Supreme Court of India

PURNO AGITOK SANGMAversusPRANAB MUKHERJEE

Citation: 2012 INSC 573
Decided: 11 December 2012
Disposal: Dismissed
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR

Holding

The election petition does not deserve a regular hearing and is dismissed under Order XXXIX Rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.

Summary

In the 2012 presidential election, petitioner Purno Agitok Sangma challenged the election of Pranab Mukherjee on the ground that Mukherjee held two "offices of profit" – Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) and Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha – at the time of filing his nomination, which would disqualify him under Article 58(2) of the Constitution. The Court examined whether these posts qualified as offices of profit, whether the 2006 amendment to the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 exempted the ISI chairmanship, and whether the petition warranted a full trial under Order XXXIX Rule 20 of the Supreme Court Rules. By a majority, the Court held that the ISI chairmanship did not confer pecuniary benefits and was excluded from disqualification, and that the Leader of the House was not an office of profit. Consequently, the petition did not raise a triable issue and did not deserve a regular hearing; it was dismissed under Order XXXIX Rule 13. A dissenting opinion argued that the petition should proceed to a regular hearing.

Issues considered

The respondent's holding of the chairmanship of the Indian Statistical Institute at the date of nomination constituted an office of profit disqualifying him under Article 58(2).
The respondent's position as Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha was an office of profit disqualifying him under Article 58(2).
Whether the 2006 amendment to the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 removes the disqualification for the ISI chairmanship in a presidential election context.
Whether the election petition, on the facts alleged, deserves a regular hearing under Order XXXIX Rule 20 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Interpretation of "office of profit" for purposes of Article 58(2) versus Article 102(1)(a).

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. s.141
Constitution of Indias. Art.102(1)(a), s. Art.102(2), s. Art.138, s. Art.145, s. Art.246(1), s. Art.58(2), s. Art.71(1), s. Art.71(3), s. Art.84
Leaders and Chief Whips of Recognized Parties and Groups in Parliament (Facilities) Act, 1998
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959s. s.3 (as amended 2006)
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952s. ss.14, s. ss.14A, s. ss.17, s. ss.18, s. ss.19, s. ss.20
Supreme Court Rules, 1966s. O.23 r.6, s. O.34, s. O.39 r.13, s. O.39 r.14, s. O.39 r.15, s. O.39 r.20

Subjects

Presidential electionElection petitionOffice of profitDisqualificationArticle 58Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) ActSupreme Court RulesPreliminary hearingOrder XXXIX Rule 13Order XXXIX Rule 20

Judgment

[2012) 11 S.C.R. 585

PURNO AGITOK SANGMA A
v.
PRANAB MUKHERJEE
(Election Petition No. 1 of 2012)

DECEMBER 5, 2012 AND DECEMBER 11, 2012
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI, P. SATHASIVAM, SURINDER
SINGH NIJJAR, J. CHELAMESWAR AND RANJAN
GOGOi, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: c
Art. 58(2) - Qualifications for election as President of
India - Expression 'office of profit' - Connotation of -
Respondent holding office of Chairman of Council of Indian
Statistical Institute, Kolkata - Held (Per majority): In order to D
be an office of profit, the office must carry pecuniary benefits
or must be capable of yielding pecuniary benefits, which is
not so in respect of Chairman, /SI - It was not such a post,
which was capable of yielding any profit so as to make it, in
fact, an office of profit- In any event, by the 2006 amendment E
to s. 3 of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,
1959, the holder of the post of Chairman, /SI has been
excluded from disqualification for contesting the Presidential
election- Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959
-s. 3.
F
Art. 58(2) - Qualification for election as President of lndif'l
- 'Office of profit' - Respondent holding the post of Leader of
House in Lok Sabha - Held (Per majority): The
disqualification contemplated on account of holding the post
of Leader of the House was with regard to the provisions of G
Art.102(1)(a) of the Constitution, besides being the position
of the leader of the party in the House, which did not entail
the holding of an office of profit under the Government - /!J ,
any event, since the respondent had tendered his resignation
585 H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A from the said post prior to filing of his nomination papers,
which was duly acted upon by the Speaker of the House,
challenge thrown by petitioner to respondent's election as
President of India on the said ground loses its relevance -
Leaders and Chief Whips of Recognized Parties and Groups
B in Parliament (Facilities) Act, 1998.

Art. 58 - Presidential election - Held: Supreme Court
has repeatedly cautioned that election of the returned
candidate should not be lightly interfered with unless
C circumstancP.s so warrant.

Supreme Court Rules, 1966:

0. 39, rr. 13 and 20 - Election petition challenging the
election of respondent to the post of President of India - Held
o (Per majority): In the facts and circumstances of the case, the
election petition does not deserve a full and regular hearing .
as contemplated under r. 20 of 0. 39 - Thus, the election
petition cannot be set down for regular hearing and is
dismissed under r. 13 of 0. 39 (J. Chelameswar and Ranjan
E Gogoi, JJ. dissenting) - Presidential and Vice Presidentil
Elections Act, 1952 - ss. 14 to 20 - Supreme Court Rules,
1966 - 0. 39, rr. 13 and 20 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
- s. 141 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 71 r/w Seventh
Schedule, List I, Entry 72.

F The petitioner, who lost the Presidential election to
the respondent, filed the instant election petition under
Art. 71 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with 0. 39
of the Supreme Court Rules 1966, challenging the
election of the respondent to the post of the President of
G India on the ground that the respondent, at the time of
filing of the nomination papers as a candidate for the
Presidential election, held the office of Chairman of the
Council of Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata and was
also the Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha; and since
H both the offices were offices of profit, the respondent
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 587

stood disqualified from contesting the Presidential A
election in view of Art. 58(2) of the Constitution. The.
challenge was based mainly on the allegation that on the
date of filing of nominations, the respondent held "offices
of profit", namely (i) Chairman of the Indian Statistical
Institute, Kolkata; and (ii) Leader of the House in the Lok B
Sabha. The stand of the respondent was that he was
holding neither of the posts on the date of filing of
nominations i.e. 28.6.2012, as he had resigned from both
the posts on 20.6.2012.

The election petition was listed for hearing on c
preliminary point in terms of 0. 39, r.13 of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1966, as to whether the petition deserved a
hearing as contemplated by r.20 of 0. 39 of the 1966
Rules.
D
Dismissing the petition, the Court

HELD: PER ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI (for himself and for P.
SATHASIVAM AND S.S. NIJJAR, JJ.)

1.1. Clause (1) of Art. 71 of the Constitution of India, E
1950 provides that all doubts and disputes arising out of
or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-
Pres ident shall be inquired into and decided by the
Supreme Court whose decision shall be final. Clause (3)
of Art. 71 provides that subject to the provisidns of the F
Constitution, Parliament may, by law, regulate any matter,
relating to or connected with the election of a President
or Vice-President. In addition, the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections Act, 1952 (the Act) was enacted
with the object of regulating certain matters relating to or G
connected with elections to the Office of President and
Vice-President of India. Part Ill of the said Act, which
contains ss.14 and 14A, as also ss.17 and 18, deals with
disputes regarding elections to the posts of President and
Vice-President of India. Sections 14 and 14A of the Act H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A specially vest the jurisdiction to try election petitions
thereunder with the Supreme Court in the manner
indicated therein. Sections 17 and 18 empower the
Supreme Court to either dismiss the election petition or
to declare the election of the returned candidate to be
s void or to declare the election of the returned candidate
to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to
have been duly elected. [para 47) [628-E-H; 629-A·B]

1.2. In view of sub-s. (3) of s.14 of the Act, the
Supreme Court has framed Rules under Art. 145 of the
C Constitution. Rule 13 of 0. 39 of the Supreme Court Rules,
1966 provides that upon presentation of a petition relating
to a challenge to election to the post of the President of
India, the same is required to be posted before a Bench
of the Court consisting of five Judges fQ_r preliminary
D hearing and to consider whether the petition deserved a
regular hearing, as contemplated in r. 20 !if 0. 39 and, in
that context, such Bench may either dismiss the petition
or pass appropriate order as it thought (it. [para 48) [629·
C-E]
E
2.1. In order to be an office of profit, the office must
carry various pecuniary benefits or must be capable of
yielding pecuniary benefits such as providing for official
accommodation or even a chauffeur driven car, which is
F not so in respect of the post of Chairman of the Indian
Statistical Institute, which was, in fact, the focus and
raison d'etre of petitioner's stand. In fact, the said office
was also not capable of yielding profit or pecuniary gain.
It can also not be said that once a person is appointed
G as Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, the Rules
and Bye-laws of the Society did not permit him to resign
from the post and that he had to continue in the post
against his wishes. There is no contractual obligation that
once appointed, the Chairman would have to continue in
such post for the full term of office. There is no such
H compulsion under the Rules and the Bye-laws of the
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 589

Society either. In any event, by the 2006 amendment to A .
s. 3 of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,
1959, the holder of the post of Chairman of the Institute
has been excluded from disqualification for contesting
the Presidential election. [para 55, 58 and 59] [631-D; 632-
G-H; 633-A-C] B

Shibu Soren Vs. Dayanand Sahay & Ors. 2001 (3)
=
SCR 1020 (2001) 7 SCC 425; and Jaya Bachchan Vs.
=
Union of India & Ors. 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 110 (2006) 5
SCC 266; M. V. Rajashekaran & Ors. Vs. Vala/ Nagaraj & Ors. C
=
2002 (1) SCR 412 (2002) 2 SCC 704; Ravanna Subanna
Vs. G.S. Kaggeerappa AIR 1953 SC 653; Madhukar G.E.
Pankakar Vs. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani 1976 (3) SCR 832 =
(1977) 1 SCC 70; Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare Vs. Shanker
=
Rao Genuji Ko/he & Ors. 1975 (2) SCR 753 (1975) 1 SCC
252; Pradyut Bordoloi Vs. Swapan Roy 2000 (5) SuppL D
=
SCR 525 (2001) 2 SCC 19; Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya
=
Vs. Ajoy Biswas & Ors. 1985 (2) SCR 50 (1985) 1 SCC 151
Consumer Education & Research Society vs. Union of India
=
& Ors. 2009 (13) SCR 664 (2009) 9 SCC 648; Kanta
Kathuria Vs. Manak Chand Surana 1970 (2) SCR 835 =E
(1969) 3 SCC 268; Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain 1976
=
SCR 347 1975 (Supp) SCC 1; Union of India & Ors. Vs.
=
Gopal Chandra Mishra & Ors. 1978 (3) SCR 12 (1978(2)
SCC 301; Moti Ram Vs. Param Dev 1993 (2) SCR 250 =
(1993) 2 SCC 725 - referred to. F

2.2. In regard to the office of the Leader of the House,
it is quite clear that the respondent had tendered his
resignation from membership of the House before he
filed his nomination papers for the Presidential election. G
However, the disqualification contempl!lted on account
of holding the post of Leader of the House was with
regard to the provisions .of Art.102(1 )(a) of the
Constitution, besides being the position of the leader of
the party in the House, which did not entail the holding H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A of an office of profit under the Government. In any event,
since the respondent had tendered his resignation from
the said post prior to filing of his nomination papers,
which had been duly acted upon by the Speaker of the
House, the challenge thrown by the petitioner to the
B respondent's election as President of India on the said
ground loses its relevance. [para 56) [631-E, G-H; 632-A-
B]

2.3. The Constitutional Scheme, as mentioned in the
Explanation to Clause (2) of Art. 58 of the Constitution,
C makes it quite clear that for the purposes of said Article,
a person would not be deemed to hold any office of profit,
inter alia, by reason only that he is a Minister either for
the Union or for any State. Art. 102 of the Constitution
contains similar provisions wherein in the Explanation to
D Clause (1) it has been similarly indicated that for the
purposes of the said clause, a person would not be
deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government
of India or the Government of any State by reason only
that he is a Minister, either for the Union, or for such
E State. [para 57) [632-C-E]

2.4. The argument that the provisions of Art. 102, as
well as Art. 58 of the Constitution could not save a
person elected to the office of President from
F disqualification if he held an office of profit, loses its
significance in view of the fact that, as would appear from
the materials on record, the respondent was not holding
any office of profit either under the Government or
otherwise at the time of filing his nomination papers for
G the Presidential election. [para 57) [632-E-F]
2.5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the
election petition does not deserve a full and regular
hearing as contemplated under r. 20 of 0. 39 of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966. It can also not be said that
H s.141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is required to
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 591

be incorporated into a proceeding taken under 0. 39 of A
the Supreme Court Rules read with Part Ill of the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952,
which includes ss.14 to 20 of the said Act and Art. 71 of
the Constitution of India. This Court is not inclined,
therefore, to set down the election petition for regular B
hearing and the same is dismissed under r. 13 of 0. 39
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. [para 60 and 62] [633-
E-F, H; 634-A]

Mange Ram Vs .. Brij Mohan & Ors. 1983 (3) SCR 525 =
(1983) 4 sec 36 - referred to. c
2.6. This Court has repeatedly cautioned that the
election of a candidate who has won in an election should
not be lightly interfered with unless circumstances so
warrant. [para 61] [633-G] D
Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Nee/am Sanjeeva Reddy 1978 (3)
SCR 1 = (1978) 2 SCC 500; Mithilesh Kumar Vs. R.
=
Venkataraman & Ors. 1988 SCR 525 (1987) Supp. SCC
692 - cited.
E
Per Chelameswar. J.:

It cannot be said that the instant election petition
does not deserve a regular hearing. Reasons for such
view shall be pronounced shortly. [646-G] F

Per Ranjan Gogoi. J. (Dissenting, but partly concurring):

1.1. The short question that has arisen for
determination in the election petition, at this stage, is
whether the same deserves a regular hearing under r. 20 G
of 0. 39 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. [para 2] [634-
C]
1.2. Art. 71 of the Constitution provides for matters
relating to, or connected with, the election of the H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A President or the Vice President. In exercise of the power
conferred by Art. 71 (3) read with Entry 72 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament has
framed the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act,
1952, s.14 (1) whereof provides that no election shall be
B called in question except by presenting an election
petition to the authority specified in sub-s. (2) i.e. the
Supreme Court. Section 14(3) provides that every election
petition shall be presented in accordance with the
provisions contained in Part Ill of the Act and such Rules
C as may be made by the Supreme Court under Art. 145 of
the Constitution. [para 9-1 O] [637-C, D-F]

1.3. By virtue of powers conferred by Art. 145 of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has framed the Supreme
Court Rules, 1966 (the Rules), r. 34 of 0. 39 whereof
D provides that the procedure on an election petition shall
follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure in
proceedings before the Supreme Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. The said procedure is contained
in 0. 23 of Part Ill of the Rules. Order 23, r. 1 contemplates
E institution of a suit by means of a plaint. After dealing with
the requirements of a valid plaint, 0.23, r.6 provides that
,a plaint shall be rejected (a) where it does not disclose a
: cause of action; and (b) where the suit appears from the
statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. [para 11
F and 13] [638-B; 639-D,F]

1.4. A preliminary hearing for determination of the
question as to whether an election petition deserves a
regular hearing under r.20 did not find any place in the
G Ru~s till insertion of r.13 in the present form w.e.f.
20.12.1997. Order 23, r. 6 was a part of the Rules
alongwith r. 13 as it originally existed. Thus, insertion of
r _13 providing for a preliminary hearing was made despite
the existence of the provisions of 0. 23, r. 6 and the
availability of the power to reject a plaint and dismiss the
H suit-(including an election petition) on the twin grounds
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 593

mentioned in r. 6 of 0. 23. [para 13 and 15] [639-C-D; 640- A
C-D]

1.5. Therefore, a preliminary hearing under 0.39, r. 13
would require the Court to consider something more than
the mere disclosure or otherwise of a cause of action on B
the pleadings made or the question of maintainability of
the election petition in the light of any particular statutory
enactment. A further enquiry, which obviously must
exclude matters that would fall within the domain of a
regular hearing under r. 20, would be called for in the
preliminary hearing under r. 13 of 0. 39. In the course of C
such enquiry the Court must be satisfied that though the
election petition discloses a clear cause of action and
raises triable issue(s), yet, a trial of the issues raised will
not be necessary or justified inasmuch as even if the
totality of the facts on which the petitioner relies are to D
be assumed to be proved there will be no occasion to
cause any interference with the result of the election. It
is only in such a situation that the election petition must
not be allowed to cross the hurdle of the preliminary
hearing. If such satisfaction cannot be reached, the E
election petition must be allowed to embark upon the
journey of a regular hearing under r. 20 of 0. 39 in
accordance with the provisions of Part Ill of the Rules.
This is the scope and ambit of the preliminary hearing
under 0. 39, r.13 of the Rules and it is within these F
confines that the question raised by the parties, at this
stage, have to be answered. [para 15] [640-D-H; 641-A]
2.1. Under the provisions of the Leaders and Chief
Whips of Recognized Parties and Groups in Parliament
(Facilities) Act, 1998 and the Rules framed thereunder, no G
remuneration to the Leader of the House or the Leader
of the Legislature Party in the House is contemplated
beyond the salary and perquisites payable to the holder
of such an office if he is a Minister of the Union (in the
instant case, the respondent was a Cabinet Minister of H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A the Union). That apart, either of the offices is not under
the Government of India or the Government of any State
or under any local or other authority as required under
Art. 58 (2) so as to make the holder of any such office
incur the disqualification contemplated thereunder. Both
B the offices in question are offices connected with the Lok
Sabha. Any incumbent thereof is either to be elected or
nominated by virtue of his membership of the House or
his position as a Cabinet Minister, as may be. The
election petition insofar as the said offices are
C concerned, therefore, does not disclose any triable issue
for a full length hearing under 0. 39, r. 20 of the Rules.
[para 16] [641 ·B·E]
2.2. With regard to the office of the Chairman of the
Council of Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, the
D question whether the said office carries any
remuneration and/or perquisites or the same is under the
control of the Union Government as also the question
whether the respondent had resigned from the said
office on 20.6.2012, are all questions of fact which are in
E dispute and, therefore, capable of resolution only on the
basis of such evidence as may be adduced by the
parties. The Court, therefore, will have to steer away from
any of the said issues at the present stage of
consideration which is one under 0. 39, r.13. Instead, for
F the present, the Court may proceed on the basis that the
office in question is an office of profit which the
respondent held on the relevant date. In this regard the
specific issue that has to be gone into is whether the
office of the Chairman, ISi, Kolkata has been exempted
G from bringing any disqualification by virtue of the
provisions of the Parliament (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act 1959, as amended. For an effective
examination of the issue, the provisions of Arts. 58, 84
and 102 of the Constitution would require a detailed
H notice and consideration. [para 17-18] [641-F-H; 642·8-D]
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 595

2.3. Article 58(1 )(c) requires a Presidential candidate A
to be qualified for election as a Member of the House of
the People. It cannot be said that whosoever is qualified
for election as a Member of the House of the People
under Art. 84 and does not suffer from any
disqualification under Art. 102 becomes automatically B
eligible for election to the office of the President. Nor can
it be said that the provisions of Arts. 58, 84 and 102 of
the Constitution envisage a composite and homogenous
scheme. The similarities as well as the differences
between Art. 58, on the one hand, and Arts. 84 and 102, c
on the other, are too conspicuous to be ignored or. over
looked. Insofar as Art. 102 (1)(a) is concerned, though
holding an office of profit is a disqualification for election
as or being a Member of either House of Parliament, such
a disqualification can be obliterated by a law made by
0
Parliament. Under Art. 58(2) though a similar
disqualification (by virtue of holding an office of profit) is
incurred by a Presidential candidate, no power has been
conferred on Parliament to remove such a
disqualification. Keeping in view that the words in the E I
Constitution should be read in their ordinary and natural
meaning so that a co11struction which brings out the true
legislative intent is achieved, Art. 58 has to be read
independently of Arts. 84 and 102 and the purport of the
two sets of Constitutional provisions has to be
understood to be independent of each other. [para 19-20] F
[644-F-G; 645-C-H]

