Holding

The two statements made by the deceased are valid dying declarations that inspire confidence and may be relied upon as the sole basis for conviction under s.302 read with s.34 IPC.

Summary

The victim Sher Singh was set on fire after being doused with kerosene by the accused Purshottam Chopra and Suresh (telwala). While in critical condition with 100% burns, he gave two statements – one to Dr. Sushma (recorded in an MLC) and another to SI Rajesh Kumar – which were treated as dying declarations. The trial court and Delhi High Court convicted the accused under IPC s.302 read with s.34, relying solely on these statements. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the admissibility of the dying declarations, the victim’s fitness to testify despite severe burns, the lack of magistrate attestation, thumb‑impression issues, and the self‑immolation theory raised by a witness. The Court held that both statements inspire confidence, satisfy the requirements of a dying declaration, and can be relied upon without corroboration. Consequently, the murder conviction stands and the appeals are dismissed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the two statements as dying declarations and whether they can form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration.
Whether the victim’s 100% burn injuries affected his fitness to make a voluntary dying declaration.
The impact of the absence of a magistrate’s attestation, thumb impression, and compliance with procedural rules on the validity of the dying declarations.
The credibility of the self‑immolation theory suggested by PW‑6 and its bearing on the prosecution case.
Whether the offence should be reduced from murder (s.302 IPC) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (s.304 Part II).
The necessity of proving a motive for a murder conviction.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304(Part II), s. 34

Subjects

Dying declarationMurderIPC s.302Section 34CorroborationBurn injuriesThumb impressionSelf‑immolationAppellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2020] 1 S.C.R. 341 341

PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA & ANR. A
v.
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 194-195 of 2012)
JANUARY, 07, 2020 B
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
s. 302 r/w s. 34 – Murder – By two accused – Setting the
deceased on fire – Information given to Police Control Room (PCR) C
– Officials of PCR took the victim to the hospital – Statement made
by the victim to the doctor (PW 8) who prepared MLC, accusing the
appellants (accused persons) for the incident – Statement later made
to police Sub-Inspector (PW16) accusing the appellants – Trial Court
relying on the Dying Declarations convicted the accused and
D
sentenced them to life imprisonment – High Court affirmed the
conviction and sentence – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: The
two statements of the victim have rightly been accepted as Dying
Declaration – The Dying Declarations inspire confidence and could
be relied and acted upon even without corroboration – Suggestion
as to self-immolation as occurring in the statement of PW-6 was of E
a remote hearsay and hence cannot be accepted – The burden to
establish the self-immolation theory was on the accused, in which
it failed – The act of pouring kerosene and then putting the person
on fire, has all the ingredients of doing an act with the intention of
causing death in a gruesome manner – Hence the conviction cannot
F
be altered to one u/s. 304 (Part II) – Conviction u/s. 302/34 and
sentence of life imprisonment affirmed.
Dying Declaration:
Principles relating to recording of Dying Declaration –
Discussed. G
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A dying declaration could be the sole basis of
conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence
of the Court. The Court should be satisfied that the declarant
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342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and
that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of
tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where a dying declaration is
suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit
state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be
acted upon without corroborative evidence. When the eye-
B
witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious
state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration
nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but
the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the
C maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the
statement. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely
necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure
authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be
requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be
obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the
D
dying declaration. As regards a burns case, the percentage and
degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility
of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality
of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to
make the statement. If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the
E statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also
finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in
recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.
[Para 21] [384-E-H; 385-A-C]
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710
F – followed.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh (2013) 14 SCC
159 : [2013] 8 SCR 968 ; Bhagwan v. State of
Maharashtra (2019) 8 SCC 95 ; State of Punjab v. Gian
Kaur and Anr. AIR 1998 SC 2809 ; Uka Ram v.
G State of Rajasthan JT 2001 (4) SC 472 : [2001] 2 SCR
1052 ; Dalip Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR
1979 SC 1173 ; Gopal Singh and Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1972 SC 1557;
Thurukanni Pompiah and Anr. v. State of Mysore AIR
1965 SC 939 – relied on.
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PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 343

Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra A
Pradesh 1999 CriLJ 4321 ; Koli Chunilal Savji and
Anr. v. State of Gujarat 1999 CriLJ 4582 ; Vijay Pal v.
State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2015) 4 SCC
749 : [2015] 3 SCR 394 ; Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda
v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1
B
SCR 88 ; Kalabai v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019
SCC ONLINE SC 621 – referred to.
1.2 In the MLC report (Ex. PW-8/A), PW-8 specifically
mentioned the particulars and information as given out by the
victim himself. PW-8 had been categorical in her assertion that
the patient had himself informed her about the alleged history C
behind his sustaining burn injuries. There is absolutely nothing
on record to disbelieve or even doubt the statement of PW-8. On
the contrary, such recording of the expressions verbatim by the
doctor lends credence to her testimony and the document
prepared by her. With this testimony of PW-8, it is established D
beyond doubt that in his first version in the hospital, the victim
asserted that the accused persons poured kerosene oil on him
and set him on fire. It is also established that accused (appellant
No. 2) was identified by the victim as ‘telwala’ and it has not been
doubted that in the slang expressions, the reference had been to
the one dealing in some kind of oil business. These are the first E
traces with names and slight particulars of the assailants. In the
sequence of circumstances, the expressions have rightly been
fastened on the appellants. [Para 23.1] [386-B-E]
1.3 It is clear from the contents of Ex. PW-8/A about the
condition of the victim that though the doctor found him to be in F
critical condition with 100% deep burns yet, he was conscious
and oriented. Such significant noting about the mental faculties
of the victim at the time of giving out the narratives to the doctor
makes it clear that even when he was suffering from the agony of
100% deep burns, he was not in an unfit state of mind; and there G
appears no reason to disbelieve his first version as recorded in
Ex. PW-8/A. [Para 23.2] [386-G-H; 387-A]
1.4 The statement (Ex.PW-16/B) said to have been made
by the victim to PW-16 [police offifical) as recorded in hospital in
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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A Hindi language, has in fact been the pivot of the prosecution case.
This statement as also the testimony of PW-16 has undergone
thorough scrutiny by the Trial Court as also by the High Court.
[Para 24] [387-B-C]
1.5 On examining testimony of PW-16 as also the contents
B of Ex. PW-16/B,it is found that there is no reason to take any
view different. The presence of PW-16 in that hospital at the
relevant point of time has not been questioned and it is clearly
established on record that before recording the statement of the
victim, he moved the application Ex. PW-16/A whereupon PW-
17 [doctor] declared the patient fit for making statement.
C Thereafter, PW-16 proceeded to record the statement of victim
and it has not been shown on record if anyone related with
deceased was present at the time of recording of his statement
by PW-16. Any possibility of tutoring or prompting is totally ruled
out. In the statement, the victim even stated the registration
D number of the vehicle he was employed and gave out the names
and addresses of the appellants while stating their respective
roles in the incident in question. At the time of making the said
statement, the victim was suffering from 100% deep burn injuries
and was in a critical condition. In the given state, elaboration on
the motive etc., was least expected from him. PW-16 appears to
E have recorded whatever was given out by the victim; and there
appears nothing of any manipulation by him. [Para 24] [387-C-F]
1.6 In the given set of circumstances, there is no infirmity
that the Trial Court and the High Court accepted that the victim
was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. It has also not
F been established on record that the statements of the victim were
an outcome of tutoring or figment of imagination. In other words,
the statements appear to be voluntary and were given in a fit
state of mind. In the given set of circumstances, the statements
so made by the victim could be acted upon as dying declarations.
G [Para 25] [388-B-C]
1.7 The expectations in the Delhi High Court Rules that
the dying declaration be recorded by a Judicial Magistrate; the
fitness of the declarant be examined; the statement be in the

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PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 345

form of simple narrative; signature or thumb impression of the A
declarant be obtained etc. are all, obviously, intended to ensure
that the dying declaration is recorded in the manner that its
credence does not remain questionable. However, a particular
statement, when being offered as dying declaration and satisfies
all the requirements of judicial scrutiny, cannot be discarded
B
merely because it has not been recorded by a Magistrate or that
the police officer did not obtain attestation by any person present
at the time of making of the statement. Even in this regard, the
witness PW-19 has pointed out that when asked to attest the
statement of the victim as recorded by PW 16 the doctor pointed
out that the facts had already been mentioned in the MLC and C
there was no need to attest the statement. Taking an overall view
of the matter, there is no reason that the statement Ex. PW-16/B
be discarded only for want of its recording by a Magistrate or for
want of attestation. [Para 25.1] [388-E-H; 389-A]
1.8 The extent of burn injuries – going beyond 92% and D
even to 100% - would not, by itself, lead to a conclusion that
victim of such burn injuries may not be in a position to make the
statement. Irrespective of the extent and gravity of burn injuries,
when the doctor had certified him to be in fit state of mind to
make the statement; and the person recording the statement
was also satisfied about his fitness for making such statement; E
and when there does not appear any inherent or apparent defect,
the dying declaration cannot be discarded. The juristic theory
regarding acceptability of statement made by a person who is at
the point of death has its fundamentals in the recognition that at
the terminal point of life, every motive to falsehood is removed F
or silenced. To a fire victim like that of present case, the gravity
of injuries is an obvious indicator towards the diminishing hope
of life in the victim; and on the accepted principles, acceleration
of diminishing of hope of life could only obliterate the likelihood
of falsehood or improper motive. Of course, it may not lead to
the principle that gravity of injury would itself lead to G
trustworthiness of the dying declaration. There could still be some
inherent defect for which a statement, even if recorded as dying
declaration, cannot be relied upon without corroboration.

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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A Therefore, merely for 100% burn injuries, it cannot be said that
the victim was incapable to make a statement which could be
acted upon as dying declaration. [Para 25.2] [389-C-G]
Vijay Pal v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2015)
4 SCC 749 : [2015] 3 SCR 394 ; Bhagwan v. State of
B Maharashtra (2019) 8 SCC 95 ; State of Punjab v. Gian
Kaur and Anr. AIR 1998 SC 2809 ; Dalip Singh and
Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 1173 – relied on.
1.9 As regards the suggestions that the alleged statements
Ex. PW-8/A and PW-16/B are manipulated and manufactured,
C there had not been shown any reason for which PW-8 and PW-16
would manufacture any such document. The doubts sought to be
suggested about availability of thumb impression of the victim
on the statement Ex. PW-16/B also deserve to be rejected. In
the case of burns, the skin of a small part of the body like thumb
may remain intact; and it is essentially a question of fact as to
D whether skin of thumb had also been burnt completely. Even when
the victim was carrying 100% deep burns, as per the post-mortem
report, peeling of skin was noticed on dorsum of hands and
therefore, taking of thumb impression on Ex. PW-16/B is not
ruled out. The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High
E Court in accepting the thumb impression on Ex. PW-16/B do not
appear calling for any interference. [Para 25.3] [389-G-H;
390-A-D]
Bhagwan v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 8 SCC 95 ;
State of Punjab v. Gian Kaur and Anr. AIR 1998 SC
F 2809 – relied on.
1.10 In such fire injury case, no adverse conclusion can be
drawn against the statement made by the victim about his having
consumed some liquor and for this reason, the reliability of all
other facts stated in his statement cannot be doubted. If he had
G consumed liquor, there was less probability of his talking
coherently. It is difficult to say that victim was unable to make
the statement coherently. [Para 25.4] [390-E-F; H]
1.11 Therefore, the two statements Ex. PW-8/A and Ex.
PW-16/B have rightly been accepted as dying declarations of the
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PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 347

victim, as made few hours before his demise and there is no A
reason to discard the same. In the given set of facts and
circumstances, where these two dying declarations inspire
confidence, They could be relied and acted upon even without
corroboration. [Para 25.5] [391-A-B]
2.1 The version as attempted to be given by PW6 in the B
cross-examination that the victim had at the first point of time
made the statement about self-immolation for the reason of himself
having been dropped from tempo has rightly been rejected by
the Trial Court and by the High Court. This witness did not state
anything in his examination-in-chief about the victim having told
anyone about self-immolation and therefore, there was no occasion C
for the prosecution to declare him hostile and to confront him
with his previous statement. Moreover, though the story about
the victim having asserted that he had set himself on fire came to
be introduced by this witness in his cross-examination on behalf
of the appellant No. 1 but the value and worth of such suggestion D
was effectively demolished by this witness himself in his further
statement in cross-examination on behalf of the appellant No. 2
where he categorically stated that “victim has not told the people
present in my presence that he had put himself on fire”. Obviously,
the suggestion as occurring in the statement of PW-6 about self-
immolation by the victim had been of a remote hearsay and is not E
of any worth at all. [Paras 26 and 26.1] [391-C-D, F-H; 392-A]
2.2 The plea about want of examination of other persons
named by PW-6 falls to the ground because such names and their
roles came to be introduced only in the statement made by PW-6
in his cross-examination. The theory of self-immolation as also F
the names of the other persons, who allegedly reached the spot,
having come up by way of cross-examination of PW-6, the burden
was on the accused persons to establish such theory by cogent
evidence. No such attempt was made on behalf of the accused-
appellants to prove any such fact or to examine any such named G
person. [Para 26.2] [392-B-C]
3. The plea that the prosecution has not been able to
establish the identity of assailants in this crime, has no substance

