PRADEEP OIL CORPORATIONversusMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.

                         [2011] 4 S.C.R. 764


A                PRADEEP OIL CORPORATION
                                v.
         MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 6546-6552 of 2003)
                            APRIL 6, 2011
B
    [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND ANIL R. DAVE JJ.]

         DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1957:

c        ss. 2(3), 114 and 120(2) - "Buildings" - Oil tanks -
    Property tax - Under the Government Grant Act, grantee in
    terms of the agreement, given possession of certain land and
    the grantee erected 'petroleum installation buildings'
    consisting of petroleum tanks, buildings, etc. for receiving and
    storing therein petroleum in bulk - The constructions were
0
    subjected to property tax by MCD - Plea of grantee that it was
    a licensee and not a tenant and, therefore, not liable to the
    tax - Held: The grantee being in exclusive possession of the
    buildings since 1958, there is a strong presumption in favour
E   of tenancy - It is for the grantee to show that despite the right
    to possess the demised premises exclusively, a right or
    interest in the property has not been created - The burden
    has not been discharged - On the other hand, in the
    proceedings under the Public Premises Unauthorized
    Occupants Eviction Act, the grantee has termed the
F   arrangement as a tenancy by describing the fee as rentals -
    The document in question constitutes a lease - Oil tanks are
    buildings for the purposes of tax - Grantee is, therefore, liable
    to pay tax, which becomes payable from the date of accrual
    of the liability - Constitution of India, 1950 -Article 285 -
G   Government Grant Act, 1895 - s.2.

        TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

        s. 105 -"Lease" - Connotation of- Explained.
H                                 764
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF 765
                      DELHI
                                                                  A
        EASEMENrs ACT, 1882

        s.52 -"License" - Connotation - Explained.

        DEEDS AND DOCUMENTS
        A deed must be read in its entirety - A document if to    B
    be construed a "lease" or "licence" -Determinative factors,
    summarized.

        WORDS AND PHRASES

        "Lease" and "License" - Connotation of.                   c
         The appellant was granted, under the Government
    Grant Act, separate licenses for the purpose of
    maintaining depot for storage of petroleum products at
    yearly license fees of Rs. 20,640/- and Rs. 31 ;000/-. In D
    terms of the grant, the appellant erected 'petroleum
    installation buildings' consisting of petroleum tanks,
    buildings and other conveniences for receiving and
    storage therein petroleum in bulk. The respondent-
    Municipal Corporation of Delhi by its order dated E
    17.8.1984, assessed the said property to property tax,
    which was challenged before appellate court/MCD
    Tribunal, which set aside the or~er holding that no
    property tax could be levied on the ·grante~ u/s 20(2) of
    the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.'The writ F
    petition filed by the MCD was dismissed by the Single
    Judge of the High Court. The LPA was ultimately heard
    by the Full Bench of the High Court, which held that the
    petroleum tanks, were 'building' and the grantee was a
    lessee and not licensee in the property. Aggrieved, the G
    grantee filed the appeals.

        Dismissing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 A license may be created on deal or parole
    and it would be revocable. However, when it is                H
    766     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 4 S.C.R.     •
A accompanied with grant it becomes irrevocable. A mere
  license does not create interest in the property to which
  it relates. License may be personal or contractual. A
  license without the grant creates a right in the licensor
  to enter into a land and enjoy it. Lease on the other hand,
B would amount to transfer of property. It is quite clear that
  the distinction between lease and license is marked by
  the last clause of s. 52 of the Easements Act as by reason
  of a license, no estate or interest in the property is
  created. [para 13-15] [781-F-G; 782-E-F]
c      Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, [1960] 1
    SCR 368; and Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly,
    1974 ( 2) SCR 530 = (1974) 1 SCC 202 - relied on.

      Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27 at
D page 21 - referred to.

       1.2 A license, inter alia, (a) is not assignable; (b) does
  not entitle the licensee to sue the stranger in his own
  name; (c) it is revocable and (d) it is determined when the
E grantor makes subsequent assignment. The rights and
  obligations of the lessor as contained in the Transfer of
  Property Act, 1882 are also subject to the contract to the
  contrary. Even the right of assignment of leasehold
  property may be curtailed by an agreement. [para 16]
F [782-H; 783-A-B]

      1.3 In the instant case, grant has been made by the
  President of India in terms of s. 2 of the Government
  Grants Act, 1895 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  may have little bearing on the. matter. The former, i.e. the
G Government Grants Act, being a special statute would
  prevail over the general statute, i.e. the Transfer of
  Property Act. Accordingly, the rights and obligations of
  the parties would be governed by the terms of the
  provisions of Government Grants Act whereunder the
H Government is entitled to impose limitations and
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
                      DELHI
                                                             767


    restrictions upon the grants and other transfer made by         A
    it or under its authority. [para 17] [782-H; 783-8-D]

         1.4 A bare perusal of the grant in question reveals that
    in the grant, the appellant i.e. grantee has been described
    as licensee. But, in the considered view of the Court, the
                                                                    8
    mere use of the word "licensee" would not be sufficient
    to hold the grant in question as a license. Simply using
    the word "licensee" would neither be regarded as
    conclusive nor determinative. In terms of Clause (1) of the
    indenture the licensee was to have the use of a piece of        C
    land for maintaining a depot for petroleum goods
    received through railways but thereby his rights to deal
    with the property and the goods brought thereon had not
    been taken away. Clearly, an embargo has been placed
    as regards the user of the construction made thereon to
    the extent that the same would be used solely for the           D
    storage of petroleum products but such restriction by
    itself can also be imposed in a case of lease. The grant
    in question clearly states that the constructions are to be
    made as per specifications approved by the Chief
    Inspector of Explosives which condition was also                E
    otherwise governed by the provisions of Explosives Act.
    Further, the pipelines are required to be laid at railway
    levels or demised in favor of the grantee, wherefor
    expenses are to be paid by it. [para 19] [783-F-G; 784-A-
    8]                                                         .    F

