R. BALAKRISHNA PILLAIversusSTATE OF KERALA AND ANR.

A                         R. BALAKRISHNA PILLAI
                                         v.
                       STATE OF KERALA AND ANR.

                              DECEMBER 5, 1995

B                   [A.M. AHMADI C.J. AND S.C. SEN, J.]

          Code of Criminal Procedure 1973-Sectio11 197 ( l)--Sanctio1r-Whe11
    11eeded-Allegation of c1iminal conspiracy against the accused-Sa11ction for
    prosecutio1r-!.P.C.-Sectio11 120-B.
c
          l.P.C.-Sectio11 21-Public servant-Meaning of-Whether a minister is
    a public servant-Held: Yes-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 197.

          The appellant had, allegedly, during his tenure as a minister for
    Electricity in Kerala, supplied electricity to a private unit in Karnataka
D   without obtaining the permission of the Government of Kerala Charges
    were framed against the appellant for criminal conspiracy under section
    120-B of I.P.C. well as under section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (1) (d) of
    the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

E         The High Court held that sanction under section 197(1) of the code
    of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not a sine qua non in relation to the
    charge of criminal conspiracy.

          On appeal, this Court

F         HELD : 1. Taking note of the provision of Article 167 (Article 164
    for Ministers), it was pointed out that the Chief Minister is paid from
    public exchequer for performing a public duty and is, therefore, a public
    servant within the meaning of Section 197 of the Code. So also a Minister
    and, therefore, on the analogy of the observations relating to the Chief
G   Minister, the Minister must also be held to be a public servant. Since he
    is appointed or dismissed by the Governor, he would fall within the
    expression a public servant not removable from his office save by or with
    the sanction oftbe Government. In the instant case as pointed out r•dier,
    by virtue of the provisions in the General Clauses Act, 1897 the e:;pression
H   'Government' used in Section 197 would mean the Governor in the case of
                                         236
                     R.BALAKRISHNAPILLAI 1'.STATE                       237

a Chief Minister or a Minister. That being >O, a Minister would be entitled A
to the protection of Section 197(1) of the code. [240-E-G]

         M. Kaiunanidhi v. Union of Ind:., [1979] SCR 254, relied on.

         Namdeo Kashinath Alier v. H.G. Vwtak & Anr, AIR (1970) Born 385,
cited.
                                                                              B

      2.1 The question whether the acts complained of had a direct nexus
or relation with the discharge of ollicial duties by the concerned public
servant would depend on ~he facts of each case. There can be no general
proposition that whenever there is a charge of criminal conspiracy levelled C
against a public servant in or out of the ollice the bar of Section 197(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure would have no application. Such a view
would render Section 197(1) of the Code specious. [241-D]
                           I
         Harihar Prasad v. The State of Bihar, [1972] 3 SCC 89, distinguished. D

         2.2. It is not every offence committed by a public servant while
engaged in the performance of his official duty which is entitled to the
protecl;on. Only an act constituting an offence directly or reasonably
connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution.
                                                                    [242-A]   E
         B. Saha & Ors. v. M.S. Kochar, [1979] 4 SCC 177, relied on.

       2.3. The criminal conspiracy alleged against the appellant is that
while functioning as the Minister for Electricity he without the consent
of the Government of Kerala supplied certain units of electricity to a F
private industry in Karnataka. Obviously, he did this in the discharge
of his duties as a Minister. The allegation is that it was an illegal act
in as much as the consent of the Government of Kerala was not obtained
before this arrangement was entered into and the supply was effected.
It is, therefore, clear Crom the charge that the act alleged is directly and G
reasonably connected with his official duty as a Minister and would,
therefore, attract the protection of Section 197(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 was a sine qua non in relation to the charge
of Criminal Conspiracy. [242-F-G, 243-A]                                     H
    238                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    1742 of 1995.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.94 of the Kerala High
    Court in Cr!. R.P. No. 962 of 1994.

B        U.R. Lalit,    R.F. Nariman, E.M.S. Anam and F. Anam for the
    Appellants.

          T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer and M.T. George for the Respondents.

C         P.S. Poti, K. Sukumaran and Ms. Malini Poduval for the Intervenor.

          The following Order of the Court was delivered :

          Special leave granted.