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348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A when the particulars as occurring in the two statements Ex. PW-
8/A and Ex. PW-16/B are examined and analysed, wherein
occupation of at least one of the assailant and then the names and
addresses of both the appellants came to be mentioned. For this
very reason, the other contention that the incident took place in
a crowded market place and the appellants were not seen by
B
anyone also pales into insignificance. [Para 27.1] [392-G-H;
393-A]
4. The establishment of the motive for crime is also of no
effect because, in the first place, in a death case, the motive
remains essentially known to the deceased and to the offender;
C and a prosecution case cannot fail only for want of proof of motive.
This apart, in the present case, the indications of an existing
dispute of the deceased with appellant No. 1 do appear in the
testimony of the brother of the deceased, PW-1. It is also noticed
that the deceased and the accused persons were the residents of
D the same locality. [Para 27.2] [393-B]
5. The High Court has rightly relied upon the information
reflected in Parts II, III and IV of PCR form, which clearly show
that not only the initial information was recorded about the victim
being on fire but further information were recorded from time to
E time during the course of transporting and admitting the victim
to hospital, where not only his address came to be mentioned but
the names of the assailants also surfaced. The said document
having been produced before the Court and its copy having been
taken on record, with PW-7 having proved the same, it would not
be justified to discard it. [Para 27.3] [393-D-E]
F
6. As regards the statement of PW-18 ASI who asserted
that the victim, while being taken to hospital in PCR Van and
even in hospital, did not speak to him and was only crying in pain,
Some of the remarks appear justified. However, this aspect does
not require further dilation for the other facts established on
G record, including the fact that the victim was conscious and
oriented at the time of admission to the hospital and made the
statements in a fit state of mind. [Para 27.4] [393-F; 394-A-B]
7. The act of pouring kerosene over a person and then
putting him on fire by lighting a match has all the ingredients of
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PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 349

doing an act with the intention of causing death of a person in a A
gruesome manner. The conviction of the appellants for the offence
of murder appears justified and there is no reason to convert the
same into any offence of lesser degree i.e. u/s. 304 (Part II).
[Para 27.5] [394-C-D]
Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra B
(1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88 – referred to.
8. When it has come on record that appellant No. 1 was
with the appellant No. 2 when the victim was threatened and was
put on fire, the conviction of this appellant under Section 302/34
IPC remains unexceptionable. The suggestion of no likelihood C
of appellant No. 1 throwing kerosene on the head of the deceased
deserves to be rejected without much dilation. [Para 27.6] [394-
E-F]
Case Law Reference
AIR 1998 SC 2809 relied on Para 14 D
[2001] 2 SCR 1052 relied on Para 14
AIR 1979 SC 1173 relied on Para 14
AIR 1972 SC 1557 relied on Para 14
AIR 1965 SC 939 relied on Para 14 E

[1985] 1 SCR 88 referred to Para 14.5
(2019) SCC ONLINE SC 621 referred to Para 15.2
(2002) 6 SCC 710 followed Para 16
F
[2013] 8 SCR 968 relied on Para 16
(2019) 8 SCC 95 relied on Para 16
1999 CriLJ 4321 referred to. Para 18.1
1999 CriLJ 4582 referred to Para 18.1
G
[2015] 3 SCR 394 relied on Para 19.1
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 194-195 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2011 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. Appeal Nos. 121 of 1999 and 139 of 1999. H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A Ms. Neha Kapoor, Mohit Rhadu, Milind Kumar, Jagjit Singh
Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, Sr. Adv., Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Abhay
Kumar, B. V. Balaram Das, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Preliminary
1. By way of these appeals, the appellants have called in question
the judgment and order dated 23.05.2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 121 of
C 1999 and Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 1999 whereby, the High Court of
Delhi has affirmed the judgment and order dated 30.01.1999 in Sessions
Case No. 2 of 1998 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi; and has
upheld the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’).
D 2. In a brief outline of the material aspects, it could be noticed that
in the present case, the appellants are accused of causing death of one
Sher Singh by putting him on fire. There had been no eye-witness to the
incident but the prosecution has relied upon two statements said to have
been made by the deceased after the incident: one when he was admitted
to the hospital with 100% burns and another when he was under treatment,
E
respectively to a doctor and to a police officer. The Trial Court as also
the High Court have accepted these statements as being his dying
declarations wherein the appellants were named as the assailants.
Therefore, the appellants stand convicted essentially on the basis of the
dying declarations of the victim. The reliability of such dying declarations
F has been assailed in these appeals apart from other contentions concerning
the surrounding factors. The relevant facts and background aspects of
the matter could be noticed, keeping in view of the points arising for
determination in these appeals.
The relevant facts and background
G 3. Put in brief, the prosecution case had been that on 18.12.1997,
at about 3.00-3.15 p.m., hearing the screams of a person and noticing
smoke coming from plot no. 17 situated near Goverdhan Park, Uttam
Nagar, Delhi, a lot of people gathered at the spot and saw that a man
was ablaze with his entire body covered with fire; and the people so
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 351
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

gathered made efforts to put out the flames by throwing water over the A
said person. The information as regards this incident was received in the
Police Control Room (‘PCR’) through a phone call from some unknown
person at 3.28 p.m. by Ct. Anju (PW-7), who made an entry bearing No.
467 in Form I (Ex. PW-7/A) and passed on the information to the nearest
Police Station. The concerned officers from PCR reached the spot and
B
shifted the injured person to Safdarjung Hospital for treatment, where
Dr. Sushma (PW-8) prepared the MLC (Ex. PW-8/A). While preparing
the MLC, the injured person identified himself as Sher Singh and gave
his address; and narrated the incident that had led to his current condition
while accusing one Purshottam and another Suresh (telwala), both
residents of A-block, Uttam Nagar, Delhi as his assailants 1. C
4. Simultaneously, SI Rajesh Kumar (PW-16) and Ct. Vijay
Parkash (PW-13) reached the site of incident and were apprised that
the injured person had been shifted to the hospital. SI Rajesh Kumar left
Ct. Vijay Parkash on the spot and himself reached the hospital, only to
find that the injured person was admitted in ICU. SI Rajesh Kumar D
collected the MLC prepared for the injured person; and moved an
application (Ex. PW-16/A) before the concerned doctor to take the
statement of the injured person. When Dr. Rajesh Verma (PW-17)
certified that the patient was fit to make the statement, SI Rajesh Kumar
recorded his statement (Ex. PW-16/B) wherein the injured person –
Sher Singh – gave out his name and address and then stated that he had E
purchased half a bottle of liquor from one Suresh (telwala), who had an
oil depot; that he drank such liquor; that Purshottam also had an oil
depot; and that while Suresh poured the kerosene oil over him and lit him
aflame, Purshottam was present.2
5. Thereafter, the SHO and Additional SHO of Police Station F
Vikas Puri reached the hospital. After recording the statement of injured,
SI Rajesh Kumar left the hospital, only to arrive back at the site of
incident and sent Ct. Vijay Parkash to register a complaint for the offence
punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC and hence, FIR
No. 780 of 1997 came to be registered. During this time, SI Rajesh G
Kumar got the site photographed; prepared the site plan; seized one
piece of burnt cloth (white colour), one half bottle of liquor, one white
1
These persons Purshottam and Suresh are the appellants herein.
2
The contents of this statement (Ex. PW-16/B) as also the MLC (Ex. PW-8/A) are
taken as the dying declarations of the victim and shall be referred in detail hereafter
later. H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A colour container, one burnt sweater, one match box which contained
match sticks; prepared seizure memo of the articles; and deposited the
same with the Police Station at Vikas Puri.
6. On the basis of statement made by the injured Sher Singh, the
appellants Purshottam and Suresh were arrested in the night intervening
B 18/19.12.1997 from their respective houses. In the morning hours of
19.12.1997, the information of Sher Singh’s death was received which
resulted in the case being converted to one under Section 302 read with
Section 34 IPC and the investigation of the case was taken over by
Inspector Om Prakash, Additional SHO, Police Station Vikas Puri, who
conducted inquest proceedings over the dead body of Sher Singh before
C sending it for post-mortem on 19.12.1997. Dr. Arvind (PW-14) conducted
the post-mortem and opined that the cause of death was due to shock
consequent to 100% ante-mortem flame burns.
7. The investigating officer then prepared a scaled map; sent the
articles seized to office of CFSL, Chandigarh and thereafter collected
D the report; and filed the charge-sheet before the Magistrate, who
committed the case to the Court of Sessions.
The evidence
8. After committal, the case was tried as Sessions Case No. 2 of
E 1998 in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. In prosecution
evidence, a total of 19 witnesses were examined namely, PW-1 Raju
(brother of deceased); PW-2 Paali (brother of deceased); PW-3 Ct.
Mahender Singh; PW-4 Head Ct. Jagbir Singh; PW-5 L/Ct. Rajesh;
PW-6 Rajesh (the shop owner near the place of incident who allegedly
reached the spot and found the victim in flames); PW-7 L/Ct. Anju (who
F received the telephonic information in PCR and made an entry to that
effect); PW-8 Dr. Sushma (who had been working in Plastic and Burns
Ward in Safdarjang Hospital and who prepared the MLC as per the
alleged version of the victim); PW-9 Dr. H. K. Sharma (who signed the
death summary/discharge slip relating to the deceased victim); PW-10
G Head Ct. Ved Parkash; PW-11 Gurdeep Kumar (the photographer);
PW-12 Inspector Devender Singh (who prepared the scaled site plan);
PW-13 Ct. Vijay Parkash (who reached the place of incident with SI
Rajesh Kumar); PW-14 Dr. Arvind (who conducted post-mortem over
the dead body of victim); PW-15 Ct. Joginder Singh; PW-16 SI Rajesh
Kumar (who reached the place of incident with Ct. Vijay Parkash and
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 353
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

