Holding

A conviction under Section 376(1) IPC is upheld on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt, while a conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is set aside for lack of specific evidence that the offence was committed on the ground of the victim's caste.

Summary

The appellant, a known acquaintance of the victim's family, entered the home of a blind Scheduled Caste woman and raped her, after which he was apprehended at the scene. The trial courts convicted him under Section 376(1) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, imposing life imprisonment for each offence. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the evidence proved the rape beyond reasonable doubt, but found no separate proof that the offence was committed "on the ground" of the victim's caste as required by the pre‑amendment provision of Section 3(2)(v). The Court therefore upheld the conviction and life sentence under the IPC while setting aside the conviction and sentence under the SC/ST Act. It also emphasized the equal weight of testimony from a disabled prosecutrix and discussed the need for an intersectional approach in sentencing. The appeal was allowed in part, confirming the life sentence for rape and overturning the SC/ST conviction.

Issues considered

The prosecution must prove that the rape was committed "on the ground" that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act as it stood in 2011.
Whether the conviction under Section 376(1) IPC is sustainable and the appropriate sentence of life imprisonment is justified.
Whether the testimony of a blind prosecutrix should be given the same evidentiary weight as that of an able‑bodied witness.
Interpretation of the phrase "on the ground" in Section 3(2)(v) and its compatibility with an intersectional analysis of oppression.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154(1) proviso, s. 164(5A), s. 54A
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013s. 376(1) amendment
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018s. 376(1) amendment
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376(1)
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(2)(v)
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015s. 3(2)(v) amendment, s. 8(c) amendment

Subjects

rapeScheduled CastedisabilityintersectionalitySC/ST Actlife imprisonmenttestimony of disabled witnesssentencingcausation requirementknowledge requirement

Judgment

470 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 3 S.C.R. 470 [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A PATAN JAMAL VALI
v.
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No 452 of 2021)
B APRIL 27, 2021
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
M R SHAH, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
C s. 376 – Offence of rape – Prosecution case that appellant
committed rape of a blind Scheduled Caste woman in her own house
– Appellant known to the victim and her family – Mother and her
sons found the victim in nude condition, bleeding from her genitals
– Appellant apprehended when trying to escape – Conviction of
the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST
D
Act and s. 376(1) by courts below – Imposition of life imprisonment
for each of the offences, which were to run concurrently – On appeal,
held: Nature and circumstances in which the offence has been
committed shows that the appellant took advantage of the victim
being blind – Testimonies of the victim and her mother clear and
E consistent, and corroborated by the evidence of brother, aunt of
the victim and the neighbor – Medical evidence and the deposition
of doctor clearly established that the victim was sexually assaulted
– Appellant was apprehended at the spot in close proximity of the
commission of the offence – Thus, the commission of offence
u/s.376(1) by the appellant proved beyond reasonable doubt – No
F
evidence led to prove that the offence was committed on the ground
that she belongs to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of s.3(2)(v)
of the SC and ST Act– However, the fact that the victim belonged to
a Scheduled Caste is an important factor to the sentencing process
for an offence u/s.376 – Appellant was a mature individual known
G to victim’s family and committed heinous offence on a Scheduled
Caste woman – Thus, the conviction of the appellant for an offence
punishable u/s. 376(1) and the sentence of life imprisonment upheld
– However, conviction for an offence u/s.3(2)(v) and the sentence
imposed is set aside– Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 – s.3(2)(v).
H
470
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 471

s. 376(1) – Punishment under – Amendments to s. 376(1) – A
Parliament sought to take a tougher stand on crime against women
and limited the discretion of the judiciary regarding imposition of
sentences for offences involving rape – By Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 2013, minimum punishment of seven years and a maximum
punishment of life imprisonment provided, without any exceptions
B
for reduction of sentence – Thereafter, by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 2018, further amendment to s. 376, by which the
minimum punishment enhanced to ten years, with the maximum
punishment remaining the same.
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act 1989: C

s.3(2)(v)(as it stood then) – Interpretation of – Held:
Interpretation of s. 3(2)(v) to mean that the offence should have
been committed “only on the ground that the victim was a member
of the Scheduled Caste”, is debatable –Statute uses the words “on
the ground’ but the juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does D
not invariably mean that the offence ought to have been committed
only on that ground – Reading the expression “only” would be to
add a restriction which is not found in the statute, it would dilute
the statute–To deny the protection of s.3(2)(v) on the premise that
the crime was not committed against an SC & ST person solely on E
the ground of their caste identity is to deny how social inequalities
function in a cumulative fashion –It is to grant impunity to
perpetrators–It cannot be said that there is no requirement to
establish a causal link between the harm suffered and the ground,
but it is to recognize that how a person was treated or impacted was
a result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities – True reading F
of s.3(2)(v) would entail that conviction can be sustained as long
as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the
offence.
s. 3(2)(v) – Prosecution case that appellant committed rape
of a blind schedule caste girl – Incident occurred in 2011 – G
Conviction of the appellant for offence punishable u/s. 3(2)(v) and
s. 376(1) IPC by courts below – On appeal, held: Both the Sessions
Judge as well as the High Court failed to notice the crucial ingredient
of s. 3(2)(v)(as it stood then) – No separate evidence led by the
prosecution to show that the accused committed the offence on the H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A basis of the caste identity of the victim – Prosecution’s case would
not fail merely because the mother of the victim did not mention in
her statement to the police that the offence was committed against
her daughter because she was a Scheduled Caste woman – However,
while it would be reasonable to presume that the accused knew the
caste of victim since village communities are tightly knit and the
B
accused was also an acquaintance of victim’s family, the knowledge
by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of offence,
having regard to the language of s.3(2)(v) as it stood at the time
when the offence was committed – Due to the intersectional nature
of oppression the victim faces, it becomes difficult to establish what
C led to the commission of offence, whether it was her caste, gender
or disability – Furthermore, evidence does not establish that the
offence was committed on the ground that such person is SC or ST
–Thus, conviction u/s.3(2)(v) is set aside.
s. 3(2)(v)– Amendment of, by the Scheduled Castes and the
D Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 –
Effect of – Held: Words “on the ground of” u/s.3(2)(v) substituted
with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe”–s. 8 which deals with presumptions as to
offences was also amended to include clause (c) to provide that if
the accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the court
E shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal
identity of the victim unless proved otherwise– Current regime under
the Act, post the amendment, facilitates an intersectional analysis
under the Act by replacing the causation requirement u/s.3(2)(v)
with a knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the
F kind of evidence that is likely to be generated in such cases.
Evidence:Testimony of disabled prosecutrix – Devaluation of
– Held: Testimony of the disabled prosecutrix/witnesses is devalued
by not recording their testimony at all, or recording it without
adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering it
G ineffectual, dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility or
for not being supported by the condition of her body – This
perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against persons
with disabilities which is an affront to their dignity and a negation
of the principle of equality – Presumptions to construe disability as
an incapacity to participate in the legal process reflect not only an
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PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 473

inadequate understanding of how disability operates but may also A
result in a miscarriage of justice – Testimony of a disabled cannot
be considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual
interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-a-vis their able-
bodied counterparts – If the testimony of such a witness inspires
judicial confidence, it is entitled to full legal weight – On facts,
B
victim’s blindness meant that she had no visual contact with the
world – Her primary mode of identifying those around her, thus, is
by the sound of their voice, so the victim’s testimony is entitled to
equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would have been able to
visually identify the accused.
Sentence/sentencing: C

Quantum of sentence for offence u/s.376 IPC – Determination
of – Facts and circumstances to be considered – Held: Nature and
gravity of the crime, circumstances surrounding the commission of
the sexual assault, position of the prosecutrix, role of the accused
in relation to the person violated, and possibility of rehabilitation D
of the offender to be considered – Intersectional identity and the
underlying societal factors within which the offence was committed,
also to be considered.
Offence of rape – Woman belonging to SC/ST – Sentencing
policy – Relevant considerations – Held: It is difficult and, artificial E
to delineate the many different identities of an individual which
overlap to place them in a disadvantaged position of power and
create the circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur–
Socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused
or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy, F
however, it is necessary to understand the context in which such
finding was made – Holistic view is to be taken of the various
intersectional identities which form a vital part of the facts and
circumstances of the act and speak to the nature of the crime.
Crime against women: G
Intersectionality–Intersectional nature of violence – Analysis
of – Held: Intersectionality can be defined as an “oppression that
arises out of the combination of various oppressions which, together,
produce something unique and distinct from any one form of
discrimination standing alone – When the identity of a woman
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474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A intersects with, inter alia, her caste, class, religion, disability and
sexual orientation, she may face violence and discrimination due
to two or more grounds – Intersectional lens is to be used to evaluate
how multiple sources of oppression operate cumulatively to produce
a specific experience of subordination for a blind Scheduled Caste
woman – Ananalysis of intersectionality does not mean that caste,
B
religion, class, disability and sexual orientation is seen as mere “add
ons” to the oppression that women may face–Intersectional analysis
requires an exposition of reality that corresponds more accurately
with how social inequalities are experienced – In India, the
fundamental guarantees under the Constitution provide for such a
C holistic analysis of discrimination faced by individuals –
Intersectionality has also emerged as a potent tool to understand
gender-based violence – Failureto consider violence perpetrated
based on multiple identities results in an inaccurate portrayal of
the violence at issue which may impact the ability to obtain relief –
Onthe other hand, a comprehensive appraisal of the intersectional
D
nature of the violence can translate into an appropriate legal
response – There is a need for the Court to address the same.
Disability and Gender–Societal Oppression – Women with
disabilities more susceptible to being at the receiving end of sexual
violence –They are often perceived as “soft targets” and “easy
E victims” for the commission of sexual violence –There is unique
vulnerability of women and girls with disabilities – Attention must
be exhibited to this salient fact – Court to exhibit sensitivity to the
heightened risk of violence and abuse that she was rendered
susceptible to, by reason of her disability.
F Sexual offences against women with disabilities – Reporting
of cases of sexual violence and to obtain suitable redress –
Suggestionof amendments to Penal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure by Justice J.S. Verma Committee–Issuance of guidelines
by this Court to make the criminal system more disabled-friendly
G Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The commission of offence under Section 376(1)
IPC by the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of PW1,the mother of PW2-victim and of PW 2,
who was sexually assaulted, are clear and consistent. The oral
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PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 475

account has been corroborated by the evidence of PW3-brother, A
PW4-cousin of PW-1 and PW5-neighbour. The medical evidence,
more particularly, the deposition of PW10-doctor clearly
establishes that PW2 was sexually assaulted. The appellant was
apprehended at the spot in close proximity of the commission of
the offence. The conviction of the appellant for an offence
B
punishable under Section 376(1) IPC and the sentence of
imprisonment for life is upheld. The fine of Rs 1,000/- and default
imprisonment of six months imposed by the Sessions Judge and
upheld by the High Court is also confirmed.The conviction of the
appellant for an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act C
1989 and the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is set
aside. [Para 11, 73][492-E-G; 523-C-D]
2.1 There have been instances where the testimony of a
disabled prosecutrix has not been considered seriously and treated
at an equal footing as that of their able-bodied counterparts. D
Presumptions of such nature which construe disability as an
incapacity to participate in the legal process reflect not only an
inadequate understanding of how disability operates but may also
result in a miscarriage of justice through a devaluation of crucial
testimonies given by persons with disabilities. The legal
personhood of persons with disabilities cannot be premised on E
societal stereotypes of their supposed “inferiority”, which is an
affront to their dignity and a negation of the principle of equality.
The testimony of the disabled witnesses is devalued by not
recording the testimony of the prosecutrix at all; or recording it
without adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering F
it ineffectual; dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility
or for not being supported by the condition of her body. [Para 43,
44][506-E-F, G-H; 507-A-C]
2.2 This kind of a judicial attitude stems from and
perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against persons G
with disabilities. The testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability,
or of a disabled witness for that matter, cannot be considered
weak or inferior, only because such an individual interacts with
the world in a different manner, vis-a-vis their able-bodied
counterparts. As long as the testimony of such a witness otherwise
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476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A meets the criteria for inspiring judicial confidence, it is entitled
to full legal weight. It goes without saying that the court
appreciating such testimony needs to be attentive to the fact that
the witness’ disability can have the consequence of the testimony
being rendered in a different form, relative to that of an able-
bodied witness. In the case at hand, for instance, PW2’s blindness
B
meant that she had no visual contact with the world. Her primary
mode of identifying those around her, therefore, is by the sound
of their voice. And so PW2’s testimony is entitled to equal weight
as that of a prosecutrix who would have been able to visually
identify the appellant. [Para 45][507-C-E]
C Mange v. State of Haryana (1979) 4 SCC 349 –
referred to.
Mandal, Disabled Women Testimony in Rape Trials,
n.23, p. 6. - referred to

