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning
Act, 1961. Therefore, the Corporation at the time of granting pennission has
to keep in mind the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning
Act, 1961. But we have not been able to find any provisions of the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act or Kamataka Town and Country Planning Act,
E 1961 where any ceiling has been applied on the construction of the multi-
storeyed building. Therefore, we do not find that the Municipal Corporation
has committed any illegality in granting pennission to the appellant for raising
construction up to third floor.

In view of the discussions made above, we are of opinion that pennission
F granted by t~e Bangalore Municipal Corporation to the appellant for raising
the construction up to third floor is not in violation of any of the provisions
of the Act and the Rules.

Next question is whether such Public Interest Litigation should at all be
G entertained & !aches thereon. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest
Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant
and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity
or for the purpose of serving their private ends.

Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing
H the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by
R & MTRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [AK MATHUR, J.)605

.....
some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. Courts should be A
very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in a very
rare cases where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for
the purpose of coming to the rescue of the down trodden and not for the
purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous
people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people B
so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. This has become very
handy to the developers and in. matters of pubJic contracts. In order to serve
their professional rivalry they utilize the service of the innocent people or
organization in filing public interest litigation. The Courts are sometimes
persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding implication and
giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the C
courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in a
very rare and few cases involving public interest of large number of people
who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the
authorities. The parameters have already been laid down in a decision of this
Court in the case of Ba/co Employees' Union (Regd) v. Union of India and
Ors., reported in [2002] 2 sec 333, wherein this Court has issued guidelines D
.... as to what kind of public interest litigation should be entertained and all the
previous cases were reviewed by

"

77. Public Interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known,
E
entered the Indian Judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to
say that it is primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of
litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended
to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the
people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically F
disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were
required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in
nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the
parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the
weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to
protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to G
means nothing more than what words themselves said viz. "litigation
in the interest of the public".

78. While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with
the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) I S.C.R.

A areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but
with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other
spheres, Prof. S.B. Sathe has summarized the extent of the jurisdiction
which has now been exercised in the following words : \

"PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the
B following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive :
- Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but
are shared widely by ·a large number of people (bonded labour,
undertrial prisoners, prison inmates).
~
.
c - Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections
of society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganized labour,
etc.).
- Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation
(inter-country adoption, the education of the children, bonded
D labour, unorganized labour, etc.).
- Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation
)I
(inter-country adoption, the education of the children of the
prostitutes).
- Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the
E sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary,
existence of grievances redress al forums).
- Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful
to the environment and jeopardize people's right to natural
resources such as air or water."
F 79. There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any
foundation that public interest litigation is now tending to become
publicity interest litigation or private inten:st litigation and has a -~

tendency to be counterproductive.

80. PIL is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was essentially
G
mea~t to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged
and was a procedure which was innovated where a public spirited
person files a petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on
account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities
·•
could not approach the Court for relief. There has been in recent
H times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a
R& MTRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J] 607

.. need ;to reemphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted A
to by petitioner and entertained by the Court. This aspect has come
up for consideration before this Court and all we need to do is to
recapitulate and reemphasize the same."

In this connection reference may be made to a recent decision given by
this Court in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra B
and Ors., S.L.P. (C) No. 26269 of (2004) in which Hon'ble Pasaya! J. has
also observed as follows :

"Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with
great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely
careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly C
private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking.
It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for
delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of
public interestlitigation should not be used for suspicious products of
mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or D
public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal
vendetta."

We fully share the views expressed in the aforesaid decision of this
Court and reiterate that it should go a warning to the Courts that this extra-
ordinary power should be used sparingly and absolutely in necessary matter E
involving down trodden people.

Jn this connection learned counsel has rightly pointed out that delay is
very material. He has invited our attention to a number of decisions of this
Court where this Court has declined to interfere on account of delay.
F
In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai and
Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC l 006, it was observed as follows :

"The provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the
granting of relief under Art. 226. However, the maximum period
fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit G
in a ciyil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a
reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art.226.
can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable
even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil
action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R

A it will almost atways be proper for the Court to hold that it is
unreasonable."

In the case of Rabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors., reported in AIR (1970) SC 470. it was observed as follows :

"No relief can be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable
B
· explanation, approach Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution
after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given
Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution. It could not have been the intention that the Supreme
Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. Though
c Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that
it was the intentionof the Constitution makers that Supreme Court
should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after in
ordinate delay."

In the case of Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and
D Exports and Ors., reported in AIR ( 1970) SC 769 Their Lordships observed
as follows : )'

"Where an applicant for an Import licence in 1959 received a ~

licence only for a fraction of the amount for which he had asked for,
chooses to wait and comes to a Court in 1964 requesting for a writ
E of mandamus even if his fundamental rights are involved, the matter
is still in the discretion of the High Court, and the High Court in its
discretion can refuse the issue of a writ because of the !aches of the
applicant."

