R.C. CHANDELversusHIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.

                    [2012] 7 S.C.R. 205


                      R.C. CHANDEL                              A
                              v.
               HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.
              (Civil Appeal No. 5790 of 2012)

                     AUGUST 8, 2012
                                                                B
         [R.M. LODHA AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

      Service Law - Judicial Service - Compulsory retirement
  Of appellant-judicial officer after 25 years in judicial service
  Challenge to - Scope of judicial review - Held: On facts, it C
 ;annot be said that the recommendation made by the Full
Court (of the High Court) to the Government for compulsory
retirement of the appellant was arbitrary or based on material
not germane for such recommendation - Recommendation
made by High Court to the Government for compulsory D
retirement of the appellant and the order of compulsory
retirement issued by the Government did not suffer from any
legal flaw - In assessing potential for continued useful service
of a judicial officer, the High Court is required to take into
account the entire service record - Those of doubtful integrity, E
questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled
to benefit of service after attaining the requisite length of
service or age - Appellant did not have unblemished service
record all along - His quality of judgments and orders was not
found satisfactory on more than one occasion - His reputation F
was observed to be tainted on few occasions and his integrity
was not always found to be above board - Confirmation of
appellant as District Judge and grant of selection grade and
super time scale did not wipe out his earlier adverse entries
- Conduct of appellant in involving an M.P. and the Ministry G
of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter of the High
Court concerning an administrative review petition filed by him
for expunging adl(erse remarks in his ACRs was most
reprehensible and highly unbecoming of a judicial officer -
                             205                                H
   206       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A Still worst, appellant had the audacity to plead that he never
  made any representation to such M.P.- The Single Judge of
  the High Court examined the administrative decision of the
  Full Court (to recommend to the Government to compulsory
  retire the appellant) as if he was sitting as an appellate
B authority to consider the correctness of such recommendation
  by going into sufficiency and adequacy of the materials which
  led the Full Court in reaching its satisfaction - The whole
  approach of the Single Judge was flawed and not legally
  proper - It did not keep the scope of judicial review - The
c Division Bench of the High Court was, thus, fully justified in
  setting aside the order of Single Judge - Fundamental Rules,
  as applicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh - Rule 56(2)(a)
  as amended - Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service
  {Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 1994 - Rule 14
0 - Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 -
  Rule 42(1 )(b) - Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions
  Judges (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 - Rule
  1-A -Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 235.

       Judiciary - Judicial Officer - Conduct of - What should be
E - Held: Judicial service is not an ordinary government service
  and the Judges are not employees as such - Judges hold the
  public office - In discharge of their functions and duties, the
  Judges represent the State - A Judge must be a person of
  impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence - The
F standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than
  an ordinary man - A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above
  suspicion - A Judge is expected not to be influenced by any
  external pressure and he is a/so supposed not to exert any
  influence on others in any administrative or judicial matter.
G
       On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working on
  the post of District and Sessions Judge, was
  compulsorily retired from service in public interest, by the
  Government of Madhya Pradesh on the request of the
H Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Full Court, on the basis
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.             207


of the service record of the appellant, had formed a           A
unanimous opinion that he must be compulsorily retired
and had recommended to the Government, accordingly.
The order of compulsory retirement was issued by the
Government in exercise of its power under amended Rule
56(2)(a) of the Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in       B
the State of Madhya Pradesh, Rule 14 of the Madhya
Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and
Service Conditions) Rules, 1994, Rule 42(1 )(b) of the
Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 and
Rule 1-A of Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions               c
Judges (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964. In
lieu of notice of three months, it was directed in the order
that the appellant shall be entitled to three months' salary
and allowances which he was receiving prior to his
retirement. At the time of issuance of the order of
                                                               0
compulsory retirement on 13.09.2004, the appellant had
completed 25 years or so in judicial service.

      The appellant challenged the order of compulsory
retirement by filing a writ petition before the High Court.
A Single Judge of that Court allowed the writ petition;        E
quashed the order of compulsory retirement dated
13.09.2004 and directed that he be reinstated with all
consequential benefits. The High Court on the
administrative side challenged the order of Single Judge
in writ appeal. The Division Bench of that Court held that     F
the challenge to the order of compulsory retirement was
ill-founded and, accordingly, set aside the order of the
Single Judge.

    In the instant appeal, the counsel for the appellant       G
submitted that compulsory retirement of the appellant on
the basis of adverse entry recorded in 1989 and two
subsequent adverse entries for 1993 and 1994 was wholly
unjustified. As regards 1989 adverse entry, the counsel
submitted that the appellant was awarded lower selection
                                                               H
    208       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2012] 7 S.C.R.


A grade in 1990 and, therefore, the said entry had lost its
  efficacy. In respect of entries recorded in 1993 and 1994,
  the counsel submitted that the said entries also lost their
  significance since the appellant was awarded super time
  scale in 1999 and above super time scale in 2002 and 1n
B between in 2001, he was allowed to continue in service.
  Moreover, the counsel submitted that the adverse
  remarks recorded in 1993 and 1994 were challenged by
  the appellant on the judicial side of the High Court and a
  Single Judge of that Court, in writ petition, had accepted
c the appellant's challenge and expunged these remarks;
  and that in writ appeal, though the Division Bench of the
  High Court had set aside the order of the Single Judge,
  but it had observed that the 1993 and 1994 entries should
  not be read adverse to the appellant for all times to come.