thereafter reached the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of A
the victim); PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma (who declared the victim fit for
giving statement); PW-18 Harish Ram (who transported the victim to
hospital from the place of incident in PCR van); and PW-19 Inspector
Om Parkash (who took over the investigation from SI Rajesh Kumar).
9. Out of the aforesaid witnesses, PW-3 Ct. Mahender Singh; B
PW-4 Head Ct. Jagbir Singh; PW-5 L/Ct. Rajesh; PW-10 Head Ct. Ved
Parkash; PW-11 Gurdeep Kumar; PW-12 Inspector Devender Singh;
and PW-15 Ct. Joginder Singh had been the formal witnesses related
with the process of investigation. However, in view of the contentions
urged and the issues involved, we may take note of the salient features
of the testimonies of other witnesses namely, the brothers of deceased, C
the person allegedly reaching the site upon noticing the incident, the
medical officers, and the police personnel.
9.1. PW-1 Raju, the elder brother of the deceased Sher Singh, led
in evidence, inter alia, to the effect that the appellants were the residents
of same locality as that of his brother; that the appellants were having D
separate kerosene depots; that they were workers for BJP; and that
prior to the murder of Sher Singh, dispute had taken place between his
brother and Purshottam but no police complaint was filed due to fear. In
his cross-examination, this witness stated that he came to know about
the quarrels of deceased with Purshottam Chopra from his mother. E
9.2. PW-2 Paali, also the brother of Sher Singh, led in evidence to
the effect that he had visited the mortuary to identify the dead body of
his brother. This witness stated that the deceased was living with him in
the same premises; that he was not aware if deceased used to consume
liquor but denied the suggestion that the deceased was a drunkard. F
9.3. PW-6 Rajesh, having a shop across the road where the
incident had taken place, in his examination-in-chief deposed that on
hearing the screams and seeing the smoke, he rushed to the spot; that
other people from the market had also reached there; that he saw a
person burning on fire; that they threw water from a nearby tap on the G
burning body of the victim who identified himself as Sher Singh; and that
someone from the market telephoned at number 100 whereupon the
police reached the spot.
9.3.1. In his cross-examination carried on behalf of the accused
Purshottam, this witness PW-6 Rajesh deposed that one has to pass
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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A from the street in front of his shop to reach plot No. 17 and there was no
other way/gali to reach plot No. 17 nor there was any other exit. This
witness further stated that upon hearing the screams, himself as also his
neighbourers Daljit Singh and Vicky from Ravindra Auto and one Rinku
rushed to the spot; that he had not seen any person running or going
from the spot. This witness further pointed out that they threw water on
B
the victim, who stated his name and also gave out his address. This
witness, inter alia, stated,-
“ …..Some public persons had enquired from the victim as to
who had put him on fire. He had told them that since he was
dropped from the tempo, he had set himself on fire…..”
C
This witness further attributed knowledge about some of the facts
to one Daljit and alleged that Daljit had seen the victim carrying kerosene
oil in polythene towards the plot. The witness stated, inter alia, as under:
“ …..Daljit had told me in the evening that he had seen the
D victim carrying the kerosene oil in a polythene towards that
plot. (Objected to by Ld. Addl. P.P.) Police had recorded my
statement and the statement of Rinku and Daljit in the same
evening. Volunteered the police had also recorded statement
of 10/12 persons. Daljit Singh and Rinku had not made these
statement to the police in my presence.
E
After 2/3 days of the incident, the T.V. persons had come at
plot no. 17 and had prepared a cassette. They had enquired
about the incident from me and Daljit Singh. My interview
was taken by City Cables. Interview of Daljit was taken by
City Cables. Daljit Singh had told city cables in his interview
F that he had seen the victim carrying kerosene oil in the
polythene to that plot. (Objected to by Ld. Addl. P.P.)”
9.3.2. On being subjected to cross-examination on behalf of the
accused Suresh, this witness stated that he was not present at the time
when Sher Singh told the public that he had put himself on fire after
G being dropped from the tempo. The relevant portion of his statement in
this cross-examination reads as under:
“….The victim Sher Singh had not told the public persons in
my presence that he had put himself on fire as he was dropped
from the tempo. About 100 or 120 persons had gathered at
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 355
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the place of incident within 5 minutes. Police had interrogated A
Tony and one other person from the same locality in my
presence on the next day and had recorded their statements.
Tony had stated to the police in his statement that victim was
telling that he had put himself on fire as he was dropped from
the tempo. (objected to) Tony had given the statement to police
B
in my presence. ….”
9.4. In all, four medical officers were examined in this matter.
PW-9 Dr. H.K. Sharma had been working in the Burns Ward of
Safdarjung Hospital where the victim was admitted on 18.12.1997 and
expired in the early hours of 19.12.1997. He got prepared the death
summary/discharge slip (Ex. PW-9/A). The statement made by this C
witness in cross-examination as regards the critical condition of the victim
and preparation of OPD slip have been referred in the contentions on
behalf of the appellants and hence, it would be apposite to take note of
his testimony in the cross-examination that reads as under:
“It is correct that the patient was in a very critical condition D
right from the time of admission. It is correct that the condition
of the patient went on deteriorating since time of his
admission. It is correct that the patient remained admitted
throughout in ICU. Death summary Ex. PW-9/A was prepared
on the basis of the recording in the patient file. First document E
prepared at the time of the patient was OPD slip. The name of
the informer was mentioned on the opd slip. I mentioned the
informant in Ex. PW-9/A to be ‘police’ from the OPD card.”
9.5. PW-14 Dr. Arvind had conducted post-mortem over the dead
body of the victim Sher Singh. In the external examination recorded by F
him, it had been recorded as under:
“…Burns injuries: (1) Cut down wound was present on the
lower end of right upper arm. (2) Dermo-eprdermai burns
superficial to deep in nature were present all over the body.
The total percentage of burns area was about 100%. The area G
of redness was present on four (sic) arms and front of chest.
The area of blackening of skin was present on face, front of
the chest. Peeling of skin was present on dorsome (sic) of
hands, Front of legs. Heat split lecerations were present on
front of left shoulder....No mark of violence of leg, signs of
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356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A struggle were present on the body. Smell of kerosene was
present in scalp hair.”
9.6. PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma deposed that he had declared the
patient to be fit for giving his statement and an endorsement was made
by him on the requisition Ex. PW-16/A provided by the Investigating
B Officer at mark ‘X’. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that
after admission, the condition of the patient was continuously
deteriorating; that he was under continuous medical watch; and that he
ultimately died at 4.00 a.m. This witness also stated that the patient was
under continuous medical attendance at ICU but denied the suggestion
that the certificate regarding fitness to make statement was obtained
C from him by the police in a routine manner.
9.7. PW-8 Dr. Sushma, one of the members of the Plastic and
Burns Ward had attended on the injured Sher Singh when he was admitted
to the hospital. She deposed, in her examination-in-chief, that Sher Singh
was initially brought to the burns causality; that Sher Singh himself gave
D the alleged history that he had sustained burn injuries when
Purshottam and Suresh (telwala) threatened him and then poured
kerosene on him and set him on fire. She also stated that on
examination, the patient was found conscious and oriented, though his
general condition was critical, being that the entire surface area of his
E body was found with 100% deep burns. The relevant contents of the
statement made by this witness PW-8 Dr. Sushma in her cross-
examination may also be taken note of in requisite details as under:
“I do not know if the patient was removed earlier to the main
casuality of Safdarjang hospital. Burns patient are brought
F directly to the casuality of burns ward. Victim Sher Sg. was
not accompanied by any relative/attendant. Police had brought
the patient in the casuality.
Death summary is prepared if the patient expires. Ex. PW-8/A
is the first document prepared by me.
G I do not remember if the patient was crying in agony when he
was brought at the casuality. As soon as the patient arrives at
the casuality, OPD slip is prepared by the Junior Resident.
On the OPD card it is decided if the patient is to be admitted
or to be sent back. MLC is prepared after the preparation of
OPD card. OPD card was before me when I prepared the
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 357
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

MLC Ex. PW-8/A. I have not recorded the fact in the MLC Ex. A
PW-8/A that the patient was brought by the police. I remember
this fact by memory. It is possible that some relations might
have accompanied the patient. The OPD card remains in the
patient file. It is incorrect to suggest that the patient had not
given any alleged history or that later at the suggestion of
B
the police I have prepared this MLC. No mark of identification
of the patient was obtained on the MLC Ex. PW-8/A. The whole
of the body of the patient including his thumbs were burnt.”
9.8. The testimonies of five police personnel related with this matter
also need to be taken note of. PW-7 L/Ct. Anju deposed that on
18.12.1997, she received information through a telephone call that some C
unknown person had set himself on fire near Uttam Nagar bus stand
and thereafter, she filled in the PCR form regarding this information at
Serial No. 467. The statement of this witness was deferred for want of
original record and she was further examined alongwith the original
proforma of PCR, photocopy whereof was taken on record as Exhibit D
PW-7/B.
9.9. PW-13 Ct. Vijay Parkash in his examination-in-chief stated
that at the relevant time, he was on emergency duty at Police Station
Vikas Puri and reached the spot with SI Rajesh Kumar after receiving
information about an injured person lying at Dal Mill Road, Goverdhan E
Park; and on reaching the said spot, they were informed that the injured
had already been shifted to the hospital by PCR Van. Thereafter, SI
Rajesh instructed him to remain at the spot and left for the hospital.
Upon his return from the hospital at about 09.50 p.m., SI Rajesh handed
him one rukka for registration of an FIR at the police station whereupon
he got recorded FIR at No. 780/97 and returned to the spot with a copy F
of FIR and thereafter assisted the Investigating Officer to collect/seize
certain articles from the spot, which were later sealed in an envelope. In
his cross-examination, this witness deposed as under:
“…There is a distance of about 1 ½ Km. between the PS and
the spot. About 15/20 public persons were already present at G
the spot when we reached there. Insp. Rajesh had not recorded
the statement of any person on reaching at the spot. After
Insp. Rajesh had returned at the spot at 9.50 P.M. from the
hospital, he did not record statement of any person in my
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358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A presence….I.O. had not called any public person at the time
of sealing the case property….”
9.10. PW-18 ASI Harish Ram stated in his examination-in-chief
that at the relevant time on 18.12.1997, he was posted in PCR West
Zone when they received a wireless message at around 3.30 p.m. that a
B person was in burnt condition near scooter market, Uttam Nagar and on
receiving this information, they immediately reached the spot in the Van
and found one male person in burnt condition at plot No. 17 Goverdhan
Park where about 20-30 persons had gathered; that they lifted the burnt
person in the PCR Van and removed him to Safdarjung Hospital; that
the name of victim came to be known as Sher Singh; that no public
C person accompanied them from the spot in PCR Van; and that the patient
was crying in pain on the way, he did not have any talk with them. In his
initial cross-examination, this witness stated that they did not make any
effort to talk to the burnt person as he was not in a condition to speak;
and that no relative of the patient met them at the hospital. In his further
D cross-examination, the witness admitted the fact that the first message
as received had been about the person having set himself on fire
whereupon they reached the spot. The witness pointed out that it took
them about 5-7 minutes to put the victim in the PCR Van but denied the
suggestion that the people present there informed that the patient put on
the fire himself. The witness stated that at the time of admitting the
E victim to hospital, he had given the name of victim as Sher Singh, as was
gathered from the persons present there; and repeated the assertion
that the victim was not in a position to speak so long as he remained in
the hospital and that the doctor had not enquired about the address of
the victim in his presence.
F 9.11. PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar, in his examination-in-chief deposed
that after a copy of DD No. 21A was handed over to him, he left with
Ct. Vijay Parkash for carrying out investigation; upon his reaching the
site, he was informed that the injured had been shifted to the hospital in
a PCR Van; he then left Ct. Vijay Parkash at the site and reached the
G hospital only to find that the injured was admitted in the ICU and thus
had sought permission through requisition Ex. PW-16/A from the
concerned doctor to record the statement of the injured. At about 7.50
p.m. the same day, he was informed that the patient was fit for giving
statement whereupon he recorded the statement Ex. PW-16/B verbatim

H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 359
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

and obtained the left thumb impression of Sher Singh. It was also stated A
by this witness that after recording the statement of Sher Singh, he went
back to the spot to carry out investigation and handed over rukka to Ct.
Vijay Parkash for registration of FIR. Thereafter, the site plan was drawn,
the site was photographed and certain articles were seized and sealed.
He further stated that he had effected arrest of the two accused persons
B
named by Sher Singh in the night intervening 18/19.12.1997; and that
after receiving information that Sher Singh had passed away in the
morning of 19.12.1997, the investigation was handed over to the Inspector
Om Parkash, Additional SHO.
9.11.1. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that when he
had gone to arrest the accused persons in the night and apprised them of C
the statement made by Sher Singh, the accused persons denied any
involvement in the commission of the said offence. He also deposed as
under:
“…On reaching at the spot, I did not make any investigation
regarding the information recorded in DD No. 21A that one D
person had set himself on fire. I did not investigate this fact
till the investigation remained with me.
*** *** ***
…I had made enquires from the public persons present there E
during my stay for about 20 or 25 minutes at the spot. At that
time, no evidence had come to show that injured Sher Singh
had put on fire by someone.”
9.11.2. PW-16 also stated that on reaching the hospital at about
5.45 to 6 p.m., he collected the MLC of Sher Singh and came to know F
that Sher Singh had held Purshottam and Suresh responsible for his
condition; he started recording the statement of the patient at about 8
p.m. and that no other doctor or nurse was with them at the time of
recording the statement. Though PW-16 stated that he did not put in any
efforts to call for SDM or MM to record the statement of Sher Singh,
yet he volunteered to state that he had sought opinion of the concerned G
doctor that if he could summon SDM or MM to record the statement but
the doctor stated that the condition of the injured had become critical.
He also stated that the injured Sher Singh had stopped talking by that
time.
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360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A 9.11.3. More specifically, in the cross-examination conducted on
behalf of the accused Suresh, PW-16 stated that the whole body of Sher
Singh was wrapped in bandages except his eyes, nose and mouth. He
denied the suggestion that the thumb impression on the statement was
forged and that the deceased was not in a position to put his thumb
impression on the statement recorded. The relevant part of his testimony
B
in this regard could also be usefully taken note of as under:
“The patient came out of the ICU at about 7.45 P.M. of 8
P.M.…. When I had moved an application for recording
statement of the patient, one doctor and one nurse were
present beside the patient. I had not requested the doctor and
C nurse in writing to remain present at the time of recording
dying declaration of the patient. (Volunteered I had requested
them orally). ….. I had not informed the doctor and nurse
about the consequences for not joining the investigation.
(Volunteered at that time I was not aware that the patient will
D be dying). When the patient was brought out of ICU I had
seen him burnt all over the body.
The whole body of the patient excluding eyes, nose and mouth
was wrapped with bandages. The ears were also not wrapped
with bandage. It is incorrect to suggest that Patient Sher Singh
E did not make any dying declaration and I had forged and
created falsely the dying declaration Ex. PW-16/B to be that
of deceased Sher Singh. It is incorrect to suggest that the
thumb impression at point A on Ex. PW-16/B has been forged
afterwards and deceased was not in a condition to put his
thumb impression. It is also incorrect to suggest that deceased
F Sher Singh had died in the ICU itself and was dead when
brought out of ICU.”
9.11.4. PW-16 also stated that he did not get the statement of
other witnesses from the spot or the nearby residential houses nor did he
make efforts to find out as to who had called the police to inform about
G the incident.
9.12. PW-19 Inspector Om Prakash had been the Additional SHO,
Police Station Vikas Puri who took over the case from SI Rajesh Kumar
on 19.12.1997. He prepared the inquest report in the presence of the
brothers of the deceased and sent the dead body for post-mortem and
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 361
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

