PAWAN KUMAR RALLIversusMANINDER SINGH NARULA

                   (2014] 7 S.C.R. 1047


                    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI                                  A
                                 v.
                 MANINDER SINGH NARULA .
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1684 of 2014)

                       AUGUST 11, 2014
                                                                       B
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]

     NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881:

      s. 138 (b) - 'Notice' - Court's power to condone delay in        c
filing a complaint uls 138 - Dishonour of cheque ..:.. Hand
written note sent by complainant to accused calling upon him
to make the payment - Subsequently a formal legal notice
issued by complainant - Held: The handwritten note was
issued within the mandatory period of thirty days of dishonour         0
of cheques and fulfilled the mandatory requirements under
clause (b) of proviso to s. 138 - Therefore, High Court
committed no error in considering the handwritten note as
'notice' u/s 138.

      s.142(b}, proviso r/w s.138 - Condonation of delay in            E
filing complaint u/s 138 - Held: Respondent did. not raise th£!
issue of limitation before that court and the question of the
said court exercising the discretion to condone the delay did
not arise at all - Respondent has not suffered any prejudice
by reason of 25 days delay ·- Therefore, appellant should              F
not have been deprived of the remedy provided by Legislature
- When the issue of limitation came up for the first time
before High Court, it ought to have dealt with the same on
merits as per proviso to· s.142(b), which confers jurisdiction
upon court to condone the delay - High Court committed an              G
error in quashing the complaint -·It ought to have remanded
the matter to trial court for deciding the issue of limitation ...:.
Accordingly, in order to meet the ends of justice, in exercise
of discretion under Art. 142 of the Constitutio17, impugned
                              1047                                     H
    1048     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A judgment of High Court is set aside - Criminal proceedings
    before trial court are restored - Appellant is permitted to file
    before trial court an application for condonation of delay,
    which shall be considered on its own merits - Constitution of
    India, 1950 - Art. 142.
B
        s.142(b), proviso (as inserted by Amendment Act, 2002)
    - Legislative intent of - Explained.

         In a case of dishonour of cheques dated 25.4.2012,
    the appellant issued a hand written notice dated 27.4.2012
C   to the respondent calling upon him to make the payment.
    Subsequently, a formal legal notice dated 24.5.2012 was
    issued uls 1381142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
    1881. The respondent denied the claim put forth in the
    said notice. Consequently, the appellant filed a complaint
D   against the respondent for offences ulss 138, 141 and
    142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and s. 420
    IPC. The trial court took cognizance and issued
    summons to the respondent, who contested the case
    and during the 'pendency of the proceedings filed a
E   petition uls 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court seeking to
    quash the complaint on the ground that it was filed with
    25 days delay. The High Court quashed the criminal
    proceedings against the respondent holding that the
     complaint was not filed within the period of limitation from
F   the notice dated 27.4.2012.

       In the instant appeal filed by the complainant, the
    questions for consideration of the Court were as follows:
                 •
           (a)   Whether the handwritten note sent by the
G                appellant on 27.4.2012 to the respondent
                 could be treated as 'notice' or the notice
                 issued by the advocate on 24.5.2012 could
                 only be treated as 'notice' within the meaning
                 of s. 138 of the Act?
H
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                1049
                 NARULA
     (b)   If there was any delay in filing the complaint,      A
           whether such delay could have been
           condoned by the High Court in accordance
           with the provisions of the Act?

     (c)   Whether the High Court was right in quashing         8
           the criminal proceedings on the ground of
           limitation or instead of quashing the criminal
           proceedings it ought to have remitted the
           matter back to the trial court for deciding the
           issue of limitation?
                                                                c
     Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. The handwritten note dated 27 .4. 2012
was issued within the mandatory period of thirty days of
dishonour of cheques and it fulfilled the mandatory             D
requirements under clause (b) of proviso to s.138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Therefore, the High
Court has committed no error in considering the
handwritten note dated 27.4.2012 as 'notice' uls 138 of
the Act. [para 19] [1060-G-H; 1061-A]                           E
    Central Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Saxons Farms & Ors.
1999 Suppl. (3) SCR 534    =(~999) 8 sec 221 - relied on.
     2.1. The respondent contested the matter before. the
trial court and also filed an application uls 91, Cr.P .C.      F
warranting the appellant to produce various documents.
He also moved an application uls 410, Cr.P.C. seeking
transfer of the complaint to a different court. It is
noteworthy that all through out the pendency of
proceedings before the trial court, the respondent did not      G
raise the issue of 'limitation'. The issue was raised for the
first time before the High Court in s.482, Cr.P.C.
proceedings. However, when the issue of limitation came
up for the first time before the High Court, it ought to have
dealt with the same on merits as per proviso to s.142(b)        H
   1050 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A of the Act. The said prQviso was inserted by the
  Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous.
  Provisions) Act, 2002 and the legislative intent was, no
  doubt, in order to overcome the technicality of limitation
  period. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended
B to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the
  introduction of this proviso was to provide discretion to
  the court to take cognizance of offence even after expiry
  of the period of Umitation. Only with a view to obviate the
  difficulties on the part of the Complainant, Parliament
c inserted the proviso to clause (b) of s.142 of the Act in
  the year 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the Court to
  condone the delay. [para17 and 20] [1059-H; 1060-A-B;
  1061-B-E]

