PERIYASAMYversusTHE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE

                 [2024] 3 S.C.R. 747 : 2024 INSC 212

                              Periyasamy
                                   v.
                        The State Represented
                       by the Inspector of Police
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 270 of 2019)
                                18 March 2024
              [Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court justified in affirming the judgment of trial
       court convicting and sentencing the accused appellant, (A-1), for
       the offence punishable under sections 302 & 307 of Penal Code,
       1860 and accused appellant (A-2) for the offence punishable under
       sections 302/109 & 307/109 of Penal Code, 1860.

                                  Headnotes
       Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 and s.307 – Trial Court convicted
       and sentenced appellants – Relying on ocular and medical
       evidence – High Court confirmed the sentence and conviction
       – Whether the sentence and conviction falls short of standard
       of beyond reasonable doubt:
       Held: Trial court primarily relied on testimonies of PW-1 to PW-3 –
       PW-1 is an injured witness and a relative of D1 – PW-2 is also an
       injured witness and a neighbor of D1 – The evidence of an injured
       witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a
       witness simpliciter – PW-2 deposed that were about 50 persons
       at the scene of the crime – Then, how has the non-examination
       of independent witness been countenanced by the prosecution
       is something that escapes, or rather confounds this Court – The
       evidence of PW-3 appears to be fraught with contradictions – His
       actions not to be akin to that of a prudent man – When A-1 had
       allegedly broken a bottle on the head of D1, PW-3 took the injured
       D1 not to the hospital but to an STD booth located nearby – Why
       a person would “hold” a person with a grievous head injury near
       an STD booth and not take him to the hospital – Significant delay
       in recording statements of PW-1 and PW-2 – Various lapses such
       as these cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution


* Author
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       case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable
       doubt – Challenge on the grounds sustained, among others that,
       (a) examined private persons were interested witnesses, with
       inconsistencies amongst them; (b) no independent witnesses were
       examined; (c) there was a delay in filing the FIR; (d) there were
       interpolations on record; (e) there were numerous lapses in the
       investigation; and (f) the medical and scientific evidence on record
       does not support the prosecution’s version of events. [Paras 31,
       33, 36, 39, 41, 47,48]
       Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 and s. 307– Role of an investigating
       officer is that of the backbone of the entire criminal proceeding
       in respect of the particular offence(s) he is charged with
       investigating – Faulty Investigation - Examined.
       Held: The investigation officer of a case is the charioteer tasked
       with using the resources and personnel at his disposal to ensure
       law and order as also that a person who has committed a crime
       is brought to the book – Nowhere has it come on record as to
       how the investigating officer (PW-22) reached the bus stand
       from where A-2 was arrested – who informed the authorities
       about A-2’s movement by bus – PW-22 made two visits to the
       scene of the crime and that he also examined several witnesses
       - how is there a striking lack of independent witnesses to lend
       credence to the prosecution’s version of events – He also did
       not conduct any scientific investigation at the spot of crime – The
       wound certificate for PW-1 and PW-2 was issued by Doctor, who
       had not been examined in the instant proceedings – Was it that
       the initial investigation was being managed so as to shield the
       real assailants, which could have been the complainant party
       themselves? – Particularly when, as the record reveals, as is
       so admitted by PW-22 of A-2 being a practicing advocate who
       has been, (i) pursuing the matters against the officials of the
       police station (ii) has been lodging complaints against the police
       officials for inaction; and (iii) had nothing to do with the ownership,
       management or control of the wine shop – The injured witnesses
       and the Investigation Officer in their testimony together are not
       inspiring confidence – The prosecution case stands shaken beyond
       a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be
       just in the eyes of law – appeals are allowed and the convictions
       accordingly set aside. [Paras 43, 44, 46, 47]
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                            749

    Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


                              Case Law Cited
            Raghbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana [2008] 15
            SCR 1108 : (2008) 16 SCC 33; James Martin v. State
            of Kerala [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC
            203; Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. (1971) 3 SCC 244;
            Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. [2010] 1 SCR
            642 : (2010) 2 SCC 333; State of Rajasthan v. Kalki
            [1981] 3 SCR 504 : (1981) 2 SCC 752; Sarwan Singh
            v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 369 (3J); Rajesh and
            Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2023] 15 SCR 1 :
            2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202 – referred to.