D       The questions which therefore arose for
  consideration were: whether the recommendation made
  by the High Court on the basis of unanimous opinion to
  the Government for compulsory retirement of the
  appellant and the order of compulsory retirement issued
E by the Government suffered from any legal flaw; whether
  the order of compulsory retirement was so arbitrary or
  irrational that justified interference in judicial review; and
  whether the view of the Division Bench upholding the
  order of appellant's compulsory retirement so erroneous
F warranting interference under Article 136 of the
  Constitution of India.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. Rule 56(2) of the Fundamental Rules
G provides that a government servant (read judicial officer)
  may, in the public interest, be retired at any time after he
  has completed 20 years' qualifying service, or on his
  attaining the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier without
  assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing.
H The notice period is three months. However, he may be
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.              209


retired forthwith and on such retirement he is entitled to      A
claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus
allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at
which he was drawing them immediately before
retirement or, as the case may be, for the period by which
such notice falls short of three months. Sub-rule 1-A           B
added to Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions Judge
(Death cum Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 provides
that with regard to age of compulsory retirement, the
permanent District and Sessions Judge shall be
governed by the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56. Rule         c
42(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1976 provides that the appointing authority may
in the public interest require a government servant (read
judicial officer) to retire from service at any time after he
has completed 20 years' qualifying service or on his            0
attaining the age of 50 years whichever is earlier by giving
three months' notice in Form 29 provided that he may be
retired forthwith and on such retirement he shall be
entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his
pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the
same rate at which he was drawing immediately before            E
his retirement or, for the period by which such notice falls
short of three months, as the case may be. Rule 14(1) of
the MadhyaPradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Service Conditions) Rules, 1994 provides that the age
of superannuation of a member of the Madhya Pradesh             F
Higher Judicial Service shall ordinarily be 60 years,
provided he is found fit and suitable to continue after 58
years in service of the High Court. Sub-rule (2) makes a
provision that without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Rule 56(3) of the Fundamental Rules and            G
Rule 42(1)(b) of the 1976 Rules, a member of the service
not found fit and suitable shall be compulsorily retired on
his attaining the age of 58 years. [Para 12] [219-F-H; 220-
A-E]
    1.2. Article 235 of the Constitution vests in the High      H
    210      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A Court the control over the subordinate judiciary within the
  State. The power of the High Court to recommend to the
  Government to compulsorily retire a judicial officer on
  attaining the required length of service or requisite age
  and consequent action by the Government on such
B recommendation is beyond any doubt. [Para 19] [220-F;
  222-D-E]
         1.3. It is clear that the appellant did not have
    unblemished service record all along. He was graded
    "Average" on quite a few occasions. He was assessed
C   "Poor" in 1993 and 1994. His quality of judgments and
    orders was not found satisfactory on more than one
    occasion. His reputation was observed to be tainted on
    few occasions and his integrity was not always found to
    be above board. In 1988-89, the remark reads, "never
D   enjoyed clean reputation". In 1993, the remark "his
    reputation was not good" and in 1994 the remark "officer
    does not enjoy good reputation", were recorded. His
    representations for expunction of these remarks failed.
    The challenge to these remarks on judicial side was
E   unsuccessful right upto this Court. In 1993, it was also
    recorded that quality of performance of the appellant was
    poor and his disposals were below average. In 1,994, the
    remark in the service record stated that the performance
    of the appellant qualitatively and quantitatively has been
F   poor. With this service record, it cannot be said that there
    existed no material for an order of compulsory retirement
    of the appellant from service. Material germane for taking
    decision by the Full Court whether the appellant could be
    continued in judicial service or deserved to be retired
G   compulsorily did exist. It is not the scope of judicial
    review to go into adequacy or sufficiency of such
    materials. [Para 33] [227-C-H]
      1.4. Though it is true that the appellant was
  confirmed as District Judge in 1985; he got lower
H selection grade with effect from 24.03.1989; he was
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.               211


awarded super time scale in May, 1999 and he was also            A
given above super time scale in 2002 but the confirmation
as District Judge and grant of selection grade and super
time scale did not wipe out the earlier adverse entries
which remained on record and continued to hold the field.
The criterion for promotion or grant of increment or             B
higher scale is different from an exercise which is
undertaken by the High Court to assess a judicial officer's
continued utility to the judicial system. In assessing
potential for continued useful service of a judicial officer
in the system, the High Court is required to take into           C
account the entire service record. Overall profile of a
judicial officer is the guiding factor. Those of doubtful
integrity, questionable reputation and wanting in utility
are not entitled to benefit of service after attaining the
requisite length of service or age. [Para 34] [228-A-D]
                                                                 D
    1.5. The appellant's challenge to 1993 and, 1994
entries was unsuccessful right upto this Court. Though
the appell3nt placed heavy reliance upon the
observations made by the Division Bench (of the High
Court) in its judg:nent that adverse remarks on his              E
reputation in the relevant years should not haunt him all
through his judicial career and hamper his prospects for
all times, the above observations by the Division Bench
while upholding the remarks in no manner restricted the
power of the Full Court in taking into consideration these       F
adverse remarks in its exercise to find out whether or not
the appellant should be retained in service after he has
attained the required length of service. The consideration
of the appellant's case for grant of selection grade and
super time scale stood on different footing. The entire          G
service record and overall profile of a judicial officer guide
the Hig'h Court in reaching its satisfaction about the
continuance or otherwise after the judicial officer has
attained the required length of service or age. When the
entire service record of a judicial officer is under             H
   212      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A consideration, obviously the High Court is alive to such
  judicial officer's having got promotion/s, increments, etc.
  during the service. [Paras 35] [229-E-H, 230-A]
       1.6. Though it was argued by the counsel for the
  appellant that the administrative committee-1 had
B recommended the appellant's continuation in service and
  there was no justification for the Full Court to take a
  contrary view, but the view of the administrative
  committee is not final. It is recommendatory in nature. It
  is open to the Full Court to accept the committee's report
C or take a different view. In the present case, the Full Court
  on the basis of the entire service record of the appellant
  formed a unanimous opinion that the appellant must be
  compulsorily retired and recommended to the
  Government, accordingly. On the basis of the existent
D material, it can hardly be said that the recommendation
  by the Full Court to the Government for compulsory
  retirement of the appellant was arbitrary or based on
  material not germane for such recommendation. [Para 36]
  [229-B-D]
E
       1.7. Judicial service is not an ordinary government
  service and the Judges are not employees as such.
  Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the
  essential functions of the State. In discharge of their
  functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The
F office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A
  Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and
  unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the
  core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the
  courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before
G whom his matter has come, would deliver justice
  impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The
  standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher
  than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the
  standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are
H drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.            213


standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A         A
Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The
credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the
Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and rule
of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process
have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his          B
judicial functions with integrity, impartiality" and
intellectual honesty. (Para 37) (229-E-H; 230-A-B]

    1.8. The most shocking and unbecoming conduct of
the appellant highlighted by the respondent no. 1 before      C
the High Court in opposition to the writ petition and in
response to the present appeal is his act to overreach the
administrative decision on the review petition filed by him
before the Chief Justice after his representations for
expunction of adverse remarks for the period ending on
31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 had been thrice earlier             D
rejected. The appellant approached 'RKM', Member of
Parliament and Chairman, House Committee (Rajya
Sabha) for his grievance concerning rejection of his
representations for expunction of remarks for 1993 and
1994. The conduct of the appellant in involving an M.P.       E
and the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in
a matter of the High Court concerning an administrative
review petition filed by him for expunging adverse
remarks in ACRs is most reprehensible and highly
unbecoming of a judicial officer. His conduct has             F
tarnished the image of the judiciary and he disentitled
himself from continuation in judicial service on that count
alone. A Judge is expected not to be influenced by any
external pressure and he is also supposed not to exert
any influence on others in any administrative or judicial     G
matter. Secondly and still worst, the appellant had an
audacity to set up a plea in the rejoinder that he never
made any representation to 'RKM', M.P. for any purpose
whatsQever. But for the appellant's approaching 'RKM'
and his request for help, 'RKM' would have never written      H
    214       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A the letter to the Minister of State for Law, Justice and
  Company Affairs. On this ground also his writ petition
  was liable to be dismissed. [Paras 38, 40] [230-B-D; 232-
  F-H; 233-A-B]

         1.9. The Single Judge examined the administrative
8
    decision of the Full Court to recommend to the
    Government to compulsory retire the appellant as if he
    was sitting as an appellate authority to consider the
    correctness of such recommendation by going into
C   sufficiency and adequacy of the materials which led the
    Full Court in reaching its satisfaction. The whole
    approach of the Single Judge in consideration of the
    matter was flawed and not legally proper. The Single
    Judge did not keep the scope of judicial review in view
    while examining the validity of the order of compulsory
D   retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court in the
    intra-court appeal was, thus, fully justified in setting aside
    the impugned order of the Single Judge. In view of that,
    the recommendation made by the High Court to the
    Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant
E   and the order of compulsory retirement issued by the
    Government did not suffer from any legal flaw. The order
    of compulsory retirement is neither arbitrary nor irrational
    justifying any interference in judicial review. The
    impugned judgment of the Division Bench is not legally
F   unsustainable warranting any interference by this Court
    in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
    [Paras 41, 43] [233-B-E; 234-C-D]

          Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand and others
G (2012) 3 SCC 580: 1992 (3) SCR 213 - held inapplicable.
       Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. and others
  v. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others (2011) 10
  SCC 1: 2011 (12) SCR 496; Samsher Singh v. State of
  Punjab and another (1974) 2 sec 831: 1975 (1) SOR 814;
H Chandra Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.               215


(2003) 6 SCC 545: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 674; High Court of         A
Judicature at Bombay Through Its Registrar v. Shirishkumar
Rangrao Patil and another (1997) 6 SCC 339: 1997 (3) SCR
1131; All India Judges' Association (2) and others v. Union
of India and others (1993) 4 sec 288: 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR
749; State of UP. and another v. Bihari Lal 1994 (Suppl) 3       B
SCC 593: 1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 108; Union of India v. V.P.
Seth and another (1994) SCC (L&S) 1052; Baikuntha Nath
Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada
and another (1992) 2 sec 299: 1992 (1) SCR 836;
Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa and another (1989)       c
4 SCC 664: 1989 (3) SCR 803; Union of India v. Col. J.N.
Sinha and another (1970) 2 sec 458: 1971 (1) SCR 791 and
All India Judges' Association (1) v. Union of India and others
(1992) 1 SCC 119: 1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 206 - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference:                         D

  1992 (3) SCR 213              held inapplicable Para 9

  2011 (12) SCR 496             referred to        Para 11

  1975 (1) SCR 814              referred to        Para 14       E
  2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 674       referred to        Para 15

  1997 (3) SCR 1131             referred to        Para 17

  1_993 (1) Suppl. SCR 749      referred to        Para 18       F
  1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 108       referred to        Para 27

  (1994) sec (L&S) 1052         referred to        Para 27

   1992 (1) SCR 836             referred to        Para 27       G

   1989 (3) SCR 803             referred to        Para 27

   1971 (1) SCR 791             referred to        Para 27

   1991 (2) Suppl. SCR 206 referred to             Para 27       H
    216       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    5790 of 2012.

       From the Judgment & Order dated 23.11.2006 of the High
  Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No. 72
B of 2006.
        Rohit Arya, Nitin Gaur, Hitendra Nath Rath, Y. Raja Gopala
    Rao, Sunil Singh Parihar for the Appellant.

