PARTAP SINGHversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS

                          . PARTAP SINGH
                                                                       A
                                v.
                      UNION OF INDIA & ORS•

                        SEPTEMBER 6, 1985

            [E.S. VENJ<ATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA, JJ ·]
                                                                       B

     Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 15

 .   Hindu Succession Act, 1956's. 14(1) -:- Compromise order -
Property allotted to widow in lieu of her -right to . maintenance -
Whether becomes absolute estate ·On the coming into force of the
Act - Provision contained in s. 14(1) whether vague, discrimi-
                                                                       c
natory and ultra vires.

     Amar Siugh was the owner of certain agricultural lands. He
died leaving behind him two widows. by. name Jagir Kaur and Har
Kaur and the petitioner as his adopted son. Under an arrangement
                                                                       D
eacn of the two widows had been given one Third share in the
lands in lieu of their right of illaintenance. Har Kaur surreruiered
ber one third share in favour of the petitioner and it was
mutated in his favour. The petitioner filed a suit against Jagir
Kaur for obtaining a declaration that she had no right, title or
interest of any sort in the lands belonging to the deceased. A
compromise decree was passed on July 18, 1945 under which Jagir
                                                                       E
Kaur could retain tJ,e one third share in the lands .in question J.n
lieu of her.maintenance and on her death the petitioner could get
possession of the same. Later on Jagir Kaur by a· will dated
January 25, 1971 bequeathed the said one third share in favour of
Hardam Singh, respondent in the S.L.P. She died within a few days
thereafter.
                                                                       F

     The petitioner filed another suit claimi11& that    Jagir Kaur
had acquired one-third share in the lands of Amar Singh for the
              \                      .
first time uniier the compromise decree which conferred on her
only a limited estate and . that on her death he should get
possesstion of the same. The interest of Jagir Kaur in the lands
                                                                       G
allotted to her for maintenance under the compromise decree did
not become an absolute estate in her hands under s. 14(1) of the
Hindu Succession Act 1956. The Trial Court dismissing the suit
held that since Jagir .Kaur had a pre-existing right · to claim
maintenance from the estate of Amar Singh, her interest in the
lands allotted to her had became enlarged into an absolute estate
                                                                           H
     774            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A    on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956 and,
     therefore, the petitioner could not claim the lands in question
     after her death on the basis of compromise decree.

          Appeals to the District Judge as well as the High Court also
     failed.
B
           The petitioner filed Special Leave Petition as well as a
     Writ Petition under Article 32 questioning the constitutional
     validity of s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 contending:
     (1) that the prpvision contained in s. 14(1) was vague and
     uncertain and in view of the observations made by this Court in
     V. ' . l ' n l a - 6' Ors. y, V. Sesba llecldi (dead.) by L.Bs. 1977 (3)
c    s.c.a. 266-267 the section could not be relied upon any longer,
     and (2) that it was violative of Articles 14 and 15(1) as it had
     attempted to favour only one section of the comnunity that was
     Hindu women on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male
     members of that comnunity.

           Dismissing the Writ Petition as well as the S.L.P.,
D
           BELO: l. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 is
     not vague and is capable of implementation. This Court gave
     effect to that provision in n tae-e's case. The observations
                                       1


     were made only with a view to bringing to the notice of
     Parliament that the provisions of s. 14 required to be recast in
ll   order to avoid any possible litigation arising on account of the
     clumsy language used therein. The Court, however, did not find
     any difficulty in construing and applying s. 14 and in declaring
     that the property which had been allotted to the appellant No. l
     under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of right of
     maintenance became her absolute property on the coming into force
F    Qf the Act. The doubt, if any, about the meaning of that section
     was set at rest by the said decision. In the instant case, the
     position of Jagir Kaur was in no way different from the position
     of Appellant No. l in 1\Jl•""'"'R's caae. [778 B-E)

            2. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to remedy to some
G    extent the plight of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute
     interest in the properties inherited by her from her husband but
     who could only enjoy them with all the restrictions attached to a
     widow's estate under the Hindu Law. There is no justification for
      the 'males belonging to the Hindu community to raise any objection
     'to the beneficient provisions contained in section 14(1) of the
H
                PARTAP SINGH v. U.Q.I. [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]                  775


Act on the grounds of hostile discrimination. The provision is                     A
further protected by the express provision contained in clause
(3) of Article 15. (778 G-H, 779 A)

     CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION                   Special      Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 4934 of 1985.
                                                                                   B
     From the Judgment and Order dated 6·.1.1984 of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1254 of 1975.

