PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR AND ORS.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

                             [2017] IOS.C.R. 12


A      PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI
                    KARMUR AND ORS.
                                      v.
                     STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

B                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1723 of2017)
                             OCTOBER 4, 2017
           [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
                  DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
c
         s. 482 - Inherent jurisdiction - Exercise of by the High
   Court - Quashing of FIR/criminal proceedings - Complaint alleging
  that accused and others hatched a conspiracy resulting into tramfer
  of valuable land belonging to complainant a11d his siblings on the
D basis of the forged documents - Registration of FIR u!ss. 384, 467,
  468, 471, I20-B, 506(2) - Quashing of FIR sought on the ground
  of amicable settlement between the parties - Rejection by the High
  Court - On appeal, held: High Court was just(fied in declining to
  quash the FIR - Instant case, is not merely one i11volving a private
  dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties who
E entered into a settlement later - Case involves a/legations of
  extortion, forgery, .fabrication of documents, utilization of.fabricated
  documents to effectuate tramfers of title before the registering
  authorities and deprivation of the complainant of his interest in
  land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney - Allegations
  implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest
F
  in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land - Such offences
  cwtnot be construed to be merely private or civil but implicate
  societal interest in prosecuting serious crime - Penal Code, 1860 -
  ss. 384, 467. 468, 471, I20-B, 506(2).
          s. 482 - Inherent powers of the High Court - Quashing of
G   FIR/criminal proceedings - Principles to be kept in mind - Stated.
          A complaint was filed against the appellants and other co-
    accused alleging that they hatched a conspiracy resulting into
    transfer of valuable land belonging to the complainant and his
    siblings on the basis of the forged documents. The appellants
H
                                     12
   PARBATBHAI AAHIR@ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI                          13
           KARMUR v. STATE OF GUJARAT

filed a petition seeking quashing of the First Information Report     A
on the ground that the appellants had amicably settled the dispute
with the complainant. The High Court rejected the prayer to quash
the FIR. Hence the present appeal.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1.1 The principles to be kept in mind while quashing       B
FIR/criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. are:
        (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
       Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or
       to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer
       new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers            C
       which inhere in the High Court;
        (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
       quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding
       on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at
       between the offender and the victim is not the same as D
       the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
       compounding an offence. While compounding an offence,
       the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
       Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
       power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the E
       offence is non-compoundable.
        (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding
       or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its
       jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must
       evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
                                                                      F
       exercise of the inherent power;
        (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a
       wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to
       secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of
       the process of any court;
                                                                      G
        (v) The decision as .to whether a complaint or First
       Information Report should be quashed on the ground that
       the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
       ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
       no exhaustive elaboration of principles can b1• formulated;
                                                                      H
14    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 10 S.C.R.


A     (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
     while dealing with a pica that the dispute has been settled,
     the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
     gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
     involving mental depravity or offences such as murder,
     rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though
B
     the victim or the family of the victim have settled the
     dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in
     nature but have a serious impact upon society. The
     decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded
     on the overriding element of public interest in punishing
c    persons for serious offences;
     (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may
     be criminal cases which ·have an overwhelming or
     predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a
     distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent
D    power to quash is concerned;
      (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
     commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
     transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
     appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
E    settled the dispute;
     (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
     proceedmg if in view of the compromise between the
     disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and
     the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
F    oppression and prejudice; and
      (x) Economic offences involving the financial and economic
     well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond
     the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants.
     The High Court would be justified in declining to qu:ish
     where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a
u
     financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
     conse<1uences of the act complained of upon the financial
     or economic system will weigh in the balance. [Para 15]
     [25-E-H; 26-A-H; 27-A-B]

H
   PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI                           15
           KARMUR v. STATE OF GUJARAT

       1.2 The High Court was justified in declining to entertain       A
 the application for quashing the First Information Report in the
 exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has adverted
 to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on
 whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to
·quash the FIR would sub serve or secure the ends of justice or
                                                                        B
 prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that the
 appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against
 them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
 The second is that the appellants have criminal antecedents. The
 High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been
 followed by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels o.f land       c
 and noted that in the past as well, they were alleged to have been
 connected with such nefarious activities by opening bogus bank
 accounts. It was in this view of the matter that the High Court
 observed that in a case involving extortion, forgery and conspiracy
 where all the appellants were acting as a team, it was not in the
                                                                        D
 interest of society to quash the I<IR on the ground that a
 settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. The view of
 the High Court is accepted. The instant case, as the allegations
 in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a
 private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting
 parties. The case involves allegations of' extortion, forgery lllld    E
 fabrication of documents, utilization of fabricated documents to
 effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities and
 the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the
 basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the
 FIR are construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate
                                                                        F
 serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in
 securing the probity of titles to or interest in land. Such offences
 cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but
 implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious crime. In
 these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in
 declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under             G
 Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of' the Penal Code.
 [Para 16] [27-B-H; 28-A]
      Gian Singh v State of Punjab 2012 (8) SCR 753 : 2012
      (10) SCC 303; Narinder Singh v State c~l Pw1jab 2014
                                     •                                  H
16            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] IOS.C.R.



