PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMAversusBURMAH SHELL CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.

                PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA                                              A
                           v.
        BURMAH SHELL CO-OP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.

                            AUGUST 21, 2002

             [R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]                                  B


      Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, I 972-Sections 60 and 93-Dispute
between Cooperative Society and appe/lant-Appointment ofarbitrator-Civil
Court restraining arbitrator from proceeding ahead with arbitration                C
proceedings-Non-appearance of cooperative society before the arbitrator on
the appointed date of hearing-Arbitrator passing ex-parte award in favour
of appe/lant-Award cha/lenged-Sing/e Judge setting aside ex-parte award
in view of restraint order of Civil Court-Division Bench holding that Civil
Court not competent to entertain any civil suit which any authority under the
Act competent to aqjudicate upon thus restraint order nu//ity-A/so arbitrator      D
could have ignored restraint order as not binding on him-On appeal held,
in such cases person aggrieved should first approach Civil Court for
adjudication upon the question of its own jurisdiction and then to vacate or
reca/l its order if it is one which it did not have jurisdiction in Jaw to make-
Unti/ this is done the order of competent court to be obeyed-Thus ex-parte
proceedings before arbitrator to be set aside and parties heard bi-parte.          E
      Judgment/order-Binding nature of-Order ofcompetent court-Remains
binding, unless vacated or set aside-Cannot be ignored by assuming it to be
void

      Dispute between appellant and respondent-society regarding                   F
allotment of plot was referred for adjudication to an Arbitrator.
Respondent-society challenged the appointment of an Arbitrator. Civil
Court restrained the Arbitrator from going ahead with the arbitration
proceedings. On the next date of hearing respondent-society did not appear
before the Arbitrator. Arbitrator proceeded ex-parte and passed an award           G
in favour of appellant. Aggrieved, respondent-society filed an appeal
against the award. Single Judge of High Court set aside the ex-parte award
in view of the restraint order passed by Civil Court. On appeal, Division
Bench held that Civil Court was not competent to entertain any civil suit
which any authority under the Act was competent to adjudicate upon, and
                                     643                                           H
    644                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A therefore, the restraint order passed by Civil Court, was a nullity and an
    order by coram non-judice. Also the arbitrator, when apprised of the
    restraint order could have ignored the order as not binding on him. Hence
    the present appeal.

            Disposing of the appeal, the Court
B
         HELD: Where exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is statutorily
  provided still on availability of requisite grounds the civil court can
  entertain a civil suit. Thus the holding of Division Bench of High Court
  that a civil court cannot under any circumstances entertain a civil suit in
C respect of proceedings pending before the Registrar, Cooperative Society
  cannot be concurred with. Also the view that Registrar of Cooperative
  Society could have ignored the order of Civil Court as not binding on him
  in view of Sections 93(3), 93(1)(c) and 60 of the Act cannot be accepted.
  It will be a dangerous proposition to be laid down as one of law that any
  individual or authority can ignore the order of the civil court by assuming
D authority upon itself to decide that the order of civil court is one by coram
  non-judice. The appropriate course in such case is for the person aggrieved      G
  first to approach the civil court inviting its attention to the relevant
  provisions of law and call it upon to adjudicate upon the question of its
  own jurisdiction and to vacate or recall its order if it be one which it did
E not have jurisdiction in law to make. So long as this is not done, the ord~r
  of competent court must be obeyed and respected by all concerned. A
  judicial order, not invalid on its face, must be given effect entailing all
  consequences, till it is declared void in a duly constituted judicial
  proceedings. Thus .the ex-parte proceedings before the arbitrator deserve
  to be set aside and the parties heard bi-parte. The then arbitrator having
F expired, a new arbitrator be appointed who shall resume the proceedings
  from the date with which the predecessor arbitrator had proceeded ex-
  parte against respondent No.I subject to the order which may be passed
  by Civil Court. (647-8-G]

            Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1969) SC 78, relied on.
G
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5180 of
    2002.

          From the Judgment anc! Order dated 27-4-2001 of the Delhi High Court
H   in L.P.A. No. 466 of 2000.
 PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA 1•. BURMAH SHELL CO-OP. HOUS. SOCIETY (LAHOTI, J.}   645

      G.L. Sanghi, K. Subba Rao and T.V. Ratnam for the Appellant.                A
      Rakesh Munjal and Sudhir Nandrajog for Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      R.C. LAHOTI J. Leave granted.
                                                                                  B
      The respondent No. 1 is a cooperative Society governed by Dehli
Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 (hereinafter 'the Act' for short). There was
a dispute between one S.N. Sharma and the respondent No. I. The former
claimed to be a member of the Society entitled to allotment of a plot by the
Society and complained of having been illegally and unjustifiably deprived        C
of the allotment. The Joint Registrar (Arbitration), vide his order dated 29-
7-1988, directed the dispute to be referred for adjudication by one Shri S.C.
Gupta S.N. Sharma expired on 28-12-1988 survived by legal representatives
whose rights are claimed by the appellant to have come to vest in him.

