PURAN CHANDversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                     [2010] 7 S.C.R: 21


                      PURAN CHAND                               A
                              v.
                   STATE OF HARYANA
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1818 of 2009)

                        MAY 13, 2010
                                                                 B
 [V.S. SIRPURKAR AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,
                      JJ.]
                                   /
        Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 rlw s. 34 - Death of married
  woman due to burn injuries - Dying declaration recorded by C
 Judicial Magistrate, First Class after Doctor gave medical
  certificate that deceased was in a fit mental state to give the
  dying declaration-. Trial court convicted all the three accused
  viz., husband, brother-in-law and aunt-in-law of the deceased
  by placing reliance. upon the dying declaration - High Court   o
  acquitted the aunt-in-law but confirmed the conviction of
  husband and brother-in-law - Further appeal by brother-in-law
  before Supreme Court on ground that the dying declaration
· was not credible - Held: The dying declaratioq was recorded
  by an independent witness, who was working as a Judicial E
  Magistrate, First Class, and before it commenced, the
  Magistrate had satisfied himself about the ability of deceased
  to make a dying declaration - There was also an
  endorsement from the doctor as regards the fitness of the
  victim to give the dying declaration - Dying declaration was
                                                                  F
  not only voluntary but truthful also and, hence, it could be
  relied upon as was done by the trial Court and the High Court
  - Conviction of appellant brother-in-law maintained.

     Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 32 - Dying declaration -
 Principles governing dying declaration re-iterated.             G

     A married woman died of burn injuries. It was alleged
 by the prosecution that kerosene oil had been sprinkled
 on the deceased and there·after she was set on fire.
                            21                                   H
    22      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A Pursuant to the incident, the deceased had been removed
  to a hospital where she gave a dying declaration. The
  dying declaration was got recorded by PW13, a First
  Class Judicial Magistrate, after PW14, the attending
  doctor, gave medical certificate that the deceased was in
B a fit mental state to give the dying declaration.

       Trial court convicted all the three accused viz.,
  husband, brother-in-law and aunt-in-law of the deceased
  u/s.302 r/w s.34, primarily, by placing reliance upon the
  said dying declaration. On appeal, the High Court
C acquitted the aunt-in-law but confirmed the conviction of
  husband and brother-in-law. The husband chose not to
  file any further appeal.

         The brother-in-law, i.e. the appellant, however,
o   challenged his conviction before this Court contending
    that the dying declaration was tutored and that there were
    intrinsic defects in the dying declaration which militated
    against its credibility.

       It was contended that, firstly, the name of the
E appellant was not to be found in the dying declaration
  and there was a mere reference to the Jeth (elder brother
  of the husband); that there was one more brother of the
  deceased's husband, and it was not certain as to whether
  the deceased referred to appellant. It was further
F contended that the deceased had suffered 90 per cent of
  burns and, therefore, it was not possible that she would
  be in her senses while making the dying declaration; that
  no kerosene oil residues were found on the clothes
  which were seized; and also that the evidence of PW-5,
G PW-10 and PW-8, who claimed that an oral dying
  declaration was made to them, was also not reliable in
  view of the evidence of PW-4 who had stated that no such
  oral dying declaration was made by the deceased.

H        Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                   -23

     HELD:1. Ordinarily, though the oral dying declaration      A
is an extremely weak type of evidence, it would not be
unnatural for a burnt woman, to confide in her near
relations like her cousin, PW-5, father PW-1 and PW-8 who
is also a near relation. The deceased would rather be
keen to express herself regarding the cause- of her death.      s
Had the prosecution relied only on the oral dying
declaration, things could hav,e ·been different. However,
there is a dying declaration, Ex~ P .F-/3, which is recorded
by a Judicial Magistrate, First class.[Para SJ [31-F-H; 32-
A-B]                                                            C
     2.1. The dying declaration has been recorded by an
independent witness who was working as a Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, and before it commenced, the
Magistrate had satisfied himself about the ability of
deceased to make a_ dying declaration. Also, there is an        D
endorsement from PW14, who had examined deceased
and had given a certificate that deceased was in a fit
mental state to give the statement. He had also endorsed
at the end of the dying declaration that she was
conscious and was in the fit state of mind while giving         E
her statement. He has been cross-examined in details    I
without any breakthrough. Therefore, it cannot be said
that deceased was not in a fit state of mind while making
her statement. A feeble argument was raised that the
accused was a Tailor, yet, his occupation was stated to         F
be a Teacher by deceased. There is a simple explanation
that usually a tailor is called Tailor Master. It may be that
the same expression might have been used by deceased.
Even elsewhere in the record of this case such
expression seems to have been used. The confusion               G
might have been created because of the use of the word
"master". Even at the end of the dying declaration, a
further endorsement was made by PW1~ certifying that,
firstly, the witness was conscious all through the time
 when her statement was being recorded and, secondly,           H
    24     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010) 7 S.C.R.


