Holding

The two‑year period under Section 11A is to be computed after excluding the period during which the acquisition proceedings were stayed by a court, and therefore the award was within time and the acquisition did not lapse.

Summary

The appellants owned land that was acquired by the Government of Tamil Nadu under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. A notification (Sec. 4) was issued on 24‑12‑1986 and a declaration (Sec. 6) on 23‑12‑1987. The appellants filed writ petitions in 1988 challenging the acquisition; the High Court granted an interim stay of four weeks on 11‑Feb‑1988, which effectively continued until a stay of dispossession was ordered on 3‑July‑1991. The award was finally made on 23‑Aug‑1993. The appellants argued that the award was beyond the two‑year period prescribed by Sec. 11A, and thus the acquisition proceedings should have lapsed. The Supreme Court held that the two‑year period must be computed after excluding the time during which the acquisition was stayed by a court order, i.e., from 11‑Feb‑1988 to 3‑July‑1991. Excluding this period, the award was within the statutory limit, so the acquisition did not lapse. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

Whether the two‑year period for making an award under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is to be computed excluding the period during which the acquisition proceedings are stayed by a court order.
Whether the interim stay granted on 11‑Feb‑1988 was operative only for four weeks or continued until the order of 3‑July‑1991, and how that affects the computation of the limitation period.
Whether the award passed on 23‑Aug‑1993 is barred as being beyond the two‑year limit, causing the acquisition proceedings to lapse.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 4, s. 6

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 11Astay ordercomputation of limitation periodacquisition awardstatutory lapseinterim injunctioncompensation

Judgment

[2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 381

- ... R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS .
v.
THE GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.
A

(Civil Appeal No. 8235 of 2009)

DECEMBER 11, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]
• "
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
s.11A - Object and legislative intent - Discussed.

s. 11A - Award - Limitation - Land acquisition
proceedings - s. 6 declaration issued on 23. 12. 1987 - Writ
petition by land owners - Interim order - Stay for four weeks
D
granted on 11.2.1988 - Order of stay of dispossession on
_,... 3.7.1991-Award passed on 23.8.1993 - Writ petition finally
L
dismissed - Appeal on the ground that acquisition
proceedings lapsed due to expiry of two years from date of
publication of s.6 declaration - Held: Acquisition proceedings
did not lapse and award was well within time - Two years from E
the date of declaration is to be computed after excluding the
period when parties approached the court and obtained
interim stay of such acquisition notices - Both the parties
proceeded on the basis that the interim order of stay passed
- " initially for four weeks continued till the final order of interim F
stay passed by the High Court on application for vacating
interim order of stay.
.. Appellants were owners of land under acquisition .
They filed writ petitions questioning the validity of G
notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act and
Section 6 declaration issued on 23rd December 1987
..-* before the High Court. In the pending writ petitions, by
interim order dated 11th Febru:iry, 1988 stay for four
381 H
...
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A weeks was granted. State-respondent filed application to
vacate the stay order. An order of stay of dispossession
~ -
was passed on 3rd July 1991. The award was passed on
23rd August 1993. Writ petitions were finally dismissed.

B
In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that
the interim order of stay was operative only for a period
-·
of four weeks from 11th February, 1988 to 11th March,
1988, High Court fell into error in dismissing writ petitions
in as much as the award passed on 23rd August 1993was
clearly beyond the period of two years from the date of
I •
c issuance of declaration under s.6 on 23rd December,
1997.

Dismissing ihe appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Perusal of the relevant provisions of the
D
Land Acquisition Act, ~SS4 namely, Sections 6 and 11A
with its explanation show that the two years from the date ).- .
of declaration must be computed after excluding the
period when parties had approached the court and
obtained interim stay of such acquisition notices. At the
E instance of the appellants, the notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act and the declaration under Section 6
initially were stayed for four weeks on 11th of February,
1988, but the Interlocutory Applications remained
pending for final disposal and finally on the applications ,.
F to vacate the stay order at the instance of the State/
respondents, the applications to vacate the stay were
disposed of, by an order which clearly shows that the
order of stay granted initially for four weeks would
continue pending further orders. Perusal of interim order
G of the High Court show that there was an order of
prohibition from dispossessing the appellants from the
acquired lands pending further orders. [Paras 7 and 10]
,. '
(389-G-H; 390-A-B; 391-G-H; 392-A-B]

