Holding

The initiation of disciplinary proceedings was not bona fide, amounted to victimisation, and was therefore quashed.

Summary

The petitioner, a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, was suspended and subjected to a departmental enquiry by the High Court on allegations of administrative irregularities. The petitioner challenged the initiation of the enquiry, arguing that a prior order by the Chief Justice had already exonerated him and that the new proceedings were mala fide and violated procedural rules. The Supreme Court examined the conduct of the three‑judge committee, finding that the complaints were vague, many were not supported by affidavits as required, and witnesses were selected for their grudges, indicating bias. It held that the Full Court had no authority to overturn the Chief Justice’s earlier decision and that the disciplinary action amounted to victimisation. Consequently, the Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings and ordered costs in favour of the petitioner.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, acting in its administrative capacity, could initiate a departmental enquiry against a judicial officer after a prior exoneration by the Chief Justice.
Whether the Full Court could overrule or recall the earlier decision of the Chief Justice under the Rules of the High Court.
Whether the disciplinary proceedings were initiated mala fide and amounted to victimisation.
Whether the complaints against the petitioner were valid and complied with the requirement of supporting affidavits.
Whether the High Court complied with Rules 14, 15 and 32 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and the constitutional provisions on superintendence of subordinate courts.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 227, s. Article 235, s. Article 32
Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958s. Rule 16
Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952s. Rule 14, s. Rule 15, s. Rule 32

Subjects

service lawdepartmental enquiryjudicial reviewvictimisationbiasadministrative lawsuperintendencehigh courtdisciplinary proceedingsfairnessarbitrariness

Judgment

A R.C. SOOD
v.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT RAJASTHAN

MAY 13, 1998

B [DR. A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

Service Law :

Departmental Enquiry-Complaint against a member of the State Higher
C Judicial Service-Some of the complaints made by persons having grudge
against the officer when he had acted on administrative side-Allegations
were vague and general-Held, such complaints did not merit serious
consideration-Initiation of disciplinary proceedings also not proper.

D
Departmental Enquiry-Judicial Review-Grounds for-High Court,
acting on the administrative side, initiating proceedings against a member
of the State Higher Judicial Service-Writ petition challenging the initiation
of departmental enquiry filed before Supreme Court-Held, the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings amounted to victimisation and therefore quashed-
.. _
Judiciary-Awarding of costs-When justified-Administrative Law-
E Colourable exercise of power-Discussed

Preliminary enquiry preceding the departmental enquiry-Purpose a/-
Held, normally enquiry committees are set up to ascertain facts-However,
on facts of the case, found that the committee was set up for collecting a
menageries of witnesses who had a grudge against the petitioner-Such
p approach criticised by this Court-Report of enquiry committed held to be
biased-Administrative Law-Bias.

Constitution of India:

Articles 235 and 227-Rules of the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan, 1952, Chapter 111, Rules J5(d) to (g) and 32(2)-Superintendence
G of High Court over subordinate courts-Procedure for exercising control-
Reference of Full Court-When not necessary-Complaint against a judicial
officer-Chief Justice got a preliminary enquiry conducted-Genuineness of
. the complaint not established-Thereafter it was decided not. to proceed
against the petitioner-Held, Chief Justice was competent under R. 32(2) to
H take decision at his level-Reference to Full Court could have been necessary
352
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN 353
under R. l 5(d) to (g) only if the Chief Justice was of the view that disciplinary A
action was called for-Reopening of the case subsequently by reference to
Full Court was not justified-More so when the complaint was not supported
by an affidavit as required by Chief Justice's order-However, the question
'whether for good or sufficient reasons the Full Court can ever overrule or
recall an eariier decision of the Chief Justice' kept open Superintendence of B
' High Court over subordinate courts-Procedure for such contra/-
Administrative directions given by the Chief Justice directing that no
cognizance of a complaint against a judicial officer be taken unless it is duly
supported by an affidavit-Full Court took cognizance of the Complaint
ignoring such direction of the Chief Justice-Held, there was no reason why
such order of the Chief Justice should have been ignored-Service law-- C
Departmental Enquiry Article 32-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to enforce
fundamental rights of its citizen-Unfair exercise of Disciplinary power
exercised by High Court on the administrative side against a member of State
Higher Judicial Service-Held : initiation of proceedings was not bona-
fide-Proceedings quashed exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 32-
Service Law-Departmental Enquiry. D
Judiciary-Judicial forum-High Court-Acting on its administrative
- 1
side-Held, fairness and objectivity expected from it even if acting° on its
administrative side-High Court held to be acted in the manner which could
only be termed as arbitrary and unwarranted.
The petitioner had joined the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and
E
w.e.f. 01.07.1989 to 01.02.1994, the petitionet·was posted as Registrar of
High Court. Departmental proceedings were initiated on the ground of a
mistake in inviting applications to fill up the vacancies in the Higher Judicial
Service by way of direct recruitment, there being an error in the publication
of advertisement in mentioning the relevant cut off date as 01.01.1995 p
instead ofOl.01.1994. The Committee of two Judges suggested the matter
be placed before the Chief Justice for taking suitable action who in turn
directed the matter be put up before the Full Court by circulation. The two
judges Committee, constituted by the Full Court on 21.10.1994 resolved that
a departmental enquiry be initiated against the petitioner and he should be
placed under suspension. On 21.10.1994, the High Court suspended the G
petitioner and decided to hold a departmental enquiry. On 24.10.1994, this
. suspension was challenged before this Court by way of a writ petition and
this Court issued a notice on 7.11.1994.

The second set of facts culminating the passing of the second resolution
of the Full Court on 5/6th January, 1995 instituting a regular departmental H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control
& Appeal) Rules, 1958, started on a complaint of one VS received by Justice
Kon or before 27.I0.1994. This complaint had been circulated amongst all
the then Judges of the High Court and in respect of which order was passed
by the then Chief Justice and the matter was closed on 31.01.1994. No
explanation was given as to how Justice K got this complaint when he was
B · transferred to the High Court on 28.04.1994 whereas the complaint of VS
was of September 1993. Suddenly on the High Court record, by way of letter
dated 27..I0.1994, Justice K forwarded this old complaint of VS to the then
Chief Justice. The Chief Justice made an endorsement the same day, showing
the sense of urgency. First Office note was that written on 09.11.I 994 after
C issuance of notice by this Court in the writ petition filed by the petitioner.
The Full Court fixed the matter on 30.11.I 994 after the decision of this
Court in the writ petition filed by the petitioner on 24.l l.1994. Hence this
writ petition.