                       Books and Periodicals Cited
            Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Volume I.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                             List of Keywords
     Standard of beyond reasonable doubt; Interested witness; Right
     of private defence; Independent Witness; Related Witness; Police
     Investigation; Star prosecution witness; Faulty Investigation; Delay
     in filing FIR; Delay in Examination of Witness.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.270
     of 2019
     From the Judgment and Order dated 26.11.2014 of the High Court of
     Madras at Madurai in CRLA No.240 of 2014
     With
     Criminal Appeal No.271 of 2019
                         Appearances for Parties
     S. Arun Prakash, B. Balaji, Vipin Kumar Jai, Mrs. Gurinder Jai, Vipul
     Jai, Ms. Sanjna Dua, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Shubhi Bhardwaj, Advs. for the
     Respondent.
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                         Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                      Judgment
       Sanjay Karol J.
1.     The present appeals arise from the final judgment and order dated
       26th November 2014 passed by the Madurai Bench of Madras High
       Court, in Crl. A. (MD) No. 238 and 240 of 2014, which confirmed the
       judgment and order dated 31st July 2014 in Sessions Case No. 109
       of 2005 passed by the Sessions Court, Tiruchirapalli, vide which the
       present appellants, Periyasamy1 and R. Manoharan2 were convicted
       in the following terms under the Indian Penal Code3:

        S. No Name                   Crime         Punishment Awarded
        1.          A1 –             IPC – S.302 Imprisonment for life and Rs.
                    Periyasamy       (2 counts)  1,000 fine
                                     IPC – S.307 Rigorous Imprisonment for
                                     (2 counts)  seven years and Rs. 1,000
                                                 fine
        2.          A2 - R.          IPC – S.302 Imprisonment for life and Rs.
                    Manoharan        r/w S.109   1,000 fine
                                     (1 count)
                                     IPC – S.307 Rigorous Imprisonment for
                                     r/w S.109   seven years and Rs. 1,000
                                     (2 counts)  fine
2.     The incident in question relates to the death of two persons after being
       stabbed, allegedly by A-1 at the instigation of A-2. The prosecution
       case emerging from the record, as also set out by the Courts below,
       is as follows:-
       2.1 On 3rd March 2002, Dharmalingam4 had after already having
           procured liquor in an earlier completed transaction, half an hour
           later demanded more brandy on credit from the owners and



1    Hereinafter ‘A-1’
2    Hereinafter ‘A-2’
3    Hereinafter ‘IPC’
4    Hereinafter ‘D1’
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         751

     Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


              workers of Saravana Wine Shop located in Neithalur Colony.
              A quarrel arose, and a showcase of the shop was smashed,
              and the bottles stored therein were damaged. In this course
              of events, it is alleged that D-1 retrieved a knife and stabbed
              one Thangavel5 (one of the owners of the shop). A-1, with a
              knife, caused fatal injuries to D-1. He also stabbed Sakthivel
              (son of Muthuveeran)6 in his stomach repeatedly. When D-2
              intervened to prevent the attack, A-1 stabbed him. While the
              injured persons were being taken to hospital, on the way, both
              D-1 and D-2 succumbed to injuries.
      2.2 Sakthivel, who was injured in the incident, reported it to A.
          Rajasekar (PW-20), a Police Inspector at the Hospital. Upon
          this statement, FIR no. 87/2002 came to be registered. Upon
          investigation on 1st July 2004, charges were framed against
          A-1 and A-2, as indicated in the above table.
      Trial Court Findings
3.    In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined 22
      witnesses; exhibited 33 documents and nine material objects. To
      repel the charges, the defence produced a solitary witness and
      three documents.
4.    The Trial Court has relied on ocular and medical evidence to establish
      the charges against the accused persons. PW-1 and K. Sakthivel,
      son of Kaathaan7 (PW-2) both deposed that in the quarrel between
      the deceased and accused persons, though they tried to pacify the
      situation, A-2 handed a knife to A-1 with which the latter stabbed
      the deceased persons.
5.    The Learned Trial Court found no substance in the challenge put
      forth by the defence attempting to shake the prosecution’s case.
      A-1 was held guilty on two counts of Section 302, IPC, i.e., for the
      murder of D-1 and D-2; A-2 was held guilty on one count only, i.e.,
      for abetting the murder of D-1.
6.    The charges of attempt to murder were found to be proven against
      both A-1 and A-2. It relied on the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3


