Holding

An advocate has no lien over a client’s case files, and withholding those files for fee recovery constitutes professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.

Summary

The appellant, a senior advocate and former legal advisor to a cooperative bank, refused to return the bank's case files after the retainership was terminated, demanding payment of alleged fees of Rs. 97,100. The bank filed a complaint before the State Bar Council, which was transferred to the Bar Council of India; the disciplinary committee found the advocate guilty of professional misconduct, imposed an 18‑month debarment and a Rs.1,000 fine. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether an advocate can claim a lien over litigation papers under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act and whether withholding such papers constitutes misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act. The Court held that case files are not "goods" capable of being bailed and that no statutory lien exists on them; consequently, retaining the files to secure fees is professional misconduct. While affirming the misconduct, the Court reduced the punishment to a reprimand, noting the lack of precedent and the appellant's bona‑fide belief in a lien, and ordered the appeal disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether an advocate has a lien over litigation files retained by him for unpaid fees.
Whether case files can be treated as "goods" under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act.
Whether refusal to return case files amounts to professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act.
Whether the constitutional right under Article 22(1) to choose counsel precludes an advocate from withholding files.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 35
Bar Council of India Ruless. Rule 24, s. Rule 28, s. Rule 29
Code of Civil Procedures. Order 3, Rule 4(1)
Constitution of Indias. Article 22(1)
Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 148, s. 171
Sale of Goods Act, 1930s. Section 2(7)

Subjects

professional misconductadvocate liencase filesfee recoveryAdvocates ActIndian Contract Actconstitutional right to counselBar Council of India Rulesdebarmentreprimand

Judgment

A R.D.SAXENA
v.
BALRAM PRASAD SHARMA

AUGUST 22, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Advocates Act, 1961-Section 35-Professional misconduct-Case file
of client withheld by Advocate for non-payment offees-Bar Council debarred
him from practice for 18 months and imposed fine of Rs. 1000-Considering
C it to be a professional misconduct-On appeal-Held, case.files cannot be
equated with "goods" or "goods bailed" as they have no marketability-
Cause of litigant far more important than right of an Advocate for his
remuneration-Such a practice can never be permitted-However, an Advo-
cate may adopt alternate legal remedies to recover his fees-It is not only a
legal duty but it is also morally imperative to return the case file as a litigant
D is free to engage any Advocate-Punishment reduced to a reprimand, not to
be counted as precedent, as law on this question was unsettled-Indian
Contract Act, 1872-Sections 148 and 171.

Constitution of India-Article 22( 1)-The right of an accused to consult
and be defended by counsel of his choice-Given status of a fundamental
E right-Code of Civil Procedure-Order 3, Rule 4( I).

Bar Council of India Rules-Rules 24, 28 and 29-Advocate specifically
prohibited from adjusting his fees against his own personal liability to the
client-No lien provided on the litigation files kept with the advocate-Any
such lien, if permitted, would be susceptible to great abuses and exploitation.
F
Words and Phrases-" Misconduct, professional or otherwise"-Mean-
ing of in the context of the Advocates Act, 196I-Section 35.

Appellant was Legal Advisor of a Bank, which requested him to
return all the case files after termination of his retainership. He informed
G the Bank that Rs. 91,700 was due towards his fees and that the files would
be returned only after it was settled. The dispute remained unresolved. So
a complaint was filed before the State Bar Council. Appellant submitted
that he had a right to retain the files by exercising his right of lien and
offered to return the files as soon as payment was made. The proceedings
H were transferred to Bar Council of India whose Disciplinary Committee
598
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA 599
held the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and debarred him A
from practice for a period of 18 months and imposed a fine of Rs. 1000.
Hence this appeal.

Appellant contended that the Bar Council of India did not appreci-
ate that he had a lien over his client's file in lieu of his unpaid fees, and
that the files could be equated with the "goods" referred to in Section 171 B
of the Indian Contract Act.

Respondent contended that there was no amount payable and an
inflated amounlhad be shown as fees; that an Advocate cannot retain the
files after the client terminated his engagement and that there is no lien on
such files.
c
Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD : Per Thomas, J. :

1. Files containing copies of the records cannot be equated with D
"goods" referred to in section 171 of the Indian Contract Act The advo-
cate keeping the files cannot amount to "goods bailed". In the case of
litigation papers in the hands of an Advocate there is neither delivery of
goods nor any contract that they shall be returned or otherwise disposed
of. The word "goods" mentioned in Section 171 is to be understood in the
E
sense in which that word is defined in the Sale of Goods Act. "Goods" to
fall within the purview of Section 171 of the Contract Act should have
marketability and the person to whom it is bailed should be in a position to
dispose it of in consideration of money. There is no scope for converting
the case files into money, nor can they be sold to any third party.[606-E-H]
F
2. Before India attained independence different High Courts in India
had adopted different views regarding the question whether an Advocate
has a lien over the litigation files kept with him. After independence, when
the new Bar Council of India came into existence it framed Rules called the
Bar Council of India Rules as empowered by the Advocates Act and
contain provisions specifically prohibiting an Advocate from adjusting the G
fees payable to him by a client against his own personal liability to the
client. These rules, even after providing a right for an Advocate to deduct
the fees. out of any money of the client remaining in his hand at the
termination of the proceeding for which the Advocate was engaged, pro-
vides no lien on the litigation files kept with him. In the conditions prevail- H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A ing in India with lots of illiterate people among the litigant public it may
not be advisable also to permit the counsel to retain the case bundle for the
fees claimed by him. Any such lien, if permitted, would become susceptible
to great abuses and exploitation. [607-E; 608-A-B; F]