D 3. The social and economic context in which sexual violence
against women from SC & ST communities occurs is highlighted.
This contextualized legal analysis has to be adopted by the Court
which is sensitive to the nature of evidence that is likely to be
produced in a case where various marginalities intersect. A distinct
individualized experience for PW2 is created on account of her
E gender, caste and disability due to her association with wider
groups that face a societal disadvantage. [Para 48][510-B-C]
SHREYA ATREY, INTERSECTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION, OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS) 2019, P. 69.; Combahee River Collective, the
F Combahee River Collective Statement, in HOME
GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY,
Barbara Smith ed., (New York: Kitchen Table/Women
of Color Press, 1983; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press 2000) 267. A. Dey. ‘Others’
G within the ‘Others’: An Intersectional Analysis of
Gender Violence in India, Gender Issues 36, 357-373
(2019).; V. Geetha, UNDOING IMPUNITY: SPEECH
AFTER SEXUAL VIOLENCE, (Zubaan, 2016),
Chapter 11. - referred to.

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PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 477

4.1 This Court has interpreted s.3(2)(v) to mean that the A
offence should have been committed “only on the ground that
the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste,” the correctness
of which is debatable. The statutory provision does not utilize
the expression “only on the ground”. Reading the expression
“only” would be to add a restriction which is not found in the
B
statute. The statute undoubtedly uses the words “on the ground’
but the juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does not invariably
mean that the offence ought to have been committed only on that
ground. To read the provision in that manner will dilute a statutory
provision which is meant to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes against acts of violence which pose a threat to C
their dignity. An intersectional lens enables to view oppression
as a sum of disadvantage resulting from multiple marginalized
identities. To deny the protection of s.3(2)(v) on the premise that
the crime was not committed against an SC & ST person solely
on the ground of their caste identity is to deny how social
D
inequalities function in a cumulative fashion. It is to render the
experiences of the most marginalized invisible. It is to grant
impunity to perpetrators who on account of their privileged social
status feel entitled to commit atrocities against socially and
economically vulnerable communities. This is not to say that there
is no requirement to establish a causal link between the harm E
suffered and the ground, but it is to recognize that how a person
was treated or impacted was a result of interaction of multiple
grounds or identities. A true reading of s.3(2)(v) would entail that
conviction under this provision can be sustained as long as caste
identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence.
F
[Para 55][513-B-G]
4.2 A close look at the evidence would demonstrate that
the prosecution has not led evidence to prove the ingredients of
section 3(2)(v). Unfortunately, there has been a serious gap in
the evidence on that count. The Sessions Judge noticed the
deposition of PW11. However, the Sessions Judge noted that G
Exhibit P-1 disclosed that PW 2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste.
The Sessions Judge also observed that PW1, who is the mother
of PW2 is an “illiterate village rustic woman” and merely because
she did not mention in the report or statement to the police that
the accused committed the offence on the ground that PW2 H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A belonged to the Scheduled Caste is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC &ST Act. The
Sessions Judge has also made observations in the judgment where
he stated that the accused would not have dared to commit the
crime if PW2 belonged to an upper caste community particularly
in a village atmosphere. In appeal, the submission that the
B
ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) were not
established was specifically urged before the High Court. The
submission was dismissed with the observation that “even
otherwise still the offence under Section 376(1) IPC is made out”.
Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have failed to
C notice the crucial ingredient of Section 3(2)(v) (as it stood at the
material time prior to its substitution by Act 1 of 2016). [Para 56,
57][514-A-B, D-G]
4.3 The issue as to whether the offence was committed
against a person on the ground that such person is a member of
D a SC or ST or such property belongs to such member is to be
established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence at
the trial. The Sessions Judge rightly held that the prosecution’s
case would not fail merely because PW1 did not mention in her
statement to the police that the offence was committed against
her daughter because she was a SC woman. However, there is
E no separate evidence led by the prosecution to show that the
accused committed the offence on the basis of the caste identity
of PW2. While it would be reasonable to presume that the accused
knew the caste of PW2 since village communities are tightly knit
and the accused was also an acquaintance of PW2’s family, the
F knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the
commission of offence, having regard to the language of Section
3(2)(v) as it stood at the time when the offence in the instant case
was committed. Due to the intersectional nature of oppression
PW2 faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the
commission of offence-whether it was her caste, gender or
G disability. This highlights the limitation of a provision where
causation of a wrongful act arises from a single ground or what is
referred to as the single axis model. [Para 58][515-A-D]

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PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 479

4.4 Section 3(2)(v) was amended by the Scheduled Castes A
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment
Act, 2015, which came into effect on 26 January 2016. The words
“on the ground of” under Section 3(2) (v) have been substituted
with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe”. This has decreased the threshold of proving
B
that a crime was committed on the basis of the caste identity to a
threshold where mere knowledge is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Section 8 which deals with presumptions as to offences
was also amended to include clause (c) to provide that if the
accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the court
shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal C
identity of the victim unless proved otherwise. [Para 59][515-E-
G; 516-A]
4.5 The Parliament Standing Committee Report on
Atrocities Against Women and Children has observed that, “high
acquittal rate motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant D
and powerful communities for continued perpetration” and
recommends inclusion of provisions of SC &ST Act while
registering cases of gendered violence against women from SC
& ST communities. However, one of the ways in which offences
against SC & ST women fall through the cracks is due to the
evidentiary burden that becomes almost impossible to meet in E
cases of intersectional oppression. This is especially the case
when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground”
under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. The current
regime under the SC &ST Act, post the amendment, has facilitated
the conduct of an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing F
the causation requirement under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act with a
knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind
of evidence that is likely to be generated in cases such as these.
[Para 60][516-E-G]
4.6 Since Section 3(2) (v) was amended and Clause (c) of G
Section 8 was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 with effect from 26 January
2016 these amendments would not be applicable to the case at
hand. The offence in the instant case took place before the
amendment, on 31 March 2011. Thus, the evidence in the instant
case does not establish that the offence was committed on the
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480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST. The conviction
under Section 3(2)(v)is set aside. [Para 61][517-A-B]
Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 3
SCC 771 : [2006] 2 SCR 793; Ramdas and Others v.
State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 170; Ashrafi v.
B State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 1 SCC 742 : [2017] 12
SCR 128; Khuman Singh v. State of MP Criminal Appeal
1283 of 2019 decided on 27 August 2019– referred
to.
Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Women and the White
C Lies of the Feminist Movement: Implications for
Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse, 1 Australian
Feminist Law Journal 1, (1993), p. 35 – referred to.
Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities
Against Women and Children, 15 March 2021, 107
D available at https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/
Committee_site/Committee_File/ReportFile/15/143/
230_2021_3_14.pdf. – referred to.
5.1 The Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the
appellant was guilty of an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC
E and ST Act and, independent of that, also of an offence punishable
under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code. In considering the
sentence to be imposed in respect of the two distinct offences,
the Sessions Judge held that a sentence of imprisonment for life
should be imposed for the offence under Section 376(1); and a
sentence of imprisonment for life would have to be imposed for
F the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act. [Para
65][518-D-F]
5.2 On a plain reading of Section 376(1), as it stood after its
insertion with effect from 25 December 1983 by Act 43 of 1983,
it is evident that a sentence of imprisonment for life is one of the
G sentences contemplated by the provision. The Criminal Law
Amendment Act 1983 was introduced with the aim of bringing
widespread amendments to the laws of rape in the country, making
it difficult for the offenders to escape conviction. Pursuant to the
said objective, Section 376(1) provided that except for cases
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PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 481

covered by sub-Section (2), a person committing rape shall be A
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than seven years. However, the proviso
stipulated that the court may for ‘adequate and special reasons’
to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. The minimum
B
sentence of seven years could, in other words, be reduced to a
lesser term only for adequate and special reasons to be recorded
in the judgment. This Court has time and again noted that
adequate and special reasons depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. These special and adequate reasons
are an exception to the rule and must be used sparingly and C
interpreted strictly. Section 376(1) however also stipulated that
the term of imprisonment “may be for life or for a term of ten
years”. [Para 67][518-G-H; 519-A-F]
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bala (2005) 8 SCC 1 :
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 859 – referred to. D
5.3 Subsequently, in 2013, post the Nirbhaya case, the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 was brought into force which
amended Section 376(1). The Parliament sought to take a tougher
stand on crime against women and limited the discretion of the
judiciary regarding imposition of sentences for offences involving E
rape by providing a minimum punishment of seven years and a
maximum punishment of life imprisonment, without any
exceptions for reduction of sentence. In 2018, Section 376 has
been further amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2018
(Act 22 of 2018) by which the minimum punishment has been
enhanced to ten years, with the maximum punishment remaining F
the same. [Para 68][519-F-H; 520-A]
5.4 Having detailed the amendments in Section 376 by the
Parliament, the law as it was at the time of occurrence of the
crime is to be applied. The range of punishment within which the
judicial discretion is to be exercised is the imposition of a minimum G
punishment of 7 years (or less on existence of adequate and special
reasons), or 10 years or imprisonment for life. In determining
the appropriate sentence, the relevant facts and circumstances
are to be seen including the nature and gravity of the crime, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the sexual assault, H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A the position of the person on whom the sexual assault is
committed, the role of the accused in relation to the person
violated and the possibility of the rehabilitation of the offender.
In addition to these factors, the intersectional identity of PW2
and the underlying societal factors within which the offence was
committed are to be taken care of. PW2 is a woman who is blind
B
since birth and is a member of a Scheduled Caste. These
intersectional identities placed her in a uniquely disadvantageous
position. [Para 69, 70][520-B-E; F-G]
5.5 This Court is also aware of the disadvantage faced by
women (and persons generally) belonging to the Scheduled Castes
C and Scheduled Tribes. It is difficult and, artificial to delineate the
many different identities of an individual which overlap to place
them in a disadvantaged position of power and create the
circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur. In
series of decisions this Court have stated that “socio-economic
D status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim
are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy”. However, it
is necessary to understand the context in which this finding was
made. In all of these cases, the Court was dealing with the plea of
mitigation of sentence awarded by the High Courts or the lower
courts on the ground of existence of ‘adequate and special reasons’
E on account of the accused being a member of the scheduled caste/
tribe; belonging to a rural background; or being illiterate. It is
on this count that the Court rejected such a plea given the heinous
nature of the crime of rape and the gravity of the criminal act.
These judgments do not bar this Court from taking a holistic
F view of the various intersectional identities which form a vital
part of the facts and circumstances of the act and speak to the
nature of the crime. [Para 71][521-E-G; 522-A-B]
5.6 In the instant case, several circumstances bearing on
the sentence must be borne in mind. First, PW2, who was
G subjected to a sexual assault was blind since birth. Second, the
appellant was known to the brothers of PW2, including PW3. The
appellant used to visit the house in which PW2 resided with
herparents and brothers. Bereft of eye-sight, PW2 was able to
identify the appellant by his voice with which she was familiar.