5    Hereinafter ‘D2’
6    Hereinafter ‘PW-1
7    Hereinafter ‘PW2’
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       to hold that A-2 instigated A-1 to attack the deceased. The learned
       Trial Court observed that the injuries sustained by PW-1 and K.
       Sakthivel (PW-2) were of such a nature that the act of the accused
       would be termed as an act of attempt to murder.
       High Court Findings
7.     The High Court, in appeal, was faced with the question of the absence
       of the name of A-2 in the FIR. Having referred to certain decisions of
       this Court, it was observed that simply because the name was not
       mentioned in the FIR, an accused can not be absolved of liability
       for having committed the offence. The next question considered by
       the Court with respect to A-2 was his involvement or lack thereof
       in the occurrence of this offence. The argument on his behalf relies
       on the fact that PW-1’s statement did not mention him, and neither
       did Exhs. P-6 and P-11, was considered unworthy, keeping in view
       the testimonies of injured eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 as also the
       statement of PW-3 under Section 161 (3) of the Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973; it was held that the involvement of A-2 stood proved
       beyond reasonable doubt.
8.     For A-1, three primary arguments were put forth, i.e., Dr.
       Radhakrishnan8 (PW-17) Doctor at Seahorse Hospital did not give
       evidence in regard to the surgical procedure undergone by PW-
       1; the injuries faced by A-1 were not sufficiently explained by the
       prosecution; and about the occurrence, the owner of the wine shop
       stood not examined.
9.     It was observed that the genuineness of the statement made by
       PW-1 to the police could not be doubted as he had told PW-17
       that he was a victim of an attack by A-1. Such genuineness stands
       buttressed by the fact that the document reached the court on the
       same day.
10. On A-1’s injuries being unexplained, it was observed that the
    same would not be sufficient to dispel the entire prosecution case.
    Reference was made to Amar Malla v. State of Tripura9. It was held
    that since both PW-1 and PW-2 are consistent on facts, including
    the place of occurrence, as also the same being an admitted fact,


8    Hereinafter ‘PW-17’
9    (2002) 7 SCC 91
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                     753

    Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


     the contention in that regard on behalf of A-1 has to be negatived.
     Given that the presence of the owner of the shop has nowhere
     been mentioned, his non-examination cannot be termed fatal to
     the prosecution case.
11. In such terms, the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence
    handed down by the Trial Court as regards A1 and A2.
     Submissions
12. The present appeals are a challenge to the judgments of the Trial
    Court and High Court. We have heard Mr. S Nagamuthu, learned
    senior counsel, Mr. S. Arun Prakash for A-1, and Mr. Vipin Jai for
    A-2. Dr. Joseph Aristotle S. was heard for the State.
     Contentions on behalf of A-1
13. The primary ground urged on behalf of A-1 was that nearly all
    witnesses were “interested” in the case’s outcome and, therefore,
    unreliable; and none of the witnesses examined were independent.
    Further, it was canvassed that the delay in lodging the FIR stands
    unexplained, more so when the medical evidence does not speak
    of PW-1 having undergone surgery. Also, it must be noted that there
    was no prior animosity or reason for discord. The events as they
    unfolded were the result of a spur-of-the-moment quarrel in which
    he also sustained grievous injuries. The right of private defence has
    also been pleaded as an alternate argument.
     Contentions on behalf of A-2
14. It was argued on behalf of A-2 that his presence at the scene of
    the crime was never established. Four limbs of A-1’s arguments,
    i.e., delay in lodging the FIR; almost all witnesses qualifying as
    “interested witnesses”; there being no enmity between the involved
    persons; and the lack of independent witnesses, were adopted by
    A-2.
     Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
15. The respondent has filed detailed submissions which attempt to
    discredit as a whole the submissions on behalf of the accused
    persons. In doing so, the State relied on various judgments from
    this Court. We have perused the written submissions filed and also
    examined the cases referred.
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       Consideration and Conclusion
16. The question that we are called upon to decide is whether, in
    the sum total of facts, circumstances, and the law applicable, the
    convictions handed down to A-1 and A-2 are based on the standard
    of beyond reasonable doubt having been met and, therefore, are
    sustainable.
17. It would be apposite for this Court to consider the law on the various
    facets of the penal laws of the land, involved in this case.
       The Right of Private Defence
18. A-1 has contended that his actions were covered under the ambit
    of the right of private defence. The principle is best captured in the
    following words found in Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Vol.I
               “… a man is justified in resisting by force anyone
              who manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or
              surprise to commit a known felony against either his
              person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not
              obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack
              where he stands but may indeed pursue his adversary
              until the danger is ended and if in a conflict between
              them he happens to kill his attacker, such killing is
              justifiable”.
19. The right of private defence is not defined under the IPC. Whether
    under the circumstances of each case, such a right is available or not
    is determined within the said boundaries only. No test in the abstract
    can be laid down for determining whether a person legitimately acted
    in private defence. The law only provides that the person claiming
    such a right bears the onus10 to prove the legitimacy of the actions
    done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume
    the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea
    being taken. (See: Raghbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana11.)
    The burden on the person pleading the right of private defence has
    been succinctly explained in James Martin v. State of Kerala12. This
    right has been held to be “very valuable, serving a social purpose”