A          (4) SCR 1012 : 2014 (6). SCC 466; State of
           Maharashtra v Vikram Anantrai Doshi 2014 (15) SCC
           29; Central Bureau of Investigation v Maninder Singh
           2015 (10) SCR 277:2016 (1) SCC 389; State of Tamil
           Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanlev 2015 (9) SCR 772 : 2016
           (1) sec 376 - referred to.
B
                             Case Law Reference
     [2012] 8 SCR 753                       referred to         Para 8
     [2014] 4 SCR 1012                      referred to         Paras
     2014 (15) sec 29                       referred to         Para 12
c    [2015] 10 SCR 277                      referred to          Para 13
     [2015] 9 SCR 772                       referred to         Para 14
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
     No. 1723 of20!7
           From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2016 of the High Court
D    of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Cr!. Misc.Application No. 30903 of 2016.
           Raktim Gogoi, Kartikeya Singh, Ms. Aashta Mehta, Anupam Lal
     Das, Advs. for the Appellant.
          Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Mamta Singh, Ms.
     Shodhika Sharma, Ashok Anand, Rakesh Kumar Singh, Somanatha
E    Padhan, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Advs. for the Respondents.
           Tile Judgment of the Court was delivered by
           DR. D. Y• .CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. By its judgment dated 25 November 2016, the High Court of
F    Gujarat dismissed an application under Section 482 of the Code of
     Criminal Procedure, 1973.The appellants sought the quashing of a First
     Information Report registered against them on i8 June 2016 with the
     City 'C' Division Police Station, District .Tamnagar, Gujarat for offences
     punishable under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the
     Penal Code. The second respondent is the complainant.
G
            3. In his complaint dated 18 June 2016, the second respondent
     stated that certain land admeasuring 17 vigha comprised in survey 1408
     at Panakhan Gokulnagar in Jamnagar city was his ancestral agricultural
     land.The land was converted to non-agricultural use on 21 June 1995
     and 5 January 2000 pursuant to orders of the District Collector. One
H    hundred and three plots were carved out of the land. Amongst them,
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR                             17
    v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

plots 45 to 56 admeasuring 32,696 sq.ft. were in the joint names of six       A
brothers and a sister (represented by the complainant). According to the
complainant, a broker by the name of Bachhubhai Veljibhai Nanda
approached him with Parbatbhai Ahir, the first appellant stating that he
desired to purchase the land. On the next day, the first appellant
approached the complainant with his partner Hasmukhbhai Patel (the            B
third appellant) to purchase the land. The complainant was requested to
provide a photocopy of the lay out plan of the plot, which he did. On the
following day the first appellant is alleged to have gone to the house of
the complainant with the second and the third appellants at which point
in time, parties agreed that the land would be sold at the rate of Rs 4,221
per sq.ft. and a deal was struck for a consideration of Rs. I, 13,58,711/-    c
out of which an amount of Rs 11 lakhs was given in cash to the
complainant for plot no.56. The complainant's case is that while the
discussion was on, he was requested by the second and the third appellants
that since the power of attorney was old and unreadable all ·the plot
holders should give their passport size photographs. Accordingly, a           D
document was reduced to writing by which it was agreed that the sale
transaction for plot no.56 would be completed within two months against
full payment. According to the complainant, when he demanded the
remaining payment for the plot from the second and third appellants, the
second appellant provided him seven cheques each in the amount of Rs
6 lakhs in the name of the six brothers (one brother being given two          E
cheques). Thereafter when the complainant followed up for the payment
of the remaining amount with the purchasers, the balance was not paid
and, on the contrary, the complainant was threatened of a forcible transfer
of the land. According to the complainant, when he visited the office of
the Sub-registrar about three days before lodging the complaint, it came
                                                                              F
to his knowledge that a sale deed has been registered not only in respect
of the plot in question( which was agreed to be sold) but also in respect
of plot nos.45 to 55 on 27 January 2016. It was then that the complainant
realised that the purchaser in the sale deed was shown as the fourth
appellant, Jayesh Arvindbhai Patel, and the name of the seventh appellant,
Jitudan Nankudan Gadhavi, resident of Payalnagar society, Naroda,             G
Ahmedabad was shown as the holder of a power of attorney.The
witnesses to the registered sale deed were the fifth appellant,Rabari
Hiteshbhai and the sixth appellant, Patel Indravaden Dineshbhai.
       4. The complaint came to be lodged on the complainant having
realised that the power of attorney in the name of his siblings had been      H
18             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [20171 I 0 S.C.R.