Baburao Patel v. Dr. Zakir Hussain (1968) 2 SCR 133 -
relied on
G
2.4. Therefore, the Parliament (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, 1959 as amended by the
Amendment Act No.31 of 2006 has no application insofar
as election to the office of the President is concerned.
The disqualification incurred by a Presidential candidate H
on account of holding of an office of profit is not
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A removed by the provisions of the said Act which deals
with removal of disqualification for being chosen as, or
for being a Member of Parliament. If, therefore, it is
assumed that the office of Chairman, ISi is an office of
profit and the respondent had held the said office on the
B material date(s), consequences adverse to the
respondent, in so far as the result of the election is
concerned, are likely to follow. The said facts will,
therefore, be required to be proved by the election
petitioner. [para 21] [646-8-D]
c 2.5. Thus, no conclusion that a regular hearing in the
instant case will be a redundant exercise or an empty
formality can be reached so as to dispense with the same
and terminate the election petition at the stage of its
preliminary hearing under 0. 39, r.13. The election petition,
D therefore, deserves a regular hearing under 0. 39, r. 20
in accordance with what is contained in the different
provisions of Part Ill of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
[para 21] [646-D-E]

E DECEMBER 11. 2012:

Per Chelameswar. J. (Dissenting, but partly concurring):

1.1. It is a long settled principle of law that the
elections to various bodies created under the
F Constitution cannot be questioned except in accordance
with the law made by the appropriate legislation. Art. 71
of tbe Constitution of India declares that all doubts and
disputes arising out of or in connection with the election
of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired into and
G decided by the Supreme Court. While the forum for
adjudication of disputes pertaining to legislative bodies
under the Constitution is required to be determined by
the appropriate legislature, the forum for the adjudication
of disputes pertaining to the election of the President and
H the Vice-President is fixed by the Constitution to be this
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 597

Court. In exercise of power under Art. 71 (3) read with Art. A
246(1) and Entry 72 of List I of the Seventh Schedule,
Parliament made the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections Act, 1952, ('the Elections Act'), s.14 whereof
declares that the only mode of questioning the election
of either the President or the Vice-President is by B
presenting an election petition to this Court. Section 14A
prescribes that the election of either the President or the
Vice-President could be challenged only on the grounds
specified in ss.18(1) and 19 of the Act. Further, Art. 145
of the Constitution authorizes this Court to make rules C
for regulating the practice and procedure of this Court
with regard to its jurisdiction, either original or appellate
vested in this Court either by the Constitution or law.
[para 3,4 and 8] [647-C, E; 648-A-B-E-F; 649-A-B; 651-C;
652-A]
D
1.2. It cannot be said that the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 applies to the conduct of the election
petition on hand in view of s.141 thereof. The procedure
that is required to be followed by this Court while
exercising jurisdiction conferred by either the E
Constitution or Parliament by law could be laid down
only by Parliament and until Parliament makes such a
law, by the rules made by this Court. CPC is not a law
made by Parliament but an "existing law" within the
meaning of the expression under Art. 366 (10) and F
deriving its force from Art. 372 of the Constitution. Further,
this Court and the High Courts are not ordinary civil
courts within the meaning of such an expression
employed in various enactments attracting the bar of
jurisdiction created by the statute. Therefore, it cannot be G
said that by virtue of the operation of s.141 of the Code,
this Court is bound by the procedure contained in the
Code while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Art. 71 of the Constitution. [para 9 and 11] [652-B-D; 654-
D-F] H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A 1.3. This Court, in exercise of its authority under Art.
145, has made rules regulating the procedure of this
Court, both in its original and appellate jurisdiction called
the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 ['the Rules']. Insofar as
the election petitions under the Elections Act are
B concerned, the procedure is prescribed under 0. 39
which occurs in Part VII of the Rules. Rule 34 thereof
stipulates that while adjudicating an election petition
under the Elections Act, this Court is required to follow
(as nearly as may be) the procedure contained in Orders
C 22 to 34 of Part Ill of the Rules regulating the proceedings
before this Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Such a stipulation is expressly made subject to other
provisions of 0.39 or any special order or direction by this
Court. The stipulation that this Court is obliged to follow
the procedure applicable to the proceedings under the
D original jurisdiction of this Court (Part Ill of the Rules) is
made subject to the other provisions of 0. 39. Thus, if the
procedure contained in Part Ill is inconsistent with any
provisions contained in Part VII (0. 39), this Court is not
obliged to follow the procedure contained in Part Ill. Apart
E from that, in view of r. 34 of 0. 39, it is always open to. this
Court in a given case not to follow the procedure
contained under 0. 39. [para 12] [655-A-F]

1.5. Rules 13 to 15 of 0. 39 prescribe the procedure
F to be followed by this Court on the receipt of an election
petition under the Act. A plain reading of r.13 of 0. 39
indicates that on the due presentation of an election
petition under the Ac;t to this Court: [1] the same shall be
posted before a bench of five Judges for a preliminary
G hearing and orders; [2] such a hearing and orders are
regarding the service of the petition and advertisement
thereof. Rules 14 and 15 respectively stipulate that the
notice of the presentation of the election petition under
the Act is required to be served on the various persons
H specified under r.14. An election petition under the Act is
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 599

required to be listed for a preliminary hearing A
contemplated under r.13. Rule 13 further stipulates [3]
upon such a preliminary hearing, if the Court comes to
the conclusion that the petition does not deserve a
regular hearing, contemplated under r.20, the Court may
either dismiss the election petition or pass any B
appropriate orders as it deems fit. [para 13-14] [655-G;
656-A-B-C-D]

1.6. Therefore, 0. 39, r. 13 prescribes a procedure
contrary to the stipulation contained under 0. 24, r.1
which mandates that after due institution of an original C
suit before this Court, "summons shall be issued". It is
worthwhile noticing that while 0. 24 requires summons
to be issued, 0. 39, r.14 contemplates that only a notice
of the presentation of an election petition is to be issued.
The distinction between summons and notice is very D
subtle but real. [para 15] [657-E-F]
2.1. Order 39. r. 13 vests a discretion in the bench of
five Judges before whom the election petition under the
Act is posted for preliminary hearing to record a E
conclusion whether the petition deserves a notice under
r.14 or publication under r.15 and a regular hearing under
r.20 or any other appropriate order such as (perhaps)
directing some formal defects in the petition to be cured
etc. However, the discretion of the bench to record a F
finding that the election petition does not deserve a
regular hearing and, therefore, is required to be
dismissed must be exercised on rational grounds known
to law for clear and cogent reasons to be recorded. [para
16-17] [657-G-H; 658-A-B-C]
G
2.2. It is not possible to give an exhaustive list of the
circumstances in which this Court can render the finding
that an election petition does not require a regular
hearing but for the purpose of the case is hand it can be
said that if the allegations made in the election petition H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A even if assumed to be true do not constitute one or some
of the grounds on which an election under the Act can
be challenged, it would be certainly one of the grounds
enabling this Court to reach a conclusion that the election
petition does not deserve a regular hearing. In the instant
B case, the only ground on which the election of the
respondent is challenged is that he was not eligible to
contest the election to the office of President of India.
Such a ground is certainly one of the grounds on which
election of the respondent as the President of India could
C be challenged, as s.18(1)(c) of the Elections Act stipulates
that if this Court is of the opinion that the nomination of
the successful candidate has been wrongly accepted, this
Court shall declare the election to be void. [para 21,23 and
27] [659-C, G; 660-A-B; 661-C]
D 3.1. The respondent does not dispute the fact that he
was the Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute,
Kolkata and also the leader of the political party called
Indian National Congress in the Lok Sabha. However, the
respondent took a categoric stand that he had resigned
E from both the offices before the crucial date i.e. on the
date of scrutiny of the nomination papers (2.7.2012) - a
stand which is seriously disputed by the election
petitioner by an elaborate pleading in the petition that the
respondent did not, in fact, cease to hold the offices by
F the crucial date. The respondent also took a categoric
stand that apart from his having had relinquished the two
offices by the crucial date, neither of the abovementioned
offices is an office the holding of which would make him
ineligible to contest the election in question. [para 29-30]
G [661-F-H; 662-A]
3.2. The issue that is required to be examined for the
purpose of the order on the preliminary hearing under r.
13 of 0.39 of the Rules is whether the holding of either of
the two offices - if really held on the crucial date - would
H render the respondent ineligible to contest the election in
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 601

question? Further, the question would be, whether the A
two offices are offices of profit. The question - whether
the respondent did in fact hold those offices on the
crucial date is a question of fact which cannot be the
subject matter of enquiry at this stage. [para 31-32] [662-
8-D] . B

3.3. Article 58 provides that holding of an office of
profit either under the Government of India or the
Government of any State or any local or other authority
subject to the control of any of the said GovP-rnments C
inter alia would render the holder of such office of profit
ineligible for election as President. The respondent's
defence is that neither of the offices held by him are
offices of profit falling under Art. 58 (2) which would
render him ineligible to contest the election in question.
[para 34-36] [662-E; 663-8-D] D

3.4. Any person seeking to contest an election either
to the office of the President of India or for the
membership of anyone of the legislative bodies under the
Constitution must satisfy certain eligibility criteria E
stipulated by the Constitution. Any person who is eligible
to become and not disqualified for becoming a member
of Parliament would not automatically be eligible to
contest the election to the office of the President of India.
There is a difference in the eligibility criteria applicable to F
the election of the membership of Parliament and the
election to the office of the President of India. Claues (2)
of Art. 58 disqualifies persons holding office of profit not
only specified under Art. 102 (1) (a) but also under any
local or any other authority which is subject to the control G
of either of the two governments. Further, while an office
of profit, the holding of which renders a person
disqualified for being chosen as a member of Parliament,
can be declared by the Parliament not to be an office of
profit holding of which would disqualify the holder from H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A becoming a member of Parliament. Such an authority is
not expressly conferred on the Parliament in the context
of the candidates at an election to the office of the
President of India.Thus, the Constitution prescribes
more stringent qualifications for election to the office of
B President of India and the disqualification stipulated
under Art. 58(2) is incapable of being exempted by a law
made by Parliament. [para 38, 40-43] (665-A-B; 667-C-D;
F-G; 668-A-B-F]

C Baburao Patel and others v. Dr. Zakir Hussain and
others 1968 SCR 133 =AIR 1968 SC 904 - relied on

3.5. The declaration made by Parliament in the
Disqualification Act, 1959 would not provide immunity for
a candidate seeking election to the office of the President
D of India if such a candidate happens to hold an office of
profit contemplated under Art. 58(2). Even otherwise, the
legal nature of Indian Statistical Institute and of the office
of its Chairman is required to be examined. The office of
the Chairman of the Institute is not an office created by
E any statute but is an office created by the bye-laws of the
Society. The Chairman is required to be elected by a
Council created under the regulations of the Society.
Therefore, it is certainly not an office (profit or no profit)
either under the Central or State Government. [para 46-
F 47 and 54] [671-D-E, G; 673-C-D]

B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others 1984
(1) SCR 395 = (1983) 4 SCC 582; and M. V. Rajashekaran
and others v. Vatal Nagaraj and others 2002 (1) SCR 412 =
(2002) 2 sec 704 - referred to.
G
3.6. Besides, the inclusion of various offices in the
Schedule of the Disqualification Act only reflects the
understanding of the Parliament that those offices are
offices of profit contemplated under Art. 102(1)(a). But
H such an understanding is neither conclusive nor binding
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 603

on this Court while interpreting the Constitution. Such A
inclusion appears to be an exercise - 'ex majure cautela'.
Interpretation of the Constitution and the laws is
"emphatically the province and duty" of the judiciary.
Therefore, the meaning of the expressions "office of
profit" and "office of profit under the State Government/ B
Central Government" are required to be examined. [para
62-63] [676-D-F; 677-A-B]
Shivamurthy Swami /namdar v. Agadi Sanganna
Andanappa (1971) 3 SCC 870; Ravanna Subanna v. G.S.
Kaggerappa, AIR 1954 SC 653; Shibu Soren v. Dayanand C
=
Sahay and others 2001 (3) SCR 1020 (2001) 7 sec 425 -
referred to.
3.7. The office of the Chairman of the Indian Statistical
Institute, Kolkata, which is an authority for the purpose 0
of Art. 58(2), is an office of profit as explained by this
Court in various judgments. Assuming that the tests
relevant for determining whether an office of profit
contemplated under Art. 58(2) are the same as the test laid
down by this Court in the context of Art. 102(1)(a), the
answer to the said question depends upon the terms and E
conditions subject to which the respondent held that
office. Whether the amounts if any paid to him in that
capacity are compensatory in nature or amounts capable
of conferring pecuniary gain are questions of fact which
ought to be decided only after ascertaining all the relevant F
facts which are obviously in the exclusive knowledge
either of the respondent or the Institute. The respondent
in his short counter made a statement that he did not
derive pecuniary gain by holding the said office. The
veracity of such statement has not been subjected to any G
further scrutiny. After an appropriate enquiry into such
conflicting statements of facts if it is to be concluded that
the said office is an office of profit, inevitably the question
whether the respondent had tendered his resignation by
the crucial date is required to be ascertained - once again H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A an enquiry into a question of fact. [para 69-70] [679-C-F;
680-A-C]

3.8. The petitioner if permitted to inspect or seek
discovery of records of the Indian Statistical Institute
111ight or might not secure information to demonstrate
8
truth or otherwise of the respondent's affidavit. The issue
is not whether the petitioner would eventually be able to
establish his case or not. The issue is whether the
petitioner is entitled to a rational procedure of law to
establish his case. The Constitution creates only one
C forum for the adjudication of such disputes. All other
avenues are closed. By holding that the election petition
does not deserve a regular hearing contemplated under
r.20 would not be consistent with the requirement that
justice must not only be done but it must also appear to
D have been done. [para 70-71] [680-D-F]

3.9. If adjudication of the election petition requires
securing of information which is exclusively available
with the respondent and the Indian Statistical Institute
E and which may be relevant, the petitioner cannot be told
that he would not be able to secure such information on
the ground that letter of the law does not provide for such
opportunity. The CPC does not apply to the election
petition. The rules framed by this Court under Art. 145 are
F silent in this regard. But the very fact that this Court is
authorised to frame rules regulating the procedure
applicable to trial of the election petitions implies that this
Court has powers to pass appropriate orders to secure
such information. [para 73] [681-C·E]
G 3.10. Similarly, accepting the statement of the
respondent that he did not derive any pecuniary benefit
by virtue of his having had been Chairman of the Indian
Statistical Institute without permitting the petitioner to test
the correctness of that statement by cross-examining the
H respondent or confronting the respondent with such
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 605

documents which the petitioner might discover if such a A
discovery is permitted would be a denial of equality of the
law to the petitioner guaranteed under Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Such facility is afforded to every litigant
pursuing litigation in a court of civil judicature in this
country. Therefore, it cannot be said that the election B
petition does not deserve a regular hearing. [para 74]
[681-G-H; 682-A]
Case Law Reference:
Per Altamas Kabir, CJI. c
2001 (3) SCR 1020 referred to para 16
2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 110 referred to para 17
2002 (1) SCR 412 referred to para 18
D
1978 (3) SCR 1 cited para 22
1988 SCR 525 cited para 24
1983 (3) SCR 525 referred to para 28
E
AIR 1953 SC 653 referred to para 28
1976 (3) SCR 832 referred to para 29
1978 (3) SCR 12 referred to para 30
1993 (2) SCR 250 referred to para 31 F

2009 (13) SCR 664 referred to para 37
1970 (2) SCR 835 referred to para 38
1976 SCR 347 referred to para 38 G
1975 (2) SCR 753 referred to para 39
Per Ranjan Gogoi, J.
(1968) 2 SCR 133 relied on para 20
H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A Per J. Chelameswar, J,
1968 SCR 133 relied on para 44
1984 (1) SCR 395 relied on para 49
2002 (1) SCR 412 relied on para 55
B
(1971) 3 sec 870 referred to para 64
AIR 1954 SC 653 referred to para 64
2001 (3) SCR 1020 referred to para 65
c
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Under Article 71 of the
Constitution of India.

Election Petition No. 1 of 2012.

D Goolam E. Vahanvati, A.G., Ram Jethmalani, Satya Pal
Jain, Harish N. Salve, Pravin H. Parekh, S.S. Shamshery,
Dheeraj Jain, P.V. Yogeswaran, Lata Krishnamurthi, P.R. Mala,
Subhashish R. Soren, Pranav Diesh, Karan Kalia, Ashish Dixit,
V.M. Vishnu, Bharat Sood, Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Devadatt
E Kamat, Rohit Sharma, Anoopam N. Prasad, Nizam Pasha,
Anandh Kannan, Sameer Parekh, E.R. Kumar, Sonali Basu
Parekh, Rajat Nair, Vishal Prasad, Utsav Trivedi, Abhishek
Vinod Deshmukh (for Parekh & Co.) Meenakshi Arora for the
appearing parties.
F The Judgments & Order of the Court was delivered by

ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. ·1,. The Petitioner herein was a
candidate in the Presidential elections.~eld on 19th July, 2012,
the results whereof were de<!lared on 22nd July, 2012. The
G Petitioner and the Respondent were the only two duly nominated
candidates. The Respondent received votes of the value of
7,13,763 and was declared elected to the Office of the
President of India. On the other hand, the Petitioner received
votes of the value of 3,15,987.
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 607
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
2. The Petitioner has challenged the election of the A
Respondent as President of India on the ground that he was
not eligible to contest the Presidential election in view of the
provisions of Article 58 of the Constitution of India, which is
extracted hereinbelow :-
B
"58. Qualifications for election as President.- (1) No
person shall be eligible for election as President unless
he -

(a) is a citizen of India,
c
(b) has completed the age of thirty-five years, and

(2) A person shall not be eligible for election as President D
if he holds any office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State or under any local or
other authority subject to the control of any of the said
Governments.
E
Explanation.-For the purposes of this article, a person
shall not be deemed to hold any office of profit by reason
only that he is the President or Vice President of the Union
or the Governor of any State or is a Minister either for the
Union or for any State."
F
3. According to the Petitioner, at the time of filing the
nomination papers as a candidate for the Presidential
elections, the Respondent held the Office of Chairman of the
Council of Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, hereinafter
referred to as the "Institute", which, according to him, was an G
office of profit. It appears that at the time of scrutiny of the
nomination papers on 2nd July, 2012, an objection to that effect
had been raised before the Returning Officer by the Petitioner's
authorized representative, who urged that the nomination
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A papers of the Respondent were liable to be rejected. In
response to the said submission, the representative of the
Respondent sought two days' time to file a reply to the
objections raised by the Petitioner. Thereafter, on 3rd July,
2012, a written reply was submitted on behalf of the
B Respondent to the objections raised by the Petitioner before
the Returning Officer, along with a copy of a resignation letter
dated 20th June, 2012, whereby the Respondent claimed to
have resigned from the Chairmanship of the Institute. A reply
was also filed on behalf of the Respondent to the objections
c raised by Shri Charan Lal Sahu. The matter was, thereafter,
considered by the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of
the nomination papers on 3rd July, 2012, when the Petitioner's
representative even questioned the genuineness· of the
resignation letter submitted by the Respondent to the President
0 of the Council of the Institute, Prof. M.G.K. Menon.

4. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of
the parties, the Returning Officer, by his order dated 3rd July,
2012, rejected the Petitioner's objections as well as the
objections raised by Shri Charan Lal Sahu, and accepted the
E Respondent's nomination papers. Accordingly, on 3rd July,
2012, the Petitioner and the Respondent were declared to be
the only two duly nominated candidates for the Presidential
election.

F 5. Immediately after the rejection of the Petitioner's
objection to the Respondent's candidature for the Presidential
elections, on 9th July, 2012, a petition was submitted to the
Election Commission of India, under Article 324 of the
Constitution, praying for directions to the Returning Officer to
G re-scrutinize the nomination papers of the Respondent and to
decide the matter afresh after hearing the Petitioner. The
Election Commission rejected the said petition as not being
maintainable before the Election Commission, since all
disputes relating to Presidential elections could be inquired into
H and decided only by this Court. Thereafter, as indicated
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 609
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
hereinabove, the Presidential elections were conducted on A
19th July, 2012, and the Respondent was declared elected to
the Office of the President of India on 22nd July, 2012.

6. Aggrieved by the decision of the Returning Officer in
accepting the nomination papers of the Respondent as being 8
valid, the Petitioner has questioned the election of the
Respondent as the President of India under Article 71 of the
Constitution read with Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1966, and, in particular, Rule 13 thereof. The said Rule,
which is relevant for a decision in this petition, reads as follows C

"13. Upon presentation of a petition the same shall be
posted before a bench of the Court consisting of five
Judges for preliminary hearing and orders for service of
the petition and advertisement thereof as the Court may D
think proper and also appoint a time for hearing of the
petition. Upon preliminary hearing, the Court, if
satisfied, that the petition does not deserve regular
hearing 'IS contemplated in Rule 20 of this Order may
dismiss the petition or pass any appropriate order as E
the Court may cleem fit."

[Emphasis supplied]

7. In keeping with the provisions of Rule 13 of Order XXXIX
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which deals with Election F
Petitions under Part Ill of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections Act, 1952, the Election Petition filed by the Petitioner
was listed for hearing on the preliminary point as to whether
the petition deserved a hearing, as contemplated by Rule 20
of Order XXXIX, which provides as follows : G

"20. Every petition calling in question an election shall be
posted before and be heard and disposed of by a Bench
of the Court consisting of not less than five Judges."

8. Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Advocate, H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A appearing for the Petitioner, submitted that the Respondent's
election as President of India, was liable to be declared as void
mainly on the ground that by holding the post of Chairman of
the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, on the date of scrutiny
of the nomination papers, the Respondent held an office of
B profit, which disqualified him from contesting the Presidential
election.

9. Mr. Jethmalani urged that apart from holding the office
of the Chairman of the aforesaid Institute, the Respondent was
C also the Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha which had been
declared as an office of profit. Urging that since the Respondent
was holding both the aforesaid offices, which were offices of
profit, on the date of filing of the nomination papers, the
Respondent stood disqualified from contesting the Presidential
election in view of Article 58(2) of the Constitution.
D
10. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that Article 71 of the
Constitution provides that all doubts and disputes arising out
of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-
President shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme
E Court whose decision is to be final. Mr. Jethmalani submitted
that there were sufficient doubts to the Respondent's assertion
that on the date of filing of his nomination papers, he had
resigned both from the office of Chairman of the Indian
Statistical Institute, Calcutta, and as the Leader of the House
F in the Lok Sabha, on 20th June, 2012. Mr. Jethmalani urged
that the doubt which had been raised could only be dispelled
by a full-fledged inquiry which required evidence to be taken
and cross-examination of the witnesses whom the Respondent
might choose to examine. Accordingly, Mr. Jethmalani
G submitted that the instant petition would have to be tried in the
same manner as a suit, which attracted the provisions of
Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as
follows:

"141. Miscellaneous Proceedings. - The procedure
H provided in this Code in regard to suit shall be followed,
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 611
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.)
as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in A
any Court of civil jurisdiction.

Explanation - In this Section the expression
"proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, .but
does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the
8
Constitution."

In addition, learned counsel also referred to Rule 34 of
Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which
provides as follows :-
c
"Order XXXIX, Rule 34

Subject to the provisions of this Order or any special order
or direction of the Court, the procedure of an Election
Petition shall follow as nearly as may be the procedure in
proceedings before the Court in exercise of its Original D
Jurisdiction."

11. Mr. Jethmalani pointed out that in the Original
Jurisdiction cf the Supreme Court, provided for in Order XXll
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, the entire procedure for E
institution and trial of a suit has been set out, providing for all
the different stages in respect of a suit governed by the Code
of Civil Procedure. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that the making
of the procedure for trial of Election Petitions akin to that of the
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was a clear F
indication that the matter must be tried as a suit, if under Rule
13 of Order XXXIX, the Court consisting of 5 Judges was
satisfied at a preliminary inquiry that the matter deserved a
regular hearing, as contemplated in Rule 20 of the said Order.

12. For the sake of comparison, Mr. Jethmalani referred G
to Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
laying down the procedure for the trial of Election Petitions and
providing that every Election Petition shall be tried by the High
Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure
applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A suits. Mr. Jethmalani urged that in matters relating to election
disputes it was the intention of the Legislature to have the same
tried as regular suits following the procedure enunciated in
Section 141 C.P.C.

13. Mr. Jethmalani then drew our attention to Article 102
8
of the Constitution and, in particular, Clause 1(1)(a) thereof,
which, inter alia, provides as follows :-

"102. (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen
as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament
c
.{fil if he holds any office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State, other than an office
declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder;
D (b) ........... .

(d) ........... .
E (e) ........... .

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause a person
shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State by
F reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or
for such State."

14. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that language similar to the
above, had been incorporated in Article 58(2) of the
G Constitution, which also provides that a person shall not be
eligible for election as President, if he holds any office of profit
under the Government of India or the Government of any State
or under any local or other authority, subject to the control of
any of the said Governments. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that as
H in Explanation to Article 102, the Explanation to Clause (2) of
Article 58 also indicates that a person shall not be deemed to
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 613
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
hold any office of profit by reason only that he is the President A
or Vice-President of the Union or the Governor of any State or
is a Minister either for the Union or for any State. Mr. Jethmalani
urged that Article 102 cannot save a person elected to the Office
of President from disqualification, if he holds an office of profit.
B
15. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that from the annexures to
the affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent it was highly
doubtful as to whether tl'le Respondent had actually resigned
from the post of Chairman of the Institute on 20th June, 2012,
or even from the Membership of the Congress Party, including C
the Working Committee, and from the office of the Leader of
the Congress Party in Lok Sabha on the same date, as
contended by him. Mr. Jethmalani submitted that from the copy
of the letter addressed to Professor M.G.K. Menon, President
of the Institute, it could not be ascertained as to whether the
endorsement made by Professor Menon amounted to D
acceptance of the Respondent's resignation or receipt of the
letter itself. Learned counsel urged that this was another case
of "doubf' within the meaning of Article 71 of the Constitution
of India which required the Election Petition to be tried as a suit
for which a detailed hearing was required to be undertaken by E
taking evidence and allowing for cross-examination of
witnesses.

16. It was also submitted that the expression "office of
profit" has not been conclusively explained till today under the F
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, nor any
other pre-independence statute, and the same required to be
resolved by this Court. In this regard, Mr. Jethmalani referred
to the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case
of Shibu Soren Vs. Dayanand Sahay & Ors. [(2001) 7 SCC G
425], in which the aforesaid expression came to be considered
and in interpreting the provision of Articles 102(1 )(a) and
191(1)(a), this Court held that such interpretation should be
realistic having regard to the object of the said Articles. It was
observed that the expression "profit" connotes an idea of some
pecuniary gain other than "compensation". Neither the quantum H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A of amount paid, nor the label under which the payment is made,
may always be material to determine whether the office is one
of profit. This Court went on further to observe that mere use
of the word "honorarium" cannot take the payment out of the
concepf of profit, if there is some pecuniary gain for the
B recipient. It was held in the said case that payment of an
honorarium, in addition to daily allowances in the nature of
compensatory allowances, rent-free accommodation and
chauffeur driven car at State expense, were in the nature of
remuneration and is a source of pecuniary gain and, hence,
c constituted profit. Mr. Jethmalani urged that it was on the basis
of such observation that the Election Petition in the said case
was allowed.

17. Mr. Jethmalani also referred to the decision of this
Court in the case of Jaya Bachchan Vs. Union of India & Ors.
D [(2006) 5 SCC 266], wherein also the phrase "office of profit"
fell for interpretation within the meaning of Article 102 and other
provisions of the Constitution with regard to use of the
expression "honorarium" and its effect regarding the financial
status of the holder of office or interest of the holder in profiting
E from the office. It was observed that what was relevant was
whether the office was capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary
gain, other than reimbursement of out-of-pocket/actual
expenses, and not whether the person actually received
monetary gain or did not withdraw the emoluments to which he
F was entitled. The three-Judge Bench, which heard the matter,
held that an office of profit is an office which is capable of
yielding profits of pecuniary gain and that holding an office under
the Central or State Government, to which some pay, salary,
emolument, remuneration or non-compensatory allowance is
G attached, is "holding an office of profit". However, the question
whether a person holds an office of profit has to be interpreted
in a realistic manner and the nature of the payment must be
considered as a matter of substance rather than of form. Their
Lordships further observed that for deciding the question as to
H whether one is holding an office of profit or not, what is relevant
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 615
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
is whether the office is capable of yielding a profit or pecuniary A
gain and not whether the person actually obtained any monetary
gain therefrom.

18. In the same connection, reference was also made to
the decision of this Court in M. V. Rajashekaran & Ors. Vs. B
Vatal Nagaraj & Ors. [(2002) 2 SCC 704], where also the
expression "office of profit" fell for consideration.

19. Mr. Jethmalani urged that having regard to the above,
the Election Petition deserved a regular hearing, as
contemplated in Rule 20 of Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court C
Rules, 1966.

20. Appearing for the Respondent, Mr. Harish Salve,
learned Senior Advocate, submitted that election to the office
of the President of India is regulated under the provisions of 0
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Act, 1952, hereinafter
referred to as the "1952 Act", and, in particular Part Ill thereof,
which deals with disputes regarding elections. Mr. Salve
pointed out that Sections 14 and 14A of the Act specifically vest
the jurisdiction to try Ele.ction Petitions under the 1952 Act with E
the Supreme Court, in the manner prescribed in the said
sections. Accordingly, the challenge to a Presidential election
would have to be in compliance with the provisions of Order
XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which deals with
Election Petitions under Part Ill of the 1952 Act. Rule 13 of Order
XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, therefore, becomes F
applicable and it enjoins that upon presentation of an Election
Petition, the same has to be posted before a Bench of the Court
consisting of five Judges, for preliminary hearing to satisfy itself
that the petition deserves a regular hearing, as contemplated
in Rule 20. For the sake of reference, Sections 14 and 14A of G
the 1952 Act, are extracted hereinbelow :-

"14. (1) No election shall be called in question except
by presenting an Election Petition to the authority specified
in sub-section (2). H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A (2) The authority having jurisdiction to try an Election
Petition shall be the Supreme Court.

(3) Every Election Petition shall be presented to such
authority in accordance with the provisions of this Part and
B of the rules made by the Supreme Court under article 145.

14A. (1) An Election Petition calling in question an
election may be presented on one or more of the grounds
specified in sub-section (1) of section 18 and section 19,
to the Supreme Court by any candidate at such election,
c or-

(a) in the case of Presidential election, by
twenty or more electors joined together as
petitioners ;
D
(b) in the case of Vice-Presidential election,
by ten or more electors joined together as
petitioners.

(2) Any such petition may be presented at any
E time after the date of publication of the declaration
containing the name of the returned candidate at
the election under section 12, but not later than thirty
days from the date of such publication."

21. Mr. Salve submitted that the nomination papers of the
F
respective candidates had been scrutinized by the Returning
Officer in accordance with the provisions of Section 5A of the
1952 Act. Referring to Sub-Section (3) of Section 5E, Mr. Salve
submitted that after completing all the formalities indicated in
G Sub-Section (3), the Returning Officer had accepted the
nomination papers of the Respondent as valid, which,
thereafter, gave the Respondent the right to contest the election.
Mr. Salve submitted that Section 14 of the 1952 Act was
enacted under Clause (3) of Article 71 of the Constitution which
provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution,
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 617
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

Parliament may by law regulate any matter relating to or A
connected with the election of a President or Vice-President.

22. Mr. Salve submitted that the election of the President
and Vice-President has been treated on a different level in
comparison with the election of Members of Parliament and B
other State Legislatures. While Article 102 deals with election
of Members to the House, Article 58 deals with the election of
the President and the Vice-President of India, which has to be
dealt with strictly in accordance with the law laid down in this
regard. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Salve
referred to a Seven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the C
case of Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Nee/am Sanjeeva Reddy
[(1978) 2 SCC 500], where the alleged conflict between Article
71 (1) of the Constitution with Article 58 thereof was considered
by this Court and it was held that Article 58 only provides for
the qualification regarding the eligibility of a candidate to D
contest the Presidential elections and had nothing to do with
the nomination of a candidate which required 10 proposers and
10 seconders. The provisions of Sections 5B and 5C of the
1952 Act were also considered and held not to be in conflict
with Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 71 (3) of the E
Constitution was also seen to be a law by which Parliament
could regulate matters connected with the Presidential
elections, including those relating to election disputes arising
out of such an election. Relying on its own earlier judgments,
the Hon'ble Judges of the Bench held that there was no force F
in the attack to either Article 71 (3) of the Constitution or the
provisions of Sections 5B or 5C of the 1952 Aet.

23. The Petitioner, C.L. Sahu, had also challenged the
election of Shri Giani Zail Singh as President of India and such G
challenge was repelled by this Court upon holding that the
Petitioner had no locus standi to file the same.

24. Mr. Salve lastly referred to the decision of this Court
in Mithilesh Kumar Vs. R. Venkataraman & Ors. [(1987)
Supp. SCC 692], wherein, on a similar question being raised, H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A a five-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated its earlier views in
the challenge made to the election of Shri Neelam Sanjeeva
Reddy and Shri Giani Zail Singh as former Presidents of India.

25. Mr. Salve then urged that since the provisions of Order
8 XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules framed under Article 145
of the Constitution had been so framed in accordance with
Section 14 of the 1952 Act, the provisions of Section 141 of
the Code of Civil Procedure could not be imported into deciding
a dispute relating to a challenge to the election of the President.

C 26. Mr. Salve submitted that Rule 13 of Order XXXIX of
the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, stood substituted on 9th
December, 1997, and the substituted provision came into effect
on 20th December, 1997. In the Original Rule which came to
be substituted, there was no provision for a preliminary hearing
D to be conducted to establish as to whether the Election Petition
deserved a regular hearing. However, in view of repeated and
frivolous challenges to the elections of almost all of the
Presidents elected, the need for such an amendment came to
be felt so as to initially evaluate as to whether such an Election
E Petition, challenging the Presidential election, deserved a
regular hearing.

27. Mr. Salve then submitted that the post of Chairman of
the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, was not an office of profit
as the post was honorary and there was no salary or any other
F benefit attached to the said post. Learned counsel submitted
that even if one were to accept the interpretation sought to be
given by Mr. R.am Jethmalani that the office itself may not
provide for any direct benefit but that there could be indirect
benefits which made ii an office of profit, the said post neither
G provides for any honorarium nor was capable of yielding any
profit which could make it an office of profit. Mr. Salve submitted
that the law enunciated in the decisions cited by Mr. Ram
Jethmalani in the case of Shibu Soren (supra) and Jaya
Bachchan (supra) was good law and, in fact, the post which
H the Respondent was holding as Chairman of the Institute was
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 619
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
not an office of profit, which would disqualify tlim from being A
eligible to contest as a candidate for the office of President of
India.

28. As to the holding of the post of Leader of the House,
Mr. Salve submitted that the holder of such a post is normally
a Cabinet Minister of the Government and is certainly not an 8
appointee of the Government of India so as to bring him within
the bar of Clause (2) of Article 58 of the Constitution of India.
In support of his contention that the provisions of Section 141
CPC would not apply in the facts of this case, Mr. Salve referred
to the decision of this Court in Mange Ram Vs. Brij Mohan & C
Ors. [(1983) 4 SCC 36], wherein the Code of Civil Procedure
and the High Court Rules regarding trial of an Election Petition,
were considered, and it was held that where necessary, the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be applied, but
only when the High Court Rules were not sufficiently effective D
for the purpose of the production of witnesses or otherwise
during the course of trial of the petition. Mr. Salve also referred
to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Ravanna
Subanna Vs. G.S. Kaggeerappa [AIR 1953 SC 653], which
was a case from Mysore relating to the election of a Councilor E
under the Mysore Town Municipal Act, 1951. Of the two
questions raised, one of the points was with regard to the
question as to whether the Appellant therein could be said to
be holding an office of profit under the Government thereby
attracting the provisions relating to disqualification. On a plain F
meaning of the expression "office of profit", Their Lordships,
inter alia, observed that the word "profit" connotes the idea of
pecuniary gain and if there really was a gain, its quantum or
amount would not be material, but the amount of money
receivable by a person in connection with the office he holds G
may be material in deciding whether the office really carries any
profit. Their Lordships went on further to observe as follows :

"From the facts stated above, it can reasonably be inferred
that the fee of Rs.6 which the non-official Chairman is
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A entitled to draw for each sitting of the Committee, he
attends, is not meant to be a payment by way of
remuneration or profit, but it is gain to him as a
consolidated fee for the out-of-pocket expenses which he
has to incur for attending the meetings of the Committee.
B We do not think that it was the intention of the Government
which created these Taluk Development Committees which
were to be manned exclusively by non-officials, that the
office of the Chairman or of the Members should carry any
profit or remuneration."

C Mr. Salve urged that in the instant case as well, the post
of Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, did not
yield any profit to the holder of the post, which was entirely
meant to be an honour bestowed on the holder thereof. Mr.
Salve also referred to the decision of this Court in the case of
D Shibu Soren (supra) which had already been referred to by Mr.
Ram Jethmalani, and pointed out that Article 102(1 )(a) of the
Constitution of India deals with disqualification from being
chosen as a Member of the two Houses or from being a
Member of either House of Parliament and did not affect the
E post of President of India.

29. The last decision referred to by Mr. Salve in the above
context was that of this Court in Madhukar G.E. Pankakar Vs.
Jaswant Chobbi/das Rajani [(1977) 1 SCC 70], where also the
F expression "office of profit" came to be considered. In
paragraph 31 of the said decision, reference was made to the
earlier decision of this Court in Ravanna Suvanna's case
(supra) and the ratio of the said decision was tested in relation
to Insurance Medical Practitioners. It was held that the
petitioner did derive profit, but the question was whether he held
G an office under the Government. Since mere incumbency in
office is no disqualification, even if some sitting fee or
insignificant honorarium is paid, it was ultimately held that the
ban on candidature or electoral disqualification, must have a
substantial link with the end, may be the possible misuse of
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 621
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.)
position as Insurance Medical Practitioner in doing his duties A
as Municipal President.