A tl'lat no relatives of her were present at that time, which
  was also countersigned by the Magistrate who recorded
  the statement. The dying declaration was not only
  voluntary but truthful also and, hence, it could be relied
  upon as was done by the Trial Court and the Appellate
B Court. [Paras 9, 1O] [32-B-E; 33-8-E]

       2.2. The Courts below have to be extremely careful
  when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker
  thereof is not available for the cross-examination which
  poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A
C mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration
  just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The Court
  has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a -
  microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration
  is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind
D and without being influenced by the relatives present or
  by the investigating agency who may be interested in the
  success of investigation or which may be negligent while
  recording the dying declaration. Number of times, a
  young girl or a wife who makes the dying declaration
E could be under the impression that she would lead a
  peaceful, congenial, happy and blissful married life only
  with her husband and, therefore, has tendency to
  implicate the inconvenient parents-in-law or other
  relatives. [Para 11] [33-F-H; 34-A-B]
F
      2.3. Number of times the relatives influence the
  investigating agency and bring about a dying declaration.
  The dying declarations recorded by the investigating
  agencies have to be very scrupulously examined and the
G Court must remain alive to all the attendant
  circumstances at the time when the dying declaration
  comes into being. When there are more than one dying
  declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying
  declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a
H dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone
      PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                    25


can be accepted while the other innocuous dying A
declarations have to be rejected. Such trend will be
extremely dangerous. However, the Courts below are fully
entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them
the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass
all the above tests. [Para 11] [34-A-D]                    s
    2.4. Again, it is extremely difficult to reject a dying
declaration merely because there are few factual errors
committed. The Court has to weigh all the attendant
circumstances and come to the independent finding
whether the dying declaration:was properly recorded and C
whether it was voluntary and truthful. Once the Court is
convinced that the dying de,claration is so recorded, it
may be acted upon and can be made a basis of
conviction. The Courts must bear in mind that each
criminal trial is an individual aspect. It may differ from the D
other trials in some or the other respect and, therefore, a
mechanical approach to the law of dying declaration has
to be shunned. [Para 12] [34-E-G]

     2.5. The law is now well settled that a dying E ·
declaration which has been found to be voluntary and
truthful and which is free from any doubts can be the sole
basis for convicting the accused. In the present case the
dying declaration passes all the tests referred above.
[Para 13] [34-H; 35-A-B; 36-C]                             F

     Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra 2006)
13 SCC 165; Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474;
Munnu Raja v. State of M. P. (1976) 3 SCC 104; State of U. P.
v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552; Ramawati Devi v.
State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211; K. Ramachandra Reddy v. G
Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618; Rasheed Beg v. State
of MP. (1974) 4 SCC 264; Kake Singh v. State of M.P.[(1981)
supp. SCC 25; Ram Manorath v. State of UP. (1981) 2 SCC
654; State of Maharashtra vs. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu
(1980) Supp. SCC 455; Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar H
    26      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A   (1980) Supp SCC 769; Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P.[(1988)
    Supp. SCC 152; State of UP. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC
    390; Mohan/a/ Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra
    (1982) 1 SCC 700; Gangotri Singh v. State of UP. (1993)
    Supp (1) SCC 327; Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of
B   Maharashtra (1993) Supp (4) SCC 316; Meesala
    Ramakrishan v. State of A.P. (1994) 4 SCC 182 and State of
    Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217, relied on.

