PRALHAD LALCHAND CHA VANversusIQBAL HUSSAIN INAYAT HUSSAIN BADRI

                    PRALHAD LALCHAND CHAVAN                                        A
                                 v.
                IQBAL HUSSAIN INAYAT HUSSAIN BADRI

                                  JULY 26, 1996

                 [S.C. AGRAWAL AND G.T. NANA VAT! JJ.)                             B

          Rent Control and Eviction :

           Celllral Provinces and Berar Regulation of Le/ling of Accommodation
    Act, 1946---Sec. 2-Central Provinces and Bei·ar Le/ling of-Houses and Rent     C
    Colllrol Orde1; 1969---Clauses 13(1), 13(3)(vi}-Order granting pennission to
    give notice of tennination becomingfinal-Subseque/l/ suit for eviction-Held,
    a tenant is precluded from res01ting to subsequent events after grant of
    pennission by the Rent Controller.

          Transfer of Property Act 1882-Section 106---Suit for eviction after      D
    tennination of tenancy-The protection of consideration of subsequent events
    in the Rent control proceedings-Held, cannot be available in a suit for
    eviction which is a separate proceeding.

          The Appellant landlord applied to the Rent Controller for grant of
    permission to issue a notice of termination of lease to the Respondent         E
    under clause 13(3) (iv & vi) of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation
    of Letting of Houses & Rent Control Order, 1969. The Appellant filed the
    application on the ground that he needs the house for his bonofide
    residence. The said application was rejected by the Rent Controller and
    Appeal filed by the Appellant before the.Rent Control Appellate Authority      F
    was allowed and necessary permission to issue notice terminating the lease
    was granted under clause 13(3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order 1969. A writ
    petition filed by the Respondent against the aforesaid order was dismissed;
    so also the review filed by him. The Letter Patent Appeal filed by the


-   Respondent was dismissed and the S.L.P. filed against the same was also G
    dismissed. Meanwhile, the Appellant issued a notice terminating the lease
    under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the lease of
    the Respondent and asking him to hand over vacant possession of the
    premises. Since the Respondent failed to deliver possession, the Appellant
    filed a Civil Suit for eviction. The Suit was decreed by the Civil Judge and.
    the Respondent was directed to vacate the premises and hand over vacant H
                                          131
    132                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   possession to the Appellant. The Appeal against the same was dismissed
    by the District Judge. Thereafter, in a Civil Revision Application filed by
    the Respondent, the High Court or Bombay held that while deciding 1the
    appeal the Appellate Court failed to consider the subsec1uent events name-
    ly that during the pendency or the litigation, the Appellant had purchased
    another house and had stared residing there and thereby the requirement
B
    or the Appellant was fulfilled. The High Court allowed the Revision Peti-
    tion and remanded the matter to the Addi. District Judge with a direction
    to consider the subsequent events and adjudicate the matter accordingly.

           On an Appeal filed before this Court, it was contended by the
C   Appellant that the scheme or the Rent Control Order is that the protection
    against eviction that is available to the tenant under clause 13 or the Rent
    Control Order whereby the landlord is required to obtain the permission
    or the Rent Controller before issuing a notice terminating the tenancy and
    such permission can be granted only on a ground mentioned in clause
D   13(3) or the Rent Control Order, that the Order or the Rent Controller
    granting permission under clause 13 can be challenged before the Rent
    Control Appellate Authority in Appeal under clause 21(3) and that no
    further appeal, revision or application for review lies from the decision of
    the Appellate Authority to any other Authority whatsoever, that under
    section 7 or the Act or 1946 the Jurisdiction or the Civil Court is barred in
E   respect or any order passed by an Officer or Authority under an order
    made under section 2 or the Act and therefore, the order granting permiis-
    sion under clause 13 is not open to challenge before the Civil Court; and
    that the order granting permission by the Rent Controller has become
    final and a party cannot be permitted to go behind the order granting
F   permission and to re agitate the question whether the Appellant is entitled
    to seek eviction or the Respondent from the premises on the ground that
    he needs the premises for the purpose or his bonafide residence.


