PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD.versusKETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL

                            [2021] 1 S.C.R. 1043                               1043


                      PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD.                                    A
                                     v.
                 KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL
                    (Civil Appeal No. 5146 of 2019)
                           FEBRUARY 03, 2021                                   B
            [ASHOK BHUSHAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY
                        AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Insolvency and Bankruptcy code, 2016 – ss. 5(7), 5(8), 3
and 60 – Contract Act, 1872 – ss.124, 126 and 172 –L&T
Infrastructure Finance company advanced the financial facility to              C
‘D’ – A facility agreement was executed between ‘D’ (borrower)
and L&T Infrastructure Finance company (lender) – Lender
advanced to borrower Rs.40 crores – ‘DV’ (corporate debtor) gave
an undertaking in favour of L&T Infrastructure Finance to the effect
that 100% of their shareholding in GEL shall not be disposed of so             D
long as any amounts were due and payable and outstanding under
the financial assistance proposed to be provided by L&T Infra to
the borrower –A Pledge agreement was also executed between ‘DV’
and L&T Infrastructure Finance company by which agreement
40,160 shares of GEL were pledged as security –L&T assigned all
rights, title and interest in the financial facility including any security,   E
interest in favour of appellant –‘D’(borrower) failed to repay –
Bank filed petition u/s.7 of the Code to initiate the corporate
resolution process in respect of ‘DV’(corporate debtor) – Pursuant
to commencement of CIRP in respect of corporate debtor, the
appellant filed its claim for an amount of Rs.83,49,85,667/- with              F
respondent, the Interim Resolution Professional – Respondent opined
that the corporate debtor’s liability was restricted to pledge of shares
–Appellant filed application before the NCLT – NCLT held that
appellant’s status as financial creditor of the corporate debtor is
not proved in light of s.5(8) of the Code – NCLAT dismissed the
appeal filed by the appellant – On appeal, held: A contract of                 G
guarantee is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the
liability, of a third person in case of his default – The present is not
case where the corporate debtor has entered into a contract to
perform the promise, or discharge the liability of borrower in case
of his default – The Pledge Agreement is limited to pledge 40,160
                                                                               H
                                     1043
1044            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     shares as security –The corporate debtor has never promised to
       discharge the liability of borrower –It was borrower who had
       promised to repay the loan of Rs.40 crores in Facility Agreement
       and it was borrower who had undertaken to discharge the liability
       towards lender – The appellant at best will be a secured debtor qua
       above security but shall not be a financial creditor within the meaning
 B
       of s.5 sub-sections (7) and (8) – The appellant is not financial
       creditor of the corporate debtor – The decision of the Resolution
       Professional is upheld.
             Dismissing the appeal, the Court
 C           HELD : 1.Whether the corporate debtor owed any financial
       debt to the appellant so as to treat the appellant as financial
       creditor is the question to be answered. The definition of ‘financial
       debt’ as contained in Section 5(8) of the 2016 Code contains the
       expressions “means” and “includes”. The definition begins with
       the words “financial debt” means ‘a debt alongwith interest, if
 D     any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time
       value of money and includes’... The main part of the definition,
       thus, provides that financial debt means a debt “which is
       disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money”.
       The definition in the second part gives instances which also
 E     includes financial debt. The appellant in his submission has relied
       on Section 5(8)(i) to support his claim that the appellant is the
       financial creditor. [Para 21][1054-E-G]
              2. It is clear from the definition a contract of guarantee
       (section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872) is a contract to
 F     perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person
       in case of his default. The present is not a case where the
       corporate debtor has entered into a contract to perform the
       promise, or discharge the liability of borrower in case of his default.
       The Pledge Agreement is limited to pledge 40,160 shares as
       security. The corporate debtor has never promised to discharge
 G     the liability of borrower. The Facility Agreement under which the
       borrower was bound by the terms and conditions and containing
       his obligation to repay the loan security for performance are all
       contained in the Facility Agreement. A contract of guarantee
       contains a guarantee “to perform the promise or discharge the
 H
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1045


liability of third person in case of his default”. Thus, key words in   A
Section 126 are contract “to perform the promise”, or “discharge
the liability”, of a third person. Both the expressions “perform
the promise” or “discharge the liability” relate to “a third person”.
The Pledge Agreement dated 10.01.2012 does not contain any
contract that the promise which was made by the borrower in the
                                                                        B
Facility Agreement dated 12.05.2011 to discharge the liability of
debt of Rs.40 crores is undertaken by the corporate debtor. It
was the borrower who had promised to repay the loan of Rs.40
crores in Facility Agreement dated 12.05.2011 and it was borrower
who had undertaken to discharge the liability towards lender. The
Pledge Agreement dated 10.01.2012 does not contain any contract         C
that corporate debtor has contracted to perform the promise, or
discharge the liability of the third person. The Pledge Agreement
is limited to pledge of 40,160 shares of GEL only. This Court has
noticed above that in the Facility Agreement there is a Security
Creation by way of Schedule IV in which 100% equity shares of
                                                                        D
GEL were pledged by the borrower and second pari-passu charge
on all current assets of the GEL was also created as security for
loan. It transpires that since some shares of GEL were also with
the corporate debtor who is subsidiary Company of ‘D’. the same
was also pledged with the lender as additional security by a
subsequent agreement dated 10.01.2012. [Para 23][1055-E-H;              E
1056-A-C]
      5. This Court in Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and
Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India held
that a person having only security interest over the assets of
corporate debtor, even if falling within the description of ‘secured    F
creditor’ by virtue of collateral security extended by the corporate
debtor, would not be covered by the financial creditors as per
definitions contained in sub-section (7) and (8) of section 5. What
has been held by this Court as noted above is fully attracted in
the present case where corporate debtor has only extended a
security by pledging 40,160 shares of GEL. The appellant at best        G
will be secured debtor qua above security but shall not be a
financial creditor within the meaning of Section 5 sub-sections
(7) and (8). [Para 30][1062-A-C]