P. Krishnamachariar v. The Official Assignee of Madras, A.I.R. (1932)
B Madras 256; Tyabji Dayabhai & Co. v. Jetha Devji & Co., A.I.R. (1927)
Bombay 542; In re B.N. Advocate Jn the Matter of Misc. Judi. Case No. J8133
A.I.R. (1933) Pat. 571, referred to.

Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 44, para 226, referred to.

C 3. The cause in a court/tribunal is far more important for all con-
cerned than the right of the legal practitioner for his remuneration in
respect of the services rendered for espousing the cause on behalf of the
litigant. If a need arises for the litigant to change his counsel pendente lite,
that which is more important should have its even course flowed unimpeded.
D Retention of records for the unpaid remuneration of the Advocate would
impede such course and the cause pending judicial disposal would be badly
impaired. No professional can be given the right to withhold the returnable
records relating to the work done by him with his client's matter on the
strength of any claim for unpaid remuneration. The alternative is that the
professional concerned can resort to other legal remedies for such unpaid
E remuneration. [608-G-H; 609-A-B]

4. A litigant must have the freedom to change his Advocate when he
feels that the Advocate engaged by him is not capable of espousing his
cause efficiently or that his conduct is prejudicial to the interest involved in
the tis, or for any other reason. For whatever reason, if a client does not
F
want to continue the engagement of a particular Advocate it would be a
professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that
he should return the brief to the client. Such an obligation is not only a
legal duty but a moral imperative. [609-C·D]

G State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam and Ors., A.I.R. (1966) SC
1910, relied on.

5. If a party terminates the engagement of an Advocate before the
culmination of the proceedings that party must have the entire file with
him to engage another Advocate. But if the Advocate who is changed
H midway adopts the stand that he would not return the file until the fees
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA 601
claimed by him are paid, the situation may turn to dangerous proportions. A
There may be cases when a party has no resource to pay the huge amount
claimed by the Advocate as his remuneration. A party in a litigation may
have a version that he has already paid for the legitimate fee to the
Advocate. At any rate if the litigation is pending the party has the right to
get the papers from the Advocate whom he has changed so that the new
B
counsel can be briefed by him effectively. In either case it is impermissible
for the erstwhile counsel to retain the case bundle on the premise that fees
is yet to be paid. [609-G-H; 610-A-B]

6. Even if there is no lien on the litigation papers of his client an
Advocate is not without remedies to realise the fee which he is legitimately c
entitled to. But if he has a duty to return the files to his client on being
discharged the litigant too has a right to have the files returned to him,
more so when the remaining part of the lis has to be fought in the court.
This right of the litigant is to be read as the corresponding counterpart of
the professional duty of the Advocate. [610-C]
n-
7. Misconduct envisaged in Section 35 of the Advocates Act is not
defined. The section uses the expression "misconduct, professional or oth-
erwise". The word "misconduct" is a relative term. It has to be considered
with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein such term
occurs. It literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. [610-D] E

Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 7, page 740, referred to.

In re A Solicitor ex parte the Law Society [1912] 1 KB 302 and George
Frier Grahame v. Attorney-General, Fiji, [1936] PC 224, referred to.
F
8. The refusal to return the files to the client when he demanded the
same amounts to misconduct under Section 35 of the Act and the appellant
is liable to punishment. Two broad aspects have to be considered regarding
quantum of punishment (1) this court has not pronounced, so far, on the
question whether Advocate has a lien on the files for his fees. (2) the
G:
appellant would have bona fide believed, in the light of decisions of certain
High Courts, that he did have a lien. In such circumstances, it is not
necessary to inflict a harsh punishment and a reprimand would be suffi-
cient in the interest of justice on the special facts of this case. It is made
clear that if any Advocate commits this type of professional misconduct in
future he would be liable to such quantum of punishment as the Bar H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Council would determine and the lesser punishment imposed now need not
be counted as a precedent. (611-B-D]

9. In Civil cases under Order 3, Rule 4 (1) CPC the appointment of an
Advocate by a party would be deemed to be in force until it is determined
with the leave of the court. In criminal cases, every person accused of an
B offence has the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his
choice which is now made a fundamental right under Article 22(1) of the
Constitution. The said right is absolute in itself and it does not depend on
other laws. The words "of his choice" in Article 22(1) indicate that the right
of the accused to change an Advocate whom he once engaged in the same
c case cannot be whittled down by that advocate by withholding the case bundle
on the premise that he has to get the fees for the services already rendered to
the client. (609-E-F]

