PAULversusSTATE OF KERALA

                          [2020] 1 S.C.R. 1091                             1091


                                PAUL                                       A
                                   v.
                        STATE OF KERALA
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 2020)
                         JANUARY 21, 2020                                  B
      [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860:
      s. 302 – Prosecution under – Initially acquittal by trial court
– On appeal, case remanded to trial court – On remand conviction           C
by Trial Court – Conviction affirmed by High Court – Appeal to
Supreme Court – Plea of accused confined to alteration of conviction
under Section 302 to one under Section 304 (Part II) giving benefit
of exception 4 to s. 300 – Held: The present case is an unambiguous
case of homicide and not a case of suicide as projected by the
                                                                           D
accused – In the facts of the case, none of the exceptions in Section
300 IPC are attracted – Section 86 IPC also not applicable in the
facts of the case – Conviction under Section 302 is confirmed.
      ss. 299 and 300 – ‘Culpable Homicide’ and ‘Murder’ –
Discussed. s. 304 (Part I) and (Part II) – Applicability of – Discussed.
                                                                           E
      s. 86 – When applicable – Discussed.
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
      s. 313 – Statement under – Evidentiary value of – Held: Such
statement even if contains inculpatory admissions cannot be ignored
– The Court may enter verdict of guilt where there is evidence.            F
      Evidence:
       Burden to prove – Held: The burden to prove the case is on
the prosecution, unless the law declares otherwise – The burden to
prove that the case falls under any of the exceptions in s. 300 IPC
                                                                           G
is on the accused – Accused can discharge the said burden by virtue
of prosecution evidence, even without adducing any defence
evidence.


                                                                           H
                                 1091
1092            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 It can safely be concluded on the basis of the
       material and findings which has been rendered by the courts
       concurrently that the case of suicide set up by the appellant was
       a completely false plea. It is clear that the appellant caused the
 B     death of his wife by throttling. The injuries clearly has been
       appreciated as indicating death by throttling.[PARA 9]
       [1101-H; 1102-A-B]
             1.2 A statement made by the accused under Section 313
       Cr.PC even it contains inculpatory admissions cannot be ignored
 C     and the Court may where there is evidence available proceed to
       enter a verdict of guilt.[PARA 14][1107-B]
             State of U.P. v. Lakhmi (1998) 4 SCC 336 : [1998] 1
             SCR 850 – relied on
             1.3. There is a case for the appellant that there were injuries
 D     on the appellant. When there is throttling, unless the victim is
       asleep or unconscious, there would be resistance. Injuries on
       the aggressor are not uncommon. In the present case there are
       also injuries on other parts of body apart from the neck. They
       indicate acts of violence by the aggressor. The Court is not even
 E     called upon to pronounce on whether there is anybody else who
       would be the aggressor. It is the appellant and appellant alone
       who can be attributed with the acts which resulted in the death of
       his wife. [PARA 21][1109-F-G]
             2.1. The fact that a false case is set up, by itself may not
 F     deprive an accused of the right to establish the fact that the case
       against him would still be embraced within any of the exceptions
       under Section 300 IPC. The law does not taboo adopting of the
       alternate pleas. Ultimately, the question would fall to be decided,
       no doubt, on the basis of appreciation of evidence and the
       requirements of law flowing from the particular provision of law.
 G     The accused may also be entitled to the benefit of reasonable
       doubt. [PARA 18][1108-F-G]
             2.2 There can be no doubt that the burden to prove that
       the case is made out in a particular case, is on the prosecution
       unless the law declares otherwise. To be murder within the
 H
                   PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                               1093


meaning of Section 302 undoubtedly, the offence must be culpable         A
homicide. In order that it is culpable homicide it must fall under
Section 299 of the IPC but all acts which amount to culpable
homicide do not constitute murder. [PARA 16][1108-C-D]
       2.3 There can be no doubt that the burden of proving that
the case fall within the four corners of any of the exceptions under     B
Section 300 of the IPC is on the accused. It is equally true that
even without adducing any defence evidence it may be possible
for the accused to discharge the said burden with reference to
material appearing by virtue of the prosecution evidence which
includes the cross examination of prosecution witnesses. The
test is one of preponderance of probability. [PARA 17][1108-E]           C

      2.4 In the present case the prosecution case about there
being a quarrel is about the mother of the appellant creating a
scene compelling the deceased to leave home and search her
husband out. There is also mention about ill treatment given by
the appellant to his wife in front of his friends and it is thereafter   D
in the night the act of the appellant throttling her took place. In
such case exception I to Section 300 IPC would not apply.
Exception I requires deprivation of power of control by the
accused by virtue of grave and sudden provocation. The grave
and sudden provocation must be given by the deceased. No doubt,          E
if death is caused of any other person by virtue of the sudden
provocation, by mistake or accident, exception I may apply.
Nothing is brought out in the evidence to even faintly establish
the giving of any provocation leave alone a grave and sudden
provocation. Equally, there is no such case undoubtedly set up in
the written statement under 313 Cr.PC even after the remand.             F
[PARA 23][1110-C-E]
      2.5 The case of exception 4 is no different in its
inapplicability to the facts. There is no material to come to the
conclusion that there occurred a sudden quarrel leading to a
sudden fight going by the version furnished by the appellant in          G
his written statement under 313 Cr.PC which statement also
recites that he fell fast asleep. Till such time there is no hint
even of any sudden fight or sudden quarrel. It must also be