H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 483

Third, shortly before entering the home of PW2, the appellant A
enquired of PW1 where her sons were, when he was told that
they were not at home. PW1 proceeded with her chores at a public
water tap. Taking advantage of the absence of the members of
the family from the family home, the appellant entered the house
and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW1 has deposed that
B
when she entered the house together with PW3, PW4 and PW5
she found PW2 in a nude condition on the ground bleeding from
the injuries sustained on her genitals. The nature and
circumstances in which the offence has been committed would
leave no manner of doubt that the appellant had taken advantage
of the position of the PW2 who was blind since birth. He entered C
the house, familiar as he was with members of the family, in their
absence and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW2 belongs to
a Scheduled Caste. The prosecution has not led evidence to prove
that the offence was committed on the ground that she belongs
to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of section 3(2)(v) of the
D
SC and ST Act. This is a distinct issue. But the fact that PW2
belonged to a Scheduled Caste is not a factor which is extraneous
to the sentencing process for an offence under Section 376. It is
in that context, that the observations of the Sessions Judge must
be read with a robust common-sense perception of ground
realities. The appellant was 27 years old, a mature individual who E
was working as a coolie together with the brothers of PW2 for a
couple of years. The nature and gravity of the offence in the instant
case is serious in itself and it is compounded by the position of
PW2 who was a visually disabled woman. A heinous offence has
been committed on a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste. The
F
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be faulted.
[Para 72][522-C-H; 523-A]
Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175 : [1995]
6 Suppl. SCR 195; State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa
(2000) 4 SCC 75 : [2000] 2 SCR 761; State of Punjab
v. Prem Sagar (2008) 7 SCC 550 : [ 2008] 8 SCR 574; G
Tekan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh
2014 Cri LJ 1409; State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa
(2000) 4 SCC 75 : [2000]2 SCR761; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Basodi (2009) 12 SCC 318 : [2009] 6 SCR
1166; State of Karnataka v. Raju (2007) 11 SCC 490 : H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A [2007] 9 SCR 970; State of Rajasthan v. Vinod Kumar
(2012) 6 SCC 770 : [2012] 6 SCR 1; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Santosh Kumar (2006) 6 SCC 1 : [2006] 3
Suppl. SCR 548; Navtej Johar v. Union of India (2018)
10 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 379; R. v. S (RD) (1997) 3
SCR 484; Samitri and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2010)
B
SCC OnLine P & H 2245 – referred to.
Justice JS Verma (Retd.), Justice Leila Seth (Retd.) &
Gopal Subramanium, Report of the Committee on
Amendments to Criminal Law, 23 January, 2013, p. 38
– referred to.
C
K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing The Intersection Of Race
And Sex: A Black Feminist Critique Of Anti-
Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, And Anti-
Racist Policies, University of Chicago Legal Forum, Vol.
4 1(1989) 149 (“Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
D Intersection of Race and Sex”); Mary Eaton,
Homosexual Unmodified: Speculations on Law s
Discourse, Race, and Construction of Sexual Identity,
in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND
THE POLITICS OF THE LAW, Didi Herman and Carl
E Stychin eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1995), p. 46; Ben Smith, Intersectional Discrimination
and Substantive Equality: A Comparative and
Theoretical Perspective, The Equal Rights Review, Vol.
16 (2016) 74 (“Smith, Intersectional Discrimination”);
Nitya Iyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the
F Shaping of Social Identity, Queen’s Law Journal, Vol.
19 (1993–1994) 179; Smith, Intersectional
Discrimination, supra n. 5, p. 84; Gauthier de Boco,
Harnessing the Full Potential of Intersectionality
Theory in Human Rights Law: Lessons from Disabled
G Children’s Right to Education in INTERSECTIONALITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Shreya Atrey& Peter
Dunne, Hart Publishing 2020); PH Collins, The
Difference That Power Makes: Intersectionality and
Participatory Democracy, 8 (1) Revista de
Investigaciones Feministas (2017), p. 22; D. Pothier,
H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 485

Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s A
Experiences, 13(1) Canadian Journal of Women and
the Law (2001), p. 39, 51; K Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence against Women of Color, 43 Stanford Law
Review 1241 (1991), 1246-1250; Shreya Atrey, Lifting
B
as We climb: Recognising Intersectional Gender
Violence in Law, Onati Socio-legal Series 1512 (2015),
1519-20; Saptarshi Mandal, The Burden of
Intelligibility: Disabled Women’s Testimony In Rape
Trials, Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 20 No. 1
(2013): 1-29, p. 20 (“Mandal, Disabled Women C
Testimony in Rape Trials”); Human Rights Watch,
“Invisible Victims of Sexual Violence: Access to Justice
for Women and Girls with Disabilities in India”, available
at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/03/invisible-
victims-sexual violence/access- justice-women-and-
D
girls-disabilities, 3 April 2018; HWR Report, n. 24,
p. 12; UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo, A/HRC/
26/38/Add.1. available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRB od ie/H RC/ Regula rS essio ns/ Sess ion26/ E
Documents/A-HRC-26-38-Add1_en.doc, 1 April
2014, para 72.; S. Mohapatra and M. Mohanty, “Abuse
and Activity Limitation: A Study on Domestic Violence
Against Disabled Women in Odisha,” available at http:/
/swabhiman.org/userfiles/file/
F
Abuse%20and%20Activity20Limitation%20Study.pdf,
2004 referred in HRW Report, n. 24, at footnote 19;
CREA, “Count Me In! Violence Against Disabled,
Lesbian, and Sex-working Women in Bangladesh, India,
and Nepal”, http://www.creaworld.org/sites/default/
files/The % 20 Count % 20 Me % 20 In % 21 % 20 G
Research%20Report.pdf, 2011referred in HRW
Report, n. 24, at footnote 20.; HRW Report, n. 24, p.
8; Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Guidelines
and Protocols: Medico-legal care for survivors/
victims of sexual violence, 16 May 2019, available at
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A ht tp s:// m ain.moh fw.gov.i n/ si te s/ def a ul t / fi les /
953522324.pdf, p.14 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2018] 7 SCR 379 referred to Para 20
B (1979) 4 SCC 349 referred to Para 43
[2006] 2 SCR 793 referred to Para 51
(2007) 2 SCC 170 referred to Para 52
[2017] 12 SCR 128 referred to Para 53
C
[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 859 referred to Para 67
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195 referred to Para 69
[2000] 2 SCR 761 referred to Para 69
D
[2008] 8 SCR 574 referred to Para 69
2014 Cri LJ 1409 referred to Para 70
[2000] 2 SCR 761 referred to Para 71
E [2009] 6 SCR 1166 referred to Para 71
[2007] 9 SCR 970 referred to Para 71
[2012] 6 SCR 1 referred to Para 71
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 548 referred to Para71
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 452 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2019 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati in Criminal appeal No. 911 of 2014.
G
Harinder Mohan Singh, Ms. Shabana, Advs. for the Appellant.
Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Polanki Gowtham, Shaik Mohamad
Haneef, T. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, Amitabh Sinha, Shrey Sharma, Advs.
for the Respondent.
H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 487

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
This judgment has been divided into the following sections to
facilitate analysis:
A Factual Background B

B Proceedings before this Court
C Analysis
C.1 Intersectionality: The Different Hues of Identity
C
C.2 Disability and Gender: Twin Tales of Societal Oppression
C.3 The ‘Caste’ that is Difficult to Cast Away: Protection of
Members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
C.4 Section 3(2)(v) of SC & ST Act
C.5 Punishment under Section 376 of the IPC D

D Conclusion and Summary of Findings
A Factual Background
1. Leave granted.
E
2. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 3 August 2019. The High Court
has affirmed the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under
Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 19891 and Section 376(1) of the Indian
Penal Code. F
3. The appellant has been sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
life for each of the above offences, the substantive sentences being
directed to run concurrently. In addition, the appellant has been sentenced
to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 for each of the offences and in default to
suffer imprisonment of six months. G
4. The appellant was residing in Gajulapalli village and was engaged
in carrying out manual work for two years prior to the incident. PW2
who is blind since birth used to live with her mother (PW1) and brother

1
“SC & ST Act’’ H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A (PW3). PW3 and LW5 are the sons of PW1. They were also engaged
in manual work together with the appellant, at the same place. The
appellant, according to the prosecution, lived in the same village and
regularly visited the house of PW1 due to his acquaintance with her
sons.
B 5. At about 9 am on 31 March 2011, PW1 was attending to her
household chores at a public tap which was within a distance of fifty
feet and her sons were cutting fire wood in the vicinity. The appellant is
alleged to have enquired about her sons when PW1 replied that her
spouse and sons were chopping fire wood and asked him to wait for a
while. After half an hour, on hearing the voice of her daughter (PW2) in
C distress, she rushed to the house and found that the door was locked
from inside. Upon raising an alarm her husband and sons rushed to the
house. The appellant opened the door and tried to escape but was
apprehended at the spot. Upon entering the house, PW1 observed that
PW2 was lying on the ground in a nude condition and was bleeding from
D her genitals. The clothes of PW2 were torn and stained with blood.
Upon enquiry, PW2 is alleged to have stated that the appellant came to
the house and enquired about her brothers; he locked the door and fell
on her, gagged and raped her.
6. The case of the prosecution is that at 10 am, the Sub-Inspector
E of Police (PW9), Mahanandi Police Station, who received a call from
PW4, a cousin of PW1, rushed to the scene of the occurrence. By that
time, the Circle Inspector of Police, Nandyal Rural Police Station had
also arrived and the villagers handed over the appellant to him. PW1
furnished a written report to the police which was registered as Crime
No 28/2011. PW11 sent the victim to the Government Hospital where
F she was examined by PW10, the Civil Surgeon at the District Hospital.
The medical examination revealed that PW2 was blind. The medical
report of the examination of PW2 has been extracted in the judgment of
the Sessions Judge and the High Court and reads as follows:
“(1) Contusion of 1 x 1 cm on left cheek, red in colour, (2) Pubic
G Hair develop, breast develop (3) Axillary Hair developed. On
examination of vagina is lacerated at 4-00 O’ clock position,
bleeding present. 3 swabs and slides taken from Hymeneal Orifice
Vaginal canal and near cervix, vaginal wall sutured with 10
Chromicatgut, hair and nail clippings taken and she i1ssued the
H wound certificate under Ex.P.6 and gave her final opinion under
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 489
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Ex.P.8 after receiving the report from A.P.F.S.L. and she opined A
that the evidence is suggestive of penetration of male genital parts.”
7. Charges were framed against the appellant under Section
376(1) of the Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act. To
substantiate its case, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses, PWs
1 to 11 in addition to which, it relied on exhibits P1 to P12 and MOs 1 to B
8. On the closure of the evidence, the appellant was examined under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. By a judgment
dated 19 February 2013 the Special Judge for the Trial of Cases under
the SC - ST (POA) Act - Cum - VIth Additional District and Sessions
Judge convicted the appellant for offences under Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC & ST Act and Section 376(1) of the Penal Code. Based primarily on C
the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3 the learned Sessions Judge held
that:
(i) The appellant had access to PW2 since he was acquainted
with her brothers and was regularly visiting the house where
she lived with her family; D

