PREMPALversusSTATF. OF HARYANA

                                   ,-
                    [2014] 7 S.C.R. 615


                         PREMPAL·                              A
                             v.
                   STATF. OF HARYANA
            (Criminal Appeal No. 2030 of 2012)
                   SEPTEMBER 3, 2014
                                                                B
        [T. S. THAKUR AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 - Murder - Allegation that the
apoel/ant grappled his sister-in-law (victim2deceased) and
poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze - Victim-deceased C
taken to hospital where Tehsildar recorded her dying
declaration - Conviction based on dying declaration - Held:
The dying declaration was recorded by Tehsildar after
obtaining the certificate from the doctor regarding the fitness
of the deceased to give statement - In the evidence also, o
doctor stated that the deceased was conscious and in a fit
condition to give statement - There was nothing to show that
the deceased was tutored by her relatives to falsely implicate
the appellant - Doctor and Tehsi/dar categorically denied the
suggestion that deceased was tutored by relatives - Deceased E
and her husband were living separately and there was no
reason for her to falsely implicate her brother-in-law ~ PW7,
uncle of deceased stated that when he reached hospital, the
deceased informed him that appellant was the culprit - 'There
was no material inconsistency between the evidence o{ PW7 F
and the dying declaration - Courts below found the ;dying
declaration reliable and inspiring confidence - No rea$on to
interfere with the order of conviction - Dying declaratiqn.

     Criminal jurisprudence: Death by burning - Held: In burn
injury cases, two possible hypothesis arise in the judicial mind G
- was it suicide or was it homicide - In cases where tlile dying
declaration projected by the prosecution gets credence, the
alternative hypothesis of suicide has to be jt,Jstifiab/y
eliminated.                                           ·
                              615                                H
    616     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A        Evidence: Dying declaration - Reliability of - Held: When
    reliance is placed upon dying declaration, the court must be
    satisfied that the dying declaration is true, voluntary and not
    as a result of eithe'r tutoring or prompting or a product of
    imagination - The Court must be further satisfied that the
B   deceased was in a fit state of mind - If a dying declaration is
    found to be reliable, then there is no need for corroboration
    by any witness and cqnviction can be sustained on that basis
    alone - In the instant case evidence of Tehsildar, the Doctor
    and other witnesses was cogent and consistent that the
c   deceased was coni~cious and in a fit state of mind to give
    dying declaration Find courts rightly based the conviction
    upon the same - When the courts below appreciated the entire
    evidence in its right perspective, interference with conviction
    order not called for.
D      The prosecution case was that on the fateful day, at
  3 p.m., the appellant who was the brother-in-law of the
  victim-deceased grappled the deceased and with the help
  of his father pushed her aside and poured kerosene on
  her and set her ablaze. The father of the appellant
E brought the deceased-daughter-in-law to the hospital
  ~ith 95% burn injuries on her body at 4 p.m. The
  Magistrate after seeking opinion of the medical officer
  regarding the fitness of the deceased to make statement,
  recorded her statement in which she held her brother-in-
F law responsible for the incident. The deceased died at
  11.45 P.M. same day. The trial Court convicted the
  appellant under SE!Ctions 302 and 354 IPC. The father-in-
  law of the deceasied was, however, acquitted. The High
  court confirmed the conviction of the appellant under
G Section 302, IPC :and acquitted him under Section 354
  IPC.
       In the instant appeal, it was contended for the
    appellant that the deceased sustained 95% burns all over
H
         PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                  617


the body and there were deep burn injuries in fingers of. A
the hand and feet of the deceased and she died shortly
after recording of her dying declaration and it might not
have been possible for her to make a statement and trial
court and the High Court erred in relying upon her dying
declaration; that though PW-4, Tehsildar got the B
certificate regarding fitness of the deceased to make the
statement, yet no specific certificate was obtained by him
that the deceased remained conscious throughout while
recording her statement; that there were two conflicting
statements by the deceased and in one statement before c
PW-4, Tehsildar, the deceased named only the appellant
whereas in the other statement before PW-7, she not only
named two accused persons but also categorically
defined the roles individually to the respective accused
persons and this contradiction raised serious doubts 0
about the incident and the veracity of the statement by
the deceased and this aspect was not properly
appreciated by the trial court and the High Court; and that
the courts below did not properly appreciate the defence
version put forth by the accused that the deceased
committed suicide.
                                                            E