after post-mortem handed over the same to his family members. This A
witness further pointed out that he recorded the statement of Rajesh at
the spot and made further enquiries but no other person gave the
statement. This witness, inter alia, stated that on 18.12.1997, he along
with SHO Police Station Vikas Puri had reached the hospital on getting
the information about the critical condition of victim and SI Rajesh Kumar
B
met them; at that time the victim was lying in adjoining room of ICU.
The witness further stated that when the doctor concerned was asked
to attest the statement of injured Sher Singh as recorded by SI Rajesh
Kumar, the doctor pointed out that the facts had already been mentioned
in the MLC and there was no need to attest the statement recorded by
SI Rajesh Kumar. In cross-examination the witness admitted the fact C
that in the related DD entry, the information recorded had been that one
person had put himself on fire. In the other part of cross-examination,
this witness was given the suggestions that when he was in-charge PP
Matiala, hot words were exchanged with accused persons and further
hot words were exchanged with them when he was in-charge PP East
D
Uttam Nagar regarding some demonstration of workers. It was yet further
suggested that one week prior to the incident, he had an altercation with
the accused persons. The witness, of course, denied such suggestions.
10. As noticed, the contents of two documents, namely, the MLC
report said to have been prepared by PW-8 Dr. Sushma (Ex. PW-8/A)
and the statement said to have been recorded by PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar E
(Ex. PW-16/B), form the core of this case inasmuch as the prosecution
has relied upon them as being the last statements made by Sher Singh
after the incident and few hours before his demise. Hence, the contents
of these documents also need to be taken note of.
10.1. In the MLC Ex. PW-8/A, said to have been prepared by F
PW-8 Dr. Sushma at 4.35 p.m. on 18.12.1997, the particulars of the
patient were stated as Sher Singh son of Ganpat Ram age 23 years
M and address as H-603, Pankha Rd. N. Delhi. While stating that the
time of burning was approximately 3.30 p.m. and time of admission was
4.35 p.m., it was also stated therein that the informant was the patient G
himself. The doctor noticed that the patient was ‘conscious, oriented’
and that he had suffered ‘burn injuries involving whole of the body
surface area-100% deep burn’. On the significant part, the doctor
stated the information given by the patient in the following terms:

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362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A “Alleged to have sustained burn injury when some Purshottam
& Suresh (telwala)3 threatened him & then poured kerosene
on him & set him on fire.”
10.2. The statement of the injured Sher Singh (Ex. PW-16/B) is
said to have been recorded by PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar in the hospital in
B Hindi language. Its approximately accurate translation, as adopted by
the High Court, reads as under:
“Statement of Sher Singh, S/o Ganpat Ram, R/o A-603, Pankha
Road, J.J.Colony, Uttam Nagar, Delhi aged 23/24 years.
I reside with my mother and I am employed as a helper in
C vehicle No. DL-IL-0382 Tata 407 owned by Raghunath who
resides opposite Chaddha Hotel, J.J.Colony, Uttam Nagar the
drivers of which vehicle are Natthu and Raju. Suresh who
runs an oil depot on Hastal Road gave me half bottle of liquor
which I drank. Suresh and Purshottam who have an oil depot
D at Jeevan Park and Suresh resides at 795, J.J.Colony and
Purshottam resides at 686, J.J.Colony, Pankha Road. Suresh
poured kerosene oil on me and Purshottam was with him.
Suresh thereafter set me on fire by lighting a match.”
10.3. Another relevant document for the present purpose is the
E PCR form (Ex. PW-7/B) wherein it was recorded in Part-I that the
information was received that ‘near scooter market, Prem Nagar Bus
Stand, Dall Mill Road, Uttam Nagar, one person has put himself on
fire’. In Part-II, the information recorded had been that the victim was
found to have suffered 100% burn injuries; he was being taken to the
hospital; and was identified as ‘Sher Singh s/o Ganpat Ram age 23/
F 24 years R/o 603 Pankha Road, Uttam Nagar’. In Part III, it was
recorded that the patient was admitted in the hospital in 100% burn
condition and he was not saying anything. However, in the last part of
this document, it came to be recorded that as per the patient’s statement
to the doctor, ‘Suresh and Purshottam threatened him and then put
G him on fire after pouring kerosene oil’.
11. In their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (‘CrPC’), both the appellants denied their involvement in the
commission of the offence i.e., putting Sher Singh on fire.
3
In Ex.PW-8/A, the expression ‘telwala’ is placed in parenthesis and is written in
H Hindi, though other contents are in English.
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 363
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

11.1. The relevant portions of appellant Purshottam’s statement A
read as under:
“Q.3 It is further in evidence against you that you are active
worker of BJP. On two or three occasions, prior to the incident
quarrels/ disputes had taken place of yours with deceased
Sher Singh. No report was got lodged with the police about B
the quarrels due to fear. What have you to say?
Ans. It is correct that I am an active member of BJP. Second
part is incorrect.
*** *** ***
C
Q.20 It is further in evidence against you that patient Sher
Singh (since deceased) had further stated in his statement to
PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar that co-accused Suresh had put him
on fire with match stick and both of you were residing at A
Block, Uttam Nagar. What have you to say?
D
Ans. It is correct that I am residing at A Block, Uttam Nagar.
Rest is denied.
*** *** ***
Q.43 Do you want to say anything else?
Ans. That being politically known person, I have been falsely E
implicated by certain persons adversely interested against me.”
11.2. The accused Suresh also submitted that he had been falsely
implicated in the case and that the evidence led in against him was false.
He gave out his version in the following:-
F
“Q.42 Do you want to say anything else?
Ans. I am innocent. I am running a business of hardware under
the name and style of “M/S NEW DELUX PANTS and at no
point time I have kerosene oil depot. The police has implicated
me in this case falsely and I was picked up from my residence G
by the police of PS Vikas Puri on the false pretext that certain
enquiries are to be made and they assured me to release on
the same day. But after taking me forcely from my residence
the police involved me in this case. I do not know the
deceased.”
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364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A The Trial Court found the appellants guilty
12. After conclusion of the trial and after having heard the parties,
the Trial Court proceeded to determine the questions involved in the
matter in its impugned judgment dated 30.01.1999. The Trial Court found
that there was no direct evidence about the commission of offence; and
B that the entire prosecution case was hinging upon the two dying
declarations said to have been made by the deceased Sher Singh.
12.1. The Trial Court accepted the genuineness of the evidence
led in by PW-8 Dr. Sushma that the victim Sher Singh himself had informed
her the reason and cause behind his injuries; that she had found the
C victim to be conscious and oriented though his general condition was
critical; and that the veracity of the MLC Ex. PW8/A prepared by her
could not be doubted. The Trial Court, inter alia, observed and held as
under:
“16. From the entire testimony of PW-8 Dr. Sushma, I am of
D the considered view that she has fully proved the contents of
MLC Ex. PW-8/A prepared by her. PW-8 Dr. Sushma was a
responsible officer and was not expected to fabricate the vital
piece of evidence against the accused persons with whom no
ill-will or enmity has been alleged. No motive can be imputed
to PW-8 Dr. Sushma to fabricate the dying declaration at the
E instance of the police. I have gone through the MLC Ex.PW-
8/A which is in the handwriting of PW-8 Dr. Sushma. Same
bears her sign at point A. The preparation of MLC by Dr.
Sushma and examination of the deceased at the time has not
been challenged in the cross-examination. There is no merit
F in the argument of the Ld. Defence counsel that since OPD
card was not produced on merit, the MLC prepared by Dr.
Sushma cannot be considered. Nothing has come on record
about the contents of the OPD card. If the OPD card was so
material or relevant in the case to falsify the MLC Ex.PW-8/
A, there was no obstruction for the accused persons to summon
G the OPD card in their defence or at the time of cross-
examination of PW-8 Dr. Sushma. Since OPD card is not on
the file and the contents of the same are not known to the
court, no adverse inference can be drawn against the
prosecution and by no stretch of imagination, the veracity of
H MLC prepared by PW-8 Dr. Sushma can be doubted. Dr.
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 365
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Sushma had no axe to grind to falsely record the alleged A
history given by the deceased himself. Nothing has come on
record to show if Dr. Sushma was known to the deceased or
any of his family members to favour them.….. PW-9 Dr. H. K.
Sharma, PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma both from Safdarjang
hospital have been examined by the prosecution. The MLC
B
prepared by Dr. Sushma Ex.PW-8/A has not been challenged
in their cross-examination also. So I am of this view that
there is no doubt about the preparation of the MLC Ex.PW8/
A by Dr. Sushma and in view the same has been proved on
record beyond reasonable doubt.”
12.2. The Trial Court also accepted the testimony of PW-16 SI C
Rajesh and the statement of the victim said to have been recorded by
him as the dying declaration with the findings as under:
“18. Perusal of the above said testimony of PW-16 SI Rajesh
Kumar reveals that statement of the injured (subsequently
treated as dying declaration) was recorded by PW-16 SI D
Rajesh Kumar. The presence of SI Rajesh at the hospital has
not been denied by the accused persons. PW-13 Ct. Vijay
Parkash in his testimony has corroborated the version of PW-
16 SI Rajesh that on receipt of DD, he alongwith SI Rajesh
had reached at the spot at 3.15 P.M. and there they had come E
to know that the injured had already been removed by PCR
van to the hospital. Insp. Rajesh had left him at the spot and
he himself had left for the hospital. No suggestion was put
by the accused persons to PW-8 Dr. Sushma, PW-9 Dr. H. K.
Sharma and PW-17 Dr. Rajesh that SI Rajesh was not present
at the hospital or that he had not recorded any statement of F
the injured Sher Singh. PW-16 SI Rajesh has proved on record
the application Ex.PW-16/A moved by him before the doctor
to record the statement of injured Sher Singh. Endorsement
of PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma declaring the patient to be fit for
statement at 7.50 P.M. appears at portion A on Ex.PW-16/A. G
Dr. Rajesh appearing before the court as PW-17 has also
deposed that he had declared the patient to be fit for statement
on the application of the IO Ex.PW-16/A. No suggestion was
put to this witness in the cross-examination by the accused
persons that no such application was moved by the IO at that
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A time. PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma working as a doctor was having
no motive to falsely make his endorsement at portion A on
Ex.PW-16/A. The application Ex.PW-16/A categorically proves
the presence of PW-16 SI Rajesh at the hospital at 7.50 P.M.
Once the permission was obtained by SI Rajesh to record the
statement of Sher Singh at 7.50 P.M. from PW-17 Dr. Rajesh
B
he was supposed to right (sic) the statement of the injured
and it does not lie in the mouth of the accused persons to
state that the statement of the injured Sher Singh was
fabricated afterwards by the IO. No suggestion was put to
PW-17 in the cross-examination by the accused persons that
C even after endorsement made by him on Ex.PW-16/A, the IO
had not record the statement of injured Sher Singh.…..
19. Nothing has come on record to show if any relative of the
deceased was present at the time when injured Sher Singh
was brought at hospital or when his MLC Ex.PW-8/A was
D prepared or when statement Ex.PW-16/B was recorded by PW-
16 SI Rajesh. No motive has been imputed by the prosecution
to this witness to falsely fabricate the statement of the
deceased. At the time of recording the statement Ex.PW-16/B,
there was nothing in the mind of SI Rajesh to show that injured
Sher Singh would expire soon. SI Rajesh got recorded the
E case u/s 307/34 IPC against both the accused persons. Rukka
was sent from the spot at 9.55 P.M. The FIR was registered
thereafter at 10.20 P.M. The names of both the accused
persons were mentioned in the MLC Ex.PW-8/A and in the
statement Ex.PW-16/B. The death of injured Sher Singh had
F not occurred by that time. So it cannot be imagined that SI
Rajesh Kumar would get the case registered giving the names
of the accused persons at that time. The case had been
registered on 18.12.97. The intimation about the death of
injured Sher Singh was received at PS Vikas Puri on 19.12.97
in the morning. The accused persons admittedly were arrested
G on the intervening night of 18/19.12.97 from their respective
houses even before the death of the deceased. All these facts
clearly rule out the possibility of any manipulations or
fabrications….”