        Ravindra Shrivastava, Arvind Verma, C.D. Singh, Sunny
c   Choudhary, Anup Jain, Anubhav Shrivastav, Aditi Mohan, Vikas
    Upadhyay for B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
D
        2. On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working on the
  post of District and Sessions Judge, Punna was compulsorily
  retired from the service in the public interest by the Government
  of Madhya Pradesh (for short, 'the Government') on the request
E of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (for short, 'High Court'). The
  order of compulsory retirement was issued by the Government
  in exercise of its power under amended Rule 56(2)(a) of the
  Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in the State of Madhya
  Pradesh, Rule 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial
  Service (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 1994 (for
F short, '1994 Rules'), Rule 42(1 ){b) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil
  Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short, '1976 Rules') and
  Rule 1-A of Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions Judges
  (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 (for short, '1964
  Rules'). In lieu of notice of three months, it was directed in the
G order that the appellant shall be entitled to three months' salary
  and allowances which he was receiving prior to his retirement.

        3. The appellant challenged the above order of compulsory
  retirement by filing a writ petition before the High Court. The
H Single Judge of that Court by his order dated 20.04.2006,
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                  217
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]
allowed the writ petition; quashed the order of compulsory          A
retirement dated 13.09.2004 and directed that he be reinstated
with all consequential benefits.

      4. The High Court on the administrative side challenged
the order of Single Judge in writ appeal. The Division Bench
                                                                    B
of that Court on consideration of the entire matter held that the
challenge to the order of compulsory retirement was ill-founded
and, accordingly, set aside the order of the Single Judge vide
its judgment dated 23.11.2006. It is from this order that the
appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.
                                                                    c
     5. The appellant was selected in the higher judicial service
of Madhya Pradesh by direct recruitment. He joined the judicial
service as an Additional District Judge on 17.10.1979. On
26.06.1985, he was confirmed as a District Judge. The
appellant was awarded lower selection grade on 07 .09.1990          D
with effect from 24.03.1989. He was awarded super time scale
in May, 1999 and above super time scale in 2002. As noted
above, by the order dated 13.09.2004, the appellant was
compulsorily retired in public interest.
                                                                    E
      6. We have heard Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior
counsel for the High Court on the administrative side.

      7. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel for the appellant
vehemently contended that the Division Bench was not at all         F
justified in setting aside the judgment and order of the Single
Judge. The observations made by the Division Bench in the
impugned order and the findings recorded therein are founded
on incorrect and misleading facts. The service record of the
appellant speaks otherwise.The appellant has been largely           G
assessed in his ACRs 'Good' or 'Very Good'. He highlighted
that the appellant was confirmed as District Judge in 1985, he
was awarded lower selection grade in 1990, he was given
super time scale in 1999 and above super time scale in 2002
on merits and, on the basis of his judicial work he was also        H
    218       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   recommended for elevation as a High Court Judge by the High
    Court collegium in March, 2004.

        8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that
  compulsory retirement of the appellant on the basis of an
  adverse entry recorded in 1989 and two subsequent adverse
8
  entries for 1993 and 1994 was wholly unjustified. As regards
  1989 adverse entry, learned senior counsel submitted that the
  appellant was awarded lower selection grade in 1990 and,
  therefore, the said entry had lost its efficacy. In respect of entries
  recorded in 1993 and 1994, learned senior counsel submitted
C that the said entries also lost their significance since the
  appellant was awarded super time scale in 1999 and above
  super time scale in 2002. In between in 2001, he was allowed
  to continue in service. Moreover, learned senior counsel would
  submit that the adverse remarks recorded in 1993 and 1994
D were challenged by the appellant on the judicial side of the High
  Court. The Single Judge of that Court accepted the appellant's
  challenge and expunged these remarks. The High Court on
  administrative side challenged the order of the Single Judge
  in writ appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court although
E set aside the order of the Single Judge but observed that 1993
  and 1994 entries shall not be read adverse to the appellant for
  all times to come.

       9. Learned senior counsel referred to the guidelines dated
F 22.08.2000 issued by the Government and submitted that in
  view thereof no order of compulsory retirement could be
  passed on the basis of incapacity if the officer was promoted
  within the last five years and during that period his performance
  remained satisfactory. He submitted that throughout his work,
G the appellant achieved the norms for disposal of cases fixed
  by the High Court and his reputation and integrity as well as
  the judicial performance was found to be good and it is
  because of that that he got lower selection grade and super
  time scale from time to time. Learned senior counsel, thus,
  submitted that the Single Judge of the High Court was fully
H
     R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                219
                  [R.M. LODHA, J.]
justified in interfering with the order of compulsory retirement      A
after dealing with each and every complaint made against the
appellant and none of these complaints was found meritorious
justifying compulsory retirement of the appellant. Learned senior
counsel for the appellant, in support of his arguments, heavily
 relied upon a recent decision of this Court in Nand Kumar            B
 Verma v. State of Jharkhand and others 1•

      10. On the other hand, Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned
senior counsel for the High Court on administrative side
(respondent no.1) stoutly defended the impugned judgment. He          C
submitted that the High Court recommended the compulsory
retirement of the appellant to the Government as he was not
found fit for continuation in judicial service in public interest.
While making such recommendation the Full Court considered
the entire service record of the appellant. Mr. Ravindra
Shrivastava, learned senior counsel referred to ACRs of the           D
appellant recorded for the years 1982, 1989, 1993, 1994, 1997
and 1998 and submitted that the decision of the Full Court to
compulsorily retire the appellant cannot be said to be unjustified.

     11. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed       E
reliance upon a decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma
(Dead) Through LRs. and others v. Lieutenant Governor (NCT
of Delhi) and others2 .