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1094            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A     appreciated that under Section 106 of the Evidence Act facts
       within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant as to what
       transpired within the privacy of their bed room even must be
       established by the appellant. [PARA 24][1110-F-G]
               2.6 The appellant cannot be handed down conviction under
 B     Section 304, Part-I. Section 300 of the IPC declares that except
       in those cases which are specifically excepted culpable homicide
       is murder in situations which have been specifically laid down.
       These are commonly referred to as firstly, secondly, thirdly and
       fourthly under Section 300 of the IPC. If the intention of the
       Legislature was that culpable homicide would amount to murder
 C     if it did not fall in any of the four exceptions enumerated in Section
       300 of the IPC, there was no need for the Legislature to ‘waste
       words’ as it were by declaring that culpable homicide is murder if
       the act fell within any of the 4 clauses in Section 300 of the IPC.
       In order that an act is to be punished as murder, it must be culpable
 D     homicide which is declared to be murder. Murder is homicide of
       the gravest kind. So is the punishment appropriately of the highest
       order. Murder requires establishment of the special mens rea
       while all cases of culpable homicide may not amount to murder.
       [PARA 28][1112-H; 1113-A-D]
 E            2.7 If the act results in culpable homicide which does not
       amount to murder, then and then alone the question arises of
       applying Section 304 Part-I or Part- II as the case may be.
       Appellant cannot extricate himself from the consequence of his
       act attracting the ingredients of murder by pointing out Section
       304 Part I which also contains the expression, “the act with the
 F     intention to cause death’. The implications are vastly different.
       Section 304 of the IPC would apply only in a case where culpable
       homicide is not murder. If the act amounting to culpable homicide
       satisfies any of the four criteria to bring it under the offence of
       murder, being mutually exclusive, there can be no scope for
 G     applying Section 304 of the IPC. [Para 29][1114-C-E]
              2.8 On the other hand, if the act is culpable homicide as
       falling in any of the four exceptional circumstances mentioned in
       Section 300 and then it would amount to culpable homicide not

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                  PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                              1095


amounting to murder. In cases where the accused is able to             A
establish he is entitled to the benefit of any of the exceptions
under Section 300 then his case may be considered under Part-I
or Part-II of Section 304 of the IPC depending on whether the
act which caused the culpable homicide was done with the
intention of causing death or with knowledge that it is likely to
                                                                       B
cause death. That apart cases of culpable homicide which do not
attract any of the four situations under Section 300 would still be
culpable homicide to be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC.
However, if the case falls under any of the four limbs of Section
300, there would be no occasion to allow Section 304 to have
play. If the act which caused the death and which is culpable          C
homicide is done with the intention of causing death, then it would
be murder. This is however subject to the act not being committed
in circumstances attracting any of the 5 exceptions. [PARAS 29
and 30][1114-E-H]
      State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and               D
      Another (1976) 4 SCC 382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601 – relied
      on
      Partap v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1976) 2 SCC 798 :
      [1976] 1 SCR 757; Periasami and Another v. State of
      T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 457 : [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 757 –                E
      referred to.
       2.9 As far as the present case is concerned, there can be
no doubt that the act which led to the death has been committed
by the appellant. The Court can safely proceed on the basis also
that it amounts to culpable homicide. Going by the circumstances       F
in the present case and in particular injuries suffered, it is quite
clear that the act would fall within the scope of Section 300 of the
IPC. Appellant’s contention that it would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder and reliance placed on the words ‘done
with the intention of causing death’ in Section 304 Part-I is wholly
meritless. None of the exceptions in Section 300 are attracted.        G
The act amounts to murder within the meaning of Section 300 of
the IPC. [Paras 29 and 30][1114-B-C; H; 1115-A]
      2.10 Section 86 of the IPC enunciates presumption that
despite intoxication which is not covered by the last limb of the
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1096            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A     provision, the accused person cannot ward off the consequences
       of his act. A dimension however about intoxication may be noted.
       Section 86 begins by referring to an act which is not an offence
       unless done with a particular knowledge or intent. Thereafter,
       the law giver refers to a person committing the act in a state of
       intoxication. It finally attributes to him knowledge as he would
 B
       have if he were not under the state of intoxication except
       undoubtedly, in cases where the intoxicant was administered to
       him either against his will or without his knowledge. Section 86
       does not attribute intention as such to an intoxicated man
       committing an act which amounts to an offence when the act is
 C     done by a person harbouring a particular intention. In the present
       case, there is no evidence about how drunk the appellant was or
       whether the drunkenness in any way stood in the way of the
       appellant forming the requisite intention. There is also gap
       between the time when he was allegedly found drinking and the
       time of the crime. Moreover, in his 313 statement, according to
 D
       him, he has stated that he fell fast asleep and he got up to see his
       wife hanging. The principle that would apply therefore is that
       appellant can be presumed to have intended the natural
       consequences of his act. [PARAS 26 and 27][1111-C-E; 1112-F-
       G]
 E           Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 : [1956]
             SCR 363 – relied on.
                             Case Law Reference
       [1976] 1 SCR 757            referred to             Para 10
 F     [1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 757 referred to                 Para 11
       [1998] 1 SCR 850            relied on               Para 13
       [1956] SCR 363              relied on               Para 26
       [1977] 1 SCR 601            relied on               Para 28
 G            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       38 of 2020.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2018 of the High Court
       of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. A. No. 1549 of 2012.