(ii) The evidence of PW1 and PW2 was corroborated by PW3,
the brother of PW2;
(iii) The narration of the incident by PW1 was duly corroborated
by an independent witness and neighbour, PW5; E
(iv) The oral testimony of the witnesses established that the
appellant was apprehended at the scene of occurrence and
when PW1 who was accompanied by PW3 and PW4
opened the door of the house, the appellant was apprehended
while attempting to escape and PW2 was found bleeding F
from her injuries lying in a nude condition on the ground;
(v) PW2 who was blind by birth had identified the appellant by
his voice which was familiar to her since the appellant was
regularly visiting the house;
(vi) PWs 1,3,4,5 apprehended the appellant handed him over to G
PW11 and the appellant was taken to Mahanandi Police
Station;
(vii) PW5 is the neighbour whose house was opposite to that of
PW1 and was a natural witness. PW4 though related to
PW1 had also corroborated the testimony of PW1; H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A (viii) The clothes of PW2 had been duly seized;
(ix) The narration of the incident by PW2 was trustworthy and
was duly corroborated by PW1 and PW3; and
(x) The oral testimony was consistent with the medical evidence
and the deposition of PW10, the doctor at the government
B hospital who deposed in that regard.
The Sessions Judge, in coming to the conclusion that an offence
under Section 3(2)(v) was established observed thus:
“39. Coming to the facts of the present case P.W.11 in the cross
C examination stated that P.W.1 and P.W.2 did not state before him
that since P.W.2 belongs to scheduled caste, accused committed
the offence. The learned defence counsel argued that in view of
the evidence of P.W.11, the prosecution failed to prove that the
accused committed the offence on the ground that the victim
belongs to scheduled caste. I do not find any merit in the above
D argument for the reason that Ex. P.1 discloses that the victim
belongs to Madiga of Scheduled Caste. P.W.1 the mother of the
victim girl is an illiterate village rustic woman simply because she
has not mentioned in the report or in the statement to the police
that accused did commit the offence on the ground that the victim
E belong to scheduled caste is no way fatal to the case of the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused for the offence
under section 3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act.
40. It is needless to say that if the victim belongs to upper caste
than the caste of the accused, particularly in village atmosphere, I
F am of the considered view that he would not have done the act
and dared to pounce upon her, and commit the offence of rape at
her own house at about 9.30 am in morning when her mother was
working near the house at public tap and her house is situated in
the residential locality. This court is of the view that as the victim
girl is helpless, blind and belongs to scheduled caste, so that the
G accused developed evil eye on her and taken advantage of her
loneliness committed the heinous crime of rape against her. Hence
I am not convinced with the argument of the learned defence
counsel and this court held that the accused committed the act of
rape on the victim un-married girl of 19 years at the time of the
incident and blind by birth and he did commit the act on the ground
H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 491
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

that she belongs to scheduled caste and on the impression that A
she cannot do anything against him. Hence, the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused for the offence under section
3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act.”
On the aspect of sentence, the Sessions Judge observed:
“When questioned about the quantum of sentence in respect of B
the. offence under section 376 (1) IPC, the accused pleaded to
take lenient view stating that he is a poor person and eking out his
livelihood by doing coolie work.
In view of the facts and circumstances of the case that it is a
heinous crime of rape committed against a blind un-married girl C
of 19 years of age, I am not inclined to exercise my discretion to
give lesser punishment to the accused as it is not a fit case to take
a lenient view.
The accused is sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- i/d SI for 6 months for the offence D
punishable under section 376 (1) of IPC and also sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 /- i/d SI
for 6 months for the offence under section 3 (2) (v) of SC/ ST
(POA) Act. Sentences shall run concurrently for the whole life.
M.0.1 to M.0.8 shall be destroyed after the expiry of appeal time.” E
8. The High Court by its judgment dated 3 August 2019 affirmed
the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. The High
Court has held that the testimonies of PW1, the mother of PW2; and of
PW2 were consistent and duly corroborated by PW3, the brother of
PW2 and by PW4 and PW5. The High Court adverted to the medical F
evidence and, in particular, the deposition of PW10. The prosecution
was held to have established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
9. Before the High Court, it was urged that the ingredients of the
offence under Section 3(2)(v) were not established as the offence was
not committed “on the ground” that PW2 belongs to a Scheduled Caste.
G
The High Court declined to accede to the submission, observing:
“Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that the offence gets attracted
if it is committed against a person knowing that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such members. Even otherwise still the offence
under Section 376(1) I.P.C. is made out.” H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A B Proceedings before this Court
10. On 19 February 2021, this Court at the preliminary hearing of
the Special Leave Petition adverted to the submissions of the learned
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and passed the following
order:
B “2 Mr Harinder Mohan Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner, has adverted to the findings contained in paragraph
39 of the judgment of the Sessions Court dated 19 February 2013
(Annexure P-12). Learned counsel submits that in view of the
expression “on the ground that such person is a member of a
C Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” in Section 3(2)(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act 1989, which has been interpreted in the decisions
of this Court, an offence under this provision has not been
established. Hence, the imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment in respect of an offence under Section 376 of the
D Indian Penal Code 1860 was not in accordance with law.
3 Issue notice, confined to the aforesaid submission, returnable in
six weeks.
4 Liberty to serve the Standing Counsel for the State of Andhra
E Pradesh, in addition.”
11. Notice has been issued by this Court confined to the above
submission. However, before we proceed to analyse the submission, we
are unequivocally of the view that the offence under Section 376(1) has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of PW1, the
F mother of PW2 and of PW 2, who was sexually assaulted, are clear and
consistent. The oral account has been corroborated by the evidence of
PW3, PW4 and PW5. The medical evidence, more particularly, the
deposition of PW10 clearly establishes that PW2 was sexually assaulted.
The appellant was apprehended at the spot in close proximity of the
commission of the offence. The offence under Section 376 has been
G established beyond reasonable doubt. This Court shall now proceed to
deal with the question of the conviction and sentence under the SC &
ST Act.
C Analysis
C.1 Intersectionality: The Different Hues of Identity
H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 493
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

12. The experience of rape induces trauma and horror for any A
woman regardless of her social position in the society. But the experiences
of assault are different in the case of a woman who belongs to a
Scheduled Caste community and has a disability because the assault is a
result of the interlocking of different relationships of power at play. When
the identity of a woman intersects with, inter alia, her caste, class,
B
religion, disability and sexual orientation, she may face violence and
discrimination due to two or more grounds. Transwomen may face
violence on account of their heterodox gender identity. In such a situation,
it becomes imperative to use an intersectional lens to evaluate how
multiple sources of oppression operate cumulatively to produce a specific
experience of subordination for a blind Scheduled Caste woman. C
13. A movement for recognition of discrimination and violence
emanating from the effects of the interaction of multiple grounds was
pioneered by African American women in United States. Kimberly
Crenshaw has been credited for coining the term intersectionality. In
her seminal work on the subject, she describes the principle with the D
help of the following hypothetical:
“Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in
one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens
in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any
number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, E
if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection,
her injury could result from sex discrimination or race
discrimination.”2
In her article, Crenshaw argues that sex discrimination and race
discrimination statutes, as well as the judicial opinions in the United States F
that she studied are narrowly tailored and address the claims of the most
privileged within the targeted group. She states:
“With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more apparent
how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think
about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single G
categorical axis. I want to suggest further that this single-axis
framework erases Black women in the conceptualization,
2
K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing The Intersection Of Race And Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique Of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, And Anti-Racist Policies,
University of Chicago Legal Forum, Vol. 4 (1989) 149 (“Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
Intersection of Race and Sex’’). H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination by
limiting inquiry to the experiences of otherwise-privileged members
of the group. In other words, in race discrimination cases,
discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-
privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is
on race- and class-privileged women.””3
B
(emphasis added)
She further highlights the intersectional nature of gender violence,
where she states that: “[t]he singular focus on rape as a manifestation
of male power over female sexuality tends to eclipse the use of rape as
C a weapon of racial terror.”
14. Intersectionality can be defined as a form of “oppression [that]
arises out of the combination of various oppressions which, together,
produce something unique and distinct from any one form of
discrimination standing alone...”.4 While the model of intersectionality
D was initially developed to highlight the experiences of African-American
women, there is a growing recognition that an intersectional lens is useful
for addressing the specific set of lived experiences of those individuals
who have faced violence and discrimination on multiple grounds. A single
axis approach to violence and discrimination renders invisible such
minority experiences within a broader group since it formulates identity
E as “totemic” and “homogenous”.5 Laws tend to focus on a singular
identity due to the apparent clarity a monistic identity provides in legal
analysis where an individual claiming differential treatment or violence
can argue that “but for” that identity, they would have been treated in
the same way as a comparator. Therefore, their treatment is irrational
F and unjustified.6 However, such essentialization of experiences of identity
groups creates a problem where intersectional discrimination or violence
has occurred. This is because the evidence of discrete discrimination or

3
Id at p. 146.
4
Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified: Speculations on Laws Discourse, Race, and
G
Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE P OLITICS
OF THE LAW, Didi Herman and Carl Stychin eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1995), p. 46.
5
Ben Smith, Intersectional Discrimination and Substantive Equality: A Comparative
and Theoretical Perspective, The Equal Rights Review, Vol. 16 (2016) 74 (“Smith,
Intersectional Discrimination’’).
6
H Ibid, 83.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 495
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

violence on a specific ground may be absent or difficult to prove.7 Nitya A
Iyer has argued that law based on single axis models forces claimants to
ignore their own lived reality and “caricaturize themselves so that they
fit into prefabricated, rigid categories”.8 Their claim will fail if they are
not able to simplify their story to accord with the dominant understanding
of how discrimination or violence on the basis of a given characteristic
B
occurs.9
15. It is important to note that an analysis of intersectionality does
not mean that we see caste, religion, class, disability and sexual orientation
as merely “add ons” to the oppression that women may face. This is
based on the assumption that gender oppression is oppressive in the
same way for all women, only more so for women suffering C
marginalization on other grounds. However, an intersectional analysis
requires us to consider the distinct experience of a sub-set of women
who exist at an intersection of varied identities. This is not to say that
these women do not share any commonalities with other women who
may be more privileged, but to equate the two experiences would be to D
play down the effects of specific socio-economic vulnerabilities certain
women suffer. At its worse it would be to appropriate their pain to claim
a universal subjectivity.
16. There is a fear that intersectionality would open a Pandora’s
box of “endless new discrete identity categories for every possible E
permutation of identity”10 We can avoid this trap by eschewing an
identity-based conception of intersectionality in favour of a systems-
based conception. Specifically, as Gauthier De Beco argues, instead of
focusing on identity-categories, the intersectionality enquiry should focus
on “co-constituted structures of disadvantage that are associated with
two or more identity-categories at the same time”.11 By exhibiting F
attentiveness to the ‘matrix of domination’12 created by the intersecting
7
Ibid, 81.
8
Nitya Iyer, Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity,
Queen’s Law Journal, Vol. 19 (1993–1994) 179.
9
Ibid. Smith, Intersectional Discrimination, supra n. 5, p. 84.
11
Gauthier de Boco, Harnessing the Full Potential of Intersectionality Theory in Human G
Rights Law: Lessons from Disabled Children’s Right to Education in INTERSECTIONALITY
AND H UMAN RIGHTS LAW (Shreya Atrey & Peter Dunne, Hart Publishing 2020).
12
PH Collins, The Difference That Power Makes: Intersectionality and Participatory
Democracy, 8(1) Revista de Investigaciones Feministas (2017), p. 22, noting:
“Intersectionality’s emphasis on intersecting systems of oppression suggests that
different forms of domination each have their own power grid, a distinctive “matrix” of
intersecting power dynamics.” H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A patterns at play, the Court can more effectively conduct an
intersectionality analysis. A legal analysis focused on delineating specific
dimensions of oppression running along a single axis whether it be caste,
disability or gender fails to take into account the overarching matrix of
domination that operates to marginalise an individual. The workings of
such a structure have been aptly stated by a woman with visual
B
impairment (due to Albinism) in the following words:
“I can never experience gender discrimination other than as a
person with a disability; I can never experience disability
discrimination other than as a woman. I cannot disaggregate myself
nor can anyone who might be discriminating against me. I do not
C
fit into discrete boxes of grounds of discrimination.
Even when only one ground of discrimination seems to be relevant,
it affects me as a whole person”13
17. Intersectionality merely urges us to have “an open-textured
D legal approach that would examine underlying structures of inequality”14.
This requires us to analyse law in its social and economic context allowing
us to formulate questions of equality as that of “power and powerlessness”
instead of difference and sameness.15 The latter being a conceptual
limitation of single axis analysis, it may allow certain intersectional claims
to fall through the cracks since such claims are not unidirectional in
E nature.
18. Intersectional analysis requires an exposition of reality that
corresponds more accurately with how social inequalities are
experienced. Such contextualized judicial reasoning is not an anathema
to judicial inquiry. It will be useful to note the comments of Justice
F L’Heureaux-Dubé and Justice McLachlin in the Canadian Supreme
Court’s judgment in R. v. S (RD)16 that, “[j]udicial inquiry into the factual,
social and psychological context within which litigation arises is not
unusual. Rather, a conscious, contextual inquiry has become an accepted
step towards judicial impartiality...this process of enlargement is not only
G consistent with impartiality; it may also be seen as its essential pre-
condition.”
13
D. Pothier, Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences,
13(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law(2001), p. 39, 51.
14
Smith, Intersectional Discrimination, supra n. 5, p. 84.
15
Ibid.
16
H (1997) 3 S.C.R. 484 at 506-507.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 497
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

