Holding

Section 21 confers a right to recover possession that survives the landlord’s death; therefore, the landlord’s legal representatives may file and pursue the application.

Summary

The tenant was granted a three‑year tenancy under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, with the Controller's permission. The landlord died before the tenancy expired, and his legal representatives later applied to the Controller for recovery of possession after the tenant failed to vacate. The tenant contended that only the landlord who obtained the permission could invoke Section 21, and that the right could not be exercised by the landlord's heirs or representatives. The Supreme Court held that Section 21 is a self‑contained provision and that the term "landlord" under Section 2(e) means the person entitled to receive rent at the relevant time, irrespective of death. Consequently, the right to seek vacant possession survives the landlord’s death and may be pursued by his legal representatives. The petition for special leave was dismissed, and the tenant was ordered to pay costs.

Issues considered

Whether the legal representatives of a deceased landlord can initiate and continue proceedings for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 21, s. 2(e)

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control ActSection 21Recovery of possessionLandlord deathLegal representativesEvictionConstruction of statutory terms

Judgment

PUKHRAJ JAIN A
V,
MRS, PADMA KASHYAP AND ANR.

MARCH 20, 1990
B
[K, JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND R.M, SAHA!, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 21-Recovery of posses-
sion by landlord from tenant-Whether legal representatives of landlord
can initiate and continue proceedings for recovery.
I
~

- c
The petitioner-tenant was let out the demised premises by the
landlord for a period of three years, with permission of Controller
under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the landlord died before
the expiry of period 9f tenancy. After the expiry of the period, his legal
representatives made an application for recovery of possession. This
application was resisted by the tenant on the ground that proceedings
D
for recovery of possession under section 21 could not be initiated and
continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained
permission.

Having failed before the High Court, the petitioner has filed peti-
tion for special leave. Hwas contended on his behalf that 'landlord' in
second part of section 21, entitling him to claim vacant possession, E
should be confined to the person who had obtained permission on the
~' premise that he "does not require the whole or any part of the premises
for a particular period."

Dismissing tile special leave petition, this Court,
F
HELD: (1) Section 21 is a self contained code. The purpose and
objective of its enactment as provision of short duration tenancy or
periodical tenancy in Rent Control Act of Delhi is unique amongst such
legislations. What was unique of it was not short duration tenancy but a
fresh look on evtction. [27G; 28G I
G
Shiv Chand Kapoor v. Amar Bose, [1990) 1 SCC 234, referred to.

(2) Since section 21 is an exception to section 14 and it mandates
restoration of possession, "notwithstanding any other law" it has to be
construed strictly and against any attempt to frustrate it. [28G]
H

25
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

(3) Recovery of possession under section 21 is not hedged, hy any
A
inquiry or opportunity, if permission is not challenged on any of the
exceptions which have been carved out by courts, obviously to uphold
fairness and honesty the core of our jurisprudence. Right to get vacant
possession is thus absolute. [29D]

B S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCC 52; V.S.
Rahe v. Smt. Rem Chamben, [1984] 1 SCC 612; Shiv Chand Kapoor v.
Amar Bose, [1990] 1SCC234, referred to.

(4) The expression "for the time being" in section 2(e) makes it
clear that landlord has to be understood in presenti. That is anyone
entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise, past or
C future landlord. Therefore, the word "landlord" on plain reading of
Section 21 does not warrant construction of the word in any other
manner. [29G]

(5) Constructionally, Section 21 is in two parts: one creation of
D short term tenancy and other its execution after expiry of time. Both
stand on their own and operate independently. Non-requirement of
premises for time being furnishes basis for entering into agreement for
periodical tenancy. Trnth of it or its genuineness are relevant con-
siderations for granting permission. And the permission granted
continues unabated, unaffected irrespective ef variation in .require-
E ment. [30D-E] - .r
(6) Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of
it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then whosoever is the landlord
at the time of affiux of tenancy may approach Controller for putt- ---.
ing him in vacant possession. Death of landlord does not either shorten
F or enlarge period nor the consequences envisaged are altered or
affected. l30F]

(7) The doctrine of actio personalies moritur cum personna does
not apply to Rent Control Acts. Its applicability was generally confined
to actions for damages for defamation, seduction, inducing a spouse to
G remain apart from the other and adultery. [3 lD-C I .

Supreme Bank v. P.A. Tindulcar, AIR 1973 SC 1104; Shanti Lal
Thakur Das & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Magan Lal Lala, [1977] I S.C.R. 313: ---<
Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 769, referred to.