30. On the other question with regard to the acceptance
of the Respondent's resignation from the post of Chairman of
the Institute held by the Respondent, Mr. Salve submitted that B
the alleged discrepancy in the signatures of the Respondent in
his letter of resignation addressed to the President of the
Institute with his other signatures, was no ground to suspect that
the said document was forged, particularly when it was
accepted by the Respondent that the same was his signature C
and that he used both signatures when signing letters and
documents. In this regard, Mr. Salve referred to the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Gopal
Chandra Mishra & Ors.[(1978(2) SCC 301], wherein the
question as to when a resignation takes place or is to take
effect, has been considered in some detail. While considering D
the various aspects of resignation, either with immediate effect
or from a future date, one of the propositions which emerged
from the ultimate conclusions arrived at by this Court was that
in view of the provisions of Article 217(1)(a) and similar
provisions in regard to constitutional functionaries like the E
President, Vice-President, Speaker, etc. the resignation once
submitted and communicated to the appropriate authority
becomes complete and irrevocable and acts ex proprio vigore.
The only difference is when resignation is submitted with the
intention of resigning from a future date, in such case it was F
held that l>efore the appointed date such resignation could be
rescinded.
31. The next case referred to by Mr. Salve in this regard is
the decision rendered by this Court in Moti Ram Vs. Param G
Dev [(1993) 2 sec 725), where a similar question arose with
regard to resignation from the office of the Chairman of the
Himachal Pradesh Khadi and Village Industries Board, with a
request to accept the resignation with effect from the date of
the letter itself. Considering the said question, this Court held H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A that a person holding the office of Chairman of the said Board
should resign from the said office and the same would take
effect from the date of communication of the resignation to ti»-·
Head of the Department in the Government of Himachal
Pradesh.
B
32. On a different note, Mr. Salve pointed out from the
Election Petition itself that the allegations made in paragraph
2(XVI) were verified by the Petitioner, both in the verification
and the affidavit affirmed on 20.8.2012, as being true and
correct on the basis of information received and believed to be
C correct. Mr. Salve submitted that under Rule 6 of Order XXXIX
of the Supreme Court Rules, allegations of fact contained in an
Election Petition challenging a Presidential election were
required to be verified by an affidavit to be made personally
by the Petitioner or by one of the Petitioners, in case there were
D more than one, subject to the condition that if the Petitioner was
unable to make such an affidavit for the reasons indicated in
the proviso to Rule 6, a person duly authorized by the Petitioner
would be entitled, with the sanction of the Judge in Chambers,
to make such an affidavit. Mr. Salve submitted that in the instant
E case there was no such occasion for the verification to be done
by the Petitioner.

33. In regard to the post of "Leader of the House", Mr. Salve
referred to the Practice and Procedure of Parliament, with
F particular reference to the Lok Sabha, wherein with regard to
the resignation from the membership of other bodies, in the
case of the Leader of the House, the procedure followed was
that when a Member of the Lok Sabha representing Parliament
or Government Committees, Boards, Bodies, sought to resign
G from the membership of that body by addressing the Speaker,
he is required to address his resignation to the Chairman of
that Committee, Board or Body and he ceases to be member
of the Committee when he vacates that office. Mr. Salve
submitted that by tendering his resignation to the Congress
H President and Chairperson of the Congress Party in Parliament
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 623
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
on 20th June, 2012, with immediate effect, such resignation A
came into force forthwith and no further formal acceptance
thereof was necessary.

34. Mr. Salve submitted that notwithstanding the
submissions made in regard to the expression "holder of an B
office of profit", the said argument was also not available to the
Petitioner, since by virtue of amendment to Section 3 of the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, in 2006,
the office of Chairman of the Institute was excluded from the
disqualification provisions of Article 58(2) of the Constitution C
of India. Mr. Salve submitted that the aforesaid Act had been
enacted to declare that certain offices of profit under the
Government, including the post of Chairman in any statutory or
non-statutory body, would not disqualify the holders thereof from
being chosen as, or for being Members of Parliament as
contemplated under Article 102(1 )(a) of the Constitution. By D
virtue of the said amendment, a new Table was inserted after
the Schedule to the Principal Act which would be deemed to
have been inserted with effect from 4th April, 1959. The Indian
Statistical Institute, Calcutta, has been placed at Serial No.4
of the Table. Accordingly, the submissions advanced by Mr. E
Jethmalani with regard to the Respondent holding an office of
profit as Chairman of the Institute on the date of filing of
nomination for election to the Office of President, were incorrect
and the same were liable to be discarded.
F
35. Mr. Salve submitted that having regard to the
submissions made on behalf of the parties, the Election Petition
filed by Shri Purno Agitok Sangma did not deserve a regular
hearing, as contemplated in Rule 20 of Order XXXIX of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and was liable to be dismissed. G

36. The learned Attorney General, Mr. Goolam E.
Vahanvati, firstly urged that the expression "office of profit" ought
not to be interpreted in a pedantic manner and has to be .
considered in the light of the duties and functions and the
benefits to be derived by the holder of the office. Mr. Vahanvati H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A pointed out that the post of Chairman of the Institute was a
purely honorary post, meant to honour the holder thereof. It did
not require the active participation of the Chairman in the
administration of the Institute, which was looked after by the
President and his Council constituted under the Rules and
B Regulations of the Institute. Mr. Vahanvati also submitted that
the post was purely honorary in nature and did not benefit the
holder thereof in any way, either monetarily or otherwise, nor
was there any likelihood of any profit being derived therefrom.
Accordingly, even if Mr. Jethmalani's submission that on the
c date of filing of nominations the Respondent continued to hold
the said office, it would not disqualify him from contesting the
Presidential election.

37. In this regard, the learned Attorney General referred
to the decision of this Court in Consumer Education &
D Research Society vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2009) 9 SCC
648], wherein the provisions of the 1959 Act, as amended by
the Amending Act of 2006, regarding the disqualification of
persons holding offices of profit from continuing as Members
of Parliament, were under consideration. Considering the
E provisions of Articles 101 (3)(a) and 103 in the Writ Petitions
filed before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, the
constitutionality of the Parliament (Prevention of
Disqualification) Amendment Act, 2006, came to be
questioned on the ground that the said Act retrospectively
F added to the list of "offices of profit" which do not disqualify the
holders thereof for being elected as Members of Parliament.
The Writ Petitioners contended that the amendment had been
brought in to ensure that persons who had ceased to be
Members of Parliament on account of incurring
G disqualifications, would be re-inducted to Parliament without
election, which, according to the Writ Petitioners, violated the
provisions of Articles 101 to 104 of the Constitution.

38. The said question was answered by this Court by
H holding that the power of Parliament to enact a law under
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 625
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
Article 102(1 )(a) includes the power of Parliament to enact such A
law retrospectively, as was held in Kanta Kathuria Vs. Manak
Chand Surana ((1969) 3 SCC 268] and later followed in the
decision rendered in Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain
(1975 (Supp) SCC 1]. Accordingly, if a person was under a
disqualification at the time of his election, the provisions of B
Articles 101 (3)(a) and 103 of the Constitution \YOU Id not apply
and he would continue as a Member of Parliament, unless the
High Court in an Election Petition filed on that ground declared
that on the date of the election, he was disqualified and
consequently declares his election to be void. In other words, c
the vacancy under Article 101 (3)(a) would occur only after a
decision had been rendered on such disqualification by the
Chairman or the Speaker in the House.

39. Reference was also made to the decision of this Court
in Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare Vs. Shanker Rao Genuji Ko/he D
& Ors. [(1975) 1 SCC 252], wherein this Court held that a
Member of the Wage Board for the sugar industry constituted
by the Government of Maharashtra, which was an honorary post
and the honorarium paid to the Members was in the nature of
a compensatory allowance, exercised powers which were E
essentially a part of the judicial power of the State. Such
Members did not, therefore, hold an office under the
Government.

40. Further reference was made to another decision of this F
Court in Pradyut Bordoloi Vs. Swapan Roy ((2001) 2 SCC 19],
in which the post of a Clerk Grade I in Coal India Ltd., a
Company having 100% shareholding of Government, was held
not to be an office of profit, which disqualified its holder under
Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, or G
under Article 191 (1 )(a) of the Constitution of India. While
deciding the case, this Court had occasion to observe that the
expression "office of profit" had not been defined in the
Constitution. It was observed that the first question to be asked
in this situation was as to whether the Government has power H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A to appoint and remove a person on and from the office and if
the answer was in the negative, no further inquiry was called
for. However, if the answer was in the positive, further inquiries
would have to be conducted as to the control exercised by the
Government over the holder of the post. Since in the said case,
B the Government of India did not exercise any control on
appointment, removal, service conditions and functioning of the
Respondent, it was held that the said Respondent did not hold
an office of profit under the Government of India, and his being
a Clerk in the Coal India Ltd. did not bring any influence or
c pressure on him in his independent functioning as a Member
of the Legislative Assembly.

41. The learned Attorney General lastly cited the decision
of this Court in Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya Vs. Ajoy Biswas
& Ors. [(1985) 1 sec 151), where also what amounts to an
D office of profit under the Government came up for consideration
and it was held that the employees in the local authority did not
hold offices of profit under the Government and were not,
therefore, disqualified either under Articles 102(1 )(a) and
191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India or the provisions of the
E Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. Their Lordships held that on an
analysis of the provisions of the Act, it was quite clear that
though the Government exercised a certain amount of control
and supervision, the respondent who was an Accountant
lncharge of the Agartala Municipality in the State of Assam, was
F not an employee of the Government and was at the relevant time
holding an office of profit under a local municipality, which did
not bring him within the ambit of Article 102(1 )(a) of the
Constitution.
G 42. The learned Attorney General submitted that the
Disqualification Act is not a defining Act and was never meant
to be and one cannot import the definition in the Schedule
where only the Institute is mentioned. Sharing the sentiments
expressed by Mr. Salve, the learned Attorney General submitted
that the Election Petition was liable to be dismissed.
H
.,

PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 627
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

43. Replying to the submissions made by Mr. Harish Salve A
and the learned Attorney General, Mr. Ram Jethmalani asserted
that the 1959 Act was, in fact, a defining Act and falls under
Entry 73 of the First List in the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution, which empowers the Parliament to legislate in
regard to elections to Parliament, to the legislatures of the B
States and to the offices of President and Vice-President and
the Election Commission. Mr. Jethmalani also reiterated that
the Institute was controlled by the Central Government. The Act
under which the Institute was formed was an Act by the Central
Government and the post of Chairman must, therefore, be held c
to be an office of profit under the Central Government.

44. Reiterating his earlier stand that the Election Petition
deserved to be regulaly heard, Mr. Jethmalani referred to the
decision of this Court In M. V. Rajashekaran's case (supra), in
which the Chairman of a One-man Commission, appointed by D
the Government of Karnataka to study the problems of
Kannadigas and was accorded the status of a Minister of
Cabinet rank and was provided by a budget of Rs.5 lakhs for
defraying the expenses of pay and day-to-day expenditure of
the Chairman, was held to be holding an office of profit under E
the Government. This Court observed that the question as to
whether a person held an office of profit under the Government
or not. would have to be determined in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case,
F
45. Mr. Jethmalani lastly referred to the decision in the
Consumer Education & Research Society case (supra), which
had been referred to by the learned Attorney General, and drew
the attention of the Court to the observations made in the
judgment in paragraph 77, where it had been observed that G
what kind of office would amount to an office of profit under the
Government and whether such an office of profit is to be
exempted, is a matter to be considered by the Parliament.
While making legislation exempting any office, the question
whether such office is incompatible with his position as an M.P. H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A and whether his independence would be compromised and
whether his loyalty to the Constitution will be affected, has to
be kept in mind to safeguard the independence of the Members
of the legislature and to ensure that they were free from any
kind of undue influence from the executive. Mr. Jethmalani
B contended that since the Respondent had held office under the
Central Government, it will have to be considered as to whether
his functioning as the President of India would, in any way, be
compromised or influenced thereby.

46. While replying, Mr. Jethmalani introduced a new
C dimension to his submissions by urging that the Rules and Bye-·
laws of the Institute did not permit a Chairman, once appointed,
to resign from his post. Accordingly, even if the Respondent
had tendered his resignation to the President, Dr. Menon, the
same was of no effect and he continued to remain as the
D Chairman of the Institute. He was, therefore, disqualified from
contesting the Presidential election and his election was liable
to be declared void and in his place the Petitioner was liable
to be declared as the duly-elected President of the country.

E 47. The Constitution provides for the manner in which the
election of a President or a Vice-President may be questioned.
Article 71 provides for matters relating to or connected with the
election of a President or a Vice-President. Clause (1) of Article
71 provides that all doubts and disputes arising out of or in
F connection with the election of a President or Vice-President
shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court
whose decision shall be final. Sub-clause (3) provides that
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may,
by law, regulate any matter, relating to or connected with the
G election of a President or a Vice-President. In addition, the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act was enacted
in 1952 with the object of regulating certain matters relating to
or connected with elections to the Office of President and Vice-
President of India. As indicated by Mr. Salve, Sections 14 and
H 14A of the 1952 Act, specially vest the jurisdiction to try Election
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 629
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]

Petitions thereunder with the Supreme Court in the manner A
indicated therein. In fact, Part Ill of the said Act deals with
disputes regarding elections to the posts of President and Vice-
President of India, which contains Sections 14 and 14A, as also
Sections 17 and 18 which empower the Supreme Court to
either dismiss the Election Petition or to declare the election B
of the returned candidate to be void or declare the election of
the returned candidate to be void and the Petitioner or any other
candidate to have been duly elected.

48. In view of Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act, the C
Supreme Court has framed Rules under Article 145 of the
Constitution which are contained in Order XXXIX of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966. As has been discussed earlier,
Rule 13 of Order XXXIX provides that upon presentation of a
Petition relating to a challenge to election to the post of
President of India, the same is required to be posted before a D
Bench of the Court consisting of five Judges for preliminary
hearing and to consider whether the Petition deserved a regular
hearing, as contemplated in Rule 20 of Order XXXIX, and, in
that context, such Bench may either dismiss the Petition or pass
any appropriate order as it thought fit. E

49. It is under the aforesaid Scheme that the present
Election Petition filed by Shri Purno Agitok Sangma challenging
the election of Shri Pranab Mukherjee as the President of India
has been taken up for preliminary hearing on the question as F
to whether it deserved a regular hearing or not.

50. The challenge is based mainly on the allegation that
on the date of filing of nominations, the Respondent, Shri
Pranab Mukherjee, held "offices of profit", namely,
G
(i) Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta;
and

(ii) Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha.

In regard to the aforesaid challenges, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A appearing for the Petitioner, had urged that in order to arrive
at a conclusive decision on the said two points, it was
necessary that a regular hearing be conducted in respect of the
Election Petition to ascertain the truth of the allegations made
by the Petitioner. It was also submitted that the same required
B a full scale hearing in the manner as contemplated under
Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as would be
evident from Order XXXIX read with the provisions relating to
the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, contained in
Part Ill of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
c 51. On the other hand, it has been urged by Mr. Harish
Salve, appearing for the Respondent, that on the date of filing
of nominations, Shri Pranab Mukherjee was neither holding the
Office of Chairman of the aforesaid Institute nor was he the
Leader of the House in the Lok Sabha, inasmuch as, in respect
D of both the posts, he had tendered his resignation on 20th June,
2012.
52. There is some doubt as to whether the Office of the
Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute is an office of profit
E or not, even though the same has been excluded from the ambit
of Article 102 of the Constitution by the provisions of the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959, as
amended in 2006. Having been included in the Table of posts
saved from disqualification from membership of Parliament, it
F must be accepted to be an office of profit. However, as argued
by Mr. Salve, categorising the office as an "office of profit" did
not really make it one, since it did not provide any profit and
was purely honorary in nature. There was neither any salary nor
honorarium or any other benefit attached to the holder of the
G said post. It was not such a post which, in fact, was capable of
yielding any profit, which could make it, in fact, an office of profit.
53. The said proposition was considered in Shibu Soren's
case (supra) where it was held that mere use of the word
"honorarium" would not take the payment out of the concept of
H profit, if there was some pecuniary gain for the recipient in
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 631
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
addition to daily allowances in the nature of compensatory A
allowances, rent-free accommodation and chauffeur driven car
at State expense.
54. Similar was the view expressed in Jaya Bachchan's
case (supra) where also this Court observed that what was 8
relevant was whether the office was capable of yielding a profit
or pecuniary gain, other then reimbursement of out-of-pocket/
actual expenses and not whether the person actually received
any monetary gain or did not withdraw the emoluments to which
he was entitled. In other words, whether a person holding a post C
accepted the benefits thereunder was not material, what was
material is whether the said office was capable of yielding a
profit or pecuniary gain.

55. In the instant case, the office of Chairman of the Institute
did not provide for any of the amenities indicated hereinabove D
and, in fact, the said office was also not capable of yielding
profit or pecuniary gain.
56. In regard to the office of the Leader of the House, it is
quite clear that the Respondent had tendered his resignation E
from membership of the House before he filed his nomination
papers for the Presidential election. The controversy that the
Respondent had resigned from the membership of the Indian
National Congress and its Central Working Committee
allegedly on 25th June, 2012, was set at rest by the affidavit
filed by Shri Pradeep Gupta, who is the Private Secretary to F
the President of India. In the said affidavit, Shri Gupta indicated
that through inadvertence he had supplied the date of the
Congress Working Committee meeting held on 25th June,
2012, to bid farewell to Shri Mukherjee on his nomination for
the Presidential Election being accepted. In any event, the G
disqualification contemplated on account of holding the post of
Leader of the House was with regard to the provisions of Article
102(1)(a) of the Constitution, besides being the position of the
leader of the party in the House which did not entail the holding
of an office of profit under the Government. In any event, since H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A the Respondent tendered his resignation from the said post
prior to filing of his nomination papers, which was duly acted
upon by the Speaker of the House, the challenge thrown by the
Petitioner to the Respondent's election as President of India
on the said ground loses its relevance. In any event, the
B provisions of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,
1959, as amended in 2006, excluded the post of Chairman of
the Institute as a disqualification from being a Member of
Parliament.

57. The Constitutional Scheme, as mentioned in the
C Explanation to Clause (2) of Article 58 of the Constitution,
makes it quite clear that for the purposes of said Article, a
person would not be deemed to hold any office of profit, inter
alia, by reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or
for any State. Article 102 of the Constitution contains similar
D provisions wherein in the Explanation to clause (1) it has been
similarly indicated that for the purposes of the said clause, a
person would not be deemed to hold an office of profit under
the Government of India or the Government of any State by
reason only that he is a Minister, either, for the Union, or for such
E State. The argument that the aforesaid provisions of Article 102,
as well as Article 58 of the Constitution, could not save a
person elected to the office of President from disqualification,
if he held an office of profit, loses much of its steam in view of
the fact that as would appear from the materials on record, the
F Respondent was not holding any office of profit either under the
Government or otherwise at the time of filing his nomination
papers for the Presidential election.
58. The various decisions cited on behalf of the parties in
G support of their respective submissions, clearly indicate that in
order to be an office of profit, the office must carry various
pecuniary benefits or must be capable of yielding pecuniary
benefits such as providing for official accommodation or even
a chauffeur driven car, which is not so in respect of the post of
Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, which was,
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 633
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
in fact, the focus and raison d'etere of Mr. Jethmalani's A
submissions.