It was contended by the petitioner that with the passing of the order
D dated 31.01.1994. by the then Chief Justice, the complaint of VS stood
disposed off and the same could not be reopened by the Full Court or the then
Chief Justice of the High Court when there were no attenuating
circumstances by way of fresh evidence or material which would warrant a
fresh look in the matter, and that the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings
E by issuing a charge-sheet because stale and an after thought and thus tainted
with malice and such proceedings were liable to be quashed as being ma/a
fide and malicious in law.

Allowing the writ petition, this Court

F HELD : 1. Normally, enquiry committees are set up in order to ascertain
correct facts. However, there is a situation where a Committee consisting of
a local Judge and two transferred Judges was set up with the local Judge
sitting alone and collecting a menagerie of witnesses who had a grudge
against the petitioner and thus were sure to depose against him. Some of
these witnesses were those who had not sent ~ny complaint against the
G petitioner prior to 30-11-1994 and it is only the local Judge who, wanting
to gather statements against the petitioner, could have known whom to
approach and call for evidence. Of the two transferred Judges who were the
members of the Committee, one never took part in any proceedings when
evidence was recorded yet he signed the report dated 4-1-1995. The other
Transferee Judge is the person who set the ball rolling with his conjuring
H up VS's complaint which had originally been circulated long before his
<>
."(

R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN 355
transfer to Rajasthan. The respondent's counsel was unable to explain as to A
how this complaint was conveniently placed in the hand of Justice K. It is
" evident that there was a deliberate design to bring to a premature end the
·-' judicial career of the petitioner, whose name, at that time, was being actively
considered for elevation as High Court Judge. This is.apparent from the fact
that in the resolutions dated 30-11-1994 and 5-1-1995 it was resolved by the
Full Court that the President of India and the Chief Justice of India should
B
be informed about the holding of the departmental proceedings against the
petitioner. Acting on the basis of the Committee's biased report, the Full
Court continued in a similar vein and proceeded to nail the petitioner by
taking a decision that lacked objectively. Apparently stung by the judgment
dated 22.11.1994 of this Court it retaliated by launching a fresh set of c
charges against the petitioner clearly with a view to ruin his judicial career.
There is no doubt that the action taken by the Court was not bona fide and
amounts to victimisation. This is certainly not expected from a judicial
forum, least of all the High Court, which is expected to discharge its
administrative duties as fairly and objectively as it is required to discharge
its judicial functions. [370-G-H; 371-A-D) D

..... 2.1. Another error, which was committed, was that the Court in its
1 resolution of 30-11-1994 took into consideration the complaint of VS even
though the same was not supported by an affidavit. The Chief Justice had by
his order dated 12-5-1994, decided that no complaint should be entertained
unless it is supported by an affidavit. Though it was an administrative order
E
it was passed by the Chief Justice in exercise of powers conferred on him
by Rule 32(2). There was no reason as to why this order should have been
ignored and the complaint of VS entertained even though it was not supported
by an affidavit. The resolution of 30-11-1994 also states that some of the
r Judges have received fresh complaints against the petitioner making serious F
... charges of corruption. No particulars are indicated as to which complaints
were received by which Judge. It is evident from the wordings of these
minutes that what those complaints were not even known to all the members
of the Full Court when they passed the Resolution on 30-11-1994. There is
no doubt when a valid decision had been taken by the then Chief Justice on
G
31-1-1994 exonerating the petitioner, there was no valid reason in law for
the Full court to revoke that decision. [366-C-E]

. 2.2. There is no material, which could justify the initiation of the
impugned action. The allegations against the petitioner were generally vague
or were such which did not show that the petitioner had committed any
H
356 SUPREME COURT ;{£PORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A irregularity leave alone illegality. For example one of the main allegations
against the petitioner was of his having committed irregularity in obtaining ..
loan for constructing a house. Apart from the fact that this loan was sanctioned
...
by the then Chief Justice, the petitioner has with the assistance of the loan
constructed. the house and is living there and the loan amount already stands
returned. In such circumstances, for the Committee to come to a conclusion
B that the disciplinary proceeding sho11ld be initiated was clearly unwarranted.
[372-E-FJ
3. Apart from the non-judicious manner in which the three-Judge
Committee conducted the enquiry, the sequence of events which bears ,
repetition shows that being piqued with this Court's Judgement quashing the
c first departmental enquiry the High Court, with the few functionaries playing
an active role, left no stone unturned with a view to victimize the petitioner.
The fact that it is only on 30.ll.1994, after the decision of this Court on
22.11.1994, that the Full Court fixed up the matter lends credence to the
petitioner's submission that the dates which appear on record may not be
real. This is more so when none of the documents in the form of complaints
D allegedly received by the Judges bear any endorsement as the receipt of the
same. It is obvious that a copy of complaint of September 1993 of VS was
handed over to Justice K, who was transferred to High Court on 28.04.1994,
'
by some one who was interested in harming the petitioner and thereupon
the second round of action against the petitioner commenced with Justice K
E being made one of the members of the three Judges Committee.
(372-G; 370-D-E[
R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan (1994 [ Supp. 3 SCC 711, relied
on.