In the case of Ramona Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport
F Authority of India and Ors., reported in AIR (1979) SC 1628, even five .l
months delay was considered to be fatal. It was observed as follows : ..
_

"Moreover, the writ petition was filed by the appellant more than
five months after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents
G and during this period, the 4th respondents incurred considerable
expenditure aggregating to about Rs. 1,25,000 in making arrangements
for putting up the restaurant and the snack bars and started running
.
the same. It would now be most inequitous to set aside the contract
of the 4th respondents at the instance of the appellant. The position
"
would have been different if the appellant had filed the writ petition
H immediately after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents
R & MTRUST"· KO RAMA NGA LA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.]609

but the appellant allowed a period of over five months to elapse A
duringwhich the 4th respondents started their position. We are,
therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case in which we shou Id
interfere and grant relief to the appellant in the exercise of our
discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution."

In the case of Ashok Kumar Mishra and Anr. v. Collector, Raipur and B
Ors.. reported in AIR (1980) SC I 12, it was observed that when the final
electoral roll was published in Nov.15, 1978 it was notified that the
nominations could be filed on and after Nov.25, I 978 and the poll , if necessary,
would take place on Dec. 31,1978. After Nov. 25, 1978, a large number of
nominations were received by the Returning Officer. It was only on Dec.5, 1978 C
for the first time that a letter was addressed by petitioner to the Collector
drawing his attention to the error that had crept into the notice published
under Rule 4(1) of the Rules. By that time, the nominations had all been
received. Tire final list of candidates for the ~lection with their symbols was
published on Dec.20, 1978. The writ petition .itself was filed on Dec.28, 1978
when the poll had to take place on Dec. 31,1978. In that context, Their D
Lordships observed as follows :·

"No satisfactory explanation was given in the course of the petition
by the petitioners, as to why they delayed the filing of the petition till
Dec.28, 1978 even though they knew that there was an error in the
notice issued under R.4(1) of the Rules in the month of Oct.1978 E
more than 2 months before the date on which it was filed." Their
·Lordships dismissed the petition as there was no satisfactory
explanation for the delay in preferring it.

In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, reported in [ 1995] 4
sec 683, Their Lordships observed as follows : F
"The power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226
of the Constitution, if it is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious
and reasonable, admits of no controversy. Persons seeking relief against
the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or G
otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless
they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of
the case clearly justified the latches or undue delay on their part in
approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore,
where the High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person
under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.

A the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as latches
or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes
unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged
deprivation of his legal right by the State."

There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while e~ercising
B extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot
disturb the third party interest created on account of delay. Even otherwise
also why Court should come to rescue of person who is not vigilant of his
~? ~

We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the
C construction already started by the appellants in 1987 and building had come
up to three floors. Thereafter it was stopped in 1988 and in March, 1991 it
resumed after permission was granted. The Writ Petition was filed in
November, 1991 meanwhile almost construction was complete. Therefore,
delay was fatal in the present case and learned single judge rightly held it.
D It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi storey buildings have come
up in this area. Learned counsel has produced photographs to show that
buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around
this area.

However, we are satisfied that there is no prohibition under the
E provisions of the Act and Rules putting the ceiling on construction of the
multi storey building. We are also satisfied that the delay is also fatal in the
present case.

It was also contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that the
respondent had no locus standi to file this petition as the present association
F is neither representative association nor a registered body. Therefore, the
Court should not have entertained the PIL on behalf of ; such unregistered ...
and unrecognized body. It is true locus in such Public Interest Litigation is
very relevant factor & Court should always inquire into the locus of person
before entertaining such petition. We have already observed above that Public
G Interest Litigation should be entertained in very rare cases.

Learned counsel has also invited our attention to Section 11 of the
Transfer of Property Act to urge that once absolute right has conferred on the
property then no rider can be put to enjoyment of that property. It is not
necessary to go into this question in this case.
H
R & MTRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP [A.K. MATHUR, J.]611

As a result of our above discussion, we set aside the judgment of the A
Division Bench of the High Court and allow the appeal i.e. C.A. No. 1416
of 1999. The facts ofC.A. No. 1415of1999 are identical with that ofC.A.
No. 1416 of 1999. Therefore, this appeal is also allowed for the reasons
mentioned aforesaid. C.A. No. 1417 of 1999, has been filed by persons who
have already purchased the flats and they are living in the said flats of the B
multi-storeyed buildings. Therefore, third party interest has already been
created. As such this appeal is also allowed for the reasons mentioned.above.
However, there will be no order as to costs. ...

D.G. Appeals allowed.