59. We are also not inclined to accept Mr. Jethmalani's
submissions that once a person is appointed as Chairman of
the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, the Rules and Bye-laws B
of the Society did not permit him to resign from the post and
that he had to continue in the post against his wishes. There is
no contractual obligation that once appointed, the Chairman
would have to continue in such post for the full term of office.
There is no such compulsion under the Rules and Bye-laws of
the Society either. In any event, since the holder of the post of C
Chairman of the Institute has been excluded from disqualification
for contesting the Presidential election, by the 2006 amendment
to Section 3 of the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification)
Act, 1959, the submissions of Mr. Jethmalani in this regard is
of little or no substance. D

60. We are not convinced that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Election Petition deserves a full
and regular hearing as contemplated under Rule 20 of Order
XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Consequently, Mr. E
Jethmalani's submissions regarding the applicability of Section
141 of the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of the Election
Petition is of no avail. We are also not convinced that Section
141 of the Code is required to be incorporated into a
proceeding taken under Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court F
Rules read with Part II of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections Act, 1952, which includes Sections 14 to 20 of the
aforesaid Act and Article 71 of the Constitution of India.

61. It may not be inappropriate at this stage to mention that
this Court has repeatedly cautioned that the election of a G
candidate who has won in an election should not be lightly
interfered with unless circumstances so warrant.

62. We are not inclined, therefore, to set down the Election
Petition for regular hearing and dismiss the same under Rule H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A 13 of Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

63. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties
shall bear their own costs in these proceedings.

RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. I have had the privilege of going
B through the opinion rendered by the learned Chief Justice of
India. With utmost respect I have not been able to persuade
myself to share the views expressed in the said opinion. The
reasons for my conclusions are as indicated below -

c 2. The short question that has arisen for determination in
the Election Petition, at this stage, is whether the same
deserves a regular hearing under Rule 20.of Order XXXIX of
the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

3. The Election Petition in question has been filed
D challenging the election of the respondent to the office of the
President of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the President').
The election in which the petitioner and the respondent were
the contesting candidates was held to the following Schedule:

E Issue of Notification calling the election 16 June 2012

Last date for making Nominations 30 June, 2012

Date for scrutiny 2 July, 2012

F Last date for withdrawal 4 July, 2012

Date of poll, if necessary 19 July, 2012

Date of counting, if necessary 22 July, 2012

G 4. Both the Election Petitioner as well as the respondent
filed their nomination papers before the Returning Officer on
28.6.2012. A total of 106 nomination papers filed by 84
·persons were taken up for scrutiny on the date fixed i.e.
2. 7 .2012. The petitioner objected to the validity of the
H nomination of the respondent on the ground that the respondent
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 635
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

on the said date i.e. 2.7.2012 was holding the office of the A
Chairman of the Council of Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
(hereinafter referred to as the Chairman ISi) which is an office
of profit. According to the petitioner, at the request of the
representative of the responde_nt, the scrutiny of the nomination
of the respondent was deferred to 3.00 p.m. of the next day i.e. B
3.7.2012 with liberty to file reply, if any, by 2.00 p.m.
Coincidentally, certain objections having been raised to the
nomination of the Election Petitioner, consideration of the same
was also deferred to 11.00 a.m. of 3.7.2012. All the remaining
nomination papers were rejected on the date fixed for scrutiny c
i.e. 2.7.2012. ·

5. On the next date i.e. 3.7.2012 at the appointed time, i.e.
11.00 a.m. the scrutiny of the nomination papers of the Election
Petitioner were taken up and Returning Officer accepted the
same. Thereafter, within the time granted on the previous date D
i.e. 2.00 p.m., the respondent submitted a written reply to the
objections raised by the petitioner alongwith a copy of a
resignation letter dated 20.6.2012 by which the respondent
claimed to have resigned from the office of the Chairman ISi.
The scrutiny of the nomination papers of the respondent was E
taken up at 3.00 p.m. on 3.7.2012 and thereafter the same was
accepted by the Returning Officer.

6. As per the Schedule of the election published by the
Election Commission the poll took place on 19.7.2012 and the F
result of the counting was announced on 22.7.2012 declaring
the respondent to be duly elected to the office of the President
of India.

7. Contending that on all the relevant dates, including the
date of scrutiny i.e. 2.7.2012, the respondent was holding the G
office of the Chairman of the Council of Indian Statistical
Institute, Kolkata as well as the office of Leader of the House
(Lok Sabha) and Leader of the Congress Party in the Lok
Sabha, which are offices of profit, the present Election Petition
has been filed on the ground that by virtue of holding the H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A aforesaid offices of profit the respondent was not qualified to
be a candidate for the election to the office of the President of
India and that the nomination submitted by the respondent was
wrongly accepted by the Returning Officer. According to the
Election Petitioner, the election of the respondent was liable
B to be declared void on the said ground. In the Election Petition
filed as well as in the short rejoinder that has been brought on
record by the Election Petitioner the claim of the respondent
that he had resigned from the office of the Chairman, ISi on
20.6.2012 has been disputed. According to the petitioner the
c resignation letter dated 20.6.2012 is forged and fabricated and
has been subsequently brought into existence to counter the
case put up by the Election Petitioner. Insofar as the other
offices are concerned, according to the Election petitioner,
though the respondent had resigned from the Union Cabinet
on 26.6.2012, he continued to remain a Member of Parliament
0
and the Leader of the Congress Legislature Party in the Lok
Sabha up to 25.07.2012 i.e. date of assumption of office as
President of India. In fact the Respondent was shown as a
Member of Parliament and as the Leader of the House in the
official Website of the Lok Sabha till 2.7.2012.
E
8. The respondent i.e. the returned candidate has filed a
short counter for the purposes of the preliminary hearing.
According to the respondent the office of the Chairman, ISi, is
not an office of profit as it does not carry any emoluments
F remuneration or perquisites. In any case, according to the
respondent, he had submitted his resignation from the said
office on 20.6.2012 which had been accepted by the President
of the Institute on the same day. Insofar as the other two offices
are concerned it is the case of the respondent that he had held
G the said offices by virtue of being a Cabinet Minister of the
Union. According to the respondent, under the Leaders and
Chief Whips of Recognized Parties and Groups in Parliament
(Facilities) Act, 1998 and the Rules framed thereunder the
aforesaid offices do not carry any emoluments or perquisites
H or benefits beyond those attached to the office of a Cabinet
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 637
· [RANJAN GOGOi, J.)
Minister of the Union. Furthermore, according to the respondent, A
he had resigned from the Congress Party and the office of the
Leader of the Legislature Party in the Lok Sabha on 20.6.2012
and from the Union Cabinet on 26.6.2012. Therefore he had
ceased to hold any office of profit on the relevant date i.e. date
of scrutiny or acceptance of his nomination. B

9. Article 71 of the .Constitution provides for matters
relating to, or connected with, the election of the President or
Vice President. Clause (1) of Article 71 provides that all doubts
and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election of C
a President or Vice President shall be inquired into and
decided by the Supreme Court. Under Clause (3), Parliament
has been empowered, subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, to make laws to regulate any matter relating to or
connected with the election of the President or Vice President.
D
10. In exercise of the power conferred by Article 71 (3) read
with Entry 72 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution, Parliament has framed the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Election Act, 1952 (Act 31 of 1952). Part Ill of the
aforesaid Act makes provisions with regard to disputes E
regarding elections. Section 14 (1) provides that no election
shall be called in question except by presenting an election
petition to the authority specified in sub-section (2) i.e. the
Supreme Court. Section 14(3) provides that every election
petition shall be presented in accordance with the provisions F
contained in Part Ill of the Act and such Rules as may be made
by the Supreme Court under Article 145 of the Constitution. The
next provision of the Act that would require specific notice is
Section 15 which provides that the Rules made by the Supreme
Court under Article 145 of the Constitution may regulate the G
form of Election Petitions, the manner in which they are to be
presented, the persons who are to be made parties thereto,
the procedure to be adopted in connection therewith and the
circumstances in which petitions are to abate, or may be
withdrawn, and in which new petitioners may be substituted, and H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A may require security to be given for costs. The rest of the
provisions of the aforesaid Act would not require any recital
insofar as the present case is concerned.

11. By virtue of powers conferred by Article 145 of the
B Constitution, the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (hereinafter
referred to as the Rules) have been framed by the Supreme
Court with the approval of the President of India in order to
regulate the practice and procedure of the Court. Order XXXIX
contained in Part VII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 deals
C with election petitions filed under Part Ill of the Presidential and
Vice Presidential Elections Act, 1952. The provisions of Rule
13 (inserted w.e.f. 20.12.1997), Rule 20 and Rule 34 of Order
XXXIX being relevant may be extracted hereinbelow:

"13. Upon presentation of a petition the same shall be
D posted before a bench of the Court consisting of five
Judges for preliminary hearing and orders for service of
the petition and advertisement thereof as the Court may
think proper and also appoint a time for hearing of the
petition. Upon preliminary hearing, the Court, if satisfied,
E that the petition does not deserve regular hearing as
contemplated in Rule 20 of this Order may dismiss the
petition or pass any appropriate order as the Court may
deem fit.]

xxxxx
F
20. Every petition calling in question an election shall be
posted before and be heard and disposed of by a Bench
of the Court consisting of not less than five Judges.

G xxxxx
34. Subject to the provisions of this Order or any special
order or directions of the Court, the procedure on an
election petition shall follow, as nearly as may be, the
procedure in proceedings before the Court in the exercise
H of its original jurisdiction."
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 639
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
12. Rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, as it existed A
prior to insertion of the present Rule 13 w.e.f. 20.12.1997 may
also be extracted herein below for an effective determination
of precise circumference of the 'preliminary hearing'
contemplated by Rule 13:
B
"Upon the presentation of the petition, the Judge in
Chambers, or the Registrar, before whom, it is presented,
may give such directions for service of the petition and
advertisement thereof as he thinks proper and a/so
appoint a time for the hearing of the petition."
c
13. A preliminary hearing for determination of the question
as to whether an election petition deserves a regular hearing
under Rule 20 did not find any place in the Supreme Court Rules
till insertion of Rule 13 in the present form w.e.f. 20.12.1997.
Rule 34 of Order XXXIX provides that the procedure on an D
Election Petition shall follow, as nearly as may be, the procedure
in proceedings before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. The procedure applicable to proceedings
in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is contained in Order XXlll of Part Ill of the Supreme Court E
Rules. Order XXlll, Rule 1 contemplates institution of a suit by
means of a plaint. After dealing with the requirements of a valid
plaint, Order Rule 6 provides that a plaint shall be rejected

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
F
(b) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint
to be barred by any law.

14. To make the narration complete it will be necessary to
note that the other provisions of Part Ill of the Rules deal with G
the procedure that would apply to the disposal of a suit filed
under Order XXlll Rule 1 and, inter alia, provide for :

(a) Issue and Service of Summons (Order XXIV)

(b) Written statement set off and counterclaims(Order H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A XXV)

(d) Summoning and Attendance of witnesses (Order
. XXIX)
B
(e) Hearing of the suit (Order XXXI)

15. Order XXlll, Rule 6, as noticed above, was a part of
the Rules alongwith Rule 13 as it originally existed. In other
C words, insertion of the new Rule 13 providing for a preliminary
hearing was made despite the existence of the provisions of
Order XXlll Rule 6 and the availability of the power to reject a
plaint and dismiss the suit (including an Election Petition) on
the twin grounds mentioned in Rule 6 of Order XXlll. Therefore
a preliminary hearing under Order XXXIX Rule 13 would require
D the Court to consider something more than the mere disclosure
or otherwise of a cause of action on the pleadings made or the
question of maintainability of the Election Petition in the light
of any particular statutory enactment. A further enquiry, which
obviously must exclude matters that would fall within the domain
E of a regular hearing under Rule 20 would be called for in the
preliminary hearing under Rule 13 of Order XXXIX. In the
course of such enquiry the Court must be satisfied that though
the Election Petition discloses a clear cause of action and raise
triable issue(s), yet, a trial of the issues raised will not be
F necessary or justified in as much as even if the totality of the
facts on which the petitioner relies are to be assumed to be
proved there will be no occasion to cause any interference with
the result of the election. It is only in such a situation that the
Election Petition must not be allowed to cross the hurdle of the
G preliminary hearing. If such satisfaction cannot be reached the
Election Petition must be allowed to embark upon the journey
of a regular hearing under Order 20 Rule XXXIX in accordance
with the provisions of Part Ill of the Rules. In my opinion, the
above is the scope and ambit of the preliminary hearing under
H Order XXXIX, Rule 13 of the Rules and ii is within the aforesaid
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 641
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
confines that the question raised by the parties, at this stage, A
have to be answered.

16. At the very outset the issue with regard to the office of
the Leader of the House and Leader of the Congress Party may
be dealt with. Under the provisions of The Leaders and Chief
8
Whips of Recognized Parties and Groups in Parliament
(Facilities) Act, 1998 Act and Rules framed there under no
remuneration to the Leader of the House or the Leader of the
Legislature Party in the House is contemplated beyond the
salary and perquisites payable to the holder of such an office C
if he is a Minister of the Union (in the present case the
Respondent was a Cabinet Minister of the Union). That apart,
either of the offices is not under the Government of India or the
Government of any State or under any local or other authority
as required under Article 58 (2) so as to make the holder of
any such office incur the disqualification contemplated D
thereunder. Both the offices in question are offices connected
with the Lok Sabha. Any incumbent thereof is either to be
elected or nominated by virtue of his membership of the House
or his position as a Cabinet Minister, as may be. The Election
Petition insofar as the aforesaid offices are concerned, E
therefore, do not disclose any triable issue for a full length
hearing under Order XXXIX, Rule 20 of the Rules.

17. The next question is with regard to the office of the
Chairman of the Council of Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata. F
Whether the said office carries any remuneration and/or
perquisites or the same is under the control of the Union
Government as also the question whether the respondent had
resigned from the said office on 20.6.2012 are all questions of
fact which are in dispute and, therefore, capable of resolution G
only on the basis of such evidence as may be adduced by the
parties. The Court, therefore, will have to steer away from any
of the said issues at the present stage of consideration which
is one under Order XXXIX, Rule 13. Instead, for the present,
we may proceed on the basis that the office in question is an
office of profit which the Respondent.held on the relevant date H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A (which facts, however, will have to be proved at the regular
hearing if the occasion so arises) and on that assumption
determine whether the election of the Respondent is still not
void on the ground that, in view of the provisions of Article 58
(2) of the Constitution, the nomination of the Respondent had
B been wrongly accepted, as claimed by the respondent. In this
regard the specific issue that has to be gone into as whether
the office of the Chainnan, ISi, Kolkata has been exempted from
bringing any disqualification by virtue of the provisions of the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act 1959, as
c amended.
18. For an effective examination of the issue indicated
above, the provisions of Articles 58, 84 and 102 of the
Constitution would require a detailed notice and consideration.
The said provisions are, therefore, extracted below:-
D
"Article 58 - Qualifications for election as President

(1) No person shall be eligible for election as President
unless he-
E (a) is a citizen of India,
(b) has completed the age of thirty-five years, and
(c) is qualified for election as a member of the House of
the People.
F
(2) A person shall not be eligible for election as President
if he holds any office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State or under any local or
other authority subject to the control of any of the said
G Governments.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this Article, a person
shall not be deemed to hold any office of profit by reason
only that he is the President or Vice President of the Union
or the Governor1 [***] of any State or is a Minister either
H for the Union or for any State.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 643
[RANJAN GOGO!, J.]
1. The words "or Rajpramukh or Uparajpramukh" omitted A
by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956,
section 29 and Schedule.

Article 84 - Qualification for membership of
Parliament
B
A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat
in Parliament unless he-
1
[(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and
su':>scribes before some person authorised in that c
behalf by the Election Commission an oath or
affirmation according to the form set out for the
purpose in the Third Schedule;]

(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Council of States,
0
not less than thirty years of age and, in the case of
a seat in the House of the People, not less than
twenty-five years of age; and
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be
prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made E
by Parliament.

1. Substituted by the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment)
Act, 1963, section 3, for clause (a) (w.e.f. 5-9-1963)

Article 102 - Disqualifications for membership F

(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and
for being, a member of either House of Parliament-

(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of G
India or the ~overnment of any State, other than an office
declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder;

(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a
competent court;
H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A (c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;

(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired
the citizenship of a foreign State, or is under any
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign
8 State;

(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by
Parliament.
1
[Explanation.-. For the purposes of this clause] a person
c shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the
Government of India or the Government of any State by
reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for
such State.

2(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of
D
either House of Parliament if he is so disqualified under
the Tenth Schedule.]

1. Substituted by the Constitution (Fifty-second
Amendment) Act, 1985, section 3, for "(2) For the
E purposes of this Article" (w.e.f. 1-3-1985).

2. Inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment)
Act, 1985, section 3 (w.e.f. 1-3-1985).

19. Article 58(1)(c) requires a presidential candidate to be
F qualified for election as a Member of the House of the People.
Does it mean that whosoever is qualified for election as a
Member of the House of the People under Article 84 and does
not suffer from any disqualification under Article 102 becomes
automatically eligible for election to the office of the President?
G In other words, do the provisions of Articles 98, 84 and 102 of
the Constitution envisage a composite and homogenous
scheme?

20. Under Article 58(1)(b) a Presidential candidate must
H have completed the age of 35 years. At the same time, under
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 645
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
Article 58(1 )(c) such a person must be eligible to seek election A
as a Member of the House of the People. Under Article 84(b)
a candidate, seeking election to the House of the People must
not be less than 25 years of age. In other words, a person
qualified to be a Member of the House of the People but below
35 years of age will not be qualified to be a candidate for B
election to the office of the President. Similarly, to be eligible
. for membership of Parliament (including the House of the
People) a candidate must make and subscribe an oath or
affirmation according to the prescribed form. No such condition
or stipulation is mandated for a Presidential candidate by c
Article 58. Insofar as Article 102 (1 )(a) is concerned though
holding an office of profit is a disqualification for election as or
being a Member of either House of Parliament such a
disqualification can be obliterated by a law made by Parliament.
Under Article 58(2) though a similar disqualification (by virtue
0
of holding an office of profit) is incurred by a Presidential
candidate no power has been conferred on Parliament to
remove such a disqualification. That apart, the Explanations to
both Articles 58 and 102 contain provisions by virtue of which
certain offices are deemed not to be offices of profit. The
similarities as well as the differences between the two E
provisions of the Constitution are too conspicuous to be ignored
or over looked. In a situation where Article 102(1)(a) specifically
empowers Parliament to enact a law to remove the
disqualification incurred for being a Member of Parliament by
virtue of holding of an office of profit and in the absence of any F
such provision in Article 58 it will be impossible to read Article
58 alongwith Article 102 to comprehend a composite
constitutional scheme. Keeping in view that the words in the
Constitution should be read in their ordinary and natural
meaning so that a construction which brings out the true G
legislative intent is achieved, Article 58 has to be read
independently of Articles 84 and 102 and the p111rport of the two
sets of Constitutional provisions have to be understood to be
independent of each other. In fact such a view finds expression
in an earlier opinion of this Court rendered in Baburao Patel H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A v. Dr. Zakir Hussain 1 which is only being reiterated herein.

