Holding

A dying declaration cannot be the sole basis of conviction unless it is proved that the declarant was conscious and in a fit state of mind, which requires a medical certificate; lacking such, the conviction must be set aside.

Summary

The appellants were convicted under Sections 302, 302/114 and 498-A of the IPC solely on the basis of the deceased's dying declaration. The Supreme Court examined whether the dying declaration was reliable, focusing on the requirement that the declarant be conscious and in a fit state of mind, which must be certified by a medical doctor. The magistrate’s subjective satisfaction and the doctor’s certificate only attested to consciousness, not fitness of mind, rendering the declaration infirm. The Court also found inconsistencies and improbabilities in the declaration, and noted the absence of any corroborating evidence of ill‑treatment or dowry demand to support the 498‑A charge. Consequently, the Court held that a conviction cannot rest solely on a dying declaration lacking proper medical certification, and quashed the convictions, acquitting the appellants.

Issues considered

Whether a conviction can be based solely on a dying declaration without a medical certificate confirming the declarant was in a fit state of mind.
Whether the magistrate's subjective satisfaction that the declarant was fit is sufficient in the absence of such medical certification.
Whether the statements in the dying declaration are sufficient to prove offences under Section 498-A IPC.
Whether inconsistencies in the dying declaration raise reasonable doubt about its reliability.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 302/114, s. 307, s. 34, s. 498-A

Subjects

dying declarationfit state of mindmedical certificationEvidence Act Section 32IPC Section 302IPC Section 498-Aconviction based on dying declarationcriminal appellate review

Judgment

A PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

SEPTEMBER 13, 1999

B [S.P. KURDUKAR, K.T. THOMAS AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.]

Criminal Law:

Evidence Act, 1872: Section 32.
c Dying declaration-Conviction based solely on-Deceased sustained
90 per cent burn injuries-Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration
opined that deceased was in a fit state ofmind-Doctor certified that deceased ·
was conscious while recording the statement-Held: Consciousness and
fitness of mind are two distinct stages-Doctor's certificate must show that
D not only the deceased is conscious but also in a fit state of mind to make the
statement-Hence, Magistrate's opinion and doctor's certificate not in
compliance with the requirement-Apart from these serious lacunas and
some more infirmities, it is not safe to base the conviction solely on the basis
of dying declaration-Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 302, 3021114 and 498-A.
E Dying declaration-,-Conviction based solely on-Scrutiny-Held: In
such cases court must carefully scrutinise the !dying declaration and the
evidence of the Magistrate who recorded it and the doctor who examined the
deceased.

Penal Code, 1860:
F
Section 498-A-Married woman-Death of-In matrimonial house-Due
to extensive burn injuries-Allegedly inflicted by her close re/atives,the
accused-No evidence to indicate that deceased was meted out any ill
treatment or there was any dowry demand-Only grievance made in her
G dying declaration was that she wanted to live separately but her husband
was opposed to it and on that score had beaten her the previous day-It was
also stated therein that her .grandmother disliked her-Held: These statements
in the dying declaration not sufficient to substantiate the prosecution case
that the accused committed offence under S.498-A

H The appellants-accused were convicted by the Sessions court for offences
328
PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA v. STA TE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 329

under Sections 302, 302/114 and 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 solely on A
the basis of the dying declaration of the deceased. The High Court confirmed
the conviction. Hence this appeal.

According to the prosecution, the deceased was married and was staying
in a hut along with her husband (acquitted accused No. 4) and other close
relatives (accused Nos. 1 to 3). On the fateful day the deceased was rushed B
to the hospital with extensive burn injuries. In her dying declaration the
deceased had stated:-

(a) that the accused poured kerosene on her and thereafter she also
poured kerosene on herself;
c
(b) that the accused burnt her with a lighted matchstick;

(c) that she had not taken food for days;

(d) that accused No;3 had tried to extinguish the fire by pouring
water on her; D
(e) that she wanted to live separately but her husband was opposed to
it and on this score had beaten her on the previous day and

(I) that her grandmother disliked her.

The Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased E
opined that she was in a fit state of mind while making the declaration. The
doctor certified that the patient was conscious while recording the statement.
On an earlier occasion the deceased had tried to commit suicide.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
F
HELD: 1.1. If the conviction is solely based upon the dying declaration,
court is required to consider carefully the dying declaration, and the evidence
of the witnesses, namely, the Magistrate who recorded it and the doctor who
examined the deceased. [333-B)
G
1.2. The deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries on her person
and the doctor who performed the post-mortem stated that she had sustained
90 per cent burn injuries. The prosecution case solely rested on the dying
declaration. It was, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to prove the
dying declaration as being genuine, true and free from au doubts and it was
recorded when the injured was in a fit state of mind. (336-G) H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 2·S.C.R.

A 1.3. In the absence of medical certification that the injured was in a
fit state of mind atthe time of making the declaration, it would be very much
risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that
the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration.
[337-E]
B 2. The certificate appended to the dying declaration at the end by the
doctor did not comply with the requirement inasmuch as she has failed to
certify that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of recording
the dying declaration. The certificate of the said expert at the end only says
that "patient is conscious while recording the statement". (336-H]
C 3. Apart from these serious lacunas, there are some more infirmities
in the dying declaration. In the dying declaration the deceased had stated that
A-1 to A-3 poured kerosene on her and thereafter she also poured kerosene
on herself. Then she stated "they have burnt me with a lighted matchstick".
It is difficult to understand as to why she poured kerosene on herself and
why three persc;ms poured kerosene and again all the three persons burnt
D her with a lighted matchstick. On an earlier occasion she had tried to
commit suicide. In her dying declaration she had stated "I had not taken food
for days". These circumstances are pointer to the fact that she was
disappointed and frustrated in her married life. The above statements in the
dying declaration raise a reasonable doubt as to whether she was in a fit state
E of mind at the time when the dying declaration was recorded. In these
circumstances it is difficult to accept the dying declaration wherein all the
three appellants are alleged to have committed the crime. (337-D-E]
4. The incident in question occurred in a thatched hut. There is
nothing to indicate in the dying declaration that the deceased was held by any
F of these appellants and/or she was prevented from running out of the hut or
prevented from raising shouts. Several huts were situated adjacent to each
other. There was sufficient opportunity and time to the injured to escape
from the hut and also to raise shrieks. The conduct of A-3 is also relevant
as he tried to extinguish the fire by putting water. [337-G]
5. There is also no evidence on record to indicate that the deceased was
G meted out any ill treatment or there was any dowry demand. The only
grievance made in the dying declaration was that she wanted to live separately
but her husband was not prepared and on that score, the husband (acquitted)
had beaten her on the previous day. It was then stated therein that her
grandmother disliked her. These statements in the dying declaration are not
H sufficient to substantiate the prosecution case that the deceased was meted
PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.P. KURDUKAR, J.J 331

out with ill treatment, an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the A
Penal Code, 1860. (338-B-C)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1175 of 1998

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.97 of the Andhra Pradesh High B
Court in Crl.A. No. 662 of 1996.

S.K.C. Pasi and Anand Singh Berwal for the Appellants.

G.Prabhakar and Ms. T. Anamika for the Respondent.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.P. KURDUKAR, J. The three appellants, namely, Paparambaka
Rosamma (A-1), Baduru Sashi@ Sashikala (A-2) and Baduru Venkatesarlu (A-
3) have filed this criminal appeal after obtaining the leave of this Court, D
challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment and order of
conviction for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 and 3021114
IPC passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Hyderabad. Originally A-1 to
A-3 and acquitted accused A-4 were put up for trial for the aforesaid offences.
The appellants, the acquitted accused and Venkata Ramana (since deceased)
are closely related to each other. A-1 is the maternal grand mother ofVenkata E
Ramana, A-2 is the daughter of A-1 and is married to A-3. A-4 is the son of
A·l. A-4 was married to Venkata Ramana and he happened to be the real
maternal uncle of Venkata Ramana. A-3 is also the son of sister of A-1.