       3. As regards the contention that on the half burnt
  clothes of deceased, there were no traces of kerosene
C and, therefore, the whole story of burning her by pouring
  kerosene on her body has to be disbelieved, it is to be
  seen that the seizure of these clothes was proved by PW-
  8. He spoke about the seizure of an empty can, smelling
  of kerosene oil, a match box with 4 or 5 burn match sticks,
D a quilted bed (probably meaning 'mattress'), smelling of
  kerosene from it which was semi burnt and some sample
  of soil. According to him, they were packed in the parcels
  separately and sealed. On this backdrop, when the
  recovery memo is seen, it mentions one empty tin box,
E match box, two burnt match sticks, earth which was put
  in plastic Dibbi, clothing of the deceased of light blue
  colour, bed sheet (Bichhona) with marks of fresh burns.
  The witness, however, has not referred in his
  Examination-in-Chief to the cloth parcel (Exhibit 4) with
F some partially burnt pieces of clothes. The FSL report
  suggests that kerosene residues were detected in Exhibit
  5, which was a plastic bag containing a partially burnt
  coloured check cotton gadda. It clearly suggests that no
  kerosene residues could be detected on Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
G 4 or 6. From this, it was urged that particularly, the parcel
  Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were bound to carry kerosene residues if
  the prosecution story was truthful. However, it is to be
  seen that the mattress did have kerosene residues. While
  this incident has taken place on 15.12.1997, parcels
H seems to have been sent only on 29.12.1997 i.e. after about
         PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                   27


     14 days of the incident, which r~ached the FSL A
     Laboratory on 31.12.1997. The FSL report bears a date
 .· 5.6.1998. There is thus the possibility of the articles losing
   . the kerosene residues due to the long interval of time, yet
     it has to be noted that the mattress which undoubtedly a
     thick material, did have the kerosene residues. Ordinarily, B ·
' ·there was no reason for the mattress having the kerosene
     residues unless kerosene was poured on the same. It is
     again to be noted that even the plastic container,
     containing kerosene, was also found not having any
     kerosene traces. Therefore, this circumstance will not c
     help the accused as some kerosene traces have been
     found on the mattress where deceased was sleeping.
     Even if this circumstance is ignored, the fact of the matter
     is that the dying declaration has been found to be
                              1
     vo,luntarily truthful and unblemished. That would clinch D
     the issue against the accused. [Para 14) [36fD-H; 37-A-E]

        4. The appreciation by the Trial Court and the
  'Appellate Court on the overall circumstances and their
   finding of conviction is correct. [Para 15) [37-E-F] \
    '                                                            E
                       Case Law Reference:
        (2006) 13 sec 165           relied on       Para 13
        (1992) 2 sec 474            relied on       Para 13
        (1976) 3 sec 104            relied on       Para 13      F

        (1985) 1 sec 552            relied on       Para 13
        (1983) 1 sec 211            relied on       Para 13
        (1976) 3 sec 618            relied on       Para 13     G
        (1974) 4 sec 264            relied on       Para 13
        (1981) supp. sec 25         relied on       Para 13
        (1981) 2 sec 654            relied on       Para 13
                                                                 H
                                             ',\
    28      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A        (1980) Supp. sec 455         relied on        Para 13

         (1980) Supp sec 769          relied on        Para 13

         (1988) Supp. sec 152         relied on        Para 13

         (1989) 3 sec 390             relied on        Para 13
B
         (1982) 1 sec 100             relied on        Para 13

         (1993) Supp (1) sec 327      relied on        Para 13

         (1993) Supp (4) sec 316      relied on        Para 13
c
         (1994) 4 sec 102             relied on         Para 13

         (1996) 8 sec 211             relied on         Para 13

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
D   No. 1818 of 2009.

        From the Judgment and order dated 27.03.2008 of the
    High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
    Appeal No. 565 of 1999.

E        Sibo Sankar Mishra, for the Appellant.