4. There is no manner of doubt that there was a complete lack of bona
F fide on the part of the High Court when it decided on 05.01.1995 to institute
disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. On this ground alone the
petitioner is entitled to succeed. [370-F)
5.1. The proceedings of the meeting of the Full Court are normally
supposed to be confidential. How is it then that a number of complaints were
G received against the petitioner at about that time, i.e. 30.11.1994. Some of
the complaints on the file of th!! Three Judges Committee are undated and
it is not known when they were received. On two complaints the date is 26-
11-1994, but they do not have the supporting affidavits. It is, therefore,
possible that these complaints may have been ante-dated specially when none
of these complaints bear an endorsement signifying the date of their receipt.
H The complaint of Mis dated 30-11-1994 but the affidavit supporting is dated
""(
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (KIRPAL, J.] 357
1-12-1994. There is no doubt that all these complaints were procured solely A
with a view to show that apart from the original complaint of VS there were
..t
other complaints against the petitioner which represented new material
justifying fresh enquiry. These complaints, some of them being made by
discredited persons containing vague and general allegations could not be
regarded as fresh material which required the initiating of disciplinary
proceedings. The said complaints did not merit any serious consideration
B
and reference to them by the High Court was uncalled for. The sentiments
expressed by this court while allowing the petitioner's writ petition on an
earlier occasion stands belied and notwithstanding such observation of this
Court, the High Court acted in a manner which can only be termed as
arbitrary and unwarranted, to say the least. [373-B-E] c
R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajas than [1994] Supp. 3 SCC 711, relied
on.

5.2. It appears that the Committee was only looking for a person who
was ready to depose against the petitioner even if he be an imposter. This D
conclusion is further strengthened by the selection of four other persons by
the Committee whose evidence is on record, all of whom had grudge against
. .., the petitioner. [369-D]

KIRPAL, J. The petitioner who was a member of the Rajasthan Higher
Judicial Service, has by this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of E
India, assailed the disciplinary proceedings which have been initiated against
him pursuant to the resolution dated 5th Jlviay, 1995 of the Full Court of the
Rajasthan High Court.

The petitioner had joined the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service as a
;·
District and Sessions Judge on 31st July, 1976. He had been posted and had F
... discharged duties at various places and in different capacities including that
as an Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court and Registrar (Vigilance),
Rajasthan High Court. With effect from !st July, 1989 to !st February, 1994
the petitioner was posted as Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. After he
was posted as District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur on 2nd February, 1994 G
and then was transferred as District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur with effect
from 6th June, 1994 but before his superannuation on attaining the age of 58
years, departmental enquiries were initiated against him on two occasions.
+ The first departmental enquiry was initiated by a resolution of Full Court
dated 21st October, 1994, which was challenged by the petitioner by filling
a writ petition in this Court. By order dated 22nd November, 1994 in the H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 3 S.C.R.

A judgment reported as R.C. Sood v. High Court of Rajasthan, (1994) Suppl. 3
SCC 7 I I, this Court quashed the said disciplinary proceedings and the Full
).
Court's resolution in respect thereto. The second disciplinary proceeding,
which has been challenged in this writ petition, has been initiated by the High ..,
Court vide its resolution dated 5/6th January, I 995. Rule .nisi was issued by
this Court limited to the question of legality of the initiation of disciplinary
B proceedings against the petitioner and not on the question of his retirement
.on his attaining the age of 58 years. ~
~
There are two sets of facts leading to the passing of the aforesaid two
resolutions by the High Court whereby it sought to initiate departmental ;

c proceedings against the petitioner. Even though the resolution dated 2 I st
October, I 994, when the first departmental proceeding was initiated, has been
quashed by this Court vide judgment dated 22nd November, I 994, in order,
however, to deal with the contentions arising in this petition, it is necessary
to first refer to the set of facts pertaining to the issuance of the first disciplinary
proceedings as that has very material bearing in the present case.
D
First Disciplinary Proceedings :

When the petitioner was working as the Registrar of the Rajasthan High
., . J.
Court the Full Court on 29th September, 1993 decided to invite applications
to fill up the vacancies in the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service by way of
E
direct recruitment. A draft advertisement was finalised in the Registry of the
Rajasthan High Court both in Hindi and in English mentioning therein the
conditions of eligibility of the candidates. According to the advertisement
which was published the age limit of the candidates was shown as the
minimum of35 years and maximum of 45 years on !st January, 1995. As the
F ......
last date for receipt of the application was 18th March, 1994 and 20th March,
1994 the relevant cut off date should have been !st January, I 994. There being
an error in the publication of the advertisement in mentioning the relevant
..
date as !st January, 1995 instead of !st January, 1994, a Committee of two
Judges was required to go into the matter. The Committee in its report
suggested that fresh applications be called for and the matter should be
G placed before the Chief Justice for taking suitable action against the officer
who was responsible for issuing the incorrect notification. The Chief Justice
directed that this report should be put up before the Full Court by circulation.
On 20th October, I 994 the Full Court constituted a committee of two other
Judges to look into the record leading to the issuance of the notification. This
H committee submitted a report dated 21st October, 1994 and noted that in the
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.] 359

draft for publication the date was correctly mentioned as I st January, 1994 but A
before the matter was sent to press for publication interpolations were made
changing the year from '1994' to '1995'. The committee further observed that
it was their tentative view that the petitioner was responsible for the "forgery
committed in the record". It recommended that a regular enquiry be made in
accordance with the rules and that the petitioner should be placed under B
suspension in contemplation of the enquiry.

On 21st October, 1994 the date of the report of the two Judge Committee,
the Full Court met at 2 p.m. and resolved that departmental inquiry be initiated
against the petitioner and he should be placed under suspension. This action
was challenged by a Writ Petition (C) No. 680 of 1994 being fled by the C
petitioner in this Court. By judgment dated 22nd November, 1994, in the case
reported as R.C. Sood v. State of Rajasthan, (supra), this Court quashed the
proposed disciplinary proceedings as well as order placing the petitioner
under suspension. While allowing the writ petition it was held that it was
difficult to appreciate how the Two Judge Committee could come to the D
conclusion that the~e was a forgery in the record and/or that any person had
benefited from the said error or that the petitioner was responsible for the
·. same.

The aforesaid decision and direction of this Court did not result in an
end to the petitioner's troubles. On the contrary the facts, to which we will E
currently refer, show how the further prospects of the petitioner in the judicial
career were successfully thwarted and the disciplinary proceedings have been
sought to be foisted on him, which is the subject matter of challenge in these
proceedings.