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1046            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A            6. The Appellate Tribunal has dealt with Section 5(8)(f) while
       rejecting the claim of the appellant as to be the financial creditor.
       It appears that the submission based on Section 5(8) (i) was not
       addressed before the Appellate Tribunal. This Court, thus, uphold
       the decision of the Resolution Professional as approved by the
       NCLAT as correct. The appellant is not financial creditor of the
 B
       corporate debtor. Hence, Miscellaneous Application was rightly
       rejected by the Adjudicating Authority.This Court, however, make
       it clear that observations made by us in this judgment are only
       for deciding the claim of the appellant as the financial creditor
       within the meaning of Section 5(7) and 5(8) of the Code and shall
 C     have no bearing on any other proceedings undertaken by the
       appellant to establish any of its right in accordance with law.
       [Para 32][1062-F-H; 1063-A]
             Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC
             17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Pioneer Urban Land &
 D           Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC
             416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381 – relied on.
             Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee
             Infratech Limited vs. Axis Bank Limited and others
             (2020) 8 SCC 401 – referred to.
 E           Jagjivandas Jethalal and another v. King Hamilton &
             Co. Indian Law Reports, Volume LV 1931, 617 – referred
             to.
                              Case Law Reference

 F     (2020) 8 SCC 401               referred to             Para 8
       [2019] 3 SCR 535               relied on               Para 27
       [2019] 10 SCR 381              relied on               Para 29
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5146
       of 2019.
 G
             From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2019 of the National
       Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT)
       (Insolvency) No. 325 of 2019.
           K.V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., Pai Amit, Charles D. Souza,
 H     Manaswi Agarwal, Apoorv Singhal, Rahat Bansal, Ms. Pankhuri
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1047


Bhardwaj, Yash Badkur, Rohit R. Saboo, Ms. Ami Jain, Ms. Anushree              A
Prashit Kapadia, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms. Namita Choudhary, Ms. Praveena
Gautam, Pawan Shukla, Raja Ram, Ms. Sweety Pandey, Varun Singh,
Gaurav Nair, Ms. Pranati Bhatnagar, Kritya Sinha, Divyanshu Bhandari,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               B
      ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
       This appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “Code”) has been filed questioning
the judgment of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New
Delhi dated 09.04.2019 dismissing the Company Appeal filed by the              C
appellant. The Company Appeal was filed by the appellant against order
dated 22.02.2019 of National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench
rejecting the Miscellaneous Application filed by the appellant under
Section 60(5)(c) of the Code holding that the appellant is not the financial
creditor of the corporate debtor, Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Private       D
Limited.
      2. Brief facts of this case for deciding this appeal are:
       L & T Infrastructure Finance Company Limited advanced the
financial facility to Doshion Limited, a Company incorporated and
registered under the Companies Act, 1956. A Facility Agreement dated           E
12.05.2011 was executed between the Doshion Limited (borrower) and
L & T Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (lender) advancing to
the borrower a financial facility of Rs.40 crores repayable in 72 structured
monthly instalments. Schedule IV of the facility agreement dealt with
“Security Creation”. The Board of Directors of Doshion Veolia Water            F
Solutions Private Limited (corporate debtor) passed a Resolution on
26.07.2011 to give Non-Disposal Undertaking in favour of L & T
Infrastructure Finance Company Limited whereby Board was authorised
to provide an undertaking to the effect that 100% of their shareholding
in Gondwana Engineers Limited (GEL) shall not be disposed of so long
as any amounts were due and payable and outstanding under the financial        G
assistance proposed to be provided by L&T Infra to borrower. On
10.01.2012 a Pledge Agreement was executed between Doshion Veolia
Water Solutions Private Limited and L&T Infrastructure Finance
Company Limited by which agreement 40,160 shares of Gondwana
Engineers Limited were pledged as a security. On 10.01.2012 a deed of
                                                                               H
1048             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     undertaking was also executed by Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Private
       Limited in favour of L&T Infrastructure Finance Co.Ltd. By agreement
       dated 30.12.2013 L&T Infrastructure assigned all rights, title and interest
       in the financial facility including any security, interest therein in favour
       of Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd., the appellant under Section 5 of the
       Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
 B
       of Security Interest Act, 2002. The borrower, Doshion Limited failed to
       repay as per agreed terms dated 12.05.2011. The appellant issued a
       notice dated 19.02.2014 and recalled the financial facility. The appellant
       filed O.A.No.325 of 2016 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
       Ahmedabad which is said to be pending.
 C            3. On 31.08.2018, Bank of Baroda filed Company Petition
       No.CP(IB)1752/MB/2017 before the Adjudicating Authority under
       Section 7 of the Code to initiate the corporate insolvency resolution
       process in respect of the Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Private Limited
       (Corporate Debtor). By order dated 31.08.2018, the Adjudicating
 D     Authority admitted the Company Petition and the corporate insolvency
       resolution process began. The respondent was appointed as the Interim
       Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor which was later confirmed
       as the Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor. Pursuant to the
       commencement of corporate insolvency resolution process in respect of
       the corporate debtor, the appellant filed its claim for an amount of
 E     Rs.83,49,85,667/- with the respondent. The respondent vide email dated
       20.09.2018 expressed an opinion that as per the Pledge Agreement
       submitted by the appellant, the corporate debtor’s liability was restricted
       to pledge of the shares only. The respondent sought further documents
       in respect of the appellant’s claim. Although additional documents were
 F     submitted by the appellant, the respondent by email dated 23.11.2018
       reiterated the earlier view.
              4. The appellant filed M.A.No.1514 of 2018 before the National
       Company Law Tribunal, Bench at Mumbai in Company Petition
       No.CP(IB)1752/MB/2017 seeking a direction to the respondent to admit
 G     the claim of the appellant as a financial debt with all consequential benefits
       including voting rights in the Committee of creditors of the corporate
       debtor. The appellant stated that pledge of the shares by the corporate
       debtor was in essence a guarantee for financial debt and, therefore,
       appellant was a financial creditor of the corporate debtor. The Resolution
       Professional vide email dated 04.12.2018 rejected the claim of the
 H
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1049
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

