PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDEDversusMUNICIPAL COUNCIL, NANDED AND ORS.

                    [2011] 2 S.C.R. 985


         PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED                          A
                           v.
       MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, NANDED AND ORS.
            (Civil Appeal No.2619 of 2002)
                    FEBRUARY 18, 2011
                                                                 B
  [DALVEER _BHANDARI AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]

      Municipalities: Allotment of land - Plot shown and
included in development plan for public and semi public
purpose - Appel/ant-charitable trust allotted a plot of land on C ·
60 years lease for starting a school for providing education
especially for girls - However, for want of money and financial
crunch, the school for which the land was initially acquired by
the appellant could not be started and the appellant started
hostel for girls and working women - Writ petition in the nature 0
of pro bona publico challenging the allotment of land to the
appellant - High Court set aside the allotment of land - On
appeal, held: It is a matter of common knowledge that girls
and women face lot of problems and difficulties in finding a
suitable and safe accommodation when they go out of their E
own· cities, to their respective schools or colleges or work-place
- If a hostel is constructed for girls and working women, then
it is definitely for public or semi public purpose and it cannot
be said that there is any deviation from the purposes for which
the said plot was earmarked and allotted to the appellant -        F
Appellant was running thf3 hostel on no profit-no loss basis
and had taken the initiative of introducing progressive
elements (through the establishment of counselling centres),
in its efforts to alleviate some primary concerns of most
 working women - Thus, order passed by the High Court was G
not sustainable - Maharashtra Municipalities (Trqnsfer of
Immovable property) Rules, 1983 - r.21.

    Public Interest Litigation:

                             985                                 H
    986      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A      Death of sole petitioner - Effect on continuance of PIL -
  Held: Although a matter cannot be allowed to be prosecuted
  for and on behalf of a dead person or against a dead party
  but a Public Interest Litigation, which generally raises an issue
  of general public importance, should not be allowed to be
B withdrawn or dismissed on technical grounds, if cognizance
  thereof has already been taken by the court.

       Concept of, and importance of - Held: The concept of
  Public Interest Litigation was introduced to help a person or
  class of persons whose legal and constitutional rights are
C violated - It means a legal action initiated in court of law for
  the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which
  the public or class of the community have pecuniary interest
  or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
  affected - A person or the society could espouse a common
D grievance by filing a petition under Article 226 of the
  Constitution in the High Court or under Article 32 of the
  Constitution in the Supreme Court - Constitution of India,
  1950 - Articles 226, 32.

E      Procedure to be adopted while entertaining PIL - Held:
  Courts entertaining PIL enjoy a degree of flexibility unknown
  to the trial of traditional court litigation but the procedure to
  be adopted by it should be known to the judicial tenets and
  adhere to established principles of a judicial procedure
F employed in every judicial proceedings which constitute the
  basic infrastructure along whose channels flows the power of
  the court in the process of adjudication - However, minor
  deviations are permissible in order to do complete justice
  between the parties.

G         Constitution of India, 1950:

        Article 226 - Applicability of provisions of CPC to
  petitions filed u!Article 226 - Held: s.14.1, CPC creates a bar
  of applicability of the provisions of the CPC to petitions filed
H under Article 226 of the Constitution - Explanation to s.141,
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 987
             COUNCIL, NANDED
CPC which has been added in the CPC with effect from          A
1.2.1977 makes it clear that the provisions of CPC do not
speoifically apply to the proceedings under Article 226 -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.141

    Article 226 - PIL - Death of sole petitioner - Right to   8
pursue the remedy in the absence of any person on record
representing the deceaseq writ petitioner - Various options
that can be exercised by the court in such situation -
Discussed.