                                     WITH

        Writ Petition No. 3947 of 1985.                                            c

         (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

         P.C.   !<hunger   and   A.M.      Tripathi    for   the    Appellant/ ·
Petitioner.
                                                                                   D
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        VENKATARAMIAH, J. The above petition for special leave is
filed by the petitioner under Article             p6 of the Constitution
requesting the Court to grant leave to him to prefer an appeal
against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana in. R.8.A. No. 1254 of 1975. He has also filed a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the
constitutionality of section 14(1) of the Hindu Suc~ession Act,
1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Since the two peti-
tions     are   connected,   they'   are    disposed    of   by    this   common
judgment;
                                                                                   F
     One Amar Singh was the owner of certain agricultural lands
measuring in all 33 Bighas 5 Biswas in the village Fatuhi Khera,
Tehsil Muktsar in the State of Punjab. He died in or about the
year 1932 leaving behind him two widows by name Jagir Kaur and
Har Kaur. The petitioner was his adopted son. Under an arrange-
ment each of the two widows had been given one-third share in the                  G
lands belonging to their husband in lieu of their right of
maintenance. In November, 1942 Har Kaur surrendered her one-third
share in the lands in favour of the petitioner and it was mutated
in his name on March 23, 1943. In 1945 the petitioner filed a
suit against Jagir Kaur, the other widow of Amar Singh, for
obtaining a declaration that she had. no right, title or interest                  H
of any sort in the lands belonging to Amar Singh. During the
pend.ency of the said suit a compromise was effected on July 18,
1945 under which the parties agreed that Jagir Kaur could retain
        776           SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1985] SUPP.2 S.C.R.

    A   the one-third share in the lands in question in lieu of her
        maintenance and on her death the peti ticner should get the
        possession of the same. Accordingly a decree was passed. Later on
        Jagir Kaur, who was in possession of the said one-third share of
        the lands, bequeathed the said share in favour of Hardam Singh,
        the respondent in the Special Leave Petition, under a Will on
B       January 25, 1971 and di.ed within a few days thereafter. There-
        after on April 2, 1971 the petitioner filed the present suit, out
        of which this appeal arises, claiming that Jagir Kaur had
        acquired one-third share in the lands of Amar Singh for the first
        time under the compromJse decree which conferred on her only a
        limited estate and that on her death he should get possession of
        the same. He urged that in the circUIIi.Stances, the interest of
c       Jagir Kaur in the lands allotted to her for maintenance under the
        compromise decree did not become an absolute estate in her hands
        under sectfon 14(1) of the Act. Since it could not be disputed
        that Jagir Kaur had a pre-existing right to claim maiGtenance
        from the estate of Amar Singh, the Trial Court held that the
        interest of Jagir Kaur in the lands allotted to her had become
        enlarged into an absolute estate on the coming into force of the
D       Act and, therefore, the petitioner could not c.laim the lands in
        question after her death on the basis of the compromise decree.
        Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Against the said judgment
        and decree of the Trial Court the petitioner filed an appeal
        before the Additional District Judge, Faridkot. In the course of
        the said appeal the petitioner conceded that the Will was a
        genuine and valid one, but it was contended that section 14(1) of
        the Act was not applicable to the case but it was governed by
        section 14(2) of the Act. The appeal was, however, dismissed.' The
        Second Appeal filed by the petitioner before the High Court of
        Punjab & Haryana against the judgment and decree of the District
        Judge was also dismissed. The Special Leave Petition, referred to
F
        above, is filed against the judgment and decree passed by the
        High Court. Realising that it is not possible for him to succeed
        in his suit in the presence of section 14(1) of the act, the
        petitioner has filed the above Writ Petition questioning its
        consti.tlltional valid1. ty.
G            Two contentions are urged by the learned counsel -for the
        petitioner in support of his plea that section 14(1) of the Act
        is unconstitutional; (1) that the provision contained in section
        14(1) of th~ Act is vague and uncertain; and (2) that it is
        violative of Article 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution as it has
        attempted to favour ~nly one section of the cOD1DJUnity, i.e.,
H
        Hindu women on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male
            PARTAP SINGH v. u.o.r. [VTh'KATABAMIAH, J.]          777


members of that community. In support of his first limb of attack
he relied on the following observations made by this Court in v.            A
T>iJasl!J!llJI! & Ors. v. v. Sesha Redd! (dead) by L.Rs. [1977] (3)
S.C.R., at page 266-267 :