appellant as financial creditor of the corporate debtor on the ground that       A
there was no separate Deed of Guarantee in favour of the Assignor.
The respondent filed an affidavit in reply before the Adjudicating Authority.
After hearing the parties, the Adjudicating Authority passed an order
dated 22.02.2019 rejecting the Miscellaneous Application filed by the
appellant. The Adjudicating Authority held that the applicant’s status as
                                                                                 B
financial creditor of the corporate debtor is not proved in the light of
Section 5(8) of the Code.
       5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Adjudicating Authority, the
appeal was filed by the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal. The
Appellate Tribunal held that pledge of shares in question do not amount
to “disbursement of any amount against the consideration for the time            C
value of money” and it do not fall within sub-clause (f) of sub-section
(8) of Section 5 as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant.
The Appellate Authority finding no merit in the appeal, dismissed the
appeal. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant
has filed the present appeal.                                                    D
       6. We have heard Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, Ms. Ami Jain, learned counsel for the respondent. We
have also heard learned counsel for the Bank of Baroda as intervenor.
       7. Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel, submits that
the appellant is a financial creditor within the meaning of Section 5 sub-       E
section (8)(i) of the Code. He submits that liability of the corporate debtor,
who is surety, is co-extensive to that of debtor and the creditor has full
rights to pursue his liability against the surety even before the creditor.
There is a debt which is payable by the corporate debtor to the appellant
and for securing that debt, the corporate debtor has created a security          F
interest in favour of the Assignor that is L&T Infrastructure Ltd. The
L&T Infrastructure Ltd. having assigned all its rights and obligations to
the appellant vide Assignment dated 30.12.2013, the appellant has stepped
into the shoes of L&T Infrastructure Ltd. The parent Company of
corporate debtor Doshion Ltd. took a credit facility from the predecessor
of the appellant and the corporate debtor undertook a liability by creating      G
a security interest in the form of shares of Gondwana Engineers Limited.
The present case is covered by Section 5(8)(b) read with 5(i), not
accepting the appellant as financial creditor would have effect of leaving
the appellant effectively remediless inasmuch as the appellant cannot
enforce the guarantee during the subsistence of moratorium period and            H
1050             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     once the resolution plan is passed without any redress to the appellant in
       the Financial Plan, the said resolution plan would be binding upon the
       appellant whereupon the appellant shall be gravely prejudiced since
       nothing could then be recoverable from the corporate debtor. The
       corporate debtor in effect has provided a guarantee to L&T Infrastructure
       Ltd. whereby the corporate debtor guarantees L&T Infrastructure the
 B
       debts due from Doshion Ltd. and in case of non-payment, a charge
       subsisted upon the 100% shareholding of Gondwana Engineers Ltd. As
       the corporate debtor has secured the payment of the loan, the liability of
       corporate debtor to L&T Infrastructure became co-extensive to that of
       Doshion Ltd. under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which,
 C     inter alia, financial creditor to the appellant herein and the loan was
       advanced for interest and the said loan was secured by the corporate
       debtor.
              8. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment of this Court
       in Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech
 D     Limited vs. Axis Bank Limited and others, (2020) 8 SCC 401,
       relied by the learned counsel for the respondent is distinguishable from
       the facts of the present case. He submits that any security that would
       permit the right of action against the third party that is not the borrower,
       would amount to guarantee. The mere fact that corporate debtor has
       not borrowed money from the appellant, it cannot absolve the corporate
 E     debtor from its liability as guarantor. He submits that term guarantee is
       not to be understood narrowly and it has to be understood to include any
       security created by third party to secure repayment of financial debt
       including a pledge of shares. The pledge of shares by corporate debtor
       to secure the loan advanced to the parent Company of the corporate
 F     debtor amounts to a guarantee. He lastly submits that judgment of Anuj
       Jain needs to be clarified to the effect that it has been rendered in a
       specific facts scenario which does not apply to the present case at all.
              9. Ms. Ami Jain, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent
       submits that the appellant is not a creditor of any nature whatsoever of
 G     the corporate debtor. The appellant has no right of recovery of any debt
       from the corporate debtor and has a limited right of enforcing and realising
       the value of its security in the shape of the shares held by the corporate
       debtor in its subsidiary, that is, Gondwana Engineers Ltd. which is pledged
       with the appellant as a security for the loan given to its parent Company,
       viz. Doshion Ltd. in accordance with the Pledge Agreement dated
 H
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1051
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