     The appellant was a charitable trust. It made a C
request to respondent no.1-muncipal council for -
allotment of a plot for starting a school for providing -
education especially for girls. The request was allowed
and allotment was made to the appellant on 60 years
lease and possession was given. A writ petition in the D
nature of pro bono publico was filed challenging the
allotment. During the pendency of writ petition, the sole
petitioner 'ATK' expired. There was no application to bring
on record the legal representatives of the deceased
petitioner. Thereafter, th~ High Court appointed the E
counsel of the deceased writ petitioner as Amicus Curiae
and directed him to continue to prosecute the said
petition. By impugned order, the High Court set aside the
allotment of a piece of land in favour of the appellant.
     The questions which arose   1or consideration in the
                                                            F
instant appeal were whether the 'High Court was justified
in setting aside the allotment and whether on the death
of the sole petitioner in Public Interest Litigation, the
petition would· stand abated or can be allowed to be
continued without bringing anyone else in place of the G
deceased petitioner.
    Allowing the appeal,· the Court
    HELD: 1.1. It is well settled that no matter can be       H
   988     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A allowed to be prosecuted for and on behalf of a dead
  person or against a dead party but it is also, no doubt,
  true that a Public Interest Litigation, which generally
  raises an issue of general public importance, should not
  be allowed to be withdrawn or dismissed on technical
B grounds, if cognizance thereof has already been taken
  by the court. The concept of Public Interest Litigation was
  introduced in Indian Legal System to help a person or a
  class of persons whose legal and Constitutional Rights
  are violated and where such person or class of persons
c as the case may be, owing to their disadvantaged
  position such as poverty, exploitation, socially and
  economic backwardness and other forms of disablement
  etc. is unable to approach the courts. Under these
  circumstances, a person or the society could espouse a
  common grievance by filing a petition under Article 226
0
  of the Constitution of India in the High Court or under
  Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme
  Court. [Paras 9, 10] [998-8-C; 998-E-F]

        1.2. Public Interest Litigation means a legal action
E initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public
  interest or general interest in which the public or class
  of the community have pecuniary interest or some
  interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
  affected. It is also well settled that laws of procedure are
F meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of
  doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose an
  adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizens
  under personal, propl!rty or other laws. Though, the
  courts entertaining PIL enjoy a degree of flexibility
G unknown to the trial of traditional court litigation but the
  procedure to be adopted by it should be known to the
  judicial tenets and adhere to established principles of a
  judicial procedure employed in every judicial proceedings
  which constitute the basic infrastructure along whose
H channels flows the power of the court in the process of
 PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 989
              COUNCIL, NANDED
adjudication. It would thus clearly mean that the courts        A
have to,' in the normal course of business, follow
traditional procedural law. However, minor deviations are
permissible here and there in order to do complete justice
between the parties. [Paras 11-13) [998-G-H; 999-A-D]
    '       '
                                                                B
    Black's Law Dictionary - referred to.

     2.1. Section 141, CPC creates a bar of applicability of
the provisions of the CPC to petitions filed under Article
226 of the Constitution. Explanation to Section 141, CPC
which has been added in the CPC with effect from                C
1.2.1977 makes it clear that the provisions of CPC do not
specifically apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The necessary corollary thereof
shall be that it shall be open to the courts to apply the
procedure provided in CPC to any proceeding in any              D
court of civil jurisdiction except to the proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Para 15) [9,99-G;
1000-8-C)

      2.2. Order 22, rule 4A, CPC prescribes the procedure      E
 where there is no legal representatives. Even if it is held
.that Order 22, CPC which relates to the subject of
 'abatement of suits', is not applicable to writ proceedings,
 it does not mean that death of the petitioner can be totally
 ignored. Looking to the nature of the writ proceedings,
                                                                F
 as initiated by the deceased petitioner, the question was
 whether the right to pursue the remedy would have
 survived despite the absence of any person on record
 representing the deceased. Under such circumstances,
                    -                                  I
 the following options can be exercised by the couft't. As
 soon as the information is received that a sole peti\ioner     G
 to the writ petition in the nature of a PIL filed pro bono
 publico, is dead, the court can issue a notice throf,lgh
 newspapers or electronic media inviting public spir~ed
 bodies or persons to file applications to take up'the·
 position of the petitioner. If such an application is filed,   H
   990     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] ~ S.C.R.