         Rao Ranjit (for Kamal Mohan Gupta) for the Respondent.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

F        V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. The judgment of the High Court
    confirming the conviction and sentence for the offences under
    Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code is in
    challenge in this appeal. Originally, there were three accused
    persons, namely, Gurdial (accused No.1 ), Pu ran Chand
G   (accused No.2), the present appellant and Raja Devi (accused
    No.3). However, accused No.3, Raja Devi was acquitted by the
    High Court and ace.used No.1, Gurdial has not chosen to file
    an appeal. It is only Puran Chand (accused No.2) who is in
    appeal before us.
H
       PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF H-ARYANA                     29
              [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
      2. Gurdial got married to one Santosh on 08.12.1997. A
According to the prosecution, she was harassed for dowry just
after one week of the marriage and was set to fire on the fateful
day i.e. on 15.12.1997 by as many as three accused persons,
they being, Gurdial, her husband, Puran Chand, her elder
brother-in-law and Rajo Devi, the paternal aunt of accused No.1, B
Gurdial. The incident took place at about 4 a.m. in the morning.
According to the prosecution, accused No.1 and accused No.2
sprinkled Kerosene Oil and in this conspiracy even Rajo Devi
(accused No.3) was a party. All this was done on account of
the less dowry received in the marriage which had taken place      c
hardly a week earlier to the incident. Santosh was taken to the
General Hospital, Sector-13, Chandigarh by Pawan Kumar,
 PW-4 and ultimately she breathed her last in the evening on
the same day. It was found that she had suffered 90 per cent
 of burns but before that her dying declaration was got recorded
                                                                  0
 by PW-13, Shri A.K. Bishnoi. According to the prosecution,
 before recording this dying declaration, an opinion was taken
 about her fitness by Dr. Siri Niwas, p_W-14. The said dying
 declaration is Ex.P.F/3 and the medical certificate is Ex.P.F/
 5. Fourteen witnesses were examined at the trial including her
 relations, investigating team, Magistrate .and the Doctor. The E
 Trial Court convicted all the three accused persons. However,
 the High Court acquitted Rajo Devi, giving her the benefit of
 doubt and that is how accused No.2, Puran Chand has come
 up before us challenging his conviction.
                                                                   F
     3. The defence was that of denial and it was stated to be
an accident. It was also stated by the present appellant that he
was staying separate from his brother Gurdial and had
unnecessarily been implicated. Three defence witnesses were
also examined.                                                     G

    4. The defence did not prevail and that is how accused
No.2 is before us.

    5. The main thrust of the argument of the Learned Counsel
was against the dying declaration. It was claimed that the dying   H
    30       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A   declaration was tutored one. Learned Counsel earnestly argued
    that there were some intrinsic defects in the dying declaration
    which militated against its credibility. It was pointed out that,
    firstly, the name of Puran Chand, the present appellant was not
    to be found in the dying declaration and there was a mere
B   referehce to the Jeth (elder brother of the husband). It was
    suggested by the Learned Counsel that there was one more
    brother of accused No: 1, Gurdial and it was not certain. as to
    whether the deceased referred to accused No.2, Puran Chand.
    It was then pointed out that Santosh, the deceased had suffered
c   90 per cent of bums and, therefore, it was not possible that she
    would be in her senses while making the dying declaration.
    Lastly, it was pointed out that there was no Kerosene Oil
    residues to1,1nd on the clothes which were seized. It was also
    suggested further that the evidence of Mohan Lal (PW-5),
    Chand Kiran (PW-10) and Mam Chand (PW-8), who claimed
0
    that an oral dying declaration was made to them, was also not
    reliable in view of the evidence of PW-4, Pawan Kumar who
    had stated that no such oral dying declaration was made by
    Santosh.