10.01.2012. The pledge is not, in any manner, a guarantee under the            A
Contract Act. Section 5(8)(i) of the Code takes within its sweep only
any liability arising out of a guarantee for any of the items referred to in
sub-clauses (a) to (h) of Section 5(8) of the Code, and not any other
instrument in the nature of a guarantee. The pledge of shares cannot be
equated with the guarantee as both are absolutely different in terms of
                                                                               B
their ramification and implication. The corporate debtor has not entered
into any contract of guarantee with the appellant to perform the promise,
or discharge the liability of a third party in case of his default. In the
event of default by the borrower, the appellant has the limited right to
realise the money by sale of shares pledged without requiring the
corporate debtor to perform the promise, or discharge the liability as no      C
promise is given by the corporate debtor to repay the debt recoverable
from the borrower.
       10. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the National
Company Law Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim of the appellant as
financial creditor. It is further submitted that the appellant has already     D
initiated proceedings at the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad for
realisation of its dues which is an admitted fact. In the Code nowhere
pledge is mentioned. The appellant cannot claim their pledge agreement
dated 10.01.2012 as guarantee as there is no Deed of Guarantee on the
record. The Code does not deal with recovery.
                                                                               E
        11. Learned counsel appearing for Bank of Baroda/Intervenor
referring to objects and reasons of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
contends that the purpose and object of the Code is entirely different. It
is not a mechanism for recovery of any amount. The appellant has already
moved to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad.
                                                                               F
       12. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and have perused the records.
       13. The only question to be considered in this appeal is as to
whether the appellant is a financial creditor within the meaning of Section
5(8) of the Code on the strength of pledge agreement dated 10.01.2012          G
and Deed of Undertaking dated 10.01.2012 entered into with L&T
Infrastructure.
      14. We may first notice the transaction in question on the basis of
which the appellant claims to be treated as financial creditor qua corporate
debtor.
                                                                               H
1052              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A            15. The Facility Agreement dated 12.05.2011 was executed
       between the Doshian Ltd. and the L&T Infrastructure Finance Company
       Ltd. The corporate debtor was not a party to the Facility Agreement. It
       was the Doshion Ltd., the borrower who was to repay the loan of Rs.40
       crores. Schedule-IV of Facility Agreement is “Security Creation” which
       is a part of the Facility Agreement, is as follows:
 B
                                   “SCHEDULE-IV
                              SECURITY CREATION
             The Facility (together with all principal interest, liquidated damages,
             fees costs, charges, expenses and other monies and all other
 C           amounts stipulated and payable to the Lender) shall be secured
             by:
             1.     Second pari-passu charge on all current assets of the
                    Borrower.

 D           2.     Second pari-passu charge on all current assets of Gondwana
                    Engineers Limited (GEL).
             3.     Pledge of 100% equity shares together with all accretions
                    thereon of the GEL.
             4.     Personal guarantee of promoters of DL namely Ashit
 E                  Dhirajilal Doshi, Dhirajilal Shivlal Doshi and Rakshit Dhirajlal
                    Doshi.
             5.     Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA) in the form of LC/
                    BG for 3 months of interest and principal payments.
             6.     Demand Promissory Note.
 F
             If, at any time during the subsistence of the Facility, the Lender is
             of the opinion that the security provided by the Borrower has
             become inadequate to cover the Facility then outstanding, then,
             on the Lender advising the Borrower to that effect, the Borrower
             shall provide and furnish to the Lender, to the satisfaction of the
 G           Lender, such additional security as may be acceptable to the
             Lender to cover such deficiency.”
             16. Item No.3 of Schedule IV, as noted above, is Pledge of 100%
       equity shares together with all accretions thereon of the GEL. There is
       Second pari-passu charge on all current assets of the GEL as per
 H     Schedule IV.
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1053
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        17. The Pledge Agreement dated 10.01.2012 was entered into            A
between the corporate debtor and L&T Infrastructure Finance Co. Ltd.
Schedule II contains details of the Securities which are 40,160 shares of
GEL. The corporate debtor has pledged in favour of lender, the securities,
the Clauses of the Pledge Agreement clearly describe the nature of the
security created by the Pledge Agreement. It is relevant to notice Clause
                                                                              B
2(iii) which is to the following effect:
      “2(iii) The Obligors hereby agree and confirm that the pledge
      created/to be created in terms of this Agreement shall be a
      continuing security for the payment of the Secured Obligations
      and the due performance by the Obligors of their obligations
      hereunder.”                                                             C