      MSR Lea.thers vs. S. Palaniappan [2012] 9 SCR 165 =
D (2013) 1 SCC 177; Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayprakash M.
  Shah [2008] 11 SCR 681 = (2008) 13 SCC 689 - relied on.

       2.2. lt is no doubt true that at the time of filing the
  complaint, the Magistrate has to take cognizance of the
E complaint when it is within limitation and in case of delay,
  the complaint has to come up with the application
  seeking condonation of delay. But, the peculiar fact of
  the instant case is that in the complaint, the complainant
  had only averred that he has sent the legal notice dated
F 24.5. 2012 btlt did not mention about the handwritten note
  dated 27.4.2012. Basing on the said averment, the trial
  judge was satisfied that the complaint was within the
  prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, in the instant
  case, raising the plea of limitation and court exercising
G the discretion to condone the delay did not arise at all.
  [para 21] [1061-F-G]

       2.3. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
  case, while keeping in mind the legislative intent and the
  specific plea of the appellant raised in the grounds for the
H Special Leave Petitiori that he should have been allowed
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                1051
                 NARULA
  to move an application for condonation of delay before A
  the trial court as the respondent has not suffered any
  prejudice by reason of 25 days delay, the appellant·
  should not have been deprived of the remedy provided
  by the Legislature. Therefore, the High Court has
1 committed an error by not considering the issue of     B
  limitation on merits. [para 22] [1061-H; 1062-A-C]

      3.1. This Court is, therefore, of the considered
 opinion that the High Court was not right in quashing the
 complaint merely on the ground that it was barred by          C
 limitation. On the other hand, the High Court ought to
 have remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding
 the issue of limitation. [para 23] [1062-D-E]

      3.2. In order to meet the ends of justice, this Court
 exercises its discretion under Art. 142 of the Constitution   D
 and sets aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.
 The criinfoal proceedings before the trial court are
 restored. The appellant is permitted to file an application
 for condonation of delay before the trial court and if such
 an application is filed, the same shall be considered on      E
 its own merits. [p(lra 25] [1062-G-H; 1063-A]

     Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. State (Through CBI) 2000 (2)
                    =
 Suppl. SCR 275 (2000) 7 SCC 656;Ramesh Chand
 Sharma Vs. Udham Singh Kamal & Ors. 1999(3) Suppl.
 SCR 613 = (1999) 8 sec 304 - cited.
                                                               F

                     Case Law Reference:
    2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 275       relied on       para 9
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR534        relied on       para 11      G

    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 613       cited           para 12
    2012 (9) SCR 165              relied on       para 20
    2008 (11) SCR 681             relied on       para 20      H
    1052    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 7 $.C.R.


A       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1684 of 2014.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.01.2013 in
  CRLMC No. 2961 of 2012 of the High Court of Delhi at New
B Delhi.

        Hzefa Ahmadi, (AC), Rohan Sharma, Azal Khan. Geetanjali
    Sharma, T.V. Geore for the Appellant.

        Vipin Kumar Jai, Manish Miglan, Vipul Jai for the
c Respondent.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted.

D      2. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated
  15th January, 2013 of the High Court of Delhi passed in
  Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2961 of 2012 filed by the
  respondent herein under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
  Code. By the said judgment, the High Court quashed the
E criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section
  138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter
  referred to as 'the Act') against the respondent.