         1.5 The appellant, i.e. the licensee, is required to pay
    the sum specified in the grant which has been described
    as 'rent' in terms of Clause 7. It further reveals that the
    licensee is also required to pay all taxes payable in           G
    respect of the said land for the time being found to be
    payable and proportionately and all cesses, and taxes in
    respect ·of the premises applicable to the land, tanks,
    works and conveniences if the same be not separately
    assessed in respect thereof. It further stipulates that the     H
    768    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2011] 4 S.C.R.    •
A licensee shall not be entitled to assign, mortgage, sub-
  let or otherwise transfer the privileges without previously
  obtaining the consent in writing of the Administration.
  The licensee shall not use the said land or any part
  thereof or permit the same to be used for worship, or
B religious or educational purposes or for any other
  purpose not specified in Clause 1 thereof but such a
  claim is not determinative. Clause (9) of the said indenture
  stipulates that either party would be entitled to terminate
  the license without assigning any reasons by giving to
c the other party at any time three calendar months' notice
  in writing. It is to be noted that even u/s. 106 of the
  Transfer of Property Act, 1882 no reason is required to
  be assigned for determining the lease. [para 20] (784-C-
  F]

D      1.6 Although, Clause 11 of the indenture in question
  provides that nothing contained therein be construed to
  create a tenancy in favor of the licensee of the said land,
  but again in the considered view of the Court, the mere
  description of the grant in question is not decisive. Under
E the grant in question, the Administration has been given
  power under Clause 12 to re-enter upon and retake and
  absolutely retain the possession of the said land but. the
  same could be permissible in law only upon
  determination of grant which would require 3 months'
F prior notice. It is to be noted that Clause 12 further
  stipulates that the licensee shall at all times keep the
  Administration indemnified against and shall reimburse
  it towards all claims, demands, suits, losses, damages,
  costs etc. which it may sustain or incur by reason of
G inconsequence of any injury to any person or to any
  property resulting from any explosion or leakage of any
  petroleum kept or placed by the licensee upon the said
  land. [para 21] (784-G-H; 785-A·C]

      1.7 Clause 14 of the indenture in question provides
H that the licensee shall follow all petroleum rules and
•   PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF 769
                     DELHI
regulations applicable to the construction, maintenance         A
of petrol pump or stores and for public safety. It is
significant to note that the said clause clearly provides
that all taxes in respect of the said patrol pump, stores,
buildings under the control of the licensee shall be paid
by the licensee. However, the rights of the parties on          B
determination of the grant have been specified. [para 22]
[785-D]

    1.8 Thus, the clauses of the indenture in question
clearly show that a bundle of rights have been conferred        C
upon the grantee i.e. the appellant. [para 23] [785-E]

     1.9 It is well settled legal position that a deed must
be read in its entirety and reasonably. The intention of the
parties must also as far as possible be gathered from the
expression used in the document itself. [para 24] [785-F]       D
     1.10 Whether a particular document will constitute
"lease" or "license" would inter alia depend upon certain
factors which can be summarized as follows: (a) whether
a document creates a license or lease, the substance of         E
the document must be preferred to the form; (b) the real
test is the intention of the parties - whether they
intended to create a lease or a license; (c) if the document
creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but if it
only permits another to make use of the property, of            F
which the legal possession continues with the owner, it
is a license; and (d) if under the document a party gets
exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is
considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be
established which negative the intention to create a lease.
[para 29] [787-F-H; 788-A-B]                                    G
      Union Bank of India v. Chandrakant Gordhandas Shah,
1994 (3)    suppl.    scR 542 = (1994) 6 sec 211;
Vayallakath Muhammedkutty v. 11/ikkal Moosakutty JT 1996
(6) 665; Om Parkash v. Dr. Ravinder Kumar Sharma, 1995          H
    770     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 4 S.C.R.
                                                                   •
A Supp.(4) SCC 115; Swarn Singh v. Madan Singh, 1995
  Supp.(1) SCC 306 and Lilawati H. Hiranandani v. Usha
  Tandon, AIR 1996 SC 44 - referred to.

         1.11 In the instant case, admittedly, the appellant is
    in possession of the buildings in question since 1958.
8
    They have been permitted to raise huge constructions
    and the nature of construction is of wide range. An
    administration block along with tanks for storing
    petroleum had been constructed. A boundary wall around
    installations and administrative block had also been
C   constructed. Admittedly, the grantee is in exclusive
    possession over the lands in question along with
    construction thereon without any let or hindrance from
    the Administration. Further, the appellant had been
    continuously carrying on their business without any
D   interference from any quarter whatsoever since 1962. As
    in the instant case, exclusive possession has been
    granted, there is a strong presumption in favour of
    tenancy. That being the case, it is for the appellant to
    show that despite the right to possess the demised
E   premises exclusively, a right or interest in the property
    has not been created. The burden, therefore, would be
    on the appellant/grantee to prove contra. [para 30) (788-
    B-E]

F      1.12 The burden is not discharged, in the instant case
  rather for the purposes of resisting its eviction from the
  suit land in the proceeding initiated under the Public
  Premises Unauthorized Occupants Eviction Act, the
  appellant has taken the stand pleading non-applicability
G of the Easements Act and has themselves termed the
  arrangement as a tenancy by describing the fee as
  rentals. The said factor is also a vital factor, as on the own
  showing of the appellant the arrangement was nothing
  but a lease. The appellant, therefore, cannot take up a
H plea by which they approbate and reprobate at the same
  time. [para 31] [788-F-G]
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
                      DELHI
                                                             771

         1.13 In the instant case, the Administration has also      A
    the option to revise the rent. Had it been a case of mere
    right to use the property, such provision would not have
    been there. Further, the manner in which the rent is to be
    paid is also important. It is to be paid annually; in a case
    of license pure and simple, the indenture would not             B
    normally contain a claim that rent would be paid annually.
    [para 32] [789-A-B]

        Capt. B. V. D'Souza v. Antonio Fausto Fernandes, [1989]
    3 SCR 626 - relied on
                                                                    c
          · Street v. Mountford, 1985 Appeal Cases 809 - referred
    to.
         1.14 It is true that there are indeed certain restrictions
    which have been imposed by the Administration with D
    regard to the.construction of the building"'storage tank,
    etc., but, such restrictions are not deCi$ive for the ..
    purpose of determining as to whether a dpcument is         a
    lease or license as such restrictions could also be
    imposed in case of a lease as well. [para 34] [789-G-H]         E

        Glenwood Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Philips, 1904-1907 All ER
    (Reprint) 203 - relied on.