19. Single axis models of oppression are a consequence of how A
historically movements aiming for legal protection of marginalized
populations developed. Most political liberation struggles have been
focused on a sole characteristic like anti-caste movements, movements
by persons with disabilities, feminism and queer liberation. Many such
movements have not been able to adequately address the intra-group
B
diversity leading to a situation where the needs of the relatively privileged
within the group have received more than a fair share of spotlight. When
these liberation struggles were adopted in law, the law also developed
into mutually exclusive terrains of different statutes addressing different
marginalities failing to take into account the intersectional nature of
oppression. C
20. In India, the fundamental guarantees under the Constitution
provide for such a holistic analysis of discrimination faced by individuals.
One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud), in Navtej Johar v. Union of
India17 applied the intersectional lens to Article 15(1) of the Constitution.
In doing so, Justice DY Chandrachud observed that: D
“36. This formalistic interpretation of Article 15 would render the
constitutional guarantee against discrimination meaningless. For
it would allow the State to claim that the discrimination was based
on sex and another ground (‘Sex plus’) and hence outside the
ambit of Article 15. Latent in the argument of the discrimination, E
are stereotypical notions of the differences between men and
women which are then used to justify the discrimination. This
narrow view of Article 15 strips the prohibition on
discrimination of its essential content. This fails to take
into account the intersectional nature of sex discrimination,
which cannot be said to operate in isolation of other F
identities, especially from the socio-political and economic
context. For example, a rule that people over six feet would
not be employed in the army would be able to stand an attack
on its disproportionate impact on women if it was maintained
that the discrimination is on the basis of sex and height. G
Such a formalistic view of the prohibition in Article 15,
rejects the true operation of discrimination, which
intersects varied identities and characteristics.”
(emphasis supplied)
17
(2018) 10 SCC 1. H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A 21. Noting how the discrimination caused by intersecting identities
amplifies the violence against certain communities (gendered/religious/
otherwise), the Justice J.S Verma Committee appointed in the aftermath
of the Nirbhaya incident to suggest reforms in Indian criminal law,
observed that:
B “34. We believe that while certain measures may have been taken
over a period of time but they have been too far and too few and
they certainly have not attempted to restructure and transform
society and its institutions. If there has to be a society which is
based on equality of gender, we must ensure that not only does a
woman not suffer on account of gender but also not suffer on
C account of caste or religion in addition. Thus a woman may suffer
a double disadvantage – a) because she is a woman, and b) because
she belongs to a caste/tribe/community/religion which is
disadvantaged, she stands at a dangerous intersection if poor.”18
22. While intersectionality has made considerable strides in the
D field of human rights law and anti-discrimination law, it has also emerged
as a potent tool to understand gender-based violence. In 1991, Crenshaw
applied the concept of intersectionality to study violence against women
of colour. She showed how race, gender, poverty, immigrant status and
being from a linguistic minority interacted to place these women in violent
E relationships.19
23. To deal with cases of violence against women from
intersectional backgrounds, Shreya Atrey proposes the model of
intersectional integrity. She notes:
“Intersectional gender violence is about: (i) rejecting violations of
F bodily and mental integrity when perpetrated based on people’s
multiple and intersecting identities (intersectionality); and (ii)
recognizing that violence should be understood as a whole taking
into account unique and shared patterns of violations yielded by
intersections of gender, race, caste, religion, disability, age, sexual
G orientation etc(integrity).”20
18
Justice JS Verma (Retd.), Justice Leila Seth (Retd.) & Gopal Subramanium, Report of
the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, 23 January 2013, p. 38 (“JS Verma
Committee Report’’).
19
K Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
against Women of Color, 43 Stanford Law Review 1241 (1991), 1246-50.
20
Shreya Atrey, Lifting as We Climb: Recognising Intersectional Gender Violence in
H Law, 5 Oñati Socio-legal Series 1512 (2015), 1519-20.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 499
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

24. She points out that a failure to consider violence perpetrated A
based on multiple identities results in an inaccurate portrayal of the
violence at issue which may impact the ability to obtain relief. On the
other hand, a comprehensive appraisal of the intersectional nature of the
violence can translate into an appropriate legal response. 21
25. The above analysis stresses on the need for the Court to address B
and unpack the qualitative impact of the various identities an individual
might have on the violence, discrimination or disadvantage being faced
by them in the society.
C.2 Disability and Gender: Twin Tales of Societal
Oppression C
26. For many disabled women and girls in India, the threat of
violence is an all-too-familiar fixture of their lives, contracting their
constitutionally guaranteed freedom to move freely and curtailing their
ability to lead full and active lives. This threat of violence can translate
into a nagging feeling of powerlessness and lack of control, making the D
realization of the promises held by Parts III and IV of our Constitution a
remote possibility for women with disabilities.
27. In saying so, we do not mean to subscribe to the stereotype
that persons with disabilities are weak and helpless, incapable of charting
the course of their lives or to deprive them of the agency and bodily E
autonomy that we all possess and are entitled to exercise. Such a negative
presumption of disability translating into incapacity would be inconsistent
with the forward-thinking conceptualization of disabled lives embodied
in our law and, increasingly, albeit slowly, in our social consciousness.
As Saptarshi Mandal notes, in critiquing the fashion in which the Punjab
and Haryana High Court dealt with the testimony of a mentally disabled F
and partially paralyzed prosecutrix22, stamping a prosecutrix with the
badge of complete helplessness, merely on the basis of disability, is an
inapposite course of action. He notes:
“the entire rationale behind the conviction of the accused turned
on sympathy for the helpless prosecutrix and her inability to G
physically resist the aggressor. Even if one agrees with the judge
that there cannot be a single standard of burden of proof for the
disabled and the able-bodied, a differentiated scale of burden of
21
Id at 1531.
22
Samitri and Ors. v. State of Haryana, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 2245. H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A proof must be based on the concept of vulnerability, not
victimhood.”23
28. Instead, our aim is to highlight the increased vulnerability and
reliance on others that is occasioned by having a disability which makes
women with disabilities more susceptible to being at the receiving end of
B sexual violence. As the facts of this case make painfully clear, women
with disabilities, who inhabit a world designed for the able-bodied, are
often perceived as “soft targets” and “easy victims” for the commission
of sexual violence. It is for this reason that our legal response to such
violence, in the instant case as well as at a systemic level, must exhibit
attentiveness to this salient fact.
C
29. As the analysis by the Sessions Judge and High Court makes
clear, a critical feature of this case is the fact that PW2 is blind since
birth. It would be overly simplistic and reductionist to reduce her
personality to her disability alone. Equally, however, the Court has to
exhibit sensitivity to the heightened risk of violence and abuse that she
D was rendered susceptible to, by reason of her disability. We would like
to utilize the facts of this case as a launching point to explore a disturbing
trend that this case brings into sharp focus and is symptomatic of – that
of sexual violence against women and girls with disabilities and to set in
motion a thought process for how the structural realities resulting in this
E state of affairs can be effectively addressed. In this part of the judgment,
we will first highlight the unique reasons that make these women more
vulnerable to being at the receiving end of sexual violence, with the help
of some illustrations. Thereafter, we will outline some challenges that
are faced by such women in accessing the criminal justice system
generally and the judicial system in particular. We will then outline some
F measures that can be taken to lower the barriers faced by them. We will
finally conclude by outlining the judicial approach which should be adopted
for assessing their testimony.
Unique vulnerability of women and girls with disabilities

G 30. An April 2018 report by Human Rights Watch, titled ‘Invisible
Victims of Sexual Violence: Access to Justice for Women and Girls with

23
Saptarshi Mandal, The Burden of Intelligibility: Disabled Women’s Testimony In Rape
Trials, Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 20 No. 1 (2013): 1-29, p. 20 (“Mandal,
H Disabled Women Testimony in Rape Trials’’).
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 501
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Disabilities in India’24 offers a thoroughgoing assessment of the problem A
of sexual violence against women with disabilities. The report documents
the stories of 17 survivors of sexual violence – 8 girls and 9 women –
who live with a spectrum of physical, sensory, intellectual and psychosocial
disabilities.25
31. As the report points out, women and girls with different B
disabilities face a high risk of sexual violence:
“Those with physical disabilities may find it more difficult to escape
from violent situations due to limited mobility. Those who are deaf
or hard of hearing may not be able to call for help or easily
communicate abuse, or may be more vulnerable to attacks simply C
due to the lack of ability to hear their surroundings. Women and
girls with disabilities, particularly intellectual or psychosocial
disabilities, may not know that non -consensual sexual acts are a
crime and should be reported because of the lack of accessible
information. As a result, they often do not get the support they
need at every stage of the justice process: reporting the abuse to D
police, getting appropriate medical care, and navigating the court
system.”26
32. In India, no disaggregated data is maintained on the extent of
violence against women and girls with disabilities. This poses a formidable
obstacle to understanding the problem better and designing suitable E
solutions. As Rashida Manjoo, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on violence against women, noted, this lack of data “renders the violence
committed against women with disabilities invisible.”27
33. The HRW report points to two studies that quantify the scale
of this problem. A 2004 survey in Orissa conducted in 12 districts with F
729 respondents found that nearly all of the women and girls with

24
Human Rights Watch, “Invisible Victims of Sexual Violence: Access to Justice for
Women and Girls with Disabilities in India’’, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/
2018/04/03/invisible-victims-sexual-violence/access-justice-women-and-girls- G
disabilities, 3 April 2018 (“HRW Report’’).
25
HRW Report, supran. 24, p. 12.
26
Id at p. 4.
27
UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo,” A/HRC/26/38/Add.1. available
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Documents/
A-HRC-26-38-Add1_en.doc, 1 April 2014, para 72. H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A disabilities surveyed were beaten at home, and 25 percent of women
with intellectual disabilities had been raped.28 In the same vein, a 2011
study found that 21 percent of the 314 women with disabilities surveyed
had faced emotional, physical or sexual violence from someone other
than their intimate partner.29
B 34. The HRW Report brings to light several harrowing examples
of circumstances in which a survivor’s disability was exploited by those
perpetrating sexual violence. To illustrate, the report describes the story
of a woman with low vision from Bhubaneshwar, Odisha who alleged
that she was raped in June, 2013. The report notes:
C “The police did not help …get legal aid. The staff of the [residential
shelter home] helped her to find a lawyer, but the lawyer they
found was not free of cost. It has been tough for her to continue
with the lawyer. This has affected the progress of the case.”30
Interaction of disabled survivors of sexual violence with the criminal
D justice system and the judiciary
35. In the wake of the Nirbhaya rape incident that shocked the
conscience of the nation, Indian criminal law underwent a series of
changes. The Justice J.S. Verma Committee, set up to suggest
amendments to the law, attached special emphasis to creating an enabling
E environment to enable women with disabilities to report cases of sexual
violence and to obtain suitable redress. As the Committee noted:
“6. A special procedure for protecting persons with disabilities
from rape, and requisite procedures for access to justice for such
persons is also an urgent need. Amendments to the Code of
F Criminal Procedure, which are necessary, have been suggested.”31