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                    PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                  1097


      Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal,. Mahendra Kumawat,            A
Advs. for the Appellant.
     Nishe Rajen Shonker, Ms. Anu K. Joy, Alim Anvar, Shaji J. Kodan
Kandath, Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                             B
      K. M. JOSEPH, J.
       1. By the impugned judgment the High court has affirmed the
Judgment of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Ernakulam convicting
the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”)
and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of           C
Rs.10,000/-.
      2. The deceased was the wife of the appellant.
       3. The appellant and his mother were charge-sheeted under
Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC alleging cruelty
and for causing the death of the appellant’s wife. By order dated            D
18.2.2005, the accused were acquitted. Thereafter, the mother of the
appellant expired. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court vide
judgment dated 29/03/2012 however, allowed the criminal appeal filed
by the State against acquittal and set aside the acquittal insofar as it
related to the appellant and the matter was remanded back with a
                                                                             E
direction to dispose of the case by continuing proceedings from the stage
of examination under Section 313 Cr.PC. It is after the remand that the
Principal Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, convicted the appellant under
Section 302 of the IPC as we have already noted. The High Court by
the impugned judgment has concurred with the view taken by the trial
Court.                                                                       F
       4. We heard Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel for the appellant
and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. Notice was
issued in the SLP noticing that the counsel for the appellant has confined
the submission to the plea of alteration of the conviction under Section
302 of the IPC to under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Learned counsel      G
for the appellant would point out that this is a case where the deceased
though conceived a child there was an abortion. She had depression.
The appellant was given to drink on the fateful night. According to the
prosecution case there was a quarrel. He would point out that though it
is true that the appellant may have set up a case that his wife has
                                                                             H
1098             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A     committed suicide that should not detract the court from considering the
       case as per law. Expatiating he contended that appellant must be extended
       the benefit of exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC which declares that
       culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed in a sudden fight without
       there being pre-meditation and in the heat of passion upon a sudden
       quarrel without the offender taking undue advantage and acting in a
 B
       cruel and unusual manner. The explanation to Exception 4 to Section
       300 undoubtedly provides that it is immaterial in such a case which party
       offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Learned counsel
       would point out that according to the prosecution version, appellantin
       fact, on that evening went to the house of PW 7 to PW9 with whom he
 C     had drinks. The deceased went there on account of his drinks. He had
       to be supported back home by the wife. He relied on the following
       judgments:
             (1) 1976 (2) SCC 798 Partap v. State of Uttar Pradesh
             (2) 1996 (6) SCC 457 Periasami and Another v. State of Tamil
 D               Nadu
             (3) 1998 (4) SCC 336 State of U.P. v. Lakhmi
              He would also submit that the Court has found that the appellant
       has suffered injuries. This strengthened the appellant’s case based on
 E     there being a quarrel and therefore this is a fit case where the conviction
       must be altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of
       the IPC. He points out that the court has acquitted him of the charge
       under Section 498A which means there was no matrimonial cruelty
       practised by the appellant on his late wife.

 F            5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State
       strenuously supported the order of the High Court. He would point out
       that this is a clear case of murder by throttling.
             PROSECUTION CASE
                6. The appellant married Jessy on 31.8.1997. Ever since marriage,
 G     it is the case of the prosecution that Jessy was being subjected to physical
       and mental cruelty in the hands of appellant and his mother. On 11.10.1998,
       the fateful day, the mother of the appellant created scene at their home.
       Being depressed, the deceased due to unbearable harassment, left the
       home in search of her husband and found him consuming liquor with his
       friends. The appellant assaulted his wife in front of them. Thereafter, on
 H     the same night at about 11.00 p.m., the appellant throttled her to death.
                     PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                     1099
                        [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

       21 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution. P-1            A
to P-18 were the documents which were marked. C-1 is the chemical
analysis report. In the judgment rendered by the High Court in the first
round of litigation where the trial court had acquitted the appellant and
his mother, the Division Bench of the High Court noticed that all the
occupants of the matrimonial home of the deceased turned hostile. PW2
                                                                                 B
to PW6, PW12 and PW14 are the brothers and sisters-in-law of the
appellant. PW7 to PW9 were the neighbours. These witnesses turned
hostile. PW1, the brother of the deceased and PW 10, the mother of the
deceased undoubtedly abided by the prosecution version. The appellate
Court noted that the appellant did not deny the fact that he and his wife
were available in the bed room in the night. He did not take up any              C
definite stand as to how the injuries were sustained by the deceased. At
this point of time, it is apposite to refer to the injuries. The following are
the ante-mortem injuries which are noted in Exh.P9 post-mortem
certificate which stood proved by PW16, Dr. Siva Sudan:
       “1. Contusion 3x3x0.5 cm on the forehead in midline, 4 cm above           D
       the root of nose.
       2. Abrasion 1x0.2cm vertical on left side of face, 3cm on front of
       lobule of left ear.
       3. Abrasion 0.8 cm x 0.3 cm almost horizontal on right side of
       neck, 2.5 cm to right of midline and 2.5 cm below the jaw bone.           E
       Underneath the sterno thyroid muscle was found bruised over on
       area 2x1.5 cm. The right superior horn of thyroid cartilage was
       found fractured with infiltration of blood around.
       4. Abrasion 1.5x0.2 cm almost vertical on front of right lower
       chest, 24 cm below the right collar bone and 8 cm to right of             F
       midline.
       5. Contusion 2.5x2x0.5 cm on outer aspect of left arm, 8cm below
       the tip of shoulder.
       6. Abrasion 1x0.2 cm on the back of inner aspect of left elbow.
                                                                                 G
       7. Contusion 1.5x1.5x2cm on the back of right forearm 15 cm
       above the elbow.
       8. Arc like healing abrasion 3x0.1 cm on front of chest with its
       convexity towards right side, 10 cm below the right collar bone
       and 1 cm to right of midline (coveted with easily removable black         H
       scab)”
1100            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A            7. Resuming the narrative, the High Court in the earlier round
       found that appellant toed the line taken in the convenient statements of
       PW2 and PW 3 which were contrary to their case diary statements that
       the deceased has committed suicide by hanging. It was noted further by
       the High court that when the evidence of the PW2 and PW3 was put to
       him he agreed with the statement that the deceased has committed
 B
       suicide. The judgment further reveals that the High Court found that a
       proper examination under Section 313 Cr.PC had not been conducted
       by the Sessions Judge. It is accordingly that the judgment setting aside
       the acquittal was made. The High Court also directed that the trial Judge
       must pointedly consider the play of Section106 of the Evidence Act.The
 C     Sessions Judge was directed to dispose of the matter by continuing
       proceeding afresh from the stage of 313 Cr.PC. examination of the
       accused.
               8. We may further notice that when the Principal Sessions Judge
       took up the matter after remand, he has entered the following findings
 D     inter alia. It was found that the death was an immediate result of the
       blunt force applied on the neck of the deceased. The learned Judge
       went on to find that a case under Section 498A was not made out.The
       appellant and the deceased-wife were living in a separate bed room.
       PW1 noted marks of physical violence on the body of the deceased.
       PW1, in his chief examination deposed that the brother of the appellant
 E     and two others informed that his sister was hospitalised due to sore
       throat. Later he was informed that she died due to hanging. He has
       testified that he saw swelling on the forehead, contused abrasion on the
       left cheek of his sister apart from marks of throttling on the neck and
       nail marks on those regions. It was found by the learned Judge that
 F     there was no cross examination of these aspects by PW1. The court
       proceeded to question the appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC. He made
       a written statement. He maintained that he was innocent. He and his
       wife were living a happy marital life. His wife had dejection and objection
       about his drinking habit. She was desperate for not having a child. The
       Court finds an admission by the appellant that on 11.10.1998 PW7 to
 G     PW9 and himself consumed liquor at the house of PW7. At about 7.00
       pm his wife came there in search of him and he went with her. His
       version that he was heavily drunk and it was his wife who fully supported
       him and he was finding it difficult to walk under the influence of alcohol.
       He admitted to having a separate bed room. An altercation between his
 H     mother and his wife is noticed. Since he was under intoxication he could
                    PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                   1101
                       [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