       The appointment of arbitrator was challenged by the Society by filing D
a civil suit in the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi who, by an
 interim order dated 4-10-1989, restrained the arbitrator from proceeding ahead
with the arbitration proceeding. There is some controversy whether the restraint
order was communicated or brought to the knowledge of the arbitrator or not;
the fact remains that on the next date of hearing appointed after 4-10-1989 E
the Society failed to make appearance before the arbitrator. The arbitrator
proceeded ex-parte and on 26-10-1989 made an award upholding the claim
of the appellant. The Society preferred an appeal against the award while the
appellant sought for its execution. The executing authority directed a plot of
land of the Society to be attached. A civil writ petition came to be filed by
the Society in the High Court of Delhi which was heard by a learned single F
judge, who vide order dated 18-8-2000, set aside the ex-parte award dated
26-10-1989 forming an opinion that in view of the restraint order passed by
the civil Court the ex-parte proceedings and the ex-parte award were vitiated.
The learned single Judge directed bi-parte hearing being restored and an
award being made afresh.                                                         G
      The appellant filled an intra-court appeal against the order of learned
single Judge. The Division Bench held that in view of the provisions contained
in Sections 60 and 93 of the Act, a civil Court was not competent to entertain
any civil suit touching a matter which any authority under the Act was
competent to adjudicate upon, and therefore, the restraint order passed by the    H
    646                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   civil Court was a nullity and an order by coram non-judice. The arbitrator,
    even if communicated with, or apprised of, the contents of the restraint order
    of the civil Court, could have ignored it and proceeded ahead as the order of
    the civil Court lacking in jurisdiction was a nullity. In the opinion of the
    Division Bench the approach of the learned Single Judge could not be
B   countemanced. However, still the Division Bench opined :-

            "It is also the stand of the first respondent that after the restraint order
            was passed by the civil Court, it stopped appearing before the arbitrator.
            The first respondent is quite justified in taking this stand. Any one in
            the position of the first respondent would have thought that the
            arbitrator ·will not proceed with the adjudication of the disputes after
c           passing of the restraint order by the Additional District Judge. In this
            view of the matter the first respondent cannot be faulted for not
            appearing before the arbitrator after 4th October, 1989. It would be
            unfair and unjust to deprive the first respondent from highlighting
            and arguing its case before the arbitrator."
D
          The Division Bench noticed the factum of Shri S.C. Gupta, the then
    arbitrator having expired in between, and therefore directed the Registrar,
    Cooperative Society to appoint another arbitrator in place of late Shri S.C.
    Gupta to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. It was ordered
    accordingly and the writ appeal was disposed of.
E
         Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, this appeal has
    been filed by special leave.

           Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion
    that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. For the purpose of the present case
F   we do not propose to enter into controversy whether the civil Court, on the
    averments made in the plaint, could have entertained a civil suit and could
    have passed the restraint order in the terms in which it did. It would suffice
    for our purpose to hold that the Society-respondent No. 1, having successfully
    obtained interim order from the civil Court restraining the arbitrator from
G   proceeding ahead with the arbitration proceeding, could have reasonably acted
    on the belief that in view of the restraint order of the civil Court the arbitrator
    would stay his hands and shall not proceed ahead. It would have been better
    if the Society, through its representative it counsel, would have made appearance
    before the arbitrator either to apprise the arbitrator with the order passed by the
    civil Court, at least to ascertain whether the order was communicated or
H   brought to the knowledge of the arbitrator. In spite of such lapse on the part
PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA v. BURMAH SHELL CO·OP. HOUS. SOCIETY (LAHOTI, J.)    647

of the Society, it is not so much a question of legality of availability of A
jurisdiction with the civil Court in passing the restraint order as it is the
question of finding out the availability of sufficient cause for non- appearance
of the Society before the arbitrator on the appointed date of hearing. We do
not agree with the reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court that a
civil Court cannot under any circumstances entertain a civil suit in respect of B
proceedings pending before the Registrar, Cooperative Society. Even where
exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Court is statutorily provided still on
availability of requisite grounds the civil Court can entertain a civil suit on
well defined parameters settled by Constitution Bench of this Court in
Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1969) SC 78. In any case we
are not prepared to subscribe to the view of the Division Bench that the C
 Registrar of Cooperative Society could have ignored the order of the civil
 Court as not binding on him in view of the provisions contained in Sections
 93 (3), 93 (I) (c) and 60 of the Act. It will be a dangerous proposition to be
 laid down as one of law that any individual or authority can ignore the order
 of the civil Court by assuming authority upon itself to decide that the order
of civil Court is one by coram non-judice. The appropriate course in such D
 case is for the person aggrieved first to approach the civil Court inviting its
attention to the relevant provisions oflaw and call it upon to adjudicate upon
the question of its own jurisdiction and to vacate or recall its order if it be
one which it did not have jurisdiction in law to make. So long as this is not
done, the order of competent court must be obeyed and respected by all E
concerned. A judicial order, not invalid on its face, must be given effect
entailing all consequences, till it is declared void in a duly constituted judicial
proceedings.

       Subject to the above we agree with the High Court that the ex-parte
proceedings before the arbitrator deserve to be set aside and the parties heard   F
bi-parte. In view of Shri S.C. Gupta, the then arbitrator having unfortunately
expired, a fresh appointment in his place needs to be made. However, we
clarify that the newly appointed arbitrator shall resume the proceedings from
the date with which the predecessor arbitrator had proceeded ex-parte against
the respondent No. I after 4-10-1989 subject to the order which may be
passed by Civil Court on injunction application tiled by the Society.             G
      For the foregoint;, reasons but subject to clarification as above the
operative part of the order made by the Division Bench of the High Court is
maintained. The appeal be treated as disposed of accordingly.

N.J.                                                      Appeal disposed of.     H