E        6. We will first examine the claim regarding the oral dying
    declaration. It has come in the evidence that after Santosh got
    burnt, she was reached to the Yamuna Nagar Hospital. The
    information of the burning was given by PW-4, Pawan Kumar
    to PW-5, Mohan Lal in the morning itself on which both went to
F   the Hospital. According to Mohan Lal (PW-5), he was told orally
    by Santosh that she was burnt by the two accused persons
    while accused No.3, Rajo Devi held her hands. The Trial Court
    has disbelieved this part of the evidence of Mohan Lal (PW-5)
    about the participation of accused No.3, Rajo Devi. However,
G   the rest of the testimony about the participation of accused
    No.1, Gurdial and accused No.2, Puran Chand has been
    believed by the Trial Court. It is to be noted that at the time she
    made oral dying declaration, she did not merely refer to Puran
    Chand as Jeth but had specifically taken his name.
H
         PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                       31
                [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
       7. We have closely examined the evidence of PW-5, A
  Mohan Lal. The evidence of Mohan Lal (PW-5) has been
  corroborated by Mam Chand (PW-8) who is another witness
  who was present at the time of seizure of material objects at
  the spot, which, according to him, were smelling of kerosene.
  This witness has not stated anything about any dying B
  dedaration in his examination-in-chief but, strangely enough, it
  was brought in his cross-examination by the defence that he
  reached the Post Graduate Institute at about 3 p.m. He also
  referred to a dialogue between Chand Kiran and Santosh
  wherein Santosh told her father that she was burnt by her' c
  brother-in-law and her husband. This witness has referred to
  the active advice having been given by her Phupha Saas,
  meaning sister of her father-in-law. He also asserted that
  Gurdial and Puran Chand were not present at the Post
  Graduate Institute at that time. It is extremely strange that such D
, material things should have been brought on record in cross-
  examination.

       8. The last witness in this line is Chand Kiran (PW-10), the
  father of Santosh who had spoken about the oral dying
  declaration made to him by Santosh involving all the three E
  accused persons. He had also referred to the evidence of Mam
  Chand, who was the brother-in-law and had claimed that his
  daughter told him that she was burnt by her husband Gurdial
  and her Jeth, Puran Chand at the instance of Rajo Devi.
  Nothing has been brought in the cross-examination of this F
  witness. The evidence of these three witnesses is
  complimentary to each other and, thus, is more acceptable in
  comparison to the evidence of Pawan Kumar (PW-4).
  Ordinarily, though the oral dying declaration is an extremely
  weak type of evidence, it would not be unnatural for a burnt G
  woman, to confide in her near relations like her cousin, Mohan
  Lal (PW-5), father Chand Kiran (PW-1) and Mam Chand (PW~
  8) who is also a near relation. Santosh would rather be keen
  to express herself regarding the cause of her death. Had the
  prosecution relied only on the oral dying declaration, things H
    32      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010} 7 S.C.R.


A   could have been different. However, there is a dying
    declaration, Ex. P .F/3, which is recorded by a Judicial
    Magistrate. First class and that will have to be critically
    examined in this case.

           9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defence,
B
    firstly, pointed out that the written dying declaration did not
    mention accused No.2 by his name. Even accused No.3, Raja
    Devi was referred as 'Bua'. It was also pleaded that there was
    another brother named Chandiram and. therefore, the benefit
    of doubt. on account of this, must go to accused No.2, Puran
C   Chand. The evidence of Dr. Satbir Singh (PW-9), who was the
    post-mortem doctor and who examined Santosh, has referred
    to superficial to deep burns on various parts of her body. He
    has also asserted that the superficial to deep burns were about
    90 per cent and they were sufficient to cause her death in the
D   ordinary course of nature. However, Dr. Siri Niwas (PW-14),
    was the most material witness who examined Santosh and had
    given a certificate that Santosh was in a fit mental state to give
    the statement. He had also endorsed at the end of the dying
    declaration that she was conscious and was in the fit state of
E   mind while giving her statement. He has been cross-examined
    in details without any breakthrough. Therefore, it cannot be said
    that Santosh was not in a fit state of mind while making her
    statement.