not separate the two. His mother beat him and he sustained injuries on        A
lips. He fell fast asleep. In the early morning he got up for urinating and
at that time only he saw the deceased hanging by a shawl tied to
therailings in the window and on his crying PW2 and 3 came to his
room. They untied the shawl and the body of Jessy was laid on the bed.
This version was noted by the learned Principal Sessions Judge to be a
                                                                              B
new version and not made at the time of the original questioning under
Section 313 Cr.PC or in the cross examination of the prosecution
witnesses. The learned Judge went on to notice the swelling on the
middle of the forehead, abrasion on the left cheek given in the inquest
report. Nail clippings and blood samples was taken from the dead body.
Nail clippings was also collected from the appellant. According to the        C
appellant blood in nail clippings was on account of an attempt by the
deceased and the appellant to untie the noose around her neck. However
the court noted that PW14 doctor has mentioned that the once ligature
has fastened firmly around her neck, the victim would become
unconscious and he or she would not be able to lift his/her upper limbs to
                                                                              D
loosen the ligature. The Court further noted that in the written statement
under 313 Cr.PCgiven after remand,it was stated that PW1 and PW3,
brothers of appellant, untied the shawl allegedto have been used by the
deceased for committing suicide. PW15 also testifies that if the victim
scratches the assaultor, blood and part of skin would be present
underneath his nail clippings. The version sought to be introduced in the     E
written statement after remand by the appellant that there was a fight
between his mother and his wife on the date of occurrence when he
was also assaulted by his mother, was found to be an embellished version
and unacceptable. The Court also noticed that the incident happened in
the bed room of the appellant and that too during night and there was no
                                                                              F
other person in the room. Therefore, the appellant had a responsibility
under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The appellant was found as
having committed murder by throttling and the theory of suicide was
found unacceptable. The High Court also noted the case of the appellant
that his wife committed suicide at 1.30 a.m. by hanging on the window
grill of their room. The High Court agreed that only hypothesis possible      G
was homicide by the appellant.
      ANALYSIS
     9. We can safely conclude on the basis of the material and findings
which has been rendered by the courts concurrently that the case of
                                                                              H
1102            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A     suicide set up by the appellant was a completely false plea. It is clear as
       day light that the appellant caused the death of his wife by throttling.
       We have already noticed the injuries. Apart from injuries to the neck, we
       noticed contusion on the forehead in the midline, upon the mid of the
       nose, an abrasion on the left side of the face (the cheek). There is
       contusion on the outer aspect of the left arm and there is an abrasion on
 B
       the back of the inner aspect of left elbow,contusion on the back of the
       right forearm. This is apart from injuries 2 and 3 which clearly has been
       appreciated as indicating death by throttling.
              10. In Partap v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1976 (2) SCC 798, there
       was an exchange of hot words between two persons in regard to water.
 C     The dispute escalated and a state of acrimony was attained. A gun was
       fired. The victim of the gun shot injury lost his life. The plea of the
       appellant was that deceased was about to strike him with the balla and
       he fired a shot in self defence. Justice M.H. Beg wrote a concurring
       judgment agreeing with Justice R.S.Sarkaria that the appellant had
 D     established a case that he has acted in his self defence and held as
       follows:
             “30. The question which arises in this case is: Even if the defence
             version is not held to be fully established by a balance of
             probabilities, were there not sufficient pointers in evidence of what
 E           was probably the truth which leaked out from some statements of
             the prosecution witnesses themselves? They had indicated the
             bellicose and threatening attitude of Ram Nath while he was
             advancing. Did this not tend to corroborate the defence version
             that he was actually advancing menacingly armed with
             a bhala poised for an attack with it when he was shot at?
 F
             31. It was held in the case of Rishi Kesh Singh by a majority of
             a Full Bench of nine Judges of the Allahabad High Court explaining
             and relying upon the decisions of this Court discussed there (at p.
             51):

 G               “The accused person who pleads an exception is entitled to be
                 acquitted if upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole
                 (including the evidence given in support of the plea of the
                 general exception) a reasonable doubt is created in the mind
                 of the Court about the guilt of the accused.”