Impugned Disciplinary Proceedings : F

We will now refer, in some detail, to the second set of facts culminating
in the passing of the impugned resolution of the Full Court on 5/6th January,
1995 instituting a regular departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan
Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1958. The story in this G
connection starts from Septeniber, 1993 when one Vijay Singh describing
himself as Chairman of the Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front, Bar Room,
Beni Park, Jaipur circulated a complaint, though described as a 'PIL - a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution', addressed to the Judges of the
Rajasthan High Court and other functionaries. It appears .that a copy of the
same was also sent to the State's Law Secretary. Vide his letter dated 15th H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A September, 1993, the Law Secretary forwarded that complaint to the Registrar
of the Rajasthan High Court. On 17th September, 1993 the Chief Justice
directed the Additional Registrar (Vigilance) to submit an early report in the
matter. On 25th September, 1993 the Additional Registrar (Vigilance) recorded
statement of one Vijay Singh Poonia, Advocate, President of the District
Court, Beni Park, Jaipur who stated that there was no organisation by the
B name of Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front in Beni Park, Jaipur and that he
had not heard the name of such an organisation. He further stated that the
signatures on the complaint were not his and that he had made no complaint
against any judicial officer. The Additional Registrar had also called for the
comments of the petitioner on the complaint. After receiving the reply Additional
C Registrar (Vigilance) recorded further statements of other persons including
members of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and thereupon submitted
his report dated I Ith January, 1994 to the Chief Justice stating therein that
the complaint against the petitioner was false and fabricated. On the receipt
of the report the Chief Justice passed the following order on 31st January,
1994.
D
"I have gone through the report submitted by the Addi. Registrar,
Vigilance, Shri Behari Lal Gupta, in the matter of complaint filed against
the Registrar, Shri R.C. Sood. The report submitted by Shri Gupta
appears to be clear, cogent and categorical. He has dealt with all the
charges that have been levelled in the complaint against Shri Sood.
E
All the witnesses have testified to the good conduct, integrity and
rightness of Shri Sood. There is no gain of truth in the allegations
levelled against Shri Sood. It appears. that this complaint is filed
against Shri Sood out of malice. I put it down as the handiwork of
some mischief mongers. Thus the complaint is filed and no action
F needs be taken against Shri Sood."

The matter thus stood closed as far as the complaint of Vijay Singh against
the petitioner was concerned.

After the petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court
G the Chief Justice issued an office note relating to complaints against the
judicial officers. This note dated 12th May, 1994 which was addressed to
Registrar (Vigilance) and Additional Registrar (Vigilance) read as follows:

"A large number of complaints are being received against the
Judicial Officers. It has been noticed that after Preliminary Enquiry,
H most of the complaints, i.e., more than 95% are found false. Sometime
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.] 361

P.E's consume a lot of time and Judicial Officers are put to· A
embarrassment. Therefore, before initiating the P.E. against any Judicial
Officer complainant may be asked to support his complaint with an
affidavit.

If the complainant does not file the requisite affidavit no action should
be taken on that complaint." B
The trouble for the petitioner revived after he had, on 24th October,
1994, filed the earlier writ petition in this Court challenging his suspension
and initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the court's resolution dated 21st
October, 1994. From the perusal of those original records which had been C
placed before this Court at the time of hearing by the learned counsel for the
respondents it is seen that a hand written letter dated 27th October, 1994 was
written to the Chief Justice then in office by Mr. Justice Kokje which reads
as follows :

"I am enclosing a copy of PIL petition received by me some time D
back. As it was addressed to the Chief Justice, I did not forward it
then to you. However, when in the last full court meeting the matter
of Sh. R.C, Sood, Distt. Judge, came up I found no reference to the
serious charges made. against him in the petition by any one. As the
allegations are serious they deserve to be investigated thoroughly. I
would therefore request·you to kindly order an inquiry in the allegations E
made against Sh. R.C. Sood in the petition especially when he has
been proceeded against on certain other charges."

On this letter itself the then Chief Justice on that very day, i.e. 27th
October, 1994, made the following endorsement :
F
... "Put up this matter in next F.C. In the meantime find out if previous
C.J. has received such copy and orders passed on."

The enclosure to the letter of Justice Kokje was a cyclostyled copy of the
same PIL/complaint of Vijay Singh which had been dealt with by the earlier G
Chief Justice vide order dated 31st January, 1994. After the judgment of this
Court on 22nd November, 1994, whereby the writ petition of RC Sood was
allowed with costs, the storm against the petitioner gathered momentum. On
30th November, 1994 the Full Court took up the letter of 27th October, 1994 ·
of Justice Kokje for discussion under Agenda Item No. 3. Copy of the minutes
of the said meeting pertaining to Item No.3 has been placed before us by the H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A learned counsel for the respondents and the same reads as under :

"On being informed that the complaint of which a copy was appended
to the letter dated 27.10.94 of Hon'ble Justice Shri Kokje had been
received earlier by the High Court a Preliminary Enquiry into the
allegations made therein had also been held, the record of Preliminary
B Enquiry was called and perused by the Full Court. It was noted that
such a serious matter was never brought before the Full Court. It was
also noted that the Preliminary Enquiry against Shri R.C. Sood then
posted as Registrar was conducted by Additional Registrar (Vig) an
officer subordinate to him. Proceedings of the Preliminary Enquiry
show that statements of persons who were alleged to have benefitted
c Shri Sood were recorded and in place of Shri Vijay Singh the
complainant, Shri Vijay Singh Poonia, President, Bar Association was
examined. Statements of selected judicial officers and lawyers certifying
Shri Sood to be a person of integrity were also recorded and relying
on such a material serious charges of corruption were dropped. Some
D of the Hon'ble Judges have also received fresh complaints against
Shri R.C. Sood making serious charges of corruption. Considering all
these circumstances and the serious nature of the charges it is resolved
as follows :

"RESOLVED that the order passed by the then Hon'ble Chief
E Justice on the report of Preliminary Enquiry against Shri R.C.Sood
conducted by the Additional Registrar (Vig) be and is hereby revoked."

FURTHER RESOLVED that Preliminary Enquiry in the matter be
made afresh by a Committee of Hon'ble Judges consisting of Hon 'ble
Mr. Justice B.R. Arora, Hon'ble Justice Shri V.S. Kokje and Hon'ble
F Justice Shri BJ. Sethana. The Committee shall also eqnuire into various
complaints forwarded to them by Hon'ble Judges against Shri R.C.
Sood. It is hoped that the report of the Committee will be placed
before Full Court on or before 6.1.1995."