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1. On receipt of intimation at 8.20 P.M., PW-8,
 the police official-AS! sought the opinion of the Medical   F
 Officer whether the deceased was fit to make the
 statement or not and PW-3, Doctor opined that the
 deceased was fit to make the statement. On receipt of the
 request from PW-8, ASI, PW-41 Tehsildar reached the
 hospital at 9.15 P.M. and PW-4, Tehsildar again obtained    G
 the opinion of PW-3, the Doctor and PW-3, opined that the
 deceased was fit to make the statement and only
 thereattYi PW-4, Tehsildar recorded her statement which
'is Ext. P11. In his evidence, PW-3 stated that the
                                           a
 deceased remained conscious and was in fit condition
                                                             H
    618    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R. i


A when PW-4, Tehsildar recorded the statement, he (PW-3)
  remained throughout and he also endorsed Ext. P11
  statement. In his cross-examination, PW-3 stated that the
  deceased sustained 95% burns and chances cannot be
  ruled out that a person can be unconscious having 95%
B burns. Much reliance was placed upon these answers
  elicited from the d<>ctor - PW-3 to assail the reliability of
  Ext. P11 dying declaration. The answers elicited from PW-
  3 C:uring the cross-examination was only an opinior.. PW-
  3 issued Exts. P12 and P13 certificates certifying that the
c deceased was in a lfit condition to give statement. Opinion
  evidence elicited during the cross-examination of PW-3,
  Doctor cannot prevail upon his assertion in Exts. P12 and
  P13 as to the fit mEmtal condition of the deceased to give
  statement. After sustaining injuries, victim was alive till
0
  midnight and that the deceased died at 11.45 P.M. on
  24.10.2001. [Paras 7 and 8] [624-A-F]

         2. The deceaSE!d sustained burn injuries at 3.00 P.M.
 · and she was admiitted in the hospital at 4.00 P.M. Her
   statement was reciorded by PW-4, Tehsildar at 9.15 P.M.
E to 9.25 P.M. During the cross-examination of PW-3, it was
   elicited from him that about eight to ten persons who were
   relatives of the deceased came to the hospital. On behalf
   of the appellant, it was contended that in the long gap of
   time, between admission of the deceased in the hospital
F and recording of her statement by PW-4, Tehsildar,
   number of relativ1es of the deceased assembled and,
   therefore, there w;:1s every possibility that the deceased
   must have been tutored to falsely implicate the appellant.
   There was no substance in the submission that the
G deceased was surrounded by her family members and
   that she was tutored to falsely implicate the appellant. May
   be after the deceas1ed was admitted in the hospital, there
   were some family members to attend to her; but there
   was no material suggesting that they were talking to the
H
          PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                     619

deceased or that the deceased was tutored. PW-3, Doctor          A
and PW-4, Tehsildar have categorically denied the
suggestion that the deceased was tutored by her father
or her relatives. Deceased and her husband were living
separately. While so, the deceased had no reason to
falsely implicate her brother-in-law. [Para 10] [624-G-H;        B
625-A-C]

     3. When reliance is .• laced upon dying declaration,
the court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is
true, voluntary and not as a result of either tutoring or
prompting ,or a product of imagination. The Court must C
be further satisfied that the dece~sed was in a fit state of
mind. [Para 11] [625-D-E]

      4. The deceased had suffered 95% burr injuries; yet
 her statement before PW-4, Tehsildar was clear and              o
 cogent. The trial court and the High Court examined the
 reliability of the dying declaration and recorded
 concurrent findings of fact that Ext. P11 dying
 declaration was reliable and inspired confidence of the
 co~. There was no perversity in such findings. PW-7 was         E
 the ncle of deceased. In his evidence PW-7 stated that
 wh n they reached the hospital, the deceased told him
 an~ her father that her brother-in-law had scuffled with
 her and pushed her down and in the meanwhile, her
 fat er-in-law came and asked the appellant to bring             F
 ker.osene and set her on fire and the appellant brought
    I                •

 kerosene and poured on her and her father-in-law set her
 on fire and thereafter both tried to extinguish the fire. So
 far as overt act of the appellant, pouring kerosene on the
 deceased, there was no material inconsistency between           G
 the evidence of PW-7 and Ext. P11 dying declaration.
·Referring to the statement of PW-7 recorded during
 i~quest, the trial court recorded factual finding that in his
 ._nxiety, PW-7 tried to rope in the father-in-law of the
 deceased also and that in his earlier statement recorded
                                                                 H
    620    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A during inquest PW-7 did not implicate the father-in-law
  and on those findings, trial court acquitted him. In the
  light of such factual finding recorded by the trial court,
  there was no merit in the submission that there were two
  contradictory version of the deceased. [Paras 13, 14 and
B 16] [628-G-H; 629-AB, F-H; 630-A]