H (8) An action for eviction abates only if the cause of action does
PUKHRAJ v. MRS. PADMA [SAHAJ, J.] 27

not snrvive. The canse of action for granting permission was the non- A
reqnirement by the landlord of the premises for the time mentioned in
the agreement whereas cause of action for eviction is non-vacation by
the tenant after the expiry of period. Therefore, it is immaterial who is
the landlord at the time when the action for vacation arose. [31F-G]
B
(9) Permission in the instant case was granted on statement of
parties in regard to their necessity or non-requirement of the premises.
Snch necessity to let out or non-requirement by the landlord could not
) be brought into those exceptions which invalidated permission. There-
}- fore, death of the landlord was immaterial as even the reason for letting
out did not die with death of landlord. [32A-B]
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 7914of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.5 .1989 of Delhi High
Court in S.A.O. No. 296 of 1984.
D
V.M. Tarkunde and S.K. Gupta for the petitioner.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Ramji Srinivasan, P.K. Jain and Ravinder Nath
for the respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.M. SAHAI, J. Tenant inducted in 1979, for three years, by the
landlord under a written agreement, in C-4/33, Safdarjang Develop-
-- ment Area, New Delhi, with permission of Controller under Section
21 of Delhi Rent Control Act (for brevity the 'Act') seeks leave of this
F
Court on limited question of law if proceedings for recovery of posses·
sion under Section 21 of the Act could be initiated and continued by
_.;.- .. legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained permission but
who died before expiry of period of tenancy.

Answer of it shall depend, primarily, on construction of word
G
'landlord' used in Section 21, a provision held to be self contained code
in Shiv Chand Kapoor v. Amar Bose, [1990] l SCC 234 and also the
purpose and objective of its enactment as provision of short duration
tenancy or periodical tenancy in Rent Control Act of Delhi right from
1952, is unique amongst such legislations and is probably non existent
in any other State. It reads as under: H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

21. "Recovery of possession in case of tenancies for limited
A period:

( 1) Where a landlord does not reqnire the whole or any
part of any premises for a particular period, and the land-
lord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the
B prescribed manner, lets the whole of the premises or part
thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to
in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the
tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate
such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in
Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, or an
application made to him in this behalf by the landlord
c within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord
in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by
evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in
occupation of such premises.

D (2) while making an order under sub-section (1), the Con-
troller may award to the landlord such damages for the use
or occupation of the premises at such rates as he considers
proper in the circumstances of the case for the period from
the date of such order till the date of actual vacation by the
tenant."
E
What it, undoubtedly, projects, is the legislative awareness of
acute crisis of houses in the State. To resolve the paucity of accommo-
dation, on one hand, due to enormous influx of office personnel and
business class as a result of rapid growth of social, economic and
political activity and apprehension of houseowners, on other;·bulk of
F whom hail from middle class or service class, of loosing their houses if
not for good then for substantial period due to development of strange
phenomenon in big cities that allotted or rented houses are more
economical than, even, own the legislature which is the best-judge of
need of its people carved out an exception to usual rent control provi-
sions of protecting tenants from eviction. What was unique of it was
G not short duration tenancy but a fresh look on eviction. Vacantposses-
sion was ensured, statutorily, without any notice, or termination of
tenancy or the hazard of establishing bona fide need and comparative
hardship etc. Since sec. 21 is an exception to Section 14 and it
mandates restoration of possession, "notwithstanding any other law"
it has to be construed strictly and against any attempt to frustrate it.
H Intensity of it can be appreciated better if its language, is compared
PUKHRAJ v. MRS. PADMA [SAHA!, J.] 29

with other provisions of recovery of possession even though those
provisions, namely, secs. 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D, were introduced A
later. They also provide speedy remedy to recover possession. But the
landlord cannot succeed unless he is able to prove circumstances
mentioned in it. More than this the tenant has been given right to
contest under Section 25B. Import of Section 21 on the other hand is
altogether different. It enjoins Controller to place landlord in vacant B
possession after expiry of time without any right to tenant to contest it
except to the limited extent that permission was vitiated by fraud as
) held in S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCC 52 or
~ misuse of the provision by landlord taking advantage of helpless situa-
tion of the tenant as held in V.S. Rahe v. Smt. Rem Chambeh, [1984] 1
sec 612; or the permission really did not create genuine tenancy as
held in Shiv Chand Kapoor v. Amar Bose, supra. Recovery of posses- c
sion under Section 21 is not hedged, by any inquiry or opportunity, if
permission is not challenged on any of those exceptions which have
been carved out by courts, obviously, to uphold fairness and honesty
the core of our jurisprudence. Right to get vacant possession is, thus
absolute. D
Purpose and objective of the Section having been ascertained, it
may now be examined if the word "landlord" used in the second part
of the Section which empowers landlord to make an application for
recovery of possession is to be understood as the same landlord who
made the application or his legal representatives as well. In other E
words, is there any justification for construing the word "landlord" in
a narrow sense so as to restrict it, only, to the person who made the
application and obtained permissiort. "Landlord" has been defined in
Section 2( e) as under:

"2(e). 'landlord' means a person who, for the time being is F
receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises,
whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf
of, or for the benefit of, any other person or who would so
receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the
premises were let to a tenant."
G
Expression, "for the time being" makes it clear, that landlord has to
be understood in praesentii. That is anyone entitled to receive rent is
the landlord. It does not visualise, past or future landlord. Therefore,
the word "landlord", on plain reading of Section 21 does not warrant
construction of the word in any other manner. Basis for submission,
however, that landlord in second part of Section 21 entitling him to H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A claim vacant possession should be confined to the person who obtained
permission was founded on use of expression, "who does not require
the whole or any part of the premises for a particular period." Attempt
was made to personalise eviction proceedings by linking it with the
person, due to y,hose non-requirement the permission was granted
resulting in automatic exclusion of legal representatives. To put it
B interpretationally the word "landlord", in second part was urged to be
understood in a manner different than it is defined in Section 2(e). Can
it be said that context or setting of Section 21 is such that the word
"landlord" in second part of it should be understood in a different
sense than that in definition clause? Not on prima facie reading of it
which has already been adverted to. Neither on close analysis. What is
visualised is occasion for short duration tenancy due to non-require-
C men! of whole or part of premises by landlord for time being; method
of its creation by written agreement entered with tenant, statutory
status to it by permission obtained from Controller and execution by
restoration of vacant possession if the tenant does not vacate after
expiry of period. All condensed in one. Constructionally it is in two
D parts one creation of short term tenancy and other its execution after
expiry of time. Both stand on their own and operate independently.
Non-requirement of premises for time being furnishes basis for enter-
ing into agreement for periodical tenancy. Truth ofit ori its genuin_t!_ness
are relevant considerations for granting permission. But it exhausts
thereafter except to the limited extent pointed out in decisions refer-
E red earlier. And the permission granted continues unabated, unaffec- /
)..

ted irrespective of variation in .requirement. Necessity of landlord,
again, does not entitle him to seek its revocation. Even his death
cannot shorten the period. Similarly once period expires the agree-
ment, the permission all cease to operate by operation of law. Nothing
further is required. Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time.
F Expiry of it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then the landlord
may approach Controller for putting him in vacant possession. Which
landlord? Obviously whosoever is the landlord at the time of afflux of
tenancy. Death of landlord does not either shorten or enlarge period
nor the consequences envisaged are altered or affected.

G Use of expression notwithstanding any other law render it ob-
ligatory on tenant to vacate without questioning authority of landlord.
Any other construction, may, as rightly observed by the High Court
lead to disastrous consequences. Even on principles of civil law the
provision for recovery of possession being in nature of execution it
could not be successfully resisted on the death of landlord due to
H whose non-requirement the permission was granted. Such narrow and
PUKHRAJ v. MRS. PADMA [SAHA!, J.] 31

unrealistic construction of the word 'landlord' shall frustrate entire
purpose of Section 21. A
~··
Maxim of actio personalies mortiur cum personna cannot apply,
either, on principle or on facts. In Supreme Bank v. P.A. Tendulkar,
AIR 1973 SC 1104 this Court while discussing applicability of the
maxim held "whatever view one may take of the justice of the princi- 13
ple it was clear that it would not be applicable to actions based on
contract or where tort feasers' Estate had benefitted from a wrong
done. Its applicability was generally confined to actions.for damages for
defamation, seduction inducing a spouse to remain apart from the
other and adultery." In Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai, [1973] 3 SCR 769; a
decision which was relied by petitioner in support of submission that
an application filed for eviction of a tenant on bona fide need lapses on c
the death of landlord and it could not be continued by his legal rep-
resentatives overruled in Shanti Lal Thakur Das and Ors. v. Chaman
_., __
_ ,
Lal Magan/a/ Te/wa/a, [ 1977] 1 SCR 313 it was observed that doctrine
of actio- persona/is moritur cum personna, did not apply to Rent
Control Acts. D

Even otherwise an action for eviction abates only if the cause of
action does not survive. What is the cause of action for an application
for vacant possession in Section 21 death of landlord or expiry of time
for which tenancy was created. Obviously the latter, the failure•of
tenant to honour his commitment to vacate the premises after expiry of E
time for which he was inducted with permission of Controller. The
death of the person who obtained the permission has nothing to do
with it. Permission was obtained because the landlord did not require
the premises on the date when it was let out to tenant. That does not
continue on the date when the tenant does not vacate the premises.
The necessity of not requiring the premises, for some time, or for the F
duration the tenant was inducted was confined to the date when the
permission was granted. It could not be taken further to the time when
the question of vacation arose. The cause of action for granting
p-ermission was the non-requirement by the landlord of the premises for
the time ment10ned in the agreement whereas cause of action for evic-
tion is non-vacation by the tenant after the expiry of period. There- G
fore, it ·is immaterial who is the landlord at the time when the action
for vacation arose. ·

Even on facts permission was applied for by the landlord as,
premises was surplus to his need for a limited period of 3 years due to the
reason that his son had gone abroad and he was expected to return H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A after three years. Permission was granted for this reason on statement
of parties. Such necessity to let out or non-requirement by the landlord
could not be brought into those exceptions which invalidate permis-
sion. Therefore death of the landlord was immaterial as even the
reason for letting out did not die with death of landlord.
B In the result this petition for special leave fails and is dismissed.
In the circumstances of the case the tenant is directed to suffer costs
which we quantify at Rs.5,000.

R.S.S.

Petition dismissed. ~-..

,.__ .....__ -