POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE ETC.versusSPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.

                      [2013] 8 S.C.R. 241


         POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE ETC.                                 A
                            v.
     SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.
         (Civil Appeal Nos. 6976-6980 of 2013)
                      AUGUST 22, 2013
                                                                      B
       [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

     Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s.28A - Limitation for filing
application for re-determination of compensation uls.28A of
the Act - If commences from the date of the award or from             C
the date of knowledge of the award on the basis of which such
application is being filed - Held: As the Land Acquisition
Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority
while making the award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would
not apply and, therefore, application uls.28A of the Act, has         D
to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed u/s. 28A
- Such application is to be filed within 3 months from the date
of the award of the court - Period of limitation is to be
calculated excluding the date on which the award was made
and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award -          E
Date of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant is not
relevant - Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes - The Court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds -"Inconvenience is not" a          F
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute -
Limitation Act, 1963 - Maxims - Maxim "dura lex sed lex" -
Applicability.

     By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld
the judgment of the Land Acquisition Collector rejecting              G
the application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 on the ground of limitation.


                               241                                    H
    242       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A     The question which arose for consideration in tile
  instant appeals was whether limitation for filmg
  application for re-determination of compensation tinder
  Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would
  commence from the date of the award or from the date
B of knowledge of the award on the basis of which such
  application is being filed.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD:1. As the Land Acquisition Collector is not a
C court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making
  the award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would not apply
  and, therefore, the application under Section 28A of the
  Land Acquisition Act, has to be filed within the period of
  limitation as prescribed under Section 28A of the Land
D Acquisition Act. The said provisions require that an
  application for re-determination is to be filed within 3
  months from the date of the award of the court. The
  proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to
  be calculated excluding the date on which the award is
E made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the
  award. The date of acquisition of knowledge by the
  applicant is not relevant. [Paras 10, 11] [248-C-D, F]

       1.2. The law of limitation may harshly affect a
F particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour
  when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power
  to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
  The statutory provision may cause hardship or
  inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no
  choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
G legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is
  hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation.
  "Inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
  while interpreting a statute. [Para 13] [250-F-H]

H         Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
 POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND               243
            ACQUISITION OFFICER

Acquisition Officer & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500: 1962 SCR 676     A
- distinguished.

     Union of India & Ors. etc. v. Mangatu Ram etc. AIR 1997
SC 2704: 1997 (3) SCR 1121; Tota Ram v. State of U.P. &
Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 280: 1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 184; State of B
A.P. & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 2949:
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 841; Des Raj (deceased by L.Rs.) &
Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 5003: 2004 (4)
Suppl. SCR 934; and State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen
Bhoi (2009) 17 SCC 74: 2009 (14) SCR ~58 - relied on.
                                                              c
     The Martin Bum Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta AIR
1966 SC 529: 1966 SCR 543 and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v.
Om Prakash Sharma & Ors. AIR 2013 SC 30: 2012 SCR 47
- referred to.
                                                              D
     Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 2010
SC 1532 2010 (2) SCR 1145; Premji Nathu v. State of
Gujarat & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 1624: 2012 (3) SCR 1042 -
cited.
                    Case Law Reference:                       E
  2010 (2) SCR 1145            cited             Para 3
  2012 (3) SCR 1042            cited             Para 3
  1997 (2) Suppl. SCR 184      relied on         Para 4       F
  1997 (3) SCR 1121            relied on         Para 4
  2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 841      relied on         Para 4
  2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 934      relied on         Para 4
                                                              G
  2009 (14) SCR 558            relied on         Para 4
  1962 SCR 676                 distinguished     Para 9
  1966 SCR 543                 referred to       Para 13
                                                              H
    244       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A     2012 SCR 47                     referred to         Para 13

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    6976-6980 of 2013.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2012 of the
B High Court of Bombay in W.P. Nos. 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143
  and 2144 of 2009.

          Gaurav Agrawal, Shankar Narayanan for the Appellant.

C       Madhavi Divan, Sanjay Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been
D preferred against the judgment and order dated 25.1.2012
  passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ
  Petition Nos. 2140-44 of 2009, wherein the High Court has
  upheld the judgment of the Land Acquisition Collector rejecting
  the application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act,
E 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the ground of
  limitation.

         2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
    are that:

F         A The land of the appellants stood notified under Sections
    4 and 6 of the Act in 1994-95. Award in respect of the said
    land was also made on 14.12.1995.