         1.15 The undisputed fact may also be noticed that the
    parties have agreed that for the purpose of determination       F
    of the agreement three calendar months' notice had to be
    given. Undoubtedly, such clause in the document in
    question has a significant role to play in the matter of
    construction of document. Clearly, if the parties to the
    agreement intended that by reason of such agreement             G
    merely a license would be created such a term could not
    have been inserted. It is well settled legal position that a
    license can be revoked at any time at the pleasure of the
    licensor. Even otherwise, unless the parties to the
    agreement had an intention to enter into a deed of lease,       H
    772     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 4 S.C.R.
                                                                  •
A the Administration would not have agreed to demise the
  premises on payment of rent in lieu of grant of exclusive
  possession of the demised land. In view of the same, it
  cannot be said that a stipulation having been made in the
  agreement itself by reasons thereof the grantee shall not
s be a tenant and thus the deed must be construed to be
  a license. In the considered view of the Court, such a
  clause may at best be one of the factors for construction
  of the document in question but the same by itself
  certainly would not be a decisive factor. [para 35-36] [790-
C C-G]
        1.16 Thus, the document in question constitutes
    lease in favour of the appellant-grantee and as such, the
    appellant-grantee is liable to pay the tax. [para 43) [793·
    E]
D
         2.1 By reason of the provisions of the DMC Act, the
    MCD is required to render several services as specified
    therein for the purpose whereof, tax is required to be
  . imposed both on land as also on building. The definition
E of "land" and "'building" as provided in the DMC Act
    must be given its full effect. As has been held by this
    Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater
    Bombay , even an oil tanker has been held to be building.
   The tax is imposed upon the holders of land and building
F by the MCD which is compensatory in nature. The word
    "letting out" in the context of the grant, therefore, must
    receive its purposive meaning. The MCD renders services
   and the benefits of such services are being taken by all
   concerned, viz., the owner of the land or building. Even
G a person who Is in possession of a land or building,
   whether legal or illegal, takes benefits of such services
    rendered by the MCD. The MCD for the purpose of
   realization of tax is not concerned with the relationship
   of the parties. It is concerned only with imposition and
H recovery of tax which is payable on all lands and
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF 773
                      DELHI
    buildings in accordance with law. The exceptions thereof         A
    have been enumerated in the Act itself. Section 119 of the
    MCD Act is one of such provisions. Such an exemption
    clause, as is well known, must be construed strictly.
    Section 119 of the MCD Act would apply if the lands and
    buildings are the properties of Union of India. The MCD          B
    has the right to levy the property tax in terms of s. 114 of
    the MCD Act in the manner as specified therein. [para 38-
    39) [791-B-F]

        Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil        C
    Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686 - relied on.

         2.2 By reason of the agreement in question, the
    buildings in question do not belong to the Administration.
    Admittedly, it belongs to the grantee i.e. the appellant.
    Therefore, s. 119 of the MCD Act would not apply to the          D
    building in question. That being the case, the grantee/
    appellant is liable to pay tax although the ownership of
    the land may belong to the Administration. Section 115
    of the MCD Act clearly provides that the general tax shall
    be payable in respect of lands and buildings. Once it is         E
    held that the grantee were liable to pay tax, the same
    becomes payable from the date of accrual of the liability.
    The said position is also fortified from specific stipulation
    in the agreement that the liability to pay all taxes including
    municipal taxes is on the grantee. [para 40] [791-G-H; 792-      F
    A-DJ
        HUDCO v. MCD; 2000 ( 5) Suppl. SCR 666 = (2001)
    1 SCC 455 - Distinguished.
        2.3 Incidence to pay tax u/s. 120(2) DMC Act is with         G
    regard to a composite assessment of land and buildings
    ass. 120(2) talks of a composite assessment only. In the
    instant case, vacant land or property of Railways is not
    sought to be taxed u/s. 120(1) DMC Act, but property tax/
    Composite Assessment is sought· to be made on the                H
    774      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 4 S.C.R.
                                                                    •
A   installations/storage depots having been constructed by
    the appellant-by virtue of s. 120(2) DMC Act. [para 42] (793-
    C-D]

                         Case Law Reference:

B    AIR 1991 SC 686                    relied on      para 9

     [1960] 1 SCR 368                   relied on      para 14

     1974 ( 2 ) SCR 530                 relied on      para 15

C    1994 (3) Suppl. SCR 542            referred to    para 25

     JT 1996 (6) 665                    referred to    para 25

     1995 Supp.(4) sec 115              referred to    para 26
     1995 Supp.(1) sec 306              referred to    para 27
0
     AIR 1996 SC 441                    referred to    para 28
     1985 Appeal Cases 809              referred to    para 32

     [1989] 3 SCR 626                   relied on      para 33
E    1904-1907 All ER (Reprint) 203 relied on          para 34

     2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 666            distinguished para 41

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. :
    6546-6552 of 2003.
F
        From the Judgment & Order dated 17.09.2002 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LP.A. Nos. 52-58 of 1987 .
                                 •
        Ajit Sinha, Sanjay Grover, Meenakshi Grover, K.V. Mohan
G for the Appellant.

          H.P. Rawal, ASG T.S. Doabia, Madhu Tewatia, Sidhi
    Arora, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Krishna Kumar, A.K. Sharma
    for the Respondents.