           The Respondent contended that grant or permission to the landlotd
G   to issue a notice terminating the tenancy under clause 13(3) of the Rent
    Control Order does not preclude the tenant from showing that in view of'
    the subsequent events that have occurred after the grant or such permis-
    sion, the need or the landlord for the premises no longer subsists and he is
    not entitled to seek eviction or the tenant; that the object underlined in the
    protection against eviction given to the tenants under clause 13 of the Re10t
H   Control Order entitles the tenant an opportunity to rely upon subsequent
          P.L.CHAYANv. IQBAL HUSSAIN !NAYAT HUSSAIN BADRI                 133

events occurring after the grant of permission and would not be in con-          A
sonance with a decision of this Court. The Respondent further contended
that in suit for eviction and in Appeal or Revision in that suit it is permis-
sible for the tenant to point out that a decree for eviction cannot be passed
in favour of the landlord in view of the event that has occurred subsequent
to the grant of permission under clause 13 and that the Court dealing with
the suit or appeal/revision is obliged to take into account such subsequent
                                                                                 B
event.

         Allowing the appeal, this Court.

       HELD : 1. The High Court was in error in holding that the Lower
Appellate Court was obliged to take into account the subsequent events           c
regarding the purchase of alternative accommodation by the Appellant and
in setting aside the Judgment of the Addi. District Judge and remanding
the matter for reconsideration to the said Court since it was not pern1is-
sible in a proceeding arising out of a suit for eviction to take into account
the subsequent events having a bearing on order granting permission D
under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order on the ground of bonafide need
of the Appellant, the said judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld
and has to be set aside. [142-F-H]

      2. By clause 13 of the Rent Control Order a bar is placed on the right
of the landlord to terminate the tenancy of the tenant by requiring him to       E
obtain the necessary permission in that regard from the Rent Controller
and such permission can be granted only if any of the grounds specified in
sub clause 3 of clause 13 is made out. [139·C-D]

       3. Having regard to the fact that the protection available under clause
13 of the Rent Control Order is confined to the first proceeding, governing      F
grant of permission to issue a notice for terminating the tenancy and the
tenant having been found not entitled to such protection on account of
grant of such permission under clause 13 of Rent Control Order and the
said order having become final, it is not open to the tenant to re-agitate the
said question in the subsequent proceeding i.e. the suit for eviction and        G
invoke the protection under clause 13 in the suit filed by the landlord
against the tenant after the tenancy has been terminated on the basis of
permission granted under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. [140-A-C]

      4. The scope of enquiry in the subsequent suit is limited to the
question whether permission to issue a notice to terminate the tenancy has       H
    134                  SUPREME --:OURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A been granted under clause 13 or the Rent Control Order and if so, whether
    "he tenancy has been validly terminated in accordance with the provisions
    of section 106 or the Transfer of Property Act and the tenant has lost the
    right to remain in occupation of the premises let out to him. Once the
    decree or order has become final, the tenant is precluded from saying that
    in view or subsequent events the need or requirement no more existed.
B                                                            [140-C-D; 142·E]
         R.P. Ghosh v. Pramila Bhai Ravindra Puri & Ors., (1976)
    Maharashtra Law Journal 828; Beni Lal (dead) by Lrs. v. State of
    Maharashtra & Ors., [1995] Suppl. 1 SCC 235; Hasmat Rai & Anr. v.
    Raghunath Prasad, [1981] 3 SCR 605 at p. 617 and D.K. Soni v. P.K.
C   Mukhe1jee and Others, (1988] 1 SCC 29 (32), referred to.

          5. The Court observed that since the existing provision under the
    C.P. & Berar Act and the Rent Control Order relating to eviction or tenant
    requiring two proceedings not only lead to multiplicity of proceedings but
D   also cause nndue hardship to the parties the Bihar State legislature has
    to give a fresh look to the said provision and bring a law in this field in
    tune with other similar legislations applicable in other parts of the
    country. [142-H; 143-A-B]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No. 9829 of
E 1996.
         From the Judgment and Order dated 18.7.94 of the Bombay High
    Court in C.R.A. No 616 of 1994.

          V.A. Mohta, S.V. Deshpande and Pramit Saxena for the Appellant.
F
         S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad, Kumar Parimal and R.N. Keshwani for
    the Respondent.

          'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G         S.C. AGRAWAL, J. Special Leave granted.