H 1.2. Considering the nature of interim order of stay
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 383
NADU &.ANR.
·~ -i passed by the High Court finally on 3rd of July, 1991, it A
is abundantly clear that both the parties proceeded on
the basis that the interim order of stay had been
continuing and the respondents were prohibited from
dispossessing the appellants from the acquired lands
pending further orders. If that was not the case, the B
question of filing an application for vacating the order of
stay granted in favour of the appellants could not arise
.. ~
at all and there was no occasion for the appellants to
contest the application for vacating the stay order on the
basis that the interim order of stay was continuing and c
should be allowed to continue. That apart, it may be
stated that although initially the interim order was passed
for four weeks, the same interim order which was granted
initially was made final until further orders on 3rd of July,
1991. From the above narration of facts, it must be held D
that no steps could be taken in view of the pending
. .; appli<:ations for grant of interim order and in view of the
interim order granted pending further orders. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings had
lapsed due to expiry of two years from the date of
E
publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act
relating to the acquired lands. [Para 11) [391-G-H;
392-A-C]
2. The explanation to Section 11 A of the Act is
-' intended to confer a benefit on the land holder, whose F
land is acquired after .the declaration under Section 6 is
made. By the provision of Section 11A, the State
' authorities are required to pass a final award within two
years from the date of publication of declaration under
Section 6 of the Act failing which, the acquisition G
proceedings would lapse, and it would clearly show the
.,. _). intention of the legislature that the benefit of this
provision would be in favour of the land owner if the
award could not be passed within two years from the
date of declaration when no order was obtained by the H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

1-- ••
A land owner from the Court staying the acquisition and the
land would revert back to the land owner because of
expiry of the period of two years from the date of
declaration or notification within the meaning of Section
11A of the Act. [Para 13) [393-C-F]
B
3. There is another aspect of the matter. The purpose
for which the Land Acquisition Act was amended and
Section 11Awas enacted, was to prevent inordinate delay
being caused by the Land Acquisition Officer in making ~ •
an award which deprived the land owners of their
c enjoyment of their land or dealt with the land whose
possession was already taken. The delay in making the
award subjected the owner of the land to untold
hardship. The objects and reasons for introducing
Section 11A into the Act were that "the pendency of
D acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes
hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic ••
the scale of compar.sation offered to them" and "it is
proposed to provide for a period of two years from the
date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of
E the Act within which the Collector should make his award
under the Act". By the introduction of this explanation
and Section 11A of the Act, the Legislature intended to
emphasize that the Collector shall make his award under
the Act within two years from the date of publication of ,-
F declaration under Section 6 of the Act, failing which the
acquisition proceeding itself shall lapse. [Para 15] [394-
C-F]
4. The appellants having taken advantage of an order
passed by the High Court during the pendency of the writ
G petition which was sought to be vacated by the State/
respondents by filing an application for vacating the stay
order, it must be concluded that the award was passed ".
within two years from the date of publication of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the
'
H respondents were entitled to exclude the period from
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 385
NADU & ANR.

-· ~ 11th of February, 1988 to 3rd of July, 1991 and, therefore, A
if this period is excluded as enshrined in the explanation
I to Section 11A of the Act, the award was within time and,
therefore, the question of holding that the acquisition
proceeding must lapse because of expiry of the said
period, cannot arise at all. [Para 17] [396-H; 397-A-C] B

Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Another
2007 (3) sec 470, distinguished.

Bai/amma (Smt.) Alias Doddabailamma and others v.
Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and C
others 2006 (2) SCC 416 and Yusufbhai Noormohamed
Nendo/iya v. State of Gujarat and another 1991 (4) SCC 531,
relied on.

Case Law Reference: D
2001 (3) sec 470 distinguished Para 5
2006 (2) sec 416 relied on Para 6
1991 (4) sec 531 relied on Para 6
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8235 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 23.1.2007 of the High
Court of Madras in Writ Appea No. 1735 of 2001.
F
V. Krishnamurhty, R. Viduthalai, Prashanth P., Prachi
Bajpai, K.V. Bharathi Upadhyaya, R. Nedumaran, Promila,
Jegadeesh, Indira, S. Thananjayan for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
TARUN CHATIERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants are the owners of lands situated in
Salem Taluk No. 151, Ayothiapatnam in the district of Salem,
Tamil Nadu (hereinafter referred to as "the acquired lands"). A H
•
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A notification under Section 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ~ .... ,

(in short "the Act") was issued on 24th of December, 1986 for
acquisition of the said lands. A declaration under Section 6 of
the Act was issued on 23rd of December, 1987. Two writ
petitions being W.P.Nos.835 and 836 of 1988 were filed
B questioning the validity and legality of the aforesaid notification
and the declaration before the High Court of Madras. In the
pending writ petitions, on 11th of February, 1988, the following
interim order was passed :- I
'
"Interim stay for four weeks. Notice returnable in four
c weeks."

