Holding

Persons interrogated under the Customs Act or FERA are not "accused" within the meaning of Article 20(3) and therefore are not entitled to the assistance of a lawyer; the limitation period under section 110 excludes the time the matter is stayed.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a person questioned under the Customs Act, 1962 or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer. The petitioners argued that denial of counsel violated Article 20(3) and Article 21 of the Constitution, while the Department contended that such persons are not "accused" within the meaning of Article 20(3). Relying on Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal and Illias v. Collector of Customs, the Court held that only persons already accused can invoke the protection against self‑incrimination and that the right cannot be expanded to persons merely under investigation. The Court also rejected the claim that the interrogation under these statutes amounts to a violation of personal liberty under Article 21. Additionally, it ruled that the period of limitation under section 110 of the Customs Act must exclude the time the cases were stayed in court. Consequently, the Department's appeal was allowed and the other appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a person interrogated under the Customs Act, 1962 or FERA, 1973 is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer.
Whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution applies to persons not yet formally accused.
Whether Article 21 of the Constitution prohibits interrogation without counsel.
Computation of the limitation period under section 110 of the Customs Act when proceedings are stayed.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 20(3), s. Article 21
Customs Act, 1962s. 107, s. 108, s. 110, s. 139
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973

Subjects

Customs ActForeign Exchange Regulation Actright to counselArticle 20(3)Article 21interrogationinvestigationlimitation periodsection 110constitutional law

Judgment

'-r POOLPANDI ETC. ETC. A
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL EXCISE AND
OTHERS ETC. ETC.

MAY 14, 1992
B
(LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J.S. VERMA AND YOGESHWAR
DAYAL, JJ.]

Customs Act, 1962/Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:
c
- Ss. 107, 108, 110139, 4()--,[nvestigation-lnte"ogation of person con~
cemed-Assistance of lawyer-Whether permissible.

Seizure of goods and documents-Period of /imitation-Time taken in
r litigation be/ore High Court or Supreme Court to be excluded from computa-
tion. D
Constitution of India, 1950 :

Articles 20(3), 21-Person accused of any offence-Who is: lntemJga-
tion of person concerned during investigation under Customs Act or
~ FERA-Refusal of assistance of lawyer-Whether violative of. E

Words and phrases:

'Just, fair and reasonable test'-Application of.

The question whether a person is entitled to the aid of a counsel when F
he is questioned during investigation under the provisions of the Customs
Act, 1962 or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, was decided by
the Delhi High Court* against the Department whereas the Madras High
Court* took* the opposite view. Both the views were challenged in the two
appeals by special leave before this Court. Several writ petitions were also
G
tiled before this Court by some persons concerned.
,
-( It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioners and the appellants
(in the appeal against thejudgment of the Madras High Court) that at the
time of interrogation of a person during the investigation under -the
provisions of Customs Acts or the FERA, there being no prohibition under H
247
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) .3 S.C.R.

A the two Acts, he is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer, and to deny him ·y .
such a right would be violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution;, and
that in view of the Constitutional protection of life and personal liberty
guaranteed by Article 21, the person concerned is 'entitled to a lawyer
during questioning by the Department.

B On behalf of the Department it was contended that there is a
distinction between an accused in a criminal case and a person called for
interrogation under the FERA anci Customs Act, and the protection under
Article 20(3) which may be available to an accused cannot be expanded to
other persons.
c Allowing the appeal of the Department and dismissing the other
cases, this Court,

HELD : 1.1.The persons being interrogated during investigation
under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 or the Foreign Exchange "-t
D Regulation Act, 1973 are not accused within the meaning of Article 20(3)
of the Constitution and the right reserved by the Constitution in favour of
accused persons cannot be expanded to be enjoyed by others. [p 257 A]

Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461,
followed.
E
*K. T. Advani v. The State : 1985 Crl.L.J. 1325, overruled.

**Poolpandi etc. v. Superintendent, Central Excise (W.P. Nos. 4690-
91/87, decided by Madras High Court on 23.6.1987), approved.