        18. The shares of GEL were pledged with L&T Infrastructure as
security. The Deed of Undertaking which was given on the same day,
i.e., 10.01.2012 is also to the same effect.
      19. Now, we may look into the provisions of the Insolvency and          D
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 relevant for the present controversy. Part II of
Chapter I of the Code deals with Insolvency Resolution Liquidation for
Corporate Persons. Section 5 is the definition clause. Section 5(7) defines
“financial creditor” in the following words:
      “Section 5(7) “financial creditor” means any person to whom a           E
      financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom such debt
      has been legally assigned or transferred to;”
       20. What is ‘financial debt’ is defined in Section 5(8) which is to
the following effect:
      “Section 5(8) “financial debt” means a debt along with interest, if     F
      any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value
      of money and includes—
      (a) money borrowed against the payment of interest;
      (b) any amount raised by acceptance under any acceptance credit
      facility or its de-materialised equivalent;                             G

      (c) any amount raised pursuant to any note purchase facility or
      the issue of bonds, notes, debentures, loan stock or any similar
      instrument.

                                                                              H
1054             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A           (d) the amount of any liability in respect of any lease or hire
             purchase contract which is deemed as a finance or capital lease
             under the Indian Accounting Standards or such other accounting
             standards as may be prescribed;
             (e) receivables sold or discounted other than any receivables sold
 B           on non-recourse basis;
             (f) any amount raised under any other transaction, including any
             forward sale or purchase agreement, having the commercial effect
             of a borrowing;
             (g) any derivative transaction entered into in connection with
 C           protection against or benefit from fluctuation in any rate or price
             and for calculating the value of any derivative transaction, only
             the market value of such transaction shall be taken into account;
             (h) any counter-indemnity obligation in respect of a guarantee,
             indemnity, bond, documentary letter of credit or any other instrument
 D           issued by a bank or financial institution;
             (i) the amount of any liability in respect of any of the guarantee or
             indemnity for any of the items referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (h)
             of this clause;”
               21. Whether the corporate debtor owed any financial debt to the
 E
       appellant so as to treat the appellant as financial creditor is the question
       to be answered. The definition of ‘financial debt’ as contained in Section
       5(8) contains the expressions “means” and “includes”. The definition
       begins with the words “financial debt” means ‘a debt alongwith interest,
       if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of
 F     money and includes’... The main part of the definition, thus, provides
       that financial debt means a debt “which is disbursed against the
       consideration for the time value of money”. The definition in the second
       part gives instances which also includes financial debt. Learned counsel
       for the appellant in his submission has relied on Section 5(8)(i) to support
       his claim that the appellant is the financial creditor. Learned counsel for
 G
       the appellant has referred both sub-clause (b) and sub-clause (i) and
       submits that credit facility which was extended to the borrower is
       referable to Section 5(8)(b) and the corporate debtor pledged his share
       to give indemnity for credit facility and which is in a sense of guarantee.
       The debt is a financial debt within the meaning of Section 5(8)(i) and the
 H     appellant is the financial creditor. There can be no dispute that credit
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1055
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