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam and Ors., AIR (1966) SC 1910,
relied on.
D
Per Sethi, J. (Supplementing) :

1. While dealing with the moneys or any other article or document
entrusted, an Advocate is expected to always keep in mind the high standards
of profession and its values adopted and practiced for centuries. 'Professional
E
obligations' of a lawyer are distinguished from the 'business commitments'
followed by trading community. The legal profession owes social obligations
to the society in discharge of the professional service to the litigants. (611-G]

2. Even under the common law uo lien can be claimed with respect to
F the case file and such documents which are necessary for the further progress
of the tis filed in the Court. Even in England the right of retention has been
much diluted by various exceptions created by decisions, chiefly by the courts
of equity on the basis of what may be just and equitable as between the
parties with conflicting interests. [614-G-H]
G Cordery "OnSocilitors" 7th Edition; Halsbury's Laws ofEngland. Volume
44( J), 1995 Edition Law (If lien by A(fred H. Silver town; Professional Practice
Handbook, Young Lawyers Section, law Institute of Victoria 1982, referred
to.

H Barratt v. Gough-Thomas, [1950] 2 All. ER 1048, referred to.
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA 603
3. In modern India, the rights of an Advocate to appear in conrt are A
referable to his enrolment as such under the Statute governing the enrol-
ment. The lawyer's rights, obligations and disabilities are governed either
by the contract or by the Statute. He has the right to sue his client for his
fees, if not paid, like any other professional. The rights and obligations of
an Advocate ought to be regulated by keeping the high standards and
B
exalted position of the profession by not treating the lawyers as ordinary
merchants. Reference to "goods" in Section 171 of the Contract Act can-
not, by any imagination, be stretched to mean the case papers, entitling
their retention by the lawyer as his lien for the purposes of releasing his
fee. It cannot be said that the case papers entrusted by the client to his
counsel are goods in his hand upon which he can claim a retaining lien till c
his fee or other charges incurred are not paid. [615-E-F]

Union of India & Anr. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., A.I.R.
(1963) SC 791; Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta-Iv. Mis EllSlend Paper
Industries Ltd., [1989] 4 SCC 244; 'G' a Senior Advocate of the Supreme D
Court A.I.R. (1954) SC 557; In re M. an advocate A.I.R. (1957) SC 149,
relied on.

Bailey's Large Dictionary of 1732, referred to.

4. In our country, it is a social duty cast upon the legal profession to E
show the people beckon light by their conduct and actions. The poor, un-
educated and exploited mass of the people need a helping hand from the
legal profession, admittedly, acknowledged as a most respectable profes-
sion. No effort should be made or allowed to be made by which a litigant
could be deprived of his rights, statutory as well as constitutional, by an F
Advocate only on account of the exalted position conferred upon him under
the judicial system prevalent in the country. It is true that an Advocate is
.. competent to settle the terms of his engagement and his fee by private agree-
ment with his client but it is equally true that if such fee is not paid he has no
right to retain the case papers and other documents belonging to his client.
Like any other citizen, an Advocate has a right to recover the fee or other G
amounts payable to him by the litigant by way of legal proceedings but
subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by law or the rules made in
that behalf. It is high time for the legal profession to join hands and evolve
a Code for themselves in addition to the mandate of the Advocates Act,
Rules made thereunder and the Rules made by various High Courts and H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A this Court, for strengthening the belief of the common man in the institu-
tion of judiciary in general and in their profession in particular. Creation of
such a faith and confidence would not only strengthen the rule of Jaw but
also result in reaching excellence in the profession. [617-D-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1938 of 2000.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 24. 7.99 of the Disciplinary Com-
mittee of the Bar Council of India, New Delhi in BCI.T.RC. No. 21 of 1996.

WITH

C Contempt Petition (C) No. 147 of 2000.

R.K. Virmani for the Appellant.

R.K. Munjral, Sushil Kr. Jain and Ms. Pratibha Jain for the Respondent.

Th<: Judgments of the Court were delivered by
D
THOMAS, J. The main issue posed in this appeal has sequential impor-
tance for members of the legal profession. The issue is this: Has the advocate
a lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his client? In this
case the Bar Council of India, without deciding the above crucial issue, has
E chosen to impose punishment on a delinquent advocate debarring him from
practicing for a period of 18 months and a fine of Rs.1000. The advocate
concerned was further directed to return all the case bundles which he got from
his client - respondent - without any delay. This appeal is filed by the said
advocate under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

F As the question involved in this appeal has topical importance for the
legal profession we heard learned counsel at length. To appreciate the conten-
tions we would present the factual backdrop as under:

Appellant, now a septuagenarian, has been practicing as an advocate
mostly in the courts at Bhopal, after enrolling himself as a legal practitioner
G with the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh. According to him, he was
appointed as legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd.
('Bank', for short) in 1990 and the Bank continued to retain him in that capacity
during the succeeding years. He was also engaged by the said Bank to conduct
cases in which the Bank was a party. However, the said retainership did not
H last long. On 17.7.1993 the Bank terminated the retainership of the appellant
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [THOMAS, J.] 605
and requested him to return all the case files relating to the Bank. Instead of A
returning the files the appellant forwarded a consolidated bill to the Bank
showing an amount of Rs. 97, 100 as the balance payable by the Bank towards
the legal remuneration to which he is entitled. He informed the Bank that the
files would be returned only after settling his dues.