A the court can examine the antecedents of the person so
   applying and find out if allowing him to be impleaded as
   petitioner could meet the ends of justice. If the matter is
   already pending and the court is of the opinion that the .
   relief sought could be granted in the PIL, without having
B .to take recourse to adversarial-style of proceedings, then
   it can proceed further as if it had taken suo moto
   cognizance of the matter. The court can still examine and
   explore the possibility if any of the non-contesting
   respondents of the writ petition could be transposed as
c petitioner as ultimately the relief would be granted to the
   said party only. The court in a suitable case can ask any
   lawyer or any other individual or an organisation to assist
   the court in place of the person who had earlier filed the
   petition. However, the fact situation of the instant case
   would show that after the death of the original petitioner
0
   'ATK', respondent no.1-municipal council could have
   stepped into the shoes of the petitioner, albeit on a limited
   scale. This is because, while the deceased writ petitioner
   had challenged the initial allotment of land in favour of
E the appellant-charitable organization on the ground that
   it was made in contravention of the purpose envisaged
   in the master plan, respondent No.1 had emphasized on
   the subsequent unauthorized change in user of land by
   the appellant. Respondent no. 12 in the writ petition 'SMS'
   could also have been transposed as a petitioner because .
F he too, had a similar grievance against the respondent
   Municipal Council as that of the original deceased
   petitioner. 'SMS' also had passed away during the
   pendency of the writ proceedings - however, in his own
   second appeal, he had been represented through his
G Legal Representative. So, the impleadment of that legal
   representative as the petitioner in this PIL would have
   been sufficient for continuance of proceedings since the
   main relief sought was the same, i.e. quashing of the
   allotment order in favour of the appellant. [Paras 17 to 22]
H [1001-C-H; 1002-A-G]
 PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 991
              COUNCIL, NANDED
      2.3. Where the main writ petitioner has passed away      A
 and any other person (not being a representative of the
 deceased) is brought on record, either from the opposite
 side or from a third party, the court may, after having
 received an application requesting for permission for the
 same, grant opportunity to the newly added petitioners        B
 to amend the petition, if they so desire. In such
 circumstances, court can taken suo moto cognizance of
 the averments made in the petition, despite death of
 original petitioner, by assigning reasons and can continue
 to bring it to a logical end, so as to meet the ends of       c
 justice. In this view of the matter, reasoning of the court
 in this regard cannot be legally upheld as the same
 would lead to an anomalous situation not akin to law.
 [Paras 23-25] [1002-H; 1003-A-C]

       3. As regards merits of the matter, 'SMS' had filed a D
  civil suit for cancellation of the lease granted in favour of
  the appellant. The suit was dismissed. Ultimately, matter
  was carried up to the Supreme Court. An SLP filed before
  the Supreme Court was dismissed as withdrawn. Thus,
  in any case, the question of legality of the allotment of the E
  subject piece of land in favour of the appellant, had
. attained finality at the High Court stage, even though at
  the instance of some other person. In the suit filed by
  'SMS', who was the plaintiff therein, the Municipal Council
  was arrayed as defendant no.2 in which it had filed its F
  written statement giving reasons for allotment of piece of
  plot in favour of the appellant. It was categorically
  mentioned in the same that Divisional Commissioner had
  accorded sanction to the said transfer of plot.
  Accordingly, the appellant had started the construction G
  of its building to be used for the hostel for girls and
  working women. Similarly, all other respondents fully
  supported the allotment of plot in favour of the appellant.
  In the writ petition by 'ATK', respondent no. 1 has
  submitted that the reservations of the land for the H
   992     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A establishment of a primary school near the open space
  in the revised layout was not under the master plan. It
  was development plan submitted by the owner of these
  two lands under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Regional
  and Town Planning Act of 1966 and those two
B reservations were as per the tentative development plan
  fortfttriated by the Municipal Council as a planning
  authorit1f'""'9 plan was sanctioned before 1972. The
  owner of the land was not in a position to finance the
  construction of a primary school. In this background,
c appellant-Trust came forward with the offer to establish
  primary school as per the revised development plan with
  the consent of the owner. In the affidavit of Collector,
  Nanded in the writ petition, it was categorically averred
  that the said plot was reserved to be allotted on the lease
  basis for 60 years and the main object of the appellant-
0
  trust was to conduct educational activities for girls ..
  Assistant Director of Town Planning had also issued no
  objection certificate for the allotment of plot. He also
  referred to Rule 21 of the Maharashtra Municipalities
  (Transfer of Immovable property) Rules, 1983 under
E which the Municipal Council is bestowed with the powers
  of sanction of government grant of the land on the basis
  of lease for promotion of educational, medical, religious,
  social and charitable purposes to the registered
  institutions on payment of such concessional premium
F as the council may, in its discretion, determine. The Chief
  Officer of Nanded Municipal Council, Nanded also
  submitted his affidavit in reply to the writ petition and
  assigned various valid and cogent reasons for allotment
  of plot to the appellant. In the reply affidavit of the then
G Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation, it was
  categorically stated that on 3.1.1978, the first development
   plan of Nanded city was sanctioned by the Government
   in which the said plot was shown and included in the
   Development plan for public and semi public purposes
H and was not shown or included as land reserved 1
 PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 993
              COUNCIL, NANDED

