PRADIP KUMAR MAITYversusCHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA & ORS.

                    [2013] 7 S.C.R. 117


                 PRADIP KUMAR MAITY                               A•
                            v.
            CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 4820 of 2013)
                       JULY 01, 2013
                                                                  B
       [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI, ANIL R. DAVE AND
               VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]

    PERSONS      WITH      DISABILITIES (EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES, PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FULL                      C
.PARTICIPATION) ACT, 1995:

     Section 38 -- Age relaxation vis-a-vis physically
handicapped - Appointment of physically handicapped
challenged as he had crossed the age prescribed - Held:           0
Expression "appropriate Government and local authority shall
formulate schemes for ensuring employment of persons with
disability" and "may provide for relaxation of upper age limit"
- Connotation of - Where the Legislature uses the words 'shall'
and 'may' in close proximity of each other, as in s. 38, word     E
 'may' cannot be construed as mandatory -- Act postulates age
relaxation only as directory or expectant - Failure to mandate
age relaxation is a lacuna in the legislation - Since the
 Government Order not providing age relaxation to physically
handicapped continues to hold the field, succour cannot be
extended to appellant who is indubitably suffering from a         F
disability - Government of West Bengal Memo No. 1736(21)
 GA dated 1.11.1999 - Service law -- Age relaxation to
physically handicapped - Costs -- Proclamation adopted by
the Ecanomic and Social Commission for Asian and Pacific
Region (ESCAP) - Legislation.                                     G

    Section 2(t) - 'Person with disability' -- Held: Means a
person suffering from not less than forty per cent of any

                             117                                  H
    118      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A   disability as certified by a medical authority -- On the coming
    into force of the Disabilities Act on 7.2.1996, the definition in
    s.2(t) shall apply notwithstanding any State legislation or
    Rules irreconcilable or repugnant thereto.

       The appellant, a physically handicapped, suffering
8
  from 60% hearing disability, and respondent no. 1 were
  interviewed for the post of Group 'D' non-teaching staff.
  The appellant securing first place in the merit list was
  appointed. Respondent no. 1, who secured second
C position, challenged the appointment of the appellant on
  the ground that on the date of interview he had crossed
  the age prescribed. Though concurrent finding of the
  single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court
  were against the appellant, he continued to hold the post
  even during the pendency of the instant appeal.
D
       Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 Persons with Disabilities (Equal
  Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
E Act, 1995, inter alia, ordains in Chapter VI, provisions
  relating to the employment of disabled persons through
  the device of reservation of posts, setting apart not less
  than three per cent (3%) seats in Government educational
  institutions and other educational institutions receiving
  aid from Government. Section 38 postulates that the
F appropriate Government and local authority shall
  formulate schemes for ensuring employment of persons
  with disabilities and such schemes may provide for the
  relaxation of upper age limits. Where the Legislature uses
  the words 'shall' and 'may' in close proximity of each
G other, as· in s. 38, word 'may' cannot be construed as
  mandatory. [para 3) [122-E-F; 123-C-E]

        Chinnamarkathian Vs. Ayyavod 1982 (2) SCR 146              =
    (1982) 1 sec 159 - relied on.
H
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 119
                  & ORS.
      'Principles of Statutory lnterpretatiori' by G.P. Singh -   A
·referred to.
     Proclamation adopted by the Economic and Social
Commission for Asian and Pacific Region (ESCAP) -
referred to.                                                      B
    1.2 The Disabilities Act does not in terms provide for
age relaxation vis-a-vis persons suffering from
disabilities, though this ought to have been woven into
the fabric of the statute. The failure to mandate age
relaxation is a lacuna in the legislation since it fails to C
comprehensively put in place affirmative action in favour
of the disabled sections with regard to employment in
even the non-reserved posts. The Disabilities Act should,
therefore, explicitly postulate compulsory relaxation of
age of candidates suffering from any of the statutorily D
recognized disabilities. [para 3 and 8] [123-G-H; 126-A;
129-A-B]
     1.3 Section 2(t) defines a 'person with disability' to
mean a person suffering from not less than forty per cent         E
of any disability as certified by a medical authority.
Therefore, it cannot be accepted that this definition would
not enure to the benefit of the appellant for the reason
that the Rules/Government Orders extant in the State of
West Bengal speak to the contrary inasmuch as they
postulate complete disability. The Disabilities Act pays
                                                                  F
obeisance to the Constitution The definition of deafness
or hearing impairment contained in the extant
Government Orders must immediately measure to the
definition contained in the Disabilities Act. On the coming
into force of the Disabilities Act on 7.2.1996, the definition    G
in s.2(t) shall apply notwithstanding any State legislation
or Rules irreconcilable or repugnant thereto. [para 4 and
9] [124-D-F; 130-D-F]