Correspondence went on between the appellant and the Bank regarding B
the amount, if any, payable to the appellant as the balance due to him. Respond-
ent Bank disclaimed any liability outstanding from them to the appellant.
The dispute remained unresolved and the case bundles never passed
from appellant's hands. As the cases were pending the Bank was anxious
to have the files for continuing the proceedings before the courts/tribunals c
concerned. At the same time the Bank was not disposed to capitulate to the
terms dictated by the appellant which they regarded as grossly unreasonable.
A complaint was hence filed by the Managing Director of the Bank, before the
State Bar Council (Madhya Pradesh) on 3.2.1994. It was alleged in the com-
plaint that appellant is guilty of professional misconduct by not returning the
files to his client. D

In the reply which the appellant submitted before the Bar Council he
admitted that the files were not returned but claimed that he has a right to retain
such files by exercising his right of lien and offered to return the files as soon
as payment is made to him. E

The complaint was then forwarded to the Disciplinary Committee of the
District Bar Council. The State Bar Council failed to dispose of the complaint
even after the expiry of one year. So under Section 36-B of the Advocates Act
the proceedings stood transferred to the Bar Council of India. After holding
inquiry the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India reached the F
conclusion that appellant is guilty of professional misconduct. The Disciplinary
Committee has stated the following in the impugned order:

"On the basis of the complaint as well as the documents available on
record we are of the opinion that the Respondent is guilty of profes-
sional misconduct and thereby he is liable for punishment. The com- G
plainant is a public institution. It was the duty of the Respondent to
return the briefs to the Bank and also to appear before the committee
to revert his allegations made in application dated 8.11.95. No such
attempt was made by him."

In this appeal learned counsel for the appellant contended that the failure H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A of the Bar Council of India to consider the singular defence set up by the
appellant i.e. he has a lien over the files for his unpaid fees due to him, has
resulted in miscarriage of justice. The Bank contended tha< there was no fee
payable to the appellant and the amount shown by him was on account of
inflating the fees. Alternatively, tlie respondent contended that an advocate
cannot retain the files after the client terminated his engagement and that there
B
is no lien on such files.

We would first examine whether an advocate has lien on the files en-
trusted to him by the client. Learned· counsel for the appellant endeavoured to
base his contention on Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act which reads thus:
c "Bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-
brokers ma)', in the absence of a contract to the contrary, retain, as a
security for a general balance of account, any goods bailed to them;
but no other persons have a right to retain, as a security for such
balance, goods bailed to them, unless there is an express contract to
D that effect."

Files containing copies of the records (perhaps some original documents
also) cannot be equated with the "goods" referred to in the section. The
advocate keeping the files cannot amount to "goods bailed" .. The word "bail-
ment" is defined in Section 148 of the Contract Act as the delivery of goods
E by one person to another for some purpose, npon a contract that they shall be
returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person
delivering them, when the puipose is accomplished. In the case of litigation
p:tpers in the hands of the advocate there is neither delivery of goods nor any
contract that they shall be returned or otherwise disposed of. That apart, the
F word "goods" mentioned in Section 171 is to be understood in the sense in
which that word is defined in the Sale of Goods Act. It must be remembered
that Chapter-VII of the Contract Act, comprising sections 76 to 123, had been
whoUy replaced by the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The word "goods" is defined
in Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act as "every kind of movable property
other than actionable claims and money; and includes stock and shares, grow-
G
ing crops, grass, and things attached, to or forming part of the land which are.
agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale."

Thus understood "goods" Jo fall within the purview of Section 171 of
the Contract Act should have marketability and the person to whom iUs bailed
H should be in a position to dispose it of in consideration of money. In other
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [THOMAS, J.] 607
words the goods referred to in Section 171 of the Contract Act are saleable A
goods. There is no scope for converting the case files into money, nor can they
be sold to any third party. Hence, the reliance placed on Section 171 of the
Contract Act has no merit.

In England the solicitor had a right to retain any deed, paper or chattel
which has come into his possession during the course of his employment. It B
was the position in common law and it later recognized as the solicitor's right
under Solicitors Act, 1860. In Halsbury's Laws of England, it is stated thus
(vi de paragraph 226 in volume 44 ):

"226. Solicitor's rights. At common law a solicitor has two rights
which are termed liens. The first is a right to retain property already
c
in his possession until he is paid costs due to him in his professional
capacity, and the second is a right to ask the court to direct that personal
property recovered under a judgment obtained by his exertions stand
as security for his costs of such recovery. In addition, a solicitor has
by statute a right to apply to the court for a charging order on property D
recovered or preserved through his instrumentality in respect of his
taxed costs of the suit, matter or proceeding prosecuted or defended
by him."