     12. Rule 56(2) of the Fundamental Rules provides that a
government servant (read judicial officer) may, in the public
                                                                      F
interest, be retired at any time after he has completed 20 years'
qualifying service, or on his attaining the age of 50 years,
whichever is earlier without assigning any reason by giving him
a notice in writing. The notice period is three months. However,
he may be retired forthwith and on such retirement he is entitled     G
to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus
allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which

1.   c2012) 3 sec 5ao.
2.   c2011) 10 sec 1.                                                 H
    220        SUf)REME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A he was drawing them immediately before retirement or, as the
  case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of
  three months. Sub-rule 1-A added to 1964 Rules provides that
  with regard to age of compulsory retirement, the permanent
  District and Sessions Judge shall be governed by the
8 provisions of Fundamental Rule 56. Rule 42(1)(b) of the 1976
  Rules provides that the appointing authority may in the public
  interest require a government servant (read judicial officer) to
  retire from service at any time after he has completed 20 years'
  qualifying service or on his attaining the age of 50 years
C whichever is earlier by giving three months' notice in Form 29
  provided that he may be retired forthwith and on such retirement
  he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of
  his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same
  rate at which he was drawing immediately before his retirement
  or, for the period by which such notice falls short of three
0
  months, as the case may be. Rule 14(1) of the 1994 Rules
  provides that the age of superannuation of a member of the
  Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service shall ordinarily be 60
  years, provided he is found fit and suitable to coptinue after 58
  years in service of the High Court. Sub-rule (2) makes a
E provision that without prejudice to the provisions contained in
  Rule 56(3) of the Fundamental Rules and Rule 42(1 )(b) of the
  1976 Rules, a member of the service not found fit and suitable
  shall be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58
  years.
F
         13. Article 235 of the Constitution vests in the High Court
    the control over the subordinate judiciary within the State. It
    reads as follows :

          "Control over subordinate courts.-The control over
G
          district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the
          posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to,
          persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and
          holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall
          be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall
H
     R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                221
                  [R.M. LODHA, J.]

      be construed as taking away from any such person any            A
      right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating
      the conditions of his service or as authorizing the High
      Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with
      the conditions of his service prescribed under such law."
                                                                      B
     14. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another3, a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court considered the ambit and
scope of the word "control" and while elaborating the powers
included in the High Courts with regard to control over
subordinate judiciary within its respective state, inter alia,        C
exposited the position that such power included pre-mature or
compulsory retirement of Judges of the district courts and of
subordinate courts.

    15. In Chandra Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan
and another4, the above position laid down by this Court in           D
Samsher Singh 3 has been reiterated.

     16. The above position laid down by this Court in the cases
of Samsher Singh 3 and Chandra Singh4 has been reiterated
in a recent decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma 2 .        E
In paragraph 82 (Pg. 43) of the Report, this Court in Rajendra
Singh Verma 2 stated as follows :

      "82. As explained by this Court in Chandra Singh v. State
      of Rajasthan [(2003) 6 SCC 545], the power of
      compulsory retirement can be exercised at any time and          F
      that the power under Article 235 in this regard is not in any
      manner circumscribed by any rule or order. What is
      explained in the said decision by this Court is that Article
      235 of the Constitution of India enables the High Court to
      assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time      G
      with a view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the
      dead wood, and this constitutional power of the High Court
      cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order."
3.   (1974) 2 sec 831.
4.   c2003) 6 sec 545.                                                H
     222        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A         17. Fallowing a decision of this Court in High Court of
    Judicature at Bombay Through Its Registrar v. Shirishkumar
    Rangrao Patil and another', this Court in Rajendra Singh
    Verma 2 reiterated that the High Court had to maintain constant
    vigil on its subordinate judiciary.
B
        18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in All India Judges'
  Association (2) and others v. Union of India and others6 has
  emphasized that the benefit of increase of retirement age to
  60 years shall not be available automatically to all judicial
  officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence
C of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit is
  available to only those who, in the opinion of the respective High
  Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. The Bench
  said, "It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm
  and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility".
D
       19. That power of the High Court to recommend to the
  Government to compulsorily retire a judicial officer on attaining
  the required length of service or requisite age and consequent
  action by the Government on such recommendation are beyond
E any doubt.

          20. The appellant, as noted above, was selected in
    Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service in 1979 by way of
    direct recruitment. At the time of issuance of the order of
    compulsory retirement on 13.09.2004 he had completed 25
F   years or so in judicial service. The available materials show that
    for the period from 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982, the appellant was
    given grade 'D' (Average).

       21. In 1988-89, the appellant was assessed "D". ACR for
G that year also records that he never enjoyed clean reputation
  although no such complaint was received in writing. It also
  records that his quality of judgments and orders was not
  satisfactory.
    5.   (1997) 6 sec 339.
H 6. (1993) 4 sec 288.
   R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                   223
                [R.M. LODHA, J.]
    22. For the period ending 31.03.1991, the appellant was            A
graded "C" (Good) but it records, "the descriptive report of the
then Chief Justice dated 28.06.1991 is that no inspection of
Betul District Judge was made, however, the appellant was
reported to be an average judicial officer".
                                                                       B
    23. For the period ending 31.03.1992, the appellant has
been given grade "D" (Average).

    24. For the period ending 31.03.1993, the appellant has
been graded "E" (Poor). Inter alia, the remarks read, "Inspection
note shows that the quality of his performance is poor. His            C
disposals were below average, his reputation was not good".

     25. For the period ending 31.03.1994, the api;iellant has
been graded "E" (Poor). The entry reads, "His performance
qualitatively and quantitatively has been poor. The officer does       D
not enjoy good reputation".