FURTHER RESOLVED that facts and circumstances leading to a
G pendency of the Preliminary Enquiry be communicated to His Excellency
the President of India and Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in view
of the fact that looking to the seniority of Shri R.C. Sood his name
is likely to be under consideration for elevation as a Judge of the High
Court. Hon 'ble the Chief Justice be and is hereby requested to do so."

H The said Three Judge Committee submitted its report on 4th January,
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.] 363
1995. After fonnulating the points for consideration and discussing the material A
placed before it, it came to the following conclusion :

"The Committee, though had a short time at its disposal, has been
able to collect only a part of the materials, but on the basis of the part
of the materials too, as discussed above, we are of the view that prima
facie Shri R.C. Sood has failed to maintain absolute integrity and to B
maintain devotion to the duty and dignity of his office. The Committee
is, also, of the opinion that a regular enquiry under rule 16 of the
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1958, may be held against Shri R.C. Sood."

Submissions : c
Two main contentions were urged on behalf of the petitioner. Firstly, it
was contended that with the passing of the order dated 31st January, 1994
by Chief Justice K.C. Aggarwal the complaint of Vijay Sing stood disposed
off. This complaint, it was submitted, could not br reopened by the Full Court
or the then Chief Justice specially when there were no attenuating D
circumstances by way of fresh evidence or material which would warrant a
fresh look in the matter - and there was no such material.

Secondly it was submitted that the initiation of the impugned disciplinary
proceedings by issuing a chargi:-sheet levelling charges which were stale and E
on materials gathered as an after thought was an action tainted with malice
and such proceedings were liable to be quashed as being mala fide and
malicious in law.

First submission :
F
The complaint of Vijay Singh had been enquired into by. the Additional
Registrar (Vigilance), on being directed to do so by the Chief Justice. During
the course of enquiry witnesses were examined and report was received
whereupon the Chief Justice on 31st January, 1994 passed the above mentioned
order. Subsequently on 12th May, 1994, the Chief Justice had directed that
no complaint should be entertained which is not supported by an affidavit. G
In the resolution of 30th November, 1994 reference is made to a preliminary
enquiry which had been made earlier and it was noted that such a serious
matter had never been brought before the Full Court. It was also stated that
statements of persons who were alleged to have been benefited by the
petitioner had been recorded and in place of the complainant Vijay Singh it H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A is one Vijay Singh Poonia, President Bar Association, who was examined. It
is because of this resolution that the earlier order of the Chief Justice and the
report of the preliminary enquiry were revoked.

The quesdon which arises for consideration is whether the Full Court
could or was justified in revoking a decision which was taken by the then
B Chief Justice on 31st January, 1994. Chapter Ill of the Rules of the High Court
. of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952, deals with the conduct of the administrative
business of the court. For the purpose of this case the relevant rules are Rule
14, 15 and 32 which are as follows : •

"14. Administrative business relating to control over subordinate
c courts and to superintendance over courts and tribunals : - All
administrative business in the Court relating to the control over
subordinate courts vested in the Court under Article 235 of the
Constitution or otherwise and to the superintendance over the courts
and tribunals vested in the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution
D or otherwise shall be disposed of as provided hereinafter.

15. Matters on which all Judges shall be consulted - On the following
matters all the Judges of the Court shall be consulted, namely:-

(a) proposals as to legislation or changes in the law ;

E (b) proposals as to changes in or the issue of new Rules of Court;

(c) proposals as to changes in or the issue of new rules for the
guidance of subordinate courts;

(d) appointment, promotion and seniority of judicial officers;
F (e) withholding of promotion, supersession or reduction of judicial
officer;

(f) removal or dismissal of any judicial officer;

(g) compulsory retirement of Judicial officer otherwise than by way of
G punishment;

(h) important questions of policy or those affecting the powers and
status of the court laid before the Court by Chief Justice or any other
Judge; •
H (i) matters connected with the Supreme Court;
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.) 365
(j) annual administration report; A
(k) matters upon which the Government desires the opinion of the
Court, if such matter is considered fit to be laid before the Court by
the Chief Justice; and

(I) any matter which the Chief Justice or the Administrative Committee, B
as constituted under Rule 16, may consider fit to be laid before them
for consideration.

32. Effect of any irregularity in or omission to follow the procedure
laid down in this Chapter - (1) No irregularity in, or omission to
follow, the procedure laid down in thin Chapter shall affect the C
validity of any order passed or anything done under these Rules

(2) For the removal of doubt, it is hereby mentioned that all
administrative work disposed of by the Chief Justice, the Administrative
Judge or Judges to whom the work has been assigned by the Chief D
Justice for disposal shall be deemed to be disposed of by the Court.

A perusal of these rules show that matters where all the Judges are
required to be consulted, namely, those which have been brought to the Full
Court, are enumerated in Rule 15. With regard to the judicial officers it is
clauses (d) to (g) which are relevant. It is only if a judicial officer is to be E
removed or dismissed that the matter has to be brought before the Full Court.
Under clause (i) if the Chief Justice desires then any matter can be listed
before the Full Court. Every complaint received against a judicial officer is not
required to be brought before the Full Court unless and until the question of
removal or dismissal of the judicial officer arises. It was competent for the
Chief Justice especially in view of the provision of sub rule (2) of Rule 32, F
while dealing with the complaint received against the petitioner, to decide that
no action thereon was called for. No illegality or impropriety was, therefore,
committed by the Chief Justice when he decided on 3 I st January, I 994 that
the complaint of Vijay Singh did not call for any disciplinary action against
the petitioner. It is only if the Chief Justice was of the view that disciplinary G
action may be called for that, by virtue of clauses (e), (f) and (g) the matter
would have required to be brought before the Full Court. That apart, the Chief
Justice could under clause (I) have brought the complaint to the notice of the
Full Court, but he chose not to do so. This was because he was apparently
satisfied about the hollowness of the complaint on the basis of the preliminary
report of the Additional Registrar (Vigilance) which was received by him. H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A We express no opinion on the question whether for good and sufficient
reasons the Full Court can ever over-rule or recall an earlier decision of the
Chief Justice. But the fact that the preliminary report was not brought to the
notice of the Full Court, which the Chief Justice was not bound do, could not
be reason for recalling the order dated 31st January, .i994 of the then Chief
Justice.
B
Another error which was committed was that the Court in its resolution
of 30th November, 1994 took into consideration the complaint of Vijay Singh
even though the same was not supported by an affidavit. The Chief Justice
had by his order dated 12th May, 1994, decided that no complaint against a
C judicial officer should be entertained unless it is supported by an affidavit.
Though this was an administrative order it was passed by the Chief Justice
in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 32(2) of the said Rules.
There was no reasons to why this order should have been ignored and the
complaint ofVijay Singh entertained even though it was not supported by an
affidavit. The resolution of 30th November, 1994 also states that some of the
D judges have received fresh complaints against the petitioner making serious
charges of corruption. No particulars are indicated as to which complaints
were received by which judge. It is evident from the wording of these minutes
that what those complaints were, were not even known to all the members of
the Full Court when they passed the resolution on 30th November, 1994. We
E have, therefore, no doubt that when a valid decision had been taken by the
then Chief Justice on 3 lst January 1994 exonerating the petitioner there was
no valid reason in law for the Full Court to revoke that decision.