21. The net result of the above discussion is that the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 as
amended by the Amendment Act No.31 of 2006 has no
application insofar as election to the office of the President is
8
concerned. The disqualification incurred by a Presidential
candidate on account of holding of an office of profit is not
removed by the provisions of the said Act which deals with
removal of disqualification for being chosen as, or for being a
C Member of Parliament. If, therefore, it is assumed that the office
of Chairman, ISi is an office of profit and the Respondent had
held the said office on the material date(s) consequences
adverse to the Respondent, in so far as the result of the election
is concerned, are likely to follow. The said facts, will therefore,
be required to be proved by the election Petitioner. No
D conclusion that a regular hearing in the present case will be a
redundant exercise or an empty formality can be reached so
as to dispense with the same and terminate the Election
Petition at the stage of its preliminary hearing under Order
XXXIX Rule 13. The Election Petition, therefore, deserves a
E regular hearing under Order XXXIX Rule 20 in accordance with
what is contained in the different provisions of Part Ill of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

ORDER
F CHELAMESWAR, J. I have had the advantage of reading
the judgments of both My Lord the Chief Justice and my learned
brother Justice Ranjan Gogoi. I regret my inability to agree with
the conclusion recorded by the learned Chief Justice that the
instant Election Petition does not deserve a regular hearing. I
G shall pronounce my 1easons for such disagreement shortly.
DECEMBER 11, 2012

CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. regret my inability to completely
agree with the opinion of the majority delivered by Hon'ble the
It Chief Justice.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 647
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
2. The pleadings and submissions relevant for the present A
purpose are elaborately mentioned in the judgment of Hon'ble
the Chief Justice of India, therefore, I do not propose to reiterate
the same.

3. The procedure that is required to be followed in an B
election petition calling in question the election of the
respondent as the President of India is the subject matter of
controversy. It is a long settled principle of law in this country
that the elections to various bodies created under the
Constitution cannot be questioned except in accordance with C
the law made by the appropriate legislation. Article 329 (b)
declares that "no election to either House of Parliament or to
the House or either House of the Legislature of a State
(hereinafter collectively called 'legislative bodies') shall be
called in question except by an election petition presented to
such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by 0
or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature".
Similarly, Article 71 declares all doubts and disputes arising out
of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-
President shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme
Court. Article 71 (3) stipulates that Parliament may by law E

1. Article 71. Matters relating to, or connected with. the election of a president
or Vice President.-(1) All doubts and disputes arising out of or in
connection with the election with the election of a president or vice president
shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court whose decision F
shall be final.
(2) If the election of a person as President or Vice President is declared void
by the Supreme Court, acts done by him in the exercise and performance
of the powers and duties of the office of President or Vice President, as
the case may be, on or before the date of the decision of the decision of
the Supreme Court shall not be invalidated by reason of that declaration G
(3) Subject to the provisions of this constitution, Parliament may by law regulate
any matter relating to or connected with the election of a President or Vice
President.
(4) The election of a person as President or Vice President shall not be called
in question on the ground of the existence of any vacancy for whatever reasn
among the members of the electoral college electing him. H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A regulate any matter relating to or connected with the election
of a President or Vice-President and such regulations by the
Parliament is, however, subject to provisions of the Constitution.
In other words, while the forum for adjudication of disputes
pertaining to legislative bodies under the Constitution is
B required to be determined by the appropriate legislature, the
forum for the adjudication of disputes pertaining to the election
of the President and Vice-President is fixed by the Constitution
to be this Court. Whereas various other matters like the
grounds on which such elections could be challenged, the
C procedure that is required to be followed in an election dispute
are required to be provided by law in the case of the members
of the legislative bodies - by the appropriate legislature and in
the case of the President and Vice-President - only by the
Parliament. In the context of the election disputes pertaining to
D the members of the legislative bodies, the authority to provide
for such matters is vested in the appropriate legislature in view
of the language· of Article 329, Entry 11A of the Ill List, VII
Schedule. Similarly, by virtue of Article 71 (3) read with Article
246 (1) and Entry 72 of List I to the VII Schedule, such power
vests exclusively in the Parliament.
E
4. In exercise of such power, the Parliament made the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952,
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Elections Act', for easy
reference). Part Ill of the said Act deals with the disputes
F
2. 14A. Presentation of Petition.-(1) An election petition calling in question
an election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in
sub-section (1) of section 18 and section 19, to the Supreme Court by any
candidate at such election, or-
(1) in the case of Presidential election, by twenty or more electors joined
G together as petitioners;
(ii) in the case of Vice-Presidential election, by ten or more electors joined
together as petitioners.
(2) Any such petition may be presented at any time after the date of publication
of the declaration containing the name of the returned candidate at the
election under section 12, but not later than thirty days from the date of
H such publication.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 649
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
regarding the election. Section 14 declares that the only mode A
of questioning of the election of either the President or Vice-
President is by presenting an election petition to this Court.
Section 14A2 prescribes that the election of either the
President or Vice-President could be challenged only on the
grounds specified in Sections 18(1) and 19 of the Act. It also B
specifies the persons .who are authorized to raise such a
question. It limits the right to raise the question only to two
categories of people - (1) the candidates at such an election;
(2) twenty or more electors in the case of the President and
ten or more electors in the case of the Vice-President. The said c
Section stipulates a limitation of 30 days for presenting such
an election petition reckoned from the date of publication of
the declaration contemplated under Section 12 thereof. While
Section 16 stipulates the reliefs that could be claimed in an
election petition, Section 15 provides as follows:-
D
"Form of petitions, etc., and procedure.- Subject to the
provisions of this Part, rules made [whether before or after
the commencement of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections (Amendment) Act, 1977] by the
Supreme Court under article 145 may regulate the form E
of election petitions, the manner in which they are to be
presented, the persons who are to be made parties
thereto, the procedure to be adopted in connection
therewith and the circumstances in which petitions are to
abate, or may be withdrawn, and in which new petitioners F
may be substituted, and may require security to be given
for costs."

It can be seen from Section 15 that the Parliament
purports to authorize this Court to frame rules dealing with G
various aspects of the election petitions such as (1) the manner
in which the petitions are to be presented; (2) the persons who
are required to be made parties thereto; (3) the procedure to
be followed in conducting the election petitions; (4) the
circumstances in which the petitions are to abate or may be
withdrawn, and (5) the circumstances in which the petitioners H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A may be substituted and may require security to be given for
costs. Similarly, in the context of the election petition calling in
question the election of a member of any one of the legislative
bodies such procedure is meticulously provided for by the
Parliament under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
B
5. In my opinion both Sections 14(2) and 15 of the
Elections Act, insofar as they purport to vest the jurisdiction in
and authorize this Court to frame rules respectively with respect
to the adjudication of the disputes pertaining to the election of
C the President; are superfluous because Articles 71 and 145 of
the Constitution already expressly provide for the same.

6. Part V Chapter IV of the Constitution provides for the
establishment, jurisdiction etc of this Court. Original jurisdiction
of this Court obtains under Article 131 and 32 of the
D Constitution. Various other articles occurring in the said Part
vest both civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Article 1383 of the Constitution authorizes the Parliament to vest
further jurisdiction in the Supreme Court by law. Such
jurisdiction could either be original or appellate. It is axiomatic
E that the authority of the legislature (Parliament in the context of
this case) to create jurisdiction takes within its sweep the
authority to prescribe various matters which are necessary
incidents of the jurisdiction such as, the limits of the jurisdiction
- pecuniary, territorial etc., the procedure to be adopted in the
F exercise of such jurisdiction etc.

7. Since the Constitution itself vests jurisdiction in this
Court under various heads and it also authorizes the Parliament
to create/vest further jurisdiction in this Court by law, the

G 3. Article 138. Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court - (1) The
Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect
to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament may by law confer.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and power with
respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of
any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides
H for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 651
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
Constitution recognized the need for regulating the procedure A
to be followed by this Court in exercise of such jurisdiction
whatever be the source of such jurisdiction. Therefore, Article
145 is incorporated. Article 145 postulates that the Parliament
may by law stipulate such procedure and in the absence of any
such law this Court can prescribe the procedure with the B
approval of the President of India.

8. Article 1454 of the Constitution authorizes this Court to
make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of this
Court with regard to its jurisdiction, either original or appellate
c
4. 145. Rules of Court, etc.-(1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of
the President, make rules for regulating generallythe practice and
procedure of the court including-
(a) rules as to the persons practising before the Court; D
(b) rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals, and other matters pertaining
to appeals including the time within which appeals to the Court are to be
enteres:
(c) rules as to the proceedings in the Court for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part 111;
(cc) rules as to the proceedings in the Court under Article 139A; E
(d) rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub clause (c) of clause
(1) of Article 134;
(e) rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or
order made by the Court may be reviewed and the procedure for such review
including the time within which applications to the Court for such review
are to be entered; F
(f) rules as the costs of and incident to any proceedings in the Court and as
to the fees to be charged in respect of proceedings therein;
(g) rules as to the granting of bail;
(h) rules as to stay of procedings;
(i) rules providing for the summary determination of any appeal which appears G
to the Court to be frivolous or vexatious or brought for the purpose of delay;
G) rules as to the procedure for inquiries referred to in clause (1) of Article
317;
(2) Subject to the provisions of clause (3), rules made under this article may fix
the minimum nmber of Judges who are to sit for any purpose, and may
provide for the powers of single Judges and Division Courts; H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A vested in this Court either by the Constitution or law. Such
authority of this Court is, however, expressly made subject to
the provisions of any law made by the Parliament and also
subject to the approval of the President of India.

9. The submission that the Code of Civil Procedure
8
applies to the conduct of the election petition on hand in view
of section 141 of the CPC, in my view, is required to be refuted.
Because the procedure that is required to be followed by this
Court while exercising jurisdiction conferred by either the
Constitution or the Parliament by law could be laid down only
C by the Parliament and until the Parliament makes such a law,
by the rules made by this Court. CPC is not a law made by the
Parliament but an "existing law" within the meaning of the
expression under Article 366 (10) and deriving its force from
Article 372 of the Constitution.
D
10. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the Code' for
short) is an enactment "consolidating the laws relating to the
procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature". Though there is

E (3) The minimum number of Judges who are to sit to the purpose of deciding
any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article
143 shall be five:
Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions
of this chapter other than Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and
in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the
F appeal involves a substantial question of law as the to the interpretation of
this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal
of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court
constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case
involving such a question and shall on receipt of the dispose of the appeal
in conformity with such opinion.
G (4) No judgment shall be delivered by the Supreme Court save in open Court,
and no report shall be made under Article 143 save in accordance with an
opinion also delivered in open Court
(5) No judgment and no such opinion shall be delivered by the Supreme Court
save with the concurrence of a majority of the Judges present at the hearing
of the case, but nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent a Judge
who does not concur from delivering a dissenting judgment or opinion.
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 653
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
nothing express in the body of the Code which declares that A
the Code applies to the Courts of Civil Judicature, such a
declaration is contained in the Preamble of the Code. By a long
established practice and interpretation of the successive
Codes, it is always understood that the Code of Civil Procedure
applies to the proceedings only in a Court of Civil Judicature. 8
The first Code was made in 1859 which was replaced by its
successor (Act 10 of 1877). The brief history of the various
enactments which regulated the procedure of the Courts of Civil
Judicature is succinctly given in Mulla's Code of Civil
Procedure, 7th Edition, at page 25 • What exactly is a Court of c
Civil Judicature is not defined either under the Code or under
any other enactment. Such an expression is used in
contradistinction to the courts exercising jurisdiction in criminal
cases. Nor the word 'court' is defined under the Code. 'Revenue
Courts' and Courts constituted under the various laws dealing D
with Small Causes are not treated to be Courts to which the
Code is automatically applicable. (See: Sections 5, 7 and 8)

5. The first Code of Civil Procedure was Act 8 of 1859. Prior to that, the
procedure of the mofussil courts was regulated by special Acts and
Regulations repealed by Act 1O of 1861; and the procedure of the Supreme E
Court was under their own rules and orders and certain Acts, for example
Act 17 of 1852 and Act 6 of 1854. The Code of 1859 applied to mofussil
Courts only. In 1862, the Supreme Court and the Courts of Sadder Diwani
Adalat in the Presidency towns were abolished by the High Courts Act 1861
(24 and 25 Vic C 104) and the powers of those Courts were vested in the
chartered high Courts. The Letters Patent of 1862 establishing the high
Courts extended to them the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure, F
1859. The Charters of 1865, which empowered the high Courts to make
rules and orders regulating proceedings in civil cases required them to be
guided as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of 1859 and
subsequent Amending Acts.
Such Amending Acts were: Act 4 of 1860; 43 of 1860; 23 of 1861; 9 of 1863;
20 of 1867; 7 of 1870; 14 of 1870; 9 of 1871; 32 of 1871 and 7 of 1872. G
The next Code was Act 10 of 1877, which repealed that of 1859. This was
amended by Act 18 of 1878 and 12 of 1879; then superseded by the Code
of 1882 (Act 14 of 1882). This was amended by Acts 15 of 1882; 14 of
1885; 4 of 1886; 10 of 1886; 7 of 1887; 8 of 18887; 6 of 1888; 10 of 1888;
13 of 1889; 8of1890; 6 of 1892; 5of1894; 7 of 1895 and 13 of 1895; and
then superseded by the present Code of Civil Procedure. H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A The expression 'Revenue Court' is defined in Section 5(2) 6 . The
nature of the jurisdiction exercised either by the Revenue Courts
· or the Small Causes Courts cannot be said to be anything other
than civil jurisdiction. Even then the Legislature in its wisdom 1

thought it fit not to extend the application of Code to these
B Courts. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani,
learned senior counsel for the petitioner, that in view of the
declaration contained in Section 1417 of the Code, the Code
applies to the conduct of the election petition under the
Elections Act, in my opinion, is untenable.
c 11. Yet another reason for such a conclusion is that in the
context of ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts under innumerable
enactments, either of the Parliament or of the State
Legislatures, this Court consistently took the view that this Court
and the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 32 or
D under Article 226 exercise jurisdiction vested in them by the
Constitution and, therefore, the same cannot be taken away by
any legislation short of a Constitutional amendment. The
implication flowing thereby is that they are not ordinary civil
courts within the meaning of such an expression employed in
E these various enactments attracting the bar of jurisdiction
created by the statute. Therefore, I find it difficult to accept the
submission that by virtue of the operation of Section 141 of the
Code this Court is bound by the procedure contained in the
Code while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
F 71 of the Constitution of India.
12. Then the question remains as to what is the procedure

6. Section 5(2). 'Revenue Court' in sub-section (1) means a Court having
jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings
G relating to the tent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes,
but does not include a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under this
Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a
civil nature.
7. 141. Miscellaneous proceedings-The procedure provided in this Code in
regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in
H all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 655
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
that is required to be followed by this Court while adjudicating A
an election dispute under the Elections Act. This Court, in
exercise of its authority under Article 145, made rules regulating
the procedure of this Court, both in its original and appellate
jurisdiction called the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, hereinafter
referred to as 'the Rules'. Insofar as the election petitions under B
the Act are concerned, the procedure is prescribed under
Order XXXIX which occurs in Part VII of the Rules. Rule 346
thereof stipulates that while adjudicating an election petition
under the Act, this Court is required to follow (as nearly as may
be) the procedure contained in Orders XXll to XXXIV of Part Ill c
of the Rules regulating the proceedings before this Court in
exercise of its original jurisdiction 9 . Such a stipulation is
expressly made subject to other provisions of Order XXXIX or
any special order or direction by this Court. The stipulation that
this Court is obliged to follow the procedure applicable to the
0
proceedings under the original jurisdiction of this Court (Part Ill
of the Rules) is made subject to the other provisions of Order
XXXIX. In other words, if the procedure contained in Part Ill is
inconsistent with any provisions contained in Part VII (Order
XXXIX}, this Court is not obliged to follow the procedure
contained in Part Ill. Apart from that, in view of the clause .... ."or E
any special order or direction of the Court" ..... occurring under
Rule 34 of Order XXXIX, it is always open to this Court in a
given case not to follow the procedure contained thereunder
Order XXXIX. The circumstances which justify the issuance of
such "special orders or directions" by this Court require a F
separate examination as and when required.
13. Therefore, the question is -what is the procedure that
is required to be followed by this Court on the receipt of an

8. 34. Subject to the provisions of this Order or any special order or directions
G
of the Court, the procedure on an election petition shall follow, as nearly
as may be, the procedure in proceedings before the Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction.
9. Various rules occuring in Part Ill of the Rules expressly provide for the
application of certain specified provisions of the CPC to such original
proceedings before this Court. H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A election petition under the Act? Rules 13 to 15 of Order XXXIX
prescribe the procedure to be followed by this Court. While
Order XXIV Rule 1 occurring under Part Ill of the Rules
mandates that when a suit is presented to this Court for
adjudication in its original jurisdiction "summons shall be issued
B to the defendant to appear and answer the claim". Rule 1310 of
Order XXXIX prescribes a different procedure. It reads as
follows:-
"Upon presentation of a petition the same shall be posted
before a bench of the Court consisting of five Judges for
C preliminary hearing and orders for service of the petition
and advertisement thereof as the Court may think proper
and also appoint a time for hearing of the petition. Upon
preliminary hearing, the Court, if satisfied, that the petition
does not deserve regular hearing as contemplated in Rule
o 20 of this Order may dismiss the petition or pass any
appropriate order as the Court may deem fit."
14. A plain reading of Rule 13 indicates that on the due
presentation of an election petition under the Act to this Court,
[1] the same shall be posted before a bench of five Judges for
E a preliminary hearing and orders; [2] such a hearing and orders
are regarding the service of the petition and advertisement
thereof. Because Rules 1411 and 15'2 respectively stipulate that

10. It may be mentioned that Rule 13, as it exists today, was substituted by GSR 407
dated 9th December, 1997, w.e.f. 20~ December, 1997. Prior to such substitution,
F the Rule read differently.
11. Rule 14. Unless otherwise ordered, the notice of the presentation of the petition,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, shall within five days of the presentation
thereof or within such further time as the Court may allow, be served by the pet~ioner
or his advocate on record on the respondent or respondent, the Secretary to the
Election Commission, the Returning Officer and the Attorney General for India. Such
service shall be effected personally or by registered post, as the Court or Registrar
G may direct. Immediately after such service the petitioner or his advocate on record
shall file with the Registrar an affidavit of the time and manner of such service.
12. Rule 15. Unless dispensed with by the Judge in Chambers or the Registrar, as the
case may be, notice of the presentation of the petition shall be published in the
Official Gazette and also advertised in newspaper at the expense of the petitioner
or petitioners, fourteen dear days before the date appointed for the hearir.g thereof
H in such manner as the Court or the Registrar may direct.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 657
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
the notice of the presentation of the election petition under the A
Act is required to be served on the various persons specified
under Rule 14. The said rule also provides for the method and
manner of service. Whereas Rule 15 stipulates that the factum
of the presentation of election petition under the Act shall be
published in the Official Gazette and also advertised in B
newspapers at the expense of the petitioner, fourteen clear days
before the date appointed for hearing. However, the obligations
stipulated in Rule 14 and 15 are made expressly subject to
orders to the contrary by the Court. It is for determining
whether the normal procedure prescribed under Rule 14 and c
15 discussed above is to be followed in a given case or not,
an election petition under the Act is required to be listed for a
preliminary hearing contemplated under Rule 13. Rule 13
further stipulates [3] upon such a preliminary hearing, if the
Court comes to the conclusion that the petition does not
0
deserve a regular hearing, contemplated under Rule 20, the
Court may either dismiss the election petition or pass any
appropriate orders as the Court deems fit.
15. Therefore, Order XXXIX Rule 13 prescribes a
procedure contrary to the stipulation contained under Order E
XXIV Rule 1 which mandates that alter due institution of an
original suit before this Court, "summons shall be issued". It is
worthwhile noticing that while Order XXIV requires summons
to be issued, Order XXXIX Rule 14 contemplates that only a
notice of the presentation of an election petition is to be issued. F
The distinction between summons and notice is very subtle but
real which would be beyond the need and scope of this
judgment to go into. I only take note of the distinction in the
language of the abovementioned rules and the existence of a
legal distinction pointed out. G

16. It follows from the above discussion, Order XXXIX Rule
13 vests a discretion in the bench of five Judges before whom
the election petition under the Act is posted for preliminary
hearing to record a conclusion whether the petition deserves
H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A a notice under Rule 14 or publication under Rule 15 and a
regular hearing under Rule 20 or any other appropriate order
such as (perhaps) directing some formal defects in the petition
to be cured etc. I do not propose to examine the full scope and
amplitude of such "appropriate order" for the purpose of this
B case as the same is not necessary.

