Holding

The prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Sections 366A and 506 IPC, and the conviction is set aside.

Summary

The appellant, Parminder Kaur, a single woman living with her child and mother, was convicted under IPC sections 366A and 506 for allegedly enticing a minor girl to illicit intercourse with her tenant boy and for threatening the victim’s brother. The prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of the minor victim and her father, while the accused offered a Section 313 defence that there was no tenant and that the complaint was false retaliation for a prior rape allegation she had made. The trial and High Courts dismissed the defence, ignored contradictions in the star‑witnesses’ statements, and condoned a five‑day delay in filing the FIR. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the delay, the numerous inconsistencies, the failure to trace the alleged tenant, and the lack of any corroborative evidence created reasonable doubt, and that the defence under Section 313 required the prosecution to rebut, which it failed to do. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Issues considered

The five‑day delay in registration of the FIR and its impact on the prosecution’s case
Whether contradictions in the testimonies of the minor victim and her father create reasonable doubt
Whether the trial courts erred in not giving due weight to the accused’s Section 313 defence
Whether the prosecution proved the elements of Sections 366A and 506 IPC beyond reasonable doubt
Whether the Supreme Court may re‑appreciate evidence in exceptional circumstances

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 366A, s. 506

Subjects

Sexual offencesDelay in FIRSection 313 CrPC defenceEvidence appraisalConviction reversalCriminal intimidationBurden of proofRe‑appreciation of evidence

Judgment

508 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 508 [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 283 of 2011)
B JULY 28, 2020
[N. V. RAMANA, SURYA KANT AND
KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.366A and 506 – Case of prosecution
C that the appellant, a single lady who had a young boy as her tenant,
lived in minor prosecutrix’s (PW1) neighbourhood – She tried to
entice the prosecutrix to indulge in illicit intercourse with the rich
tenant boy and allegedly pushed her into the room occupied by him
and bolted it from outside – Door was unlocked after five minutes,
with prosecutrix’s father (PW2) standing outside – Boy escaped–
D Matter was reported only after the appellant allegedly threatened
to kill prosecutrix’s brother if anyone was informed – Alternate
version given by appellant u/s.313,CrPC was rejected – Convicted
u/ss.366A, 506 – Held: Five day delay in registration of FIR gains
importance as the father of the victim is an eye-witness to a part of
E the occurrence – Difficult to appreciate that a father would await a
second incident to happen before moving the law into motion – No
complaint registered against the tenant boy who was not even traced
– Numerous contradictions between testimonies of PW1 & PW2,
which are fatal to prosecution’s case – Important links of the story,
including what happened in the crucial five minutes when the girl
F was locked inside the room or how the male tenant reacted, are
missing – Appellant’s alternate version that there was no male tenant
at all and no one except her child and mother lived with her and
that she was falsely implicated as vengeance for filing rape complaint
against the person with whom the prosecutrix’s father used to work,
could not be lightly brushed aside – Prosecution failed to prove
G
appellant’s guilt u/ss.366A & 506 beyond reasonable doubt – CrPC,
1973 – s.313.
Code of Criminal Prcedure, 1973 – s.313 – Held: Once a
plausible version is put forth in defence at the s.313 examination
stage, then it is for prosecution to negate such defense plea.
H
508
PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 509
STATE OF PUNJAB