       3. The brief history of the case, according to the appellant,
  is that he had given a loan of Rs.60 lakhs to the respondent in:
F the month of November, 2011. In discharge of his obligation to"
  the appellant, on 25th April, 2012, the respondent issued (i)
  Cheque No. 889953, drawn on Allahabad Bank, for Rs.30
  lakhs; (ii) Cheque No. 545420, drawn on ICICI Bank, for Rs.20
  lakhs; and (iii) Cheque No. 545409, drawn on ICICI Bank, ·for
G Rs. 10 lakhs. When the appellant presented the said cheques
  in his Bank for realization, they were dishon9ured by the
  respondent's banker with remarks 'Stop Payment'.

        4. The appellant, after receiving the communication from
H
     PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                      1053
           NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
his banker about the dishonour of Cheques, issued a                    A
handwritten notice (Annexure P4) to the respondent on 27th
April, 2012 calling upon him to make the payment. Upon non-
compliance by the respondent, a formal legal notice dated 24th
May, 2012 (Annexpure P5) was issued under Section 138/142
of the Act requiring the respondent to pay the cheques amount          B
along with interest and costs. In his reply to the legal notice, the
respondent totally disagreed with the allegation of taking loan
from the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant filed a
Complaint Case against the respondent invoking Sections 138,
141 and 142 of the Act and Section 420, of the Indian Penal            c
Code. The Metropolitan .Magistrate took cognizance arid
summoned the respondent who pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried.

      5. During the pendency of trial, the respondent filed             -
  Criminal Miscellaneous Case before the High Court under              D
  Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings
  pending before the Trial Court. The High Court expressed the
  view that the complaint was not filed within a period of one
  month after the expiry of 15 days of receipt of the notice dated
  27th April, 2012 and hence it was barred by limitation under         E
  Section 142(b) of the Act and by the impugned judgment
  quashed the criminal proceedings against the respondent.
  Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant-
. complainant approached this Court by way of Special Leave
 ~@on.                                                                 F

       6. Before us, the case of the appellant is that the High
 Court was not justified in exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction
 under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The High Court incorrectly
 considered the handwritten note as legal notice and calculated G
 the limitation period accordingly. Whereas, the handwritten note
 was only an intimation to the accused and according to the'
 provisions of law, the actual notice within 30 days from the date .
 of dishonour of the cheques, was issued on 24th May, 2012
 and accordingly criminal proceedings were initiated well within H
   1054      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A the limitation period. But, the High Court failed to take into
  consideration this material fact and merely on the ground of 25
  days delay from the date of service of handwritten note,
  quashed the criminal proceedings. The High Court ignored the
  fact that the Act clearly enables the Court to condone the delay,
B if any, beyond 30 days of limitation period under proviso to
  Section 142(b) of the Act.

       7. During the course of hearing, we felt it justifiable to have
  assistance of a senior counsel and we accordingly appointed
C Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel as Amicus Curiae.

        8. Learned Amicus submitted that the handwritten note
  dated 27th April, 2012 whereby the appellant called upon the
  respondent to make payment, would fall within the four corners
  of 'notice' under Section 138(b) of the Act and there was a
D delay of 25 days in filing the Complaint under the provisions of
  the Act. He further submitted that the proviso to Section 142(b)
  of the Act confers power on the Court to condone the delay, if
  the complainant satisfies the Court on the part of delay. As it
  was believed by the Trial Court that since the legal notice was
E issued on 24th May, 2012 the limitation period would come into
  force from that date only, there was no occasion for the
  appellant to plead for sufficient cause for condonation of delay
  as the question of delay did not arise before the Trial Court.
  While issuing process, the Trial Court was clearly of the view
F that the Complaint was within limitation on the basis of
  averments made in the Complaint. Therefore, the occasion did
  not arise for the appellant to raise the plea of 'sufficient cause'
  for the delay. Moreover, the respondent had also not raised the
  question of limitation before the Trial Court and the issue of
G limitation was raised for the first time before the High Court.
         9. Even otherwise, before quashing the criminal
    proceedirigs on the ground of limitation, the High Court could
    have decided whether sufficient cause was made out by the
    appellant under the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act, and if
'-i satisfied, it could have condoned the delay. Alternatively, the
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANIN DER SINGH                     1055
          NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
High Court could have remanded the matter to the Trial Court          A
to determine the issue. In support of his submissions, he placed
reliance on a judgment of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs.
State (Through CBI) (2000) 7 SCC 656, in which while
considering the provisions of Section 473, Cr.P.C. and
deciding the question whether on the ground of limitation, the        B
accused is entitled to seek his discharge, this Court held:

    "The mere fact that the complain( was filed 25 days after
    the .expiry of the period of limitation did not entitle the
    accused to seek his discharge under Section 245, Cr.P.C
    because the complainant has, under law, a right to seek           C
    for extension of time under Section 473 Cr.P.C. The
    complainant could satisfy the Magistrate on the facts and
    circumstances of the case that the delay was explainable
    which was occasioned on account of their bona fide belief
    to obtain the sanction for the purpose of filing the              D
    complaint".

     10. Learned Amicus finally submitted that the legislative
intent in inserting the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 142 of
the Act was only to protect the Cheque holders from the               E
defaulters who issued the Cheques and the Court should act
reasonably in providing an opportunity to the Cheque holder to
present his version on the issue of delay if any. After taking into
consideration the reasons advanced by the Cheque holder, the
Court should consider the question of delay and then only it          F
should pass an order. But in the present case, the High Court
adopted an unhealthy approach by passing the impugned order
quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground of limitation,
that too for a delay of only 25 days, without considering the
appellant's reasons for the delay. He further submitted that the      G
observation of the High Court in the impugned order that
"allowing the appellant to pursue the Complaint against the
respondent would be an abuse of process" is also not in the
interest of justice.

     11. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,       H
    1056    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A contended that there is no apparent error in the judgment of the
  High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground
  of limitation. The High Court has correctly treated the
  handwritten notice sent by the appellant on 27th April, 2012 as
  a valid notice in terms of Section 138 of the Act as the appellant
B had given the notice in writing within fifteen days of information
  of dishonour of the Cheuqes from his banker. In support of this
  contention learned counsel has cited the judgment of this Court 1
  in Central Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Saxons Farms & Ors.
  (1999) 8 SCC 221 wherein this Court held that though no form
c of notice is prescribed in Clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act,
  the requirement is that notice shall be given in writing within
  fifteen days of receipt of information from the bank regarding
  return of the Cheque as unpaid and in the notice a demand for
  payment of the amount of the Cheque has to be made. So,
  learned counsel argued that looking. at this settled legal
0
  position, the first notice issued by the appellant on 27th April,
  2012 had since fulfilled the criteria laid down by this Court, the
  same has to be treated as 'notice' within the meaning of
  Section 138(b) of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that the High
  Court was right in considering the handwritten note as 'notice'
E for the purpose of calculating delay in filing the Complaint and
  it rightly declared that the Complaint was barred by limitation.

         12. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended
  that even though the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act
F facilitates condonation of delay if the complainant satisfies the
  Court that he had cogent reasons for not making the complaint
  within the limitation period, in the present case the complainant
  had made no request before the High Court for availing such
  benefit of condonation of delay. To substantiate his argument,
G learned counsel relied upon the counter affidavit filed by the
  appellant before the High Court and submitted that there also
  the appellant, instead of pleading for condonation of delay, took
  the stand that the communication dated 27th April, 2012 shall
  not be treated as notice, whereas it fulfilled all ingredients of a
H 'notice' under Section 138 of the Act. In support of his claim
    PAWAN KUMAR RALL! v. MANINDER SINGH                    1057
          NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
~hat the matter is barred by limitation and requires to be          A
bismissed at the threshold itself, he relied on this Court's
Judgment in Ramesh Chand Sharma Vs. Udham Singh
Kamal & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 304 and submitted that in that
case also despite the objection of limitation raised by the
appellants, the first respondent did not file any application for   B
condonation of delay and this Court had dismissed the O.A.
filed by the first respondent, on the ground of limitation.

      13. Learned counsel for the respondent therefore firmly
opposed the plea of the learned Amicus that the matter has to       C
be remanded back to the Trial Court for hearing the issue of
limitation by providing an opportunity to the appellant to avail
the remedy envisaged under the proviso to Section 142(b) of
the Act. He finally submitted that the High Court was right in
quashing the criminal proceedings and the impugned order
does not call for interference of this Court under Article 136 of   D
the Constitution.