Second Submission :

During the course of hearing Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta, learned counsel
F for the respondent produced in court the original file containing the complaints
received and the proceedings of the aforesaid Three Judge Committee. We
have carefully examined the said file in order to satisfy ourselves whether the
Committee was fair and judicious in the task which was entrusted to it.
Without going into minute details, the file reveals following facts which speak
G for themselves.

On the letter dated 27th October, 1994, the Chief Justice made a note
dated 27th October, 1994 calling for a report. But the first note of the registry
relating to the letter dated 27th October, 1994 of Justice Kokje is dated 9th
November, 1994. The suggestion made in this note was that the file be sent
H to vigilance cell because that dealt with the complaints received against the
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.) 367
judicial officers. The next note also dated 9th November, 1994 of the vigilance A
cell states that its report is placed along with the note. This is followed by
a note also of 9th November, 1994 of the Chief Justice stating that "put up
in next Full Court''. Curiously enough the report mentioned in the note of the
vigilance cell is not on the record filed in court though it purported to be a
part of vigilance section's note. There is then an undated note which appears B

- to be the minutes of a meeting of the Three Judge Committee which is in the
file in which it is, inter alia, stated that initially it has been decided_ to call
seven witnesses for their examination relating to various charges against the
petitioner. The Committee also decided to call for the valuation of the house
belonging to the petitioner from the Valuation Cell of the Income-tax
Department as well as the Chief Engineer, PWD, Rajasthan, Jaipur. These C
minutes are signed by all the three judges of the committee. There is then a
confidential note dated 9th December, 1994 signed by Justice Arora directing
the registry to summon four witnesses mentioned therein for 19th December,
1994 and three other witnesses named therein for 20th December, 1994 . The
file discloses that as on 30th November, 1994 there were written complaints
made by seven persons against the petitioner apart from the complaint of 19th D
September, 1993 of Vijay Singh. The other complaints are either dated 26th
November, 1994 or 30th November, 1994 or are undated. Even though there
were seven complainants only three of them were summoned as witnesses.
There is no indication as to why four other persons were not summoned. Of
these seven witnesses who were summoned only three, including two of the E
complainants, were examined. Two other persons who were examined were
those in respect of whom no summons were ordered to be issued. Thus the
Committee examined five witnesses out of which M.R. Mitruka and Vijay
Singh were the two complainants, K.R. Jatav is the only other witness who
was summoned vide order dated 9th December, 1994. N.K. Mahamwal and O.P.
Sharma were examined even though they were neither the complainants as on F
30th November, 1994 nor had been summoned vide order dated 9th December,
1994.

Before adverting to these five witnesses it is important to note that the
file contains copies of the summons dated 9th December, 1994 issued to the G
seven witnesses but, curiously enough, not even a single copy of the summons
~ bears an endorsement of the receipt by any witness. The file also does not
contain any other document showing that the witnesses to whom summons
had been issued were served at the addresses contained in the summons.
This fact is important to note because it has been contended by Mr. Kailash
Vasudev, learned counsel for the petitioner, which contention we will consider H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A later, that Vijay Singh who is described in the complaint and is stated to have
been examined by the Committee was not a lawyer and Vijay Singh, to whom
summons were alleged to have been issued at the Bar room address, was a
non existent person. The file of the Committee also includes written complaints
in the form of affidavits of five other persons. Two of them are dated 31st
B December, 1994, one !st January, 1995 and another is dated 2nd January, 1995.
When the Full Court had on 30th November, 1994 stated that the Committee
was to go into the complaint of Vijay Singh and any other complaint received
by the Judges, it is not understandable as to why any complaint received after·
30th November, 1994 was entertained by the Committee. Another important
feature to note is that apart from Vijay Singh's complaint of 1993 all the other
C complaints are either undated or received after this Court's judgment of 22nd
November, 1994.

Another notable feature of the Enquiry Committee's report is that though
a Three Judge Committee was constituted the witnesses to whom summons
were issued on 9th December, 1994 appear to have been selected by the local
-
D judge Justice Arora. The examination of witnesses took place on 20th and
21st December, 1994 at Jodhpur and 29th December, 1994 at Jaipur. What is,
however, revealed from the file is that these witnesses were examined only by
two of the Three Judges and Justice Sethna did not take part in the examination
of the witnesses and was not present at the time of the examination even
E though he has signed the final report.