A    forged. The complainant stated that neither he nor any of his siblings
     had given a power of attorney in favour of the seventh appellant.
     According to the complainant, neither the non-judicial stamp dated 25
     January 2016 in the amount of Rs I0,.30.0001- nor the judicial stamp
     dated 27 January 2016 has been purchased by him. In fact. according to
     the complainant, it was the fourth appellant who had purchased the judicial
B
     stamp dated 27 January 2016.
             5. According to the complaint, plots no.45 to 55 admeasuring 30,005
     sq.ft. are valued at Rs 12.50 crores. It has been alleged that a conspiracy
     was hatched by the appellants and by the other co-accused resulting
     into the transfer of valuable land belonging to the compbinanl and his
c    siblings, on the basis of forged documents.
         6. The High Court noted thatthe fourth appellant had moved Special
  Criminal Application no.4538 of 2016 which had been rejected by the
  coordinate bench of the High Court on 3 August 2016. While rejecting
  the earlier application under Section 482, the High Court had observed
D thus:
             "19. Primary details revealed the complaint had led this Court
             examine the papers of the investigation. The evidence so far
             collected prima facie reveal the involvement of the petitioner.
             This Court also could notice that it is a case v. here under the
E            pretext of buying only a particular Plot No.56 from the
             complainant and his family members, the power of attorney has
             been forged usurping nearly I 0 other plots which value nearly 11
             crores and odd by allegedly conniving with each other, and
             therefore, the payment of Rs 42 lakhs by the cheques to the
F            complainant in relation to one of the plots also would pale into
             insignificance. This, by no means, even at a prima facie level,
             can be said to be a civil dispute, given a colour of criminality. It
             would be in the interest of both the sides for this Court to either,
             at this stage not to make a roving inquiry or divulge anything
             which may affect the ongoing investigation. Suffice it to note
G            that, the petition does not deserved to be entertained an the same
             stands rejected."
  Before the High Court, the plea for quas_hing the First Information Report
  was advanced on the ground that the appellants had amicably settled the
  dispute with the complainant. The complainant had also filed an affidavit
H to that effect.
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAl BHIMSJNHBHAI KARMUR                             19
    v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       7. On behalf of the prosecution, the Public Prosecutor opposed         A
the application for quashing on two grounds. First - the appellants were
absconding and warrants had been issued against them under Section
70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.Second, the appellants had
criminal antecedents, the details of which are contained in the following
chart submitted before the High Court:         •
                                                                              B
    I Paiixttbhai Bhim;inhbhai     City "A" Division Jamnagar      P.I
      Karmrn·                      CR No 1-251/20 JO

   2 Ramdc Bhikha Nanadaniya       City "A'"Division Jamnagar      P2
                                   CR No.1-135/2016
                                                                   2
                                   City "A" Division Jamnagar
                                                                              c
                                   CR No.1-105/2016,.

                                   City "A" Division Jamnagar      2
                                   CR No. l-251 /20 JO

   3   Ha~mtkh Harnrajbhai Patel   Gandhinagar M-Casc No. I/2014   P.3        D

                                   City "A" Division Jamnagar
                                   CR No.1-105/2016

   4 lndravadan Dineshbhai         City "A: Di vision famnagar     P.6
     Patel                         CR No.l-105/2016
                                                                              E
   5 Jitendra Somabhai Modi        City "A" Division Jamnagar      P.7
                                   CRNo.1-105/2016

                                   Odhav Police Station
                                   CR No.1-180/2015
                                                                              F
   6 Vishnu@T oto Rabari           Gandhinagar M-Casc No.1/2014

                                   City "A: Division Jamnagar
  ·-·- - · - - - - · -
                                   CR----
                                       No.1-105/2016                     .