Before India attained independence different High Courts in India had
'E .
adopted different views regarding the question whether an advocate has a lien
over the litigation files kept with him. In P. Krishnamachariar v. The Official
Assignee of Madras, AIR ( 1932) Madras 256, a Division Bench held that an
advocate could not have such a lien unless there was an express agreement to
the contrary. The Division Bench has distinguished an earlier decision of the
Bombay High Court in Tyabji Dayabhai & Co. v. Jetha Devji & Co., AIR F
(1927) Bombay 542, wherein the English law relating to the solicitors lien was
followed. Subsequently, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 1943
followed the decision of the Division Bench. A Full Bench of the Patna High
Court in In re B.N. Advocate in the matter of Misc. Judi. Case No.18133 AIR
(1933) Pat 571, held the view that an advocate could not claim a right to retain
G
the certified copy of the judgment _obtained by him on the premise that an
appeal was to be filed against it. Of course the Bench said that if the client had
specifically instructed him to do so it is open to him to keep it.

After independence the position would h~ve continued until the enact-
ment of the Advocates Act, 1961 which has repealed a host of enactments H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A including Indian Bar Council Act. When the new Bar Council of India came
into existence it framed Rules called the Bar Council of India Rules as empow-
ered by the Advocates Act. Such Rules contain provision specifically prohib-
iting an advocate from adjusting the fees payable to him by a client against his
own personal liability to the client. As a rule an Advocate shall not do anything
whereby he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
B
client,(vide Rule 24). In this context' a reference can be made to Rules 28 and
29 which are extracted below:

"28. After the termination of the proceeding, the Advocate shall be at
liberty to appropriate towards the settled fee due to him, any sum
c remaining unexpended out of the amount paid or sent to him for
expenses, or any amount that has come into his hands in that proceed-
ing."

"29. Where the fee has been left unsettled, the Advocate shall be
entitled to deduct, out of any moneys of the client remaining in his
D hands, at the termination of the proceeding for which he had been
engaged, the fee payable under the rules of the Court, in force for the
time being, or by then settled and the balance, if any, shall be refunded
to the client."

Thus, even after providing a right for an advocate to deduct the fees out
E of any money of the client remaining in his hand at the termination of the
proceeding for which the advocate was engaged, it is important to notice that
no lien is provided on the litigation files kept with him. In the conditions
prevailing in India with lots of illiterate people among the litigant public it may
not be advisable also to permit the counsel to retain the case bundle for the fees
F claimed by him. Any such lien if permitted would become susceptible to great
abuses and exploitation.

There is yet another reason which dissuades us from giving approval to
any such lien. We are sure that nobody would dispute the proposition that the
cause in a court/tribunal is far more important for all concerned than the right
G of the legal practitioner for his remuneration in respect of the services rendered
for espousing the cause on behalf of the litigant. If a need arises for the litigant
to change his counsel pendente lite, that which is more important should have
its even course flowed unimpeded. Retention of records for the unpaid remu-
neration of the advocate would impede such course and the cause pending
H judicial disposal would be badly impaired. If a medical practitioner is allowed
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [THOMAS, J.] 609
a legal right to withhold the papers relating to the treatment of his patient which A
he thus far administered to him for securing the unpaid bill, that would lead
to dangerous consequences for the uncured patient who is wanting to change
his doctor. Perhaps the said illustration may be an over-statement as a necessary
corollary for approving the lien claimed by the legal practitioner. Yet the
illustration is not too far-fetched. No professional can be given the right to
B
withhold the returnable records relating to the work done by him with his
client's matter on the strength of any claim for unpaid remuneration. The
alternative is that the professional concerned can resort to other legal remedies
for such unpaid remuneration.

A litigant must have the freedom to change his advocate when he feels c
that the advocate engaged by him is not capable of espousing his cause effi-
ciently or that his conduct is prejudicial to the interest involved in the !is, or
for any other reason. For whatever reason, if a client does not want to continue
the engagement of a particular advocate it would be a professional requirement
consistent with the dignity of the profession that he should return the brief to
th~ :lient. It is time to hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but
D
a moral imperative.

In civil cases, the appointment of an advocate by a party would be
deemed to be in force until it is determined with the leave of the court, (vide
order 3, Rule 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure). In criminal cases, every E
person accused of an offence has the right to consult and be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice which is now made a fundamental right under Article
22(1) of the Constitution. The said right is absolute in itself and it does not
depend on other laws. In this context reference can be made to the decision of
this Court in State o,f Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam and Ors., AIR ( 1966) SC
1910. The words "of his choice" in Article 22(1) indicate that the right of the F
accused to change an advocate whom he once engaged in the same case, cannot
be whittled down by that advocate by withholding the case bundle on the
premise that he has to get the fees for the services already rendered to the client.

If a party terminates the engagement of an advocate before the culmi- G
nation of the proceedings that party must have the entire file with him to engage
another advocate. But if the advocate who is changed midway adopts the stand
that he would not return the file until the fees claimed by him is paid, the
situation perhaps may turn to dangerous proportion. There may be cases when
a party has no resource to pay the huge amount claimed by the advocate as his
remuneration. A party in a litigation may have a version that he has already H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A paid the legitimate fee to the advocate. At any rate if the litigation is pending
the party has the right to get the papers from the advocate whom he has changed
so that the new counsel can be briefed by him effectively. In either case it is
impermissible for the erstwhile counsel to retain the case bundle on the premise
that fees is yet to be paid.