The aforesaid two writ petitions finally came up for hearing
before a learned Judge of the High Court who by an order
dated 23rd of August, 2001 rejected the writ petitions and
D feeling aggrieved, the appeals were filed before the Division
Bench which by the impugned order had dismissed the
appeals of the appellants. The appellants, feeling aggrieved,
••
had filed two special leave petitions which on grant of leave,
were heard in the presence of the learned counsel for the
E parties.
Having heard the learned senior counsel for the parties
and after careful examination of the relevant provisions of the
Act, we are of the view that these appeals have no merit. The
submission of Mr.Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel '-
F appearing on behalf of the appellants, was that having regard
to the fact that the interim order of stay was operative only for
a period of four weeks from 11th of February, 1988 to 11th of
March, 1988, the High Court had fallen into a grave error in
dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants inasmuch
G as the award passed on 23rd of August, 1993 was clearly
beyond the period of two years from the date of issuance of
declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 23rd of December, ....
1987. Mr.Viduthalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents contested the submissions advanced by
H Mr.Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 387
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.}
,..
"' appellants. He submitted that the High Court was fully justified A
in dismissing the writ petitions having regard to the nature of
the interim order of stay granted by the High Court in the
pending writ petitions and, therefore, it must be held that the
question of holding that entire proceedings had lapsed and that
the acquired lands must be restored to the appellants could not B
arise at all. Before we proceed to consider the issue as posed
before us, it would be necessary to deal with some of the
• \ ; provisions of the Act. First of such provisions is Section 6 of
the Act which deals with intended acquisition. The explanation
to Section 6 of the Act says that "In computing any of the c
periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which
any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the
notification issued under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order
of a Court shall be excluded."

3. Section 11 of the Act deals with enquiry and award by D
• -i
Collector. It says that -

"On the day so fixed, or any other day to which the enquiry
has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire
into the objections (if any) which any person interested has E
stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the
measurements made under section 8, and into the value
of the land and at the date of the publication of the
notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and into the
-· respective interests of the persons claiming the
compensation and shall make an award under his
F

hand ................................. "

4. Next comes the most relevant provision of the Act for
the purpose of this case i.e. Section 11A of the Act which deals
with the period within which an award shall be made. It says G
that "The Collector shall make an award under Section 11
•-" within a period of two years from the date of the publication of
the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the
entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse,
provided that in a case where the said declaration has been H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition ~ ...
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68of1984), the award shall be made
within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred
to in this section, the period during which any action or ,
B proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration
is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded."

5. As noted herein earlier, Mr.V.Krishnamurthy, learned
! t
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that
in view of the admitted fact that the limited order of stay granted
c by the High Court in the two writ petitions was not extended by
it, the award which was passed had lapsed after the expiry of
period of two years from the date o{ publication of the
declaration, therefore, it must be held that the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the acquired lands had
D lapsed and, accordingly, the acquired lands of the appellants
must be restored to them. In this connection, Mr.Krishnamurthy ••
had drawn our attention to the admitted fact that the notification
under Section 6 of the Act was published in the official gazette
on 23rd of December, 1987 and the limited interim order of stay
E was granted by the High Court on 11th of February, 1988 and
on 3rd of July, 1991, an order of stay of dispossession was
passed in favour of the appellants and thereafter finally the
award was passed on 23rd of August, 1993. From the above