           This appeal by the landlord arises out of a suit for eviction from
    premises governed by the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar
    Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred
    to as 'the Act') and the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and
H   Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Control
      P.L CHAVAN'· IQBAL HUSSAIN INA YATHUSSAIN BAD RI (S.C.AGRA WAL, J.J   135

Order').                                                                          A
      The Rent Control Order has been made in exercise of the powers
conferred by Section 2 of the Act which empowers the State Government
by general or special order to provide for regulating the letting and
sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation whether
residential or non-residential. Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act prescribes     B
that such order may provide for preventing the eviction of tenants or
sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances. In
clause 13 of the Rent Control Order provision has been made for the
protection of a tenant against the eviction. The relevant parts of the said
clause are reproduced below :                                                     C

           "13(1) No landlord shall, except with the previous written permis-
           sion of the Controller :

           (a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determine the
           lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option; or D

           (b) where the lease is determinable by efflux of the time limited
           thereby require the tenant to vacate the house by process of law
           or otherwise if the tenant is willing to continue the lease on the
           same terms and conditions.
                                                                                  E
        xx              xx           xx            xx            xx         xx

           (3) If after hearing the parties the Controller i' satisfied :

           xx           xx           xx             xx           xx         xx

           (iv) that the tenant has used the house or premises or any part        F
           thereof for a purpose other than that for which it was leased; or

        xx              xx           xx            xx            xx         xx

        (vi) that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the
        purpose of his bona fide residence, provided he is not occupying G
        any other residential house of his own in the city or town con-
        cerned; or

        xx              xx           xx            xx            xx         xx

                he shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to deter-   H
    136                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A           mine the lease as required by sub-clause (l)."

           On April 18, 1985 the appellant submitted an application before the
    Rent Controller for grant of permission to issue a notice terminating the
    lease of the respondent. The appellant sought the permission on grounds
    (iv) and (vi) of sub-clause (3) of clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. The
B   said application of the appellant was rejected by the Rent Controller by
    order dated December 29, 1987. The appeal filed by the appellant against
    the said order was allowed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority by
    order dated December 16, 1988 and necessary permission to issue notice
    terminating the lease was granted under ground (vi) of sub-clause (3) of
c   clause 13 of the Rent Control Order, i.e., the landlord needs the house or
    a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide residence, provided he
    is not occupying any other residential house of his own in the city or town
    concerned. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control Appellate
    Authority dated December 16, 1988 the respondent moved the High Court
D   of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur by filing Writ Petition No. 1745of1989.
    The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge of the
    High Court by Judgment dated August 8, 1989. The petition filed for review
    of the said Judgment was dismissed by the learned single Judge by order
    dated November 29, 1990. Thereafter, the respondent filed a Letters Patent
    Appeal against the Judgment of the learned single Judge, which was
E   dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The petition for special
    leave to appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench was dismjssed
    by this Court. As a result the order granting permission under clause 13 of
    the Rent Control Order, to issue a notice terminating the lease of the
    respondent, became final.
F
           In the meanwhile after passing of the order of the Rent Control
    Appellate Authority dated December 16, 1988 granting permission to issue
    a notice terminating the lease, the appellant, on March 3, 1989, issued a
    notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the
    lease of the respondent by the end of April 1989 and asking him to hand
G   over vacant possession of the premises on the date of termination of the
    lease. Since the respondent failed to comply with the said notice and did
    not deliver possession of the premises, the appellant, on May 2, 1989, filed
    a suit (Civil Suit No.100 1989) in Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division,
    Amravati for eviction of the respondent. The said suit of the appellant was
H   decreed by the Civil Judge by Judgment dated January 31, 1990 and the
      PL.CHAVAN, IQBALHUSSAININAYATHUSSAINBADRl(S.C.AGRAWAIJ]          137

respondent was directed to vacate the premises and hand over vacant A
possession to the appellant. The appeal filed by the respondent against the
said decree of the trial court was dismissed by the District Judge, Amravati
by Judgment dated March 24, 1994. Thereafter, the respondent filed Civil
Revision Application No. 616 of 1994 in the High Court which was allowed
by the impugned Judgment dated July 18, 1994 on the view that while
                                                                             B
deciding the appeal the appellate court failed to consider the subsequent
events namely that during the pemlency of the litigation appellant had
purchased another house and had started residing there and thereby the
requirement of the appellant was fulfilled. According to the High Court
the landlord secured permission for his bona fide requirement, but during
the pendency of the litigation especially in the eviction proceedings, sub-   c
sequent events regarding the purchase of alternative accommodation oc-
curred and that this aspect has to be taken into consideration. The High
Court, therefore, while setting aside the Judgment of the Additional Dis-
trict Judge, Amravati, has remanded the matter to the Additional District
Judge with a direction to consider the subsequent events and adjudicate D
the matter accordingly. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment of the High
Court the appellant has filed this appeal.