28
S. Mohapatra and M. Mohanty, “Abuse and Activity Limitation: A Study on Domestic
Violence Against Disabled Women in Odisha,” available at http://swabhiman.org/
G userfiles/file/Abuse%20and%20Activity%20Limitation%20Study.pdf, 2004 referred
in HRW Report, supra n. 24, at footnote
29
CREA, “Count Me In! Violence Against Disabled, Lesbian, and Sex-working Women
in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal’’, http://www.creaworld.org/sites/default/files/
The%20Count%20Me%20In%21%20Research%20Report.pdf, 2011 referred in HRW
Report, supra n. 24, at footnote 20.
30
HRW Report, supra n. 24, p. 8.
31
H JS Verma Committee Report, supra n. 18 .
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 503
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

36 The Committee’s suggestions translated into changes in the A
Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Some key changes
were as follows:
(i) When the victim of the offences specified in the provision
is either permanently or temporarily mentally or physically
disabled, the FIR shall be recorded by a police officer, at B
the residence of the person seeking to report such offence
or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the
presence of a special educator or an interpreter, as the case
may be.32 Such information may also be video-graphed.33
(ii) The same accommodations, as outlined above, have also C
been made as regards the recording of confessions and
statements.34 Further, as regards those who are physically
and mentally disabled, such a statement shall be considered
a statement in lieu of examination-in-chief, obviating the
need for it to be recorded at the time of trial.
D
(iii) The amendments also sought to put in place a framework
to enable victims with disabilities to participate in a test
identification parade. In such cases, a judicial magistrate
will oversee the procedure to ensure the witness is supported
in identifying the accused with a means they find
comfortable.35 This process must be video-graphed.36 E

37. Further, guidance issued by the Union Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare notes the challenges faced by survivors with disabilities
in reporting cases given the barriers to communication, their dependency
on caretakers, their complaints not being taken seriously and the lack of
an appropriate environment which encourages them to express their F
grievances and complaints.37 In addition, unfamiliar and stressful court
environments pose a heightened challenge, during protracted cases, for
such women. Lack of information about their entitlements under the

32
CrPC, Section 154(1) proviso 2, (a). G
33
CrPC, Section 154(1) proviso 2, (b).
34
CrPC, Section 164 (5A) (a), provisos 1 and 2.
35
CrPC, Section 54A, proviso 1.
36
CrPC, Section 54A, proviso 2.
37
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Guidelines and Protocols: Medico-legal care
for survivors/victims of sexual violence, 16 May 2019, available at https://
main.mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/953522324.pdf, p. 14. H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A law, as well as the right to seek legal representation, compels them to be
mute and helpless spectators.38
38. Certain concerns have also been highlighted by the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its concluding observations
on the initial report on India. These include lack of measures to identify,
B prevent and combat all forms of violence against persons with disabilities;
lack of disaggregated statistical data in National Crime Records Bureau
on cases of gender-based violence against women and girls with
disabilities, including violence inflicted by intimate partners; limited
availability of accessible shelters for women with disabilities who are
victims of violence; and lack of effective remedies for persons with
C disabilities facing violence, including rehabilitation and compensation.39
39. While changes in the law on the books mark a significant step
forward, much work still needs to be done in order to ensure that their
fruits are realized by those for whose benefit they were brought. In this
regard, we set out below some guidelines to make our criminal justice
D system more disabled-friendly.
(i) The National Judicial Academy and state judicial academies
are requested to sensitize trial and appellate judges to deal
with cases involving survivors of sexual abuse. This training
should acquaint judges with the special provisions,
E concerning such survivors, such as those outlined above. It
should also cover guidance on the legal weight to be attached
to the testimony of such witnesses/survivors, consistent with
our holding above. Public prosecutors and standing counsel
should also undergo similar training in this regard. The Bar
F Council of India can consider introducing courses in the
LL.B program that cover these topics and the intersectional
nature of violence more generally;
(ii) Trained special educators and interpreters must be
appointed to ensure the effective realization of the
G reasonable accommodations embodied in the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 2013. All police stations should maintain

38
HRW Report, supra n. 24, p. 7.
39
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, “Concluding Observations on
the Initial Report Of India”, GE.19-18639(E) available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/
H record/3848327?ln=en, 29 October 2019, para 34.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 505
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

a database of such educators, interpreters and legal aid A
providers, in order to facilitate easy access and coordination;
(iii) The National Crimes Record Bureau should seriously
consider the possibility of maintaining disaggregated data
on gender-based violence. Disability must be one of the
variables on the basis of which such data must be maintained B
so that the scale of the problem can be mapped out and
tailored remedial action can be taken;
(iv) Police officers should be provided sensitization, on a regular
basis, to deal with cases of sexual violence against women
with disabilities, in an appropriate way. The training should C
cover the full life cycle of a case involving a disabled
survivor, from enabling them to register complaints, obtain
necessary accommodations, medical attention and suitable
legal representation. This training should emphasize the
importance of interacting directly with the disabled person
concerned, as opposed to their care-taker or helper, in D
recognition of their agency; and
(v) Awareness-raising campaigns must be conducted, in
accessible formats, to inform women and girls with
disabilities, about their rights when they are at the receiving
end of any form of sexual abuse. E

40. We hasten to add that these suggestions are not a reflection
of the manner in which the investigation, enquiry and trial were conducted
in the instant case. They simply represent our considered view on the
systemic reforms needed to ensure that cases such as the instant one
are dealt with in the most appropriate way. F
Testimony of disabled prosecutrix:
41. Another feature of the case that we would like to dwell on
relates to the testimony of the prosecutrix, PW2. In his judgment, the
Sessions Judge noted as follows:
G
“21. Identification of the accused by the victim girl:- It is
needless to say that identifying the accused basing on the voice is
weak type of evidence. Coming to the present facts and
circumstances of the case, P.W.2 is blind by birth as the access of
the accused to victim proved by the prosecution she can easily
H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A identify the accused by hearing his voice. Moreover, P.W.I, P.W.3,
P.W.4 and P.W.5 and some others caught hold the accused when
he opened the door of the house of P.W.I, on the date of the
incident and the evidence of the police officials also corroborates
with the witnesses who caught hold of the accused and handed
over him to P.W.II and on the instructions of P.W. II, the accused
B
was taken to Mahanandi Police Station. It was suggested to P.W.2
that her statement that she identified the accused with his voice is
false. In view of the categorical evidence of P.W.I, P.W.3, P.W.4,
so also the admission made by the accused in 313 Cr.P.C
examination that he used to visit the house of P.W.l to call the
C brothers of the victim for doing coolie work, the above suggestion
has no legs to stand. The above evidence would amply prove that
the victim has successfully identified the accused and her evidence
cannot be doubted simply because she is a blind girl.”
42. In the High Court, the defense sought to cast doubt on the
D testimony of the prosecutrix by arguing that she would have been unable
to identify the accused due to her disability. While the above plea was
not pressed by the appellant in this Court, we would like to take this
opportunity to affirm the conclusion of the Sessions Judge and to clarify
the position of law on this point.
E 43. There have been instances where the testimony of a disabled
prosecutrix has not been considered seriously and treated at an equal
footing as that of their able-bodied counterparts. One such instance is
the judgment of this Court in Mange v. State of Haryana40, where the
testimony of a thirteen year-old girl who was deaf and mute was not
recorded and the conviction was confirmed on the account of an eye
F witness and supported by medical evidence. This Court in affirming the
conviction noted that the non-examination of the prosecutrix was not a
major infirmity in the prosecution’s case “apart from being a child witness,
she was also deaf and dumb and no useful purpose would have been
served by examining her.” We are of the considered view that
G presumptions of such nature which construe disability as an incapacity
to participate in the legal process reflect not only an inadequate
understanding of how disability operates but may also result in a
miscarriage of justice through a devaluation of crucial testimonies given
by persons with disabilities. The legal personhood of persons with
40
H (1979) 4 SCC 349.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 507
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

disabilities cannot be premised on societal stereotypes of their supposed A
“inferiority”, which is an affront to their dignity and a negation of the
principle of equality.
44. A survey and analysis of High Court judgments by Saptarshi
Mandal indicates that the testimony of the disabled witnesses is devalued
by not recording the testimony of the prosecutrix at all; or recording it B
without adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering it
ineffectual; dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility or for
not being supported by the condition of her body.41
45. This kind of a judicial attitude stems from and perpetuates the
underlying bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities. We are C
of the view that the testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability, or of a
disabled witness for that matter, cannot be considered weak or inferior,
only because such an individual interacts with the world in a different
manner, vis-a-vis their able-bodied counterparts. As long as the testimony
of such a witness otherwise meets the criteria for inspiring judicial
confidence, it is entitled to full legal weight. It goes without saying that D
the court appreciating such testimony needs to be attentive to the fact
that the witness’ disability can have the consequence of the testimony
being rendered in a different form, relative to that of an able-bodied
witness. In the case at hand, for instance, PW2’s blindness meant that
she had no visual contact with the world. Her primary mode of identifying E
those around her, therefore, is by the sound of their voice. And so PW2’s
testimony is entitled to equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would
have been able to visually identify the appellant.
C.3 The ‘Caste’ that is Difficult to Cast Away: Protection
of Members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled F
Tribes
46. Social movements in India for securing justice to those who
have suffered centuries of caste-based discrimination paved way for
the enactment of the SC & ST Act in 1989 to prevent commission of
atrocities against members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe42 G
communities. The Act also falls within the purview of Article 17 of the
Constitution, which prohibits untouchability. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Act states the following:
41
Mandal, Disabled Women Testimony in Rape Trials, supra n. 23, p. 6.
42
“SC & ST’’
H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A “1. Despite various measures to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they
remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They
are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and
harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived
of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against
B
them for various historical, social and economic reasons.
2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education,
etc., they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being
taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and
C resist practices of un-touchability against them or demand statutory
minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour,
the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them.
When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try
to preserve their self-respect or honour of their women,
D they become irritants for the dominant and the mighty.
Occupation and cultivation of even the government allotted land
by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented
and’ more often these people become victims of attacks by the
vested interests of late, there has been an increase in the
disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like
E making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedible substances like
human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and rape of women
belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes. Under the circumstances, the existing laws like the
F protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of
the Indian Penal Code have been found to be inadequate to check
these crimes. A special legislation to check and deter crimes against
them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled
Tribes has, therefore, become necessary.
G 3. The term ‘atrocity’ has not been defined so far. It is considered
necessary that not only the term ‘atrocity’ should be defined but
stringent measures should be introduced to provide for higher
punishments for committing such atrocities. It is also proposed to
enjoining, on the States and the Union territories to take specific
preventive and punitive measures to protect the Scheduled Castes
H
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 509
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and the Scheduled Tribes from being victimised and where A
atrocities are committed, to provide adequate relief and assistance
to rehabilitate them.”
(emphasis added)
47. While the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act
specifically mentions commission of rapes against SC & ST women as B
a form of atrocity committed against the SC & ST communities, it does
not specifically articulate the distinct disadvantage women of these
communities face on account of casteism, patriarchy and poverty at the
same time. Shreya Atrey notes that while the anti-caste movements
began in early 1900s and saw active participation of SC & ST women, C
their oppression was imagined only on the basis of caste rather than
patriarchy43. On the other hand, the mainstream feminist movement also
failed to take into consideration the specific forms of oppression that SC
& ST women face not only at the hands of upper caste men but also
upper caste women. To reframe the words of the Combahee River
Collective Statement, a classic text in US anti-racist feminism - the SC D
& ST women struggled together with SC & ST men against casteism,
while they also struggled with men about sexism.44 Adrija Dey in her
work has specifically highlighted that class, caste, geography and religion
play a pivotal role in how gender violence is perceived and how
punishments are meted out in the criminal justice system.45 How E
pervasive sexual violence is against women from SC & ST community
is emphatically stated by V. Geetha in extract her book titled ‘Undoing
Impunity’:
“As for sexual violence, Dalit women activists understood it to be
part of a continuum of violence that Dalit women experienced: in F
a life-world where food, water, clean living spaces are routinely
denied to Dalit women, where their labour was exploited, and no
protection available in their places of work, where to be in bondage
to a landlord or petty trader was commonplace, and at all times
43
SHREYA ATREY, INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION , Oxford University Press) 2019, p. 69. G
44
Combahee River Collective, The Combahee River Collective Statement, in HOME
GIRLS: A BLACK F EMINIST ANTHOLOGY , Barbara Smith ed., (New York: Kitchen Table/
Women of Color Press, 1983; reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press
2000) 267. The original quote read, “We struggle together with Black men against
racism, while we also struggle with Black men about sexism.”
45
A. Dey. ‘Others’ Within the ‘Others’: An Intersectional Analysis of Gender Violence
in India, Gender Issues 36, 357–373 (2019). H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A they are viewed as sexually available, and humiliated in their bodily
being, sexual violence emerged as not an exceptional act of
violence, but the most concentrated expression of a fundamental
animus against Dalits”46
48. The above discussion highlights the social and economic context
B in which sexual violence against women from SC & ST communities
occurs. This contextualized legal analysis has to be adopted by the Court
which is sensitive to the nature of evidence that is likely to be produced
in a case where various marginalities intersect. In the present case, a
distinct individualized experience for PW2 is created on account of her
gender, caste and disability due to her association with wider groups that
C face a societal disadvantage.
C.4 Section 3(2)(v) of SC & ST Act
49. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act as it stood at the material
time read as follows:
D “3. Whoever not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe …
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
against a person or property on the ground that such person is a
E member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for life and with fine;”
50. Under Section 3(2)(v), an enhanced punishment of
imprisonment for life with fine is provided where
F
(i) The offence is committed by a person who is not a member
of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
(ii) The offence arises under the Penal Code and is against a
person or property and is punishable with imprisonment for a
term of ten years or more; and
G
(iii) The offence is committed “on the ground that such person is
a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” or such
property belongs to such a person.
46
V. Geetha, UNDOING IMPUNITY: SPEECH AFTER SEXUAL VIOLENCE, (Zubaan, 2016), Chapter
H 11.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 511
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