     14. We have heard learned counsel at length. In view of
the conflicting approach adopted by the High Court in
determining the issue of limitation which subsequently led to the   E
quashing of criminal proceedings pending before the Trial
Court, the following issues emerge for our consideration for the
disposal, of this matter:

      (a)   Whether the handwritten note sent by the appellant      F
            on 27th April, 2012 to the respondent could be
            treated as 'notice' or the notice issued by the
            advocate on 2'4th May, 2012 could only be treated
            as 'notice' within the meaning of Section 138 of the
            Act?
                                                                    G
      (b)   If there was any delay in filing the Complaint in the
            present case, whether such delay could have been
            condoned by the High Court in accordance with the
            provisions of the Act?
                                                                    H
    . 1058         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A            (c)    Whether ttie High Court was right in quashing the
                    criminal proceedings on the ground of limitation or
                    instead of quashing the criminal proceedings it
                    ought to have remitted the matter back to the Trial
                    Court for deciding the issue of limitation?
B
           15. Before embarking on the above issues, we may notice
     that the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act limits the
     applicability of the main provision stating:

             138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds
c                 in the account.-



         Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
         unless-
D
             (a)    the cheque has been presented to the bank within
                    a period of six months from the date on which it is
                    drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever
                    is earlier;
E            (b)    the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
                    as the case may be, makes a demand for the
                    payment of the said amount of money by giving a
                    notice in writing, to the drawer of the Cheque, within
                    thirty days of the receipt of information by him from
F                   the bank. regarding the return of the Cheque as
                    unpaid; and
             (c)    the drawer of such Cheque fails to make the
                    payment of the said amount of money to the payee
G                   or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course
                    of the Cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of
                    the said notice."
      16. Section 142 of the Act also puts a limitation on the
  power of the Court to take cognizance of the offences, which
H reads as under:
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                     1059
          NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
    142. Cognizance of offences-Notwithstanding anything             A
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974),-

      (a)   no court shall take cognizance of any offence
            punishable under Section 138 except upon a
                                                                     8
            complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the
            case may be, the holder in due course of the
            cheque;

      (b)   such complaint is made within one month of the
            date on which the cause of action arises under           C
            clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138:

    Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken
    by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant
    satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not         0
    making a complaint within such period.

      (c)   no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate
            or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try
            any offence punishable under Section 138.
                                                                     E
     17. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the Cheques in
question were issued by the respondent and the same were
dishonoured by the Bank on his instructions of 'stop payment'.
Two communications, one a handwritten note dated 27th April,
2012 by the appellant himself and the other a formal legal notice    F
dated 24th May, 2012 issued by the advocate, were served on
the respondent calling upon him to pay the Cheque amounts.
The respondent did not respond to the handwritten
communication, but has replied to the legal notice issued
through advocate on 24th May, 2012 denying the allegation.           G
Upon failure of the respondent to obey the handwritten
communication as well as the legal notice, the appellant initiated
criminal proceedings by filing Complaint Case on 5th July, 2012.
It appears that the respondent contested the matter before the
Trial Court and also filed an application under Section 91,          H
    1060    SUPREME COURT.REPORTS                  [2014] 7 S.C.R.


A Cr.P.C. warranting the appellant to produce various documents.
  He has also moved an application under Section 410, Cr.P.C.
  seeking transfer of the Complaint to a different Court. It is
  noteworthy that all through out the pendency of proceedings
  before the Trial Court, the respondent did not raise the issue
B of 'limitation'. The issue was raised for the first time before the
  High Court in Section 482, Cr.P.C. proceedings. The High
  Court, considering the handwritten note sent by the appellant
  on 27th April, 2012 as 'notice' under Section 138 of the Act,
  came to the conclusion that the complaint is barred by
c limitation.

       18. This Court has already clarified in Central Bank of
  India & Anr. (supra) that Section 138 of the Act does not
  prescribe any specific form of notice, but mandates that it
  should be issued in writing within thirty days (w.e.f. 6-2-2003)
D of receipt of information from the banker about the dishonour
  of Cheque, with a demand to the drawer for making payment
  of the said amount.