H         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
                      DELHI
                                                                 775


         DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Whether an                        A
    agreement for erection of oil storage tank together with pump
    house, chowkidar cabins, switch room, residential rooms and
    verandah for storing oil decanted from the railway tankers, which
    bring petroleum products to the site at which they are decanted,
    would amount to lease or license, is one of the several             B
    questions which falls for conSideration in these appeals, which
    has arisen out of a Full Bench decision rendered by the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi while disposing a batch of petitions
    bearing Nos. LPA 53, 54, 55, 57 and 58/1987.

         2. Before dwelling into the question of law involved           C
    hereinabove and in order to appreciate the contentions raised
    by the parties hereto, we may notice few basic fact which has
    resulted into filing of these appeals.

         3. The appellant herein had been granted under the             D
    Government Grant Act separate and distinct licenses by the
    President of India acting through Superintendent of Northern
    Railway, Delhi for the purpose of maintaining depot for storage
    of petroleum products at a yearly license fee of Rs. 20,640/-
    and Rs. 31,000/- per annum respectively.                            E

        4. Under the aforesaid grant, the appellant had been given
    the right to erect/construct 'petroleum installation buildings'
    consisting of petroleum tanks, buildings and other conveniences
    for receiving and storing therein petroleum in bulk, and
                                                                        F
    consequently possession of land has been given.

         5. Consequent to the said agreement the administration
    granted 'exclusive possession' of the said land to the appellant
    who entered the land for the purpose and the terms mentioned
    therein in the aforesaid agreement/grant. Consequently, the         G
    appellant submitted layout building plans for the construction of
    the oil depot and the standing committee of the Municipal
    Corporation of Delhi (in short "MCD") approved the layout plan
    for the construction of 10 oil storage tanks of petroleum
    produ~.                                                             H
    776     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                        •
A      6. Subsequent to that the appellant raised various
  constructions comprising of an administration block etc. along
  with huge petroleum storage tanks for storing petroleum
  products. A boundary wall around the installations and the
  administrative block was also constructed. The nature of the
8 construction which is stated to be wide range and extensive
  user, is more than 40 years old now.

         7. The respondent MCD vide its Order dated 17.08.1984
    passed an assessment order with regard to the property tax
    qua the aforesaid property and confirmed the rateable value
c   proposed by it. The said assessment order was challenged by
    the appellant before the appellate Court/MCD Tribunal which
    vide its Order dated 12.7.1985 set aside the assessment order
    passed by the respondent MCD and held that the appellant is
    only a licensee in the property and is not a tenant, therefore,
D   no property tax can be levied on the appellant under Section
    20(2) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (in short
    "MCD Act"). Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the appellate
    Court, the respondent MCD filed a writ petition. However, the
    said writ petition was dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge of the
E   Delhi High Court on 05.08.1986 holding that the petroleum
    storage tanks do not fall within the definition of building under
    the MCD Act. It was further held by the Ld. Single Judge that
    the grant in favour of the petitioner was a license and hence
    the petitioner is not liable for the payment of any property tax
F   in respect of the land or the petroleum storage tanks.
    Challenging the aforesaid order of Ld. Single Judge, an LPA
    was filed and subsequently, the same was referred to a Full
    Bench of High Court. The Full Bench of the High Court vide its
    impugned judgment and order dated 17.09.2002 held that the          •
G   petroleum storage tanks are a building and the petitioner was
    a lessee and not a licensee in the property in question.

         8. It was forcefully argued before us by the learned counsel
    appearing for the appellant that no property tax is payable qua
    the property in question under the provisions of section 119 of
H
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
        DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
                                                                 777

    the DMC Act read with Article 285 of the Constitution of India,      A
    as the property in question is a government property. It was
    further contended that the incidence to pay property tax qua the
    petroleum installations including the tanks cannot fall upon the
    appellant under section 120(2) of the DMC Act because the
    appellant is a mere licencee of government land having               B
    permission to construct and consequently having constructed
    thereupon is neither a tenant nor a lessee and the agreement
    in question does not create any leasehold right or tenancy in
    the favour of the appellant. In other words, the submission was
    that the agreement in question is a licence deed. It was further     c
    contended that the petroleum storage tanks/depots are not
    "buildings" and therefore not subject to property tax. It.was also
    argued that the petroleum storage tanks/d$pots being plant and
    machinery are liable to be exempted u'n~er the provisions of
    section 116(3) of the DMC Act.            · ·:
                                                                         D
         9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for
    the respondent MCD submitted that th~ jndentures in question
    are indeed a lease and not a licence. It was argued that the
    question as to whether such an, i;>il 'i>torage tank ~ould be
    building or not is no longer res irltegri#;in yiew,of judgment of E
    the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corpor~tioh of
    Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686.
    It has been further contended that that the question as to
    whether the indentures in question constitute lease or license
    so as to attract the provisions of Section 120 of the MCD Act F
    would depend upon tha construction thereof. It was urged that
    having regard to the nature of the interest conveyed, it would
    be erroneous to construe the instrument as a license as the
    land having been used for the purpose of construction of a
    building, the object thereof being clear, it could not have been G
    construed to be a license and must be construed to be a lease.
    It was further argued that it is not a case where it could be said
    that no interest in the land had been created by reason of the
    instruments in question.
                                                                       H
    778       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                          •
A       10. Before addressing the rival contentions, it would be
    useful to reiterate few relevant provisions of the MCD Act.

          "2(3) "building" means a house, out-house, stable, latrine,
          urinal, shed, hut wall (other than a boundary wall) or any
          other structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud,
B
          metal or other material but does not include any portable
          shelter''.



c         "2(24). "land" includes benefits to arise out of land, things
          attached to the each or permanently fastened to anything
          attached to the earth and rights created by law over any
          street:

D
          "119. Taxation of Union properties.-(1) Notwithstanding
          anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
          chapter, lands and buildings being properties of the union
          shall be exempt from the property taxes specified in
E         Section 114:

          Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall prevent the
          Corporation from levying any of the said taxes on such
          lands and buildings to which immediately before the 26th
          January, 1950 they were liable or treated as liable so long
F
          as that tax continues to be levied by the Corporation on
          other lands and buildings.