       5. The defence version was that the deceased
  committed suicide as she was frustrated because she
  could not conceive a child. The appellant in his statement
  under Section 313 Gr.P.C. stated that on 24.10.2001 he
C had gone to Narnaund for purchase of domestic articles
  and returned home at 5.00 p.m. and only then he came
  to know that his sister-in-law had set herself on fire and
  his father had taken her to Shanti Hospital for treatment
  and that the deceased used to remain depressed as she
D did not conceive th1e child and therefore she committed
  suicide. The appellant placed reliance upon the statement
  of his father recorde'd under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also
  the burn injuries sm;tained by Jai Singh. The fact that the
  father-in-law sustained burn injuries did not lead to the
E conclusion that it was a suicide. [Para 17] [630-B-D]

       6. In burn injury cases, two possible hypothesis arise
  in the judicial mind .. was it suicide or was it homicide. In
  cases where the dying declaration projected by the
  prosecution gets credence, the alternative hypothesis of
F suicide has to be justifiably eliminated. In the instant
  case, had it been a suicide, the deceased who was at the
  point of death had no reason to falsely implicate her
  brother-in-law. There was no substance in the defence
  version of suicide theory. [Para 18] [630-E-F]
G
      7. If a dying dec:laration is found to be reliable, then
  there is no need for corroboration by any witness and
  conviction can be sustained on that basis alone. In the
  present case evidence of Tehsildar, the Doctor and other
              \
H witnesses 'is cogent and consistent that the deceased
          PREMPAL\v. STATE OF HARYANA                       621


. was conscious and in a fit state of mind to give dying A
  declaration and courts rightly based the conviction upon
  the same. When the trial court as well as the High Court
  have appreciated the entire evidence in its right
  perspective, there was no reason to interfere and the
  appeal fails. (Paras 19 and 20] (630-G-H; 631-A-B]       B

     State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Sagar Yadav And Ors.
 AIR 1985 SC 416 = (1985) 1 sec 552: 1985 (2) SCR 621;
 Bapu vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC (Crl.) 545 =
 (2006) 12 SCC 73: 2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 52 - relied on.
                                                                  c
                      Case Law Reference:
   1985 (2) SCR 621            Relied on           Para 11
                                                        I
                                                    I
   2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 52      Relied on           Para 12
                                                            !
                                                                  D
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
 No. 2030 of 2012.

     From the Judgment and Order deted 28.11.2011 of the
 High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal
 No. 716-DB/2002.                                                 E

     Rishi Malhotra for the Appellant.

      Vivekta Singh, Nupur Chaudhary, Kamal Mohan Gupta, for
 the Respondent.
                                                                  F
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the
judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
dated 28.11.2011 passed in Crl. Appeal No. 716-DB/2002, in G
and by which the High Court confirmed the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 IPC and also the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed on the appellant.

     2. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that,      H
    622     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A marriage of Smt. Anita (deceased) with Dharampal was
  solemnized in the year 1997. Appellant-Prempal is the younger
  brother of Dharampal. On 24.10.2001 at 3.00 p.m. Anita was
  all alone at her matrimonial house located at village Budana.
  Her husband Dharampal working as a teacher in village
B Milakpur had not returned home from the school; her mother-
  in-law had gone to her parents house. When Anita was all
  alo~e. the appellant.. Prempal grappled with Anita and pushed
  her down and alleged to have set her on fire at about 3.00 p.m.
  along with Jai Singh, father of the appellant. Anita was brought
c to Shanti Hospital, Narnaund by her father-in-law Jai Singh with
  95% burn injuries on her body on the same day at 4.00 p.m.
  On receipt of the information from the Medical Officer and after
  obtaining opinion of the Medical Officer that Anita was in a fit
  condition to make the statement, Assistant Sub Inspector of
  Police (PW 8) requested PW-4, Tehsildar to record the
0
  statement of Anita. liehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate (PW 4)
  reached the hospital and agai9 sou9ht opinion of the Medical
  Officer (Ext. P13) who opined that Anita was fit to make a
  statement. Tehsildar (PW4) recorded the statement of Anita
E (Ext. P11) in which deceased Anita stated that her brother-in-
  law Prempal grappled with her and pushed her aside and
  poured kerosene upon her and set her ablaze. Based on her
  statement, FIR was registered under Section 307 IPC against
  the appellant. PW-8 had taken up the investigation and
   prepared the Rough Site Map of the spot and seized material
F objects from the scene of the crime.