10   Section 105 Indian Evidence Act 1872
11   [2008] 15 SCR 1108 : (2008) 16 SCC 33
12   [2003] Suppl. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC 203
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                              755

     Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


      and, therefore, it should not be construed narrowly. (See: Vidhya
      Singh v. State of M.P.13)
20. This Court has summarised the principles in regard to the exercise
    of right of private defence in Darshan Singh v State of Punjab &
    Anr.14 as referred to in Sukumaran v State15
             "(i)   Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly
                    recognised by the criminal jurisprudence of all civilised
                    countries. All free, democratic and civilised countries
                    recognise the right of private defence within certain
                    reasonable limits.
             (ii)   The right of private defence is available only to one who
                    is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an
                    impending danger and not of self-creation.
             (iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the
                   right of self-defence into operation. In other words, it is
                   not necessary that there should be an actual commission
                   of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private
                   defence. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such
                   an offence is contemplated and it is likely to be committed
                   if the right of private defence is not exercised.
             (iv) The right of private defence commences as soon as a
                  reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminous with
                  the duration of such apprehension.
             (v)    It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate
                    his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.
             (vi) In private defence the force used by the accused ought
                  not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than
                  necessary for protection of the person or property.
             (vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead
                   self-defence, it is open to consider such a plea if the same
                   arises from the material on record.



13   (1971) 3 SCC 244
14   (2010) 2 SCC 333
15   (2019) 15 SCC 117
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             (viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the right of
                    private defence beyond reasonable doubt.
             (ix) The Penal Code confers the right of private defence only
                  when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.
             (x)     A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of
                     losing his life or limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict
                     any harm even extending to death on his assailant either
                     when the assault is attempted or directly threatened.”
       However, this Court will only enter into the question of applicability
       of the right of private defence if the primary submission of complete
       acquittal fails, for it has been submitted by Mr. Nagamuthu, learned
       senior counsel that this submission is an alternate to the arguments
       advanced by Mr. S. Arun Prakash, learned counsel for A-1.
       Independent and Related or Interested Witnesses
21. It is a well-recognised principle in law that the non-examination of
    independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the
    prosecution. The difference between a witness who is “interested”
    and one who is “related” stand explained by a Bench of three learned
    Judges in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki16
             “7. …“Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness
             may be called “interested” only when he or she derives
             some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree
             in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished.
             A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible
             eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said
             to be “interested.”
       We may refer to the observation in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab17
       as under to appreciate the evidentiary value of such testimonies: –
             “...Moreover, it is not the law that the evidence of an
             interested witness should be equated with that of a
             tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require
             corroboration as a matter of necessity. The evidence of



16   [1981] 3 SCR 504 : (1981) 2 SCC 752
17   (1976) 4 SCC 369 (3J)
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                            757

     Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


             an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as
             such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a
             rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be
             scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made
             and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested
             witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be
             relied upon even without corroboration. Indeed there may
             be circumstances where only interested evidence may be
             available and no other, e.g. when an occurrence takes
             place at midnight in the house when the only witnesses
             who could see the occurrence may be the family members.
             In such cases it would not be proper to insist that the
             evidence of the family members should be disbelieved
             merely because of their interestedness…”
      In other words, if witnesses examined are found to be ‘interested’
      then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume
      importance.
      Faulty Police Investigation
22. Recently, this Court in Rajesh and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
    (3-Judge Bench)18, while setting aside the conviction of the three
    Appellants therein, remarked:
             “39. Before parting with the case with our verdict, we may
             note with deep and profound concern the disappointing
             standards of police investigation that seem to be the
             invariable norm. As long back as in the year 2003, the
             Report of Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath’s ‘Committee on
             Reforms of Criminal Justice System’ had recorded thus:
                   ‘The manner in which police investigations
                   are conducted is of critical importance to the
                   functioning of the Criminal Justice System. Not
                   only serious miscarriage of justice will result if
                   the collection of evidence is vitiated by error
                   or malpractice, but successful prosecution of
                   the guilty depends on a thorough and careful
                   search for truth and collection of evidence which


