POONAM & OTHERSversusHARISH KUMAR AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 783
- Decided
- 3 November 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A K GANGULY
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing to condone a 63‑day delay, as the delay was not gross and the explanation warranted liberal construction, thus the delay was condoned.
Summary
The sisters Poonam, et al., filed a civil suit for declaration of title and injunction against their brother, which was dismissed by the trial court. They appealed the decree but filed the appeal 63 days late, seeking condonation of delay, citing illness of one sister and negligence of counsel. The District Judge and subsequently the High Court rejected the condonation, holding the delay was not bona‑fide. On a petition under Article 136, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion and held that a 63‑day delay is not gross and, given the explanation, should be liberally construed. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court order, condoned the delay, and restored the appeal to the file.
Issues considered
- When the High Court may refuse to condone a delay in filing an appeal.
- What standard of explanation and length of delay warrants liberal construction for condonation.
- Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 136
Subjects
Judgment
[2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 291
POONAM & OTHERS A
v.
HARISH KUMAR AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 9059 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 03, 2011
B
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND
GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]
Delayllaches - Appeal - Delay of 63 days in filing appeal
against the judgment and decree passed by trial court in a C
civil suit filed by the plaintiffs-appellants - Application for
condonation of delay in filing appeal dismissed by the
appellate court - Order upheld by High Court in revision -
Held: When a Court exercises its discretion in either
condoning or refusing to condone delay in filing any o
proceeding, the Court acts in exercise of its discretion -
Normally, Supreme Court in exercise of its discretion under
Article 136 of the Constitution may not interfere with the
exercise of discretion by the High Court in such matters -
However, there is no strait-jacket about this - The discretion E
of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is
meant to further the ends of justice and Supreme Court has
been using its discretion in appropriate cases when it is
satisfied that exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court or other
Tribunals has not been on sound judicial principles - In the
facts of this case it is clear that of all the three ladies, who were F
the appellants, one of them was pursuing the case and she
fell sick - Therefore, she was not in a position to pursue the
legal remedy with due diligence as a result of which the
appeal was filed with a delay of 63 days - The delay of 63 G
days is not a delay for a long period and there was some
explanatio'n for the delay - The High Court should have
considered the explanation for the delay along with the facts
of the case, the position of the parties, the nature of the
291 H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A litigation and the period of delay - The High Court should also
have considered that it has been settled by a catena of cases
that, unless the delay is gross, an explanation for the same
should be liberally construed - Apparently, the High Court
was not able to consider all these relevant facts in their correct
B perspective before passing the impugned order - Order of the
High Court set aside and delay in filing the appeal condoned
- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136.
Appellants nos. 1 to 3 are sisters of Respondent no.
1, who is their brother. The parents of the parties had
C died. The appellants filed a civil suit for declaration of their
title as 3/9th owner each, of the suit scheduled properties
and for permanent injunction restraining Respondent
no.1 from interfering with their peaceful possession and
creating any third party rights In the said properties. The
D Trial Court dismissed the suit and accordingly a decree
was drawn up.
The appellants-plaintiffs challenged the judgment
and decree by filing an appeal before the District Judge.