The key words are “on the ground that such person is a member A
of a SC or ST”. The expression “on the ground” means “for the reason”
or “on the basis of”. The above provision (as it stood at the material time
prior to its amendment, which will be noticed later) is an example of a
statute recognizing only a single axis model of oppression. As we have
discussed above, such single axis models require a person to prove a
B
discrete experience of oppression suffered on account of a given social
characteristic. However, when oppression operates in an intersectional
fashion, it becomes difficult to identify, in a disjunctive fashion, which
ground was the basis of oppression because often multiple grounds
operate in tandem. Larrisa Behrendt, an aboriginal legal scholar from
Australia, has poignantly stated the difficulty experienced by women C
facing sexual assault, who are marginalised on different counts, to identify
the source of their oppression:
“When an Aboriginal woman is the victim of a sexual assault,
how, as a black woman, does she know whether it is because she
is hated as a woman and is perceived as inferior or if she is hated D
because she is Aboriginal, considered inferior and promiscuous
by nature?”47
51. Being cognizant of the limitation of Section3(2)(v) – as it stood
earlier - in dealing with matters of intersectionality, we are however
bound to apply the standard that has been laid down in the law. The E
expression “on the ground” was considered in a two-judge Bench
judgment of this Court in Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State of Rajasthan48,
where the Court speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat held:
“15. Sine qua non for application of Section 3(2)(v) is that an
offence must have been committed against a person on the ground F
that such person is a member of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. In the instant case no evidence has been led to establish
this requirement. It is not case of the prosecution that the
rape was committed on the victim since she was a member
of Scheduled Caste.”
G
52. The Court held that in the absence of evidence to that effect,
the offence under Section 3(2)(v) would not stand established. This
47
Larissa Behrendt, Aboriginal Women and the White Lies of the Feminist Movement:
Implications for Aboriginal Women in Rights Discourse, 1 Australian Feminist Law
Journal 1, (1993), p. 35.
48
(2006) 3 SCC 771. H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A principle was subsequently followed in a two judge Bench judgment of
this Court in Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra49 where it
was held that merely because a woman belongs to the SC & ST
community, the provisions of the SC & ST Act would not be attracted in
a case of sexual assault. This Court observed that there was no evidence
to prove the commission of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC &
B
ST Act.
53. The contours of the terms “on the ground of” have been
explicated by this Court in the following cases. In Ashrafi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh50, a two judge Bench of this Court held that conviction
under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act cannot be sustained because
C the prosecution could not prove that the rape was committed only on the
ground that the woman belonged to the SC & ST community. This Court
speaking through Justice R Banumathi held:
“9.The evidence and materials on record do not show that the
Appellant had committed rape on the victim on the ground that
D she belonged to Scheduled Caste. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Prevention of Atrocities Act can be pressed into service only if it
is proved that the rape has been committed on the ground that
PW-3 Phoola Devi belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In
the absence of evidence proving intention of the Appellant
E in committing the offence upon PW-3-Phoola Devi only
because she belongs to Scheduled Caste community, the
conviction of the Appellant Under Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act cannot be sustained.”
(emphasis added)

F 54. In another judgment of this Court in Khuman Singh v. State
of MP51, Justice R Banumathi speaking for this Court held :
“As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as
to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence
must have been committed against the person on the ground that
G such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe.
In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to
“Khangar”-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no

49
(2007) 2 SCC 170.
50
(2018) 1 SCC 742 (“Ashrafi’’).
51
H Criminal Appeal 1283 of 2019 decided on 27 August 2019 (“Khuman Singh’’).
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 513
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

evidence to show that the offence was committed only on A
the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled
Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under
Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”
(emphasis supplied)
B
55. In the above two extracts, this Court has interpreted Section
3(2)(v) to mean that the offence should have been committed “only on
the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste.” The
correctness of this exposition. Is debatable. The statutory provision does
not utilize the expression “only on the ground”. Reading the expression
“only” would be to add a restriction which is not found in the statute. C
The statute undoubtedly uses the words “on the ground’ but the
juxtaposition of “the” before “ground” does not invariably mean that the
offence ought to have been committed only on that ground. To read the
provision in that manner will dilute a statutory provision which is meant
to safeguard the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes against acts of D
violence which pose a threat to their dignity. As we have emphasized
before in the judgment, an intersectional lens enables us to view oppression
as a sum of disadvantage resulting from multiple marginalized identities.
To deny the protection of Section 3 (2) (v) on the premise that the crime
was not committed against an SC & ST person solely on the ground of
their caste identity is to deny how social inequalities function in a E
cumulative fashion. It is to render the experiences of the most marginalized
invisible. It is to grant impunity to perpetrators who on account of their
privileged social status feel entitled to commit atrocities against socially
and economically vulnerable communities. This is not to say that there is
no requirement to establish a causal link between the harm suffered and F
the ground, but it is to recognize that how a person was treated or impacted
was a result of interaction of multiple grounds or identities. A true reading
of Section 3(2)(v) would entail that conviction under this provision can
be sustained as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the
occurrence of the offence. In the view which we ultimately take, a
reference of these decisions to a larger bench in this case is unnecessary. G
We keep that open and the debate alive for a later date and case.
56. If the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish the
commission of the offence on the ground that PW2 was a member of a
Scheduled Caste, a fresh look at the judgments in Ashrafi (supra) and
H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A Khuman Singh (supra) would have been warranted. However, a close
look at the evidence would demonstrate that the prosecution has not led
evidence to prove the ingredients of section 3(2)(v). Unfortunately, there
has been a serious gap in the evidence on that count. In the present
case, PW11 who was the Investigating Officer deposed:
B “PW 1 and PW2 did not state before me that since she belongs to
Schedule Caste the accused committed the offence. Part 1 C.D
does not disclose in specific that the accused was handed over to
the Circle. ‘Inspector of police. Witness adds by the time he reached
the scene of offence the Sub Inspector and Circle inspector of
police were present and the witnesses present there handed over
C to the accused to them in turn he instructed them to take the
accused to Mahanandi Police Station. It is not true to suggest that
my statement that the accused was handed over to Sub Inspector
of police or Circle Inspector of police is false as accused was not
present at the scene of offence.”
D 57. The Sessions Judge noticed the deposition of PW11. However,
the Sessions Judge noted that Exhibit P-1 disclosed that PW 2 belongs
to a Scheduled Caste. The Sessions Judge also observed in paragraph
39 of the judgment that PW1, who is the mother of PW2 is an “illiterate
village rustic woman” and merely because she did not mention in the
E report or statement to the police that the accused committed the offence
on the ground that PW2 belonged to the Scheduled Caste is not fatal to
the case of the prosecution under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act.
The Sessions Judge has also made observations in that regard in paragraph
40 of the judgment which has been extracted earlier where he stated
that the accused would not have dared to commit the crime if PW2
F belonged to an upper caste community particularly in a village atmosphere.
In appeal, the submission that the ingredients of the offence under Section
3(2)(v) were not established was specifically urged before the High
Court. The submission was dismissed with the observation that “even
otherwise still the offence under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code is
G made out”. Both the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have
failed to notice the crucial ingredient of Section 3(2)(v) (as it stood at the
material time prior to its substitution by Act 1 of 2016)52
52
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC & ST Act, prior to its amendment, read: “(2) Whoever, not
being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (v) commits any offence
under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of
H ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 515
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

58. The issue as to whether the offence was committed against a A
personon the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST or
such property belongs to such member is to be established by the
prosecution on the basis of the evidence at the trial. We agree with the
Sessions Judge that the prosecution’s case would not fail merely because
PW1 did not mention in her statement to the police that the offence was
B
committed against her daughter because she was a Scheduled Caste
woman. However, there is no separate evidence led by the prosecution
to show that the accused committed the offence on the basis of the
caste identity of PW2. While it would be reasonable to presume that the
accused knew the caste of PW2 since village communities are tightly
knit and the accused was also an acquaintance of PW2’s family, the C
knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the basis of the commission of
offence, having regard to the language of Section 3(2)(v) as it stood at
the time when the offence in the present case was committed. As we
have discussed above, due to the intersectional nature of oppression
PW2 faces, it becomes difficult to establish what led to the commission
D
of offence – whether it was her caste, gender or disability. This highlights
the limitation of a provision where causation of a wrongful act arises
from a single ground or what we refer to as the single axis model.
59. It is pertinent to mention that Section 3(2)(v) was amended by
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Amendment Act, 2015, which came into effect on 26 January 2016. The E
words “on the ground of” under Section 3(2) (v) have been substituted
with “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe”. This has decreased the threshold of proving that
a crime was committed on the basis of the caste identity to a threshold
where mere knowledge is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Section 8 F
which deals with presumptions as to offences was also amended to
include clause (c) to provide that if the accused was acquainted with the
victim or his family, the court shall presume that the accused was aware
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine”
The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment
G
Act, 2015, w.e.f 26 January 2016, amended Section 3(2)(v) and currently states:
“(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property [knowing
that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or such property
belongs to such member] shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine”. H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A of the caste or tribal identity of the victim unless proved otherwise. The
amended Section 8 reads as follows:
“8. Presumption as to offences. - In a prosecution for an offence
under this Chapter, if it is proved that
(a) the accused rendered [any financial assistance in relation to
B the offences committed by a person accused of], or reasonably
suspected of, committing, an offence under this Chapter, the Special
Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that such person
had abetted the offence;
(b) a group of persons committed an offence under this Chapter
C and if it is proved that the offence committed was a sequel to any
existing dispute regarding land or any other matter, it shall be
presumed that the offence was committed in furtherance of the
common intention or in prosecution of the common object.
[(c) the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or
D his family, the Court shall presume that the accused was aware
of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is
proved.]”
60. The Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities
Against Women and Children has observed that, “high acquittal rate
E motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful
communities for continued perpetration” and recommends inclusion of
provisions of SC & ST Act while registering cases of gendered violence
against women from SC & ST communities53. However, as we have
noted, one of the ways in which offences against SC & ST women fall
F through the cracks is due to the evidentiary burden that becomes almost
impossible to meet in cases of intersectional oppression. This is especially
the case when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground”
under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. The current regime
under the SC & ST Act, post the amendment, has facilitated the conduct
of an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing the causation
G requirement under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act with a knowledge
requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind of evidence that is
likely to be generated in cases such as these.
53
Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children,
15 March 2021, 107 available at https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/
H Committee_File/ReportFile/15/143/230_2021_3_14.pdf.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 517
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