B Even if there is no lien on the litigation papers of his client an advocate
is not without remedies to realise the fee which he is legitimately entitled to.
But if he has a duty to return the files to his client on being discharged the
litigant too has a right to have the files returned to him, more so when the
remaining part of the !is has to be fought in the court. This right of the litigant
C is to be read as the corresponding counterpart of the professional duty of the
advocate.

Misconduct envisaged in Section 35 of the Advocates Act is not defined.
The section uses the expression "misconduct, professional or otherwise". The
word "misconduct" is a relative term. It has to be considered with reference
D to the subject matter and the context wherein such term occurs. It literally
means wrong conduct or improper conduct.

Corpus Juris Secundum, contains the following passage at page 740
(vol.7):

"Professional misconduct may consist in betraying the confidence of
E a client, in attempting by any means to practise a fraud or impose on
or deceive the court or the adverse party or his counsel, and in fact in
any conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or
to alienate the favourable opinion which the public should entertain
concerning it."
F
The expression "professional misconduct" was attempted to be defined
by Darling, J., in In re A Solicitor ex parte the Law Society (1912] I KB 302
in the following terms:

"If it is shown that an Advocate in the pursuit of his profession has
done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded
G
as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good
repute and competency, then it is open to say that he is guilty of
professional misconduct."

In this context it is to be mentioned that the aforesaid definition secured
H approval by the Privy Council in George Frier Grahame v. Attorney-General,
•

R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [SETHI, J.] . 611
Fiji, (1936) PC 224. We are also inclined to take that wide canvass for under- A
standing the import of the expression "misconduct" in the context in which it
is referred to in Section 35 of the Advocates Act. .

We, therefore, hold that the refusal to return the files to the client when
he demanded the same amounted to misconduct under Section 35 of the Act.
Hence, the appellant in the present case is liable to punishment for such B
misconduct.

However, regarding the quantum of punishment we are disposed to take
into account two broad aspects: ( i) this court has not pronounced, so far, on
the question whether advocate has a lien on the files for his fees. (2) the
appellant would have bona fide believed, in the light of decisions of certain c
High Courts, that he did h<;ve a lien. In such circumstances it is not necessary
to inflict a harsh punishment on the appellant. A reprimand would be sufficient
in the interest of justice on the special facts of this case.

We, therefore, alter the punishment to one of reprimanding the appellant.
How~ver, we make it clear that if any advocate commits this type of profes-
D
sional misconduct in future he would be liable to such quantum of punishment
as the Bar Council will determine and the lesser punishment imposed now need
not be counted as a precedent.

Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
E
SETHI, J. I had the privilege of going through the lucid and informative
judgment prepared by my esteemed brother Thomas J. I agree both with the
reasoning and the conclusions. However, realising by the importance of the
issue involved and its implication on the legal profession in relation with
litigant public, I wish to add a few words by my own to this judgment.
F
While dealing with the moneys or any other article or document en-
trusted, an advocate is expected to always keep in mind the high standards of
profession and its values adopted and practiced for centuries. 'Professional
obligations' of a lawyer are distinguished from the 'business commitments'
followed by trading community. The legal profession owes social obligations G
to the society in discharge of the profession services to the litigants. The Bar
Council of India Rules say that :

"An advocate shall, if at all times, compose himself in a manner
befitting his status as an officer of the court, a privileged member of
the community and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be H
0

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar or for
a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be
improper for an advocate."

According to the ancient traditions, the professional services rendered
by the lawyers were honorary and the reward given to him was not a compen-
B sation for discharge of his legal obligations or legal assistance but in the
nature of gratitude in recognition of th~ honorary services rendered by him.
Among the Romans, it was one of the duties, which the patrician as patron
owed to the plebeian to give protection to the latter in his law suits. For those
who rendered legal assistance, Gibbon says in his book "Decline and Fall of
C Roman Empire" :

"On the public days of market, or assembly, the masters of the art were
seen walking in the forum ready to impart the needful advice to the
meanest of their citizens from whose votes on a future occasion they
might solicit a grateful return. As their years and honors increased,
D they seated themselves at home, on a chair or throne, to expect with
patient gravity the visits of their clients, who at the dawn of day, from
the town and country, began to thunder at their doors."

However, with the passage of time professional assistance ceased to be
gratuitous. With the multiplicity of the proceedings, increase in litigation and
E complicacies of law, the legal assistance could not be in the nature of a mere
social obligation and the services rendered as honorary, because a great
deal of time was needed by a lawyer to equip himself with the laws, which
prevented him from earning his livelihood from other sources. The ancient
tradition having ceased to exist, the profession of law could have flourished
F only if those who pursued it were allowed remuneration for the services
rendered.