18   2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202
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                is both admissible and probative. In undertaking
                this search, it is the duty of the police to
                investigate fairly and thoroughly and collect all
                evidence, whether for or against the suspect.
                Protection of the society being the paramount
                consideration, the laws, procedures and police
                practices must be such as to ensure that the
                guilty are apprehended and punished with
                utmost dispatch and in the process the innocent
                are not harassed. The aim of the investigation
                and, in fact, the entire Criminal Justice System
                is to search for truth. ……The standard of police
                investigation in India remains poor and there is
                considerable room for improvement. The Bihar
                Police Commission (1961) noted with dismay that
                “during the course of tours and examination of
                witnesses, no complaint has been so universally
                made before the Commission as that regarding
                the poor quality of police investigation”. Besides
                inefficiency, the members of public complained of
                rudeness, intimidation, suppression of evidence,
                concoction of evidence and malicious padding
                of cases…..’
          40. Echoing the same sentiment in its Report No. 239 in
          March, 2012, the Law Commission of India observed that
          the principal causes of low rate of conviction in our country,
          inter alia, included inept, unscientific investigation by the
          police and lack of proper coordination between police and
          prosecution machinery. Despite passage of considerable
          time since these gloomy insights, we are dismayed to
          say that they remain sadly true even to this day. This is
          a case in point….”
23. A perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that for both
    counts before it, reliance primarily has been placed on PW-1 to
    PW-3. Apart from these three-star prosecution witnesses, the
    Investigating Officer (PW-22), by virtue of having been “in the driver’s
    seat” of the case, acquires importance. The salient points that can
    be appreciated from an assay of their respective testimonies may
    be referred to as follows:-
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         759

    Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


     23.1 PW-1 is Sakthivel, S/o Muthuveeran. It was stated that upon
          information that D-1 and Senthilkumar were quarreling with the
          owner of the wine shop, he and Sakthivel, S/o Kathan rushed to
          the shop. It is there that upon the instigation of A-2, who handed
          A-1 a knife he stabbed the witness thrice in the stomach of PW-1
          and PW-2, D-1, and D-2 as well. SI, Kulithalai, interrogated him at
          4.30 a.m. on 4th March 2002, and the statement made thereunder
          is Exh.P-1. In his cross-examination, it has come forth that upon
          his arrival at Seahorse Hospital by 10:00 p.m., he was conscious,
          and it is upon administration of anesthesia for surgery that he
          became unconscious. Regarding the location of a wine shop, it
          has been deposed that the same is located in a crowded area
          and has a regular stream of visitors in and around the area.
     23.2 With respect to A-2, it has been deposed that whether or not
          he was an owner of the wine shop is unclear, but he certainly
          was a visitor.
     23.3 However, he contradicts his earlier version that upon reaching
          the hospital, he was not in a position to speak and had not
          informed the doctor of the incident, and instead, it was the
          people who accompanied him who briefed the doctor.
24. Sakthivel, S/o Kathan (PW-2) stated that A-1 stabbed him in the
    stomach twice, which was at the instigation of A-2. According to
    this witness, A-1, A-2, and D-2, along with other persons, worked in
    the wine shop. His statement was recorded in the evening after the
    incident. He states that the showcase upon his reaching the wine
    shop was intact. Further, D-1 was under the influence of alcohol
    when PW-2 saw him, but, significantly, D-1 had not stabbed A-1,
    and as such, no blood was seen on the hands of A-1.
25. Senthilkumar (PW-3) states that he was interrogated the morning after
    the incident at 7.30 a.m. His deposition reveals him not to know as
    to whether D-1 (Dharmalingam) was in a state of intoxication before
    going to the wine shop. Nor has he seen the showcase of the shop
    in a broken condition.
26. The learned Trial Court found sufficient evidence to convict both A-1
    and A-2 based on these three testimonies.
27. K. Raajasekar (PW-22) (the Investigating Officer) at the relevant
    time Inspector of Police, Kulithalai, took charge of the investigation
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       of the incident on 4th March 2002. In his examination-in-chief, he
       has described how the investigation proceeded. It was deposed
       that on 5th March 2002 at about 12 noon, he arrested A-2 from
       the Pettavaithalai bus stand. He also deposed, having visited the
       scene of the crime twice and interrogated several witnesses. On
       9th April 2002, he examined the witnesses (medical evidence) who
       had allegedly furnished wound certificates for A-1 and A-2. Further
       witnesses were examined on 10th July 2002, and a chargesheet was
       filed on 15th July 2002.
28. It is undisputed that PWs 1 and 2 are injured witnesses. It is a
    well-established principle of law, not requiring any underscoring or
    reiteration, that the evidence of an injured witness is considered to
    be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter.
29. The learned Trial Court observed that for the reasons, (a) that the
    witnesses had nothing to gain from deposing against the accused
    persons; (b) there is no suggestion that any rival business interest
    was to be benefitted by Sarvana Wines being embroiled in the
    controversy; (c) A-2 was in fact a “good Samaritan” ; (d) that the
    witnesses were deposing the accused persons at the behest of the
    police being an unsubstantiated claim; and (e) that the witnesses
    cannot be said to be “interested”. The concept of interested witness,
    as referred to hereinabove, shows that for a person to be such, he
    ought to have an interest in seeing the accused persons punished.
30. There is a direct statement by PW-1 that D-1 was his relative, i.e.,
    son of his paternal uncle. D-2 was a relative of the owner of the
    wine shop, who, according to him, was A-1, but in another instance,
    he states that A-1 was only a worker. In respect of A-2, the only
    statement is that it was upon his instigation that A-1 stabbed them.
31. It is hard to conceive how the Trial Court concluded that despite being
    the first cousin of D-1 and himself a person injured in the incident,
    PW-1 was not an interested witness. Further, we find a categorical
    statement that, “the wine shop is in the main road’ and “the wine
    shop would be crowded always”. In such a situation, the joining of
    independent witnesses ought not to have been a difficult task but,
    yet, it remained unachieved.
32. Further, we note that he admits variation in his statement (Exh.P-1)
    in different ink and hand. He further states that there wasn’t much
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                       761

    Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


     light at the spot of the incident, but then denies it to be “too dark”
     when the occurrence has happened.
33. This Court has to strike a balance between the testimony of the injured
    witness and that of an interested witness. It is also not a case that
    PW-1 was a natural witness, as he stated that he had not been to
    the wine shop and was only near the STD booth where the ensuing
    quarrel was separated. In striking the above-stated balance, other
    factors must also be considered, which will be discussed subsequently.
34. PW-2 was a neighbour of D-1. Upon being informed of the quarrel
    between A-1 and D-1, he and PW-1 allegedly went there and
    separated the parties. He claims to be an eyewitness to the incident.
    After having undergone surgery, he regained consciousness the next
    day at 6.30 a.m.
35. It was that evening when the police recorded his statement. At the
    time of recording these statements in Court, i.e., 14th November
    2005, a separate case preferred by the accused persons was under
    trial and PW-2 was made an accused thereunder. Now, having been
    made an accused in a case, as also having been injured with two
    stabs in the stomach and additionally being the neighbour of D-1, it is
    difficult to reconcile that PW-2 would be a witness of unquestionable
    integrity upon whose statement convictions can be based. Once
    again, we find that in regard to A2 the only thing stated is that upon
    the instigation of A-2, A-1 stabbed them. There is no other statement
    as to what may have been said by A-2 to enrage him enough that
    even after the quarrelling parties were separated and they had
    dispersed in their respective directions, A-1 went ahead angrily and
    repeatedly stabbed them.
36. He has also deposed that there were about 50 persons at the scene
    of the crime, then, how has the non-examination of independent
    witness been countenanced by the prosecution and “approved” by the
    Courts below, is something that escapes us, or rather confounds us.
37. Another essential aspect to be examined is that the statement of
    PW-1 was recorded at 4.30 a.m. on 4th March 2002 wherein as
    summarised above, he has clearly mentioned the role of PW-2,
    however, the latter’s examination by the police was only at 5.00 p.m.,
    that too when per his own statement he had regained consciousness
    from his surgery at 6.30 a.m. itself. This gap is entirely unexplained
    and wholly overlooked by the Courts below.
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38. Coming to the version of PW-2 again, we notice him to be extremely
    evasive on the issue as to whether the police had visited the spot
    in the night intervening 3/4th March 2002 or not. He denies being
    interrogated by the police before 4th March 2002 till about 5.00 p.m.
    He admits having visited a private hospital and, yet, as discussed
    earlier, failed to report the matter to the police, more so the cause of
    injuries sustained by him or for that matter others present on the spot.
39. The evidence of PW-3, upon which the counsel has laid considerable
    emphasis for the respondent, appears to us to be fraught with
    contradictions. In his examination-in-chief, it is recorded that D-1
    had asked A-2 and A-1 for a bottle of liquor on credit, which the
    latter two refused and scolded him, upon which he pushed down
    the showcase, leading A-1 to grab a beer bottle and break it on the
    head of D-1. When he was cross-examined he deposed as follows:
          “The police recorded what all I have stated and obtained
          my signature. It is not correct to state that Dharmalingam
          asked 1st Accused in the wine shop to provide bottle on
          credit; that as he has refused, Dharmalingam picked up
          the quarrel, pushed the show case and broken into pieces;
          that Thangavel appeared there to question it; that we and
          Dharmalingam stabbed his relatives and Thangavel;….”
40. As is apparent, he states, for one, that D-1 had indeed broken the
    showcase but subsequently states that to depose the same would
    be incorrect. Furthermore, we find his actions not to be akin to that
    of a prudent man. When A-1 had allegedly broken a bottle on the
    head of D-1, PW-3 took the injured D-1 not to the hospital but to an
    STD booth located nearby, where a quarrel ensued between him
    and A-1, which was eventually separated by PWs 1 and 2. Even
    more so, when A-1 was allegedly stabbing PW-2, he was still at the
    STD booth with D-1, yet not having gone to the hospital and also not
    having made any attempt to stop such stabbing. Why a person would
    “hold” a person with a grievous head injury near an STD booth and
    not take him to the hospital or, additionally, not try and stop others
    from being grievously injured is something that compromises, in our
    mind, the credibility of the version of PW-3.
41. Apart from the three star witnesses of the prosecution, in our
    considered view, failing the standard of scrutiny applied to a
    criminal proceeding, a perusal of the records reveals another facet,
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                         763

    Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


     compromising in nature to the prosecution case. It has come forth
     in the evidence of PW-1 that upon his arrival at the hospital, he
     was in a conscious state, so why the recording of the statement
     delayed till 4.30 a.m. is unsubstantiated. This is further so because
     while PW-1 speaks of being operated upon, none of the witnesses
     examined as medical witnesses corroborate such a statement. For
     emphasis, we may refer to the statement of PW-17, the medical
     officer in the Seahorse Hospital, at the relevant time. He stated that
     upon admission, PW-1 was fully conscious. The wound certificate
     was issued by Dr. Pon Shanthi, who has not been examined.
42. The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Also, as
    we have alluded to earlier, there is a significant gap in the examination
    of PW-2 as well. For all the aforesaid reasons, it cannot be said
    that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against
    the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a
    conviction under Section 302 IPC.
43. We further examine the role of the I.O. The investigation officer
    of a case is the charioteer tasked with using the resources and
    personnel at his disposal to ensure law and order as also that a
    person who has committed a crime is brought to the book. In other
    words, the role of an investigating officer is that of the backbone of
    the entire criminal proceeding in respect of the particular offence(s)
    he is charged with investigating. A perusal of his testimony reveals
    certain problematic statements. Nowhere has it come on record
    as to how the investigation reached the bus stand from where A-2
    was arrested – who informed the authorities about A-2’s movement
    by bus? Further, he has deposed that he made two visits to the
    scene of the crime and that he also examined several witnesses.
    Then how is there a striking lack of independent witnesses to lend
    credence to the prosecution’s version of events? He does not know
    where D-1 had expired. How? He also did not conduct any scientific
    investigation at the spot of crime. Such an investigation carried out
    most casually and callously is sought to be made the basis by the
    police in seeking the conviction of the accused.
44. Another direct contradiction concerns his examination of the doctors
    who allegedly gave wound certificates for PWs 1 and 2. In the
    testimony of PW-17, it is clear that he was not the one who gave the
    wound certificate as he was only on duty from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., and
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       PW-1 was brought to the hospital at 10 p.m. The wound certificate
       was issued by Dr. Pon Shanthi, who had not been examined in the
       instant proceedings.
45. For the charges under Section 307 IPC, the learned Trial Court also
    considered the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 3. We have considered
    the evidence of these three witnesses in detail and are of the opinion
    that for the reasons afore-stated, the said witnesses cannot be relied
    upon.
46. In addition to the person who led the investigation, we must consider
    the testimonies of the people who aided in it.
       46.1.         PW-20 was the Sub-Inspector, Kulithalai Police Station,
               at the relevant time. His testimony appears to be evasive
               and full of improvements, needing to explain the material
               interpolations on the medical record. He admits not having
               recorded any information received from the Seahorse Hospital
               on the night of 3rd of March, 2022 at 11.00 hours. He admits
               not to have added a version in the sentence - Exhs. P-1 and
               P-24, which, as we notice, record the name of the assailant.
               He admits the jurisdictional police station to carry out the
               investigation, was not his (Tirupathur Town Police Station)
               but only Kulithalai. He admits that neither he nor any one of
               the police officers from any of the police stations visited the
               spot till the morning after the date of the incident, despite the
               travel distance being less than half an hour. No explanation
               is forthcoming as to why one of the most essential aspects of
               the criminal investigation was ignored or delayed. We notice
               the witness to have admitted having informed the details of
               the incident both to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and
               K. Rajasekar (PW-22). Was it that the initial investigation was
               being managed so as to shield the real assailants, which
               could have been the complainant party themselves? Or was it
               that the police were trying to frame the accused? Particularly
               when, as the record reveals, as is so admitted by PW-22 of
               A-2 being a practicing advocate who has been, (i) pursuing
               the matters against the officials of the police station; (ii) has
               been lodging complaints against the police officials for inaction;
               and (iii) had nothing to do with the ownership, management
               or control of the wine shop.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                           765