      Shri V.A. Mohta, the learned senior counsel appearing for the ap-
pellant, has urged that the scheme of the Rent Control Order is that the
protection against eviction that is available to the tenant under clause 13   E
of the Rent Control Order whereby the landlord is required to obtain the
permission of the Rent Controller before issuing a notice terminating the
tenancy and such permission can be granted only on a ground mentioned
in sub-clause 3 of clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. Shri Mohta has
submitted that the order of the Rent Controller granting permission under F
clause 13 can be challenged before the Rent Control Appellate Authority
in appeal under Sub-clause (3) of clause 21 and that no further appeal,
revision or application for review lies from the decision of the Rent Control
Appellate Authority to any other authority whatsoever. Shri Mohta has
pointed out that under Section 7 of the Act the Jurisdiction of civil courts G
is barred in respect of any order passed by an officer or authority under
an order made under Section 2 of the Act and, therefore, the order
granting permission under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order is not open
to challenge before the civil court. Such an order can, however, be chal-
lenged by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before
the High Court. The respondent had availed the said remedy under Article H
                                                         •
    138                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 226 of the Constitution by filing a writ petition which petition was dismissed
    by the single Judge and the said judgment of the learned single Judge was
    affirmed in Letters Patent Appeal by the Division Bench and the petition
    filed for special leave to appeal against the said judgment was also dis-
    missed by this Court. As a result, the order granting permission under
    clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order became final and a party cannot
B   be permitted to go behind the order granting permission and to reagitate
    the question whether the appellant is entitled to seek eviction of the
    respondent from the premises on the ground that he needs the premises
    for the purpose of his bona fide residence. Shri Mohta has placed reliance
    on the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in R.P. Ghosh v.
C   Pramilabai Ravindra Puri and 01'., (1976) Maharashtra Law Journal 828,
    and the observations of this Court in Benita! (dead) by Lrs. v. State of
    Maharashtra and o,,., [1995] Suppl. 1 SCC 235.

          Shri S. Balakrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the respon-
D dent, has submitted that grant of permission to the landlord to issue a
    notice terminating the tenancy under clause 13(3) of the Rent Control
    Order docs not preclude the tenant from showing that in view of the
    subsequent events that have occurred after the grant of such permission,
    the need of the landlord for the premises no longer subsists and he is not
    entitled to seek eviction of the tenant. Shri Balakrishnan has laid emphasis
E   on the object underlying the protection against eviction given to the tenants
    under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order and has submitted that to deny
    to the tenant an opportunity to rely upon subsequent events occurring after
    the grant of permission would not be in consonance with the decisions of
    this Court wherein subsequent events have been taken note by thi' Court
F   in the context of proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground of
    bona fide need of the landlord.

        A perusal of the provisions contained in clause 13 of the Rent
  Control Order shows that the nature of protection which has been con-
  ferred on the tenant under the said clause differs from the protection given
G to the tenant under other similar rent control laws in other States. In most
  of the rent control laws in force protection against eviction is conferred on
  the tenant by imposing the requirement that no decree for eviction shall
  be passed against the tenant except on certain specified ground or no suit
  for eviction by the tenant would be filed except on certain specified
H grounds. Such laws envisage a single judicial proceeding in which the
                         I
      P.L CHAVAN •c IQBALHUSSAININAYATHUSSAIN BADRI (S.CAGRA WAI., J.j   139