D          Two questions were raised before the High Court, namely, (i)
    whether sanction under Section 197(1) of th.e Coc'e of Criminal Procedure
    (hereinafter called the 'Code') was required for the prosecution under the
    prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and (ii) whether sanction under Sec-
    tion 6 of that Act was a pre-requisite for the prosecution of an accused
E   public servant under Section 5 thereof even when such public servant had
    ceased to be a public servant on the date of taking cognizance of the
    offence by the Special Judge? In order to appreciate the exact point arising
    in this case and raised in this appeal, it is necessary to refer to the charge
    framed by the learned Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge,
    Thiruvananthpuram. The charge framed is in two parts. The first part is to
F   the effect that the accused Shri P. Balakrishna Pillai while functioning as
    Minister for Electricity, Government of Kerala, between May, 1982 and
    5.6.85 and his co-accused while functioning as Technical Member/Chair-
    man of the Kerala State Electricity Board, Thiruvananthapuram, between
    1.2.84 and 30-11-1985, in their capacity as such public servants during the
G   period from July, 1984 to November, 1985 entered into a criminal con-
    spiracy to sell electricity to the State of Karnataka to be supplied to Mis.
    Graphite India Limited, Bangalore, Karnataka State, without the consent
    of the Government of Kerala, which was an illegal act under provisions of
    the Electricity (supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules
H   and in pursuance of the said conspiracy he abused his official position and
                  R. BALAKRI SHNA PILLAI v. STA'.fE                    239

illegally sold 12241440 units to M/s. Graphite' India Limited, Karnataka     A
(the Karnataka Party) during the months of October, 1984 and May, 1985
and thereby caused the said private pare'./ to obtain undue pecuniary
advantage to the lune of Rs. 19, 58, 630.40 and more by way of resultant
profit to the industry and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code. The second charge relates to the           B
commission of an offence punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section
5(1)(d) of the Prevention of corruptrnn Act with which we are not con-
cerned because it was not contended before us by counsel for the appellant
that sanction under Section 197 of the Code was required insofar as that
charge was concerned.
                                                                             c
       Section 197(1) provides that when any person who is or was a public
servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the
Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by
him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,
no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous D
sanction - (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may
be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in
connection w;th the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; and
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at
the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with
the affairs of a State, of the State Government.                             E

       We may mention that the Law Commission in its 41st Report in
paragraph 15.123 while dealing with Section 197, as it then stood, observed
"it a['pears to us that protection under the sections needed as much after
retirement of the public servant as before retirement. The protection F
afforded by the section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a
private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the public servant
ceased to hold his official position, and then to lodge a complaint. The
ultimate justification for the protection conferred by SectiOn 197 is the
public interest in seeing that official acts do not lead to needless or G
vexatious prosecutions. It should be left to the Government to determine
from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any
public servant". It was in pursuance of this observation that the expression
'was' came to be employed after the expression 'is' to make the sanction
applicable even in cases where a retired public servant is sought to be
prosecuted.                                                                  fl
    240                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP.6 S.C.R.

A          A Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of
    India, [1979] 3 SCR 254 was required to consider whether a Chief Minister
    was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal
    Code and Section 197 of the Code. This Court referred to the decision of
    the High Court of Bombay In Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H. G. Vmtak &
B   Anr., AIR (1970) Bombay 385 and extracted the following passage there-
    from:

            "Whatever be the practical and actual position, the fact remains
            that it is the Governor who can accept the resignation of the
            Ministry or Minister and it is the Governor again who can dismiss
c           or remove the Minister from office. Under Section 3(60) of the
            General Clauses Act, 1897, the word 'State Government' has been
            defined. Clause (c) of Section 3(60) is applicable to the present
            case and, therefore, the State Government is to mean the Governor
            for the purpose of the present case. The result, therefore, is that
D           accused No. 1 is a public servant who can be said to be removable
            only by the State Government, meaning thereby the Governor, and
            I do not find any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the
            second requirement of Section 197, Cr.P.C. also is fully satisfied
                                                   1
            as far as accused No. 1 is concerned.'
E
    Taking not of the provisions of Article 167 (Article 164 for Ministers), it
    was pointed out that the Chief Minister is paid form public exchequer for
    performing a public duty and is, therefore a public servant within the
    meaning of Section 197 of the Code. So also a Minister of a State is paid
F   from its public exchequer, he is paid doing the duty entrusted to him as a
    Minister and, therefore, on the analogy of the observations relating to the
    Chief Minister, the Minister must also be held to be a public servant. Since
    he is appointed or dismissed by the Governor, he would fall within the
    expression 'a public servant not removable from his office save by or with
    the sanction of the Government'. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier,
G by virtue of the provisions in the General Clauses Act. 1897 the expression
    'Government' used in Section 197 would mean the Governor in the case of
    a Chief Minister or a Minister. That being so, we are of the opinion that a
    Minister would be entitled to the protection of Section 197(1) of the Code.