E The appellants-plaintiffs also filed an application for
condonation of delay of 63 days in filing the appeal
stating that appellant no. 2 and 3 were married and
illiterate; that appellant no.1 was pursuing the case in the
court but during pendency of the case, appellant no.1 fell
F ill and therefore requested the counsel to intimate to the
appellants regarding the position of proceedings; that the
counsel assured that he will inform the appellants as and
when their presence was needed in the court, but the
counsel never informed the appellants for giving their
evidence in court, which resulted in dismissal of the case;
G that later someone from the locality informed the
appellants about the dismissal of the case whereafter the
appellants rushed to the Court and applied for a certified
copy of the judgment and then filed the appeal a little
belatedly. The District Judge dismissed the application for
H
POONAM & ORS. v. HARISH KUMAR AND ANR. 293
condonation of delay on the ground that the delay was A
not bona-fide and no reasonable cause has been made
out to condone the delay. The reasoning of the District
Judge for reaching the above conclusion was that, (i) the
appellants were neither illiterate nor rustic villagers as all
of them had signed in English and (ii) that during course
8
of proceedings before the trial court, the appellants were
careless and negligent. Against this order, the appellants
preferred a revision before the High Court. The High
Court upheld the order of the District Judge holding that
the delay of 63 days in filing the appeal was not properly C
explained. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. When a Court exercises its discretion in
either condoning or refusing to condone delay in filing 0
any proceeding, the Court acts in exercise of its
discretion. Normally, this Court in exercise of its
discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution may not
interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court
in such matters. However, there is no strait-jacket about E
this. The discretion of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution is meant to further the ends of justice and
this Court has been using its discretion in appropriate
cases when it is satisfied that exercise of jurisdiction by
the High Court or other Tribunals has not been on sound
F
judicial principles. It is well settled that judicial discretion
shall always be exercised "according to the rules of
reason. and justice and not according to private opinion"
[Para 14] [297-C-F]
Sharpe v. Wakefield (1891 AC 193) - referred to. G
2. In the facts of this case it is clear that of all the three
ladies, who were the appellants, one of them was
pursuing the case and she fell sick. Therefore, she was
not in a position to pursue the legal remedy with due H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A diligence as a result of which the appeal was filed with a
delay of 63 days. The delay of 63 days is not a delay for
a long period and there has been some explanation for
· the delay. The High Court should have, before passing
the impugned judgment, considered the explanation for
8 the delay along with the facts of the case, the position of
the parties, the nature of the litigation and the period of
delay. The High Court should also have considered that
It has been settled by a catena of cases that, unless the
delay is gross, an explanation for the same should be
C liberally construed. It appears that the High Court has not
been able to consider all these relevant facts in their
correct perspective before passing the impugned order.
[Para 15] [297-G-H; 298-A-B]
3. The order of the High Court is set aside and the
D delay is condoned. The appeal is directed to be restored
to i~ file. [Para 16] [298-C]
Case Law Reference:
(1891 AC 193) referred to Para 14
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9059 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 01.12.2008 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.
F 3745 of 2008.
M.K. Dua for the Appellant.
Rajesh Tyagi, Dilip K. Sharma, Atishi Dipankar for the
G Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This civil appeal is directed against the 01.:ler dated
H
POONAM & ORS. v. HARISH KUMAR AND ANR. 295
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
01.12.2008 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at A
Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.3745/2008, whereby the High
Court declined to interfere with the order dated 27.07.2007 of
the District Judge, Ambala. By order dated 27.07.2007 the
District Judge dismissed the application for condonation of
delay of 63 days in filing the appeal against the judgment of 8
the trial court in Civil Suit No. 23/2003.
3. The facts and circumstances, which are relevant to this
appeal, are as under.
4. All the appellants no. 1 to 3 are sisters of Respondent C
no. 1, who is their brother. The father of the parties died on
17.01.2003 and the mother had predeceased the father. Eight
daughters and one son survived their father. The father during
his lifetime arranged the marriage of six daughters except the
appellant no. 1 & 2 herein. D
5. In the year 2003, the appellants brought a suit (CS no.
23 of 2003) before the Civil Judge, Ambala City for declaration
of their title as 3/9th owner each, of the suit scheduled
properties and for permanent injunction restraining the
•Respondent no.1 from interfering with their peaceful E
possession and creating any third party rights in the said
properties. According to the appellants- plaintiffs, the suit
schedule properties were their ancestral property in which
plaintiffs have got right by birth and all of them have got equal
shares in the same. F
6. The Respondent no. 1 controverted the aforesaid
averrnent of the appellants-plaintiffs by claiming that the suit
schedule properties were not ancestral but were self-acquired
by their deceased father. Further case of the Respondent No.1 G
is that he is the absolute owner of the said properties by virtue
of a registered Will dated 18.06.2002 executed by the
deceased father in his favour.