  exclusively for primary school. Thus, only after land user A
  was changed, admittedly the appellant was using it for
  the said purposes i.e. Public and semi public use, which
  fact was not denied by respondents. However, for want
  of money and financial crunch, the school for which the
  land was initially acquired by the appellant could not be B
  started. So, it constructed a hostel for working women
  and girls taking higher education. There was one
  auditorium also which was used as family counselling
  centre. It was neither disputed nor anything could be
  brought on record to show that appellant was running c
  the said hostel for any gains or profit. In fact, it was run
  on no profit-no loss basis. The accounts of the appellant
  were duly audited and reflected absolute transparency.
  There was no reason to doubt the correctness thereof. It
  is a matter of common knowledge that girls and women 0
  face lot of problems and difficulties in finding a suitable
  and safe accommodation when they go out of their own
  cities, to their respective schools or colleges or work-
  place. If a hostel has been constructed for girls and
  working women, then it would definitely be for public or E
  semi public purpose and it cannot be said that there has
  been any deviation from the purposes for which the said
  plot was earmarked and allotted to the appellant. It is
  commendable that the appellant has taken the initiative
  of introducing progressive elements (through the
  establishment of counselling centres), in its efforts to F
  alleviate some primary concerns of most working
  women. It would be nothing short of a cruel twist of
  justice, if they are prevented from continuing to do so by
  a PIL, which is motivated by ulterior motives. The
  provisions of Memorandum of Association of the G
  appellant clearly stated that one of the objectives of the
  appellant was to provide Hostel facilities for girls and
  working women. This further fortified the stand of the
, appellant that it was public or at least semi-public
  purpose. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, the H
    994      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
  cannot be sustained in law. [Paras 26 to 37] [1003-E-H;
  1004-A-H; 1005-A-G; 1006-A-G]

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
B 2619 of 2002.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 16/17.7.2001 of the
    High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in
    Writ Petition No. 925 of 1988.

c       Dr. A.M. Singhvi, V.A. Mohta, Ajay Majithia, Anubhav
    Singhvi, Abhimanyu Bhandari (for Yash Pal Dhingra) for the
    Appellant.

      G.E. Vahanvati, AG, Parag Tripathi, ASG, Shivaji M.
D Jadhav, Shankar Chillarge, Asha Gopalan Nair for the
  Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. How far whip of Public Interest
E Litigation can be stretched and used is the moot and foremost
  question to be answered in this Appeal, arising out of judgment
  and order dated 16/17th July, 2001 passed by Division Bench
  of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at
  Aurangabad in W. P. No. 925 of 1988 titled as A nil
F Tryambakarao Kokil (since dead) Vs. Municipal Council,
  Nanded and others.

       2. Appellant herein - Pragati Mahila Mandal, Nanded is
  before us challenging the said judgment and order passed by
  Division Bench, whereby and whereunder allotment of a piece
G of plot bearing Survey No. 42 of Village Assadullabad
  (Maganpura), admeasuring 75'x 350' in its favour has been set
  aside and quashed as being illegal and void ab initio, with
  further direction to Respondent No. 1, Municipal Council,
  Nanded to take possession of the said plot together with
H
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 995
    COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

building appurtenant thereto, within a period of eight weeks from     A
the date of impugned judgment.

    Thumb nail sketch of the facts of the case is as under:

     3. Appellant is a Charitable Trust duly registered under the
provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. On 14.10.1983,           B
it made a request to Respondent No. 1 Municipal Council,
Nanded (now Nanded Waghela City Municipal Corporation) for
allotment of a plot, out of the lands belonging to it, for starting
a school to provide education, especially for girls. Accordingly,
in the year 1984, the Administrator, who was then holding the         C
charge of the Municipal Council, vide Resolution dated
22.10.1984 allotted a plot admeasuring 75' x 350' bearing
Survey No. 42 to the Appellant on a 60 years' lease.

     4. It further contemplated that the applicable rental            0
compensation shall be fixed on the basis of the rate to be
worked out by the Assistant Town Planner, subject to
compliance of the provisions of Section 92 of the Maharashtra
Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships
Act, 1965 (for short The Act'). The Assistant Town Planner was        E
also required to undertake the measurements and after fixing
boundaries, the said piece of plot came to be handed over to
the Appellant on 25.10.1984, after drawing a possession
Panchanama. However, at that time, the nominal rental
compensation could not be fixed as the State Government was
yet to grant sanction for transfer of the land in favour of the       F
Appellant, as contemplated under Section 92 of the Act.