F 1.2 Clause (3) of Article 20 of the C1>nstitution declares that no
person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. It does not refer to the hypothetical person who may in the future
be discovered to have been guilty of some offence. [p. 252 A]

G 1.3 In order that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion
incorporated in Article 20(3) may be claimed by a person, it has to be
established that when he made the statement he was a person accused of
an offence. [p. 252 CJ

Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461
H and 11/ias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, (1969) 2 SCR 613, followed.
POOLPANDI v. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE 249

Raman/al Bhogilal Shah and another v. D.K Guha anti Ors., [1973] A
1 sec 696, referred to.

Nandini Satpathy v. Dani (P.L.) and Anr., [1978] 3 SCR 608, inap·
plicable.

2.1 Applying the 'just, fair and reasonable test', it can not be said B
that calling a person away from his own house and questioning him in the
atmosphere of the customs office without the assistance of his lawyer or
his friends either violates his constitutional right under Article 21 or
amounts to mental torture. [p. 257 B C; FJ
c
-· 2.2 The purpose of the enquiry under the Customs Act and the other
similar statutes will be completely frustrated if the whims of the persons
in possession of useful information for the departments are allowed to
prevail. For achieving the object of such an enquiry if the appropriate
authorities be of the view that such persons should be dissociated from
the atmosphere and the company of persons who provide encouragement · D
to them in adopting a non-cooperative attitude to the machineries of law,
there cannot be any legitimate objection in depriving them of such com-
pany. The relevant provisions of the Constitution in this regard have to be
construed in the spirit they were made and the benefits thereunder should
not be expanded to favour exploiters engaged in tax evasion at the cost of E
public exchequer. [p. 257 D - F]

3. During the litigation, orders of stay have been passed from time
to time and the matters have remained pending for no, fault on the part of
the concerned Departments of the Union of India and, therefore, the entire
period for which the cases have remained pending either in this Court or , F
in the High Courts shall be excluded while computing the period under s.
110 of the Customs Act and the other relevant provision~: [p. 258 F G]

Re Groban : 352 US 330, 1 L Edn. 376 and Carlos Garza De Luna
Appt. v. United States, 1 American Law Reports 3d 967, referred to.
~G

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 301-302 of 1987.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.6.1987 of the Madras High
Court in W.P. Nos. 4690/87 and 4691 of 1987. H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A WITH

Criminal Appeal Nos. 476/86; Writ Petitions (Crl.) Nos. 350 519.,
520-21, 571-72, and 623 of 1989; 235, 236, 795, 847, 848, 1215, 1219, 1257,
1824, 1864 & 1887/1990; 7, 26, 27, 28; 60, 107, 108, 717, 1336, 1390and1392
of 1991.
B
KT.S. Tuls~ Addi. Solicitor General, H.N. Salve, U.R. Lalit, Ms.
Bina Gupta, Ms. Monika Mobil, Ms. Monika Lal, A. Subba Rao, Ms.
Sushma Suri, P. Parmeswaran, Ms. A. Subhashini, K.K. Mani, Sumeet
Kachwaha and B. Kumar for the appearing parties.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered_ by

SHARMA, J. The common question arising in these cases is whether
-
the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 1986, the appellant in
Criminal Appeals No. 301-302of1987 and the petitioners in the other cases
D are entitled to the presence of their lawyers when they are questioned
during the investigation under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred as to
'FERA'). There is difference of opinion between the High Courts on this
issue, the Delhi High Court in the judgment (reported in 1985 Crl. Law
A
1
E Jo udinr~al at p.age lh325) under chadllenhge in CdriminH~l Ahppeal Nok. ~76 ohf 1986
ho g agamst t e revenue, an t e Ma ras ig Court ta mg t e op-
posite view in its judgment impugned in Criminal Appeals No. 301-302 of
1987.

F
2. The main argument has been addressed by Mr. Salve with refer-
ence to the facts in Criminal Appeals No. 301 and 302 of 1987 arising out
--
of a matter u~der the Customs Act, 1962. Mr. U.R. Lalit, the counsel in
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 717 of 1991, has adopted his contentions and
suppqrted the same by additional grounds. The Enforcement Directorate,
Delhi zone, investigating the matter under the FERA, has filed Criminal
G Appeal No. 476 of 1986 against the judgment of the Delhi High Court
allowing the applications under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, of the respondents, who are represented before us by Mr. Panjwani.