17. However, it goes without saying that the discretion of
the bench hearing the election petition to record a finding that
the election petition does not deserve a regular hearing and,
C therefore, is required to be dismissed must be exercised on
rational grounds known to law for clear and cogent reasons to
be recorded. For such obligation is the only justification of the
extraordinary degree of protection and immunities granted to
the judiciary by our Constitution. Absence of rational grounds
based on clear and cogent reasoning would lead to a popular
D misconception that this branch of the Constitutional governance
is no different from the other two branches, a misconception
which is certainly not conducive to the credibility (of the legal
system) which is the ultimate strength of all judicial institutions.

E 18. Placing reliance on Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Shri Ram
Jethmalani argued that an election petition can be rejected
even prior to the stage of issuance of summons only when the
election petition does not disclose a cause of action. He
submitted that under any circumstances it cannot reasonably
F be argued that the election petition on hand does not disclose
a valid cause of action. He further argued that the question
whether the petitioner would be able to establish the truth of
various allegations made by him in the election petition cannot
be the subject matter of enquiry under Rule 13 but the enquiry
G can only be confined to - whether the allegations if proved do
constitute sufficient cause of action to enable the petitioner to
claim the relief such as that are claimed in the election petition?
19. On the other hand it is the case of the respondent that
various factual allegations made in the election petition even if
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 659
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
proved to be true do not disclose a cause of action entitling A
the petitioner to relief as claimed in the election petition.
20. To examine the correctness of the above rival
submissions, I deem it appropriate to examine the
circumstances under which this Court can dismiss an election B
petition under the Act at the stage of preliminary hearing even
before issuing notice to the respondent under rule 13.

21. I am of the opinion that ii is not possible to give an
exhaustive list of the circumstances in which this Court can
render the finding that an election petition does not require a C
regular hearing but ii can be said that having regard to the fact
that an election petition is not a common law proceeding but
the creature of the statute, non-compliance with the mandatory
requirements of the statute under which the right to question an
election under the Elections Act is created is certainly one of D
the grounds on which election petition can be dismissed at the
stage of preliminary hearing.

22. For example, the right to question an election under
the Elections Act is available only to two categories of people E
as enumerated under section 14A which is already taken note.
In a case where the election petition is presented by somebody
other than who is entitled to question the election irrespective
of the allegations made in the election petition the same is
required to be dismissed at the stage of preliminary hearing.
F
23. Similarly, section 14A declares that an election under
the Act can be called in question only on the ground specified
under sections 1813 and 1914 . Therefore, ifthe allegations made

13. Section 18. Grounds for declaring the election of a returned candidate to G
be void.-(1) If the Supreme Court is of opinion.,-
(a) that the offence of bribery or undue influence at the election has been
committed by the returned candidate or by any person with the consent of
the returned candidate; or
(b) that the result of the election has been materially affected-
(i) by the improper reception or refusal of a vote, or H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A in the election petition even if assumed to be true do not
constitute one or some of the grounds on which an election
under the Act can be challenged, it would be certainly one of
the grounds enabling this Court to reach a conclusion that the
election petition does not deserve a regular hearing.
B
24. It is in this background the question whether the instant
election petition is required to be dismissed even without
issuing notice to the respondent is required to be determined?

25. The entire thrust of the arguments of the respondent
C - who appeared before this court even before this court
directed issuance of notice upon him - is that the election
petition does not disclose a valid cause of action calling for
issuance of notice or publication contemplated under Rules 14

D (iQ by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act
or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act; or
(iiQ by reason of the fact that the nomination of any candidate (other than the
sucessful candidate), who has not withdrawn his candidature, has been
wrongly accepted ; or
(c) that the nomination of any candidate has been wrongly rejected or the
E nomination of the successful candidate had been wrongly accepted;
the Supreme Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to
be void.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the offences of bribery and undue influence
at an election have the same meaning as in Chapter IXA of the Indian Penal
Code.
F
14. Section 19. Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned
candidate may be declared to have been elected.-lf any person who has
lodges an election petition had, in addition to calling in question the election
of the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he himself or any other
candidate had been duly elected and the Supreme Court is of opinion that
in fact the petitioner or such candidate received a majority of the valid votes,
G the Supreme Court shall, after declaring the election of the returned
candidate to be void, declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the
case may be, to have been duly elected:
Provided that the petitioner or such candidate shall not be declaled to be
suly elected if it is proved that the election of such candidate would have
been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been
H presented calling in question his election.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 661
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
& 15 and a regular hearing contemplated under Order XXXIX A
Rule 20.
26. To accept or reject the submission of the respondent
it is necessary to examine the grounds on which election of the
respondent is challenged.
B
27. The only ground on which the election of the respondent
is challenged is that he was not eligible to contest the election
to the office of President of India. Such a ground is certainly
one of the grounds on whi~h election of the respondent as the
President of India could be challenged, as Section 18(1)(iii) C
stipulates that if this court is of the opinion that the nomination
of the successful candidate has been wrongly accepted, this
court shall declare the election to be void.

28. The next question is whether the election petition D
contains necessary allegations to substantiate the above
mentioned ground on which the election is challenged? The
allegations, as disclosed by the election petition in this regard,
are twofold and are sufficiently elaborated in the judgements
of My Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brother Justice E
Ranjan Gogoi. Therefore, I do not propose to reiterate the same.

29. The respondent does not dispute the fact that he was
the Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata and also
the leader of the political party called Indian National Congress
in the Lok Sabha. However, the respondent took a categoric F
stand that he had resigned from both the abovementioned
offices before the crucial date i.e. on the date of scrutiny of the
nomination papers (2nd July 2012) - a stand which is seriously
disputed by the election petitioner by an elaborate pleading in
the petition that the respondent did not in fact cease to hold the G
abovementioned offices by the crucial date.

30. The respondent also took a categoric stand that: apart
from his having had relinquished the abovementioned two
offices by the crucial date, neither of the abovementioned H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A offices is an office the holding of which would make him
ineligible to contest the electlon in question.

31. The issue that is required to be examined for the
purpose of the order on the preliminary hearing under Rule 13
is whether the holding of either of the abovementioned two
8
offices - if really held on the crucial date - would render the
respondent ineligible to contest the election in question? If the
answer is in the negative, this Court could dismiss the election
petition on hand under Rule 13.

C 32. The answer to the issue in my opinion depends upon
the answer to the question - Whether the said two offices are
offices of profit which would in law render the respondent
ineligible to contest the election in question? The question -
Whether the respondent did intact hold those offices on the
D crucial date? is a question of fact which, in my opinion, cannot
be the subject matter of enquiry at this stage.

33. To answer the first question, we must first examine what
is the prohibition under the law which renders any person
E ineligible to contest the election in question.

34. Article 58 provides that:

"Qualifications for election as President.- (1) No person
shall be eligible for election as President unless he
F (a) is a citizen of India,

(b) has completed the age of thirty five years, and
(c) is qualified for election as a member of the House
G of the People
(2) A person shall not be eligible for election as President
if he holds any office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State or under any local or
other authority subject to the control of any of the said
H Governments.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 663
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
Explanation: For the purposes of this article, a person shall A
not be deemed to hold any office of profit by reason only
that he is the President or Vice President of the Union or
the Governor of any State or is a Minister either for the
Union or for any State."
B
35. It can be seen from the above that holding of an office
of profit either under the Government of India or the Government
of any State or any local or other authority subject to the control
of any of the said Governments inter a/ia would render the
holder of such office of profit ineligible for election as President. C

36. The respondent's defence is that neither of the offices
held by him are offices of profit falling under Article 58 (2) which
would render him ineligible to contest the election in question.
According to him the office of the Chairman of Indian Statistical
Institute, Kolkata - whether an office of profit or not stood D
declared [by a law made by the Parliament as contemplated
under Article 102(1 )(a) 15 i.e. the Parliament (Prevention of
15. In the purported exercise of the power conferred under Article 102(1)(a),
the Parliament from time to time made various enactments, last in the
series is the Disqualification Act, 1959, which is also ameded from time to E
time, once in 1993 and later in 1996 and 2006. Section 3 of the said Act
declares that none of the offices specified therein shall disqualify the holder
thereof for being chosen as or for being a member of Parliament. Section
3 insofar as relevant reads as follows:
"3. Certain offices of profit not to disqualify.-lt is hereby declared that none of
the following offices, in so far as it is an office of profit under the Government F
of India or the Government of any State, shall disqualify the holder thereof
for being chosen as, or for being, a member of Parliament, namely,-.. ."
Various offices are specified in various sub-clauses from (a) to (m) of the
said section to be offices which do not disqualify the holders thereof from
becoming or being members of the Parliament. An analysis of these various
clauses inserted from time to time (which to my mind indicates a haphazard
tinkering with the act) shows that some offices are statutory, some of the G
offices are brought into existence by virtue of executive orders of the
Goverrnent of India or the State Government. Relevant in the context is
clause (k) of the said section which reads as follows:
"(k). the office of Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Secretary or Member (by
wharever name called) in any statutory or non-statutory body specified in
the Table;" H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A Disqualification) Act, 1959] - not to disqualify a person from
either being chosen as or for being a member of the
Parliament. Therefore, it is argued that even assuming that it
is an office of profit falling under Article 58(2), the holding of
such an office did not render him ineligible to contest the
B election in question because of the declaration made in the
Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959
(hereinafter referred to as "the Disqualification Act, 1959") as
the Constitution itself under Article 102(1 )(a) authorises the
Parliament to make such a law and Article 58(1)(c) declares
C that a person "qualified to be a member of the House of the
People" is eligible to contest the Presidential election.

37. On the other hand it is argued by Shri Jethmalani that
there is a difference in the language of Article 58(2) and Article
102(1 )(a) both of which deal with certain offices of profit and
D the consequential disqualification attached to the holders of
such offices to contest the election either to the office of
President of India or to the Parliament respectively. The
declaration made under the Disqualification Act, 1959 may in
a given case confer sufficient legal immunity from the operation
E of the disqualification specified in Article 102(1)(a) to enable
the holder of such a declared office to contest the election to
either House of the Parliament but such declaration does not
confer any immunity from the operation of the disqualification
contained in Article 58(2).
F
Though holding of an office of profit under any body - other than the Central
Government or a State Government - is not a disqualification for a person
seeking election to the Partiament, the Parliament chose to include within
its sweep of the provisions of Disqualification Act, 1959 the various offices
mentioned in Section 3 (k) read with the table annexed to the Schedule of
the Act. Whether it is really necessary to bring such offices under the
G protective umbrella of the Act to avoid any challenge on the ground of the
holders of such office being disqualified from seeking election to the
Parliament, is a moot question.
There is a table attached to the Schedule of the Actwhich came to be
inserted by Act 31 of 2006 consisting of 55 entries. Entry 4 therein is the
'Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta' of which the respondent was admittedly
H the Chariman.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 665
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
38. Any person seeking to contest an election either to the A
office of the President of India or for the membership of anyone
of the legislative bodies under the Constitution must satisfy
certain eligibility criteria stipulated by the Constitution. Article
58 of the Constitution stipulates that no person shall be eligible
for election as the President of India unless he is a citizen of B
India and is qualified for election as a member of the House of
the People but has completed the age of 35 years. It must be
noticed that the qualifications and disqualifications with regard
to the membership of the Parliament are contained in Articles
84 16 and 10217 respectively. Article 84 stipulates that to be c

16. Article 84-Qualifications for membership of Parliament-A person shall
not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless he-
(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person
authorized in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation
according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule; D
(b) is, in the case of a seat in the Council of States, not less than thirty five
years of age and, in the cae of a seat in the House of the people, not less
than twenty-five years of age, and
(c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf
by or under any law made by Parliament.
17. Article 102-Disqualifications for membership-(1) A person shall be
E
disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of either House
of Paniament-
(a) If he holds may office of profit under the Government of India or the
Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by
law not to disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent Court;
F
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent:
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a
goreign State, or is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence
to a foreign State:
(e) if he is so disqualififed by or under any law made by Parliament. G
Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause a person shall not be deemed
to hold an officeof profit under the Government of India or the Government
of any State by reason only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for
such State.
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House of
Parliament if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule. H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A qualified to be chosen as a member of Parliament, a person
must be a citizen of India, he must also subscribe to an oath
specified under the said Article read with the third Schedule to
the Constitution and be aged not less than 25 years in the case
of the House of the People and 35 years in the case of the
B Council of States. The Article also authorises that the
Parliament may by law prescribe such other qualifications.
Whereas Article 102 declares certain categories of person to
be disqualified either for being chosen or for continuing after
being chosen as a member of either House of Parliament. They
c are (1) persons holding any office of profit either under the
Government of India or the Government of any State; (2)
persons of unsound mind and stand so declared by a
competent court; (3) any undischarged insolvents; (4) persons
who are not citizens of India or those who acquired citizenship
0 of any foreign State etc. Article 102 (e) authorises the
Parliament to make laws prescribing further disqualifications
for the membership of the Parliament. However, insofar as the
first class of persons mentioned above (holders of offices of
profit) Article 102(1 )(a) authorises the Parliament to make a
E declaration by law the holding of such declared offices of profit
would not be a disqualification for the membership of the
Parliament. The explanation to Article 102 makes a categoric
declaration that a person who is a Minister either of the Union
or of a State shall not be deemed to be holding an office of
profit contemplated under Clause (1 )(a).
F
39. The Representation of the People Act, 1951,
(hereinafter referred to as 'the R.P. Act, 1951') is a law made
by the Parliament' referable to Articles 84(c) and 102(e). In the
context of the Parliament, Sections 3 and 4 prescribe that a
G person seeking an election to the Parliament shall necessarily
be an elector for a parliamentary constituency in India. In other
words, various qualifications prescribed for registration as an
elector in the electoral roll contemplated under Section 15 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1950 must also be
H satisfied for a person to become eligible to contest for the
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 667
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
Parliament. Sections 16 to 19 prescribe various qualifications A
and disqualifications in the context of registration of a person
in an electoral roll. They pertain to the minimum age,
qualifications, residence etc. Chapter Ill and IV of the R.P. Act,
1951 prescribe various disqualifications under Sections 8, 9,
9A, 11A thereof for becoming a member of any of the B
legislative bodies under the Constitution.

40. On an examination of the above provisions, it appears
to me that eligibility and disqualification to become a member
of parliament are two distinct things. In my view, any person who C
is eligible to become and not disqualified for becoming a
member of Parliament would not automatically be eligible to
contest the election to the office of the President of India. There
is a difference in the eligibility criteria applicable to the election
of the membership of Parliament and the election to the office
of the President of India. D

41. While Article 58 declares that a person who is qualified
to be elected as a member of a House of the People shall be
eligible for the election of the President, it stipulates a higher
age qualification of 35 years for a person seeking election to E
the President of India while it is sufficient under Article 84 (b)
for a person seeking election to the House of the People to be
not less than 25 years only. Another distinction is that: Article
102 (1 )(a) declares that persons holding an office of profit either
under the Government of India or of the Government of any F
State (unless they are protected by the law made by the
Parliament) are disqualified for being chosen as members of
the Parliament whereas Article 58 sub-clause (2) disqualifies
persons holding office of profit not only specified under Article
102(a) but also under any local or any other authority which is G
subject to the control of either of the above mentioned two
governments. In other words, the holding of an office of profit
under any local or other authority is not a disqualification for
membership of Parliament while it is a disqualification for the
election to the office of the President of India.
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A 42. One more distinction is that while an office of profit,
the holding of which renders a person disqualified for being
chosen as a member of Parliament, can be declared by the
Parliament not to be an office of profit holding of which would
disqualify the holder from becoming a member of Parliament.
8 Such an authority is not expressly conferred on the Parliament
in the context of the candidates at an election to the office of
the President of India.

43. Therefore, when Article 58(1 )(c) stipulates that no
person shall be eligible for election as the President of India
C unless he is qualified to be a member of the House of the
People, the protective declaration made by the Parliament
referable to Article 102(1 )(a) regarding certain offices of profit
does not render holders of such offices eligible for contesting
the Presidential election. Particularly, holders of office of profit
D i.;nder any "local or other authority" are positively disqualified
for being elected as President of India. The said disqualification
cannot be removed by the Parliament as Article 102(1 )(a) does
not authorise the Parliament to make any such declaration in
the context of the holders of an office of profit under any local
E or other authority subject to the control of either the Government
of India or the State Government, obviously because the holding
of such an office is not declared to be a disqualification under
the Constitution for the membership of the Parliament. I accept
the submission of Mr. Jethmalani. In my opinion, the Constitution
F prescribes more stringent qualifications for election to the office
of President of India and the disqualification stipulated under
Article 58(2) is incapable of being exempted by a law made
by the Parliament.
44. My opinion derives support from a Constitution Bench
G decision of this Court in Baburao Patel and others v. Dr. Zakir
Hussain and others AIR 1968 SC 904 wherein the interface
· between Articles 58 and 84 of the Constitution was examined.
Challenging the election of Dr. Zakir Hussain as President of

H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 669
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
India, an election petition came to be filed in this Court wherein A
the Court noted thus:

"9. The contention of the petitioners is that because of ....
cl. (a) of Art. 84 ..... it became necessary to take oath for
a person standing for election to either House of
Parliament in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule, 8
a person standing for election as President had also to
take a similar oath because Art. 58(1)(c) requires that a
person to be eligible for election as President must be
qualified for election as a member of the House of the
People ........... urged that no one is qualified ...... for C
election as a member of the House of the People unless
he makes and subscribes an oath in the form set out for
the purpose in the Third Schedule, and therefore this
provision applied to a person standing for election as
President, for without such oath he would not be qualified D
to stand for election to the House of the People."

This Court in para 10 compared the language of Articles
58 and 84 of the Constitution and held as follows:-

" .... and reading them together it would follow that a person E
standing for election as President would require such
qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or
under any law made by Parliament. Further as cl. (c) of Art.
58(1) lays down that a person standing for presidential
election has to be qualified for membership of the House F
of the People, Article 102 (which lays down
disqualifications for members of Parliament) would also be
attracted except in so far as there is a special provision
contained in Article 58(2). Thus cl. (c) of Article 58(1)
would bring in such qualifications for members of the G
House of the People as may be prescribed by law by
Parliament, as required by Article 84(c). It will by its own
force bring in Article 102 of the Constitution, for that Article
lays down certain disqualifications which a presidential
H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A candidate must not have for he has to be eligible for
election as a member of the House of the People. But it
is clear to us that, what is provided in clauses (a) and (b)
of Article 58(1) must be taken from there and we need not
travel to els. (a) and (b) of Article 84 in the matter of
B citizenship and of age of the presidential candidate.
Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 58(1) having made a
specific provision in that behalf in our opinion
exclude els. (a) and (b) of Art. 84. This exclusion was
there before the Amendment Act.'
c This Court refused to read the requirement of subscribing
to the oath according to the form set out in Third Schedule of
the Constitution for contesting the presidential election.