The only complaint before the Full Court on 30th November, 1994 was
that of Vijay Singh. In the affidavit in rejoinder the petitioner has averred that
the complaint was stated to have been made by Vijay Singh of Rajasthan
Judicial Liberation Front. The person who was examined by the Committee
F was Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh resident of 179, Kalidas Marg, Beni Park,
Jaipur. It is contended by the petitioner that no person by the name of Vijay
Singh resides at the said address and there is no such front called Rajasthan
Judicial Liberation Front. In support of this averment reliance is placed on a
report of the SHO, PS, Beni Park, Jaipur, copy of which has been filed in Court
G along with its English translation, which inter a/ia states that on verification
it has been found that there is no plot no. 179, Kalidas Marg, Beni Park, Jaipur.
This report further states that plot no. 179, Sindhi Colony, Jaipur, is owned
by one Tulsi Ram and plot no, 179 Indira Colony by Shambu Dayal and in
both these plots Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh did not reside. The petitioner
has also filed certificate from Rajasthan High Court Bar Association, Jaipur,
H District Advocates Bar Association, Beni Park, Jaipur and the Bar Association
·.-(

R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KJRPAL, J.) 369
District Court dated 3 lst October, 1995, 27th October, 1995 and 17th October, A
J995, respectively and in each of these certificates it has been stated that no
person by the name of Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh resident of 179,
Kalidas Marg, Beni Park, Jaipur, is a member of their association. Lastly an
affidavit of Vijay Singh Sharma (Brahmin by caste) son of K.M. Sharma,
Advocate has been filed in which he has stated that he has not filed any B
complaint against the petitioner and that to the best of his knowledge no
other person by the name of Vijay Singh Sharma was practising in the District
Court or at Jaipur. Even though this rejoinder affidavit was filed in this Court
on 14th November, 1995, none of the averments contained therein in relation
to Vijay Singh or other persons who spoke against the petitioner have been
rebutted by the respondents either by filing a sur rejoinder or even at the time C
of arguments. This would clearly show that Vijay Singh who was examined
by the Committee was certainly not an advocate and was in all probabilities
an impostor. Who that person was who was examined by the Committee
remains unexplained.

It appears that the Committee was only looking for a person who was D
ready to depose against the petitioner even if he be an imposter. This
.., conclusion is further strengthened by the selection of four other persons by
the Committee whose evidence is on record. Of thesi: M.R. Mitruka had filed
a complaint dated 30th November, 1994 supported by an affidavit dated I st
December, 1994 which means that on the day when the Full Court passed the E
r~solution on 30th November, 1994 the complaint along with the affidavit
could not have been on the record. This witness who had chosen to file an
affidavit against the petitioner after the Full Court resolution on 30th November,

- 1994 was an ex member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service who had been
removed from the service in 1982. The petitioner herein had conducted a
preliminary enquiry in the charges which had been framed against Mitruka F
and it is after the receipt of the preliminary report of the petitioner that regular
departmental proceedings against him were initiated culminating in awarding
the punishment of removal from service by the Full Court of the Rajasthan
High Court. The other person chosen to be summoned by the Committee was
K.R. Jatav, also belonging to the judicial service. There were some allegations G
against him and the petitioner, when he was posted as Registrar (Vigilance)
had conducted a preliminary enquiry as a result whereof he was awarded the
penalty of censure. Subsequently some more complaints were received against
K.R. Jatav and on further enquiry by the petitioner disciplinary action was
taken against him and he was superseded on the basis of this report and bad
ACPs. He obviously was inimical towards the petitioner. N.K. Mahamwal is H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A also a member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service against whom complaints
were made by the members of the Bar alleging misbehaviour towards advocates
27th October, 1994 forwarding to the then Chief Justice the old complaint of
Vijay Singh. The Chief Justice makes an endorsement on this letter on the
same date - thereby showing the sense of urgency. First office note is written
only on 9th November, 1994, after issuance of notice by this Court in the writ
B petition filed by the petitioner. The fact that it is only on 30th November, 1994,
after the decision of this Court on 22nd November, 1994, that the Full Court
fixed up the matter lends credence to the petitioner's submission that the
dates which appear on record may not be real. This is more so when we find
that none of the documents in the form of complaints allegedly received by
C the Judges bear any endorsement as to the date of receipt of the same. To
crown it all the second round started on a complaint of Vijay Singh stated to
have been received by Justice Kokje on or before :Oth October, 1994. This
complaint had been circulated in September, 1993 amongst all the then Judges
of the High Court and in respect of which order was passed by the them Chief
Justice and the matter was closed on 31st January, 1994. Respondents' counsel
D could give no explanation as to how Justice Kol\je got this complaint against
the petitioner some time before 27th October 1994 when he was transferred
to the Rajasthan High Court only on 28th April, 1994. At that time the
petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court with effect from
!st February, 1994. It is obvious that a copy of this complaint was handed
E over to Justice Kokje by some one who was interested in harming the petitioner
and thereupon the second round of action against the petitioner commenced
with Justice Kokje being made one of the members of the Three Judge
Committee.

F
We have no manner of doubt that there was a complete lack of bona
tides on the part of the High Court when it decided on 5th January, 1995 to
institute disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. On this ground alone
-
the petitioner is entitled to succeed.

Conclusions :

G Normally enquiry committees are set up in order to ascertain correct
facts. Here, however, we have a situation where a committee consisting of a
local judge and two transferred judges was set up with the local judge sitting
alone and collecting a menagerie of witnesses who had a grudge against the
petitionrr and were thus sure to depose against him. Some of these witnesses
were those who had not sent any complaint against the petitioner prior to
H 30th November, 1994 and it is only the local judge who, wanting to gather
'"'(
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.] 371
statements against the petitioner, could have known whom to approach and A
call for evidence. Of the two transferred judges who were members of the
committee, one never took part in any proceeding when evidence was recorded
between 20th February and 2nd January, 1995. Yet he signs the report dated
4th January, 1995. The other transferee judge is the person who set the ball
rolling with his conjuring up Vijay Singh's complaint which had originally B
been circulated long before the judge's transfer to Rajasthan. The respondent's
counsel was unable to explain as to how this complaint was conveniently
placed in this judge's hand. It is evident that there was a deliberate design
to bring to a premature end the judicial career of the petitioner, whose name,
at that time, was being actively considered for elevation as High Court Judge.
This is apparent from the fact that in the resolutions dated 30th November, C
1994 and 5th January, 1995 it was resolved by the Full Court that the President
of India and the Chief Justice of India should be informed about the holding
of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Acting on the basis of the
Committee's biased report the Full Court, we are sad to note, continued in
similar vein and proceeded to nail the petitioner by taking a decision which D
lacked objectivity. Apparently stung by the judgment dated 22nd November,