G         "120(2). If any land has been let for a term exceeding one
          year to a tenant and such tenant has built upon the land,
          the property taxes assessed in respect of that land and the
          building erected thereon shall be primarily livable upon the
          said tenant, whether the land and building are in the
H .       occupation of such tenant or a sub- tenant of such tenant.
•   PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
       DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
                                                                779


                                                                        A
        "123. Property taxes a first charge on premises on which
        they are assessed.-Property taxes due under this Act in
        respect of any land or building shall, subject to the prior
        payment of the land revenue if any, due to the Government
                                                                        8
        thereon be a first charge-

               ( a) in the. case of any land or building held
               immediately from the Government, upon the interest
               in such land or building of the person liable for such
               taxes and upon the goods and other movable               C
               properties if any found within or upon such land or
               building and belonging to suc;h person; and

                (b) in the case of any other (and or building upon
              · such land or building and upon the goods and            0
                other movable properties/if any, found within or
                upon such land or building and belonging to the
                person liable for such taxes."

        11 . We may also notice the language of Article 285 of the
    Constitution of India which reads as,follows: -                     E
                                         /     rr

        "285. Exemption of property· 6f~·ti:ie Union from State
        taxation

        (1) The property of the Union sh~I. save insofar as
                                                                        F
        Parliament may by law otherwis_e provide, be exempt from
        all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a
        State.                                      ~
                                              -        /
        (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law
        otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State        G
        from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which
        such property was immediately before the commencement
        of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so long as
        that tax continues to be levied in that State."
                                                                        H
    780      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011] 4 S.C.R.


A         12. It would be useful to examine at this stage the definition
    of "lease" and "license" as envisaged under Section 105 of the
    Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and section 52 of the Indian
    Easements Act, 1882 respectively.

          Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads: -
B
          "105. Lease Defined.-A lease of immovable property is
          a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a
          certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in
          consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a
c         share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be
          rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the
          transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on
          such terms."

0       On the other hand, Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act,
    1882 reads as:

          "License, defined.-Where one person grants to another,
          or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or
          continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the
E         grantor, something which would, in the absence of such
          right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an
          easement or an interest in the property, the right is called,
          a license."

F      13. A license may be created on deal or parole and it would
  be revocable. However, when it is accompanied with grant it
  becomes irrevocable. A mere license does not create interest
  in the property to which it relates. License may be personal or
  contractual. A licensee without the grant creates a right in the
G licensor to enter into a land and enjoy it. In Halsbury's Laws of
  England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27 at page 21 it is stated: -
          "license coupled with grant of interest: A license coupled
          with a grant of an interest in property is not revocable.
          Such a license is capable of assignment, and covenants
H
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF 781
        DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
        may be made to run with it. A right to enter on land and           A
        enjoy a profit a prendre or other incorporeal hereditament
        is a license coupled with an interest and is irrevocable.
        Formerly it was necessary that the grant of the interest
        should be valid; thus, if the interest was an incorporeal
        hereditament, such as a right to make and use a                    B
        watercourse, the grant was not valid unless tinder seal, and
        the license, unless so made, was therefore a mere license
        and was revocable but since 1873 the Court has been
        bound to give effect to equitable doctrines and it will restrain
        the revocation of a license coupled with a grant which             c
        should be, but is not, under seal."

        14. Lease on the other hand, would amount to transfer of
    property. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor,
    (1960] 1 SCR 368, the following well established proposition
    were laid down by a Constitution Bench for ascertaining                0
    whether a transaction amounts to a lease or a license: -
        "27. There is a marked distinction between a lease and a
        license. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines
        a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to          E
        enjoy such property made for a certain time in
        consideration for a price paid or promised. Under Section
        108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in
        possession of the property. A lease is thereforee a transfer
        of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the     F
        leasehold interest. The Lesser parts with his right to enjoy
        the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from
        it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the
        Lesser. Whereas Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act
        defines a license.                                                 G
        Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a
        right to use the property in a particular way or under certain
        terms while it remains in possession and control of the
        owner thereof, it will be a license. The legal possession,
                                                                           H
      782       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                             •
 A          thereforee, continues to be with the owner of the property,
            but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises
            for a particular purpose. But for the permission his
            occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favor
            any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore,
. B         clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing
            line is dear through sometimes it becomes very thin or
            even blurred. Alone time it was thought that the test of
            exclusive possession was infallible and if a person was
            given exclusive possession of a premises, it would
 c          conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there was
            a change and the recent trend of judicial option is reflected
             in Errington v. Errington 1952 (1) All ER 149, wherein Lord
             Denning reviewing the case law on the subject
            summarises the result of his discussion thus at p. 155:
 D          ''The result of all these cases is that, although a person who
            is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie to be
            considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held
            to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to
            create a tenancy."
 E
            15. It is quite clear that the distinction between lease and
      license is marked by the last clause of Section 52 of the
      Easement Act as by reason of a license, no estate or interest
      in the property is created. In the case of Qudrat Ullah v.
 F    Municipal Board, Bareil/y, (1974) 1 SCC 202 it was observed
      at p. 398 thus: -

            "... If an interest in immovable property, entitling the
            transferors to enjoyment is created, it is a lease; ii
            permission to use land without right to exclusive
 G          possession is alone granted, a license is the legal result."

                                                 (emphasis underlined)

         16. A license, inter alia, (a) is not assignable; (b) does not
 H entitle the licensee to sue the stranger in his own name; (c) it
•   PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
       DELHI [DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
                                                                 783


 is revocable and (d) it is determined when the grantor makes           A
 subsequent assignment. The rights and obligations of the
 lessor as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are
 also subject to the contract to the contrary. Even the right of
 assignment of leasehold property may be curtailed by an
 agreement.                                                             B

       17. In the present ca,se grant has been made by the
 President of India in terms of Section 2 of the Government
 Grants Act, 1895 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 may
 have little bearing in the instant case. The former, i.e. the
 Government Grants Act, 1895 being a special statute would              C
 prevail over the general statute, i.e. the Transfer of Property Act,
 1882. Accordingly, the rights and obligations of the parties
 would be governed by the terms of the provisions of
 Government Grants Act, ~ 895 whereunder the Government is
 entitled to impose limitations and restrictions upon the grants        D
 and other transfer made by it or under its authority.