facility given by the Assignor to borrower by Facility Agreement dated           A
12.05.2011 is a credit facility which can be covered under Section 5(8)(b).
A bare perusal of Section 5(8)(i) indicates that it contemplates amount
of any liability in respect of any of the guarantee or indemnity for any of
the items referred to in sub-clauses(a) to (h) of clause (8). Sub-clause
(i) uses two expressions “guarantee” and “indemnity” for any of the
                                                                                 B
items referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (h).
      22. Chapter VIII of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with “Of
Indemnity and Guarantee”. Section 124 defines “Contract of indemnity”
and Section 126 defines “Contract of guarantee”. Section 126 which is
relevant for the present case is as follows:
                                                                                 C
       “Section 126. “Contract of guarantee”, “surety”, “principal
       debtor” and “creditor”.—A “contract of guarantee” is a contract
       to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person
       in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is
       called the “surety”; the person in respect of whose default the
       guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor”, and the person       D
       to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. A guarantee
       may be either oral or written.”
        23. As clear from the definition a contract of guarantee is a contract
to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in
case of his default. The present is not a case where the corporate debtor        E
has entered into a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the
liability of borrower in case of his default. The Pledge Agreement is
limited to pledge 40,160 shares as security. The corporate debtor has
never promised to discharge the liability of borrower. The Facility
Agreement under which the borrower was bound by the terms and                    F
conditions and containing his obligation to repay the loan security for
performance are all contained in the Facility Agreement. A contract of
guarantee contains a guarantee “to perform the promise or discharge
the liability of third person in case of his default”. Thus, key words in
Section 126 are contract “to perform the promise”, or “discharge the
liability”, of a third person. Both the expressions “perform the promise”        G
or “discharge the liability” relate to “a third person”. The Pledge
Agreement dated 10.01.2012 does not contain any contract that the
promise which was made by the borrower in the Facility Agreement
dated 12.05.2011 to discharge the liability of debt of Rs.40 crores is
undertaken by the corporate debtor. It was the borrower who had                  H
1056            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     promised to repay the loan of Rs.40 crores in Facility Agreement dated
       12.05.2011 and it was borrower who had undertaken to discharge the
       liability towards lender. The Pledge Agreement dated 10.01.2012 does
       not contain any contract that corporate debtor has contracted to perform
       the promise, or discharge the liability of the third person. The Pledge
       Agreement is limited to pledge of 40,160 shares of GEL only. We have
 B
       noticed above that in the Facility Agreement there is a Security Creation
       by way of Schedule IV in which 100% equity shares of GEL were
       pledged by the borrower and second pari-passu charge on all current
       assets of the GEL was also created as security for loan. It transpires
       that since some shares of GEL were also with the corporate debtor who
 C     is subsidiary Company of Doshion Ltd. the same was also pledged with
       the lender as additional security by a subsequent agreement dated
       10.01.2012.
             24. The Pledge Agreement and undertaking given, entered between
       Assignor and corporate debtor cannot be termed as contract of guarantee
 D     within the meaning of Section 126.
            25. The expression “pledge” is separately dealt with in the Indian
       Contact Act, 1872. Section 172 defines ‘pledge’ in the following words:
             “Section 172. “Pledge”, “pawnor”, and “pawnee” defined.-
             The bailment of goods as security for payment of a debt or
 E           performance of a promise is called “pledge”. The bailor is in this
             case called the “pawnor”. The bailee is called “pawnee”.:”
              26. The word ‘guarantee’ and ‘indemnity’ as occurring in Section
       5(8)(i) has not been defined in the Code. Section 3 sub-section (37) of
       the Code provides that words and expressions used but not defined in
 F     the Code but defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall have the
       meanings respectively assigned to them.
              27. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a judgment
       of the Bombay High Court in the Indian Law Reports, Volume LV
       1931, 617, Jagjivandas Jethalal and another vs. King Hamilton
 G     & Co., which was case arising out of the suit filed to enforce an equitable
       mortgage of an immovable property. The defendants as owners of the
       immovable property in question created an equitable mortgage upon it
       as sureties for the firm of Sarda & Sons who owed money to the plaintiff.
       The Bombay High Court had occasion to consider Section 126 of the
 H     Contract Act in the above case. Noticing the arguments based on Section
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1057
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