     1.4 Age relaxation was available in the State of West        H
    120    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A Bengal for the physically handicapped or disabled tm ·
  1999. However, the Memo No. 1736(21) G.A. dated
  1.11.1999, inter alia, introduced benefits to Other
  Backward Classes, but withdrew or deprived it to
  disabled defence personnel ahd physically handicapped
B candidates. Keeping the ethos, expectations and
  endeavours of the Disabilities Act as well as the Beijing
  Declaration in mind as well as at heart, the deletion of age
  relaxation is facially a retrograde action. However,
  keeping extant legislation and executive fiats in
c perspective, since age relaxation is not available post
  1.11.1999 to the physically handicapped in the State of
  West Bengal and since the Disabilities Act postulates age
  relaxation only as directory or expectant, the Government
  Order will continue to hold the field and, as such,
  succour cannot be extended to the. appellant who is
0
  indubitably suffering from a disability. Keeping in view the
  fact that the appellant has not succeeded before the
  single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High
  Court, as also before this Court, he shall be liable to pay
E costs to respondent No.1. [Para 6-9 and 11] [126-H; 127-
  E; 129-C-D; 131-B]

      Saiyad Mohammad Bakar E/-Edroos v. Abdu/habib
  Hasan Arab 1998 (2) SCR 648 = (1998) 4 SCC 343 and K.P.
  Sudhakaran v. State of Kera/a 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 291 =
F (2006) 5 SCC 386 ~ referred to.
                       Case Law Reference:
      1982 (2) SCR 146            relied on           para 3
      1998 (2) SCR 648            referred to         para 9
G
      2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 291     referred to         para 9
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    4820 of 2013.
H
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 121
                  & ORS.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2007 of the                A
High Court at Calcutta in FMA No. 399 of 2006.

    A.K. Ganguli, Samapati Chatterjee, Soumen Kumar Dutta,
Sarta Chandra for the Appellant.

 . Gaurav Jain, Abha Jain, Subir Sanyal, Kamal Mishra, Avijit          8
Bhattacharjee, Sarbani Kar for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. Leave granted. We have heard                 C
counsel for the parties in detail and hence proceed to deliver
judgment.

      2. The dispute pertains to the employment of the Appellant
and Respondent no.1 in the Group 'D' staff (non-teaching staff)
of the Nazirbazar Harendranath High School, Nazirbazar,                D
Medinipur, West Bengal (Respondent no.6}. Pursuant to holding
of the interviews, the Appellant was placed first in the merit list
followed by the Respondent no.1 in second position.
 Respondent no.1, thereafter, challenged the appointment of the
Appellant on the ground that he had crossed the permissible            E
age prescribed for recruitment to this Group 'D' post even on
the date when the interview was conducted and completed.
 However, the Appellant's contention is that he was entitled to
 relaxation in the maximum age as a consequence of his
 suffering from a hearing disability to the extent of sixty per cent   F
(60%). The factum of his said affliction is not in dispute,
although it has been faintly argued by Mr. Sanyal, learned
counsel for Respondent no.1 that the applicable Rules and
Regulations contemplate complete loss of audio powers for
favourable treatment; and that the forty per cent (40%} disability,    G
indubitably prescribed by the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act.
1995 [hereafter referred to as, 'Disabilities Act'] does not come
to the succour of the Appellant. Despite the fact that the
Appellant had not succeeded in the writ proceedings before the         H
    122       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 7 s.c.~..