      18: In view of the aforesaid legal position with regard to
 the applicability of the Government Grants Act, we have
 considered the grant in question after hearing both the parties        E
 at length and perused the entire record. ·

        19. A bare perusal of the grant in question reveals that in
  the grant, the appellant herein i.e. grantee has been described
  as licensee. But in our considered view the mere use of the
  word "licensee" would not be sufficient to hold the grant in F
  question as a license. Simply using the word "licensee" would
  neither be regarded as conclusive nor determinative. In terms
  of Clause (1) of the said indenture the licensee was to have
  the use of a piece of land for maintaining a depot for petroleum
  goods received through railways but thereby his rights to deal G
  with the property and the goods brought thereon had not been
· taken away. Clearly, an embargo has been placed as regards
  the user of the cons,truction made thereon to the extent that the
  same woul~ be used solely for the storage of petroleum
  products but suc;h restriction by itself can also be imposed in H
    784     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2011] 4 S.C.R.

A a case of lease. The grant in question clearly states that the
  constructions are to be made as per specifications approved
  by the Chief Inspector of Explosives which condition was also
  otherwise governed by the provisions of Explosives Act. Further,
  the pipelines are required to be laid at railway levels or demised
B in favor of the grantee, where for expenses are to be paid by
  it. It further sates that the pipelines are to be laid underground
  in such a manner that vehicles can pass over that.

          20. The present appellant i.e. licensee is required to pay
    the sum specified therein which has been described as 'rent'
C   in terms of Clause 7. It further reveals that the licensee is also
    required to pay all taxes payable in respect of the said land for
    the time being found to be payable and proportionately and all
    cesses, and taxes in respect of the premises applicable to the
    land, tanks, works and conveniences if the same be not
D   separately assessed in respect thereof. It further stipulates that
    the licensee shall not be entitled to assign, mortgage, sub-let
    or otherwise transfer the privileges without previously obtaining
    the consent in writing of the Administration. The licensee shall
    not use the said land or any part thereof or permit the same to
E   be used for worship, or religious or educational purposes or
    for any other purpose not specified in Clause 1 thereof but such
    a claim is not determinative. Clause (9) of the said indenture
    stipulates that either party would be entitled to terminate the
    license without assigning any reasons by giving to the other
F   party at" any time three calendar months' notice in writing. It is
    to be noted that even under Section 106 of the Transfer of
    Property Act, 1882 no rea~on. is required to be assigned for
    determining the lease.
       21. Further, Clause 11 of the indenture in question
G provides that nothing contained herein be construed to create
  a tenancy in favor of the licensee of the said land but again in
  our considered view, the mere description of the grant in
  question is not decisive. Under the grant in question, the
  Administration has been given power under Clause 12 to re-
H
•                  .
     PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF 785
        DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

    enter upon and retake and absolutely retain the possession of          A
    the said land but the same could be permissible in law only
    upon determination of grant which would require 3 months' prior
    notice. It is to be noted that Clause 12 further stipulates that
    the licensee shall at all times keep the Administration
    indemnified against and shall reimburse it towards all claims,         B
    demands, suit~>. losses, damages, costs etc. which it may
    sustain or incur by reason of inconsequence of any injury to any
    person or to any property resulting from any explosion or
    leakage of any petroleum kept or placed by the licensee upon
    the said land.                                                         c
         22. Clause 14 of the indenture in question provides that
    the licensee shall follow all petroleum rules and regulations
    applicable to the construction, maintenance of pfitrol pump or
    stores and for public safety. It is significant to note that the
    aforesaid clause clearly provides that all taxes in respect of the     D
    said patrol pump, stores, buildings under the control of the
    licensee shall be paid by the licensee. However, the rights of
    the parties on determination of the grant have been specified.

         23. The aforesaid clauses of the indenture in question            E
    clearly shows that a bundle of rights have .been conferred upon
    the grantee i.e. the appellant herein .
                   . ~··:i.


          24. It is w~1l settled legal position that a deed must be read
    in its entirety and reasonably. The intention of the parties must
    also as far as possible be gathered from the expression used
                                                                           F
    in the document itself.

         25. In Union Bank of India v. Chandrakant Gordhandas
    Shah, (1994) 6 SCC 271, an instrument was held to be a deed
    of lease as the lessee was conferred right to exclusive                G
    possession where for various terms of the indenture which were
    taken into consideration for finding out whether the same was
    lease or a license. Similarly, In Vaya/lakath Muhammedkutty
    v. 11/ikkal Moosakutty JT 1996 (6) 665, where the defendant
    was given exclusive possession of the disputed premises for            H
    786       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 4 S.C.R.     •
A running a hotel but was not given the permission to sub-lease
  the property, the document was held to be a license.

          "9 ..... this Court has indicated that for a consideration as
          to whether a document creates a license or lease, the
          substance of the document must be preferred to the form.
B
          It is not correct to say that exclusive possession of a party
          is irrelevant but at the same it is also not conclusive. The
          other tests, namely, intention of the parties and whether the
          document creates any interest in the property or not are
          important considerations."
c
          26. In Om Parkash v. Dr. Ravinder Kumar Sharma, 1995
  Supp.(4) SCC 115, a deal was held to be a license where the
  keys of the premises was to be taken in the morning and
  returned in the evening and a portion thereof was occupied by
D the mother of the licensor.