H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 367
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

12.3. The Trial Court also did not find any adversity in the situation A
that no statement was made to PW-18 ASI Harish by Sher Singh when
he was being transported to the hospital. The Trial Court also rejected
the other contentions urged on behalf of the accused appellant and held
that even if the victim had suffered 100% burn injuries, the dying
declaration made by him was not to be rejected as there was nothing to
B
show that the mental condition of injured Sher Singh was such that he
was unable to speak and, inter alia, held as under:
“25……… I am of the view that despite suffering 100% burns,
injured Sher Singh was mentally fit to make dying declaration.
The certificate issued to that effect by PW-17, Dr. Rajesh
clinches the entire issue. C

26. ….Moreover, mere for the negligence of the IO to get record
the dying declaration from the SDM, the dying declaration
Ex. PW-8/A and Ex. PW-16/B cannot be rejected on that score
alone. It is not always mandatory for the police to get record
the dying declaration from the SDM or Ld. M.M. though the D
recording of the dying declaration by these officers do expire
(sic) much confidence….”
12.4. One of the principal submissions on behalf of the accused
persons had been that as per the testimony of PW-6 Rajesh, the victim
had at the first point of time made the statement to the effect that he had E
put himself on fire. The Trial Court rejected this part of the statement
made by PW-6 Rajesh in his cross-examination while observing as under:
“29……The testimony of PW-6 before the court is somewhat
contradictory on many aspects. In the examination-in-chief,
the witness merely stated that the victim had told his name to F
be Sher Singh. In the cross-examination, he has further
disclosed that the victim had also given his home address i.e.
A-603, J.J. Colony, Uttam Nagar. In the examination-in-chief,
this witness did not depose that the victim had told to some
public persons that since he was dropped from the tempo, he G
(Sher Singh) had set himself on fire. Again in the examination-
in-chief, the witness did not state that the Daljit and Rinku
were present at the spot and Daljit had told him in the evening
that he had seen the victim carrying kerosene oil in a
polythene towards that plot. Similarly, this witness did not
H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A depose about preparation of cassette by T.V. persons after 2/
3 days after incident and about the disclosure of Daljit Singh
to them in his interview about the victim carrying kerosene
oil in the polythene to that plot. The witness did not disclose
all these facts in the examination-in-chief to give an
opportunity to the prosecution to confront him on the facts
B
recorded in his statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. The testimony of
this witness on all these facts does not inspire confidence
and does not shatter the dying declaration recorded
subsequently by PW-8 and PW-16. In view of above
discussion, I am fully of the view that dying declarations
C Ex.PW-8/A and Ex.PW-16/B were duly made by the deceased
Sher Singh and the same were duly recorded by PW-8 Dr.
Sushma and PW-16 SI Rajesh respectively.”
12.5. The Trial Court found that the two dying declarations inspired
confidence and were worthy of reliance while observing that the same
D were recorded at the earliest; that none of the relatives of the victim
were present at that time; and that there was nothing to suggest if the
deceased was influenced by any consideration to falsely name the
accused persons while letting the real culprits go scot free.
12.6. The Trial Court, though found that the prosecution had failed
E to establish the motive of the accused persons for setting the deceased
Sher Singh on fire, but observed that merely for want of proof of motive,
the prosecution case could not be discarded and said as under:
“42. Though the prosecution has failed to prove specifically
motive of the accused persons to put the deceased on fire, yet
F the same is not fatal to be prosecution case. SI Rajesh Kumar
has deposed that he has made efforts to enquire the motive of
the accused persons from the deceased but he had stopped
talking by that time. However, it has come on record that the
deceased was known to the accused persons. The deceased
and the accused persons were the residents in the same locality.
G PW-1 Raju has categorically deposed that on 2/3 occasions
earlier also dispute had taken place of the deceased with
accused Purshotam. They had not lodged any report with
the police about the quarrels due to fear. In the cross-
examination the testimony of the witness regarding the quarrels
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 369
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

to have taken place earlier with the accused Purshotam has A
not been controverted. Nothing has been suggested by the
accused persons about the cause of quarrel with the
deceased. It is very difficult for the prosecution to establish
motive in the absence of the victim. The motive remains locked
in the heart of the accused and in view of the categorically
B
allegations in the dying declaration against them, the failure
of the prosecution to prove the motive positively pales into
insignificance….”
12.7. The Trial Court also referred to the contention that no overt
act was attributed to the accused appellant Purshottam but opined that
in the proven circumstances, he could not escape liability while observing C
as under:
“50. From the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the above judgment, it is clear that accused Purshotam
cannot escape the consequence simply because no overt act
was attributed to him by deceased Sher Singh in his second D
dying declaration Ex.PW-16/B. Reading the substrum of both
the dying declaration as a whole, I am of the view that the
deceased has implicated both the accused persons for the
offence committed by them. It was accused Purshotam who
was having previous quarrels with the deceased. So all these E
proved circumstances on record clearly proved the involvement
of both the accused persons in the commission of the offence.”
12.8. In the ultimate analysis, the Trial Court found proved the
prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt and hence, convicted the
accused-appellants for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and F
sentenced them to life imprisonment.
The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence
13. Assailing the order of conviction, the accused persons preferred
separate appeals, being Criminal Appeal Nos. 121 of 1999 and 139 of
1999 before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court reappreciated the G
evidence and concurred with the decision of the Trial Court while holding
that the statement made by the deceased Sher Singh to Dr. Sushma
(PW-8) and recorded by her in the MLC (Ex. PW-8/A) as also the
statement made by him to SI Rajesh Kumar (PW-16) in Ex. PW-16/B,
H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A which were considered to be the dying declarations, clearly established
the crime alleged against the appellants.
13.1. The High Court particularly referred to the fact that in the
PCR Form (Ex. PW-7/A) the entries came to be made by PW-7 Ct.
Anju not only as regards the information received at the initial stage but
B further to that about the nature of injuries as also the particulars of the
victim with his name and address and the fact that he was admitted to
the hospital. The High Court, in a comprehension of the material on
record, found that PW-18 ASI Harish had not been truthful in his assertion
that the victim did not say anything to him because the subsequent entries
in the PCR Form (Ex. PW-7/A) could not have been made by PW-7 Ct.
C Anju but for the information passed on to her by PW-18 ASI Harish,
who, in turn, ought to have gathered all such particulars from the victim
only. The High Court, inter alia, observed as under:
“11…..To a person with ordinary commonsense and requiring
no great process of reasoning, it would be apparent that Anju
D would write the name, the parentage, the age, the address,
the 100% burnt condition of Sher Singh, kerosene oil being
used to burn him and he being removed to Safdarjung
Hospital only through the mouth of ASI Harish, who had dared
to stare into the eyes of the judicial process and falsely state
E that on the way to the hospital he had no talk with the
deceased……”
13.2. The High Court further proceeded to analyse the description
appearing in MLC Ex. PW-8/A and found that such entries were
obviously made by PW-8 Dr. Sushma on the information divulged by the
F victim himself. The High Court said,-
“14. Dr.Sushma has contemporaneously recorded that Sher
Singh told her that Purshottam and Suresh have set him on
fire after pouring kerosene oil on him. How would Dr.Sushma
know two names i.e. Purshottam and Suresh unless somebody
G told her so. Obviously it is Sher Singh who gave said names
to her.”
13.3. The High Court also referred to the contents of the dying
declaration Ex.PW-16/B and observed as under:
“21. That in the dying declaration Ex.PW-16/B not only the
H names but the avocation and even the residential address of
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 371
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the accused has been given with lethal precision lends A
assurance to the truthfulness of the dying declaration so
recorded and this dying declaration is upon proof of Sher
Singh being fit when he made the statement, notwithstanding
his condition being critical for the reason a person may be in
a critical medical state but may be mentally fully conscious.”
B
13.4. After rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the
appellants as regards the reliability of the dying declarations recorded by
PW-8 Dr.Sushma and PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar, the High Court accepted
the case of prosecution while observing as under:
“30. The settled legal position is that a dying declaration C
which inspires confidence needs no corroboration to sustain
itself and in the instant case we have already discussed that
there is sufficient evidence to bring luminance of gold to the
two dying declarations made by Sher Singh and we do not
find the same to be copper and that there is intrinsic evidence
of truthfulness in the same for how could Dr.Sushma and SI D
Rajesh Kumar note the name, the parentage, the age and the
address of the deceased unless the deceased told them so.
How could SI Rajesh Kumar note the names of the accused,
their avocation and their residential addresses unless the
deceased told him so. These are tell tale pointers leading in E
the direction of the truthfulness of the two dying declarations
made by Sher Singh and we have no evidence that Dr.Sushma
has contrived a writing on the MLC. Why should she do so?
There is no evidence why SI Rajesh Kumar would contrive a
document? There is no evidence of any such contrivance on
the part of the two. Though critical, but in a state of mind fit F
enough to make a statement is the evidence which has surfaced
through the testimony of Dr.Rajesh Verma and he is the third
person against whom no evidence of contrivance has emerged.
31…as per the post-mortem report Ex. PW-14/A the deceased
died due to shock consequent upon 100% ante-mortem flame G
burns….The state of the hands of the deceased i.e., skin
peeling on the dorsum of the hands shows the extent of the
burn injuries on the hands on the dorsa side i.e. not the palm
but the outer portion of the hand and therefrom there is an
indication that kerosene was doused on the deceased by H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A somebody else and not the deceased himself for if the deceased
had poured kerosene oil on himself the same could not fall
on the dorsum of the hands and if this was so we would have
not found peeling of the skin on the dorsum of the hand and
this is an additional piece of evidence wherefrom it can be
inferred that somebody else doused the deceased with
B
kerosene and not the deceased self doused himself with
kerosene.”
13.5. While rejecting the contentions urged on behalf of the
appellants that the statement allegedly made by the victim Sher Singh to
PW-6 Rajesh that for being dropped from the tempo he had set himself
C on fire may be accepted as the first dying declaration and, while approving
the findings of the Trial Court in paragraphs 29 of the impugned judgment,
the High Court said,-
“28. The contention that Rajesh PW-6 has categorically
deposed that when he was near Sher Singh soon after Sher
D Singh was seen by him engulfed in flames, somebody in the
crowd asked him as to how he had caught fire, Sher Singh
replied that since he was dropped from the tempo he had set
himself on fire and this is the first point of time on which Sher
Singh made a dying declaration and thus the same had to be
E accepted is a plea which was raised before the learned Trial
Judge and has been rightly rejected and for which we accept
the reasoning of the learned Trial Judge in para 29 of the
impugned order and since each and every reasoning of the
learned Trial Judge is accepted by us, we need not burden
our decision by re-penning the same and would comment that
F para 29 of the impugned judgment be read as an integral
part of our present opinion.”
13.6. Therefore, the High Court, rather in its independent analysis
of the evidence on record, concurred with the conclusion of guilt of the
appellants and dismissed the appeals.
G
Rival Contentions
14. Assailing the conviction and sentencing in the impugned
judgment, it has been contended on behalf of appellant No. 1 that the
conviction of this appellant is based only on speculations and the
prosecution had even failed to prove his identity. As regards value and
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 373
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