61. However, since Section 3(2) (v) was amended and Clause (c) A
of Section 8 was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 with effect from 26 January
2016 these amendments would not be applicable to the case at hand.
The offence in the present case has taken place before the amendment,
on 31 March 2011. Therefore, we hold that the evidence in the present
case does not establish that the offence in the present case was committed
B
on the ground that such person is a member of a SC or ST. The conviction
under Section 3(2)(v) would consequently have to be set aside.
C.5 Punishment under Section 376 of the IPC
62. Mr Harinder Mohan Singh, learned Counsel has submitted
that as a sequel to the setting aside of the conviction under Section C
3(2)(v), the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life for the
offence under section 376 needs to be modified. In this context, learned
Counsel relied upon the provisions of Section 376(1).
63. Now Section 376(1), as it stood at the material time prior to its
substitution by Act 13 of 2013, was substituted by the Criminal Law D
(Amendment) Act 1983 (Act 43 of 1983) with effect from 25 December
1983. Section 376(1) as substituted by the amendment read as follows :
“376. Punishment to rape: (1) Whoever, except in the cases
provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not E
be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine
unless the woman raped is his own wife and is not under twelve
years of age, in which case, he shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years or
with fine or with both: F
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to
be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment
for a term of less than seven years.”
Essentially, the submission which has been urged on behalf of the
G
appellant is that under Section 376(1) as it then stood, Parliament had
made provisions for:
(i) A minimum sentence of seven years;
(ii) The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a term of
less than seven years for adequate and special reasons to be recorded H
by the Court;
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A (iii) A term of imprisonment extending to ten years; and
(iv) A term of imprisonment for life.
In the context of (iii) and (iv) above, the words used in Section
376(1) were “but which may be for life or for a term which may extend
to ten years”.
B
64. On behalf of the appellant it has been urged that in the present
case the Sessions Judge proceeded to impose a term of imprisonment
for life on the basis that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) was established.
If it is held that the offence under Section 3(2)(v) has not been established,
the Sessions Judge, it was urged, erred in taking the view that the court
C was not inclined to exercise its discretion “to give lesser punishment to
the accused”. In other words, it was submitted that the Sessions Judge
proceeded on the basis that a sentence of imprisonment for life was the
norm and there was a discretion to award a lesser punishment, which is
erroneous.
D 65. In evaluating the submission, it is necessary to note that the
Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of
an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and, independent
of that, also of an offence punishable under Section 376(1) of the Penal
Code. In considering the sentence to be imposed in respect of the two
E distinct offences, the Sessions Judge held that:
(i) A sentence of imprisonment for life should be imposed for
the offence under Section 376(1); and
(ii) A sentence of imprisonment for life would have to be imposed
for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act.
F
66. For the reasons which we have indicated earlier we have
come to the conclusion that the ingredients of the offence under Section
3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act were not established. The issue which
survives for consideration is as to whether the punishment of imprisonment
for life in respect of the offence under Section 376(1) should have been
G imposed.
67. On a plain reading of Section 376(1), as it stood after its insertion
with effect from 25 December 1983 by Act 43 of 1983, it is evident that
a sentence of imprisonment for life is one of the sentences contemplated
by the provision. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 was introduced
H with the aim of bringing widespread amendments to the laws of rape in
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 519
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the country, making it difficult for the offenders to escape conviction. A
The stated object and purpose of the Act was:
“There have been pressing demands inside and outside Parliament
for the amendment of the law relating to rape so that it becomes
more difficult for the offenders to escape conviction and severe
penalties are imposed on those convicted. […] B
2. […] The changes proposed in the Bill have been formulated
principally on the basis of the following considerations:-
[…]
(3) minimum punishments for rape should be prescribed;” C
Pursuant to the above-mentioned objective, Section 376(1)
provided that except for cases covered by sub-Section (2), a person
committing rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than seven years.
However, the proviso stipulated that the court may for ‘adequate D
and special reasons’ to be mentioned in the judgment impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.
The minimum sentence of seven years could, in other words, be
reduced to a lesser term only for adequate and special reasons to
be recorded in the judgment. This Court has time and again noted
that adequate and special reasons depend on the facts and E
circumstances of each case. These special and adequate reasons
are an exception to the rule and must be used sparingly and
interpreted strictly as held by this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Bala54. Section 376(1) however also stipulated that
the term of imprisonment “may be for life or for a term of ten F
years”.
68. Subsequently, in 2013, post the Nirbhaya case, the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 2013 was brought into force which amended
Section 376(1). The Parliament sought to take a tougher stand on crime
against women and limited the discretion of the judiciary regarding
G
imposition of sentences for offences involving rape by providing a
minimum punishment of seven years and a maximum punishment of life
imprisonment, without any exceptions for reduction of sentence. In 2018,
Section 376 has been further amended by the Criminal Law Amendment
54
(2005) 8 SCC 1. H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A Act 2018 (Act 22 of 2018) by which the minimum punishment has been
enhanced to ten years, with the maximum punishment remaining the
same.
69. Having detailed the amendments in Section 376 by the
Parliament, we are cognizant that we must apply the law as it was at the
B time of occurrence of the crime. The range of punishment within which
we must exercise our judicial discretion is the imposition of a minimum
punishment of 7 years (or less on existence of adequate and special
reasons), or 10 years or imprisonment for life. In determining the
appropriate sentence, this Court has consistently laid down that we must
of necessity be guided by all the relevant facts and circumstances
C including
(i) The nature and gravity of the crime;
(ii) The circumstances surrounding the commission of the sexual
assault;
D (iii) The position of the person on whom the sexual assault is
committed;
(iv) The role of the accused in relation to the person violated; and
(v) The possibility of the rehabilitation of the offender.
E The above factors are relevant for the determination of the
quantum of punishment as held in Ravji v. State of Rajasthan55, State
of Karnataka v. Krishnappa56,and State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar57
among others.
70. In addition to these factors, we must also be alive to the
F intersectional identity of PW2 and the underlying societal factors within
which the offence was committed. PW2 is a woman who is blind since
birth and is a member of a Scheduled Caste. These intersectional identities
placed her in a uniquely disadvantageous position. The Chhattisgarh
Pradesh High Court in Tekan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now
Chhattisgarh)58 dealt with the conviction of a person accused of raping
G
55
(1996) 2 SCC 175.
56
(2000) 4 SCC 75.
57
(2008) 7 SCC 550.
58
2014 Cri LJ 1409. Physical disability has been considered as an aggravating factor in
sentencing by other High Courts as well. See, for e.g.,Rabindrayan Das v. State, 1992
H Cri LJ 269, Orissa High Court.
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 521
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

a blind woman on multiple occasions, on the promise of marriage. The A
High Court was acutely aware of the misuse of the woman’s disability
by the accused and sentenced him to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.
The conviction and sentence were later upheld by this Court59. This
Court also dealt with the question of compensation to be paid to the
prosecutrix and the physical disadvantage accruing to her on account of
B
her disability. In doing so, Justice M Y Eqbal, speaking for the two-judge
bench, noted:
“15. Coming to the present case in hand, victim being
physically disadvantaged, she was already in a socially
disadvantaged position which was exploited maliciously by
C
the accused for his own ill intentions to commit fraud upon
her and rape her in the garb of promised marriage which
has put the victim in a doubly disadvantaged situation and
after the waiting of many years it has worsened. It would not
be possible for the victim to approach the National Commission
for Women and follow up for relief and rehabilitation. Accordingly, D
the victim, who has already suffered a lot since the day of the
crime till now, needs a special rehabilitation scheme.” (emphasis
supplied)
71. Similarly, we are also aware of the disadvantage faced by
women (and persons generally) belonging to the Scheduled Castes and E
Scheduled Tribes. As explained above, it is difficult and, in our opinion,
artificial to delineate the many different identities of an individual which
overlap to place them in a disadvantaged position of power and create
the circumstances for heinous offences such as rape to occur. At this
point, it would be relevant to note that a series of decisions of this Court
rendered by three-judge benches60 and two-judge benches61, have stated F
that “socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the
accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing
policy”. However, it is necessary to understand the context in which
this finding was made. In all of these cases, the Court was dealing with
the plea of mitigation of sentence awarded by the High Courts or the G
59
(2016) 4 SCC 461.
60
State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC 75; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Basodi (2009) 12 SCC 318.
61
State of Karnataka v. Raju (2007) 11 SCC 490; State of Rajasthan v. Vinod
Kumar, (2012) 6 SCC 770; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Santosh Kumar (2006) 6
SCC 1.
H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 3 S.C.R.

A lower courts on the ground of existence of ‘adequate and special reasons’
on account of the accused being a member of the scheduled caste/
tribe; belonging to a rural background; or being illiterate. It is on this
count that the Court rejected such a plea given the heinous nature of the
crime of rape and the gravity of the criminal act. In our opinion, these
judgments do not bar us from taking a holistic view of the various
B
intersectional identities which form a vital part of the facts and
circumstances of the act and speak to the nature of the crime.
72. In the present case, several circumstances bearing on the
sentence must be borne in mind. First, PW2, who was subjected to a
sexual assault was blind since birth. Second, the appellant was known to
C the brothers of PW2, including PW3. The appellant used to visit the
house in which PW2 resided with her parents and brothers. Bereft of
eye-sight, PW2 was able to identify the appellant by his voice with which
she was familiar. Third, shortly before entering the home of PW2, the
appellant enquired of PW1 where her sons were, when he was told that
D they were not at home. PW1 proceeded with her chores at a public
water tap. Taking advantage of the absence of the members of the
family from the family home, the appellant entered the house and
subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW1 has deposed that when she
entered the house together with PW3, PW4 and PW5 she found PW2 in
a nude condition on the ground bleeding from the injuries sustained on
E her genitals. The nature and circumstances in which the offence has
been committed would leave no manner of doubt that the appellant had
taken advantage of the position of the PW2 who was blind since birth.
He entered the house, familiar as he was with members of the family, in
their absence and subjected PW2 to a sexual assault. PW2 belongs to a
F Scheduled Caste. The prosecution has not led evidence to prove that the
offence, as we have noticed, was committed on the ground that she
belongs to a Scheduled caste within the meaning of section 3(2)(v) of
the SC and ST Act. This is a distinct issue. But the fact that PW2 belonged
to a Scheduled Caste is not a factor which is extraneous to the sentencing
process for an offence under Section 376. It is in that context, that we
G must read the observations of the Sessions Judge with a robust common
sense perception of ground realities. The appellant was 27 years old, a
mature individual who was working as a coolie together with the brothers
of PW2 for a couple of years. The nature and gravity of the offence in
the present case is serious in itself and it is compounded by the position
H of PW2 who was a visually disabled woman. A heinous offence has
PATAN JAMAL VALI v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 523
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

been committed on a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste. The A
imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be faulted.
D Conclusion and Summary of Findings
73. For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that
the conviction under Section 376(1) and the sentence imposed by the
Sessions Judge must be affirmed. In the circumstances we order as B
follows:
(i) The conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section
3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act and the sentence imposed in
respect of the offence is set aside and the appeal allowed to
that extent; and C

(ii) The conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under
Section 376(1) of the Penal Code and the sentence of
imprisonment for life is upheld. The fine of Rs 1,000/- and
default imprisonment of six months imposed by the Sessions
Judge and affirmed by the High Court shall also stand D
confirmed.
74. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
75. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
E
Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of.

F

G

H