        27. In Swam Singh v. Madan Singh, 1995 Supp.(1) SCC
    306 it was held: -

          "3. On a careful consideration of the above arguments, we
E         feel that there is no substance in any one of them. To our
          mind it is very clear that the right granted under the above
          document is nothing but a license. Our reasons are as
          under:

F         (1) the nomenclature of the document is license. Of course,
          we hasten to add that nomenclature is not always
          conclusive;

          (2) the document in question in no unambiguous terms
          says that the possession and control shall remain with
G         the owner. This is a clear indication of the fact that no
          interest in immovable property has been conferred on the
          grantee. If it were to be a case of lease under Section 105
          of the Transfer of Property Act, there must be an interest
          in the immovable property. On the contraf'/, if it were to
H
•   PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
       DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
                                                                     787


        be a license under Section 52 of the Easements Act, no               A
        such interest in immovable property is created. The case
        on hand is one of such.

        (4) No doubt there is a statement in the document that "I
        shall not sublet it to further anybody else. This is nothing
                                                                             8
        more than an affirmation of the requirement that the
        licensee must use the property. No doubt under Section
        52 of the Easements Act, license is personal but where
        an affirmation is made that such an affirmation cannot
        alter the relationship of the parties as Lesser and lessee.          C
        Jn this view factually the case Capt. BVD' Douza v.
        Antonio Fausto Fernandes, Quoted from the judgment
        and order dated 3. 5. 1993 of Andhra Pradesh Admn.
         Tribunal at Hyderabad in OA No. 47322191 and 5668192,
        is distinguishable."
                                                                             D
         28. In Lilawati H. Hiranandani v. Usha Tandon, AIR 1996
    SC 441, an assignment made to the effect that the owner
    permitted the licensee to occupy a portion with no right or
    interest created in his favor and also undertaken to vacant the
    premises within one month, was held to be a case of license.             E
         29. In view of the aforesaid well settled legal position,
    whether a particular document will constitute "lease" or "license"
    would inter alia depend upon certain factors which can be
    summarized as follows: -
                                                                             F
          (a)   whether a document creates a license or lease, the
                substance of the document must be preferred to the
                form;

          (b) · · the real test is the intention 'of the parties - whether   G
                  they intended to create a lease or a license;

          (c)   if the document creates an interest in the property,
                it is a lease; but if it only permits another to make
                use of the property, of which the legal possession
                continues with the owner, it is a license; and               H
    788          SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 4 S.C.R.      •
A          (d)     if under the document a party gets exclusive
                   possession of the property, prima facie, he is
                   considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may
                   be established which negative the intention to
                   create a lease.
B
       30. Reverting back to the factual situation of the case at
  hand, admittedly, the appellant is in possession of the buildings
  in question since 1958. They have been permitted to raise huge
  constructions and the nature of construction is of wide range.
  An administration block along with tanks for storing petroleum
C had been constructed. A boundary wall around installations and
  administrative block had also been constructed. Admittedly, the
  grantee is in exclusive possession over the lands in question
  along with construction thereon without any let or hindrance from
  the Administration. Further, the appellant had been continuously
D carrying on their business without any interference from any
  quarter whatsoever since 1962. As in the instant case, exclusive
  possession has been granted, as discussed hereinbefore,
  there is a strong presumption in favour of tenancy. That being
  the case, it is for the appellant to show that despite the right to
E possess the demised premises exclusive; a right or interest in
  the property has not been created. The burden therefore would
  be on the appellant/grantee to prove contra.

       31. The aforesaid burden is not discharged in the present
F case rather for the purposes resisting its eviction from the suit
  land in the proceeding initiated under the Public Premises
  Unauthorized Occupants Eviction Act, the appellant has taken
  the stand pleading non-applicability of the Indian Easement Act
  and has themselves termed the arrangement as a tenancy by
G describing the fee as rentals. The said factor is also a vital
  factor as on the own showing of the appellant the arrangement
  was nothing but a lease. The appellant therefore cannot take
  up a plea by which they approbate and reprobate at the same
  time.

H         32. In Street v. Mountford, 1985 Appeal Cases 809, it was
•    PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF
        DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
    held that when exclusive possession is granted in lieu of only A
                                                                    789



    rent payable therefore, the presumption that the instrument is
    that of a lease becomes stronger. In the present case the
    Administration has also option to revise the rent. Had it been
    a case of mere right to use the property, such provision would
    not have been there. Further, the manner in which the rent is to B
    be paid is also important. It is to be paid annually in a case of-c
    a license pure and simple, the indenture would not normally
    contain a claim that rent would be paid annually.

        33. In Capt. B. V. D'Souza v. Antonio Fausto Fernandes,,            C
    [1989] 3 SCR 626, this Court observed:

         "However, this cannot answer the disputed issue as it
         creates a license or lease, the substance of the document
         must be referred to the form, As was observed by this
         Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor,           D
         (1960] 1 SCR 368 , the real test is the intention of the
         parties - whether they intended to create a lease or
         license. If an interest in the property is created by the deed
         it is a lease but if the document only permits another
         person to make use of the property "of which the legal             E
         possession continues with the owner" it is a license. If the
         party in whose favor the document is executed gets
         exclusive possession of the property prima facie he must
         be considered to be a tenant: although this factor by itself
         will not be decisive. Judged in this light, there does not         F
         appear to be any scope for interpreting Ex. 20 as an
         agreement of leave and license."

          34. It is true that there are indeed certain restrictions which
    have been imposed by the Administration with regard to the
    construction of the building storage tank, etc., but in our             G
    considered view such restrictions are not decisive for the
    purpose of determining as to whether a document is a lease
    or license as such restrictions could also be imposed in case
    of a lease as Well. In Glenwood Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Philips,
    1904-1907 All ER (Reprint) 203, it was held:                            H
    790       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 4 S.C.R.     •
A         "In the so-called license itself it is called indifferently a
          license and a demise, but in the Act it is spoken of as a
          lease, and the holder of it is described as the lessee. It is
          not, however, a question of words, but of substance. If the
          effect of the instrument is to give the holder an exclusive
B         right of occupation of the land though subject to certain
          reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which it
          may be used, it is in law a demise of the land itself."

       35. We may also notice the undisputed fact that in the
  present case the parties have agreed that for the purpose of
C determination of the agreement three calendar months' notice
  had to be given. Undoubtedly, such clause in the document in
  question has a significant role to play in the matter of
  construction of document. Clearly, if the parties to the
  agreement intended that by reason of such agreement merely
D a license would be created such a term could not have been
  inserted.