        B. Appellants did not file applications under Section 18 of
G the Act rather some other "interested persons" whose land was
  also covered by the same notification under Section 4 of the
  Act filed references and one such reference, i.e. L.A.R. No. 314
  of 1999 was decided on 3.4.2006.

       C. For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A
H of the Act, counsel for the appellants applied for a certified copy
 POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND                          245
  ACQUISITION OFFICER [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
of the Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the               A
said award was ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was
obtained by learned counsel for the appellants only on 3.6.2006.
Application for re-determination of the amount of compensation
was filed on 18.7.2006 by the appellants, on the basis of the
said Court's award.                                                       B

     D. The Special Land Acquisition Collector vide order
dated 22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground
that the same was filed with a delay of 4 days.

    E. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the said order                C
before the High Court. The same stood dismissed vide
impugned judgment and order dated 25.1.2012.

     Hence, these appeals.

      3. Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on D
behalf of the appellants has submitted that Section 28-A of the
Act was inserted by amendment in 1987 and being a beneficial
legislation it should be interpreted liberally and period of
limitation should be considered and determined on all equitable
grounds. It is well-neigh possible for any person to file an E
appeal without having knowledge of the order/award and
therefore, the limitation should be counted from the date of
acquisition of knowledge of the Court award. More so, the delay .
was only of two days and certainly not of four days. In order to' :;-.
fortify his case Shri Gaurav Agarwal has placed reliance~upon r
the judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1532; and Premji Nathu v. State of
Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 1624.

     4. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing on                   G
behalf of the respondents, has opposed the appeal contending
that personal inconven~nce or hardship of an individual cannot
be a consideration for interpreting statutory provisions in case
the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. It is to
be given only strict literal interpretation. In the instant case, there
                                                                          H
    246       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A is no ambiguity so far as the statutory provisions are concerned.
  Therefore, limitation is to be taken as prescribed under the
  statute. In support of her case Ms. Madhavi Divan has placed
  reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Tota Ram v. State
  of U.P. & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 280; Union of India & Ors. etc.
B v. Mangatu Ram etc., AIR 1997 SC 2704; State of A.P. & Anr.
  v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2949; Des Raj
  (deceased by L.Rs.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2004
  SC 5003; and State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, (2009)
  11 sec 74.
c        5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

       The sole question for the consideration of the court is
  whether limitation for filing the application for re-determination
D of the compensation under Section 28A of the Act would
  commence from the date of the award or from the date of
  knowledge of the court's award on the basis of which such
  application is being filed.

E         6. Though, there is nothing on record to substantiate the
    appellants' claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the
    Court's award only on 17.7.2006 and immediately took steps
    to file application for re-determination under Section 28A of the
    Act.

F      7. The issue involved herein is no more res-integra. The
  appellants' case before the High Court as well as before us has
  been that the limitation would commence from the date of
  acquisition of knowledge and not from the 'date of award.
  Though, Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel for the
G appellants, has fairly conceded that there is no occasion for this
  Court to consider the application of the provisions of the
  Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the 'Act 1963') inasmuch
  as the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act.

          8. Section 28A of the Act reads as under:
H
 POPAT BAH IRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND                   24 7
  ACQUISITION OFFICER [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    "28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation            A
    on the basis of the award of the court.-(1) Where in an
    award under this Part, the court allows to the applicant any
    amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded
    by the Collector under Sect(on 11, the persoos interested
    in all the other land covered by the same notifji:ation under   B
    Section 4 sub-section (1) and who are also ag~rieved by
    the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they
    had not made an application to the Collector under
    Section 18, by written application to the Collector within
    three months from the date of the award of the.... court        c
    require that the amount of compensation payable to'Jhem
    may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of
    compensation awarded by the court:

         Provided that in computing the period of thr~e
    months within which an application to the Collector shall       D
    be made under this sub-section, the day on which the
    award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining
    a copy of the award shall be excluded."