Criminal Law – Sexual Offences – Delay in FIR – Sweeping A
assumptions by Courts – Effect of – Discussed.
Criminal Law – Re-appreciation of evidence by Supreme Court
– Discussed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD 1.1 The five-day delay in registration of the FIR, in
the facts and circumstances of this case, gains importance as the
father of the victim is an eye-witness to a part of the occurrence.
It is difficult to appreciate that a father would await a second
incident to happen before moving the law into motion. Sweeping
assumptions concerning delays in registration of FIRs for sexual C
offences, send a problematic signal to society and create
opportunities for abuse by miscreants. Instead, the facts of each
individual case and the behaviour of the parties involved ought
to be analysed by courts before reaching a conclusion on the
reason and effect of delay in registration of FIR. In the present D
case, neither is Section 366A by itself a sexual offence in the
strict sense nor do the inactions of the prosecutrix or her father
inspire confidence on genuineness of the prosecution story. PW-
1 and PW-2 differed in their physical description of the boy’s age,
clothing and his whereabouts. If the boy was indeed a tenant and
if he did live there for months, it is highly mootable that he E
couldn’t have been traced. Lack of examination of material
independent witnesses, adversely affects the case of the
prosecution. [Paras 11, 13, 15][515-A-C; 516-A; 516-D]
1.2 Ordinarily, the Supreme Court ought not to re-appreciate
evidence. However, where the courts below have dealt with the F
material-on-record in a cavalier or mechanical manner likely to
cause gross injustice, then this Court in such exceptional
circumstances may justifiably re-appraise the evidence to advance
the cause of justice. Such re-assessment ought not to take place
routinely and ought not to become substitution of an otherwise G
plausible view taken by the Courts below. There are numerous
clear contradictions between the testimonies of the two star-
witnesses, which is fatal to the prosecution case. Important links
of the story, including what happened in the crucial five minutes
when the girl was locked inside the room or how the male tenant
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A reacted, are missing. Similarly, other links of the story are grossly
inconsistent and don’t fit with each other. [Paras 16, 17, 19 and
20][516-G-H; 517-A, C; 518-B-C]
1.3 Once a plausible version has been put forth in defence
at the s.313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution
B to negate such defense plea.The alternate version given by the
appellant could not be lightly brushed aside. Her two-part defence
was that first there was no male tenant at all and no one except
for her child and mother lived with her, and second, that she was
being falsely implicated as vengeance for filing a rape complaint
against one ‘BS’ with whom the prosecutrix’s father used to work.
C A rape complaint had indeed been made by the appellant against
him approximately seven months previous to the present incident.
DW-1, who lived in the neighbourhood of the parties, both
supported the appellant’s claim that there was no male tenant in
her home and created sufficiently reasonable connection between
D ‘BS’ and the prosecutrix’s father by volunteering that PW-2 was
residing in BS’s premises. The trial Court’s analysis of the
appellant’s Section 313 defence ought to have been deeper, before
concluding it as being false or untrustworthy. Given the facts of
this case where the common testimony of PW-1 on both charges
was doubted, it would be unwise to rely upon it as the sole piece
E of evidence to convict the appellant for criminal intimidation
without any other corroboration. [Paras 21-25][518-F-H;
519-A-G]
Kamij Shaikh v. Emperor AIR 1948 Pat 73 – approved.

F Musauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, (2009) 14 SCC
541 : [2009] 9 SCR 1135; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore
Kubersing Chamansing and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 145;
Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam (2019) 13 SCC 289 :
[2018] 13 SCR 1108; M Abbas v. State of Kerala (2001)
10 SCC 103; Manik Taneja & Anr. v. State of
G Karnataka & Anr. (2015) 7 SCC 423 : [2015] 1 SCR
156 – relied on.
Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2003)
8 SCC 551 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 792 – referred to.

H
PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 511
STATE OF PUNJAB

Case Law Reference A
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 792 referred to Para 2
[2009] 9 SCR 1135 relied on Para 14
(2001) 6 SCC 145 relied on Para 15
[2018] 13 SCR 1108 relied on Para 21 B
(2001) 10 SCC 103 relied on Para 21
[2015] 1 SCR 156 relied on Para 25
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
283 of 2011. C
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.1999 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 305-SB
of 1999.
Dushyant Parashar, Dinesh Pandey, Manu Parashar, Ms. Jaspreet
Gogia, Advs. for the appearing parties. D