worth of the alleged dying declarations of the deceased, learned counsel A
would argue that such dying declarations are not reliable for various
reasons and counts. The learned counsel has elaborated that the assertion
occurring in the dying declaration Ex. PW-16/B that the deceased had
consumed liquor is falsified by the post-mortem report Ex. PW-14/A
stating that there were no traces of alcohol in the body of the deceased.
B
Learned counsel has also argued that as per PW-8 Dr. Sushma, the
deceased was suffering 100% deep burns involving whole of the body
and the nature of the injury was grievous; and she had also testified that
thumbs of the deceased were burnt. Thus, according to the learned
counsel, in the given status of burns, including the thumbs, assertion of
PW-16 about having obtained the thumb impressions of the deceased is C
clearly falsified; and dying declaration alleged to have been recorded by
PW-16 appears to be a doctored and manipulated document. It has also
been argued that PW-16 had ample opportunity to call for a Magistrate
for recording the dying declaration as he was allegedly declared fit by
the Doctor, but PW-16 did not do so and purportedly recorded the dying
D
declaration himself that further casts serious doubt on the correctness
of such alleged dying declaration. Learned counsel has referred to
Chapter 13-A of the Delhi High Court Rules to submit that as per the
requirements therein, PW-16 ought to have requested the Magistrate to
record such dying declaration and in any case, ought to have taken the
attestation from medical or para-medical staff in attendance but he did E
not do so, and this creates further doubt on the correctness of such
statement. Learned counsel has argued that for various infirmities and
inconsistencies as also for want of corroboration, the alleged dying
declarations cannot be relied upon; and that being the sole basis of
conviction, the impugned judgments deserve to be set aside. The learned
F
counsel has, inter alia, referred to and relied upon the decisions in State
of Punjab v. Gian Kaur and Anr.: AIR 1998 SC 2809, Uka Ram v.
State of Rajasthan: JT 2001 (4) SC 472, Dalip Singh and Ors. v.
State of Punjab: AIR 1979 SC 1173, Gopal Singh and Anr. v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.: AIR 1972 SC 1557 and Thurukanni
Pompiah and Anr. v. State of Mysore: AIR 1965 SC 939. G
14.1. The learned counsel has further argued that there being no
eye-witness and the entire matter resting upon circumstantial evidence,
the appellants could not have been held guilty before establishment of
the entire chain of circumstances and cogent corroboration of the alleged
dying declarations. The learned counsel has contended that the place of H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A incident was a crowded market and there were many shops in the area;
and then, there was only one exit from the place of incident. Thus,
according to the learned counsel, it was impossible for the accused to
escape the place of incident without being spotted by any of the
shopkeepers or people in the market; and they having not being spotted
so, the prosecution case cannot be relied upon.
B
14.2. The learned counsel has further relied upon the testimony
of PW-6 Rajesh to submit that in the very first instance, the victim made
the statement to the effect that he was dropped from the tempo he was
working with and had set himself on fire. The learned counsel would
contend that PW-6 having not been declared hostile, the statement made
C by the deceased to PW-6 ought to be considered as the first dying
declaration and therein, the cause of incident having been stated by the
deceased as self-immolation, the prosecution case ought to fail on this
count alone. The learned counsel has also contended that the prosecution
has failed to examine the other persons Rinku and Daljeet whose names
D have occurred in the testimony of PW-6 and who were present at the
site when the deceased made his statement about self-immolation.
14.3. The learned counsel has also referred to the fact that as per
PW-18, who took the deceased in his PCR Van from the place of incident
to the hospital, the deceased was crying the whole way and was unable
E to speak and this version, according to the learned counsel, contradicts
the testimony of PW-16 that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and
was conscious to give his statement.
14.4. It has also been contended that the prosecution proved only
Part I of the document Ex. PW-7/A but not Parts II, III and IV thereof
F and such other parts appear to be doctored and manipulated. The learned
counsel has also argued that the prosecution has failed to prove any
motive on part of appellant No. 1 to commit the alleged offence and the
hearsay testimony of PW-1 about his having heard from his mother about
the quarrel between appellant No. 1 and the deceased is not of any
value or substance. Learned counsel would also contend that deceased
G himself had nowhere mentioned in any of the alleged dying declarations
about the motive behind the crime; and the prosecution also having failed
to prove any such motive, the prosecution case cannot be said to have
been established beyond reasonable doubts. It has also been argued that
the appellant No. 1 being shorter in height than the deceased, there was
H no likelihood of him throwing kerosene on the head of the deceased.
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 375
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

14.5. Lastly, with reference to the decision in Sharad Birdhi A
Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116, learned
counsel has contended that when two views are possible on evidence,
one pointing to the guilt of the accused and another to his innocence, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of the one which is favourable to him.
15. While assailing the conviction and sentencing, learned counsel B
for the appellant No. 2 has argued that the alleged dying declarations
are not reliable and conviction could not have been based thereupon. It
has been contended that the dying declarations are unreliable for various
reasons that: (a) the OPD Card which was the first document prepared
by the Hospital was not produced on record; (b) the tone and tenor of
the language used in Ex. PW-8/A shows that it could not have been the C
statement of the deceased since he was in critical condition; (c) that the
document Ex. PW-16/B, recorded almost three hours after the alleged
first statement could not have been more detailed when the condition of
deceased was critical and as per the treating Doctor PW-9, the condition
of the deceased was continuously deteriorating; (d) that the thumb D
impression of the deceased on the dying declarations is entirely doubtful
when he had suffered 100% burns all over the body; (e) that there were
no indication of liquor consumption in MLC or post-mortem report; (f)
that if the deceased had consumed half bottle of liquor, his making long
narrative with intelligible and coherent statement remains doubtful; (g)
and that no effort was made to requisition the services of Magistrate for E
the purpose of recording the dying declarations. Thus, according to the
learned counsel, the dying declarations do not pass through the test of
truthfulness and reliability and cannot be acted upon.
15.1. The learned counsel for appellant No. 2 has also strongly
relied upon the testimony of PW-6 Rajesh who was not declared hostile; F
and has contended that the entire prosecution case fails when it is noticed
that his version about self-immolation by the deceased is in sharp contrast
to the contents of the alleged dying declarations.
15.2. The learned counsel for the appellant No. 2 has further
contended that the prosecution has failed to establish any motive for G
commission of crime by this appellant and, with reference to the decision
in Kalabai v. State of Madhya Pradesh: 2019 SCC ONLINE SC
621, has argued that motive having not been proved, conviction under
Section 302 IPC is not sustainable.
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A 15.3. Learned counsel has also urged in the alternative that in the
given set of facts and circumstances, even if the conviction of the
appellant No. 2 is to be maintained, the same may be altered to the one
under Part II of Section 304 IPC.
16. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondent has
B strenuously argued that the prosecution case clearly stands established
by the two dying declarations independently recorded, one by PW-8
Dr.Sushma and another by PW-16 SI Rajesh. Learned counsel has
referred to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra: (2002) 6 SCC 710 as also other
decisions of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh:
C (2013) 14 SCC 159 and in Bhagwan v. State of Maharashtra: (2019)
8 SCC 95 to submit that on the settled principles relating to acceptability
of a dying declaration, the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants
deserve to be rejected. The learned counsel would submit that the two
dying declaration are consistent on material points and features and the
D same have rightly been accepted by the Trial Court as also by the High
Court. The learned counsel would also submit that at the time of recording
of Ex. PW-8/A, no relative or acquaintance of the victim was present
and any possibility of tutoring is totally ruled out. According to the learned
counsel, there was no occasion for PW-8 Dr.Sushma to record the
particulars of the deceased and other information of her own imagination;
E and such particulars and information could have occurred in Ex. PW-8/
A only when divulged by the victim himself. Learned counsel further
submitted that even the question regarding thumb impression pales into
insignificance when it is noticed that there is no such thumb impression
on Ex. PW-8/A.
F 16.1. In regard to the thumb impression on Ex. PW-16/B, the
learned senior counsel has contended that even if the victim had allegedly
suffered 100% burns, the evidence is not to the fact that inner side of
the hand/palm was also burnt to the extent that the victim could not have
put his thumb impression; and post-mortem report would also show that
G dorsum of the hand was burnt and therefore, taking of thumb impression
on Ex. PW-16/B is not ruled out. The learned counsel has contended
that, again, there was no occasion for PW-16, to record all the particulars
of the victim as also the offenders including their addresses, unless given
out by the victim himself; and there is no reason to discard this dying
declaration Ex. PW-16/B either.
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 377
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

16.2. As regards the possibility of the victim having set himself on A
fire and the want of evidence of other persons named by PW-6, the
learned senior counsel has contended that such theory of self-immolation
as also the names of other persons essentially came to be introduced in
the cross-examination of PW-6 Rajesh and therefore, the burden was
on the accused persons to establish such theory and to examine such
B
alleged persons; and no fault could be fastened on prosecution if such
persons were not examined. According to the learned counsel, the
defence having failed to establish the theory of self-immolation, the
contentions urged on behalf of the appellants deserve to be rejected.
16.3. The learned senior counsel has further argued that so far as
the question of motive is concerned, though the possibility of motive has C
come on record in the testimony of PW-1 Raju but in any case, even if
the prosecution has not been able to lead cogent evidence as regards
motive, the accusations against the appellants do not fail, particularly in
view of the facts occurring in the two dying declarations.
16.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, D
the dying declarations have rightly been accepted in this case and the
conviction of the appellants on that basis calls for no interference.
17. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions
and having examined the record, we find no reason to consider
interference in the conviction of the appellants and, in our view, these E
appeals must fail.
Admission and acceptability of dying declaration: the
principles
18. The principles relating to admission and acceptability of the F
statement made by a victim representing the cause of death, usually
referred to as a dying declaration, are well settled and a few doubts as
regards pre-requisites for acceptability of a dying declaration were also
put at rest by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Laxman
v. State of Maharashtra: (2002) 6 SCC 710.
G
18.1. In the said case of Laxman, conviction of the appellant was
based on dying declaration of the deceased which was recorded by the
Judicial Magistrate. The Session Judge and the High Court found such
dying declaration to be truthful, voluntary and trustworthy; and recorded
conviction on that basis. In appeal to this Court, it was urged with reference
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A to the decision in Paparambaka Rosamma and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh: 1999 CriLJ 4321 that the dying declaration could not have
been accepted by the Court to form the sole basis of conviction since
certification of the doctor was not to the effect that the patient was in a
fit state of mind to make the statement. On the other hand, it was
contended on behalf of the State, with reference to the decision in Koli
B
Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat: 1999 CriLJ 4582, that
the material on record indicated that the deceased was fully conscious
and was capable of making a statement; and his dying declaration cannot
be ignored merely because the doctor had not made the endorsement
about his fit state of mind to make the statement. In view of these
C somewhat discordant notes, the matter came to be referred to the Larger
Bench. The Constitution Bench summed up the principles applicable as
regards the acceptability of dying declaration in the following:-
“3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying
declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when
D the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this
world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced,
and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great
caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be
given to this species of evidence on account of the existence
E of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The
situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and
serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his
statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and
cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has
F no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying
declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full
confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness.
The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the
statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring
or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must
G further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind
and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.
Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 379
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious A
state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not
prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification
of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the
dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can
be oral or in writing and any adequate method of
B
communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise
will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In
most cases, however, such statements are made orally before
death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a
Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded,
no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate C
absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual
to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement
of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a
dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate
and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is
D
no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently,
what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such
statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. What is essentially required is that
the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied
that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved E
by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit
to make the statement even without examination by the doctor
the declaration can be acted upon provided the court
ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A
certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and
F
therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration
can be established otherwise.”
18.2. The Constitution Bench affirmed the view in Koli Chunilal
Savji (supra) while holding that Paparambaka Rosamma (supra), was
not correctly decided. The Court said,-
G
“5…….It is indeed a hyper technical view that the certification
of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious
and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit
state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically
stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to
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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that
the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded
the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court
in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P.(1999) 7 SCC 695
must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the
law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of
B
Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC 562.”
19. In the case of Dal Singh (supra), this Court has pointed out
that the law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration
nor is there a prescribed format or procedure for the same. All that is
required is the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that
C the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a
statement. This Court also pointed out that as to whether in a given burn
case, the skin of thumb had been completely burnt or if some part of it
will remain intact, would also be a question of fact. This Court said,-
“20. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
D that law does not provide who can record a dying declaration,
nor is there any prescribed form, format, or procedure for
the same. The person who records a dying declaration must
be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is
capable of making such a statement. Moreover, the
E requirement of a certificate provided by a doctor in respect
of such state of the deceased, is not essential in every case.
21. Undoubtedly, the subject of the evidentiary value and
acceptability of a dying declaration, must be approached with
caution for the reason that the maker of such a statement
F cannot be subjected to cross-examination. However, the court
may not look for corroboration of a dying declaration, unless
the declaration suffers from any infirmity.
22. So far as the question of thumb impression is concerned,
the same depends upon facts, as regards whether the skin of
G the thumb that was placed upon the dying declaration was
also burnt. Even in case of such burns in the body, the skin
of a small part of the body i.e. of the thumb, may remain intact.
Therefore, it is a question of fact regarding whether the skin

H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 381
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

of the thumb had in fact been completely burnt, and if not, A
whether the ridges and curves had remained intact.”
19.1. In the case of Bhagwan (supra), this Court accepted the
dying declaration made by a person having suffered 92% burn injury
and whose continued consciousness was certified by the doctor. This
Court referred to the decision in Vijay Pal v. State (Government of B
NCT of Delhi): (2015) 4 SCC 749, where the statement made by the
victim having suffered 100% burn injury was also accepted. This Court
said :-
“ 23…..(B). Can a person who has suffered 92% burn injuries
be in a condition to give a dying declaration? C
24. This question is also no longer res integra. In Vijay Pal v.
State (NCT of Delhi): 2015 (4) SCC 749, we notice the following
discussion: (SCC p. 759, paras 23-24)
‘23. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant
that when the deceased sustained 100% burn injuries, she D
could not have made any statement to her brother. In this
regard, we may profitably refer to the decision in Mafabhai
Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat: (1992) 4 SCC 69 wherein
it has been held that a person suffering 99% burn injuries
could be deemed capable enough for the purpose of making E
a dying declaration. The Court in the said case opined
that unless there existed some inherent and apparent defect,
the trial court should not have substituted its opinion for
that of the doctor. In the light of the facts of the case, the
dying declaration was found to be worthy of reliance.
F
24. In State of M.P. v. Dal Singh: (2013) 14 SCC 159, a two-
Judge Bench placed reliance on the dying declaration of
the deceased who had suffered 100% burn injuries on the
ground that the dying declaration was found to be credible.’
25. Therefore, the mere fact that the patient suffered 92%
G
burn injuries as in this case would not stand in the way of
patient giving a dying declaration which otherwise inspires
the confidence of the Court and is free from tutoring, and
can be found reliable.”