H         The next question is whether the offence alleged against the appel-
                   R. BALAKRI SHNAPILLAI v. STATE                           241

!ant can be said to have committed by him while acting or purporting to            A
act in the discharge of his official duty. It was contended by the learned
counsel for the State that the charge of conspiracy would not attract
Section 197 of the Code for the simple reason that it is no part of the duty
of a Minister while discharging his official duties to enter into a criminal
conspiracy. In support of his contention, he placed strong reliance on the         B
decision of this Court in Harihar Prasad v. The State of Bihar, (1972) Crl.
L.J. 707 = [1972] 3 SCC 89. He drew our attention to the observations in
paragraph 74 of the judgment where the Court, while considering the
question whether the acts complained of were directly concerned with the
official duties of the concerned public servants, observed that it was no          C
duty of a public servant to enter into a criminal conspiracy and hence want
of sanction under Section 197 of the Code was no bar to the prosecution.
The question whether the acts complained of had a direct nexus or relation
with the discharge of official duties by the concerned public servant would
depend on the facts of each case. There can be no general proposition that
whenever there is a charge of criminal conspiracy levelled against, a public       D
servant in or out of office the bar of Section 197(1) of the Code would have
no application. Such a view would render Section 197(1) of the Code
specions. Therefore, the question would have to be examined in the facts
of each case. The observations were made by the court in the special facts
of that case which clearly indicated that the criminal conspiracy entered          E
into by the three delinquent public servants had no relation whatsoever
with their official duties and, therefore, the bar of Section 197(1) was not
attracted. It must also be remembered that the said decision was rendered
keeping in view Section 197(1), as it then stood, but we do not base our
decision on that distinction. Our attention was next invited to a three-Judge      F
decision in B. Saha & Ors. v. M.S. Kochar, [1979] 4 SCC 177. The relevant
observations relied upon are to be found in paragraph 17 of the judgment.
It is pointed out that the words 'any offence alleged to have been com-
mitted by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty' employed Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of both a
narrow and a wide interpretation but their Lordships pointed out that if           G
they were construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether
sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never
can be". At the same time, if they were too widely construed, they will take
under their umbrella every act constituting an offence committed in the
course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or          H
    242                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A is purported to be performed. The right approach, it was pointed out, was
  to see that the meaning of this expression lies between these two extremes.
  While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public
  servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is
  entitled to the protection. Only an act constituting an offence directly or
B reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for
  prosecution. To put it briefly, it is the quality of the act that is important,
  and if it falls within the scope of the afore-quoted words, the protection of
  Section 197 will have lo be extended to the concerned public servant. This
  decision, therefore, points out what approach the Court should adopt while
  construing Section 197(1) of the Code and its application to the facts of
C the case on hand.

         In the present case, the appellant is charged with having entered into
  a criminal conspiracy with the co-accused while functioning as a Minister.
  The criminal conspiracy alleged is that he sold electricity to an industry in
D the State of Karnataka 'without the consent of the Government of Kerala
  which is an illegal act' under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
  1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. The
  allegation is that he in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his
  official position and illegally sold certain units to the private industry in
E Bangalore (Karnataka) which profited the private industry to the tune of
  Rs. 19, 58, 630.40 or more and it is, therefore, obvious that the criminal
  conspiracy alleged against the appellant is that while functioning as the
  Minister for Electricity he without the consent of the Government of
  Kerala supplied certain units of electricity to a private industry in Kar-
F nataka. Obviously, he did this in the discharge of his duties as a Minister.
  The allegation is that it was an illegal act inasmuch as the consent of the
  Government of Kerala was not obtained before this arrangement was
  entered into and the supply was effected. For that reason, it is said that he
  had committed an illegality and hence he was liable to be punished for
G criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B, l.P.C. It is, therefore, clear from
  the charge that the act alleged is directly and reasonably connected with
  his official duty as a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection
   of Section 197(1) of the Act.


H          For the above reasons, we are unable to accept the view taken by the
                 R. BALAKRI SHNAPILLAI v. STATE                    243

High Court of Kerala insofar as the requirement of sanction under Section A
197(1) of the Code is concerned, in relation to the charge of criminal
conspiracy. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the
High Court insofar as that charge is concerned, and hold that sanction
under Section 197(1) of the Code was a sine qua non. As pointed out
earlier so far as the second charge under Section 5(2) read with Section B
5(1){d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, the view of the
High Court remains undisturbed. The appeal is allowed accordingly and
will stand so disposed of.

B.K.M.                                                 Appeal allowed.