PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY (DIED) BY L.RS. & ORS.versusTHE SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LA)

                  [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286

           Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors.
                               v.
                The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
            [Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018]
                                  08 April 2024
              [Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal,* JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the
       delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal against the
       judgment of the reference court under the Land Acquisition Act,
       1894, by some of the Legal Representatives of a deceased Claimant
       who died pending the reference and who were not impleaded in
       the reference proceeding.

                                   Headnotes
       Limitation – Object of the law of limitation – Explained
       Held: The law of limitation is based on public policy and is enshrined
       in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, meaning
       there might be an end to a litigation – Statutes of limitation and
       prescription are statutes of peace and repose – When a right is
       not exercised or a remedy is not availed for a long time, it must
       cease to exist and law of limitation is a way to achieve it – Law of
       limitation bars time barred remedy rather than right with passage
       of time. [Paras 7 & 8]
       Limitation Act – The interplay between sections 3 and 5 –
       Section 5 needs “sufficient cause” to be proved as a condition
       precedent to condone delay
       Held: Section 3 being a substantive provision of mandatory nature
       needs to be interpreted strictly – Section 5 being a discretionary
       provision has to be interpreted liberally because it helps the
       Courts to do substantial justice – Based on the object of the
       law of limitation, viz., public policy, both these sections have to
       be construed harmoniously – The existence of ‘sufficient cause’
       for condoning delay in filing the suit, appeal or application is a
       condition precedent to exercise the discretionary power of Courts
       to condone the delay. [Paras 14-16]


* Author
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       Limitation Act – Section 5 – Discretionary power – Explained
       Held: Where a case is brought before the court beyond the period
       of limitation, the applicant has to explain to the court as to what
       was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough
       reason which prevented him to approach the court within the
       period of limitation – Even after ‘sufficient cause’ is established,
       the Court has the discretion to decide whether to allow or dismiss
       the application for condonation of delay upon the bonafides of the
       party – The discretion will not be exercised by the Court when the
       delay is caused by negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides – In
       such cases, even though the law of limitation harshly affects or
       causes inconvenience to the party, the Court has to apply it with
       all its rigour. [Paras 18, 23 to 25]
       Limitation Act – Section 5 – Non applicability of equity
       considerations
       Held: Equity has no place in condoning the delay under Section
       5 of the Limitation Act – When a party does not adhere to the
       mandatory provisions of limitation, Courts cannot condone the
       delay on grounds of sympathy or compassion as it will be unjust
       to a person who files a case for remedies diligently and within
       time. [Paras 19 and 20]
       Limitation Act – Section 5 – Whether liberal interpretation
       of ‘Sufficient cause’ overrides substantial law of limitation?
       Held: Concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
       approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to override
       the substantial law of limitation – The Courts have to exercise
       the discretion systematically and in an informed manner to allow
       application for condonation of delay. [Para 21]
       Limitation Act – Section 5 – Relevance of merits of the case
       at hand
       Held: The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with
       the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals. [Para 22]
       Limitation Act – Principles regarding relevance of law of
       limitation, scope of section 3, power of court to condone
       delay under section 5 – Summarised
       Held: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
       should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
       rather than the right itself;
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                              243

            Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                  The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

     (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
     of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a
     fixed period of time;
     (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
     differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
     whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
     (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
     justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be
     kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial
     law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
     (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
     delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of
     power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
     sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where
     there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
     (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
     not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the
     court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing
     the appeal;
     (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
     condoning the delay; and
     (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
     parameters laid down for condoning the delay for the reason that
     the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding
     the statutory provision. [Para 26]

                              Case Law Cited
           Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.
           [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 – relied on.
           Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. v. Munshi (Dead)
           by LRs. and Ors. [2007] 1 SCR 1114 : (2007) 11 SCC
           285; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors.
           v. Katiji and Ors. [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC
           107; Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields
           Ltd. [1962] 2 SCR 762 : A.I.R. 1962 SC 361; Maqbul
           Ahmad and Ors. v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
           Ors. A.I.R. 1935 PC 85; Brijesh Kumar and Ors. v.
           State of Haryana and Ors. 2014 (4) SCALE 50; Lanka
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            Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [2011]
            3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363; State of Jharkhand &
            Ors. v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC
            1927 – referred to
            Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives &
            Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 127;
            Imrat Lal & Ors. v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.
            (2014) 14 SCC 133 – distinguished.

                                 List of Acts
       Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Limitation Act, 1963

                              List of Keywords
       Law of Limitation; Condonation of delay; Sufficient cause; Liberal
       construction; Substantial justice.