       36. It is well settled legal position that a license can be
  revoked at any time at the pleasure of the licensor. Even
E otherwise, unless the parties to the agreement had an intention
  to enter into a deed of lease the Administration would not have
  agreed to demise the premises on payment of rent in lieu of
  grant of exclusive possession of the demised land and further
  stipulated service of three months' notice calling upon either
F party to terminate the agreement. In view of the same, the
  argument advanced by the learned counsel of the appellant that
  a stipulation having been made in the agreement itself that by
  reasons thereof the grantee shall not be a tenant and thus the
  deed must be construed to be a license cannot be accepted.
G In our considered view, such a clause may at best be one of
  the factors for construction of the document in question but the
  same by itself certainly be a decisive factor.

      37. The next question which needs to be addressed in
  view of the aforesaid well settled legal position is whether the
H agreement in question should be interpreted as lease or license
 PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF                  791
    DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA. J.]
having regard to t~e object sought to be achieved by the            A
provisions of DMC Act.

     38. By reason of the provisions of the DMC Act, the MCD
is required to render several services as specified therein for
the purpose whereof, tax is required to be imposed both on land
                                                                    8
as also on building. The definition of "land" and "'building" as
provided in the DMC Act must be given its full effect. As
mentioned hereinbefore in the case of Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay case (supra), even an oil tanker has been
held to be building.
                                                                    c
      39. The tax is imposed upon the holders of land and
building by the MCD which is compensatory in nature. The word
"letting out" in the context of the grant therefore must receive
its purposive meaning. The MCD renders services and the
benefits of such services are being taken by all concerned, viz.,   D
the owner of the land or building. Even a person who is in
possession of a land or building, whether legal or illegal, takes
benefits of such services rendered by the MCD. The MCD for
the purpose of realization of tax is not concerned with the
relationship of the parties. It is concerned only with imposition   E
and recovery of tax which is payable on all lands and buildings
in accordance with law. The exceptions thereof have been
enumerated in the Act itself. Section 119 of the MCD Act is
one of such provisions. Such an exemption clause, as is well
known, must be construed strictly. Section 119 of the MCD Act       F
would apply if the lands and buildings are the properties of
Union of India. The MCD has the right to levy the property tax
in terms of Section 114 of the MCD Act in the manner as
specified therein.

     40. By reason of the agreement in question, the buildings      G
in question do not belong to the Administration. Admittedly, it
belongs to the grantee i.e. appellant herein, As discussed
hereinbefore, the Oil tanks has been construed as buildings for
the purposes of tax. Therefore, Section 119 of. the MCD Act
would not apply to the building in question. That being the case,   H
    792     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 4 S.C.R.
                                                                      •
A the grantee/appellant is liable to pay tax although the ownership
  of the land may belong to the Administration. Section 115 of
  the MCD Act clearly provides that the general tax shall be
  payable in respect of lands and buildings. Such lands and
  buildings may be in lawful occupation of the owner. The
B occupcition of the said building may be lawful or unlawful. Even
  in a case where apartments are constructed on the land
  belonging to the Government or a statutory body but the
  occupier of the apartment is liable to pay tax. If a person
  encroaches upon somebody's lands and constructs buildings
c thereupon, he would also be liable to pay tax. Once it is held
  that the grantee were liable to pay tax, the same becomes
  payable from the date of accrual of the liability. The said
  position is also fortified from specific stipulation in the
  agreement that the liability to pay all taxes including municipal
  taxes is on the grantee.
0
       41. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
  strong reliance on the decision of this Court in HUDCO v. MCD;
  (2001) 1 sec 455 to contend that land belonging to the
  government is immune from the payment of property tax by
E virtue of section 119( 1) of the DMC Act and Article 285 of the
  Constitution of India. In the HUDCOs case vacant land of the
  government, prior to execution of the lease deed in favour of
  HUDCO, was sought to be taxed and that no building had been
  constructed by HUDCO. HUDCOs own case was that interest
F in land could pass only on execution of lease and construction
  thereon under section 120(2) of the MCD Act. MCD had
  invoked Section 120(1) DMC Act to fasten liability on HUDCO
  and not under Section 120(2) DMC Act after construction was
  made by HUDCO and lease deed executed bythe government.
G In that case, this Court has held that vacant land belonging to
  the Government was not taxable by virtue of section 119 DMC
  Act and Article 285 of the Constitution of India. However, in our
  considered view, the case at hand is totally different. The
  HUDCO ~udgment dealt with the case where vacant land
H belonging to tf e lessor/Government and in regard whereto no
 PRADEEP OIL CORPN. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF                  793
    DELHI [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
lease deed had been executed and no construction had been          A
made by the lessee/HUDCO. The land belonging to the central
government was sought to be taxed under section 120(1) of the
DMC Act which fastens liability on the lessor. Since land
belonged to UOI the same was exempted from payment of tax
until the lease deed was executed and construction made            B
thereon by HUDCO-under Section 120(2).

     42. Incidence to pay tax under section 120(2) DMC Act is
with regard to a composite assessment of land and buildings
as section 120(2) talks of a composite assessment only. In the C
present case vacant land or property of Railways is not sought
to be taxed as was in the case of HUDCO Vs. MCD under ·
section 120(1) DMC Act,· but property tax/Composite
Assessment is sought to be made on the installations/stotage
depots having been constructed by the appellant-by virtue of
Section 120(2) DMC Act. It is important to notice that w.e.f. the D
date of execution of lease deed and construction made thereon
by HUDCO, HUDCO has been paying the property tax.
HUDCOs case is therefore not applicable.

     43. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the        E
considered view that the document in question constitutes lease
in favor of the appeliant-grantee; and accordingly liable to pay
taxes.

    44. In view of the same, we find no merit in the present
appeal, accordingly, the same is liable to be dismissed and        F
hence dismissed. No order as to costs.

R.P.                                      Appeals dismissed.