F
facts, according to Mr.Krishnamurthy, it would be clear that
admittedly the period of 2 years from the date of publication of
..
the declaration under Section 6 of the Act i.e. 23rd of
December, 1987 had lapsed before the date of award i.e. 23rd
of August, 1993 although a limited order of stay for four weeks
was granted which was not extended by any order of extension.
G In support of this contention, Mr.Krishnamurthy placed strong
reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar
and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Another2007 (3) SCC 470. . ...
6. As noted herein earlier, Mr.Viduthalai, the learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that
H
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 389
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
-> ~
on a perusal of the orders passed by the High Court on the A
question of grant of order of stay, it would be evident that the
parties had proceeded all along on the basis that the interim
order of stay granted for a limited period had continued upto
the stage when the interim order of stay was made absolute
on the same terms and further in view of the findings of the High B
Court that both the parties proceeded on the basis that the
interim order of stay was continuing all through, it must be held
... • that the time during which the interim order of stay was
continuing i.e. from 11th of February, 1988 to 3rd of July, 1991
must be excluded from the calculation of the period within the c
meaning of explanation to Section 11A of the Act and if this
time is excluded, the award which was passed on 23rd of
August, 1993 was well within time and, therefore, the High Court
was fully justified in concluding that the question of holding that
since the award was passed beyond the period of 2 years from D
• A the date of declaration, the entire acquisition proceedings must
be held to have lapsed, does not arise at all. In support of this
submission, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents has relied on two decisions of this Court namely
Bailamma (Smt.) Alias Doddabailamma and others Vs. E
Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and
others 2006 (2) SCC 416 and Yusufbhai Noormohamed
Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat and another 1991 (4) SCC
_., 531. Accordingly, Mr.Viduthalai, learned senior counsel for the
respondents has submitted that there is no reason to interfere
F
with the orders of the High Court holding that the respondents
were entitled to exclude the period in terms of the explanation
to Section 11 A of the Act.

7. We have carefully examined the rival submissions of the
learned senior counsel for the parties. We have also examined G
the impugned order of the High Court as well as the relevant
~" provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 6 and 11A with its
explanation, as noted herein earlier. From a perusal of the
aforesaid provisions, it would be evident that the two years from
the date of declaration must be computed after excluding the H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

~ ~

A period when parties had approached the court and obtained
interim stay of such acquisition notices. As noted herein earlier,
at the time of admission of the writ petitions, the following
interim order was passed on 11th of February 1988 :-

"Interim stay for four weeks. Notice returnable in four
B
weeks"

8. Subsequent to the passing of this interim order, it is true
that the interim order was not extended by any further order of
; ...
the Court. However, the parties thought that the interim order
c was continuing. Keeping that in mind, the State/respondents
filed an application for vacating the interim order dated 11th of
February, 1988 granted by the Court.
9. On 3rd of July, 1991, on the said application for vacating
D the interim order filed at the instance of the State/respondents,
the High Court passed the following order:- ~ .
"These petitions coming on for hearing upon perusing the
petitions and the respective affidavits filed in support of
W.P. Nos. 835 and 836/88 on the file of the High Court
E and the order of this Court dated 11.02.88 and made in
W. M.P. Nos. 1248 and 1249 of 1988 and the counter
affidavits filed herein and upon hearing the arguments of
Mr. N. Chinnu, Advocate for the petitioners in W.M.P. Nos.
1248 and 1249/88 and for the respective respondents in )c.

F W. M. P. Nos. 11986 and 11987/90 and Mrs. M. Gomathi,
Govt. Advocate (Writs) on behalf of the respondents in
W.M.P. Nos. 1248 and 1249/90 and for the petit:oners in
W.M.P. Nos. 11986 and 11987of1990, it is 0~...iered; that
the dispossession of the petitionsers (in W.M.P. Nos.
G 1248 and 1249190) of tfieir lands alone in (1) Survey No.
99/3A, an extent of 1.34 acres of Ayothipatnam Village,
Sa/em Ta/uk, Salem District (in W.M.P. Nos. 1248188) 1.,
and (2) 1-37 acres in Survey Nos. 9813 and 9814,
Ayothiapatnam Village, Sa/em District in W.M.P. No.
H 1249188 respectively pursuant to the Section 4(1)
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 391
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

Notification in G. 0. Ms. No. 3320, Social Welfare, dated A
24.12.1986, on the file of the first respondent in both the
petitions, and published at page 21 of the Parl-11 Section
- 2 Supplement to Tamil Nadu Govt. Gazette Issue No.
1C, dated 07.01.1987, and Section-6 Declaration in G.O.
Ns. No. 2532, Social Welfare, dated 08.12.1987, and B
published at pages 23 and 24 of part-fl Section 2
:,. Supplement to Tamil Nadu Govt. Gazette issue No. 49-
C, dated 23.12.1987, in so far as they relate to the lands
of the petitioners in each of the petitions be and hereby
are stayed pending further orders on this petition." C
(Emphasis supplied)