landlord is required to make out a case for eviction of the tenant on the A
basis of any one of the specified grounds and the decree or order for
eviction passed by the civil court or the Rent Controller is subject to an
appeal or revision and a further appeal or revision in the High Court. The
Rent Court Order, however, envisages two separate proceedings. One is
the proceeding before the Rent Controller under clause 13 of the Rent B
Control Order for grant of permission to issue a notice terminating his
tenancy which order is subject to appeal before the Rent Control Appellate
Authority and judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In the event of grant of permission to issue the notice ter-
minating the lease, the proceedings under clause 13 of the Rent Control
Order are followed by a second proceeding, viz., a suit for eviction after C
the landlord has terminated the tenancy by issuing a notice in accordance
with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. By
clause 13 of the Rent Control Order a bar is placed on the right of the
landlord to terminate the tenancy of the tenant by requiring him to obtain
the necessary permission in that regard from the Rent Controller and such D
permission can beJ!ianted only if any of the grounds specified in sub-clause
(3) of clause 13 is made out. In other words under clause 13 the bar that
is placed on the right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy of the tenant
is lifted when permission to issue notice is granted and thereafter the
landlord can proceed to terminate the tenancy in accordance with Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act and in the event of the tenant not E
vacating the premises after the termination of the tenancy by such a notice,
the landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant by filing a suit on the
ground that the tenancy having been terminated under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act the tenant has no right to remain in occupation.
In the said suit the validity of the order granting permission cannot be F
assailed by the tenant in view of the bar created by Section 7 of the Act
read with clause 21(3) of the Rent Control Order.

      Shri Balakrishnan does not dispute that it is not open to the respon-
dent to assail the correctness of the Order granting permission under G
clause 13 of the Rent Control Order in the suit for eviction filed after
terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Shri Balakrishnan has, however, stressed that in the suit for eviction and
in appeal or revision in that suit it is permissible for the tenant to point out
that a decree for eviction cannot be passed in favour of the landlord in
view of an event that has occurred subsequent to the grant of permission H
    140                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order and that the court dealing "ith
  the suit or appeaVrevision is obliged to take into account such subsequent
  event. In our view this contention cannot be accepted. Having regard to
  the fact that the protection that is available under clause 13 of the Rent
  Control Order is confined to the first proceeding governing grant of
  permission to issue a notice for terminating the tenancy and the tenant
B
  having been found not entitled to such protection on account of grant of
  such permission under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order and the said
  order having become final, it is not open to the tenant to reagitate the said
  question in the subsequent proceeding, viz., the suit for eviction, and invoke
  the protection available under clause 13 in the suit filed by the landlord
c against the tenant after .the tenancy has been terminated on the basis of
  the permission granted under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. The
  scope of inquiry in the subsequent suit is limited to the question whether
  permission lo issue a notice to terminate the tenancy has been granted
  under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order and if so whether the tenancy
D has been validly terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section
                                                             ...
  106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the tenant has lost right to remain
  in occupation of the premises let out to him.

           In R.P. Ghosh v. Pramilabai Ravindra Puri and Others, (supra) a
     Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has taken the same view. In that
E case permission had been granted by Rent Controller to serve a notice
     terminating the tenancy under clause 13 of the Rent Control Order on the
     ground that the premises were required by the landlord for his bona fide
     personal occupation and an appeal against the said order had been dis-
     missed by the appellate authority. The landlord had issued a notice to the
F    tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thereafter the
     original landlord died and his legal representatives filed a suit for eviction.
     It was urged that since the ground on which permission was granted was
     personal to the landlord and in view of the death of the original landlord
     the cause of action did not survive and the permission granted by the Rent
     Controller stood exhausted with the death of the original landlord and !hall
G    it was obligatory on the part of the legal representatives to prove their own
     any bona fide need independently and since it had not been done and a
     fresh permission had not been obtained from the Rent Controller by the
     legal representatives of the deceased landlord, the suit was not main-
     tainable. The said contention was negatived by the Division Bench of the
H    High Court. The High Court held that once permission is granted under
      P.L. CHAY AN v. IQBALHUSSAIN !NAYATHUSSAJN BADR! (S.C. AGRA WAl, J.}   141

clause 13 of the Rent Control Order by the Rent Controller, then the A
landlord is at liberty to serve notice upon the tenant terminating his tenancy
as per provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and it is the Transfer of
Property Act which then applied and the provisions of the Rent Control
Order do not come into play nor they could affect the question of notice
to quit, its requirement or its service etc. once a valid perrr..ission from the
                                                                                   B
Rent Controller is obtained. The learned Judges have said :