                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil)
       No. 31248 of 2018
       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2017 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State
       of Andhra Pradesh in LAASM No. 714 of 2016
                           Appearances for Parties
       Mrs. Madurima Tatia, V. Sridhar Reddy, Abhijit Sengupta, Rohit
       Jaiswal, Advs. for the Petitioners.
       Santosh Krishnan, Girish Chowdhary, Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal,
       Advs. for the Respondent.
                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment
       Pankaj Mithal, J.
1.     Some land in village Gandluru, District Guntur, Andhra Pradesh
       was acquired some time in 1989 for Telugu Ganga Project. Not
       satisfied by the compensation offered under the award, the
       claimants (16 in number) preferred a reference under Section
       18 of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter for short the ‘Act’) i.e.,
       L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990 titled Juvvala Gunta China Chinnaiah
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                       245

            Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                  The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

     (dead) and Ors. vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)
     Telugu Ganga Project, Podalakur at Nellore. Out of the 16 claimants
     in the above reference, claimants No. 1, 3 and 11 died during
     the pendency of the reference before the Court of Addl. Senior
     Civil Judge, Gudur. No steps were taken to substitute the heirs
     and legal representatives of the above deceased persons. The
     said reference was dismissed on merits along with some other
     references vide common judgment and order dated 24.09.1999
     upholding the award of the collector.
2.   After the lapse of more than 5/6 years, an appeal was proposed to
     be filed in the High Court Under Section 54 of the Act challenging
     the dismissal of the reference. The said appeal was proposed to
     be filed only by some of the heirs and legal representatives of the
     deceased claimant No. 11 in the reference i.e., Pathapati Subba
     Reddy. No other claimant or their legal heirs from amongst the other
     15 who were parties in the reference joined the heirs and legal
     representatives of claimant No. 11 in filing the appeal. They did not
     even prefer any separate or independent appeal of their own. In
     other words, out of the 16 claimants, 15 of them impliedly accepted
     the judgment and order of the reference court and it is only the heirs
     and legal representatives of claimant No. 11, who feel aggrieved and
     have proposed to file the appeal.
3.   The above appeal, as stated earlier, was preferred with the delay of
     5659 days. Accordingly, an application supported by an affidavit of
     the surviving daughter of the deceased claimant No. 11 was filed for
     condoning the delay in filing the proposed appeal. It was averred in
     the said application that the proposed appellants are the heirs and
     legal representatives of the deceased claimant No. 11 i.e. Pathapati
     Subba Reddy, who died on 15.05.1995 during the pendency of the
     reference but they were not brought on record before the decision
     of the reference. The said deceased claimant No.11 was survived
     by his two daughters. The elder one died and that the proposed
     appellants are the surviving second daughter and her descendants.
     Since she was living in her matrimonial house, she had no knowledge
     of the above reference. It was only on 28.05.2015 when one of the
     grandsons of the said daughter of the deceased claimant visited
     the office of the L.A.O. for the purpose of obtaining submersion
     certificate to secure a job that he came to know that there was
     a reference which was dismissed on 24.09.1999, whereupon the
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       proposed appeal was immediately filed along with an application to
       condone the delay in its filing.
4.     There is no dispute to the fact that in L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990 there
       were 16 claimants in all. During the pendency of the aforesaid
       reference, claimants No. 1, 3 and 11 were dead but the heirs and
       legal representatives of none of them were brought on record. None
       of the other claimants or their heirs and legal representatives made
       any effort to challenge the order of the dismissal of the reference
       except the proposed appellants which indicates that the others have
       accepted the same. It is only one of the surviving daughters of the
       deceased claimant No. 11 and her descendants who have sought
       to prefer the proposed appeal against the judgment and order dated
       24.09.1999 with an inordinate delay of 5659 days. The High Court
       not being satisfied by the explanation furnished in preferring the
       proposed appeal beyond limitation, refused to condone the delay in
       filing the proposed appeal and consequently dismissed it as barred
       by time by the order impugned dated 18.01.2017.
5.     The present Special Leave Petition has been filed challenging the
       judgment and order dated 18.01.2017 of the High Court passed
       in L.A.A.S.M.P. No. 714 of 2016 in L.A.A.S. (SR) No. 6950 of
       2015 whereby the High Court has dismissed the application of the
       petitioners herein for condoning the delay of 5659 days in filing the
       proposed appeal.
6.     The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances
       of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the
       delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by
       limitation.
7.     The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in
       the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the
       general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The
       object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed
       period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or
       dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there
       should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy
       if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e.
       human beings, who are mortals.
8.     The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and
       prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          247

            Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                  The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

     right not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases
     to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring
     the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.
9.   Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that
     no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the
     period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though
     limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions
     contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is
    reproduced hereinbelow:
           “3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions
           contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
           instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the
           prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation
           has not been set up as a defence.”
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and
    application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we
    would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context
    with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay
    in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after
    the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the
    word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is
    mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory
    and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding
    limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings.
    In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an
    appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law
    of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24
    (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the
    exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit
    an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided
    the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the
    appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are
    conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after
    the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant
    is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The
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       said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred
       after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be
       exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other
       factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not
    adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications
    for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a
    pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section
    5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other
    hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of
    mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal
    alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1,
    it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may
    require different construction, as for example, the court exercises
    its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing
    the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same
    may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It,
    therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in
    construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section
    3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is
    based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and
    the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act
    that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and
    Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing
    the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
    in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial
    justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
    ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors.
    vs. Katiji and Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in
    condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant
    does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary



1   [2007] 1 SCR 1114 : (2007) 11 SCC 285
2   [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                            249

               Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                     The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

     to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes
     refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious
     matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial
     justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and
     if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding
     the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the
     delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is
     a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone
     the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’
     and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
     employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters
     or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by
     taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’
    in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry
    of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive
    right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not
    to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
    binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption
    creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And
    Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after
    sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal
    within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay
    as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with
    the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for
    various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon
    the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
    Ors.4, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from
    limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship.
    The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory
    provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily
    and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on
    sympathetic grounds alone.


3   [1962] 2 SCR 762 : A.I.R. 1962 SC 361
4   A.I.R. 1935 PC 85
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20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and
    Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as
    above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained
    a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of
    action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same
    by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground
    of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6,
    where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay
    of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay,
    this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion
    in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have
    exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner.
    The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay
    should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The
    Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
    oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
    jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok
    Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the case cannot be
    considered while dealing with the application for condonation of
    delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8,
    this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to
    be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances
    of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in
    Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
    negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
    observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of
    the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
    under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the
    law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
    equitable grounds.


5   2014 (4) SCALE 50
6   [2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363
7   AIR 2009 SC 1927
8   [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           251

            Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                  The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision
    which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be
    maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing
    the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
           “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
           may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
           applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
           The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation
           on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
           provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
           that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
           resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
           cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
           the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect
           to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
           means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted
           in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
           “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
           while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
    paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
           “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
           that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
           limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to
           what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
           and enough reason which prevented him to approach
           the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
           negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts
           and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
           diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
           ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
           in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
           condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
           within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
           the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
           cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
           condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
           condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
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              violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
              showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
    aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
       (i)    Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should
              be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather
              than the right itself;
       (ii)   A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
              of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after
              a fixed period of time;
       (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
             differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
             sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
       (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
            justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may
            be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the
            substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the
            Limitation Act;
       (v)    Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
              delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise
              of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
              even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such
              as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of
              due diligence;
       (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
            not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if
            the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
            filing the appeal;
       (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning
             the delay; and
       (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
              parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
              the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
              tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        253

              Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
                    The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

27. It is in the light of the above legal position that now we have to test
    whether the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal ought to
    be condoned or not in this case.
28. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that in
    somewhat similar situation, delay in filing appeal for the enhancement
    of compensation had been condoned by this Court. He placed
    reliance upon the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal
    Representatives & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.9. In this case,
    delay in filing appeal was condoned as in other appeals compensation
    awarded at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. was upheld and the
    proposed appellants were also held entitled to the same benefit of
    compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. instead of Rs.101/-
    per sq. yd. as awarded but with the rider that they will not be entitled
    for interest for the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is the case of Imrat
    Lal & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.10. In this case
    also the matter was regarding determination of compensation for
    the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the
    appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no
    sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay,
    this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number
    of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.
30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of
    conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been
    shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to
    be condoned merely because some persons have been granted
    relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such
    circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express
    provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason
    that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay
    without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay
    is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions
    have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in
    the case of Basawaraj (supra).



9    (2014) 14 SCC 127
10   (2014) 14 SCC 133
254                                                         [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


31. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted on the basis of
    additional documents that in connection with the land acquisition in
    some other Special Leave Petitions, delay was condoned taking a
    lenient view and the compensation was enhanced with the rider that
    the claimants shall not be entitled for statutory benefits for the period
    of delay in approaching this Court or the High Court. The said orders
    do not clearly spell out the facts and the reasons explaining the delay
    in filing the appeal(s) but the fact remains that the delay was condoned
    by taking too liberal an approach and putting conditions which have
    not been approved of by this Court itself. In the absence of the facts
    for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases, vis-à-vis, the
    facts of this case, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of
    getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, we are
    unable to exercise our discretionary power of condoning the delay
    in filing the appeal on parity with the above order(s).
32. Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit
    to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There
    is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by
    the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were
    negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed
    appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision
    of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not
    been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision,
    they could have applied for procedural review which they never did.
    Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing
    the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in
    refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
33. In the above situation, we do not deem it proper and necessary to
    interfere with the decision of the High Court refusing to condone the
    inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal.
34. The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.

       Headnotes prepared by:                             Result of the case:
       Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor                Special Leave
       (Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)                Petition dismissed.