      26. The questions that fall for consideration are: whether
the recommendation made by the High Court on the basis of
unanimous opinion to the Government for compulsory
retirement of the appellant and the order of compulsory                E
retirement issued by the Government suffer from any legal flaw?
Is the order of compulsory retirement so arbitrary or irrational
that justifies interference in judicial review? Is the view of the
Division Bench upholding the order of appellant's compulsory
retirement so erroneous warranting interference by this Court          F
in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?

     27. In Rajendra Singh Verma 2 , this Court restated what
has been stated in earlier decisions that compulsory retirement
from service is neither dismissal nor removal; it differs from         G
both of them, in that it is not a form of punishment prescribed
by the rules and involves no penal consequences inasmuch as
the person retired is entitled to pension and other retiral benefits
proportionate to the period of service standing to his credit. An
order of compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse           H
     224        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [20121 7 S.C.R.


A consequence, principles of natural justice have no application.
  This Court took into consideration a long line of cases including
  State of UP. and another v. Bihari La/7, Union of India v. V.P.
  Seth and another8, Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief
  District Medical Officer6, Baripada and another , Baidyanath
B Mahapatra v. State of Orissa and another10, Union of India v.
  Col. J.N. Sinha and another11 , All India Judges' Association
  (1) v. Union of India and others 12 and All India Judges'
  Association (2)6 and culled out the legal position in paragraph
  183 (Pg. no. 75) of the Report as follows :
c          "183. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court
           that while considering the case of an officer as to whether
           he should be continued in service or compulsorily retired,
           his entire service record up to that date on which
           consideration is made has to be taken into account. What
D         weight should be attached to earlier entries as compared
           to recent entries is a matter of evaluation, but there is no
           manner of doubt that consideration has to be of the entire
           service record. The fact that an officer, after an earlier
           adverse entry, was promoted does not wipe out earlier
E         adverse entry at all. It would be wrong to con~_nd that
          merely for the reason that after an earlier adverse entry an
          officer was promoted that by itself would pretjude the
          authority from considering the earlier adverse entry. When
          the law says that the entire service record has to be taken
F         into consideration, the earlier adverse entry, which forms
          a part of the service record, would also be relevant
          irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned was
          promoted to higher position or whether he was granted
          certain benefits like increments, etc."
G 7.     1994 (Suppl) 3 sec 593.
    8.   (1994) sec (L&S) 1052.
    9.   (1992) 2 sec 299.
    10. (1989) 4 sec 664.
    11. (1970) 2 sec 458.
H   12. (1992) 1 sec 119.
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                  225
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     28. Few other features based on service record of the           A
appellant highlighted in the counter filed by the respondent no.
1 in opposition to the writ petition as well as in response to the
special leave petition before this Court may be noticed. The
appellant was informed of his having been assessed in grade
"D" for the period 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982 by communication         B
dated 15.09.1982. The said adverse grading was not assailed
by the appellant and it remained on the record as it is. The
appellant was also intimated on 06.11.1989 about the adverse
remarks recorded in his ACR for the period 1988-89 that he
never enjoyed clean reputation and that his quality of judgments     c
and orders was not satisfactory. The appellant made
representation against the above remarks but the same was
rejected and they hold the field as it is. For the period ending
31.03.1992, the appellant was graded "D" and that grading
remains as it is.
                                                                     D
      29. The adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for the
period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994, were
communicated to the appellant. He made two separate
representations for expunging the adverse remarks recorded
for these years. His representations were rejected by the then       E
Chief Justice on 27.08.1994 and the appellant was informed
of the said rejection on 30.08.1994. Despite rejection of the two
representations made by the appellant, he again made two
representations to the Chief Justice for expunction of these
adverse remarks. These representations were also rejected            F
and the appellant was communicated of the same on
05.01.1995. The representations made by the appellant having
been rejected twice by the Chief Justice, the appellant yet again
made representation on 02.08.1995 for expunction of these
remarks. This representation also came to be rejected by the         G
Chief Justice on 21.08.1995 by observing that the remarks in
the ACR for the above period do not call for any modification.
The appellant sought administrative review of the decision taken
by the Chief Justice and the administrative review was also
rejected by the Chief Justice on 06.01.1996. The appellant then      H
    226        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A filed a writ petition (No. 413 of 1996) on the judicial side of the
  High Court. The Single Judge of that Court allowed the
  appellant's writ petition vide his judgment and order dated
  18.10.1996 and quashed the adverse remarks in the
  appellant's ACR for the years ending on 31.03.1993 and
B 31.03.1994. The High Court on administrative side filed LPA
  against the judgment and order dated 18.10.1996. The Division
  Bench of that Court allowed the LPA and set aside the judgment
  and order of the Single Judge dated 18.10.1996. While doing
  so the Division Bench in its judgment and order dated
c 25.02.1997 observed in para 69 as follows :

          "69. Before parting with this case in all fairness, we
          consider it necessary to observe that the adverse remarks
          on the reputation of respondent conveyed to him in the
          relevant years should not haunt him all through his judicial
D         career and hamper his prospects for all times. The above
          remarks cannot be read to his prejudice in future if he
          shows improvement in his work and performance and is
          able to achieve the requisite grade for being admitted to
          higher Selection Grade. The very purpose of
E         communicating adverse remarks is not to condemn an
          officer but to caution him at the right time so as to give
          chance of improvement."

        30. Against the judgment and order dated 25.02.1997
F   passed by the Division Bench, the appellant filed a special
    leave petition before this Court but that was dismissed on
    28.04.1997. Thus, advance remarks for the period ending
    31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 remain as it is.