126 of the Indian Contract Act raised by the respondent, the Bombay           A
High Court noticed following at page 684:
      “......Mr. Desai’s answer to that is that the defendants here were
      not sureties. He relies on section 126 of the Indian Contract Act
      which provides that a “contract of guarantee” is a contract to
      perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in     B
      case of his default, and the person who gives the guarantee is
      called the “surety”. Mr. Desai says that here there was no personal
      obligation on the defendents to pay anything: they merely handed
      over their property as security, and that being so, there was no
      contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third
      person. Then he says that in section 135, which provides that a         C
      contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which
      the creditor makes a composition with, or promises to give time
      to, or not to sue, the principal debtor, dishcarges the surety unless
      the surety assents to such contract, th word “surety” must have
      the same meaning as in section 126, and therefore a person who          D
      merely deposits the documents as security is not a surety within
      section 135. There may possibly be something in that argument
      on the wording of the sections, but it has been held often that the
      Indian Contract Act is not exhaustive, and, therefore, one has to
      consider apart from the Act what the general is.”
                                                                              E
       28. The Bombay High Court although observed that on plain
reading of Section 126, there may be some substance in the submission
of Mr. Desai but Bombay High Court proceeded to examine the general
law. The judgment of the Bombay High Court relied by the learned
counsel for the appellant was on its own facts and has no bearing on
interpretation of Section 5(8)(i) with reference to Section 126 of Contract   F
Act.
       29. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed heavy
reliance on two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Jaypee Infratech
Limited vs. Axis Bank Limited (supra). One of the issues which
came before this Court was as to whether the respondent (lenders of           G
JAL) could be financial creditors of the corporate debtor JIL on the
strength of the mortgages created by corporate debtor as collateral
securities of its holding Co. JIL. In the above case, the AXIS Bank had
lent finance to Jaiprakash Associates Ltd.(JAL), the holding company,
Jaypee Infratech Ltd.(JIL) had mortgaged several properties as collateral     H
1058            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     securities for the loans and advances made by the Axis Bank to JAL.
       Interim Resolution Professional has rejected the claim of the Asix Bank
       to be recognised as financial creditor of corporate debtor (JIL). The
       National Company Law Tribunal has approved the decision of Interm
       Resolution Professional rejecting the claim of Axis Bank as financial
       creditor against which appeal was filed before the Appellate Tribunal
 B
       which was allowed. The corporate debtor had filed an appeal before
       this Court in which appeal one of the issues was as to whether the Axis
       Bank can be recognised as financial creditor of the corporate debtor on
       the strength of the mortgaged by the JIL, corporate debtor of its holding
       Co. JAL. This Court after noticing the facts, noted rival submissions of
 C     the parties on the above issue in detail. The two earlier judgments of this
       Court, namely, Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4
       SCC 17 and Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union
       of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416 were extensively noted. Paragraphs 46 to
       50.2 contain elaborate discussion regarding the essentials of “financial
       debt” and “financial creditor” which are to the following effect:
 D
             “46. Applying the aforementioned fundamental principles to the
             definition occurring in Section 5(8) of the Code, we have not an
             iota of doubt that for a debt to become ‘financial debt’ for the
             purpose of Part II of the Code, the basic elements are that it
             ought to be a disbursal against the consideration for time value of
 E           money. It may include any of the methods for raising money or
             incurring liability by the modes prescribed in Sub-clauses (a) to
             (f) of Section 5(8); it may also include any derivative transaction
             or counter-indemnity obligation as per Sub-clauses (g) and (h) of
             Section 5(8); and it may also be the amount of any liability in
 F           respect of any of the guarantee or indemnity for any of the items
             referred to in Sub-clauses (a) to (h). The requirement of existence
             of a debt, which is disbursed against the consideration for the
             time value of money, in our view, remains an essential part even
             in respect of any of the transactions/dealings stated in Sub-clauses
             (a) to (i) of Section 5(8), even if it is not necessarily stated therein.
 G           In any case, the definition, by its very frame, cannot be read so
             expansive, rather infinitely wide, that the root requirements of
             ‘disbursement’ against ‘the consideration for the time value of
             money’ could be forsaken in the manner that any transaction could
             stand alone to become a financial debt. In other words, any of the
 H           transactions stated in the said Sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Section
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1059
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    5(8) would be falling within the ambit of ‘financial debt’ only if it   A
    carries the essential elements stated in the principal Clause or at
    least has the features which could be traced to such essential
    elements in the principal clause. In yet other words, the essential
    element of disbursal, and that too against the consideration for
    time value of money, needs to be found in the genesis of any debt
                                                                            B
    before it may be treated as ‘financial debt’ within the meaning of
    Section 5(8) of the Code. This debt may be of any nature but a
    part of it is always required to be carrying, or corresponding to, or
    at least having some traces of disbursal against consideration for
    the time value of money.
    47. As noticed, the root requirement for a creditor to become           C
    financial creditor for the purpose of Part II of the Code, there
    must be a financial debt which is owed to that person. He may be
    the principal creditor to whom the financial debt is owed or he
    may be an assignee in terms of extended meaning of this definition
    but, and nevertheless, the requirement of existence of a debt being     D
    owed is not forsaken.
    48. It is also evident that what is being dealt with and described in
    Section 5(7) and in Section 5(8) is the transaction vis-a-vis the
    corporate debtor. Therefore, for a person to be designated as a
    financial creditor of the corporate debtor, it has to be shown that     E
    the corporate debtor owes a financial debt to such person.
    Understood this way, it becomes clear that a third party to whom
    the corporate debtor does not owe a financial debt cannot become
    its financial creditor for the purpose of Part II of the Code.
    49. Expounding yet further, in our view, the peculiar elements of       F
    these expressions “financial creditor” and “ financial debt”, as
    occurring in Sections 5(7) and 5(8), when visualised and compared
    with the generic expressions “creditor” and “debt” respectively,
    as occurring in Sections 3(10) and 3(11) of the Code, the scheme
    of things envisaged by the Code becomes clearer. The generic
    term “creditor” is defined to mean any person to whom the debt          G
    is owed and then, it has also been made clear that it includes a
    ‘financial creditor’, a ‘secured creditor’, an ‘unsecured creditor’,
    an ‘operational creditor’, and a ‘decree-holder’. Similarly, a “debt”
    means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due
    from any person and this expression has also been given an              H
1060      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A     extended meaning to include a ‘financial debt’ and an ‘operational
       debt’.
       49.1. The use of the expression “means and includes” in these
       clauses, on the very same principles of interpretation as indicated
       above, makes it clear that for a person to become a creditor, there
 B     has to be a debt i.e., a liability or obligation in respect of a claim
       which may be due from any person. A “secured creditor” in terms
       of Section 3(30) means a creditor in whose favour a security
       interest is created; and “security interest”, in terms of Section
       3(31), means a right, title or interest or claim of property created
       in favour of or provided for a secured creditor by a transaction
 C     which secures payment for the purpose of an obligation and it
       includes, amongst others, a mortgage. Thus, any mortgage created
       in favour of a creditor leads to a security interest being created
       and thereby, the creditor becomes a secured creditor. However,
       when all the defining clauses are read together and harmoniously,
 D     it is clear that the legislature has maintained a distinction amongst
       the expressions ‘financial creditor’, ‘operational creditor’, ‘secured
       creditor’ and ‘unsecured creditor’. Every secured creditor would
       be a creditor; and every financial creditor would also be a creditor
       but every secured creditor may not be a financial creditor. As
       noticed, the expressions “financial debt” and “financial creditor”,
 E     having their specific and distinct connotations and roles in
       insolvency and liquidation process of corporate persons, have only
       been defined in Part II whereas the expressions “secured creditor”
       and “security interest” are defined in Part I.
       50. A conjoint reading of the statutory provisions with the
 F     enunciation of this Court in Swiss Ribbons (supra), leaves nothing
       to doubt that in the scheme of the IBC, what is intended by the
       expression ‘financial creditor’ is a person who has direct
       engagement in the functioning of the corporate debtor; who is
       involved right from the beginning while assessing the viability of
 G     the corporate debtor; who would engage in restructuring of the
       loan as well as in reorganisation of the corporate debtor’s business
       when there is financial stress. In other words, the financial creditor,
       by its own direct involvement in a functional existence of corporate
       debtor, acquires unique position, who could be entrusted with the
       task of ensuring the sustenance and growth of the corporate debtor,
 H
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1061
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    akin to that of a guardian. In the context of insolvency resolution      A
    process, this class of stakeholders namely, financial creditors, is
    entrusted by the legislature with such a role that it would look
    forward to ensure that the corporate debtor is rejuvenated and
    gets back to its wheels with reasonable capacity of repaying its
    debts and to attend on its other obligations. Protection of the rights
                                                                             B
    of all other stakeholders, including other creditors, would obviously
    be concomitant of such resurgence of the corporate debtor.
    50.1. Keeping the objectives of the Code in view, the position and
    role of a person having only security interest over the assets of
    the corporate debtor could easily be contrasted with the role of a
    financial creditor because the former shall have only the interest       C
    of realising the value of its security (there being no other stakes
    involved and least any stake in the corporate debtor’s growth or
    equitable liquidation) while the latter would, apart from looking at
    safeguards of its own interests, would also and simultaneously be
    interested in rejuvenation, revival and growth of the corporate          D
    debtor. Thus understood, it is clear that if the former i.e., a person
    having only security interest over the assets of the corporate debtor
    is also included as a financial creditor and thereby allowed to
    have its say in the processes contemplated by Part II of the Code,
    the growth and revival of the corporate debtor may be the casualty.
    Such result would defeat the very objective and purpose of the           E
    Code, particularly of the provisions aimed at corporate insolvency
    resolution.
    50.2. Therefore, we have no hesitation in saying that a person
    having only security interest over the assets of corporate debtor
    (like the instant third party securities), even if falling within the    F
    description of ‘secured creditor’ by virtue of collateral security
    extended by the corporate debtor, would nevertheless stand outside
    the sect of ‘financial creditors’ as per the definitions contained in
    Sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 5 of the Code. Differently put,
    if a corporate debtor has given its property in mortgage to secure       G
    the debts of a third party, it may lead to a mortgage debt and,
    therefore, it may fall within the definition of ‘debt’ Under Section
    3(10) of the Code. However, it would remain a debt alone and
    cannot partake the character of a ‘financial debt’ within the
    meaning of Section 5(8) of the Code.”
                                                                             H
1062            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