2. The marriage between A-4 and Smt. Venkata Ramana was solemnised
some time in 1990 and since then she was residing at her matrimonial home. F
A-4 was working as a coolie in a steel company and had constructed a
thatched hut at Tenali. The hut of parents of Smt. Venkata Ramana was
situated at a short distance from the hut of A-4 at Tenali. A-2 and A-3 after
their marriage had come to stay with A-1. It was not liked by Smt. Venkata
Ramana and, therefore, she was instigating A-4 to live separately or A-2 and G
A-3 should be asked to leave the hut. It is the prosecution case that A-2 and
A-3 were residing in a separate portion in the same hut. It is then alleged by
the prosecution that there used to be frequent quarrels between Smt. Venkata
Ramana on one side and A-1 to A-4 on the other as Smt. Venkata Ramana
was insisting that she should stay along with her husband separately. A-1
to A-4 were not prepared to concede to her demand and as a result thereof, H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A they meted out ill treatment to Smt. Venkata Ramana. It has come on record
that Smt. Venkata Ramana on the earlier occasion tried to commit suicide, but,
however, failed in her attempt.

3. The incident in question which gave rise to the present prosecution
occurred on March 4, 1994 at about 12.30 noon. It is alleged by the prosecution
B that when Smt. Venkata Ramana was in her hut, A-2 and A-3 came there and
picked up a quarrel with Smt. Venkata Ramana. A-2 and A-3 then at the
instigation of A-1, po~red kerosene on Smt. Venkata Ramana and thereafter
they threw a lighted matchstick on her. Within a short time, the clothes of Smt.
Venkata Ramanacaught fire. A-3 then poured the water and tried to extinguish
C the fire. The injured was then taken to the government hospital at Tenali
where Dr. K. Vishnupriya Devi ( PW I 0) examined her and found to be in a
serious condition. She sent a requisition to K. Lakshmana Rao (PW 13), the
Addi. Munsiff Magistrate, Tenali, for recording the dying declaration. K.
Lakshamana Rao (PW 13) reached the hospital at about 2.30 p.m. and recorded
the dying declaration (Ex.P-14 ). The injured was then shifted to Guntur Medical
D College, Guntur, for further treatment. The injured succumbed to her injuries
on March 9, 1994 in the hospital. Vaitheru Sambaiah (PW 2)-the father of Smt.
Venkata Ramana, lodged the first information report at Tenali police station
as regards the incident and on the basis thereof, a crime came to be registered
for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 307 read with Section 34
E IPC. After receipt of the information about the death of injured, offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC read with Sec;tion 34 IPC came to be altered
to one under Section 302/114 and 498-A IPC. After completing the investigation,
charge sheet came to be filed against all the four accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A, 302, 3021114 IPC. The trial court framed the
charges against all the four accused, but they denied all these charges.
F According to them, they are innocent and have been falsely implicated in the
present crime.

4. All the close relatives of Smt. Venkata Ramana, who could have
deposed to th~ ill-treatment meted out to her did not support the prosecution
G and turned hostil_e. This list included the parents, brother and other relatives
of Smt. Venkata Ramana. Consequently, the trial court as weH as the High
Court could not rely upon the evidence of these witnesses and had to
consider and rely upon the dying deciaration (Ex.P- .14) and the evidence in
that behalf. The dying declaration of Smt. Venhta Ramana is at Ex. P-14 and
was sought to be proved by the prosecution through ·the evidence of Shri .
H K. Lakshamana Rao(PW 13), the then Addl.MunsiffMagistrate, Tenali, and·
PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.P. KURDUKAR, J.J 333

Dr. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW IO). It is, therefore, admitted position that the A
judgments and order of convictions passed by the courts below is solely
based upon the dying declaration Ex.P-14. We are, therefore, required to
consider carefully the dying declaration Ex.P-14 and the evidence of two
witnesses, namely, K. Lakshamana Rao (PW 13) and Dr. K. Vishnupriya Devi
(PW 10).
B
5. We are conscious of the fact that the trial court and the High Court
accepted the evidence of Dr. K. Lakshamana Rao (PW 13) and Dr. K.Vishnupriya
Devi (PW IO) and held that the dying declaration Ex.P-14 is a true and
voluntary and was made by the injured while in a fit state of mind and free
from any tutoring or prompting. C
6. The original dying declaration ofSmt. Venkata Ramana was recorded
in vernacular (Telugu) and during the course of hearing, an admitted translation
thereof was produced before us. Since the conviction and sentence is solely
based upon the dying declaration, we deem it proper to reproduce the sanfe:-
D
DYING DECLARATION