3. Mr. Salve referred to the provisions of Chapter XIII and XIV of
the Customs Act and contended that since there is no statutory provision
H prohibiting the presence of a counsel during the interrogation of the person
POOLPANDI v. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE [SHARMA, J.] 251

y concerned, a reques~ in this regard, if made, cannot be legitimately refused. A
In any event, the learned counsel proceeded to urge, that in a situation
where the possibility of the person under interrogation of being prosecuted
as an accused cannot be denied, he is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer
during the questioning, because to deny him such a right would be violative
of the constitutional protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
B
Alternatively Mr. Salve contended that in view of the constitutional protec-
tion of life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21, the person
~· concerned is entitled to insist upon the presence of his lawyer when he is
questioned by the officers of. the department.

:.-
4. Both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit itrongly relied on the observations c
in Nandini Satpathy v. Dani (P.L.) and Anr., [1978] 3 SCR 608, at pages
623, 624, 626-629, 645 and 646. We are afraid, in view of two judgments of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of
): West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR 461 and Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras,
[1969] 2 SCR 613, the stand of the appellant cannot be accepted. The D
learned counsel urged that since Nandini Satpathy's case was decided later,
the observations therein must be given effect to by this Court now. There
is no force in this argument.

~. 5. Mr. Salve referred to the provisions of the Customs Act and E
contended that .in view of the mandate in section 108(3) a person has to
answer truthfully the question put to him by the Customs Officer and has
to produce documents or any other thing as may be required, and lie is
within his rights to refuse to answer such questions which may lead to his
own prosecution. An inquiry under the Act is held only when prim a f acie F
some violation of the law takes place, and the purpose of the inquiry is to
--J.
identify the guilty person who has been described by the learned counsel
as the potential accused. The protection under Article 20(3) is claimed to
be not limited to persons who are already accused but to extend to cover
a potential accused too; and a person under interrogation may himself be
such a potential accused. He may, therefore, require the presence of a G
lawyer who can advise him as to which of the questions he may refuse to
answer in view of the protection under Article 20(3). It is submitted that
to deny him this privilege is to deny him a constitutional right. We do not
find any merit in this argument in view of the decisions of this Court
referred to above. H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A 6. Clause (3) of Article 20 declares that no person accused of any
offence shall be. compelled to be a witness against himself. It does not refer
to the hypothetiCal person who may in the future be discovered to have
been guilty of some offence. In Ramesh Chandra Mehta's case, the appel-
lant was searched at the Calcutta Airport and diamonds and jewelleries of
substantial value were found on his person as also currency notes in a
B
suitcase with him, and in pursuance to a statement made by him niore
pearls and jewellery were recovered from different places. He was charged
with offences under the Sea Customs Act. During the trial, reliance was
placed on his confessional statements made before the Customs
Authorities, which was objected to on the ground that the same were
c inadmissible in evidence inter alia in view of the provisions of Article 20(3).
While rejecting the objection, the Supreme Court held that in order that .
the guarantee against testimonial compulsion incorporated in Article 20(3)
-·
may be claimed by a person, it has to be established that when he made
the statement in question, he was a person accused of an offence. Pointing
D · out to the similar provisions of the Sea Customs Act as in the present Act
and referring to the power of a Customs Officer, in an inquiry in connec-
tion with the smuggling of goods, to summon any person whose attendance
he considers necessary to give evidence or to produce a particular docu-
ment the Supreme Court observed thus : ~
E
"The expression "any person" includes a person who is
suspected or believed to be concerned in the smuggling of
goods. But a person arrested by a Customs Officer because he
is found in possession of smuggled goods or on suspicion that
F he is concerned in smuggling is not when called upon by the
Customs Officer to make a statement or to produce a document
or thing, a person accused of an offence within the meaning of
Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. The steps taken by the Customs
Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the
Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of goods
G dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties. The Customs
Officer does not at that stage accuse the person suspected or
infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs Act with the
commission of any office. His primary duty is to prevent smug-
gling and to recover duties of customs when collecting evidence
H in respect of smuggling against a person suspected of infringing
POOLPANDI v. SUPDT. CENlRAL EXCISE (SHARMA, J.] 253

the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, he is not accusing the A
y person of any offence punishable at a trial before a Magistrate."