A learned Single Judge and thereafter had also failed in his
  Appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court,
  he appears to have been in the employment of Respondent no.6
  throughout the duration of litigation and remained so on
  01.10.2007 when the maintenance of status quo came to be
B ordered in the present proceedings. We may also underscore
  that concurrent findings are against the Appellant.         ·

         3. The Disabilities Act was passed by Parliament in the
   wake of the Proclamation that came to be adopted by the
   Economic and Social Commission for Asian and Pacific
C Region (ESCAP), the endeavour and expectation of which was
   the attainment of full participation and equality to persons with
   disabilities in the matter of protection of their rights, provision
   of medical care, education, training, employment and
   rehabilitation. Keeping in perspective that India was a signatory
D to the said Proclamation, necessitating its wholesome and
   holistic implementation, the Disabilities Act was introduced in
 · the Lok Sabha on 26th August 1995 and came into force on
   7th February 1996. The Disabilities Act, inter alia, ordains in
   Chapter VI, provisions relating to the employment of disabled
E persons through the device of reservation of posts,
   establishment of Special Employment Exchanges, the
   formulation of schemes for ensuring employment of persons
   with disabilities and the reservation and setting apart of not less
   than three per cent (3%) seats in Government educational
F institutions and other educational institutions receiving aid from
   Government etc. etc. The Disabilities Act also specifically
   stipulates that if in any recruitment year any vacancy cannot be
   filled up due to non-availability of persons with disabilities, i.e.,
   (i) blindness or low vision; (ii) hearing impairment; and (iii)
G locomotor disability or cerebral palsy, such vacancy shall be
   carried forward. If in the succeeding year the vacancies in the
   three categories cannot yet again be filled up by an eligible
   candidate, the vacancy must first enure to the benefit of any of
   the other two categories; and only in the event that there are
H no candidates even therefrom, can the employer fill up such
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 123
         & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
segregated or reserved vacancy by a general appointment. It A
is also noteworthy that the reservation of three per cent (3%)
is a minimum requirement. So far as Government as well as
aided educational institutions, also poverty alleviation schemes
of appropriate Government and local authorities are concerned,
the statute mandates a three per cent reservation for the benefit B
of persons with disabilities; failure to implement these
provisions can be remedied by issuance of a writ of mandamus.
The two sections, i.e., Sections 39 and 40 containing these
 stipulations are preceded by Section 38, which is germane to
the conundrum at hand. It postulates that the appropriate . c
 Gpvernment and local authority shall formulate schemes for
ensuring employment of persons with disabilities and such
 schemes may provide for the relaxation of upper age limits.
 Owing to the use of the word 'may' in the section, the question
 that immediately arises is whether even in the absence of an 0
 implemental scheme, can a superior Court issue an inviolable
 order with regard to the relaxation of upper age limits.
 Chinnamarkathian Vs. Ayyavoo (1982) 1 SCC 159 holds that
 whenever the word 'may' is employed in a statute it confers
 discretion to do something. It seems to us that in instances
 where the Legislature uses the words 'shall' and 'may' in close · E
 proximity of each other, as in Section 38, there is virtually no
 room to construe the word 'may' as mandatory. Indeed, the
 decisions in this context dwell predominantly on the scope of
 interpreting "shall" as merely obligatory, whereas the nodus in
 hand is the obverse. G.P. Singh in his treatise titled, the F
 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' remains steadfast in the
 opinion that when both words are used in the same Section,
 'shall' imposes an obligation or imperative whilst 'may' connotes
 directive or discretionary power., The Disabilities Act should,
therefore, explicitly postulate compulsory relaxation of age of G
 candidates suffering from any of the statutorily recognised
disabilities. The absence of this feature has become
conspicuous by the dispute in hand. We think that the failure to
mandate age relaxation is a lacuna in/ the legislation since it
fails-to comprehensively put in place affirmative action in favour   H
     124      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 7 S.C.R.