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURYA KANT, J.
1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by Parminder
Kaur, impugning the judgment dated 30.11.2009 of the High Court of E
Punjab and Haryana through which her challenge to a judgment dated
27.02.1999 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala was turned
down, thereby confirming her conviction of three years rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2000 under Sections 366A and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”). F
FACTS & CASE HISTORY
2. The prosecution story, as recorded in the FIR at around noon
on 24.02.1996, was that the appellant was a single lady living with her
child, mother and a young boy as her tenant in the neighbourhood of the
prosecutrix’s1 house. About a week prior to registration of the police G
complaint, the appellant called the prosecutrix to her house and tried to
entice her to indulge in illicit intercourse with the rich tenant boy in return
for clothes and trips from him. The appellant at about 6.00 A.M. on
1
The name of the prosecutrix/victim has been withheld, in compliance with the ratio in
Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 8 SCC 551. H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A 19.02.1996, allegedly pushed the visiting prosecutrix into the room
occupied by the tenant boy and bolted it from the outside. It was only on
hearing the prosecutrix’s screams that after five minutes the door was
unlocked, with her father (Hari Singh, PW-2), Bhan Singh and Karnail
Singh standing outside. Swiftly, the boy ran out of the room and
successfully escaped. Upon the prosecutrix emerging from the room,
B
her father protested and expressed his dismay to the by-standing appellant.
Scared for their reputation, the prosecutrix and her father returned to
their home without reporting the matter to anyone, except the
prosecutrix’s mother. However, on 24.02.1996 at 7.00 A.M., the appellant
caught hold of the prosecutrix outside her house and threatened to kill
C her brother if anyone was informed of the matter. The prosecutrix was
able to escape the appellant’s clutches and worried at this high-
handedness, proceeded with her father towards the police station to
report these two incidents and lodged a complaint.
3. During trial, the prosecution examined five witnesses, including
D the prosecutrix (PW-1), her father (PW-2), the draftsman who prepared
the site plan (PW-3), the headmistress who proved the prosecutrix’s age
(PW-4) and the investigating officer (PW-5). The appellant, in turn, both
denied all allegations and examined one witness of her own – a neighbour,
Gurnail Singh (DW-1) and offered an alternate version in her statement
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”),
E claiming that there was no tenant at all in her home and that the complaint
was nothing but motivated revenge at the instance of one Bhola Singh
against whom she had levelled allegations of rape a few months ago.
4. This alternate version was summarily rejected by the trial Court
which concluded that the appellant’s claim of the complaint being at the
F instance of Bhola Singh was unlikely both because malicious prosecution
of sexual abuses involving minors, at the instance of third parties, was
improbable; and even DW-1 in his cross-examination had admitted that
Hari Singh was a permanent employee of the Irrigation Department and
could not be a Karinda (employee) of Bhola Singh as claimed by the
G appellant.
5. Relying upon the school records produced by DW-4, the Court
observed that the prosecutrix was studying in Class VII with date of
birth as 12.04.1982, thereby unimpeachably making her a minor. Without
delving into the elements of Section 366A or 506 IPC, or whether each
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PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 513
STATE OF PUNJAB [SURYA KANT, J.]