        3. On 24.10.2001 at about 11.45 P.M., Anita succumbed
  to injuries. On receipt of intimation about the death of Anita, the
  investigating officer went to the hospital and held the inquest
G proceedings and prepared the Inquest Report. PW-1, Dr. J.P.
  Malik conducted autopsy on the body of deceased Anita and
  issued the Post Mortem Certificate. The investigating officer
  recorded the statement of Ohan Singh (PW 7) and Chhotu Ram
  father of Anita. The case registered under Section 307 IPC was
H altered into Section 302 IPC and after completion of
          PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                          623
               [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant and        A
Jai Singh - father-in-law of deceased.

     4. To bring hoine the guilt of accused, prosecution
examined eight witnesses and exhibited number of documents
and material objects. After conclusion of the trial, the trial court
                                                                       8
convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and also to pay
a fine of Rs. 5,000/- with default clause. The trial court also
convicted the appellant under Section 354 IPC and sentenced
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years         C
and both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The
co-accused Jai Singh was acquitted of the charge. In the
appeal preferred by the appellant, the High Court confirmed the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the
sentence imposed on him and acquitted him •mder Section 354
IPC. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal.         D

      5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Anita
sustained 95% burns all over the body and there wera deep
burn injuries in fingers of the hand and feet of Anita and she
died shortly after recording of her dying declaration and it might     E
not have been possible for her to make a statement and trial
court and the High Court erred in relying upon the dying
declaration. The learned counsel for the appellant contended
that though PW-4, Tehsildar got the certificate regardi,1g fitness
of the deceased to make the statement, ye! no specific                 F
certificate was obtained by him that the deceased remained
conscious throughout while recording her statement. It was
submitted that the courts did not properly appreciate the
defence version put forth by the accused that Anita committed
suicide.
                                                                       G
    6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that dying declaration of Anita is true and voluntary
and not a result of tutoring and relying upon the same, trial court
and the High Court have rightly based the c0nviction and the
same warrants no interference.                                         H
    624     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A     ·7. We have given our due consideration to the respective
  contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. On receipl
  of intimation at 8.20 P.M., PW-8 sought the opinion of the
  Medical Officer whether Anita was fit to make the statement or
  not and PW-3, Doctor opined that Anita was fit to make the
B statement. On receipt of the request from PW-8, ASI, PW-4,
  Tehsildar reached the hospital at 9.15 P.M. and PW-4, Tehsildar
  again obtained the opinion of PW-3, Doctor and PW-3, Dr.
  Suresh opined that Anita was fit to make the statement and only
  thereafter PW-4, Tehsildar recorded her statement which is Ext.
c P11. In his evidence, PW-3 stated that Anita remained
  conscious and was in a fit condition when PW-4, Tehsildar
  recorded the statement, he (PW-3) remained throughout and
  he also endorsed Ext. P11 statement.

        8. In his cross-E3xamination, PW-3 stated that Anita
D sustained 95% burns and chances cannot be ruled out that a
  person can be unconscious having 95% burns. Much reliance
  was placed upon the above answers elicited from the doctor -
  PW-3 to assail the reliability of Ext. P11 dying declaration. The
  answers elicited from PW-3 during the cross-examination is.
E only an opinion. PW-21 issued Exts. P12 and P13 certificates
  certifying that Anita was in a fit condition to give stateme:it.
  Opinion evidence elicited during the cross-examination of PW-
  3, Doc:tor cannot prevail upon his assertion in Exts. P12 and
  P13 as to the fit mental condition of Anita to give statement. It
F is also to be noted that after sustaining injuries, victim was alive
  till midnight and that Anita died at 11.45 P.M. on 24.10.2001.

       9. Anita sustained burn injuries at 3.00 P.M. and she was
  admitted in the hospital at 4.00 P.M. Statement of Anita was
  recorded by PW-4, Tehsildar at 9.15 P.M. to 9.25 P.M. During
G the cross-examination of PW-3, it was elicited from him that
  about eight to ten persons who are relatives of Anita came to
  the hospital. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that
  in the long gap of time, between Anita's admission in the
H hospital and recording of her statement by PW-4, Tehsildar,
          PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                          625
               [R. BANUMATHI; J.]
number of relatives of Anita assembled and therefore there is           A
every possibility that Anita must have been tutored to falsely
implicate the appellant.