        31. From the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.
G 1 it also transpires that the benefit of super time scale was not
  given to the appellant as soon as it became due. Rather, the
  administrative committee in its meeting held on 25.03.1995, on
  consideration of the case of the appellant for grant of benefit
  of super time scale, deferred his case with remarks, "his work
H performance and conduct will be kept under watch". The view
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                 227
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]
of the administrative committee was accepted by the Full Court      A
in its meeting held on 29.04.1995. The appellant's case for
grant of super time scale was again considered by the Full Court
in the subsequent year 1996 and the Full Court in its meeting
held on 20/21.04.1996 found that the appellant was not suitable
for grant of super time scale. It was only in 1999 that the         B
appellant was given super time scale and 2002 that he was
granted above super time scale.

     32. In 2002, the appellant was warned for claiming false
units. His explanation that there was typing mistake was not        C
found to be credible.

      33. From the above, it is clear that the appellant did not
have unblemished service record all along. He has been
graded "Average" on quite a few occasions. He was assessed
"Poor" in 1993 and 1994. His quality of judgments and orders        D
was not found satisfactory on more than one occasion. His
reputation was observed to be tainted on few occasions and
his integrity was not always found to be above board. In 1988-
89, the remark reads, "never enjoyed clean reputation". In 1993,
the remark "his reputation was not good" and in 1994 the            E
remark "officer does not enjoy good reputation", were recorded.
His representations for expunction of these remarks failed. The
challenge to these remarks on judicial side was unsuccessful
right upto this Court. In 1993, it was also recorded that quality
of performance of the appellant was poor and his disposals          F
were below average. In 1994, the remark in the service record
states that the performance of the appellant qualitatively and
quantitatively has been poor. With this service record, can it be
said that there existed no material for an order of compulsory
retirement of the appellant from service? We think not. The         G
above material amply shows that the material germane for
taking decision by the Full Court whether the appellant could
be continued in judicial service or deserved to be retired
compulsorily did exist. It is not the scope of judicial review to
go into adequacy or sufficiency of such materials.
                                                                    H
    228       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       34. It is true that the appellant was confirmed as District
  Judge in 1985; he got lower selection grade with effect from
  24.03.1989; he was awarded super time scale in May, 1999
  and he was also given above super time scale in 2002 but the
  confirmation as District Judge and grant of selection grade and
B super time scale do not wipe out the earlier adverse entries
  which have remained on record and continued to hold the field.
  The criterion for promotion or grant of increment or higher scale
  is different from an exercise which is undertaken by the High
  Court to assess a judicial officer's continued utility to the judici<'
c system. In assessing potential for continued useful service of
  a judicial officer in the system, the High Court is required to take
  into account the entire service record. Overall profile of a judicial
  officer is the guiding factor. Those of doubtful integrity,
  questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled to
D benefit of service after attaining the requisite length of service
  or age.

         35. That the appellant's challenge to 1993 and 1994
    entries was unsuccessful right upto this Court is not in dispute.
    However, learned senior counsel for the appellant has placed
E   heavy reliance upon the observations made by the Division
    Bench in its judgment and order dated 25.02.1997, particularly,
    paragraph 69 thereof wherein the Division Bench held that
    adverse remarks on the reputation in the relevant years should
    not haunt him all through his judicial career and hamper his
F   prospects for all times. We are afraid the above observations
    by the Division Bench while upholding the remarks in no
    manner restricted the power of the Full Court in taking into
    consideration these adverse remarks in its exercise to find out
    whether or not the appellant should be retained in service after
G   he has attained the required length of service. The
    consideration of the appellant's case for grant of selection
    grade and super time scale stood on different footing. The
    entire service record and overall profile of a judicial officer guide
    the High Court in reaching its satisfaction about the continuance
H   or otherwise after the judicial officer has attained the required
   R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                  229
                [R.M. LODHA, J.]

length of service or age. When the entire service record of a        A
judicial officer is under consideration, obviously the High Court
is alive to such judicial officer's having got promotion/s,
increments, etc. during the service.

     36. It was argued by the learned senior counsel for the         8
appellant that the administrative committee-1 had
recommended the appellant's continuation in service and there
was no justification for the Full Court to take a contrary view.
The view of the administrative committee is not final. It is
recommendatory in nature. It is open to the Full Court to accept     C
the committee's report or take a different view. In the present
case, the Full Court on the basis of the entire service record of
the appellant formed a unanimous opinion that the appellant
must be compulsorily retired and recommended to the
Government, accordingly. On the basis of the material which
                                                                     0
existed and which we have referred to above, it can hardly be
said that the recommendation by the Full Court to the
Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant was
arbitrary or based on material not germane for such
recommendation.
                                                                     E
     37. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service
and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the
public office; their function is one of the essential functions of
the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges
represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office      F
of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable
integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest
to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the
courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom
his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and           G
uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct
expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This
is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen,
the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected
to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a            H
    230       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion.
  The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the
  Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and rule of law
  to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be
  strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions
B with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.

         38. The most shocking and unbecoming conduct of the
    appellant highlighted by the respondent no. 1. before the High
    Court in opposition to the writ petition and in response to the
C   present appeal is his act to overreach the administrative
    decision on the review petition filed by him before the Chief
    Justice after his representations for expunction of adverse
    remarks for the period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994
    had been thrice earlier rejected. The appellant approached Shri
D   R. K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman, House
    Committee (Rajya Sabha) for his grievance concerning
    rejection of his representations for expunction of remarks for
    1993 and 1994. Though the appellant has denied that he ever
    approached Shri R.K. Malaviya but to falsify his claim, the
    learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed before
E   us xerox copy of the letter dated 14.02.1996 written by Shri R.K.
    Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister of State for Law,
    Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi
    and the copy of the letter dated 08.03.1996 sent by the Ministry
    of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice),
F   Government of India addressed to the Chief Secretary to the
    Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and the Registrar,
    High Court. The letter dated 14.02.1996 addressed by Shri
    R.K. Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, the then Minister of State
    for Law, Justice and Company Affairs reads as follows :
G ''R.K. Malaviya     Off.: 66, PARLIAMENT HOUSE
  MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT          NEW DELHI - 110001.
         CHAIRMAN            TEL.: 3017048, 3034699
    HOUSE COMMITIEE