 A            30. This Court held that a person having only security interest
       over the assets of corporate debtor, even if falling within the description
       of ‘secured creditor’ by virtue of collateral security extended by the
       corporate debtor, would not be covered by the financial creditors as per
       definitions contained in sub-section (7) and (8) of Section 5. What has
       been held by this Court as noted above is fully attracted in the present
 B
       case where corporate debtor has only extended a security by pledging
       40,160 shares of GEL. The appellant at best will be secured debtor qua
       above security but shall not be a financial creditor within the meaning of
       Section 5 sub-sections (7) and (8).
              31. Mr. Vishwanathan tried to distinguish the judgment of this
 C     Court in Jaypee Infratech Limited (supra) by contending that the
       above judgment has been rendered in the specific facts scenario which
       does not apply to the present case at all. Shri Vishwanathan submits that
       in Jaypee Infratech Limited case (supra) corporate debtor had
       created mortgage for the loan obtained by the parent Company and no
 D     benefit of such loan has been received by the corporate debtor whereas
       in the present case corporate debtor has been the direct and real
       beneficiary of the loan advanced by Assigner to the parent Company of
       the corporate debtor. The above point as contended by the learned counsel
       does not commend us. The present is also a case where only security
       was created by the corporate debtor in 40,160 shares of GEL, there was
 E     no liability to repay the loan taken by the borrower on the corporate
       debtor in the present case. At best the Pledge Agreement and Agreement
       of undertaking executed on 10.01.2012, that is, subsequent to Facility
       Agreement, is security in favour of Lender-Assignor who at best will be
       secured creditor qua corporate debtor and not the financial creditor qua
 F     corporate debtor.
              32. We may notice that the Appellate Tribunal has dealt with
       Section 5(8)(f) while rejecting the claim of the appellant as to be the
       financial creditor. It appears that the submission based on Section 5(8)
       (i) was not addressed before the Appellate Tribunal which has now been
 G     pressed before us. We, thus, uphold the decision of the Resolution
       Professional as approved by the NCLAT as correct. The appellant is
       not financial creditor of the corporate debtor. Hence, Miscellaneous
       Application was rightly rejected by the Adjudicating Authority. We,
       however, make it clear that observations made by us in this judgment
       are only for deciding the claim of the appellant as the financial creditor
 H
PHOENIX ARC PVT. LTD. v. KETULBHAI RAMUBHAI PATEL 1063
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

within the meaning of Section 5(7) and 5(8) of the Code and shall have       A
no bearing on any other proceedings undertaken by the appellant to
establish any of its right in accordance with law. We, thus, do not find
any merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

Ankit Gyan                                               Appeal dismissed.   B




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