      10. We do not find any substance in the submission that
Anita was surrounded by her family members and that she was
                                                                  8
tutored to falsely implicate Prempal. May be after Anita was
admitted in the hospital, there were some family members to
attend to her; but there is no material suggesting that they were
talking to Anita or that Anita was tutored. PW-3, Doctor and
PW-4, Tehsildar have categorically denied the suggestion that C
Anita was tutored by her father Chhotu or her relatives. ~
Deceased and her husband Dhc;irampal were living separately.
While so, Anita had no reason to falsely implicate her brother-
in-law.

     11. When reliance is placed upon dying declaratiofl,_ the .. D
court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is true,
voluntary and not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or
a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied
that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. In State of Uttar
Pradesh vs. Ram Sagar Yadav And Ors. AIR 1985 SC 416              E=
(1985) 1 sec 552, ·this Court held that if the Court is satLsfied
that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base
conviction on it without corroboration. In this context, the
observations made in para (13) of the judgment are relevant
to be noted:-                                                     F
    "It is well settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration
    can be acted upon without corroboration. (See Khushal
    Rao vs. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552; Harbans Singh
    vs. State of Punjab, 1962 Supp.1 SCR 104; Gopalsingh
    vs. State of M.P. (1972) 3 sec 268). There is not even a            G
    rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that
    a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is
    corroborated. The primary effort of the court has to be to
    find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no
                                                                        H
    626       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A         question of corroboration arises. It is only if the
          circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not
          clear or convincing that the court may, for its assurance,
          look for corroboration to the dying declaration ........... "

B       12. In Bapu vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC (Crl.)
    545 == (2006) ~2 SCC 73, this Court in paras (14) and (15)
    observed as under:-

        14. In Raviv. State of T.N. [(2004) 10 SCC 776] the
    Supreme Court observed that: (SCC p.777, para 3)
c
          'lilt the truthfulne!SS ... of the dying declaration cannot be
          doubted, the same alone can form the basis of conviction
          of an accused and the same does not require any
          corroboration, whatsoever, in law."
D
          15. In Muthu Kutty v. State [ (2005) 9 SCC 113) vide para
          15 the Supreme Court observed as under : ;sec p. 120-
          '/ 21)

          "15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,
E         it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of
          cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting
          the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the
          reason the court also insists that the dying declaration
          should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence
F         of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on
          guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a
          result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of
          imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the
          deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear
G         opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once
          the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
          voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without
          any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an
          absolute rute of law that the dying declaration cannot form
          the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The
H
     PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                          627
          [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. A
This Court has laid down in several judgments the
principles governing dying declaration, which could be
summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State
of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC 474]: (SCC pp. 480-81, paras
18-19) (emphasis supplied)                                 B

      (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that
dying declaration cannot be acted· upon without
corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P)[(1976)
3 sec    104].
                                                                   c
       (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration
is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav
[(1985) 1 SCC 552] and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar
[(1983) 1  sec  211].                                  D
      (iii) The court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. E
(See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor
[(1976) 3  sec    618].)

      (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should
not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See             F
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P [(1974) 4 SCC 264]).

      (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and
could never make any dying declaration the evidence
with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v: G
State of M.P [(1981) Supp. SCC 25]).

      (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity
cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath
v. State of U.P [(1981) 2    sec654]).
                                                                   H
    628       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014} 7 S.C.R.


A               (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
          contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be
          rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti
          Laxmipati Naidu[ (1980) Supp. ~CC 455]).

B                (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement,
          it is not to be cfiscarded. On the contrary, the shortness
          of.the statement.itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo
          Ojha v. State of Bihar [(1980) Supp. SCC 769]).

                (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether
c         deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
          declaration look up to the mE:dica/ opinion. But where the
          eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and
          conscious state to make the dying declaration, the
          medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram V.
D         State of M.P. [(1988) Supp. SCC 152]).

                (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the
          version as given in the dying declaration, the said
          declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v.
E
          Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390]).