In England also, a belief existed from the earliest time that the lawyer's
fees is not a compensation to him for discharge of legal obligations but a
gratuity or an honorarium which the client bestowed on him in token of his
G gratitude. The lawyers were considered as an officer of the Court, the tradition
being that the law was an honorary occupation and not a means of livelihood.
Early advocates were generally persons in holy orders who rendered their
services to the weak and afflicted without charge and as an act of pity.

Under common law, the rights of a solicitor are called as liens, which are
H of two types namely: (1) a 'retaining lien', i.e. a right to retain property already
, R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [SETHI, J.] 613
in his possession until he has beeli paid costs due to him in his professional A
character; and a 'lien on property recovered or preserved , i.e., a right to ask
the court to direct that personal property recovered under a judgment obtained
by his exertions stand as security for his costs of such recovery.

According to Cordery "On Solicitors" - Seventh Edition, the retaining
lien is founded on the general law of lien which springs from possession and B
is governed by the same rules as other cases of possessory lien. Per Evershed
MR in Barratt v. Gough-Thomas (1950) 2 All ER 1048 observed :

"It is a right at common law depending (it has been said) upon implied
agreement. It has not the character of an incumbrance or equitable
charge. It is merely passive and possessory - that is to say, the solicitor
c
has no right of actively enforcing his demand. It confers upon him
merely the right to withhold possession of the documents or other
personal property of his client or former client.. .. It is wholly derived
from and therefore co-extensive with the rights of the client to the
documents or other property." D
According to Cordery the property upon which lien can be claimed is
in the form' of deeds, papers or other personal property which comes into
solicitor's possession in the course of his professional employment with the
sanction of the client and/or client's property, such as bill of exchange, appli-
cation of shares, share certificates, a debenture trust deed, a policy of assurance, E
letters of administration or money. After referring to various authorities of
English Courts, the law relating to lien and its retention has been summarised
in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.44(1), 1995 Edition, as under:

"Property affected by retaining lien - The general rule is that the
retaining lien extends to any deed, paper or personal chattel which has
F
come into the solicitor's possession in the course of his employment
and in his capacity as solicitor with the client's sanction and which is
the client's property. The following may thus be subject to a retaining
lien :
G
( l) a bill of exchav ge;
(2) a Cheque;
(3) a policy of assurance;
(4) a share certificate;
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A (5) an application for shares;
(6) a debenture trust deed;
(7) letters patent;
(8) letters of administration;
(9) money, including money in a client account, although only the
B
amount due to the solicitor, and maintenance received by a solicitor if
not subject to an order as to its application or bound to be applied, in
effect, as trust money, or;

(10) documents in a drawer of which the solicitor is given the key.
c The lien does not extend to (a) a client's original will; or (b) a deed
in favour of the solicitor but reserving a life interest and power of
revocation to the client; or (c) original court records; or (d) documents
which did not come into the solicitor's hands in his capacity as solicitor
for the. person against whom the lien is claimed or his successor, but
D as mortgages, steward of a manor or trustee. Moreover, where docu-
ments are delivered to a solicitor for a particular purpose under a
special agreement which does not make express provision for a lien in
favour of the solicitor, as perhaps the raising of money, or money is
paid to the solicitor for a particular purpose so that he becomes a
E trustee of the money, no lien arises over those documents or that money
unless subsequently left in the solicitor's possession for general pur-
poses. Otherwise the lien extends to the property whatever the occa-
sion of delivery, except that where a solicitor acts for both mortgagor
and mortgagee and the mortgage is redeemed the solicitor cannot set
up a lien on the deeds against the mortgagor."
F
It is further stated that such a lien extends only to the solicitor's taxable costs,
charges and expenses incurred on the instructions of the client against whom
the lien is claimed and for which the client is personally liable including the
costs of recovering the remuneration by action or upon a taxation.

G It follows, therefore, that even under the common law no lien can be
claimed with respect to the case file and such documents which are necessary
for the further progress of the !is filed in the court. Even in England the right
of retention has been much diluted by various exceptions created by decisions,
chiefly by the courts of equity on the basis of what fnay be just and equitable
H as between the parties with conflicting interests.
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [SETHI, J.] 615
Alfred H. Silvertown in "The Law of Lien" stated that where documents A
are delivered by a client to a solicitor for a specific purpose, then no lien is
created unless there is an agreement to the contrary. The retaining lien extends
only to the extent of solicitor's taxable costs and expenses arising from the
instructions of the client, for which the client is personally liable. The lien does
not embrace fees and expenses which are due to the solicitor in some other
B
capacity. To attract the solicitor's lien on a document of his client, it has to be
·~
specifically shown that the client had agreed with respect to the creation of lien
upon the document in case of his failure to pay the solicitor's fee.

The "Professional Practice Handbook, Young Lawyers Section, Law
Institute of Victoria 1982" prescribes that it is the duty of a solicitor, when
called upon by his client, to deliver him the documents in his charge. The
c
Solicitor is subject to the ordinary law of bailee of client's papers in his
possession. The bailment is a bailment at will which, depending upon the
circumstances, may be gratituous or for reward. In either case the bailee-
solicitor is under a duty to re-deliver, upon demand, the client's papers cer-
tainly within the period during which a solicitor may be regarded as owing a D
duty not to destroy papers having regard to the limitations of Actions Act,
1958.