 H
             PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                      1103
                [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

In that case, the result of a consideration of the decision of this       A
Court in relation to the provisions of Section 105 of the Evidence
Act was summed up by me as follows (at pages 97-98):
   “... an accused’s plea of an exception may reach one of three
   not sharply demarcated stages, one succeeding the other,
   depending upon the effect of the whole evidence in the case            B
   judged by the standard of a prudent man weighing or balancing
   probabilities carefully. These stages are: firstly, a lifting of the
   initial obligatory presumption given at the end of Section 105
   of the Act; secondly, the creation of a reasonable doubt about
   the existence of an ingredient of the offence; and thirdly a
   complete proof of the exception by ‘a preponderance of                 C
   probability’, which covers even a slight tilt of the balance of
   probability in favour of the accused’s plea. The accused is not
   entitled to an acquittal if his plea does not get beyond the first
   stage. At the second stage, he becomes entitled to acquittal by
   obtaining a bare benefit of doubt. At the third stage, he is           D
   undoubtedly entitled to an acquittal. This, in my opinion, is the
   effect of the majority view in Parbhoo’s case which directly
   relates to first two stages only. The Supreme Court decisions
   have considered the last two stages so far, but first stage has
   not yet been dealt with directly or separately there in any case
   brought to our notice.”                                                E

32. Provisions of Section 105 of the Evidence Act, which are
applicable in such cases, contain what are really two kinds of
burden of the accused who sets up an exception: “firstly, there is
the onus laid down of proving the existence of circumstances
                                                                          F
bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the
Penal Code, 1860, or, within any special exception or proviso
contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining
the offence,”
and, secondly, there is the burden of introducing or showing              G
evidence which results from the last part of the provision which
says that “the Court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances”. The effect of this obligatory presumption at the
end of Section 105 of the Evidence Act is that the Court must
start by assuming that no facts exist which could be taken into
                                                                          H
1104            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           consideration for considering the plea of self-defence as an
             exception to the criminal liability which would otherwise be there.
             But, when both sides have led evidence of their respective versions,
             the accused can show, from any evidence on the record, whether
             tendered by the prosecution or the defence, that the mandatory
             presumption is removed. The last mentioned burden is not really a
 B
             burden of establishing the plea fully but of either introducing or of
             showing the existence of some evidence to justify the taking up
             of the plea. The burden resulting from the obligatory presumption
             is not difficult to discharge and its removal may not be enough for
             an acquittal.”
 C            11. In Periasami and Another v. State of T.N.; 1996 (6) SCC
       457, accused, two in number, were alleged to have attacked the deceased.
       Though the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused,the High Court
       convicted the two appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34
       IPC and another accused under Section 324 IPC. This Court found that
 D     the injuries were caused by the appellant with lethal weapons. Dealing
       with the contention that offence would not be above 304 Part I, the
       Court noted that though the right of private defence was not set up
       under Section 313 Cr.PC.,absence of such a plea would not stand in the
       way of the defence based on the exception being set up was the contention
       taken by the appellant. The Court noted as follows:
 E
             “17. While dealing with the said alternative contention we have to
             bear in mind Section 105 of the Evidence Act, 1872. A rule of
             burden of proof is prescribed therein that the burden is on the
             accused to prove the existence of circumstances bringing the case
             within any of the exceptions “and the Court shall presume the
 F           absence of such circumstances”. The said rule does not whittle
             down the axiomatic rule of burden (indicated in Section 101) that
             the prosecution must prove that the accused has committed the
             offence charged against. The traditional rule that it is for
             prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt applies
 G           in all criminal cases except where any particular statute prescribes
             otherwise. The legal presumption created in Section 105 with the
             words “the Court shall presume the absence of such
             circumstances” is not intended to displace the aforesaid traditional
             burden of the prosecution. It is only where the prosecution has
             proved its case with reasonable certainty that the court can rest
 H
             PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                  1105
                [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

on the presumption regarding absence of circumstances bringing        A
the case within any of the exceptions. This presumption helps the
court to determine on whom is the burden to prove facts necessary
to attract the exception and an accused can discharge the burden
by “preponderance of probabilities” unlike the prosecution. But
there is no presumption that an accused is the aggressor in every
                                                                      B
case of homicide. If there is any reasonable doubt, even from the
prosecution evidence, that the aggressor in the occurrence was
not the accused but would have been the deceased party, then
benefit of that reasonable doubt has to be extended to the accused,
no matter he did not adduce any evidence in that direction.
18. The above legal position has been succinctly stated by            C
Subbarao, J. (as he then was) in a case where an accused pleaded
the exception under Section 84 IPC (Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai
Thakkar v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1964 SC 1563 : (1964) 2 Cri
LJ 472]):
   “The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove     D
   beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with
   the requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Penal
   Code, 1860. This general burden never shifts and it always
   rests on the prosecution. … If the material placed before the
   court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions,       E
   admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test
   of ‘prudent man’ the accused will have discharged his burden.
   The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the
   burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise
   a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or
   other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself.”         F