The above conclusion was reached after consideration of several relevant
decisions and deep deliberation on the issue, and cannot be ignored on the
strength of certain observations in the judgment by three learned Judges
in Nandini Satpathy's case which is, as will be pointed out hereinafter, B
clearly distinguishable.

)-- 7. A perusal of the facts in Nandini Satpathy v. Dani, (Supra) would
clearly indicate that the decision has no application in the present cases.
The matter arose out of a complaint filed by the Deputy Superintendent c
- of Police (Vigil_ance) against the appellant under section 179 of the Indian
Penal Code before the Sub Di~sional Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack. The
Magistrate took the cognizance of the offence and issued summons for
appearance against the appellants. It was contended unsuccessfully that the
charge was unsustainable in view of the protection under Article 20 (3) of
D
the Constitution and the immunity under section 161 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code. In this background the observations relied upon by Mr.
Salve and Mr. Lalit were made and they cannot be treated to have in any
way diluted the ratio in Romesh Chandra Mehta's case. The question
whether customs officials are police officers, and whether the statements
recorded by the customs authorities under section 107 and 108 of the E
Customs Act were inadmissible in evidence were examined in lllias v.
Collector of Customs (supra) and answered in the negative by a Bench of
five Judges and it is, therefore, no use referring to the observations made
in the judgment in a regular criminal case initiated by the police.
F
8. Reference was also made to the Constitution Bench decision in
-).__ Raman/al BhogiLal Shah and another v. D.K Guha and Others, [1973] 1
SCC 696. The appellant Ramanlal was arrested on August 31, 1971 under
Section 19B of the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1947, and the
grounds of arrest served on him included the accusation relating to a
transaction with reference to which he was summoned on April 17, 1972 G
to appear before the Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate on April
28, 1972 to give evidence. The petitioner pointed out that he was accused
-( at the time when he was arrested of having committed an offence which
was the subject- matter of the enquiry and the summons should, therefore,
be withdrawn. The prayer was rejected by the Deputy Director who H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A insisted that the petitioner had to comply with the same. On these facts the
matter was considered by the Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the
First Information Report in the case bad been lodged earlier, and since "it
is well settled that with the lodging of the First Information Report a
person in accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (3)", the
appellant was entitled to partial relief. The decision in Romesh Chandra
B Mehta v. State of West Bengal was referred to and not dissented from. We,
therefore, reject the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants
founded on Article 20(3) of the Con5titution. It will be further noticed that
in Raman/al's case (supra) the Bench took the precaution of observing that
the only protection that Article 20 (3) gives to a person accused of an
C offence is that be cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, but
this does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters
which do not tend to incriminate him. Rejecting the prayer of the appellant
for setting aside the summons the Court directed him to appear before the
Deputy Director and answer such questions as did not tend to incriminate
D him. It is significant to note that these observations permitting him not to
answer self-incriminating questions were made only because the appellant
was held to be an accused on the relevant date.

9. Mr. Salve has, next, contended that the appellant is within his right
to insist on the presence of his lawyer on the basis of Article 21 of the
E Constitution. He has urged that by way of ensuring protection to his life
and liberty he is entitled to demand that he shall not be asked any question
in the absence of his lawyer. The argument proceeds to suggest that
although strictly the questioning by the Revenue authorities does not
amount to custodial interrogation, it must be treated as near custodial
F interrogation, and if the same is continueci for a long period it may amount
to mental third degree. It was submitted by both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit
that the present issue should be resolved only by applying the 'just, fair and
reasonable test', and Mr. Lalit further added that the point has to be
decided in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining in a particular
case and a general rule should not be laid down one way or the other. Mr.
G Salve urged that when a person.is called by the customs authorities to their
office or to any place away from his house, and is subjected to intensive
interrogation with.out the presence of somebody who can aid and advise
him, he is bound to get upset, which by itself amounts to loss of liberty.
Reference was made by the learned counsel to the minority view in Re
H Groban : 352 US 330, 1 L ed 2d 376, declaring that it ~olates the protection
POOLPANDI v. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE [SHARMA, J.) 255

guaranteed by the constitution for the State to compel a person to appear A
alone before any law enforcement officer and give testimony in secret
against his will.