                                             (Emphasis added~       E

    9. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1500, this Court dealt
with the issue of limitation while dealing with an application
under Section 18 of the Act, and it was observed therein that
unless a party had knowledge of the order, the question of          F
approaching the appropriate forum challenging the order, does
not arise. Therefore, it is the date of the knowledge from which
the limitation would start. The Court observed :

    "..... The knowledge of the party affected by the award,        G
    either actual or constructive, being an essential
    requirement of fairplay and natural justice the
    expression ....... In our opinion, therefore, it would be
    unreasonable ........ where the rights of a person are
    affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the      H
    248       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved
          against the said order by reference to the making of the
          said order, the making of the order must mean either
          actual or constructive communication of the said order
          to the party concerned ... "
B
        10. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mangatu Ram
 - & Ors. (supra); and Tota Ram v. State of UP. & Ors. (supra),
   dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land
   Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial
C authority while making the award, the provisions of the Act 1963
   would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section
   28A of the Act, has to be filed within the period of limitation as
   prescribed under Section 28A of the Act. The said provisions
   require that an application for re-determination is to be filed
   within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The
D proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be
   calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and
   the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.

       11. In State of A.P. & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors.
E (Supra), this Court reconsidered the aforesaid judgments
  including the judgment in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh
  (supra) and held that the statute provides limitation of 3 months
  from the date of award by the court excluding the time required
  for obtaining the copy from the date of award. It has no
F relevance so far as the date of acquisition of knowledge by the
  applicant is concerned. In view of the express language of the
  statute, the question of knowledge did not arise and, therefore,
  the pie.a of the applicants that limitation of 3 months would begin
  from the date of knowledge, was clearly unsustainable and
G could not be accepted. The Court also rejected the contention
  of the applicants that a beneficial legislation should be given a
  liberal interpretation observing that whosoever wants to take
  advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and
  has to take appropriate action within time limit prescribed under
H the statute. Such an applicant must at least be vigilant in making
 POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND                       249
  ACQUISITION OFFICER [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
efforts to find out whether the other land owners have filed any       A
reference application and if so, what is the result thereof. If that
is not done then the law cannot help him. The ratio of the
judgment in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) was held
to be non-applicable in case of Section 28-A of the Act. The
Court observed:                                                        B

     " ....... In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso to
     Section 18 of the Act and held that clause (a) of the
     proviso was not applicable in the said case because the
     person making the application was not present or was not C
     represented before the Collector at the time when he
     made his award. The Court a/so held that notice from the
     Collector under Section 12(2) was a/so not issued,
     therefore, that part of clause (b) of the proviso would not
     be applicable. The Court, therefore, referred to the
     second part of the proviso which provides that such D
     application can be made within six months from the date
     of the Collector's award. In the context of the scheme of
     Section 18 of the Act, the Court held.that the award by
    .the Land Acquisition Officer is an offer of market price
     by the State for purchase of the property. Hence, for the E
     said offer, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the party
     affected by the award was an essential requirement of fair
     play and natural justice. Therefore, the second part of the
     proviso must mean the date when either the award was
     communicated to the party or was known by him either F
     actually or constructively.

            The aforesaid reasoning would not be applicable
     for interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no
     question of issuing notice to such an applicant as he is          G
     not a party to the reference proceeding before the court.
     The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an
     offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is
     no duty cast upon the court to issue notice to the
     landowners who have not initiated proceedings for                 H
     250        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R .


.A         enhancement of compensation by filing reference
           applications; maybe, that their lands are acquired by a
           common notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
           As against this, under Section 18 it is the duty of the
           Collector to issue notice either under Section 12(2) of the
B          Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the
           date to be pronounced before passing of the award and
           if this is not done then the period prescribed for filing
           application under Section 18 is six -months from the date
           of the Collector's award." (Emphasis added)

C A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Des Raj
  (supra) and Chitrasen Bhoi (supra).

       12. In view of above, there is no occasion for us to consider
  the judgments cited at the bar on behalf of the appellants in
D support of its case. More so, the said judgments have been
  delivered by this Court while dealing with the applications under
  Section 18 of the Act. If there are directly applicable precedents
  on the issue, the same have to be followed rather than to
  search for a new interpretation unless it is established that the
E earlier judgments require reconsideration. The suggestion of
  reconsideration has specifically been rejected by this Court in
  Marri Venkaiah (supra).

        13. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
F harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
  its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
  power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
  The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience
  to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce
  it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed
G lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
  attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
  "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while
  interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a statutory provision
  is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision
H
 POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE v. SPECIAL LAND                  251
  ACQUISITION OFFICER [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its       A ·
operation."

    (See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of
Calcutta, Al R 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om
Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30)                           8
     In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none
of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is
tenable.

     14. As the matters are squarely covered by the above        C
referred to judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit.
The cases do not warrant any interference. The appeals are,
accordingly, dismissed.

B.B.B.                                   Appeals dismissed.