     Periyasamy v. The State Represented by the Inspector of Police


      46.2. There is yet another disturbing feature emanating from his
            statement. Why is it that the police used a private vehicle for
            carrying out the investigation, as was admitted by this witness
            in any case, whose owner and driver in any event not examined
            during trial or investigation? The prosecution doesn’t contend
            that at the relevant time, no government vehicle was available
            at the police station or that the said private vehicle was hired by
            them. It is also significant that PW-21 admits that PW-1 had not
            named A-2 in his statement, and, PW-22 when speaking about
            A-2, only states, “On 5.3.2002 at 12.00 noon, I arrested the
            accused Manoharan at Pettavaithalai Bus Stand after enquired
            sent him to the Court Custody on the same day.”
      46.3. In respect of PW-21, we find him to have not denied but feigned
            ignorance of the fact that Sundaravadivel had held Paramasivam
            S/o Kaalimoopan against whom a false case stood fastened by
            Inspector Sundaravadivel, under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of
            Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas,
            Immoral Traffic Offenders, Forest Offenders, Sand Offenders,
            Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 198219 . He only states
            that “being an Advocate the 2nd accused came to the area police
            stations.” This in no way discloses what led either PW-22 or him
            to suspect and thence, act on the complicity of A-2 in the crime.
47. Various lapses such as these cumulatively affect the overall sanctity
    of the prosecution case, making it fall short of the threshold of
    beyond reasonable doubt. It is in such circumstances, on analysis
    of the record, that we are unable to sustain the conviction handed
    down by the Courts below to A-1 and A-2. The injured witnesses and
    the Investigation Officer in their testimony together are not inspiring
    confidence, and in our own estimation the prosecution case stands
    shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can
    be said to be just in the eyes of law.
48. We sustain the challenge on the grounds, among others that,
    (a) examined private persons were interested witnesses, with
    inconsistencies amongst them; (b) no independent witnesses were
    examined; (c) there was a delay in filing the FIR; (d) there were
    interpolations on record; (e) there were numerous lapses in the


19   Hereinafter referred to as ‘Goondas Act’
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       investigation; and (f) the medical and scientific evidence on record
       does not support the prosecution’s version of events.
49. During the course of submissions on behalf of A-1, the learned
    senior counsel appearing on his behalf had urged the right of private
    defence as a secondary submission, in the event of the arguments
    in favour of complete acquittal on finding favour with the court. Given
    that, upon consideration and analysis of the submissions made and
    the material on record, we have found that the convictions cannot
    stand in the eyes of law, we need not delineate on that submission.
50. In that view of the matter, the appeals are allowed and the convictions
    subject matter thereof, are accordingly set aside. Both appellants are
    directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
    Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Headnotes prepared by:                            Result of the case:
       Gaurav Upadhyay, Hony. Associate Editor            Appeals allowed.
       (Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)