.A of the disabled sections of our society with regard to
   employment in even the non-reserved posts. The critique that
   this would unfairly increase the percentage of reservation does
   not pass muster since so far as non-reserved posts are
   concerned, the appointment has to be solely according to merit.
 B Age relaxation enables disabled persons, otherwise outside the
   orbit of employment to general posts, an additional opportunity
   of being considered for such post. It is dissimilar to the regime
   of a reserved post where only a person in the postulated group
   is eligible for appointment. One readily recalls the self-
 C deprecation of the saint who realized the triviality of his lament
   for not possessing a pair of shoes on his encountering a person
   who had no feet. When a relaxation of age is extended to the
   disabled, the post remains to be nevertheless filled up by
   adherence to merit.
 D        4. Before departing from this skeletal narration of the
    provisions of the Disabilities Act, suffice it to state that Section
    2(t) defines a 'person with disability' to mean a person suffering
    from not less than forty per cent of any disability as certified by
    a medical authority. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument
 E of Mr. Sanyal that this definition would not enure to the benefit
   ·of the Appellant for the reason that the Rules I Government
    Orders extant in the State of West Bengal speak to the contrary
    inasmuch as they postulate complete disability. On the coming
    into force of the Disabilities Act on 7th February 1996, the said
 F definition in Section 2(t) thereof shall apply notwithstanding any
    State legislation or Rules irreconcilable or repugnant thereto.
    This proposition of law is too well settled to tolerate any
    explanation again; doing so would needlessly lead to prolixity.
    However, despite thii; legal posit, as will presently be seen,
 G relief will still not be available to the Appellant.

          5. Reverting to the position obtaining in the State of West
     Bengal at the relevant time, our attention has been drawn to
     the Government Order dated August 26, 1986 which reads as
     follows:
 H
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 125
         & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
   "Sub:      Recruitment of Assistant teacher, non-teaching      A
              staff and Headmaster/Headmistress of non-
              Government Secondary Schools ~ Upper-age
              limit for physically handicapped candidates.

   The undersigned is directed to say that in terms of this       B
   department Memo No.454-Edn.(S) dated 25.4.83 the
   upper-age limit for first entry into service of Assistant
   Teachers and non-teaching staff has been prescribed as
   35 years. The age limit is relaxable upto 40 years for
   experienced and highly qualified candidates and for            C
   candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
   Tribe, disabled defence personnel and physically
   handicapped candidates. But in terms of Finance
   Department Memo No.105-17-F dated 2.12.80 the upper-
   age limit for recruitment to State Government Service and
   posts whether recruited through the Public Service             D
   Commission or otherwise, has been prescribed as 45
   years in the case of physically handicapped persons
   provided they are otherwise suitable.

   (2) In view of the position stated above, the Government       E
   have after careful consideration, decided that the upper-
   age limit for first entry into service of Assistant teachers
   and non-teac~ing staff of Non-Government Secondary
   Schools will be 45 years in the case of physically
   handicapped persons provided they are otherwise                F
   suitable and possess the qualifications and capacity
   to perform duties and responsibilities attached to the
   posts concerned.

   (3) Grant of the above concessions shall be subject to the
   following conditions:                                          G

   (i) The "physically handicapped" as illustrated in item (ii)
   below should be proved by a medical certificate from
   Competent Medical Officer as defined in Rule 14 of West
   Bengal Service Rules Part-I.                                   H
    126          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A         (ii) For the purpose of the concessions the term 'Physically
          handicapped' wilt include three categories viz., the blind,
          the deaf and dumb and the orthopaedically handicapped
          as indicated below:

           (a)    The blind - The blind are those who suffer from the
B
                  following conditions -

                  (i)    Total absence of sight.

                  (ii)   Visual acquity not exceeded 3/60 or 10/200
c                        (Smellen) in the better eye with correcting
                         lense.

           (b)    The deaf and dumb - The deaf are those in whom
                  the sense of hearing is fully non-functional for the
                  ordinary purpose of life. The dumb are those
D                 persons suffering from aplasia (complete loss of
                  speech-sense of hearing normal) or whose speech
                  is not clear and/ or normal.

           (c)    The orthopaedically handicapped are those who
E                 have physically defects or deformities which cause
                  adequate interference with the normal functioning
                  of bones, muscles and joints.