        19. We have perused the handwritten note dated 27th April,
E 2012 (Annexure P4) and found that it was issued within the
  mandatory period of thirty days of dishonour of cheques and
  contained (a) the subject amount of Rs.60,00,000/- given by the
  appellant as loan to the respondent under promissory notes;
  (b) the details of Cheque numbers and dates of issue with
F amounts and particulars of Bank; (c) Returning of Cheques by
  the banker dishonouring them on the grouna of 'Stop Payment'
  by the respondent; (d) a demand for immediate repayment of
  the amount; and (d) a caution to the respondent that in case of
  failure on the part of respondent, the appellant would initiate
G legal proceedings. Thus, in our opinion, the handwritten note
  dated 27th April, 2012 fulfilled the mandatory requirements
  under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 and could be said
  to be a valid 'notice' in the light of this Court's Judgment in
  Central Bank of India & Anr. (supra). Moreover, this document
  (Annexure P4) stands admitted by the appellant in his cross
H
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                     1061
          NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
examination also. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court has     A
committed no error in considering the handwritten note dated
27th April, 2012 as 'notice' under Section 138 of the Act.

     20. However, when the issue of limitation has come up for
the first time before the High Court, it ought to have dealt with    B
the same on merits as per proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act.
The said proviso appended to clause (b) of Section 142 of the
Act was inserted by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 and the legislative
intent was, no doubt, in order to overcome the technicality of      C
limitation period. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
appended to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the
introduction of this proviso was to...provide discretion to the
Court to take cognizance of offence even after expiry of the
period of limitation [See MSR Leathers Vs. S. Palaniappan
(2013) 1 SCC 177]. Only with a view to obviate the difficulties      D
on the part of the Complainant, Parliament inserted the proviso
to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in the year 2002. It
confers a jurisdiction upon the Court to condone the delay [See
 Subodh S. Salaskar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah (2008) 13 SCC
68~.                                                                 E

      21. It is no doubt true that at the time of filing the complaint,
the Magistrate has to take cognizance of the complaint when
it is within limitation and in case of delay in filing the complaint,
the complaint has to come up with the application seeking F
condonation of delay. But, the peculiar fact of the present case .
is that in the complaint, the complainant had only averred that
he has sent the legal notice dated 24th May, 2012 but not
mentioned about the handwritten note dated 27th April, 2012.
Basing on the said averment, the learned Trial Judge was G
satisfied that the complaint is within the prescribed period of
limitation. Hence, in this case, raising the plea of limitation and\-
Court exercising the discretion to condone the delay did not
arise at all.

     22. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,        H
    1062 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 7 S.C.R.

A · while keeping in mind the legislative intent and the specific plea
    of the appellant raised in the grounds for the Special Leave
    Petition that he should have been allowed to move an
    application for condonation of delay before the Trial Court as
    the respondent has not suffered any prejudice by reason of 25
B days delay, we strongly feel that the appellant should not have
    been deprived of the remedy provided by the Legislature. In
    fact, the remedy so provided was to enable a genuine litigant
    to pursue his case against a defaulter by overcoming the
    technical difficulty of limitation. Hence, the High Court has
c   committed an error by not considering the issue of limitation
    on merits.

       23. In view of the settled principles of law in Rakesh Kumar
  Jain, MSR Leathers. Subodh S. Salaskar (supra) and in the
  peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
D considered opinion that the High Court was not right in
  quashing the complaint merely on the ground that complaint is
  barred by limitation, that too a plea which was taken for the first
  time before the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court
  ought to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for
E deciding the issue of limitation.

       24. At the same time, we want to make it very clear that
  by this observation we are not laying down a legal proposition
  that without even filing an application seeking condonation of
F delay at an initial stage, complainant can be given opportunity
  at any stage of the proceeding. As already discussed by us in
  the foregoing paragraphs, we have come •o the irresistible
  conclusion, to afford an opportunity for the complainant to move
  an application seeking condonation of delay, under the peculiar
G facts and circumstances of the case.

       25. For all the aforesaid reasons, in order to meet the ends
  of justice, we exercise our discretion under Article 142 of the
  Constitution and set aside the impugned judgment1of the High
  Court quashing the criminal proceedings and restore the
H criminal proceedings before the Trial Court. The appellant is
    PAWAN KUMAR RALLI v. MANINDER SINGH                      1063
          NARULA [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
,permitted to file an application for condonation of delay before A
 th~ ·:rrial Court and if such an application is filed, the Trial Court
 shafl be at liberty to consider the same on its own merits,
 without being impressed upon by any of the observations by
 this Co.urt, and pass appropriate orders:
                                                                       B
    . ~6. We are thankful to Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned amicus
curiae, for his able assistance.

    27. The appeal stands allowed with the aforesaid
observations.
                                                                       c
Rajendra Prasad                                      Appeal allowed.