                (xi) Wh1ere there are more than one statement in
          the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time
          must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dyirig
          declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable,
F         it has to be accepted. (See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani
          v. State of Maharashtra [(1982) 1 sec 700]). II

          13. Deceased Anita had suffered 95% burn injuries; yet
    her statement before PW-4, Tehsildar was clear and cogent.
G   The trial court and the High Court examined the reliability of the
    dyin.g declaration and recorded concurrent findings of fact that
    Ext. P11 dying declaration is reliable and inspires confidence
    of the court. We find no perversity in su<ih findings.

          14. PW-7, Dhan Singh is the uncle of deceased Anita. In
H
          PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                          629
               [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
his evidence PW-7 stated that when they reached the hospital, A
the deceased told him and her father Chhotu Ram that her
brother-in-law Prempal had scuffled with her and pushed her
down and in the meanwhile, Jai Singh came and asked ·
Prempal to bring kerosene and set her on fire and Prempal
brought kerosene and poured on her and Jai Singh set her on B
fire and thereafter Jai Singh and Prempal tried to extinguish
the fire. It was submitted that during cross-examination of PW-
7, he was also confronted with reference to his statement
 recorded during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
 Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there are two        c
conflicting statements by the deceased and in one statement
 before PW-4, Tehsildar, Anita named only the appellant
whereas in the other statement before PW-7, she not only
 named two accused persons but also categorically defined the
 roles individually to the respective accused persons and this
                                                                0
 contradiction raises serious doubts about the incident and the
 veracity of the statement by Anita and this aspect was not
 properly appreciated by the Trial Court and the High Court.

      15. Countering the above arguments, the learned counsel
for the respondent-State took us through the evidence of PW-           E
7 and also the judgment of the trial court and submitted that in
his statement recorded during inquest PW-7 had stated that
Anita told him that appellant was responsible for her burns and
the courts rightly• held that there is no inconsistency between
dying declaration' and the statement of PW-7.                          F

     16. We have gone through the evidence of PW-7 and the
judgment of the trial court. So far as overt act of the appellant,
pouring kerosene on the deceased, we find no material
inconsistency between the evidence of PW-7 and Ext. P11                G
dying declaration. Referring to the statement of PW-7 recorded
during inquest, the trial court recorded factual finding that in his
anxiety, PW-7, Ohan Singh tried to rope in Jai Singh also and
that in his earlier statement recorded during inquest PW-7,
 Ohan Singh did not implicate Jai Singh and on those findings,
                                                                       H
    630      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A .trial court acquitted Jai Singh. In the light of such factual finding
   recorded by the trial court, we find no merit in the submission
   of the learned counsel for the appellant that there were two
   contradictory version of the deceased.

       17. The defence version is that Anita committed suicide
8
  as she was frustrated because she could not conceive a child.
  The appellant-Prempal in his statement under Section 313
  Cr.P.C. stated that on 24.10.2001 he had gone to Narnaund
  for purchase of domestic articles and returned home at 5.00
C p.m. and only then he came to know that his sister-in-law Anita
  had set herself on fire and his father Jai Singh had taken her
  to Shanti Hospital for treatment and that deceased Anita used
  to remain depressed as she did not conceive the child and
  therefore she committed suicide. The appellant placed reliance
  upon the statement of his father Jai Singh recorded under
D Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also the burn injuries sustained by Jai
  Singh. The fact that Jlai Singh sustained burn injuries, does not
  lead to the conclusion that it was a suicide.

         18. In burn injury cases, two possible hypothesis arise in
E the judicial mind - was it suicide or was it homicide. In cases
  where the dying declaration projected by the prosecution gets
  credence, the alternative hypothesis of suicide has to be
  justifiably eliminated. In the present case, had it been a suicide,
  Anita who was at the point of death had no reason to falsely
F implicate her brother-in-law Prempal. We do not find any
  substance in the defence version of suicide theory.

       19. A perusal of various judgments of this Court, some of
  which we have r€lferred to above, shows that if a dying
  declaration is found to be reliable, then there is no need for
G corroboration by any witness and conviction can be sustained
  on that basis alone.

        20. In the present case evidence of Tehsildar, the Doctor
    and other witnesses is cogent and consistent that the deceased
H
            PREMPAL v. STATE OF HARYANA                    631
                 [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
 was conscious and in a fit state of mind to give dying A
 declaration and courts rightly based the 6onviction upon the
'same. When the trial court as well as the High Court have
 appreciated the entire evidence in its right perspective, we see
 no reason to interfere and the appeal fails. In the result, the
 appeal is dismissed.                                             B

Devika Gujral                                  Appeal dismissed.