F         10. What impresses us most about the dying declaration
    is that. firstly, it has been recorded by an independent witness
    like Shri A.K. Bishnoi who was working as a Judicial
    Magistrate, First Class, and secondly, before it commenced,
    the Magistrate had satisfied himself about the ability of Santosh
G   to make a dying declaration. There is an endorsement
    obtained of Dr. Siri Niwas. The said dying declaration is in the
    question & answer form and we do not see any suggestive
    questions having been put excepting question No.4 which is
    to the effect "is anyone else responsible for this incident?".
    However. it must be said that this question was more with an
H
        PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                        33
               [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

  idea to seek more information which could have been A
  legitimately put. This is apart from the fact that the Courts below
  ultimately gave the benefit of doubt to accused No.3, Rajo Devi.
 What impresses us is that in the dying declaration, Santosh
  specifically exonerated her mother-in-law and the father-in-law
  by saying that tney treated her well. A feeble argument was B
  raised that the accused was a Tailor, yet, his occupation was
  stated to be a Teacher by Santosh. There is a simple
  explanation that usually a tailor is called Tailor Master. It may
  be that the same expression might have been used by Santosh.
  Even elsewhere in the record of this case such expression          c
  seems to have been used. The confusion might have been
  created because of the use of the word "master". Even at the
  end of the dying declaration, a further endorsement was made
  by Dr. Siri Niwas certifying that, firstly, the witness was
  conscious all through the time when her statement was being . D
  recorded and, secondly, that no relatives of her were present
   at that time, wh\ch was also countersigned by the Magistrate
 .who recorded the statement. At the instance of the defence
   counsel, we have ourselves seen the original dying declaration
   as also ttie First Information Report based on the same. In our
   opinion, the dying declaration was not only voluntary but truthful E
   also and, hence, it could be relied upon as was done by the
. Trial Court and the Appellate Court.

       11. The Courts below have to be extremely careful when
 they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not      F
 available for the cross-examination which poses a great
 difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in
 relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is
 extremely dangerous. The Court has to examine a dying
 declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out         G
 whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a
 conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the
 relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be
 interested in the success of investigation or which may be
 negligent while recording the dying declaration. Number of          H
    34      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 7 S.C.R.

A times. a young girl or a wift:: who rnak~s the dying declaration
  could be unde1 the impression that she would lead a peaceful,
  congenial, happy and blissful married life only with her husband
  and, therefore, has tendency to implicate the inconvenient
  parents-in-law or other relatives. Number of times the relatives
B influence the investigating agency and bring about a dying
  declaration. The dying declarations recorded by the
  investigating agencies have to be very scrupulously examined
  and the Court must remain alive to all the attendant
  c!rcumstances at the time when the dying declaration comes
c into being. When there are more than one dying declarations,
  the intrinsic contradictions in those dymg declarations are
  extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which
  supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other
  innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. Such trend
  will be extremely dangerous. However, the Courts below are fully
0
  entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the
  basis of conviction. where the dying declarations pass all the
  above tests.

         12. Again, it is extremely difficult to reject a dying
E declaration merely because there are few factual errors
  committed. The Court has to weigh all the attendant
  circumstances and come to the independent finding whether the
  dying declaration was properly recorded and whether it was
  voluntary and truthful. Once the Court is convinced that the dying
F declaration is so recorded. it may be acted upon and can be
  made a basis of conviction. The Courts r;iust bear in mind that
  each criminal trial is an individual aspect. It may differ from the
  other trials in some or the other respect and, therefore, a
  mechanical approach to the law of dying declaration has to be
G shunned. We have tested the dying declaration with all these
  factors in mind and we are satisfied that even the Trial Court
  and the Appellate Court have fully satisfied themselves in
  respect of the acceptability of this dying declaration.

      13. The law is now well settled that a dying declaration
H which has been found to be voluntary and truthful and which is
       PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                         35
              [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
free from any doubts can be the sole basis for convicting the A
accused. This Court in Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of
Maharashtra [(2006) 13 SCC 165] has taken stock of the
following cases where the principles governing dying
declaration have been laid down:
                                                                      B
     (i)      Paniben v. State of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC 474;

     (ii)     Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104;

      (iii)   State of UP v. Ram Sagar Yadav [1985] 1 SCC
              552;                                                    c
      (iv)    Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar[(1983) 1 SCC 211

      (v)     K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor
              [(1976) 3 sec 6181
                                                                      D
      (vi)    Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264;