7. On the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed
H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A five issues. Thereafter the case was adjourned for evidence of
the appellants- plaintiffs. Despite several opportunities, the
appellants-plaintiffs allegedly led no evidence. Since there was
no evidence of the plaintiffs on record, the Respondent
no.1defendant also did not lead any evidence.
B 8. By order dated 01.12.2006 the Trial Court dismissed
the suit filed by the appellants-plaintiffs with costs and
accordingly a decree was drawn up.
9. The appellants-plaintiffs challenged the aforesaid
C judgment and decree by filing an appeal before the District
Judge, being Civil Appeal No.12 of 2007. The appellants-
plaintiffs also filed an application for condonation of delay of
63 days in filing the appeal by offering an explanation which
can be summarized as under:
D
"That the appellant no. 2 and 3 were married and illiterate.
The appellantno.1 was pursuing the case in the
court.During the pendency of the case, appellantno.1 fell
ill and therefore requested thecounsel to intimate to the
appellantsregarding the position of proceedings. The
E counsel assured that he will inform the appellants as and
when their presence is needed in the court. But the
counsel never informed the appellants for giving their
evidence in court, which resulted in the dismissal of the
case on 1.12.2006. On 26.02.2007, someone from the
F locality informed the appellants about the dismissal of the
case. Thereafter the appellants rushed to the Court and
applied for a certified copy of the judgment and then filed
the appeal a little belatedly.•
G 10. By order dated 27.07.2007, as noted above, the
District Judge dismissed the application for condonation of
delay on the ground that the delay was not bona-tide and no
reasonable cause has been made out to condone the delay.
11. The reasoning of the District Judge for reaching the
H
POONAM & ORS. v. HARISH KUMAR AND ANR. 297
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULY,.J.]
above conclusion was that, (i) the appellants are neither illiterate A
nor rustic villagers as all of them had signed ill English. (ii)
.During the course of proceedings before the trial court, the
appellants were careless and negligent.
12. Against this order the appellants preferred a revision
before the High Court.
8
13. By impugned order dated 01.12.2008 the High Court
dismissed the revision petition upholding the order of the
District Judge. The High Court expressed the view that the delay
of 63 days in filing the appeal has not been properly explained. C
14. We cannot accept the view taken by the High Court in
the impugned judgment. When a Court exercises its discretion
in ejther condoning or refusing to condone delay in filing any
proceeding, the Court acts in exercise. of its discretion. D
Normally, this Court in exercise of its discretion under Article
136 of the Constitution may not interfere with the exercise of
discretion by the High Court in such ·matters. However, there
is no straitjacket about this. The discretion of this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution is meant to further the ends of
justice and this Court has been using its discretion in E
appropriate cases when it is satisfied that exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Court or other Tribunals has not been
on sound judicial principles. It is well settled that judicial
discretion shall.always be exercised "according to the rules of
reason and justice and not according to private opinion" [See F
Sharpe Vs. Wakefield (1891 AC 193)].
15. In the facts of this case it is clear that of all the three
ladies, who were the appellants, one of them was pursuing the
case and she fell sick. Therefore, she was not in a position to G
pursue the legal remedy with due diligence as a result of which
the appeal was .filed with a delay of 63 days. The delay of 63
days is not a delay for a long period and there has been some
explanation for the delay. The High Court should have, before
passing the impugned judgment, considered the explanation for H
. .
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A the delay along with the facts of the case, the position of the
parties, the nature of the litigation and the period of delay. The
High COJ.Jrt should also have considered that it has been settled
by a catena of cases that, unless the delay is gross, --an
explanation for the same should be liberally construed. It
8 appears that the High Court has not been able to consider all
these relevant facts in their correct perspective before passing
the impugned order.
16. We, therefore, are constrained to set aside the order
of the High Court and condone the delay. We direct that the
C appeal should be restored to its file and the hearing of the
appeal may proceed as expeditiously as possible.
17. However, nothing said in this judgment should be
considered as expression of opinion on the merits of the
o controversy between the parties. The appeal is allowed. There
will be no .order as to costs.
8.8.8. Appeal allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.