     5. Respondent No.1, the Municipal Council then in turn
submitted a proposal to the Collector, seeking sanction of the
State Government regarding allotment of the aforesaid plot in         G
favour of the Appellant. The Assistant Town Planner by his
communication dated 5.6.1986 informed Respondent No.1 that
rental compensation for the subject plot for giving it on long
lease of 60 years, would work out at Rs. 6,816/- per annum. A
representation was made by the Appellant for reduction of the         H
    996      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A rental to a reasonable sum, owing to it being a Charitable Trust,
  working mainly for the benefit of girls and women and it had
  no source of income to pay such rental compensation. On
  reconsideration of the matter, the rental was fixed at Rs. 11 per
  annum by the Divisional Commissioner, vide his order dated
B 12.11.1986, wherein sanction was granted under Section 92
  of the Act, for allotment of the subject plot to the Appellant on a
  lease for 60 years. Thus, it was an ex-post facto sanction
  granted in favour of the Appellant, after the possession of the
  plot was already handed over to the Appellant. It was this
C allotment of land in favour of the Appellant and also other
  allotments made by Respondent No.1 in favour of other allottees
  together with certain donations made by Respondent No.1,
  Municipal Council that were the subject matter of challenge in
  a consolidated writ petition filed by Anil Tryambakarao Kokil
  (since dead) in the nature of pro bona publico.
0
         6. However, it appears that during pendency of this Writ
  Petition, the sole petitioner Anil Tryambakarao Kokil expired.
  It is to be noted here that, following his demise, no application
  to bring the Legal Representatives of the deceased Petitioner
E on record was preferred, before the hearing of the writ petition
  could commence. Thereafter, instead of directing the petition
  to have abated or to have made some alternative
  arrangements (since his legal representatives were not brought
  on record) to ensure that some other public spirited person to
F be brought in as petitioner to prosecute the petition, in place
  of deceased Anil Tryambakarao Kokil, the counsel Mr. S.C.
  Bora, who probably was already appearing for deceased Writ
  Petitioner, was appointed as Amicus Curiae and was directed
  to continue to prosecute the said petition in that capacity of
G Amicus Curiae. Thus for all practical purposes, the petition
  continued to be prosecuted and heard even when admittedly
  the sole Petitioner Anil Tryambakarao Kokil had expired long
  time back.

          7. Thus, apart from examining the correctness, legality and
H
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 997
    COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

propriety of the impugned order passed by Division Bench, it           A
is also necessary to examine the effect of death of the sole
petitioner in a Public Interest Litigation, viz., whether the same
would stand abated or can be allowed to be continued without
bringing anyone else in place of the deceased petitioner.
                                                                       B
     8. The Division Bench had, vide its interim order dated
16.1.2001, considered the question of the effect of the death
of the sole petitioner Anil Tryambakrao Kokil on the Writ
Petition, and whether anyone else is required to be brought in
his place. After duedeliberation, the Division Bench then              C
appointed counsel for the petitioner who was already
appearing as Amicus Curiae, with further direction to allow him
to continue the petition. Thus, there was change of status of the
counsel for deceased petitioner. The said Order dated
16.1.2001 reads as under:
                                                                       D
           "This is a public interest litigation pertaining to the
     allotment of plots and shops in the Nanded City; by the
     Municipal Council, Nanded. However, the petitioner has
     expired long back. Nobody has come forward to agitate
     the cause of this petition further. After having gone through     E
     the petition, this Court would like to hear the parties to find
     out whether there is any substance in the petition.

            Shri S.C. Bora, learned Advocate, who has made the
     statement that the petitioner has expired, has stated that        F
     this Vakilpatra ceases to be effective. However, in our
     opinion, it is necessary to appoint Amicus Curiae so as
     to assist this Court to understand the facts of the case and
     to find out if any decision is required to be given in the
     matter. Shri Bora is, therefore, appointed as Amicus
     Curiae in the matter.

            Shri M.V. Deshpande, learned Advocate for the
     Municipal Council, states that he was under the impression
     that since the petitioner has expired, the matter will not be
     heard today. The learned Advocates for other respondents
    998       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A         also state that they require more time for getting themselves
          prepared in the matter.

                S.O. to 6.2.2001."

         9. Perusal thereof does not, in fact, reflect or show as to
B for what reasons and under what circumstances the Amicus
   CLJrfae was allowed to be relegated to the position of the
 · petitioner, who had admittedly died long time back. It is too well
   settled that no matter can be allowed to be prosecuted for and
   on behalf of a dead person or against a dead party but it is also
C no doubt true that a Public Interest Litigation, which generally
   raises an issue of general public importance, should not be
   allowed to be withdrawn or dismissed on technical grounds, if
   cognizance thereof has already been taken by the Court. But
   an important issue would still arise whether in case of death of
D a sole petitioner in a Public Interest Litigation, without bringing
   anyone else in his place, if the petition could still be allowed to
   be prosecuted or continued?

