PRASANTA KUMAR SARKARversusASHIS CHATTERJEE & ANR.

                  [2010) 12 S.C.R. 1165


              PRASANTA KUMAR SARKAR                             A
                             V.
               ASHIS CHATTERJEE & ANR.
            (Criminal Appeal No. 2086 of 2010)
                   OCTOBER 29, 2010
                                                                B
            [D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

     s.439 - Bail - Factors to be taken into account while      c
considering an application for bail - Explained - HELD: In
the instant case, the High Court completely lost sight of the
basic principles - In the circumstances, it was not the stage
at which bail u/s 439 should have been granted to the accused
more so when even charges were not framed - Order of High       0
Court set aside.

    Respondent no. 1 was accused of committing
murder of an old widow by strangulation. His bail
applications were rejected by the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate as also the Court of Session.               E
However, the High Court granted him regular bail u/s 439
CrPC. Aggrieved, the brother of the deceased filed the
appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court                              F
      HELD: 1.1. ·it is trite that the Supreme Court does not,
normally, interfere with an order passed by the High
Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However,
it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise
its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in G
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to

                            1165                                H
    1166     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [201 O] 12 S.C.R.


A be borne in mind while considering an application for bail
  are: (1) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
  ground to believe that the accused had committed the
  offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii)
  severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)
B danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released
  on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and
  standing of the accused; (vt) likelihood of the offence
  being repeated; (vit) reasonable apprehension of the
  witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course,
c of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. It is manifest
  that if the High Court does not advert to these relevant
  considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said
  order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
  mind, rendering it to be illegal. [para 11 and 12] [1169-G-
D H; 1170-A-E]
         State of UP. through CBI Vs. Amarmani Tripathi 2005
    (3) Suppl. SCR 454 = 2005 (8) SCC 21; Prahlad Singh
    Bhati Vs. NCT, Delhi & Anr. 2001 (2) SCR 684 = 2001 (4)
    SCC 280; Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh &
E   Ors. 2002 (2) SCR 526  =    2002 (3) SCC 598; and Masroor
    Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2009 (14) SCC 286 - relied
    on.

          1.2. In the instant case, while dealing with the
F application of the accused for grant of bail, the High Court
  completely lost sight of the basic principles. The accused
  is alleged to have committed a heinous crime of killing
  an old and helpless lady by strangulation. He was seen
  coming out of the victim's house by a neighbour around
G the time of the alleged occurrence, giving rise to a
  reasonable belief that he had committed the murder.
  Under the given circumstances, it was not the stage at
  which bail u/s 439 of the Code should have been granted
  to the accused, more so, when even charges have not
  yet been framed. It is also pertinent to note that the
H
        PRASANTA KUMAR SARKAR v. ASHIS                    1167
              CHATTERJEE & ANR.

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had rejected three            A
bail applications of the accused, but the High Court did
not find it worthwhile to even make a reference to these
orders. [para 13] [1171-A-D]

    Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu                B
Yadav & Anr. 2004 (7) SCC 528 - relied on.

                      Case Law Reference:
     2009 (14) sec 286              relied on        para 9
    2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 454         relied on        para 11       c
    2001 (2) SCR 684                relied on        para 11
    2002 (2) SCR 526                relied on        para 11
     2004 (7)   sec 528             relied on        para 13       D
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 2086 of 2010.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 11.01.201 O of the High
Court at Calcutta in CRM N. 272 of 2010.                           E

     Nagender Rai, C.K. Rai, Babita Sant, Harish Pandey for
the Appellant.

    Ujjwal Banerjee, Asit Kumar Rari, Namita Roy, Sarla
Chandra, Satish Vig for the Respondents.                           F

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    D.K. JAIN, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against order   G
dated 11th January, 2010 passed by the High Court of Calcutta
in C.R.M. No. 272 of 2010, granting regular bail to respondent
No. 1 in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as "the accused"),

                                                                   H
      1168     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (201 OJ 12 S.C.R.


f.\   under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
      (for short "the Code").

          3. The accused is facing trial for an offence punishable
      under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
8     "IPC") for allegedly committing the murder of one Ms. Mallika
      Sen. Respondent No.2 is the State of West Bengal.

           4. Very briefly stated the facts material for the adjudication
      of this appeal can be stated thus:

C          Ms. Mallika Sen, a 57 years old widow was found
      strangulated at her residence on 2nd July, 2009. The appellant,
      who is the brother of the victim, lodged a written complaint at
      the Rampurhat Police Station, on the basis of which FIR No.
      111/09 dated 2nd July, 2009 was registered under Section
D     302, IPC.

           It has been alleged that a neighbour of late Ms. Sen, one
      Mr. Somenath Dutta, saw the accused rushing out of the
      residence of the deceased, around the time the incident took
      place. The accused was arrested on 13th July, 2009 and
E     produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate who
      remanded him to judicial custody. Thereafter, on the same day,
      the police filed a forwarding report in the said court, inter alia,
      requesting for holding of a Test Identification Parade (T.l.P.) of
      the accused. The T.l.P. was conducted, but perhaps the
F     accused could not be identified. However, in the second T.l.P.,
      the accused was duly identified by the aforesaid witness.