        'The Rent Control Order only provides that such a notice cannot
        be given unless a written permission of Rent Controller is obtained.
        It does not Jay down any further condition as far as the quit notice
        under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned. C
        The filing of a suit for cjectment is an independent action. The
        combined effect of this is that it contemplates two distinct proceed-
        ings, one relating to granting of a written permission by the Rent
        Controller to give notice to determine the lease under the
        provisions of the Rent Control Order and thereafter filing of a suit D
        for ejectment before a competent civil court after giving necessary
        notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Rent
        Controller or the authority constituted under the Rent Control
        Order has no authority or jurisdiction to eject a tenant or deliver
        possession of the property to the landlord. This is the p.ovince of
        a civil Court. The filing of the ejectment suit after giving a notice E
        under section 106 of the Transfer of Property act is not the
        continuation of the proceedings instituted before the Rent Con-
        troller, but it is an independent and distinct proceeding which is
        governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Transfer of
        Property Act." (p. 832)                                               p

        "Obviously exclusive jurisdictions is vested upon the Rent Control
        authorities to decide the rights of the parties arising out of the
        Rent Control Order. A decision of the Rent Controller in this
        behalf is binding upon a civil Court and it is not open for the civil
        Court to go behind the said order." (p. 834)                               G

        "Once it is held the decision of the Rent Controller so far as it
        relates to the matter within his exclusive jurisdiction is concerned,
        is final and could not be challenged in a suit or in any collateral
        proceedings, then, in our opinion, the same matter cannot be H
    142                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A           reopened in a civil suit instituted by the landlord after obtaining a
            permission for the Rent Controller. So far as a s~it for ejectment
            is concerned, the cause of action is not the ground on which the
            permission is granted by the Rent Controller, but the termination
            of the tenancy of the tenant under the provisions of the Transfer
            of Property Act. The same gives an occasion for and forms the
B
            foundation of the suit. So far as the ejectment suit is concerned,
            the grounds of ejectment are irrelevant. To such a suit the
            provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and Transfer of Property
            Act will apply and not the provision of the Rent Control Order."
            (p. 835)
c
          We are in agreement with the said view of the High Court. It appears
    that the said decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge
    who decided this matter.

          The principle that subsequent events should be taken into account
D by the court while passing a decree can have a limited application in a case
    like the pres~nt one involving, two independent proceedings. It would apply
    at the stage of the first proceeding relating to the grant of permission but
    would have no application after the order passed in the first proceeding
    has attained finality. Once the decree or order has become final the tenant
E   is precluded from saying that in view of subsequent events the need or
    requirement no more existed. (See : Hasmat Rai & Anr: v. Raghunalh
    Prasad, (1981] 3 SCR 605, at p. 617; D.K Soni v. P.K. Muklwjee and Othai,
    (1988] 1 sec 29, at p. 32).

          For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the view that the High
F Court was in error in holding that the lower appellate court was obliged
    to take into account the subsequent events regarding the purchase of
    alternative accommodation by the appellant and in setting aside the Judg-
    ment of the Additional District Judge and remanding the matter for
    reconsideration to the said Court. Since, in our opinion, it was not permis-
G   sible in proceedings arising out a suit for eviction to take into account the
    subsequent events having a bearing on order granting permission under
    clause 13 of the Rent Control Order on the ground of bona fide need of
    the appellant, the said Judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld and
    has to be set aside.

H          Before we conclude we must say that the existing provisions undeir
       PLCHAVAN,. IQBALHUSSAININAYATHUSSAIN BADRI (S.C.AGRAWAL,J.J      143

the Act and the Rent Control Order relating to eviction of tenant requiring A
two proceedings - one for grant of permission to issue the notice terminat-
ing the tenancy lo be followed by a regular suit for eviction - not only lead
to multiplicity of proceedings but also cause undue hardship to the parties.
It is high time that the Legislature gives a fresh look to the said provisions
and brings the law in this field in tune with other similar legislations
                                                                               B
applicable in other parts of the country.

       In the result, the appeal is allowed, and Judgment of the High Court
dated July 18, 1994 is set aside and, while dismissing the revision petition
filed by the respondent, the Judgment and Order dated March 24, 1994
passed by the Additional District Judge, Amravati is restored. In the facts    C
and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

V.M.                                                       Appeal allowed.