            "It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evi-
            dent .as far back as 1967 that sub Sectfons (1) and (2)
         .. of section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of           B
            construction in cases where property was received by a
            Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument
            granting such property prescribed a restricted estate
            for her in the property and divergence of judicial
            opinion was.creating a situation which might well be
            described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum       c
            of certainty which it must always possess in order to
           .guide the affairs of men, the legisldture, for all
           these years, did not care to step in to .remove       the
           . constructional dilemna facing , the courts and adopted
            an attitude of indifference and. inaction, untroubled
                                                                        D
            and unmoved by the large number.of cases on this point
             encumbering the. files of different courts in the
             country, when by. the simple expedient of an amendment,
           . it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an
             end to n~edless litigation. This is a classic instance
             of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt
             draftsmanship, has .created endless confusion for
                                                                        E
             litigants ·and proved a paradise for lawyers. It
             illustrates forcibly the need of an authority or body
             to be set up by the Government or the Legislature
             which would constantly .keep in touch with         the
             adJUdicatory authorities in the country as also with
             the legal profession and immediately respond by making
                                                                        F
             recommendations for suitable amendments whenever it is
             found . that a particular satuto:cy provision . is, by
             reason of inspt language or unhappy draftsmanship,
             creating difficulty of construction . or is otherwise
             inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and
           is consequently counter productive of the result. it
                                                                        G
           was intended to achieve. If there is a close inter
           action between the adjudicatory wing of the State .and
           a dynamic and ever alert authority or body which
           responds swiftly to the draw·backs, and deficiencies in
           the law in actiofl, much of the time and money, which
           is at present expanded in fruitless    litig~tion,   would
                                                                        H
      778           SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


 A               be saved and law would achieve a certain amount of
                 clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make
                 it easily intelligible to the people."

           It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner
      quite ingeniously that since Parliament had not amended section
 ll   14 after the above judgment of this Court as indicated by the
      Court, the said section could not relied upon any longer.

           We do not find any substance in the contention that section
      14(1) of the Act is vague and is not capabl~ of implementation
      because .this Court gave effect of that sub-section in the very
      judgment on which the petitioner relies notwithstanding the
 c    observations extracted above. Those observations were made by
      this Court only with a view to bringing to the notice of Parlia-
      ment that the provisions of section 14 required to be recast in
      order to avoid any possible litigation arising on account of the
      clumsy language used in section 14 of the Act. The Court, how-
      ever, did not find any difficulty in construing and applying
      section.14(1) of the Act to the case of the appellant No. 1 in
lJ    that case and in declaring that the property which had been
      allotted to her under compromise in lieu or satisfaction of right
      of maintenance became her absolute property on the coming into
      force of the Act. The doubt, if any, about the meaning of that
      section was set at rest by the above decision. In the instant
      case the position of Jagir Kaur was in no way different from the
      position of the appellant No. 1 in 'J'ul""'!l'"''s case (supra). The
      first ground, therefore, should fail.

           There is very little substance in the second contention
      raised by the petitioner also. The submission made on behalf of
      the petitioner in this case over-looks the benign constitutional
F     provision in clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution which
      provides that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from
      making any special provision for women and children. The said
      provision over-rides clause (1) of Article 15 of the Constitution
      which provides that the State shall not discriminate.against any
      citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of
      birth or any of them. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to
      reme:dy to some extent the plight of a Hindu woman who could not
      claim absolute interest in the properties inherited by her from
      her husband but who could only enjoy theffi with all the
      restrictions attached to a widow's estate under the Hindu       law.
      There is now hardly any justification for the males belonging to
II    the Hindu Cotmllunity to raise any objection   to   the   beneficent
            PARTAP SINGH v. u.o.r. [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]          779


provisions contained in section 14(1) of the Act on the ground of     A
hostile discrimination. The above provision is further protected .
by the express provision contained in clause (3) of Article 15,
since it is a special provision enacted for the benefit of Hindu
women. We do not find any merit in the Writ Petition. The Writ
Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition       B
also has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.


                                           '
A.P .J.                                        Petitions dismissed.