individual ingredient had been satisfied by the prosecution, the learned A
Additional Sessions Judge focused on negating the defences projected
by the appellant. In response to the contradictions between important
aspects of the prosecutrix and her father’s testimonies, like differences
in physical description and antecedents of the male tenant and the inability
of the witnesses and the police to catch or trace the boy, the trial Court
B
instead noted that there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix and
her father. The five-day delay in registration of the FIR was condoned
for having arisen out of natural fear of reputation of the prosecutrix and
her family, as well as the mild severity of the case. Similarly, the non-
examination of the other two independent witnesses, Bhan Singh and
Karnail Singh was ignored as being normal reluctance of bystanders in C
cases where there was no rape or assault.
6. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the appellant had
intentionally induced the prosecutrix to perform illicit intercourse with
her male tenant, and that she had also criminally intimidated the prosecutrix
by threatening her family member. Noting the large number of dependents D
that the appellant had to support as a single lady, and considering the
lack of commission of any assault or rape against the prosecutrix, the
appellant was concurrently sentenced to three years rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs 2,000 (or further six months rigorous
imprisonment in lieu thereof) under Section 366A, and one year rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000 (or further three months rigorous E
imprisonment in lieu thereof) under Section 506 of IPC.
7. The aggrieved appellant approached the High Court which too
refused to interfere with the order of conviction. While dismissing the
appeal, the High Court observed that the statement of the accused under
Section 313 CrPC appeared to be an after-thought, and that in the absence F
of any evidence proving enmity between the parties it was impossible
that anyone would falsely implicate a woman in such like offence. The
minority of the prosecutrix was noted as having been proved, and the
testimonies of PW1 and PW2 were held to be impeccable and
corroborating each other completely. Similar to the trial Court, the High G
Court also explained-away the delay in registration of FIR as a result of
family reputation put at stake in matters of sexual offence cases. Other
omissions in the form of non-examination of Bhan Singh and Hari Singh
and failure to catch or trace the identity of the male tenant were deemed
insignificant and immaterial.
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514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
8. The judgments of the trial Court and High Court have been
elegantly assailed before us by learned counsel for the appellant who
contended that the testimonies of the two star-witnesses, being full of
material contradictions, are far from reliable. The delay in registration of
B the FIR and the lack of any attempt to catch or even later trace the male
tenant showed that the story was concocted by the prosecutrix’s family
with ulterior motives. Reliance was also placed on the denial and alternate
version put forth by the appellant in her statement under Section 313
CrPC, and the failure of the Courts below to either examine such statutory
statement in-depth or for the prosecution to belie it effectively. Emphasis
C was laid on the statement of DW-1 who volunteered during his cross-
examination that PW-2 was then living in the house owned by Bhola
Singh, the person against whom the appellant had alleged rape. The
deleterious effect of these proceedings on Bhola Singh’s trial and his
subsequent acquittal on grounds that Parminder Kaur (the appellant here)
D was a lady of questionable character who indulged in trafficking of minors,
was highlighted to show colourable motive behind registration of this
case against the appellant.
9. On the contrary, learned state counsel supported the impugned
judgment(s) by placing emphasis on the concurrent findings of the Courts
E below. Reliance was also placed on PW-2’s cross-examination wherein
he himself denied knowing Bhola Singh, to counter the allegation of false
implication by the prosecutrix.
ANALYSIS
I. Sweeping generalisations and superficial analysis
F
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length through video conferencing, we find from the impugned orders
that the Courts below failed in making the desired attempt to delve deep
into the factual matrix of this case. Many aspects, as discussed hereunder,
have completely been ignored or only dealt with hastily. Further, the
G reasoning is generic and is premised upon generalisations which may
not be necessarily true always. It is indisputable that parents would not
ordinarily endanger the reputation of their minor daughter merely to falsely
implicate their opponents, but such clichés ought not to be the sole basis
of dismissing reasonable doubts created and/or defences set out by the
accused.
H
PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 515
STATE OF PUNJAB [SURYA KANT, J.]

11. Similarly, the five-day delay in registration of the FIR, in the A
facts and circumstances of this case, gains importance as the father of
the victim is an eye-witness to a part of the occurrence. It is difficult to
appreciate that a father would await a second incident to happen before
moving the law into motion. Sweeping assumptions concerning delays in
registration of FIRs for sexual offences, send a problematic signal to
B
society and create opportunities for abuse by miscreants. Instead, the
facts of each individual case and the behaviour of the parties involved
ought to be analysed by courts before reaching a conclusion on the reason
and effect of delay in registration of FIR. In the facts of the present
case, neither is Section 366A by itself a sexual offence in the strict
sense nor do the inactions of the prosecutrix or her father inspire C
confidence on genuineness of the prosecution story. No steps were taken
to avail of medical examination of the victim, nor was the Panchayat or
any social forum approached for any form of redress till the occurrence
of the second alleged incident.
12. Further, it is beyond comprehension that the prosecutrix’s father D
and his two male associates failed to stop the tenant boy who was
allegedly about to commit a sexual offence with the minor victim and
neither did they later make any attempt to even register a complaint
against him. Strangely, the prosecution has acquiesced to such
disappearance of the boy from the scene. Still further, the father of the
E
prosecutrix merely registered his protest to the appellant on the scene,
instead of reacting instinctively and approaching police authorities when
faced with possible trafficking of his daughter. This conduct of belatedly
proceeding against only the prosecutrix creates a lurking suspicion against
the prosecution case and it may not be totally improbable to infer that it
was a malicious attempt at the behest of Bhola Singh to falsely implicate F
a weak rape victim and stifle her ability to seek justice.
II. Shoddy investigation and prosecution
13. The original record elucidates the lack of serious effort on
part of either the investigation agency or the prosecutor to bring home
the appellant’s guilt. Save for the initiative of the prosecutrix and her G
father to register the complaint, no substantive evidence has been gathered
by the police. Despite the male tenant having been residing with the
appellant allegedly for many months, the police were unable to even
discover his name, let alone his antecedents or location. Further, DW-1
casts an impressionable doubt on the existence of the boy in the first H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A place. This is further buttressed by the fact that PW-1 and PW-2 differed
in their physical description of the boy’s age, clothing and his
whereabouts. If the boy was indeed a tenant and if he did live there for
months, it is highly mootable that he couldn’t have been traced.
14. The spot map prepared by PW-3 also has glaring omissions.
B The location of Bhan Singh’s house and the place where the appellant
allegedly threatened the prosecutrix on 24.02.1996 are not even marked.
Letters which the prosecutrix alleged in her examination-in-chief and
police complaint that the appellant got written from her, have not been
produced during trial. These could have shed light on the relationship
between the accused, prosecutrix and the male tenant prior to the incident.
C It is the duty of the prosecution to lead the best evidence in its possession,
and failure to do so ought to lead to an adverse inference.2
15. Non-examination of Bhan Singh and Karnail Singh is also a
noticeable lapse, given the gaps in the prosecution story. It appears that
no serious attempt was made to get them examined to resolve the
D contradictions in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2. Such lack of
examination of material independent witnesses, adversely affects the
case of the prosecution. This Court in Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore
Kubersing Chamansing and others3, viewed that:
“19. … It is true that if a material witness, who would unfold
E the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the
prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise,
or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case
which could have been supplied or made good by examining
a witness who though available is not examined, the
F prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency
and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the
court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution
by holding that if the witness would have been examined it
would not have supported the prosecution case. ...”