                This order shall be deemed to have come into force
          with effect from 25.4.83, i.e., the date of issue of order
F
          No.454-Edn.(S) dated 25.4.83."

                                                   [Emphasis supplied]

      6. This Government Order was partially modified by letter
G dated July 29, 1990 conveying to all concerned the following :

          "In supersession of this Department G.O. No.454 Edn.(S)
          dated 25.04.83 the undersigned is directed to say that after
          careful consideration, the Government have decided that
          the upper age limit for first entry into service of Assistant
H
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 127
         & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
    Teacher and non teaching staff in Non Govt. Secondary         A
    Schools shall be 35 years. The age limit is relaxable upto
    40 years for candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste
    and Scheduled Tribe, Disabled defence personnel and
    physically handicapped candidates.
                       II
                                                                  B


As will be palpably clear, age relaxation was available for the
physically handicapped or disabled till 1999 although the
relaxation stood reduced from 45 years to 40 years of age.
                                                                  c
     7. Mr. Sanyal, learned counsel for the Respondent no.1 has
emphasized the point that age relaxation was specifically dealt
with in both the above Government Orders, and since the age
relaxation for the defence personnel and physically
handicapped or disabled has notably been deleted from             D
subsequent Government Orders it is facially clear that this
advantage was not found by the State of West Bengal to be
expedient any longer. It is for this purpose that reliance was
placed on behalf of Respondent no.1 to Memo No.1736(21)
G.A. dated 1st November 1999 which, inter alia, introduced
                                                                  E
benefits to Other Backward Classes whilst withdrawing or
depriving it to disabled defence personnel and physically
handicapped candidates :

        "GUIDELINE FOR RECRUITMENT OF NON-
    TEACHING STAFF (LIBRARIAN, CLERK, GROUP D                     F
    STAFF) OF NON GOVT. AIDED SECONDARY
    SCHOOLS, HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOLS, GOVT.
    SPONSORED SCHOOLS, D.A. GETTING SCHOOLS
    AND ALL TYPES OF AIDED MADRASAHS INCLUDING
    SENIOR MADRASAHS AND NEWLY SET UP                             G
    EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION AT SECONDARY LEVEL
    IN WEST BENGAL



    4.d) No person shall be selected for appointment unless       H
    128       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 7 S.C.R.


A         he/she is a citizen of India and 18 years of age or above.
          The maximum age limit for appointment in Aided Institution
          is 37 years and as relaxable in case of S.C./S.T./O.B.C.
          candidates as per existing Government orders.
                          II

B
          This Memorandum states that it is in supersession of all
          previous orders of that Department in respect of procedure
          for recruitment of non-teaching staff of any Institution.
          Predicated on this Memorandum it is contended against
c         the Appellant that age relaxation provided in the 1990
          Government Order stood withdrawn; that this position has
          been reiterated in Government Order dated 21st January
          2003 which states that non-teaching posts must be filled
          up only on the basis of the guidelines for recruitment as
D         contained in Memo No.1736(21) G.A. dated 01 st
          November 1999 issued by the Directorate of Education,
          West Bengal :

          "In the circumstances, the undersigned is directed by the
          order of the Governor to say that henceforth all
E
          appointments in teaching and non-teaching posts available
          as vacant either due to retirement/death/resignation of an
          existing employee or due to creation of posts in the
          aforesaid institutions on first recognition or upgradation or
          otherwise should be filled up only as follows :
F
          (a) In case of whole-time teaching post, through the School
          Service Commission of the concerned region; and

          (b) In case of a non-teaching post, on the basis of the
G         guidelines for recruitment as contained in Memo
          No.1736(21) G.A. dt. 01.11.99 issued by the Director of
          School Education, West Bengal.