      (vii)   Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [(1981) supp. SCC 25;

      (viii) Ram Manorath v. State of UP. [(1981) 2 SCC 654;
                                                                      E
      (ix)    State of Maharashtra vs. Krishnamurti Laxmipati
              Naidu [(1980) Supp. SCC 455;

      (x)     Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar [(1980) Supp SCC
              769]
                                                                      F
      (xi)    Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [(1988) Supp. SCC
              152

      (xii)   State of UP. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390;

      (xiii) Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani              v.   State of G
             Maharashtra ((1982) 1 SCC 700]

     In para 12 of the abovesaid judgment, this Court has held
that dying declaration is the only piece of untested evidence and
must like any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated   H
    36      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A   therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act
    upon it. This Court has further reiterated that if after careful ·
    scrutiny the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any
    effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and
    if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal
8   impediment to make it a basis of conviction, even if there is
    no corroboration. In that behalf, this Court has referred the
    reported cases of Gangotri Singh v. State of UP. ((1993)
    Supp (1) SCC 327]; Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of
    Maharashtra [(1993) Supp (4) SCC 316]; Meesa/a
C   Ramakrisfyan v. State of A.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 182]; and State
    of Rajasthan v. Kishore ((1996) 8 SCC 217]. We are in
    respectful agreement with th3 law laid down and would hasten
    to add that in the present case the dying declaration of Santosh
    pa~ses all the tests referred to by us above.

D       14. Lastly, a point was raised by the learned defence
  counsel that on the half burnt clothes of Santosh, there were
  no traces of kerosene and, therefore, the whole story of burning
  her by pouring kerosene on her body has to be disbelieved. It
  is to be seen that the seizure of these clothes was proved by
E Mam Chand (PW-8). He spoke about the seizure of an empty
  can, smelling of kerosene oil, a match box with 4 or 5 burnt
  match sticks, a quilted bed (probably meaning 'mattress'),
  smelling of kerosene from it which was semi burnt and some
  sample of soil. According to him, they were packed in the
F parcels separately and sealed. On this backdrop, when the
  recovery memo is seen, it mentions one empty tin box, match
  box, two burnt match sticks, earth which was put in plastic Dibbi,
  clothing of the deceased Santosh of light blue colour, bed sheet
  (Bichhona) with marks of fresh burns. The witness, however,
G has not referred in his Examination-in-Chief to the cloth parcel
  (Exhibit 4) with some P,artially burnt pieces of clothes. The FSL
  report suggests that kerosene residues were detected in
  Exhibit 5, which was a plastic bag containing a partially burnt
  coloured check cotton gadda, It clearly suggests that no
H kerosene residues could be detected on Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 or
         PURAN CHAND v. STATE OF HARYANA                    37
                [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

6. From this, the learned counsel urged that particularly, the A
parcel Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were bound to carry kerosene residues
if the prosecution story was truthful. However, it is to be seen
that the mattress did have kerosene residues ..While this
incident has taken place on 15.12.1997, parcels seems to have
been sent only on 29.12.1997 i.e. after about 14 days of the B
incident, which reached the FSL Laboratory on 31.12.1997.
The FSL report bears a date 5.6.1998. There is thus the
possibility of the articles losing the kerosene residues due to
the long interval of time, yet it has to be noted that the mattress
which undoubtedly a thick material, did have the kerosene C
residues. Ordinarily, there was no reason for the mattress
having the kerosene residues unless kerosene was poured on
the same. It is again to be noted that even the plastic container,
 containing kerosene, was also found not having any kerosene
traces. Therefore, this circumstance will not help the accused    o
 as some kerosene traces have been found on the mattress
where Santosh was sleeping. Even if we ignore this
 circumstance, the fact of the matter is that the dying declaration
 has been found 8\i  us to be voluntarily truthful and unblemished.
 That would clinch the issue against the accused.
                                                                  E
     15. The appreciation by the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court on the overall circumstances and their finding of
conviction is correct. The appeal has no merits and it deserves
to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.
                                                                  F
B.B.B.                                     Appeal dismissed.