20. Keeping the above legal position in mind, we scrutinised the
evidence to ascertain whether the deceased could have been the
aggressor. Neither PW 1 nor PW 2 could say how the occurrence
started. The possibility that before they reached the place, some
events would have already taken place cannot be ruled out. PW 1       G
and PW 2 overheard the squeal of a pig. They also overheard the
sound of a quarrel. When they reached the scene they saw the
carcass of a slain pig lying nearby. The motive suggested by the
prosecution was sufficient for the deceased as well to entertain
animus towards the second appellant. Further, both sides would        H
1106            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           have confronted with each other on that morning abruptly without
             any prior knowledge or inkling that the deceased might go to the
             plantain grove at the crucial time for answering the call of nature.”
                                                           (emphasis supplied)
              12. The Court found that the circumstances were more than
 B     enough to install a reasonable doubt that the accused would have picked
       up a quarrel with the second appellant and other events followed and on
       this basis they were held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to
       murder.
               13. In State of U.P. v. Lakhmi; 1998(4) SCC 336 the case involved
 C     death of the respondent’s wife. Respondent and the deceased had two
       children. The prosecution case was that there wereintermittent skirmishes
       between the couple. The wife accused the appellant of dissipating his
       money on account of having drinks. During the early hours of the fateful
       day, it is further alleged that the respondent inflicted blows on the head
 D     of the deceased, smashed her skull leading to instant death. The trial
       Court convicted the respondent but High Court acquitted him. We may
       notice paragraph 8. It reads as under:
             “8. As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the High Court
             that statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the
 E           Code does not deserve any value or utility if it contains inculpatory
             admissions. The need of law for examining the accused with
             reference to incriminating circumstances appearing against him
             in prosecution evidence is not for observance of a ritual in a trial,
             nor is it a mere formality. It has a salutary purpose. It enables the
             court to be apprised of what the indicted person has to say about
 F           the circumstances pitted against him by the prosecution. Answers
             to the questions may sometimes be flat denial or outright repudiation
             of those circumstances. In certain cases the accused would offer
             some explanations to incriminative circumstances. In very rare
             instances the accused may even admit or own incriminating
 G           circumstances adduced against him, perhaps for the purpose of
             adopting legally recognised defences. In all such cases the court
             gets the advantage of knowing his version about those aspects
             and it helps the court to effectively appreciate and evaluate the
             evidence in the case. If an accused admits any incriminating
             circumstance appearing in evidence against him there is no
 H
                   PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                   1107
                      [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

      warrant that those admissions should altogether be ignored merely      A
      on the ground that such admissions were advanced as a defence
      strategy.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
       14. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that a statement
made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.PC even it contains inculpatory     B
admissions cannot be ignored and the Court may where there is evidence
available proceed to enter a verdict of guilt. In the aforesaid case he
specifically stated that he murdered his wife with a Kunda and not with
Phali. The Court noted further that there was no merit in the defence
sought to be set up under Section 84 of the penal code. However, the         C
Court noted as follows:
      16. …..However, we have noticed that the accused had adopted
      another alternative defence which has been suggested during
      cross-examination of prosecution witnesses i.e. his wife and PW
      2 (Ramey) were together on the bed during the early hours of the       D
      date of occurrence. If that suggestion deserves consideration we
      have to turn to the question whether the benefit of Exception I to
      Section 300 of the IPC should be extended to him?
      17. The law is that burden of proving such an exception is on the
      accused. But the mere fact that the accused adopted another            E
      alternative defence during his examination under Section 313 of
      the IPC without referring to Exception I of Section 300 of IPC is
      not enough to deny him of the benefit of the exception, if the
      Court can cull out materials from evidence pointing to the existence
      of circumstances leading to that exception. It is not the law that
      failure to set up such a defence would foreclose the right to rely     F
      on the exception once and for all. It is axiomatic that burden on
      the accused to prove any fact can be discharged either through
      defence evidence or even through prosecution evidence by
      showing a preponderance of probability.
      18. In the above context, we deem it useful to ascertain what          G
      possibly would have prompted the accused to kill his wife. The
      prosecution case as noted above, is that the accused was not
      well-disposed to his wife as she was always speaking against his
      drinking habits. We are inclined to think that, while considering
      the manner in which he had suddenly pounced upon his young
                                                                             H
1108             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           wife who bore two children to him and smashed her head during
             the early hours, he would have had some other strong cause which
             probably would have taken place within a short time prior to the
             murder. Certain broad features looming large in evidence help us
             in that line of thinking.”
 B            15. The Court went on to hold on analysing the evidence that the
       features show that the appellant had seen something lascivious between
       his wife and PW2. This led the Court to find that the respondent was
       entitled to benefit of Exception I to Section 300 IPC and the respondent
       was convicted under Section 304 Part I of IPC.
 C            16. There can be no quarrel with the principleswhich have been
       laid down. Principles of law however cannot be appreciated or applied
       irrespective of the facts obtaining in a particular case. There can be no
       doubt that the burden to prove that the case is made out in a particular
       case is on the prosecution unless the law declares otherwise. To be
       murder within the meaning of Section 302 undoubtedly, the offence must
 D     be culpable homicide. In order that it is culpable homicide it must fall
       under Section 299 of the IPC but all acts which amount to culpable
       homicide do not constitute murder.
              17. There can be no doubt that the burden of proving that the
       case fall within the four corners of any of the exceptions under Section
 E     300 of the IPC is on the accused. It is equally true that even without
       adducing any defence evidence it may be possible for the accused to
       discharge the said burden with reference to material appearing by virtue
       of the prosecution evidence which includes the cross examination of
       prosecution witnesses. The test is one of preponderance of probability.
 F            18. The fact that a false case is set up by itself may not deprive
       an accused of the right to establish the fact that the case against him
       would still be embraced within any of the exceptions under Section 300
       IPC. The law does not taboo adopting of the alternate pleas. Ultimately,
       the question would fall to be decided, no doubt, on the basis of appreciation
 G     of evidence and the requirements of law flowing from the particular
       provision of law. The accused may also be entitled to the benefit of
       reasonable doubt.
               19. Applying the principles, let us examine the facts of this case.
       It is true, no doubt, evidence was tendered by PW2 and PW3, who it
       may be noted are the brothers of the appellant, that the wife of the
 H
       appellant committed suicide. In the original 313 questioning the appellant
                    PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                   1109
                       [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