       5. The accused filed several bail applications before the
  Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate which were all dismissed
G vide orders dated 7th September, 2009, 16th September, 2009
  and 19th September, 2009.

          6. On 7th October, 2009, charge-sheet No. 138 of 2009
      under Section 302 IPC was filed against the accused before
      the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.
H
         PRASANTA KUMAR SARKAR v. ASHIS                      1169
          CHATTERJEE & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

     7. Having failed to secure bail from the Sessions Court,         A
the accused preferred a bail application, being C.R.M. No. 272
of 2010 before the High Court under Section 439 of the Code.
As stated above, by the impugned order, the High Court
allowed the application, and granted bail to the accused by a
short order, observing thus:                                          B

      "Having regard to the nature of the alleged crime, we do
      not think that interest of investigation requires or (sic)
      justifies further detention of the present petitioner at this
      stage."
                                                                      c
      8. Hence the present appeal by the complainant.

     9. Mr. Nagender Rai, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, while assailing the impugned order,
contended that the said order being non-speaking, deserves
                                                                  0
to be set aside in light of the decision of this Court in Masroor
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr..1 Learned counsel submitted
that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the
manner in which a hapless old lady was done to death as also
the fact that the accused had been duly identified by an E
independent witness.

     10. Per contra, Mr. Ujjwal Banerjee, learned counsel
appearing for the accused, contended that the case against the
accused was false, as is evident from the fact that the witness
had failed to identify the accused in the first T.l.P. Learned        F
counsel contended that the accused had been arrested on a
mere suspicion, and in light of the fact that he has not misused
the bail, the impugned order needs to be affirmed.

      11. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly G
unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent
upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,
1.   (2009) 14 sec 286.                                               H
    1170      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2010) 12 S.C.R.

A cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles
  laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point.
  It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors
  to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail
  are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
8 to  believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii)
  nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the
  punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused
  absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character,
  behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi)
C likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable
  apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii)
  danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.
  (See: State of UP. through CBI Vs. Amarmani Tripathi; 2
  Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT, Delhi & Anr. 3 ; Ram Govind
  Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh & Ors. 4)
0
        12. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to
  these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the
  said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
  rendering it to be illegal. In Masroor (supra), a Division Bench
E of this Court, of which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member,
  observed as follows:

          "Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborate
          examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the
          merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should
F
          be avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order
          reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being
          granted particularly where the accused is charged of
          having committed a serious offence." (See also: State of
          Maharashtra Vs. Ritesh 5 ; Panchanan Mishra Vs.
G
    2.   (2005) 8 sec 21.
    3.   (2001) 4 sec 280.
    4.   (2002) 3 sec 598.
    5.   (2001) 4 sec 224.
H
          PRASANTA KUMAR SARKAR v. ASHIS                     1171
           CHATTERJEE & ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

      Digambar Mishra & Ors. 6; Vijay Kumar Vs. Narendra &            A
      Ors. 7; Anwari Begum Vs. Sher Mohammad & Anr8)

      13: We are constrained to observe that in the instant case,
IA'.hile· dealing with the application of the accused for grant of
bail, the High Court completely lost sight of the basic principles
                                                                      8
enumerated above. The accused, in the present case, is
alleged to have committed a heinous crime of killing an old
helpless lady by strangulation. He was seen coming out of the
victim's house by a neighbour around the time of the alleged
occurrence, giving rise to a reasonable belief that he had            C
committed the murder. We feel that under the given
circumstances, it was qot the stage at which bail under Section
439 of the Code should have been granted to the accused,
more so, when even charges have not yet been framed. It is
also pertinent to note that, as stated above, the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate had rejected three bail applications of the       D
accused but the High Court did not find it worthwhile to even
make a reference to the!se orders. In this regard, it would be
useful to refer to the following observations echoed in Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan@ Pappu Yadav & Anr9.:-
                                                                      E
      "In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
      been rejected there is a further onus on the court to
      consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
      noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have
      been rejected and after such consideration if the court is      F
      of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said
      court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such
      earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should
      be granted." (See also: Ram Pratap Yadav Vs. Mitra Sen
      Yadav & Anr10.)
                                                                      G
e.   (2005) 3 sec 143.
7.   (2002) s sec 364.
8.   (2005) 7 sec 326 ..
9.   (2004) 7 sec 528.
1o (2003) 1 sec 15.                                                   H
    1172    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A         14. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, and
    the impugned order is set aside. The bail bond and the surety
    furnished by the accused in terms of the impugned order stands
    cancelled and it is directed that he will be taken into custody
    forthwith. Needless to add that observations touching the merits
s   of the case against the accused are purely for the purpose of
    deciding the question of grant of bail and if in future any such
    application is filed by the accused, it shall be considered on
    its own merits untrammelled by any of these observations.

    R.P.                                          Appeal allowed.