10. We are afraid the judgment of the United States Supreme ~ourt
in Re Grabon's case : 352 US 330, 1 Lawyer Edition 2d 376; is of no
assistance to the appellant. The matter related to an investigation into the B
cause of a fire where the right to assistance of counsel to the witness was
denied, on the basis of a state statute. In this situation the witnesses refused
to depose without the presence of their counsel, and their refusal was
treated as a violation of the provisions of the statue, and they were sent to
prison. They filed an application for writ of habeas corpus which on c
dismissal came before the United States Supreme Court. The question
which was raised and considered by the Court was whether the witnesses
had a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel during their inter-
+ rogation as witness in the enquiry. Reed, J., speaking for three members
of the Court, rejected the contention that the witnesses had such a right. D
It was pointed out that the persons concerned were not accused and they
could not claim the right available to an accused of being heard through
his own counsel. Two other Judges concurred in this view and thus the
majority judgment went against the plea of such a claim. It was observed
that prosecution of an individual differs widely from investigation of inci-
dents damaging to the economy or dangerous to the public. The enquiry E
under consideration was a proceeding to elicit facts on the basis of which
it could be determined whether the fire was the result of carelessness or
design, and although it could lead to arrest of any person against whom
there was sufficient evidence on which a charge of arson could be based,
it was held that the fact that the testimony of the witnesses might provide F
basis of criminal charges against them did not mean that they were entitled
to insist on the presence of their counsel. The majority decision in the case
supports the stand of the respondent, Union of India. We have gone
through the minority 'iew in the judgment of Black, J. and arc not im-
pressed by the same. Mr. Salve has relied upon the following observations
from the judgment : - . "' G

"Secret inquisition~ are c;langerous' things justly feared by free
men everywhere.: They are the breeding place for arbitrary
misuse of official power. They~are often the beginning of
tyranny as. well as indispensable instruments for its survival. H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992} 3 S.C.R.

A Modern as well as ancient history bears witness that both
innocent and guilty have been seized by officers of the state
and whisked away for secret interrogation or worse until the
groundwork has been secretely laid for their inevitable convic-
tion. While the labels applied to this practice have frequently
changed, the central idea wherever and whenever carried out
B remains unchanging-extraction of "statements" by one means or
another from an individual by officers of the state while he is
held incommunicado. "

The learned judge, accordingly expressed his dissent observing that
c to compel a person to answer questions at a secret interrogation where he
is- denied legal assistance and where he is subject to the uncontrolled and
invisible exercise of power by government officials, would be unconstitu-
tional. We do not share the apprehension as expressed above in the
minority judgment in connection with enquiry and investigation under the
D Customs Act and other similar statutes of our country. There is no questi?n
of whisking away the persons concerned in the cases before us for secret
interrogation, and there is no reason for us to impute the motive of
preparing the groundwork of false cases for securing conviction of innocent
persons, to the officers of the state duly engaged in performing their duty
of prevention and detection of economic crimes and recovering misap-
E propriated money justly belonging to the public. Reference was also made
to the observation in the judgment in Carlos Garza De Luna, Appt., v.
United States : 1 American Law Reports 3d 969; setting out the historical
background 'of the right of silence of an accused in a criminal case. Mr.
Salve has relied upon the opinion of Wisdom, Circuit Judge, that the
F history of the development of the right of silence is a history of accretions,
not of an avulsion and the line of growth in the course of time discloses
the expanding conception of the right than is restricted application. The
Judge was fair enough to discuss the other point of view espoused by the
great jurists of both sides of Atlantic before expressing his opinion. In any
event we are not concerned with the right of an accused in a criminal case
G and the deci~ion is, therefore, not relevant at all. The facts as emerging ·
from the judgment indicate that narcotics were thrown from a car carrying
the two persons accused in the case. One of the accused persons testified
at the trial and his counsel in argument to the jury m.ade adverse comments
on the failure of the other accused to go to the witness box. The first
H accused was acquitted and the second accused was convicted. The questidn
POOLPANDI v. SUPDT. CENTRAL EXCISE [SHARMA, J.] 257

of the right of silence of the accused cam~ up for consideration in this set A
up. In the cases before us the persons concerned are not accused and w~
do not find any justification for "expanding" the right reserved by the
Constitution of India in favour of accused persons to be enjoyed by others.