also took the stand that it is a case of suicide. After the matter was        A
remanded, in the 313 statement the appellant continued to persevere
with the stand and set up the case that he was beaten up by his mother
following a quarrel between her and his wife and then he fell fast asleep.
When he got up for urination in the early morning he saw the deceased
hanging. He has categorically stated that PW2 and PW3 came, untied
                                                                              B
the shawl used by her for committing suicide. It was accepting the plea
of the appellant that the High Court in the earlier round had found that
he had not been questioned under Section 313 Cr.PC in regard to
circumstances which were addressed by the prosecution as evidence of
his complicity. The case which is sought to be set up before us revolves
around the applicability of exception 4 to Section 300 IPC which involves     C
inter alia a sudden fight following a quarrel. What is conspicuous by its
absence is a plea despite the opportunity he had of indicating about any
such quarrel between him and his wife. The case sought to be set up
was though is that he was heavily drunk: He was at the residence of
PW7: The quarrel ensued between his mother and his wife: She-
                                                                              D
(deceased) came to the residence of PW7: She has escorted him back.
He was beaten by his mother when they reached home following a
quarrel between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law;He fell fast
asleep.
       20. The evidence including the medical evidence is clear and has
been correctly appreciated by two courts. It leads to the only irresistible   E
inference that it was not a case of suicide but an unambiguous case of
homicide. The death was caused by throttling. Appellant and his wife
were occupying a separate bed room. There is reference to the nail
clippings containing blood. The attempt at explaining the same has been
correctly dispelled by the trial court.                                       F
        21. There is a case for the appellant that there were injuries on
the appellant. It is to be noted that when there is throttling unless the
victim is asleep or unconscious there would be resistance. Injuries on
the aggressor are not uncommon. In this case we have also noted the
injuries on other parts of body apart from the neck. They indicate acts of    G
violence by the aggressor. In this case we are not even called upon to
pronounce on whether there is anybody else who would be the aggressor.
It is the appellant and appellant alone who can be attributed with the
acts which resulted in the death of his wife.
     22. Valiant attempt is made by Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned             H
counsel for the appellant to bring the case within the scope of Section
1110             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A     304 Part-I. He emphasised that proceeding that it is culpable homicide
       and that he had the intention also to cause the death of his wife, it could
       still be brought under Section 304 Part-I as the Legislature expressly
       declares that be it a culpable homicide, it is not the inexorable opening of
       the doors to an offence under Section 302 IPC but it could despite the
       intention to cause death being present, be culpable homicide not amounting
 B
       to murder.
              23. In this regard, it must be noticed that the prosecution case
       about there being a quarrel is about the mother of the appellant creating
       a scene on 11.10.1998 compelling the deceased to leave home and search
       her husband out. There is also mention about ill treatment given by the
 C     appellant to his wife in front of his friends and it is thereafter in the night
       the act of the appellant throttling her took place. We are unable to see
       how exception I to Section 300 IPC which is also pressed into service
       by the learned counsel for the appellant apply. Exception I requires
       deprivation of power of control by the accused by virtue of grave and
 D     sudden provocation. The grave and sudden provocation must be given
       by the deceased. No doubt, if death is caused of any other person by
       virtue of the sudden provocation, by mistake or accident, exception I
       may apply. Nothing is brought out before us in the evidence to even
       faintly establish the giving of any provocation leave alone a grave and
       sudden provocation. Equally, there is no such case undoubtedly set up in
 E     the written statement under 313 Cr.PC even after the remand.
              24. The case of exception 4 is no different in our view in its
       inapplicability to the facts. There is no material for us to come to the
       conclusion that there occurred a sudden quarrel leading to a sudden
       fight going by the version furnished by the appellant in his written statement
 F     under 313 Cr.PC which statement also recites that he fell fast asleep.
       Till such time there is no hint even of any sudden fight or sudden quarrel.
       It must also be appreciated that under Section 106 of the Evidence Act
       facts within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant as to what transpired
       within the privacy of their bed room even must be established by the
 G     appellant. The fact that appellant went about setting up of a palpably
       false case even at the late stage of filing the written statement under
       313 after remand trying to attribute death by hanging by his wife falsely.
             25. We may no doubt notice Section 86 of the IPC. Section 86
       reads as follows:
 H
                    PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                     1111
                       [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