The High Court observed that it had been given "a fair idea" about the
modus operandi adopted by the appellants for grabbing the. land, in the       G
course of which they had opened bogus bunk accounts. The High Court
held that the ease involves exto1iion, forgery and conspiracy and al\ the
appellants have acted as a team. Hence, in the view of the High Com1,
it was not in the interest of society at large to accept the settlement and
quash the FIR. The High Court held that the charges are of a serious          H
20                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 10 S.C.R.



A    nature and the activities of the appellants render them a potential threat
     to society. On this ground, the prayer to quashthe First Information
     Report has been rejected.
             8. On behalf of the appellants, reliance has been placed on the
     decisions rendered by this Court in Gian Singh v State of Punjab 1and
B    in Narinder Singh v State of Punjab 2.Learned counsel submitted that
     the dispute between the complainant and the appellants arose from a
     transaction for the sale of land. It was urged that the dispute is essentially
     of a civil nature and since parties have agreed to an amicable settlement,
     the proper course for the High Court would have been to quash the FIR
     in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 482 of the Code of
c    Criminal Procedure, 1973.
            9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
     state has supported the judgment of the High Court. Learned counsel
     emphasised the circumstances which weighed with the High Court,
     including (i) the seriousness of the allegations; (ii) the conduct of the
D    appellants who were absconding; and (iii) the criminal antecedents of
     the appellants. Hence, it was urged that the appellants were not entitled
     to the relief of quashing the FIR merely because they had entered into a
     settlement with the complainant.
              I0. Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision.The statute
E saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make
     such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of
     any court; or (ii)otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh
     (supra) a bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the
     body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which
F    the High Court should con.sider in determining as to whether to quash an
     FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The
     considerations which must weigh with the High Court are:
              "61 ... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
              proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
              jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
G
              criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320
              of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
              limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
              engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or
     I   (2012) lOSCC 303
H    2 (2014) 6  sec 466
PARBATBHAI AAHIR@ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR                              21
    v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRA CHUO, J.]

     (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases         A
     power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may
     be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their
     dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
     case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
     exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
                                                                              B
     the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences
     of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
     cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's
     family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences
     are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
     Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender            c
     in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention
     of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
     while working in that capacity, etc; cannot provide for any basis
     for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
     the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly
                                                                              0
     civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
     quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,
     financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions
     or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or
     the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
     in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In         E
     this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
     proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between
     the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote
     and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the
     accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
                                                                              F
     would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
     full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
     other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be
     unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
     criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding
     would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement           G
     and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and
     whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriatethat the
     criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above
     question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within
     its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
                                                                              H
22             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 10 S:C.R.



A           11. In Narinder Singh (supra), Dr Justice AK Sikri, speaking for
     a bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of
     offences against society, it is the duty of the state to punish the offender.In
     consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender.
     Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and
     victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender
B
     should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On
     the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the
     correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more
     weightage than the theory of deterrence.In such a case, the court may
     be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to
c    better relations between them and would resolve ·a festering private
     dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of
     significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482
     should be exercised:
             "29. 7 ... Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
D            immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
             matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal
             in accepting the settlement to guash the criminal proceedings/
             investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the
             investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been
             filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
E            evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage,
             the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers
             favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
             circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand,
             where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
F            conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
             normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power
             under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
             would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits ... "
  This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the
G Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in
  quashing the First Information Report:
             "33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded
             on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an
             indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the
H            accused persons because of some previous dispute bctwc<?n the
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR                               23
    v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

       parties, though nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail. A
       However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz.,
       "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise up till
       now, which could not be finalized". This becomes an important
       aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led
       to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the
                                                                             B
       complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the
       village, including Sarpanch. intervened in the matter and the parties
       have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live
       peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration.
       The evidence is yet to be led in the.Court. It has not even started.
       In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal c
       chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the
       prosecution ease. Even though nature of injuries can still be
        established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted
        medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who
        caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore,
                                                                             D
        appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag
        these proceedings ... "
       12. In State of Maharashtra v VikramAnantrai Dosbi3, a bench
of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and
the principles which must govern !n deciding whether a criminal
proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed.              E
In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained Letters of
Credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet
involved offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with
Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus_ beneficiary companies were
alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills.              F
MrJustice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the
court was not dealing with a simple case where "the accused had
borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere". The court held
that the manner in which Letters of Credit were issued and funds were
siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law:                                  G

        " ... availing of money from a nationalized bank in the manner, as
        alleged by the investigating agency. vividly exposits fiscal impurity
        and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated
'c2014) 15 sec 29                                                               H
24              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017) JO S.C.R.