45. For reaching such a conclusion this Court took note
o of the fact that prior to the 16th Constitutional amendment, the
requirement of subscription to such an oath did not exist in the
context of either the election to the Parliament or the office of
the President. It was introduced by the 16th amendment as a
necessary requirement for a person to be qualified to contest
E the election to the Parliament. The omission to make such an
amendment that refers to the persons contesting election to the
office of the President is a clear indication that the Constitution
ever intended such a requirement to be applied for the
presidential election also. In paragraph 12 this Court held thus:

F "Now if the intention of Parliament was that an oath similar
in form to the oath to be taken by persons standing for
election to Parliament had to be taken by persons standing
for election to the office of the President there is no reason
why a similar amendment was not made in Article 58(1 )(a).
G Further if the intention of Parliament was that a presidential
candidate should also take an oath before standing for
election, the form of oath should also have been prescribed
either in the Third Schedule or by amendment of Article 60,
which provides for oath by a person elected as President
H before he takes his office. But we find that no change was
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 671
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
made either in Article 58(1)(a) or in Article 60 or in the A
Third Schedule prescribing the form of oath. to be taken
by the presidential candidate before he could stand for
election. This to our mind is the clearest indication that
Parliament did not intend, when making the Amendment
Act, that an oath similar to the oath taken by a candidate B
standing for election to Parliament had to be taken by a
candidate standing for election to the office of the
President. So there is no reason to import the provision
of Article 84(a) as it stood after the Amendment Act into
Article 58(1)(a), which stood unamended. That Is one c
reason why we are of opinion that so far as the election to
the office of the President is concerned, the candidate
standing for the same has not to take any oath before
becoming eligible for election as President."

46. Therefore, I have no hesitation to reach to the D
conclusion that the declaration made by the Parliament in the
Disqualification Act, 1959 would not provide immunity for a
candidate seeking election to the office of the President of India
if such a candidate happens to hold an office of profit
contemplated under Article 58(2). E

47. Assuming for the sake of argument that the declaration
of law made by Parliament [contemplated and made under
Article 102(a)] can obliterate the disqualification even with
respect to a candidate at the presidential election, Article F
102(a) authorises the parliament to make such a declaration
with respect to only the offices of profit either under the
Government of India or Government of any State but not with
respect to the offices of profit under "local or other authorities".
Therefore, the legal nature of Indian Statistical Institute and of G
the office of its Chairman is required to be examined.

48. Whether the office of the Chairman of the
abovementioned Institute can be called an office of profit either
under the Government of India or the State Government or local
or other authority attracting the prohibition under Article 58(2) H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A and rendering the respondent ineligible to contest the election
in question?

49. This Court in 8.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute
and others (1983) 4 SCC 582 held that the Indian Statistical
Institute is an authority falling under Article 12 of the Constitution
8
of India, therefore, 'State' for the purpose of Part-Ill of the
Constitution. Under the scheme of Indian Statistical Institute Act,
the Government of India has deep and pervasive control on the
administration of the Institute. It also provides financial support
to the Institute.
c
50. The said Institute is a body registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 whose activities to some
extent are regulated by the enactment of the Parliament titled
"The Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 (No.57 of 1959),
D hereinafter referred to as the Institute Act. The Preamble to the
Act declares as follows:

"An Act to declare the institution known as the Indian
Statistical Institute having at present its registered office
in Calcutta to be an institution of national importance
E
and to provide for certain matters connected therewith."

51. It must be remembered that Entry 64 of List-I of the 7th
Schedule read with Article 246 (1) authorises the Parliament
to make laws with respect to:
F
"Institutions for scientific or technical education financed by
the Government of India wholly or in part and declared by
Parliament by law to be institutions of national importance.·

52. Section 4 of the Institute Act authorises the Institute to
G grant degrees and diplomas for various disciplines specified
therein. Section 5 authorises the Government to pay such sums
as appropriated by the Parliament in each financial year to the
Institute. The Act (Section 6) also obligates the Institute to get
its accounts audited by such auditors as may be appointed by
H the Government of India in consultation with the Auditor-General
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 673
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
of India and the Institute. Section 718 prohibits Institute from A
taking certain actions without the previous approval of the
Government of India. The full details of the Act are not
necessary for the present case.

53. But from the above it can be safely concluded that the B
Institute is an authority subject to the control of the Government
of India within the meaning of Article 58(2).

54. As it can be seen from the Scheme of the Institute Act
and the preamble that the administration of the society is still
to be run in accordance with its bye-laws and regulations-of the c
Society except insofar as those activities which are specifically
regulated by the Act (57 of 1959). The office of the Chairman
of the Institute is not an office created by any statute but is an
office created by the bye-laws of the Society. The Chairman is
required to be elected by a Council created under the D
regulations of the Society. Therefore, it is certainly not an office
(profit or no profit) either under the Central or State Government.
55. The learned counsel for the petitioner very vehemently
argued that the very fact that the Parliament thought it fit to E
specifically include the office of the Chairman of the Indian

18. Section 7. Prior Approval of Central Government necessary for certain action
by the lnstitute.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, or in the memorandum or rules and regulatins, the
Institute shall not except with previous approval of the Central Government,
F
"(a) alter, extend or abridge any of the purposes for which it has been
established or for which it is being used immediately before the
commencement of this Act, or amalgamate itself either wholly or partially
with any other Institution or society; or
(b) alter or amend in any manner the memorandum or rules and regulations;
or
G
(c) sell or otherwise dispose of any property acquired by the Institute with money
specifically provided for such acquisition by the Central Government:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary in the case of any such
movable property or class of movable property as may be specified by the
Central Government in this behalf by general or special order; or
(d) be dissolved. H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A Statistical Institute in the table annexed to the Disqualification
Act, 1959 would ipso facto imply that the office in question is
an office of profit. He relied upon M. V. Rajashekaran and
others v. Vatal Nagaraj and others (2002) 2 SCC 704 at page
711 wherein this Court observed thus:
B
"5 ..... The fact that the office of the chairman or a member
of a committee is brought within the purview of this Act
implies that the office concerned must necessarily be
regarded as an office of profit, but for the exclusion under
the clause by the legislature, the holder of such office could
c not have been eligible for being chosen as a Member of
the Legislature. The object of this provision is to grant
exemption to holders of office of certain description and
the provision in substance is that they will enjoy the
exemption, even though otherwise they might be regarded
D as holders of offices of profit..."
56. It is argued by Shri Harish Salve appearing for the
respondent that while interpreting the provisions of the
Constitution, the understanding of the legislature regarding the
E fact whether a particular office is an office of profit need not
necessarily be the correct understanding and this court is
required to independently examine this question.

57. It is argued by Shri Salve that the office of the Chairman
of the Indian Statistical Institute cannot be said to be either an
F office of profit either under the Government of India or the
Government of a State, which would render the holder of such
an office disqualified for becoming either a member of
Parliament or the President of India.
G 58. The learned Attorney General argued that the
Disqualification Act, 1959 is not a defining enactment. It
nowhere defines what is an office of profit but an enactment
made ex abundanti cautela to avoid any possible challenge to
election of some of the members of the Parliament on the
H ground that they are holders of offices of profit and, therefore,
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 675
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
this Court is still obliged to examine whether a particular office A
is an office of profit rendering the holder thereof ineligible to
become a member of Parliament or the President of India.

59. This Court In M. V. Rajashekaran (supra) dealt with the
question of office of profit under the State of Karnataka in the 8
context of the election of one Nagaraj to the legislative council
of Karnataka. Nagaraj was appointed a One-Man Commission
by the State of Karnataka to study certain problems. In that
capacity he was entitled to certain pay and reimbursement of
day to day expenditure. Subsequently, while continuing in the C
office of One-Man Commission, Nagaraj filed his nomination
for election to the Legislative Council of the State of Karnataka.
On an objection raised, Nagaraj was disqualified to contest the
election on the ground of his having had held an office of profit,
the nomination of Nagaraj was rejected. Nagaraj successfully
questioned the election of Rajashekaran and others on the D
ground that his nomination was illegally rejected. Rajashekaran
appealed to this Court. The issue revolved around interpretation
of Article 191, a provision corresponding to Article 102 in the
context of the eiections to the legislative assembly or legislative
council of a State. The enactment called Karnataka Legislature E
(Prevention of Disquaiification) Act, 1956 was made by the
State of Karnataka to protect the holders of some of the offices
from incurring disqualification on the ground that those offices
were offices of profit contemplated under Article 191.
F
60. This Court opined that Nagaraj was holding an office
of profit contemplated under Article 191 and therefore
disqualified from contesting the election because Nagaraj was
appointed a One-Man Commission by the Government of
Karnataka and he was obliged to study the problem entrusted G
to him and submit a report to the Government; that the
Government of Karnataka conferred the status of a Minister of
the Cabinet rank on the office and made budgetary provision
to defray the expenses of pay and day-to-day expenditure of
Nagaraj. This Court also recorded the conclusion that:
H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A "remuneration that Nagaraj was getting cannot be held to
be "compensatory allowance" within the ambit of section
2(b) of the Act and, therefore, he was holder of an office
of profit."

B 61. During the process of examination of various
provisions of the Karnataka Legislature (Prevention of
Disqualification) Act, 1956, this Court made the observation
relied upon by Shri Jethmalani. (para 55 supra) In my opinion,
this Court in Rajashekaran's case never specifically examined
the issue whether mere inclusion of office in an enactment
C preventing the disqualification falling under Article 191 or Article
102 (as the case may be) would imply in law that the office
specified in such an Act is necessarily an office of profit.
Therefore, the above extracted statement in my view does not
constitute the ratio decidendi of the said judgment.
D
62. Even otherwise the inclusion of various offices in the
Schedule of the Disqualification Act only reflects the
understanding of the Parliament that those offices are offices
of profit contemplated under Article 102(1 )(a). But such an
E understanding is neither conclusive or binding on this Court
while interpreting the Constitution. As argued by the learned
Attorney General, such inclusion appears to be an exercise -
'ex majure cautela' 19 • It is the settled position of law that
interpretation of the Constitution and the laws is "emphatically
F
19. Also see the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, at
page 11 para 33, wherein ir is stated:
• ... Further the amendment to the said Act in the year 2006 was carried out in
view of the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in the matter of Jaya Bachan
reported in (2006) 5 sec 266. The amendment to the Act was made ex
G majore cautela- as is obvious from the Statement of Objects and Reasons
to the amendment itself. The assumption that an express excision under
that Act is conclusive of whether the office constitutes an Office of Profit, is
patently untenable- a number of amendments were made ex majore cautela
so as avoid any controversy in relation to the holders of such office. The
mere fact that an office is excluded under that Act does not establish that
for all other statutes and Art. 58. the Officer is necessarily an office of profit."
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 677
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
the province and duty" of the judiciary. Therefore, I reject the A
submission of Mr. Jethmalani.

63. Therefore, the meaning of the expressions "office of
profit" and "office of profit under the State Government/Central
Government" are required to be examined. B

64. In Shivamurthy .Swami /namdar v. Agadi Sanganna
Andanappa (1971) 3 SCC 870 this Court dealt with the
question - what is an office of profit? and held as follows:

"14 .... office in question must have been held under a c
Government and to that some pay, salary, emoluments or
allowance is attached. The word 'profit' connotes the idea
of pecuniary gain. If there is really a gain, its quantum or
amount would not be material; but the amount of money
receivable by a person in connection with the office he D
holds may be material in deciding whether the office really
carries any profit.. . ."

reiterating the principle laid down in Ravanna Subanna
v. G.S. Kaggerappa, AIR 1954 SC 653.
E
65. In Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay and others (2001)
7 sec 425 both the questions were considered 20 •

66. The question in the said case was whether the
Chairman of the Interim Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council
F

20. Para 26. The expression 'office of profit" has not been defined either in
the Constitution or in the Representation of the People Act. In common
parlance the expression "profit" connotes an idea of some pecuniary gain.
If there is really sone gain, its label-"honorarium'-"remuneration'-
'salary" is not material-it is the substance and not the form which matters G
and even the quantum or amount or 'pecuniary gain" is not relevant-what
needs to be found our is whether the amount of money receivable by the
person concerned in connection with the office he holds, gives to him some
"pecuniary gain", other than as "compensation" to ilefray his our-of-pocket
expenses, which may have the possibility to bring that person under the
influence of the executive, which is conferring that benefit on him. H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A set up under section 20 of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous
Council Act, 1994 was holding an office of profit under the
State Government. This Court had to examine both the
questions - whether the office in question was an office of
profit at all and secondly whether it was an office of profit
B under the State Government? This Court confirmed the
opinion of the High Court that the Chairman of the Interim
Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council was not only an office of
profit but an office of profit under the State Government. The
Court noticed that the expression "office of profit" is not defined
c under law and, therefore, indicated the considerations relevant
for determining the question whether a particular office is an
office of profit. The Court reached to such a conclusion on
consideration of various facts that the various amounts paid to
Shibu Soren could not be said to be in the nature of
"compensatory allowance" and was in the nature of
0
remuneration or salary inherently implying an element of "profit"
and of giving "pecuniary gain" to Shibu Soren and the office of
the Chairman of Interim Council was temporary in nature with
limited lifespan and the members of the Interim Council were
E appointed by the State to hold their offices at the pleasure of
the State.

67. The test as pointed out by the Court was whether the
office gives the incumbent some pecuniary gain other than as
compensation to defray his out-of-pocket expenses which may
F have the possibility to bring that person under the influence of

Para 27. With a view to determine the office concerned is an "office of profir,
the court must, howecer, take a realistic view. Taking a broad or general
view, ignoring essectial details is not desirable not is it permissible to take
a narrow view by which technicality may overtake reality. It is a rule of
G interpretation of statutes that the statutory provisions are so construed as
to avoid absurdity and to further rather than defeat or frustrate the objection
of the enactment. Courts, therefore, while construing a statute avoid strict
construction by construing the entire Act. (See with advantage Ashok Kumar
Bhattacharya v. Ajoy Biswas (1985) 1SCC151, Tinsukhia Electric Supply
Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709 and CIT v. J.H. Golla (1985)
H 4 sec 343.
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 679
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
the executive. In coming to such conclusion this Court examined A
a number of earlier judgments on the issue.
68. Both the abovementioned cases and the earlier
authorities cited therein examined the question as to what is
an office of profit and what are the tests relevant to determine
B
whether such an office is held under the Government but the
question what is an office of profit under a local or other authority
subject to the control of either the Central or State Government
contemplated under Article 58(2) never fell for the consideration
of this Court in those cases.
c
69. That leads me to the next question whether the office
of the Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, which
I already concluded to be an authority for the purpose of Article
58(2), is an office of profit as explained by this Court in various
abovementioned judgments. I proceed on the basis that tests D
relevant for determining whether an office of profit
contemplated under Article 58(2) are the same as the test laid
down by this Court in the context of Article 102(1 )(a). The
answer to the said question depends upon the terms and
conditions subject to which the respondent held that office. E
Whether the amounts if any paid to him in that capacity are
compensatory in nature or amounts capable of conferring
pecuniary gain are questions of fact which ought in my view to
be decided only after ascertaining all the relevant facts which
F
21. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is submitted that in any event the
position of Chariman of ISi is not an Office of Profit in so far as the office
does not enjoy any benefits and remuneration let alone any salary,
emolument, perks etc. of any kind. It is submitted that ISi isa society
registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is also governed by the
ISi Act, 1954. The executive powers of the institute lie with the Director of G
ISi. Both the President and the Chairman of the Institute is, in protocol.
ranked higher than the Director, ISi but both the President and the
Chariman below him are neither entitled to nor receive any emoluments,
perquisites or benefits from the Institute. As such, it is submitted that the
office of Chariman of ISi is not an Office of Profit. The Chariman has no
executive role. As such, the disqualification under Article 58 of the
Constitution does not apply to the said office. H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A are obviously in the exclusive knowledge either of the
respondent or the abovementioned institute. I must also state
that the respondent in his short counter made a statement21 that
he did not derive pecuniary gain by holding the
abovementioned office. After such an appropriate enquiry into
B such conflicting statements of facts if it is to be concluded that
the said office is an office of profit inevitably the question
whether the respondent had tendered his resignation by the
crucial date is required to be ascertained once again an
enquiry into a question of fact.
c 70. Whether a decision on such questions of facts can be
rendered on the basis of the affidavit of the respondent, the
veracity of which is not subjected to any further scrutiny? The
petitioner if permitted to inspect or seek discovery of records
of the Indian Statistical Institute might or might not secure
D information to demonstrate truth or otherwise of the
respondent's affidavit.

71. The issue is not whether the petitioner would eventually
be able to establish his case or not. The issue is whether the
E petitioner is entitled to a rational procedure of law to establish
his case? The stake in the case for the parties is enormous,
nothing but the Presidency of this country. The Constitution
creates only one forum for the adjudication of such disputes.
All other avenues are closed. By holding that the petition does
F not deserve a regular hearing contemplated under Rule 20, in
my opinion, would not be consistent with the requirement that
justice must not only be done but it must also appear to have
been done.

72. Adjudication of rights of the parties under the Anglo-
G Saxon jurisprudence, which we follow, requires the
establishment of relevant facts which constitute the cause of
action necessary for the party claiming a relief from the Court.
Such facts are to be established by adducing evidence either
oral or documentary. Recognizing the possibility (that in a given
H
PURNO AGITOK SANGMA v. PRANAB MUKHERJEE 681
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
case) the party making an assertion of fact may not have within A
its control all the evidence necessary for proving such a fact,
courts of civil judicature are empowered to order the discovery,
inspection, production etc. of documents and also summon the
persons in whose custody such relevant documents are
available. (See: Section 30 read with Order XI etc. of the Code B
of Civil Procedure). Such empowerment is a part of a rational
procedure designed to serve the ends of justice.

73. If the adjudication of the election petition requires
securing of information which is exclusively available with the C
respondent and the Indian Statistical Institute and which may
be relevant can the petitioner be told that he would not be able
to secure such information on the ground that letter of the law
does not provide for such opportunity? We have already come
to the conclusion that the CPC does not apply to the election
petition. The rules framed by this Court under Article 145 are D
silent in this regard. But the very fact that this Court is authorised
to frame rules regulating the procedure applicable to trial of the
election petitions implies that this court has powers to pass
appropriate orders to secure such information. To hold to the
contrary would be to tell a litigant who might as well have been E
the first citizen of this country (given a more favourable political
regime) that the law of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of
India does not afford even that much of a rational procedure
which was made available by the foreign rulers to the ordinary
citizens of this country - which is still available to an ordinary F
litigant of this country.

74. Similarly, accepting the statement of the respondent
that he did not derive any pecuniary benefit by virtue of his
having had been Chairman of the Indian Statistical Institute G
without permitting the petitioner to test the correctness of that
statement by cross-examining the respondent or confronting the
respondent with such documents which the petitioner might
discover if such a discovery is permitted would be a denial of
equality of law to the petitioner guaranteed under Article 14 of H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A the Constitution of India. Such facility is afforded to every litigant
pursuing litigation in a court of civil judicature in this country.
Therefore, I do not subscribe to the view that the election
petition does not deserve a regular hearing.

8 75. At stake is not the Presidency of India but the
constitutional declaration of equality and the credibility of the
judicial process.

76. In view of the majority opinion that the election petition
does not deserve a regular hearing I do not propose to examine
C the question whether the second office held by the respondent
as Leader of the Lok Sabha is an office of profit attracting the
disqualification under Article 58(2).

R.P. Election Petition dismissed.

Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "Presidential election"Sign in to search