10. As noted herein earlier, c:t the instance of the
appellants, the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act
and the declaration under Section 6 initially were stayed for four 0
• A weeks on 11th of February, 1988, but the Interlocutory
Applications remained pending for final disposal and finally on
the applications to vacate the stay order at the instance of the
State/respondents, the applications to vacate the stay were
disposed of, as noted herein earlier by an order which clearly E
shows that the order of stay granted initially for four weeks would
continue pending further orders. From a perusal of the
aforesaid interim order of the High Court passed on 3rd of July,
1991, it is, therefore, evident that there was an order of
- ~ prohibition from dispossessing the appellants from the acquired
lands pending further orders. F

11. In view of our discussions made herein above and
considering the nature of interim order of stay passed by the
High Court finally on 3rd of July, 1991, it is abundantly clear that
both the parties proceeded on the basis that the interim order G
• ~ of stay had been continuing and the respondents were
.._ i prohibited from dispossessing the appellants from the acquired
lands pending .further orders. If that was not the case, the
question of filing an application for vacating the order of stay
granted in favour of the appellants could not arise at all and H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A there was no occasion for the appellants to contest the
application for vacating the stay order on the basis that the
interim order of stay was continuing and should be allowed to
continue. That apart, it may be stated that although initially the
interim order was passed for four weeks, the same interim
a order which was granted initially was made final until further
orders on 3rd of July, 1991. From the above narration of facts,
it must be held that no steps could be taken in view of the
pending applications for grant of interim order and in view of '
the interim order granted pending further orders. Therefore, it
C cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due
to expiry of two years from the date of publication of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to the acquired
lands.

12. In Yusufbhai Noormohamed's case (supra) at para 8,
D this Court observed as under:-

"The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and,
in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or
proceeding referred to in the Explanation to actions or
E proceedings preceding the making of the award under
Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by
the learned Single Judge himself where the case is
covered by Section17, the possession can be taken

F
before an award is made and we see no reason why the
aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given
.-
a different meaning depending upon whether the case is
covered by Section17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it
appears to us that Section11-A is intended to 1i!'n1t the
benefit conferred on a land holder whose land is acquired
after the declaration under Section 6 is made to in cases
G
covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award
must be made within a period of two years of the ~ ~
declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings
would lapse and the land would revert to the /and-holder.
In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is
H
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 393
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

-. required, is that the /and-holder who seeks the benefit A
must not have obtained any order from a court restraining
any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration
under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation
covers only the cases of those /and-holders who do not
obtain any order from a court which would delay or B
prevent the making of the award or taking possession of
the land acquired.
->
• (emphasis supplied)

13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear c
that the explanation to Section 11A of the Act is intended to
confer a benefit on the land holder, whose land is acquired after
the declaration under Section 6 is made. By the provision of
Section 11A, the State authorities are required to pass a final
award within two years from the date of publication of D
. ~
declaration under Section 6 of the Act failing which, the
acquisition proceedings would lapse, and it would clearly show
the intention of the legislature that the benefit of this provision
would be in favour of the land owner if the award could not be
passed within two years from the date of declaration when no E
order was obtained by the land owner from the Court staying
the acquisition and the land would revert back to the land owner
because of expiry of the period of two years from the date of
declaration or notification within the meaning of Section 11A
-,. of the Act. As noted herein earlier, initially the interim order of F
stay was granted staying the notifications for four weeks, but
from the record and the conduct of both the parties and after
considering the fact that the State/respondents had to file an
application for vacating the stay order thinking that stay order
was continuing and the appellants having contested the said G
application for stay till the disposal of the same, there cannot
be any doubt in our mind that both the parties proceeded on
........ -t the basis that the interim order of stay passed initially for four
weeks continued till the final order of interim stay passed by
the High Court on the application for vaca_ting the interim order
H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A of stay.

14. Such being the stand taken by us, we are, therefore,
t
-
of the view that the award was passed in accordance with
Section 11A of the Act, that is to say, the award was passed
within two years from the date of publication of declaration under
B
Section 6 of the Act.

15. There is another aspect of the matter. The purpose for
which the Land Acquisition Act was amended and Section 11A
-< "
was enacted, was to prevent inordinate delay being caused by
c the Land Acquisition Officer in making an award which deprived
the land owners of their enjoyment of their land or dealt with the
land whose possession was already taken. The delay in making
the award subjected the owner of the land to untold hardship.
The objects and reasons for introducing Section 11A into the
D Act were that "the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long
periods often causes hardship to the affected parties and
renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them"
and "it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from
. ~

the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the
E Act within which the Collector should make his award under the
Act". By the introduction of this explanation and Section 11 A
of the Act, the Legislature intended to emphasize that the
Collector shall make his award under the Act within two years
from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of
F the Act, failing which the acquisition proceeding itself shall .. -
lapse. In this connection, reliance can be made to a decision
of this Court in Bailamma (supra) as noted herein earlier. In
this decision, this Court had considered the effect of the
amendment of the Act introducing Section 11A with explanation
and observed in this connection as follows :
G
"This Court emphasized the fact that Section 11-A was
enacted with a view to prevent inordinate delay being
made by Land Acquisition Officer in making the award I; .. ~

which deprived owners of the enjoyment of the property or
H to deal with the land whose possession has already been
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 395
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]