G III. Gross mis-appreciation of conflicting testimonies
16. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court ought not to re-appreciate
evidence. However, where the courts below have dealt with the material-
on-record in a cavalier or mechanical manner which is likely to cause
2
Musauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, (2009) 14 SCC 541, 11-15.
3
H (2001) 6 SCC 145.
PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 517
STATE OF PUNJAB [SURYA KANT, J.]

gross injustice, then this Court in such exceptional circumstances may A
justifiably re-appraise the evidence to advance the cause of justice. There
is no gainsaying that such re-assessment ought not to take place routinely
and ought not to become substitution of an otherwise plausible view
taken by the Courts below.
17. The trial Court has summarily disregarded the contradictions B
highlighted by the defense side, on the premise that such contradictions
had no material bearing and that there was no reason to disbelieve the
prosecutrix. The High Court too has opined that PW-1 and PW-2 have
completely corroborated each other and their testimonies were
impeccable. These reasons, in our considered opinion, are not only
contrary to the record but they also lead to an impermissible reversal of C
the burden of proof imposed in criminal trials. There are numerous clear
contradictions between the testimonies of these two star-witnesses, which
we find fatal to the prosecution case.
18. First, PW-1 states that when the door was unlocked from
outside, only her father (PW-2) and Bhan Singh were present outside. D
However, this contradicts both the information she gave in the police
complaint and the testimony of her father (PW-2) who states that
additionally a third person, Karnail Singh, was also present. Second, the
prosecutrix’s description of the male tenant differs significantly from
that of her father. Whereas PW-1 estimated his age at about 26 years E
and described him as wearing a pant-shirt, PW-2 believed the boy to be
18-19 years’ old and wearing a banian, underwear and dirty shirt. Third,
on the antecedents of the anonymous boy, the prosecutrix stated that he
was residing with the appellant for a year, whereas this period was
materially less at only 2-3 months per her father. Fourth, whereas
prosecutrix claimed that her father and Bhan Singh unsuccessfully F
attempted to catch the tenant while he was escaping from the room,
PW-2 himself states that he was too perplexed to either run or raise any
alarm. Fifth and most notably, on the point of recording of the FIR, the
testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-5 all differ noticeably. Whereas
PW-1 claims that the complaint was recorded by PW-5 while sitting on G
a “patthar” (stone), PW-2 claims that the same was recorded by PW-5
while sitting on a “concrete bench” in the waiting shed of a bus stand in
the presence of two other policemen. Most intriguingly, PW-5 gives an
entirely third version, claiming that he was present at the bus stand with
five other police officials and that the statement was written not by him
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518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A but by another ASI, who placed the papers on the bonnet of the jeep
while standing.
19. In addition to these inconsistencies which cast a serious shadow
of doubt over the version of events put forth by the prosecution, the
accounts of PW-1 and PW-2 are superficial and lack detail. Important
B links of the story, including what happened in the crucial five minutes
when the girl was locked inside the room or how the male tenant reacted,
are missing.
20. Similarly, other links of the story are grossly inconsistent and
don’t fit with each other. PW-2 admits to being not at home and instead
C outside Bhan Singh’s house during the initial part of the incident, which
as per the prosecutrix’s statement was a 10-minute walk from the spot
of the crime. It is thus unlikely that PW-2 could have heard the
prosecutrix’s screams from such afar or could have covered such a
significant distance in less than five minutes as claimed by PW-1. There
are, thus, mutual contradictions in the prosecution story.
D
IV. Failure to refute Section 313 CrPC statement
21. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after the
prosecution closes its evidence and examines all its witnesses, the accused
is given an opportunity of explanation through Section 313(1)(b). Any
E alternate version of events or interpretation proffered by the accused
must be carefully analysed and considered by the trial Court in compliance
with the mandate of Section 313(4). Such opportunity is a valuable right
of the accused to seek justice and defend oneself. Failure of the trial
Court to fairly apply its mind and consider the defence, could endanger
the conviction itself.4 Unlike the prosecution which needs to prove its
F case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to create
reasonable doubt or prove their alternate version by mere preponderance
of probabilities.5 Thus, once a plausible version has been put forth in
defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the
prosecution to negate such defense plea.
G 22. In the case at hand, the alternate version given by the appellant
could not be lightly brushed aside. Her two-part defence, put succinctly,
was that first there was no male tenant at all and no one except for her
child and mother lived with her, and second, that she was being falsely
4
Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289, 19.
5
H M Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103, 10.
PARMINDER KAUR @ P.P. KAUR @ SONI v. 519
STATE OF PUNJAB [SURYA KANT, J.]