In modern India, the rights of an advocate to appear in the Court are
referable to his enrolment as such under the Statute governing the enrolment.
The lawyer's rights, obligations and disabilities are, therefore, governed either
E
by the contract or by the Statute. He has the right to sue his client for his fees,
if not paid, like any other professional. The rights and obligations of an
ad·1ocate ought to be regulated keeping the high standards and exalted position
of the profession by not treating the lawyers as ordinary merchants. Thomas,
1. has very elaborately dealt with and concluded that the provisions of Section F
171 of the Contract Act cannot be pressed into services by an advocate for
retention of documents of his client purportedly in exercise of his lien over such
case-file papers.

Reference to "goods" in Section 171 of the Contract Act cannot, by any
imagination, be stretched to mean the case papers, entitling their retention by G
the lawyer as his lien for the purposes of realising his fee. Besides the meaning
attached to the "goods" under Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, under the
General Law the "goods" have been defined in Bailey's Large Dictionary of
1732 as "merchandise" and by Johnson, who followed as the next lexicogra-
pher, it is defined to be movables in a house; personal or immovable estates; H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A wares, freight, merchandise. Webster defines the word "goods" thus :

"Goods, noun, plural; (1) movables; household furniture; (2) Personal
or movable estate, as horses, cattle, utensils, etc. (3) wares; merchan-
dise; commodities bought and sold by merchants and traders."

B The Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills
Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 791 held that to become "goods" an article must be
something which can ordinarily come to the markets to be bought and sold. In
Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta-I v. Mis. Eastend Paper Industries Ltd.,
[1989) 4 sec 244 it was stated that goods are understood to mean as identi-
fiable articles known in the markets as goods and marketed and marketable in
c the market as such. Where the Act does not define "goods", the legislature
should be presumed to have used that word in its ordinary dictionary meaning
i.e. to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the
market to be bought and sold and is known to the market as such.

D Thus, looking from any angle, it cannot be said that the case papers
entrusted by the client to his counsel are the goods in his hand upon which he
can claim a retaining lien till his fee or other charges incurred are not paid. In
the matter of 'G' a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, AIR (1954) SC 557
this Court observed that it was highly reprehensible for an advocate to stipulate
for or receive a remuneration proportioned to the result of litigation or a claim
E whether in the form of a share in the subject matter, a percentage or otherwise.
An advocate is expected, at all times, to conduct himself in a manner befitting
his status as an officer and gentleman by upholding the high and honourable
profession to whose privilege he has been admitted after his enrolment. If an
advocate departs from the high standards which the profession has set for itself
F and conducts in a manner which is not fair, reasonable and according to law,
he is liable to disciplinary action. In re M.an advocate, AIR (1957) SC 149 this
Court observed :

"As has been laid down by this Court in the matter of 'G' a Senior
Advocate of the Supreme Court (supra) the Court, in dealing with cases
G of professional misconduct is "not concerned with ordinary legal
rights, but with the special and rigid rules of professional conduct
expected of and applied to a specially privileged class of persons who,
because of their privileged status, are subject to certain disabilities
which do not attach to other men and which do not attach even to them
H in a non-professional character.......... he (a legal practitioner) is bound
R.D. SAXENA v. B.P. SHARMA [SETHI, J.] 617
to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable A
profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he
departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself
and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary
action". It appears to us that the fact of there being no specific rules
governing the particular situation, which we are dealing with, on the
B
facts found by us, is not any reason for accepting a less rigid standard.
If any, the absence of rules increases the responsibility of the members
of the profession attached to this Court as to how they should conduct
themselves in such situations, having regard to the very high privilege
that an Advocate of this Court now enjoys as one entitled, under the
law, to practice in all the courts in India." c
In our country, admittedly, a social duty is cast upon the legal profession
to show the people beckon light by their conduct and actions. The poor,
uneducated and exploited mass of the people need a helping hand from the
legal profession, admittedly, acknowledge as a most respectable profession. No
effort should be made or allowed to be made by which a litigant could be D
deprived of his rights, statutory as well as constitutional, by an advocate only
on account of the exalted position conferred upon him under the judicial system
prevalent in the country. It is true that an advocate is competent to settle the
terms of his engagement and his fee by private agreement with his client but
it is equally true that if such fee is not paid he has no right to retain the case E
papers and other documents belonging to his client. Like any other citizen, an
advocate has a right to recover the fee or other amounts payable to him by the
litigant by way of legal proceedings but subject to such restrictions as may be
imposed by law or the rules made in that behalf. It is high time for the legal
profession to join heads and evolve a Code for themselves in addition to the
F
mandate of the Advocates Act, Rules made thereunder and the Rules made by

- various High Courts and this Court, for strengthening the belief of the common
man in the institution of judiciary in general and in their profession in particu-
lar. Creation of such a faith and confidence would not only strengthen the rule
of law but also result in reaching the excellence in the profession.
G
A.Q. Appeal disposed of.