          This cancels the earlier Govt. orders in Memo No.117-
          S E ( S) dt. 24.02.1995 and Memo No.511-SE(S)
H         dt.29.03.2000.                    .
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 129
         & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
           This will take immediate effect."                          A
      8. We have already underscored that the Disabilities Act
does not in terms provide for age relaxation vis-a-vis persons
suffering from disabilities and that this ought to have been
woven into the fabric of the statute. Had this been so done, it       B
would have been mandatorily incumbent on every State to fall
in line with and implement the Central legislation especially so
far as extending the maximum age eligibility criterion for the
disabled. Having said so, and keeping the ethos, expectations
and endeavours of the Disabilities Act as well as the Beijing         C
Declaration in mind as well as at heart, it seems to us that the
deletion of age relaxation is facially a retrograde action.
However, keeping extant legislation and executive fiats in
perspective, since age relaxation is not available post 1st
November 1999 to the physically handicapped in the State of
West Bengal, regrettably, succour cannot be extended to the           D
Appellant who is indubitably suffering from a disability. Relief
for the disadvantaged in our society should be holistic and
should be implemented with vigour. Although the issue is not
focal before us, we also think that it is most unfortunate that the
exercise to identify and earmark posts suitable for being filled      E
up by total reservation for the disabled to the extent of a
minimum of three per cent has not been completed thereby
reducing the statutory promise to a mere hallucination. We
hasten to reiterate that the present case does not fall in the
genre of reservation but of relaxation of age.                        F

     9. Since the legal regime applicable to amelioration of the
persons suffering from disabilities has been argued before us,
we need to dwell upon it briefly. Briefly, because this aspect of
the law is so well entrenched in our jurisprudence that only a        G
succinct reiteration is justified. The Constitution of India is the
grund norm, demanding meticulous allegiance from all other
laws. Statutes, central/parliamentary or of State legislatures,
must mandatorily comply with our Constitution. We must hasten
to emphasise that statutes must also conform with the discipline
                                                                      H
    130      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 7 S.C.R.


A of the three lists contained in the Seventh Schedule of the
  Constitution. Most statutes postulate the promulgation of Rules,
  through delegated legislation, which, if they are not ultra vires
  the Statute inasmuch as they are operational within the
  parameters of their parent pandects, require adherence.
B Executive Orders or Administrative Instructions cease to have
  legal efficacy the moment they are contrary to their superiors,
  i.e., the Constitution, a Statute, or any delegated legislation in
  the form of Rules or Regulations. This is also referred to as
  "dominion paramountcy" by some Courts. There is a plethora
c of precedents on this proposition, as also on the tiers of
  subservience, including the adumbration in the case of Saiyad
  Mohammad Bakar El-Edroos v. Abdulhabib Hasan Arab
  (1998) 4 SCC 343 and K.P. Sudhakaran v. State of Kera/a
  (2006) 5 SCC 386. The Disabilities Act pays obeisance to the
D Constitution and had it concerned itself with improving the lot
  of the disabled by also providing for compulsory relaxation of
  age stipulations for employment having regard to disability, all
  other contrary forms of law-making by State Legislatures or
  State Governments would have fallen foul of it, and consequently
  would have ceased to command legal authority. Thus, the
E definition of deafness or hearing impairment contained in the
  extant Government Orders must immediately measure to the
  definition contained in the Disabilities Act. But since the
  Disabilities Act postulates age relaxation only as directory or
  expectant, the Government Order will continue to hold the field.
F
       10. Mr. Ganguly, learned senior counsel appearing for the
  Appellant has not contended that the Government Orders
  mentioned above are ultra vires the Disabilities Act or that they
  are devoid of being functional. This is also the dialectic favoured
G by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the
  impugned judgment, which we affirm.

      11. In this analysis we cannot but conclude that the
  Appellant has failed to disclose any Legislation or Rules or
H Orders that would facilitate, support or legitimise his claim for
PRADIP KUMAR MAITY v. CHINMOY KUMAR BHUNIA 131
         & ORS. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
being conferred with the advantage of age relaxation, which is     A
presently available only to SC/ST/OBC candidates. It is for
these reasons that regretfully we are unable to locate any merit
in the present appeal. Interim orders are accordingly recalled
and the appeal is dismissed. Keeping in view the fact that the
Appellant has not succeeded before the Single Bench as well        B
as the Division Bench, as also before us, he shall be liable to
pay costs to Respondent No.1.

R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.