H
  R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.               231
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]

    (RAJYA SABHA)             RES.: 30, CANNING LANE              A
                               KASTURBA GANDHI MARG
                               NEW DELHI -110001
                              TEL. : 3782895
                              RES.: 19, TILAK NAGAR, MAIN
                               ROAD INDORE (M.P.)                 B
                              TEL. :492412,492588,495054
                              14 February 1996
    Dear Shri Bhardwaj Ji

          Enclosed is a representation of Shri R.C. Chandel,      C
    District & Sessions Judge, Rewa [MP], which is self-
    explanatory.

          I shall be grateful if you kindly get it examined and
    do the needful.
                                                                  D
                                              Yours sincerely,

                                              [R.K. MALVIYA]
    Shri H.R. Bhardwaj,
    Minister of State for Law, Justice &                          E
    Company Affairs, Government of India,
    NEW DELHI."
     39. The forwarding letter sent by the Government of India,
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of       F
Justice) dated 8.3.1996 reads as follows :
                      "No. L-19015/3/96-Jus
                        Government of India
                 Ministry of Law, Justice and C.A.
                      (Department of Justice)                     G
                            Jaisalmer House, Mansingh Road
                                       New Delhi, the 8/3/96.
      1)   The Chief Secretary
           to the Government of
                                                                  H
    232          SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (2012] 7 S.C.R.


A                 Madhya Pradesh,
                  BHOPAL.
           2)     The Registrar,
                  Madhya Pradesh High Court,
                  JABALPUR.
B
           Subject:   Reference from Sh. R.K. Malaviya, Member
                      of Parliament and Chairman, House
                      Committee, Rajya Sabha on representation of
                      Sh. R.C. Chandel District and Sessions Judge,
c                     Rewa (M.P.)

          Sir,

                I am directed to forward herewith a copy of letter
          dated 14.2.1996 alongwith its enclosure, received from
D         Shri R.K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman
          House Committee, Rajya Saba on the above subject for
          taking such action as may be considered appropriate.

                                                    Yours faithfully,
E                                                    (P.N. SINGH)
                      Under Secretary to the Government of India"

        40. The conduct of the appellant in involving an M.P. and
  the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter
F of the High Court concerning an administrative review petition
  filed by him for expunging adverse remarks in ACRs of 1993
  and 1994 is most reprehensible and highly unbecoming of a
  judicial officer. His conduct has tarnished the image of the
  judiciary and he disentitled himself from continuation in judicial
G service on that count alone. A Judge is expected not to be
  influenced by any external pressure and he is also supposed
  not to exert any influence on others in any administrative or
  judicial matter. Secondly and still worst, the appellant had an
  audacity to set up a plea in the rejoinder that he never made
H
   R.C. CHANDEL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.                    233
                [R.M. LODHA, J.]
any representation to Shri R.K. Malaviya, M.P. for any purpose          A
whatsoever. But for the appellant's approaching Shri R.K.
Malaviya and his request for help, Shri R.K. Malaviya would
have never written the letter quoted above to the then Minister
of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs. On this ground
also his writ petition was liable to be dismissed.                      B

     41. The learned Single Judge examined the administrative
decision of the Full Court to recommend to the Government to
compulsory retire the appellant as if he was sitting as an
_appellate authority to consider the correctness of such
recommendation by going into sufficiency and adequacy of the            C
materials which led the Full Court in reaching its satisfaction.
The whole approach of the Single Judge in consideration of the
matter was flawed and not legally proper. The learned Single
Judge proceeded to examine the materials by observing, "The
entire record pertaining to complaints against the petitioner has       D
also been produced before me during the course of argument
by learned senior counsel for respondent no. 1. Thus, I am
dealing each and every complaint one by one". We are afraid,
the learned Single Judge did not keep the scope of judicial
review in view while examining the validity of the order of             E
compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court
in the intra-court appeal was, thus, fully justified in setting aside
the impugned order.

     42. Learned senior counsel for the appellant placed heavy          F
reliance on a decision of this Court in Nand Kumar Verma1.
Having carefully considered Nand Kumar Verma1, we find that
the decision of this Court in Nand Kumar Verma1 has no
application on the facts of the present case. This is clear from
para 36 (Pg. 591) of the Report which reads as follows:
                                                                        G
     "36. The material on which the decision of the compulsory
     retirement was based, as extracted by the High Court in
     the impugned judgment, and material furnished by the
     appellant would reflect that totality of relevant materials
                                                                        H
    234        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A         were not considered or completely ignored by the High
          Court. This leads to only one conclusion that the subjective
          satisfaction of the High Court was not based on the
          sufficient or relevant material. In this view of the matter, we
          cannot say that the service record of the appellant was
B         unsatisfactory which would warrant premature retirement
          from service. Therefore, there was no justification to retire
          the appellant compulsorily from service."

    Nand Kumar Verma 1, thus, turned on its own facts.

C      43. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the
   recommendation made by the High Court to the Government
  for compulsory retirement of the appellant and the order of
  compulsory retirement issued by the Government do not suffer
  from any legal flaw. The order of compulsory retirement is
D neither arbitrary nor irrational justifying any interference in
  judicial review. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench
  is not legally unsustainable warranting any interference by this
  Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

E        44. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order
    as to costs.

    8.8.B.                                         Appeal dismissed.