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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A 20. In the case of Gian Kaur (supra), the dying declaration was
disbelieved on the ground that though as per medical evidence the
deceased had 100% burn injuries but the thumb mark appearing on the
dying declaration had clear ridges and curves. The benefit of doubt
extended by the High Court was found to be not unreasonable and hence,
this Court declined to interfere while observing as under:-
B
“5. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration on the
ground that even though according to the medical evidence
Rita had 100% burns, the thumb mark of Rita appearing on
the dying declaration had clear ridges and curves. The High
Court found the evidence of Dr Ajay Sahni-PW 1 not reliable
C as he failed to satisfactorily explain how such a thumb mark
could appear on the dying declaration when Rita had 100%
burns over her body. The High Court relied upon the
deposition of Doctor Aneja, who had performed the post-
mortem and who has categorically stated that there were 100%
D burns over her body and both the thumbs of Rita were burnt.
In view of such inconsistent evidence, the High Court was
right in giving benefit of doubt to the respondents. It cannot
be said in this case that the High Court has taken an
unreasonable view.”
E 20.1. In the case of Gopal Singh (supra), the Court found that
the dying declaration did not contain complete names and addresses of
the persons charged with the offence and it was found that conviction
could not be based on such dying declaration alone without corroboration.
Essentially, for the infirmity carried by such dying declaration, this Court
found lesser justification for the High Court’s interference with the order
F of acquittal while observing as under:-
“8. But even if we assume that the High Court was right in
concluding that the dying declaration established the identity
of the appellants, it was certainly not of that character as
would warrant its acceptance without corroboration. It is
G settled law that a court is entitled to convict on the sole basis
of a dying declaration if it is such that in the circumstances
of the case it can be regarded as truthful. On the other hand
if on account of an infirmity, it cannot be held to be entirely
reliable, corroboration would be required……”
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 383
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

20.2. In the case of Dalip Singh (supra), the alleged dying A
declaration turned out to be doubtful for it contained such facts which
could not have been in the knowledge of the deceased and hence, this
Court found it unsafe to rely on the same while observing as under: -
“9.…..The dying declaration seems to be otherwise truthful
but for the fact that it could not be within the knowledge or B
vision of Teja Singh that Jetha Singh was murdered by the
appellants. His saying so in the dying declaration makes his
statement a bit doubtful. It is, therefore, safe to leave out of
consideration this dying declaration….”
20.3. In the case of Thurukanni Pompiah (supra), this Court C
held that while a truthful and reliable dying declaration may form the
sole basis of conviction, even without corroboration but the Court must
be satisfied about its truthfulness and reliability; and if the Court finds
that the declaration is not wholly reliable and a material portion of the
deceased’s version of the occurrence is untrue, the Court may, in the
circumstances of a given case, may consider it unsafe to convict the D
accused on the basis of the declaration alone without further
corroboration. This Court observed, inter alia, as under:-
“10. Under clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, a statement made by a person who is dead, as to
the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the E
transaction which resulted in his death is a relevant fact in
cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into
question, and such a statement is relevant whether the person
who made it was or was not, at the time when it was made,
under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature F
of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into
question. The dying declaration of Eranna is therefore relevant
and material evidence in the case. A truthful and reliable dying
declaration may form the sole basis of conviction, even though
it is not corroborated. But the Court must be satisfied that the
declaration is truthful. The reliability of the declaration should G
be subjected to a close scrutiny, considering that ‘it was made
in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity to test
its veracity by cross-examination. If the Court finds that the
declaration is not wholly reliable and a material and integral
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384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A portion of the deceased’s version of the entire occurrence is
untrue, the Court may, in all the circumstances of the case,
consider it unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the
declaration alone without further corroboration.”
20.4. In the case of Uka Ram (supra), this Court again emphasised
B on the requirement that the Court should be satisfied about trustworthiness
of the dying declaration, its voluntary nature and fitness of the mind of
the deceased and it was held that:
“6. ….Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration
was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous
C consideration, it can base its conviction without any further
corroboration as rule requiring corroboration is not a rule
of law but only a rule of prudence.”
20.4.1. In the said case of Uka Ram, however, the Court found
that the deceased was a mental patient and there existed a doubt about
D mental condition of the deceased at the time of making the dying
declaration. In the given circumstances, this Court found that to be a fit
case to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused.
21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles
relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability
E could be usefully summed up as under:-
i) A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even
without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the Court.
ii) The Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit
state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a
F voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination.
iii) Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from
any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like
nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
G iv) When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a
fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot
prevail.
v) The law does not provide as to who could record dying
declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 385
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the A
maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement
vi) Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary
for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and
credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such
dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons B
present at the time of recording the dying declaration.
vii) As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns
would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration;
and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and
conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. C
viii) If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the statement placed
as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and
consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its
basis even without corroboration.
22. Applying the relevant principles to the facts of the present D
case, we have not an iota of doubt that the appellants have rightly been
convicted on the basis of the statements of the victim Sher Singh, as
recorded by PW-8 Dr. Sushma and PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar.
Testimony of PW-8 and the contents of Ex. PW-8/A
E
23. As noticed, it is clearly established on record that the victim
Sher Singh, when found engulfed in fire, information was received in
PCR and its Van reached the place of incident within minutes of incident;
and the victim was immediately placed in the Van and was taken to
Safdarjung Hospital. Though it appears from the testimony of PW-9 Dr.
H.K. Sharma as also of PW-8 Dr. Sushma that the first document F
prepared at the time of admission of the patient is OPD slip; and such
OPD slip in this matter has not been produced on record. However,
such omission of the prosecution, in our view, has no bearing on the
substance of the matter because immediately after preparation of the
OPD slip, the victim was taken to the Burns Ward and detailed Medico-
G
Legal Case Report was prepared by PW-8 Dr. Sushma. The incident
had taken place at about 3.00-3.15 p.m. and the MLC report (Ex. PW-
8/A) was prepared by Dr. Sushma at 4.35 p.m. There had not been
unnecessary time gap between the occurrence and the preparation of

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386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A MLC particularly when major part of time was spent in the process of
transportation.
23.1. The significant feature of the case is that in the said MLC
report (Ex. PW-8/A), PW-8 specifically mentioned the particulars and
information as given out by the victim himself. As noticed, in the
B information particulars, this doctor clearly stated the version of the victim
that he sustained burn injury ‘when some Purshottam & Suresh
(telwala) threatened him & then poured kerosene on him & set him
on fire’. It is noticed that in Ex. PW-8/A the word ‘telwala’ came to be
mentioned within brackets and was written in Hindi (being vernacular
expression), although other contents of this document were filled up in
C English. PW-8 had been categorical in her assertion that the patient had
himself informed her about the alleged history behind his sustaining burn
injuries. There is absolutely nothing on record to disbelieve or even doubt
the statement of PW-8 Dr. Sushma. On the contrary, such recording of
the expressions verbatim by the doctor lends credence to her testimony
D and the document prepared by her. In our view, with this testimony of
PW-8 it is established beyond doubt that in his first version in the hospital,
the victim Sher Singh asserted that Purshottam and Suresh poured
kerosene oil on him and set him on fire. It is also established that Suresh
was identified by the victim as ‘telwala’ and it has not been doubted that
in the slang expressions, the reference had been to the one dealing in
E some kind of oil business. These are the first traces with names and
slight particulars of the assailants. As shall be noticed hereafter, in the
sequence of circumstances, the expressions have rightly been fastened
on the appellants.
23.2. It is also noteworthy that in Ex. PW-8/A, the doctor PW-8
F Sushma mentioned all other features relating to the medical condition of
the patient and recorded that he had suffered ‘burn injuries involving
whole of the body surface area-100% deep burn’. However and
even while mentioning that the general condition of the patient was
‘critical’, it was also recorded in Ex. PW-8/A that the patient was
G ‘conscious, oriented’. It is but clear from the contents of Ex. PW-8/A
about the condition of the victim Sher Singh that though the doctor found
him to be in critical condition with 100% deep burns yet, he was conscious
and oriented. In other words, he was neither unconscious nor disoriented.
In yet other words, he was neither insensate nor confused. Such
significant noting about the mental faculties of the victim at the time of
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 387
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