       10. The concept of Public Interest Litigation was introduced
E in Indian Legal System to help a person or a class of persons
  whose legal and Constitutional Rights are violated and where
  such person or class of persons as the case may be, owing to
  their disadvantaged position such as poverty, exploitation,
  socially and economic backwardness and other forms of
  disablement etc. is unable to approach the courts. Under the
F aforesaid circumstances, a person or the society could espouse
  a common grievance by filing a petition under Article 226 of the
  Constitution of India in the High Court or under Article 32 of the
  Constitution of India in the Supreme Court.

G       11. According to Black's Law Dictionary - "Public Interest
  Litigation means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the
  enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the
  public or class of the community have pecuniary interest or
  some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
H affected."
    PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 999
        COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

      12. It is also well settled that laws of procedure are meant A
to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing
substantial and real justice and not to foreclose an adjudic:ition
on merits of substantial rights of citizens under personal, .
property or other laws.
                                                                         B
      13. Though, the courts entertaining PIL enjoy a degree of
flexibility unknown to the trial of traditional court litigation but the
procedure to be adopted by it should be known to the judicial
tenets and adhere to established principles of a judicial
procedure employed in every judicial proceedings which
constitute the basic infrastructure along whose channels flows C
the power of the court in the process of adjudication. It would
thus clearly mean that the courts have to, in the normal course
of business, follow traditional procedural law. However, minor
deviation~ are permissible here and there in order to do
complete justice between the parties.                                    D
/



     14. Even though, we made fervent search to find out a
suitable answer to the questions posed hereinabove, from
earlier precedents of this Court but it appears to be a unique
case. Therefore, in our wisdom, we thought it appropriate to            E
provide answer to the said question.

     15. Before proceeding to decide the said issue, it is
necessary to take into consideration some of the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter shall be referred
to as Code for short).                                                  F

     Section 141 of the Code, which creates a bar of
applicability of the provisions of the Code to petitions filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution reads as under:
                                                                        G
       "141. Miscellaneous proceedings- The procedure provided
       in this Code in regard to suit shall be followed, as far as it
       can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court
       of civil jurisdiction.
                                                                        H
    1000    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A             [Explanation - In this section, the expression
        "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but
        does not include any proceeding under article 226 of the
        Constitution.]"

         Explanation which has been added in the Code with effect
8
    from 1.2.1977 makes it clear that the provisions of the Code
    do not specifically apply to the proceedings under Article 226
    of the Constitution of India.

       The necessary corollary thereof shall be that it shall be
C open to the Courts to apply the procedure provided in the Code
  to any proceeding in any Court of civil jurisdiction except to the
  proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

        16. Order XXll, Rule 4A of the Code prescribes the
0   procedure where there is no legal representative, reads thus:

        "Order XXll Rule 4A. Procedure where there is no legal
        representative-

        If, in any suit, it shall appear to the Court that any party who
E       has died during the pendency of the suit has no legal
        representative, the Court may, on the application of any
        party to the suit, proceed in the absence of a person
        representing the estate of the deceased person, or may
        by order appoint the Administrator-General, or an officer
F       of the Court or such other person as it thinks fit to represent
        the estate of the deceased person for the purpose of the
        suit; and any judgment or order subsequently given or
        made in the suit shall bind the estate of the deceased
        person to the same extent as he would have been bound
        if a personal representative of the deceased person has
G
        been a party to the suit.

        (2) Before making an order under this Rule, the Court -

        (a) may require notice of the application for the order to
H       be given to such (if any) of the persons having an interest
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 1001
    COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

    in the estate of the deceased person as it thinks fit; and        A

    {b) shall ascertain that the person proposed to be
    appointed to represent the estate of the deceased person
    is willing to be so appointed and has no interest adverse
    to that of the deceased person."                                  B

      17. Thus, even if it is held that Order 22 of the Code, which
relates to the subject of 'abatement of suits', is not applicable
to writ proceedings, it does not mean that death of the
petitioner can be totally ignored. Looking to the nature of the
writ proceedings, as initiated by the deceased petitioner, the        C
question is whether the right to pursue the remedy would have
survived despite the absence of any person on record
representing the deceased.

     18. Under these circumstances, what would have been the          o
best option open to the court, is to be seen. In our considered
opinion, the following options could have been exercised by the
Court.

      19. As soon as the information is received that a sole
petitioner to the writ petition in the nature of a PIL filed pro bono E
publico, is dead, the Court can issue a notice through
newspapers or electronic media inviting public spirited bodies
or persons to file applications to take up the position of the
petitioner. If such an application is filed, the court can examine
the antecedents of the person so applying and find out if ·F
allowing him to be impleaded as petitioner could meet the ends
of justice.