11. We do not find any force in the arguments of Mr. Salve and Mr.
Lalit that if a person is called away from his own house and questioned ill
B
the atmosphere of the customs office without the assistance of his lawyer
or his friends his constitutional right under Article 21 is violated. The
argument proceeds thus : if the person who is used to certain comforts and
convenience is asked to come by himself to the Department for answering
questions it amounts to mental torture. We are unable to agree. It is true c
that large majority of persons connected with illegal trade and evasion of
truces and duties are in a position to afford luxuries on lavish scale of which:
an honest ordinary citizen of this country cannot dream of and they are
surrounded by persons similarly involved either directly or indirectly in
+ such pursuits. But that cannot be a ground for holding that he has a D
constitutional right to claim similar luxuries and company of his choice. Mr.:
Salve was fair enough not to pursue his argument with reference to the
comfort part, but continued to maintain that the appellant is entitled to the
company of his choice during the questioning. The purpose of the enquiry
under the Customs Act and the other similar statutes will be completely '
·frustrated if the whims of the persons in possession of useful information E
for the departments are allowed to prevail. For achieving the object of such
an enquiry if the appropriate authorities be of the view that such persons
should be dissociated from the atmosphere and the company of .persons
who provide encouragement to them in· adopting a non-cooperative at-
titude to the machineries of law, there cannot be any legitimate objection
F
in depriving them of such company. The relevant provisions of the Con-
stitution in this regard have to be construed in the spirit they were made
and the benefits thereunder should not be "expanded". to favour exploiters
engaged in true evasion at the cost of public exchequer. Applying the 'just,
fair and reasonable test' we hold that there is no merit in the stand of
appellant before us. G

12. Both Mr. Lalit, the learned counsel in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
717 of 1991 and the learned counsel for the respondent in Criminal Appeal
No. 476 of 1986 (arising out of a FERA case) reiterated the stand ~hat the
parties represented by them respectively should be treated to be in identi- H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

.A cal position as an accused and consequently should be allowed the protec- ·
tion under clause (3) of Article 20. In view of the judgments of this Court Y
and the discussion as mentioned earlier, the argument cannot be accepted.
Mr. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General, was right in pointing
out the distinction between an accused in a criminal case and a person
B called for interrogation under the present Acts as discussed at page 466 in
Romesh Chandra Mehta's case (supra).

13. The judgment under challenge in Criminal Appeal No. 476 of
1986 deals with several questions raised by the respondent, and the appeal 4
has been pressed by Mr. Tulsi as against that part which allows the
C presence of a lawyer when the respondent is interrogated. It has been
rightly contended on behalf of the appellant that the relevant provisions,
in this regard, of the FERA and the Customs Act are in pari materia and
the object of tlie two Acts is also similar. As pointed out earlier the case
of Raman/al Bhogilal (supra) was one arising under FERA. Consequently
Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 1986 has to be allowed against that part of the -.+
D judgment of the Delhi High Court which dealt with the right. of the
respondents to have their lawyer during their interrogation.

14. In the result Criminal Appeal No. 476 of 1986 is allowed, but
without costs in the terms indicated above and the other cases are dis-
E missed with costs to the Union of India.

15. The learned counsel for the Union of India has drawn our
attention to the period of limitation fixed under the statutes for the purpose
of taking certain steps and has rightly contended that in view of the
pendency of the present cases in Courts the period has to be extended.
F During the litigation; orders of stay· have been passed from time to time
and the matters have . remained pending for no fault on the part of the
concerned Departments of the Union of India and we, therefore, direct
that the entire period for which the cases have remained pending either in
this Court or in the High Court shall be excluded while computing the
G period under section 110 of the Customs Act and the other relevant
provisions.

R.P. Cr. A. 476/86allowed and others dismissed.