.. 1994 of this Court it retaliated by launching a fresh set of charges against the
petitioner clearly with a view to ruin his judicial career. We have no doubt that
the action taken by the court was not bona fide and amounts to victimisation.
This is certainly not expected from a judicial forum, least which has resulted E
in a preliminary enquiry being conducted by the petitioner when he was
posted as Registrar (Vigilance). As a result thereof N.K. Mahamwal· was
transferred. Later another complaint against him was received for misbehaviour
with the advocates and litigants and again on the report of the petitioner a
warning was administered to Mahamwal. At the time when the petitioner was
posted as District Judge, Udaipur, he had also reported against the bad F
behaviour of Mahamwal who was posted as Munsif Magistrate under his
charge. As a result of all this N.K. Mahamwal had been superseded and many
of his juniors had been promoted. He, therefore, obviously must have borne
grudge against the petitioner. O.P.Sharma the last witness to be examined also
belongs to the Rajasthan Higher Service against whom two complaints were G
received when the petitioner was posted as Registrar (Vigilance). There were
serious complaints in relation to O.P. Sharma's integrity which were received
by the High Court and one such complaint had been received by the petitioner
when he was working as Additional District Judge, Jaipur city which was
forwarded by him to the Additional Registrar (Vigilance) which had resulted
in a preliminary enquiry and a subsequent disciplinary proceedings against H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998) 3 S.C.R.

A him. It is further seen that of all the affidavits in the form of complaints which
were received by the Committee after 30th November 1994, two of them were
from those persons who were formerly members of the Rajasthan Judicial
Service who had been removed. One of them had sought voluntary retirement
after he had been superseded on account of poor service record and the other
B was compulsorily retired by the High Court. The third affidavit dated 2nd
January, 1995 was of yet another judicial officer against whom disciplinary
proceedings had been initiated and an FIR had been lodged in respect of the
alleged murder of her husband.

Based on such type of evidence the Committee submitted its report on >
C 4th January, 1995 signed by all the three Judges. It is but natural that highest
standard of integrity is expected of and is required to be maintained by every
judicial officer. It is with this in view that even though the impugned initiation
of proceedings is being alleged to be for mala fide reasons that it is proper
to see whether the allegations against the petitioner were such which in any
way warranted the holding of a disciplinary proceeding. We have:· therefore,
D carefully seen the report of the Committee and the complaints against the
petitioner in order to satisfy ourselves whether there was any cogent material
which warranted initiation of disciplinary proceedings. We do not find, after
such examination, that any material existed which could justify the initiation
of the impugned action. The allegations against the petitioner were generally
vague or were such which stood explained from the record itself or were such
E which did not show that the petitioner had committed any irregularity, leave
alone illegality. For example one of the main allegations against the petitioner
was of his having committed irregularity in obtaining loan for constructing a
house. Apart from the fact that this loan was sanctioned by the then Chief
Justice, the petitioner has with the assistance of the loan constructed the
F house and is living there and the loan amount already stands returned. In
such circumstances for the Committee to come to a conclusion that the
disciplinary proceedings should be initiated was clearly unwarranted.

Apart from the non-judicious manner in which the Three Judge Committee
conducted the enquiry the sequence of events, which bears repetition, shows
G that being piqued with this Court's judgment quashing the first departmental
enquiry the High Court, with a few functionaries playing an active role, left
no stone unturned with a view to victimise the petitioner. On 21st October,
1994 the High Court suspended the petitioner and decided fo hold the first
departmental enquiry. On 24th October, 1994 this suspension was challenged
by way of a writ petition in this Court in which this Court on 7th November,
H 1994 issued show cause notice to the High Court. Suddenly we find on the
R.C. SOOD v. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN [KIRPAL, J.] 373
High Court record Justice Kokje's letter dated of all the High Court, which is A
expected to discharge its administrative duties as fairly and objectively as it
is required to discharge its judicial functions.

The proceedings of the meeting of the Full Court are normally supposed
to be confidential. How is it then that a number of complaints were received
against the petitioner at about that time, i.e., 30th November, 1994. Some of B
the complaints on the file of the Three Jud~ Committee are undated and it
is not known when they were received. On two complaints the date is 26th
November, 1994, but they do not have supporting affidavits. It is, therefore,
possible that these complaints m3y have been ante-dated specially when
none of these complaints bear an endorsement signifying the date of their C
receipt. The complaint of Mitruka is dated 30th November, 1994 but the
affidavit supporting is dated I st December, 1994. The fact that an enquiry was
going to be conducted against the petitioner was not publicly advertised
..,· which could have resulted in complaints being filed, how is it then that after
the judgment of this Court on 22nd November, 1994 and about the time the
resolution dated 30th November, 1994 was passed, unsolicited complaints D
started coming in. We have no doubt that all these complaints were procured
solely with a view to show that apart from the original complaint of Vijay
Singh there were other complaints against the petitioner which represented
new material justifying a fresh enquiry. These complaints, some of them being
made by discredited persons containing vague and general allegations could E
not, in our view, be regarded as fresh material which required disciplinary
proceedings being initiated. The said complaints did not merit any serious
considerations and reference to them by the High Court was uncalled for. In
this connection we reiterate the sentiments expressed by this Court while
allowing the petitioner's writ petitions on the earlier occasion when at page
716 of the report it was observed as follows : F

"This case leaves us very sad. Entrustment of the 'control' of the
subordinate judiciary to the High Courts by enactment of the relevant
provisions in the Constitution oflndia, p~rticularly Article 235 therein
is for the purpose of ensuring their independence and protection from
executive interference. At a time when fairness and non-arbitrariness G
are the essential requirements of every administrative State action, it
is more so for any administrative act of the Judges. It is necessary
that members of the subordinate judiciary get no occasion to think
otherwise. We are afraid, this incident appears to shake this faith. We
do hope it is an inadvertent exception." H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A We are sorry to note that the said hope stands belied and
notwithstanding the aforesaid observations the High Court acted in the manner
which can only be termed as arbitrary and unwarranted, to say the least.
•'

For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition i~ allowed. The entire
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the High Court against the petitioner
B together with the Full Com"'.'s resolutions dated 30th November, 1994; 5th
January, 1995 and 6th January, 1995 are quashed. We also direct the
respondents - High Court of Rajasthan to pay Rs. 20,000/- as costs to the
petitioner.

C RK.S. Petition allowed.