Declaration of Paparabaka Venkata Ramana, Wlo Srinu, Ravinder Nagar,
resident ofTenali village, Taluk-District recorded by me in the presence
of Duty Doctor Sri Dr. Vishnu Priya of Government Hospital, Tenali.

Received a requisition to record a dying declaration from the E
Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Tenali at 1.57 p.m. and at once
I proceeded to the Hospital and reached the same at 2.20 p.m. on
04.03.1994.

I send away all persons from the patient's room except the Medical
attendants with a view to secure privacy. I put the following single F
questions to the declarant to elicit answers from him with a view to
know her state of mind.

Q: What is your name?

A: Ramana-Venkata Ramana. G
Q: What is your Father's/Husband's name?

A: Srinu;
Q: Which village do you belong to?

A: Tenali. H
'>
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Q: Do you know where you are?
A: I am in the hospital.
.-:...
Q: Do you know that I am the Magistrate? If not then understand
that I am the Magistrate?

B A: I was told so. I came to know.
Q: Can you make the statement?
A: Yes, I will tell.
On the basis of answers elicited from the declarant to the above
c questions I am satisfied that she is in a fit disposing state of
mind to make a declaration.
Q: What happened to you?
A: Venkateswarlu Boduru and Boduru Sashi are wife and husband.
.. Paparambaka Rosamma my grand mother poured kerosene on
D me. I also poured kerosene on myself. They have burnt me with
a lighted matchstick. They poured water.
Q; When, where and what happened-give details.
A: Around 12.30 p.m. in the afternoon, Venkateswarlu and Shashi
came into my house with an electric tester used in electric
E repairs, threatening to stab. Venkateswarlu came and poked me
on the chest. Shashi beat me. Both beat me. Rosamma abused
me and told me to leave the house. Everyday she used to get
into same sort of quarrel. She also made others to beat me.
Venkateswarlu is my grandmother's sister's son. Shashi is his
F wife. They live in our house. Both Shashi aQd Venkateswarlu
poured kerosene on me.
They threw lighted matchstick on me. My grandmother instigated
them to burn me. Everything was done at her instance. Kerosene
was poured on me and when lit, I went in flames. Venkateswarlu
poured water. My husband was not there. He had gone to work
G
in the steel company. They ·say that I wanted to live separately.
Due to this, my husband beat me yesterday afternoon. All of
them did not want us to live separately. I have not taken any
food for days. My grandmother did not come to my rescue. I
was married in 1990 when cyclone had come. I have two children.
H Both are daughters. My husband is my maternal uncle. My

I'
I
II
-
PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.P. KURDUKAR, J.J 335

grandmother disliked me. Since the day of our marriage A
Venkateswarlu and his wife are living with us.
Q: Do you have anything further to add?
A: Nothing. My children were not present in the house, they had
gone out. There is nothing more. They used to instigate my B
husband to beat me. Venkateswarlu is engaged in putting up
tents.
Q: Would you like to put thumb impression or signatures?

A: I will put thumb impression.
Certified that the patient is in consciousness state and has C
sound of mind to give her declaration. She understood about the
contents of her dying declaration given before me.

Certified that the contents of dying dedaration of the deponent
have been read over and explained. to her in Telugu and she
admitted that the contents of dying declaration are to be true D
and correct.
Certified that except myself and duty Doctor no others were
present at the patient-deponent at the time of recording this
statement from her.
Closed the proceedings at 2.55 p.m. on 04.03.1994.
E
Sd/-
K. Lakshmana Rao, 04.03.1994.

Patient is conscious, while recording the statement.
Sd/- F
K. Vishnu Priya,
04.03.1994 at 3.00 p.m.