implicated as vengeance for filing a rape complaint against one Bhola A
Singh with whom the prosecutrix’s father used to work.
23. It is revealed that a rape complaint had indeed been made by
the appellant against Bhola Singh approximately seven months previous
to the present incident. Not only did she face difficulties in registering an
FIR of rape with the police, but she also had to take pains in filing a B
private complaint and prosecuting the case against such third party. In
fact, the effect of these proceedings was in line with the appellant’s
defence, for in that rape trial the trial Court drew a damning observation
against her character (calling her a child trafficker) owing to these
proceedings.
C
24. Lastly, DW-1, who lived in the neighbourhood of the parties,
both supported the appellant’s claim that there was no male tenant in her
home and created sufficiently reasonable connection between Bhola
Singh and the prosecutrix’s father by volunteering that PW-2 was residing
in Bhola Singh’s premises. Reliance on mere admission by DW-1 during
cross-examination that PW-2 was a government employee, neither D
negates the defense of false implication nor does it imply that PW-2
couldn’t be working with Bhola Singh in a part-time/casual capacity or
staying in Bhola Singh’s house. Thus, the trial Court’s analysis of the
appellant’s Section 313 defence ought to have been deeper, before
concluding it as being false or untrustworthy. E
V. Charge of Criminal Intimidation
25. Proving the intention of the appellant to cause alarm or compel
doing/abstaining from some act, and not mere utterances of words, is a
pre-requisite of successful conviction under Section 506 of IPC.6 The
trial Court has undertaken no such separate analysis or recorded any F
finding on this count, thus calling into question the conviction for criminal
intimidation. Further, the nature of this charge is such that it is a derivative
of the main charge of ‘procuration of minor girls’. Given the facts of this
case where the common testimony of PW-1 on both charges has been
doubted, it would be unwise to rely upon it as the sole piece of evidence G
to convict the appellant for criminal intimidation without any other
corroboration.7

6
Manik Taneja & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 423, 12.
7
Kamij Shaikh v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Pat 73, 5.
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520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 6 S.C.R.

A CONCLUSION
26. We are thus of the considered view that the prosecution has
failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the appellant under
Section 366A and 506 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, for
the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and
B sentence awarded by the Courts below are set aside. The appellant is
acquitted and consequently set free.

Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H