A              in the chargesheet cannot be put in the compartment of an
               individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has
              immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling
              of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly
              conceived contrivance to avail of these kindofbenefits it cannot
              be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predomi1wtingly
B
              of ci\dl character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates
              a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of
              the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation.''
     The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was
     hence set aside by this Court.
c
          13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of
  Investigation v Maninder Singh 4 by a bench of two learned Judges
  of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its
  inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceelimgs under Sections
  420, 467, 468 and471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While
D allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau oflnvestigation Mr Justice
  Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the
  case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds
  of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled
  with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section
E 482:
             ·' ... In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that .
             money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but
             also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a
             theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we arc
F            concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate
             design with an eye of personal profit regardless ofconsequence
             to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the
             ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank
             would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the
             economic offenders are not allowed to continue. the entire
G            community is aggrieved."
           14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi
     Stanley 5,the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was
     a woman "who was following the command of her husband" and had
     • c2016) 1 sec 389
H    'c2016)1 sec 376
PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI'BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR                                 25
    v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud           A
which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission,
this Court held that:
        " ... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be
        considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission
        assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An                 B
        offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not
        depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain
        provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of
        jurisdiction.Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether
        pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or           C
        getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents.
        cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the gmund of her gender
        as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argOl'nent.
        The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on
        this score ... "
        " ... A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for         D
        that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent
        in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on
        the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when
        the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the
        load on the system ... "                                                  E
       15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on
the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:·
(i)   Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
      prevent an abuse of the process of any court .or to secure the ends
      of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only               F
      recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First
       Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
       settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim
       is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of       G
       compounding an offence. Whilecompounding an offence, the power
     · of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
       Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
                                                                                  H
26             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 10 S.C.R.


A (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint
        should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482,
        the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would
        justify the exercise of the inherent power;
     (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and
B         plenitude it has to be exercised; (i)to secure the ends of justice or
          (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
     (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report
          should be quashed on the ground th~t the offender and victim have
          settled the dispute, revolves u:timately on the facts and
c        circumstances of each case and no exhau&t;ve elaboration of
          principles can be fonnulated;
     (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing
          with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must
          have due regard to the nature and. gravity of the offence. Heinous
D         and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such
          as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though
          the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
          offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious
          impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such
          cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in
E         punishing persons for serious offences;
     (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases
           which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
           dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of
           the inherent power to quash is concerned;
F
     (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial,
           financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an
           essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing
           where parties have settled the dispute;
     (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding
G
          ifin view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility
          of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal
          proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
     (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
         (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial
H
 PARBATBHAI AAHIR @ PARBATBHAI BHIMSINHBHAI KARMUR                          27
     v. STATE OF GUJARAT [DR. D. Y. CIIANDRACHUD, J.]

     and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie       A
     beyond the domain of a meredispute between private disputants.
     The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the
     offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic
     fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained
     ofupon the financial or economic system will .weigh in the balance.
                                                                            B
         16. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid
 down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High
 Court was justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing
 the First Information Report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
 The High Court has adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of
 them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under C
·Section 482 to quash the FIR would subserve or secure the ends of
 justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that
 the appellants were absconding and warrants had been issued against
 them uncle~ Section 70 0f the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
 second isthat the appellants havecriminal antecedents, reflected in the D
 chart which has been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. The
 High Court adverted to the modus operandi which had been followed
 by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels of land and ·noted that in
 the past as well, they were alleged to have been connected with such
 nefarious activities by opening bogus bank accounts. It was in this view
 of the matter that the High Court observed that in a case involving E
 extortion, forgery and conspiracy where all the appellants w.ere acting
 as a team, it was not in the interest of society to quash the FIR on the
 ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. We
 agree with the view of the High Court. The present case, as the allegations
 in the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private F
 dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The
 case involves allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of
 documents, utilization of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers
 of title before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the
 complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of
 attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as they stand, it is G
 evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital
 societal interest in securing the probity of titles to or interest in land.
 Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes
 but implicate the societa\ interest in prosecuting serious crime. In these
                                                                             H
28                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2017] IO S.C.R.



A    circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to
     quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468,
     471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code.
           17. We do not, for the above reasons, find any merit in the appeal.
     The Criminal Appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed.
B

     Nidhi Jain                                               Appeal dismissed.