     20. If the matter is already pending and the court is of the
opinion that the relief sought could be granted in the PIL, without   G
having to take recourse to adversarial-style of proceedings,
then it can proceed further as if it had taken suo moto
cognizance of the matter.

     21. The court can still examine and explore the possibility,
                                                                      H
    1002     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A if any of the non-contesting Respondents of the Writ Petition
  could be transposed as petitioner as ultimately the relief would
  be granted to the said party only. The court in a suitable case
  can ask any lawyer or any other individual or an organisation
  to assist the court in place of the person who had earlier filed
B the petition.

          22. However, the fact situation of this case would show that
    after the death of the original petitioner Anil Tryambakarao
    Kokil, Respondent No.1 Municipal Council could have stepped
    into the shoes of the petitioner, albeit on a limited scale. This
C   is because, while the Writ Petitioner had challenged the initial
    allotment of land in favour of the Appellant charitable
    organization on the ground that it was made in contravention
    of the purpose envisaged in the Master Plan, Respondent No.1
    Nanded Municipal Council had emphasized on the subsequent
D   unauthorized change in user of land by the Appellant. If we were
    to cast our net wider, Sitaram Maganlal Shukla, (who was
    Respondent No. 12 in the Writ Petition), could also have been
    transposed as a Petitioner because he too, had a similar
    grievance against the Respondent Municipal Council as that of
E   the original deceased petitioner. It has been brought to our
    notice that the said Sitaram Maganlal Shukla also had passed
    away during the pendency of the Writ Proceedings - however,
    in his own Second Appeal No. 30 of 2000, he had been
    represented through his Legal Representative. So, the
F   impleadment of that Legal Representative as the Petitioner in
    this PIL would have been sufficient for continuance of
    proceedings. Since the petition before the High Court was in
    the nature of a PIL, it is immaterial that the respective causes
    of action urged by the Writ Petitioner and Respondent No. 12
G   have their foundations in different sets of legal argument, as the
    main relief sought is the same, i.e. quashing of the allotment
•   order in favour of the Appellant.
        23. At any rate, in cases like the above, where the main
    Writ Petitioner has passed away and any other person (not
H
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 1003
    COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

being a representative.of the deceased) is brought on record,         A
either from the opposite side or from a third party, the court
may, after having received an application requesting for
permission for the same, grant opportunity to the newly added
petitioners to amend the petition, if they so desire.
                                                                        B
      24. In these circumstances, Court could have taken a suo
moto cognizance of the averments made in the petition, despite
death of original petitioner, by asigning reasons and could have
continued to bring it to a logical end, so as to meet the ends of
justice.
                                                                        c
    25. In this view of the matter, reasoning of the Court in this --
regard cannot be legally upheld nor we can put a seal of -
approval to such a procedure as the same would lead to an
anomalot:s situation not akin to law.
                                                                        D
      26. Now, coming to the merits of the matter, few facts
material for deciding have already been mentioned
hereinabove but we have to decide whether the Division Bench
in the impugned judgment was justified in quashing the allotment
made in favour of the Appellant or not.                                 E ·
     27. It is pertinent to point out here that the aforementioned
Sitaram Maganlal Shukla had filed a civil suit for cancellation
of the lease granted in favour of the Appellant. Ultimately, matter
was carried up to this Court. The said suit was dismissed. An
SLP (c) No.16517/2007 against the judgment and order dated              F
15.6.2007 passed in Second Appeal No. 30 of 2000 of the High
Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad was filed before this
Court. However, on 21.9.2007 the said SLP was dismissed as
withdrawn. Thus, in any case, the question of legality of the
allotment of the subject piece of land in favour of the Appellant,      G
had attained finality at the High Court stage, even though at the
instance of some other person.
    28. In the aforesaid suit filed by Sitaram Maganlal Shukla,
who was the plaintiff therein, the Municipal Council was arrayed        H
    1004    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A as defendant No.2 in which it had filed its written statement
  giving reasons for allotment of piece of plot in favour of the
  Appellant. It was categorically mentioned in the same that
  Divisional Commissioner had accorded sanction to the said
  transfer of plot by its letter dated 12.11.1986. Accordingly, the
B Appellant had started the construction of its building to be used
  for the hostel for girls and working women. Similarly, all other
  Respondents had fully supported the allotment of plot in favour
  of the Appellant.