giving out the narratives to the doctor makes it clear that even when he A
was suffering from the agony of 100% deep burns, he was not in an
unfit state of mind; and there appears no reason to disbelieve his first
version as recorded in Ex. PW-8/A.
Testimony of PW-16 and the contents of Ex. PW-16/B
24. The statement (Ex.PW-16/B) said to have been made by the B
victim Sher Singh to PW-16 SI Rakesh Kumar, as recorded in hospital in
Hindi language, has in fact been the pivot of the prosecution case. This
statement as also the testimony of PW-16 SI Rakesh Kumar has
undergone thorough scrutiny by the Trial Court as also by the High Court,
as noticed in the extraction hereinbefore. We have yet again examined C
the testimony of PW-16 as also the contents of Ex. PW-16/B and find
no reason to take any view different. The presence of PW-16 in that
hospital at the relevant point of time has not been questioned and it is
clearly established on record that before recording the statement of the
victim, he moved the application Ex. PW-16/A whereupon PW-17 Dr.
Rajesh Verma declared the patient fit for making statement. Thereafter, D
PW-16 proceeded to record the statement of victim and it has not been
shown on record if anyone related with deceased was present at the
time of recording of his statement by PW-16. Any possibility of tutoring
or prompting is totally ruled out. As noticed, in the statement, the victim
even stated the registration number of the vehicle he was employed and E
gave out the names and addresses of the appellants while stating their
respective roles in the incident in question. At the time of making the
said statement, the victim Sher Singh was suffering from 100% deep
burn injuries and was in a critical condition. In the given state, elaboration
on the motive etc., was least expected from him. PW-16 appears to
have recorded whatever was given out by the victim; and there appears F
nothing of any manipulation by him.
The two statements Ex. PW-8/A and Ex. PW-16/B are dying
declarations
25. For what has been observed hereinabove, it is but clear that in G
his first version before the doctor, the victim Sher Singh named Purshottam
and Suresh as his assailants and particulars of these persons were fully
described by him in the statement made to PW-16 only a few hours
before his demise. It has not been disputed that particulars and addresses
as stated by the victim in his statement Ex. PW-16/B had been of the
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388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A appellants only. It, therefore, emerges that the victim, before his demise,
alleged that the appellant No. 2 had put him on fire and the appellant No.
1 was his accomplice. While recording his version in Ex. PW-8/A, the
doctor PW-8 mentioned that he was conscious and oriented. On the
other hand, before recording the statement of the victim (Ex. PW-16/B),
PW-16 obtained the certification from PW-17 Dr. Rajesh Verma that
B
the patient was fit to give his statement. In the given set of circumstances,
we find no infirmity that the Trial Court and the High Court accepted
that the victim was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. It has also
not been established on record that the statements of the victim were an
outcome of tutoring or figment of imagination. In other words, the
C statements appear to be voluntary and were given in a fit state of mind.
In the given set of circumstances, the statements so made by the victim
could be acted upon as dying declarations. However, before reaching to
the conclusion on the basis of these statements, it would be appropriate
to deal with the criticism offered on behalf of the appellants.
D 25.1. It has been contended that the statement Ex. PW-16/B
cannot be accepted for the same having not been recorded by or in the
presence of Magistrate nor any attestation having been obtained. Chapter
13-A of Delhi High Court Rules has also been referred. In our view, the
said rules as regards the expected manner of recording of dying
declaration, by their very nature, could only be considered directly and it
E cannot be laid down that want of compliance of any of the expectation
therein would result in discarding of a recorded dying declaration. The
expectations in the said rules that the dying declaration be recorded by a
Judicial Magistrate; the fitness of the declarant be examined; the
statement be in the form of simple narrative; signature or thumb
F impression of the declarant be obtained etc. are all, obviously, intended
to ensure that the dying declaration is recorded in the manner that its
credence does not remain questionable. However, a particular statement,
when being offered as dying declaration and satisfies all the requirements
of judicial scrutiny, cannot be discarded merely because it has not been
recorded by a Magistrate or that the police officer did not obtain attestation
G by any person present at the time of making of the statement. Even in
this regard, the witness PW-19 Inspector Om Prakash has pointed out
that when asked to attest the statement of Sher Singh as recorded by SI
Rajesh Kumar, the doctor pointed out that the facts had already been
mentioned in the MLC and there was no need to attest the statement.
H
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 389
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Taking an overall view of the matter, we find no reason that the statement A
Ex. PW-16/B be discarded only for want of its recording by a Magistrate
or for want of attestation.
25.2. Another emphasis laid on behalf of the appellants is on the
fact that the victim Sher Singh had suffered 100% burns and he was
already in critical condition and further to that, his condition was regularly B
deteriorating. It is, therefore, contended that in such a critical and
deteriorating condition, he could not have made proper, coherent and
intelligible statement. The submissions do not make out a case for
interference. As laid down in Vijay Pal’s case and reiterated in Bhagwan’s
case (supra), the extent of burn injuries – going beyond 92% and even to
100% - would not, by itself, lead to a conclusion that victim of such burn C
injuries may not be in a position to make the statement. Irrespective of
the extent and gravity of burn injuries, when the doctor had certified him
to be in fit state of mind to make the statement; and the person recording
the statement was also satisfied about his fitness for making such
statement; and when there does not appear any inherent or apparent D
defect, in our view, the dying declaration cannot be discarded. Contra to
what has been argued on behalf of the appellants, we are of the view
that the juristic theory regarding acceptability of statement made by a
person who is at the point of death has its fundamentals in the recognition
that at the terminal point of life, every motive to falsehood is removed or
silenced. To a fire victim like that of present case, the gravity of injuries E
is an obvious indicator towards the diminishing hope of life in the victim;
and on the accepted principles, acceleration of diminishing of hope of
life could only obliterate the likelihood of falsehood or improper motive.
Of course, it may not lead to the principle that gravity of injury would
itself lead to trustworthiness of the dying declaration. As noticed, there F
could still be some inherent defect4 for which a statement, even if
recorded as dying declaration, cannot be relied upon without
corroboration. Suffice would be to observe to present purpose that merely
for 100% burn injuries, it cannot be said that the victim was incapable to
make a statement which could be acted upon as dying declaration.
G
25.3. The suggestions have also been made that the victim was in
100% burnt condition and therefore, the alleged statements Ex. PW-8/A
and PW-16/B are manipulated and manufactured. We find nothing of
substance in such suggestions for there had not been shown any reason
4
As had been in Dalip Singh’s case (supra). H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A for which PW-8 Dr.Sushma and PW-16 SI Rajesh Kumar would
manufacture any such document. Interestingly, certain suggestions were
made to PW-19 Inspector Om Prakash in his cross-examination about
his previous exchange of hot words or altercation with the accused
persons. However, there was no such suggestion to PW-16 or to PW-8.
For the same reason, the doubts sought to be suggested about availability
B
of thumb impression of the victim on the statement Ex. PW-16/B deserve
to be rejected. In the case of Dal Singh (supra), this Court has pointed
out that in the case of burns, the skin of a small part of the body like
thumb may remain intact; and it is essentially a question of fact as to
whether skin of thumb had also been burnt completely. In this regard, it
C is also noticeable that even when the victim was carrying 100% deep
burns, as per the post-mortem report, peeling of skin was noticed on
dorsum of hands and therefore, taking of thumb impression on Ex. PW-
16/B is not ruled out. The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the
High Court in accepting the thumb impression on Ex. PW-16/B do not
appear calling for any interference. It gets, perforce, reiterated that there
D
appears no reason for PW-16 to go to the extent of manufacturing the
document with a false thumb impression.
25.4. Another contention urged on behalf of the appellants has
been that the victim, as per his statement, had allegedly consumed half
bottle of liquor before being put on fire but, as per post-mortem report,
E no such liquor was found in the dead body. This apart, if he had consumed
liquor, there was less probability of his talking coherently. We find these
contentions also lacking in substance. It had been a case of fire injury
and as per the post-mortem report, the liver, spleen, kidney and other
body-parts were found congested. In such fire injury case, no adverse
F conclusion can be drawn against the statement made by the victim about
his having consumed some liquor and for this reason, the reliability of all
other facts stated in his statement cannot be doubted. As noticed, he had
given his complete particulars including address at the time of admission
to the hospital and it has not been shown if such particulars were narrated
by anyone else. He had stated in his statement Ex. PW-16/B even the
G vehicle registration number on which he was employed and then had
given the names and addresses of both the appellants while stating that
appellant No. 2 Suresh poured kerosene on him and appellant No. 1
Pushottam was also there; and the appellant No. 2 set him on fire by
lighting of match. It is difficult to say that victim was unable to make the
H statement coherently.
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 391
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

25.5. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of A
the view that the two statements Ex. PW-8/A and Ex. PW-16/B have
rightly been accepted as dying declarations of Sher Singh, as made few
hours before his demise and there is no reason to discard the same. In
the given set of facts and circumstances, where these two dying
declarations inspire confidence, we are clearly of the view that they
B
could be relied and acted upon even without corroboration.
Testimony of PW-6
26. A great deal of emphasis has been made in this case with
reference to the testimony of PW-6 Rajesh and it has been contended
on behalf of the appellants that as per this testimony, the victim had at C
the first point of time made the statement about self-immolation for the
reason of himself having been dropped from tempo. It is contended that
such statement by the victim ought to be taken as his first dying
declaration. Having closely scrutinized the testimony of this witness PW-
6 Rajesh, we are satisfied that the version as attempted to be given by
him in the cross-examination has rightly been rejected by the Trial Court D
and by the High Court.
26.1. Noticeable it is that this witness PW-6, in the examination-
in-chief deposed that on hearing the screams and having seen the smoke,
he reached the spot; that other people from market also reached the
spot; that he saw a person burning on fire; that water was thrown on the E
burning body of the victim from a nearby tap and the victim identified
himself as Sher Singh; and that someone from the market telephoned at
number 100 whereupon the police reached the spot. This witness did not
state anything in his examination-in-chief about the victim having told
anyone about self-immolation and therefore, there was no occasion for F
the prosecution to declare him hostile and to confront him with his previous
statement. Moreover, though the story about the victim having asserted
that he had set himself on fire came to be introduced by this witness in
his cross-examination on behalf of the appellant No. 1 but the value and
worth of such suggestion was effectively demolished by this witness
himself in his further statement in cross-examination on behalf of the G
appellant No. 2 where he categorically stated that “victim Sher Singh
has not told the people present in my presence that he had put himself
on fire”. In this cross-examination, the witness attempted to impute the
knowledge about such statement to one Tony. Obviously, the suggestion
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392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A as occurring in the statement of PW-6 about self-immolation by the victim
had been of a remote hearsay and is not of any worth at all.
26.2. In the same sequence, the contentions urged on behalf of
the appellants about want of examination of other persons named by
PW-6 falls to the ground because such names and their roles came to be
B introduced only in the statement made by PW-6 in his cross-examination.
In the given context, it has rightly been contended on behalf of the
respondent that the theory of self-immolation as also the names of the
other persons, who allegedly reached the spot, having come up by way
of cross-examination of PW-6, the burden was on the accused persons
to establish such theory by cogent evidence. No such attempt was made
C on behalf of the accused-appellants to prove any such fact or to examine
any such named person.
26.3. As noticed, the appellant No. 1 attempted to suggest in his
statement under Section 313 CrPC that he was a politically known person
and was falsely implicated by certain persons ‘adversely interested’
D against him. No such evidence is placed on record as to who were such
persons and as to why they would be falsely implicating him in a murder
case. Thus, the incomplete and uncertain defence theory has rightly
been rejected and we have no hesitation in endorsing the findings recorded
in the impugned judgments in that regard.
E Other Contentions
27. Although we have found that the two statements made by the
victim and recorded in Ex. PW-8/A and Ex. PW-16/B could be relied
upon as his dying declarations and thereby the complicity of appellants
in the crime is established; and we have also rejected the contentions
F urged with reference to the testimony of PW-6 yet, the other contentions
urged on behalf of the appellants need to be examined before reaching
to a final conclusion.
27.1. It has been argued that the prosecution has not been able to
establish the identity of assailants in this crime. The submission has no
G substance when the particulars as occurring in the two statements Ex.
PW-8/A and Ex. PW-16/B are examined and analysed, wherein
occupation of at least one of the assailant and then the names and
addresses of both the appellants came to be mentioned. For this very
reason, the other contention that the incident took place in a crowded
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PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI) 393
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

market place and the appellants were not seen by anyone also pales into A
insignificance.
27.2. The submission that prosecution has not been able to establish
the motive for crime is also of no effect because, in the first place, in a
death case, the motive remains essentially known to the deceased and
to the offender; and a prosecution case cannot fail only for want of B
proof of motive. This apart, in the present case, the indications of an
existing dispute of the deceased with appellant No. 1 do appear in the
testimony of the brother of the deceased, PW-1 Raju. It is also noticed
that the deceased and the accused persons were the residents of the
same locality.
C
27.3. The contention that only Part I of the PCR is proved and not
the other parts is also not correct. It is noticed from the record that PW-
7 Ct. Anju was examined on 12.08.1998 when her statement was deferred
for summoning the concerned record and then, her statement was further
recorded on 31.08.1998 when she brought the original proforma of PCR
and the photocopy of the same was taken on record as Ex. PW-7/B. In D
our view, the High Court has rightly relied upon the information reflected
in Parts II, III and IV of PCR form, which clearly show that not only the
initial information was recorded about the victim being on fire but further
information were recorded from time to time during the course of
transporting and admitting the victim to hospital, where not only his E
address came to be mentioned but the names of the assailants also
surfaced. The said document having been produced before the Court
and its copy having been taken on record, with PW-7 having proved that
same, it would not be justified to discard the same.
27.4. A substantial deal of argument had been with reference to F
the statement of PW-18 ASI Harish who asserted that the victim, while
being taken to hospital in PCR Van and even in hospital, did not speak to
him and was only crying in pain. The High Court has made scathing
remarks about this witness PW-18. Some of the remarks appear justified,
particularly when PW-18 attempted to say that he came to know the
name of the victim in the hospital from the persons present there. No G
such persons were otherwise shown on record and from the testimony
of PW-8 Dr. Sushma, it is established that the particulars in MLC report
came to be mentioned by her as per the information divulged by the
victim himself. For the reasons best known to him, PW-18, who had
taken the victim to hospital, attempted to say that the victim was not in a H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 1 S.C.R.

A condition to speak and thereby, attempted to disown whatever information
that was given by the victim during the process of transportation.
However, this aspect does not require further dilation for the other facts
established on record, including the fact that the victim was conscious
and oriented at the time of admission to the hospital and made the
statements in a fit state of mind.
B
27.5. Another contention urged on behalf of the appellants about
converting the present case to that under Section 304 Part II for the
offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder has only been
noted to be rejected. The act of pouring kerosene over a person and
then putting him on fire by lighting a match has all the ingredients of
C doing an act with the intention of causing death of a person in a gruesome
manner. The conviction of the appellants for the offence of murder
appears justified and we find no reason to convert the same into any
offence of lesser degree. Therefore, the submissions made on behalf of
the appellants with reference to the decisions in Sharad Birdhi Chand
D Sarda and Kalabai (supra) also deserve to be, and are, rejected.
27.6. Another suggestion on behalf of the appellant No. 1 that in
any case, he has not been assigned the role of pouring the kerosene or
lighting the fire also deserves to be rejected for the facts and
circumstances noticed above and particularly when it has come on record
E that he was with the appellant No. 2 when the victim was threatened
and was put on fire. The conviction of this appellant under Section 302/
34 IPC remains unexceptionable. For what has been noticed hereinabove,
the suggestion of no likelihood of appellant No. 1 throwing kerosene on
the head of the deceased deserves to be rejected without much dilation.

F Conclusion
28. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of
the view that the appellants have rightly been held guilty of causing
death of Sher Singh by putting him on fire and have also rightly been
convicted for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. No case for
G interference is made out.
29. Accordingly, and in view of the above, these appeals fail and
are, therefore, dismissed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.
H