- +
taken Delay in making the award subjected the owner of A·
the land to untold hardship. The objects and reasons for
introducing Section 11-A into the Act were that "the
pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often
causes hardship to the affected parties and renders
unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them" and B
"it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from
the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6
of the Act within which the Collector should make his
.., • award under the Act". The emphasis, therefore, was on the
Collector making his award within the period prescribed. c
However, the legislature was also aware of the reality of
the situation and was not oblivious of the fact that in many
cases acquisition proceedings were stalled by stay orders
obtained from courts of law by interested parties. It,
therefore, became imperative that in computing the period
D
of two years, the period during which an order of stay
... operated, which prevented the authorities from taking any
action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration, must
be excluded. If such a provision was not made, an
acquisition proceeding could be easily defeated by
obtaining an order of stay and prolonging the litigation E
thereafter. Explanation to Section 11-A was meant to deal
with situations of this kind. The explanation is in the widest
possible terms which do not limit its operation to cases

-- . where an order of stay is obtained by a land-owner alone.
One can conceive of cases where apart from land- owners F
others may be interested in stalling the land acquisition
proceeding. It is no doubt true that in most of the reported
decisions the party that obtained the stay order happened
to be the owner of the land acquired. But that will not lead
us to the conclusion that the explanation applied only to G
cases where stay had been obtained by the owners of the
.......
~
land. There may be others who may be interested in
obtaining an order of stay being aggrieved by the
acquisition proceeding. It may be that on account of
development of that area some persons in the vicinity may H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A be adversely affected, or it may be for any other reason
that persons in the locality are adversely affected by the
project for which acquisition is being made. One can
+
-
imagine many instances in which a person other than the
owner may be interested in defeating the acquisition
B proceeding. Once an order of stay is obtained and the
Government and the Collector are prevented from taking
any further action pursuant to the declaration, they cannot

c
be faulted for the delay, and therefore, the period during
which the order of stay operates must be excluded. In a
sense, operation of the order of stay provides a justification
for the delay in taking further steps in the acquisition
-
proceeding for which the authorities are not to blame."

16. Following the principles laid down and the observations
made by this Court in the aforesaid decision, with which we are
D in respectful agreement, we are, therefore, of the view that the
State/respondent was entitled to exclude the period mentioned
herein earlier and that it must also be held that if such period
. ~

is excluded the period of two years from the date of declaration
under Section 6 of the Act before the award is passed would
E not expire and accordingly, the question of holding that the
entire acquisition proceeding shall lapse, cannot arise at all.
17. Before we part with this judgment, we may deal with
the decision of this Court as relied on by the learned senior
F counsel for the appellants in Ashok Kumar's case (supra). In ~~-

our view, this decision stands on a different footing. In that
decision, it is true that the interim order of injunction was
passed but not extended whereas in the present case
admittedly the interim order which was granted by the court for
a limited period was extended till further orders by an order
G
dated 3rd of July, 1991 which was passed on the application·
for vacating the order of stay filed by the State/respondents .
Such being the position and in view of our discussions made
.......
........
herein above, therefore, the appellants having taken advantage
of an order passed by the High Court during the pendency of
H
R. KOLANDAIVELU & ORS. v. GOVT. OF TAMIL 397
NADU & ANR. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
the writ petition which was sought to be vacated by the State/ A
respondents by filing an application for vacating the stay order,
it must be concluded that the award was passed within two
years from the date of publication of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act and the respondents were entitled to
exclude the period from 11th of February, 1988 to 3rd of July, B
1991 and, therefore, if this period is excluded as enshrined in
the explanation to Section 11A of the Act, the award was within
time and, therefore, the question of holding that the acquisition
proceeding must lapse because of expiry of the said period,
cannot arise at all. No other submissions were advanced by c
the learned counsel for the parties.

18. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any reason
to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court
and accordingly the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order
as to costs. D

·- ' D.G. Appeal dismissed.