        29. In the Writ Petition No. 925 of 1988, Respondent No.
C 1 has submitted that the reservations of the land in survey No.
  42 and Survey No. 29 for the establishment of a primary school
  near the open space in the revised layout was not under the
  master plan. It was development plan submitted by the owner
  of these two lands under Section 44 of the Maharashtra
D Regional and Town Planning Act of 1966 and those two
  reservations are as per the tentative development plan
  formulated by the Municipal Council as a planning authority. This
  plan was sanctioned before 1972. The owner of the land was
  not in a position to finance the construction of a primary school.
E In this background, Appellant - Trust came forward with the offer
  to establish primary school as per the revised development plan
  with the consent of the owner.

        30. It is pertinent to point out the affidavit of Collector,
F Nanded in the Writ Petition. He has categorically averred that
  the said plot was reserved to be allotted on the lease basis for
  60 years and the main object of the Appellant, Pragati Mahila
  Mandal, Nanded is to conduct educational activities for girls.
  Assistant Director of Town Planning had also issued no
G objection certificate for the allotment of plot to the above
  institution. He has also referred to Rule 21 of the Maharashtra
  Municipalities (Transfer of Immovable property) Rules, 1983
  under which the Municipal Council is bestowed with the powers
  of sanction of government grant of the land on the basis of lease
  for promotion of educational, medical, religious, social and
H
PRAGATI MAHILA MANDAL, NANDED v. MUNICIPAL 1005
    COUNCIL, NANDED [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

charitable purposes to the registered institutions on payment               A
of such concessional premium as the council may, in its
discretion, determine.

     31. The Chief Officer of Nanded Municipal Council,
Nanded had also submitted his affidavit in reply to the Writ                8
Petition and assigned various valid and cogent reasons for
allotment of plot to the Appellant.

    32. In the reply affidavit of Kiran Kurundkar dated
30.6.2001, the then Commissioner of the Nanded - Waghela
Municipal Corporation, it has categorically been stated that on             C
3.1.1978, the first development plan of Nanded city was
sanctioned by the Government in which the said plot was shown
and included in the Development plan for public and semi public
purposes and was not shown or included as land reserved
exclusively for primary school. Thus, only after land user was              D
changed, admittedly the Appellant is using it for the said
purposes ie. Public and semi public use, which fact has not
been denied by Respondents.

      33. However, as has been mentioned earlier, for want of               E
money and financial crunch, the school forwhich the land was
initially acquired by the Appellant could not be started. So, it
constructed a hostel for working women and girls taking higher
education. There is one auditorium also which is being used
as family counselling centre.
                                                                            F
      34. It has neither been disputed before us nor anything
could be brought on record to show that Appellant is running
the said hostel for any gains or profit. In fact, it is run on no profit-
no loss basis. This is manifest from the details of the list of
students who have been pursuing various courses for higher                  G
education since the year 1991 to the year 2000. It largely
discloses the names of the students, the courses for which they
had opted and the colleges of enrolment It also shows that
initially room rent was only Rs. 150/- which was enhanced to
Rs. 400/- in the year 2000. Most of the inmates were students               H
    1006       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A and only handful of them were working women. We have been
  given to understand that as of today, it is charging only Rs. 750/
  - per month from each of the students occupying the room. The
  accounts of the Appellant are duly audited and reflect absolute
  transparency. There is no reason to doubt the correctness
B thereof.
         35. It is a matter of common knowledge that girls and
  women face lot of problems and difficulties in finding a suitable
  and safe accommodation when they go out of their own cities,
C to their respective schools or colleges or work-place. If a hostel
  has been constructed for girls and working women, then it would
  definitely be for public or semi public purpose and it cannot be
  said that there has been any deviation from the purposes for
  which the said plot was earmarked and allotted to the Appellant.
  It is commendable that the Appellant has taken the initiative of
D introducing progressive elements (through the establishment of
  counselling centres), in its efforts to alleviate some primary
  concerns of most working women. It would be nothing short of
  a cruel twist of justice, if they are prevented from continuing to
  do so by a PIL, which is motivated by ulterior motives.
E
       36. In this regard, it is further necessary to mention that the
  provisions of Memorandum of Association of the Appellant
  clearly state that one of the objectives of the Appellant is to
  provide Hostel facilities for girls and working women. This
F further fortifies the stand of the Appellant that it is public or at
  least semi-public purpose.
      37. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, we are of
  the considered opinion that impugned judgment and order
  passed by the Division Bench cannot be sustained in law. It '
G deserves to be set aside and quashed. We accordingly do so.
  The appeal is accordingly hereby allowed.
           Parties are directed to bear their own respective costs.
    D.G.                                           Appeal allowed.
H