      “86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed         A
      by one who is intoxicated.—In cases where an act done is not an
      offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person
      who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be
      dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had
      if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated
                                                                                B
      him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his
      will.”
       26. Section 86 of the IPC enunciates presumption that despite
intoxication which is not covered by the last limb of the provision, the
accused person cannot ward off the consequences of his act. A dimension
however about intoxication may be noted. Section 86 begins by referring         C
to an act which is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge
or intent. Thereafter, the law giver refers to a person committing the act
in a state of intoxication. It finally attributes to himknowledge as he
would have if he were not under the state of intoxication except
undoubtedly, in cases where the intoxicant was administered to him either       D
against his will or without his knowledge. What about an act which
becomes an offence if it is done with a specific intention by a person
who is under the state of intoxication? Section 86 does not attribute
intention as such to an intoxicated man committing an act which amounts
to an offence when the act is done by a person harbouring a particular
intention. This question has engaged the attention of this Court in the         E
decision in Basdev v. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488. In the said case
the appellant, a retired military official went to attend a wedding. The
appellant was very drunk. He asked a young boy to step aside a little so
that he could occupy a convenient seat. The boy did not budge. The
appellant fired from a pistol, he had with him, in the abdomen of the boy       F
which proved fatal. This Court inter alia held as follows:
      “4. It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks
      of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge
      and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be
      felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness              G
      knowledge is to be presumed in the same manner as if there was
      no drunkenness, what about those cases where mens rea is
      required.
      Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so,
      why has the section omitted intent in its latter part? This is not the    H
1112            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           first time that the question comes up for consideration. It has
             been discussed at length in many decisions and the result may be
             briefly summarised as follows:-
             5. So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the
             intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober.
 B           But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must gather it
             from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due
             regard to the degree intoxication. Was the man beside his mind
             altogether for the time being?
             If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention.
 C           But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it
             could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply
             the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences
             of his act or acts.
             6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention
 D           and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to
             form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the
             consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge
             merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and
             intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line
             between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not
 E           difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in
             some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably
             and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”
                                                            (emphasis supplied)

 F             27. In this case there is no evidence about how drunk the appellant
       was or whether the drunkenness in any way stood in the way of the
       appellant forming the requisite intention. There is also gap between the
       time when he was allegedly found drinking and the time of the crime.
       Moreover, in his 313 statement, according to him, he has stated that he
       fell fast asleep and he got up to see his wife hanging. The principle that
 G     would apply therefore is that appellant can be presumed to have intended
       the natural consequences of his act.
             28. As far as the contention that appellant should be handed down
       conviction under Section 304, Part-I, we are not impressed by the said
       argument. As to what constitutes murder under Section 300 of the IPC
 H
                     PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                    1113
                        [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

and what constitutes culpable homicide amounting to murder has been a           A
vexed issue and the subject matter of a large body of case law. Section
300 of the IPC declares that except in those cases which are specifically
excepted culpable homicide is murder in situations which have been
specifically laid down. These are commonly referred to as firstly,
secondly, thirdly and fourthly under Section 300 of the IPC. If the intention
                                                                                B
of the Legislature was that culpable homicide would amount to murder
if it did not fall in any of the five exceptions enumerated in Section 300
of the IPC. What was the need for the Legislature to ‘waste words’ as
it were by declaring that culpable homicide is murder if the act fell within
any of the 4 clauses in Section 300 of the IPC? In order that an act is to
be punished as murder, it must be culpable homicide which is declared to        C
be murder. Murder is homicide of the gravest kind. So is the punishment
appropriately of the highest order. Murder requires establishment of the
special mens rea while all cases of culpable homicide may not amount to
murder. This Court in the judgment in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another 1976(4) SCC 382 inter alia held
                                                                                D
as follows:
      21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court
      is confronted with the question whether the offence is ‘murder’
      or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a
      case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three
      stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be,        E
      whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused
      the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between
      the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage
      for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to
      “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to           F
      this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for
      considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is
      reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine
      whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within
      the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder”
      contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the        G
      negative the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting
      to murder”, punishable under the first or the second part of Section
      304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third
      clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the
                                                                                H
1114             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


 A           positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions
             enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable
             homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first
             part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.
                                                            (emphasis supplied)
 B             29. As far as this case is concerned, there can be no doubt that
       the act which led to the death has been committed by the appellant. We
       can safely proceed on the basis also that it amounts to culpable homicide.
       Going by the circumstances present in this case and in particular injuries
       suffered, it is quite clear that the act would fall within the scope of
 C     Section 300 of the IPC. If the act results in culpable homicide which
       does not amount to murder, then and then alone the question arises of
       applying Section 304 Part-I or Part- II as the case may be. Appellant
       cannot extricate himself from the consequence of his act attracting the
       ingredients of murder by pointing out Section 304 Part I which also
       contains the expression, “the act with the intention to cause death’. The
 D     implications are vastly different. Section 304 of the IPC would apply
       only in a case where culpable homicide is not murder. If the act amounting
       to culpable homicide satisfies any of the four criteria to bring it under the
       offence of murder, being mutually exclusive, there can be no scope for
       applying Section 304 of the IPC. On the other hand, if the act is culpable
       homicide as falling in any of the five exceptional circumstances mentioned
 E     in Section 300 and then it would amount to culpable homicide not
       amounting to murder. In cases where the accused is able to establish he
       is entitled to the benefit of any of the exceptions under Section 300 then
       his case may be considered under Part-I or Part-II of Section 304 of the
       IPC depending on whether the act which caused the culpable homicide
 F     was done with the intention of causing death or with knowledge that it is
       likely to cause death. That apart cases of culpable homicide which do
       not attract any of the four situations under Section 300 would still be
       culpable homicide to be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC.
       However, if the case falls under any of the four limbs of Section 300,
       there would be no occasion to allow Section 304 to have play. If the act
 G     which caused the death and which is culpable homicide is done with the
       intention of causing death, then it would be murder. This is however
       subject to the act not being committed in circumstances attracting any
       of the 5 exceptions. Appellant’s contention that it would be culpable
       homicide not amounting to murder and reliance placed on the words
       ‘done with the intention of causing death’ in Section 304 Part-I is wholly
 H     meritless.
                      PAUL v. STATE OF KERALA                                  1115
                         [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

       30. The act of the appellant in the facts of this case clearly show     A
that he has throttled his wife. None of the exceptions in Section 300 are
attracted. The act amounts to murder within the meaning of Section 300
of the IPC. The upshot of the above discussion is, we see no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal stands dismissed.
                                                                               B
Kalpana K. Tripathy                                        Appeal dismissed.




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