7. After going through the evidence of K. Lakshamana Rao (PW 13)
and Dr. K. Vishnupriya Devi (PW l 0) and on very careful perusal of the said G
document, there are some inherent defects and improbabilities which could
not persuade us to accept the said dying declaration as a truthful and
voluntary for the reasons set out hereinafter.

8. The main.question is as to whether she was conscious and was in
a fit mental condition to make a voluntary disclosure of the incident. Dr. K. H

'
'
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Vishntipriya Devi (PW 10) who Was attached to Tenali Government Hospital
examined Smt. Venkata Ramana on 4th March, 1994 at 1.30 p.m. She then sent
a requisition (Ex. P9) to the Magistrate Shri K.Laksliamana Rao (PW 13) to ·
record the dying decla!'lltion of the injured. All that Dr. K.Vishnupriya Devi
has stated is that injured was· conscious but she has not deposed that the
injured was in a fit state of mind to make a statement. It has come on record
B that Smt. Venkata Ramana had sustained 90 per cent bum injuries. K.
Lakshamana Rao (PW 13) who recorded the dying declaration has made a
note in Ex.P-14-the dying declaration after putting some preliminary questions
to the injured and it reads as under:

"On the basis of answers elicited from the declarant to the above
c questions I am satisfied that she is in a fit disposing state of mind to
make a declaration.'

Thereafter, the learned Magistrate proceeded to record the dying declaration.
At the end; Dr. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW 10) has appended a certificate saying
D "patient is conscious while recording the statement." The question that needs
to be considered is· as to whether the. Magistrate could have come to a
definite. conclusiOn that the injured was in a fit state of mind to make a
declaration in the absence ·of a certificate by the doctor certifying the state
of mind that existed before recording the dying declaration? In our opinion,
in the absence of medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of
E mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to
accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured
was in a fit state of mind at the time of m~ing a declaration. It is a case of
circumstantial evidence and only circumstance relied upon by the prosecution
is dying declaration.

F 9:It is true that the medical officer Dr. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW 10) at
the end of the dying declaration had certified "patient is ·conscious while
recording the statement." It has come on record that the injured Smt. Venkata
Rarilana had sustained extensive bum injuries on her person. Dr. P. Koteswara
Rao (PW 9) who performed the post mortem stated that injured had sustained
G 90 per cent bum injuries. In this case as stated earlier, the prosecution case
solely rested on the dying declaration. It was, therefore, necessary for the
prosecution to prove the dying declaration being genuirie, true and free from
all doubts and it was recorded when the injured was in a fit state of mind.
In our opinion, the certificate appended to the dying declaration at the end
by Dr. Smt. K.Vishnupriya Devi (PW 10) did not comply with the requirement
H inasmuch as she has failed to certify that the injured was in a fit state of mind
PAPARAMBAKA ROSAMMA v. STA TE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.P. KURDUKAR, J.J 337

at the time of recording the dying declaration. The certificate of the said expert A
at the end only says that "patient is conscious while recording the statement."
In view of these material omissions, it would not be safe to accept the dying
declaration (Ex.P-14) as true and genuine and was made when the injured was
in a fit state of mind. From the judgments of the courts below, it appears that
this aspect was not kept in mind and resultantly erred in accepting the said B
dying declaration (Ex.P-14) as a true, genuine and was made when the injured
was in a fit state of mind. In medical science two stages namely conscious
and a fit state of mind are distinct and are not synonymous. One may be
conscious but not necessarily in a fit state of mind. This distinction was
overlooked by the courts below.

IO. Apart from these serious lacunas, mentioned herein above, we rmd
c
some more infirmities in the dying declaration (Ex.P-14). In the dying declaration,
Smt. Venkata Ramana had stated that A-1 to A-3 poured the kerosene on her
and thereafter she also poured kerosene on herself. Then she stated "they
have burnt me with a lighted match stick." It is difficult to understand as to
why she poured the kerosene on herself. It has also come on the record that D
on the earlier occasion, Sm~. Venkata Ramana (since deceased) had tried to
commit suicide. In her dying declaration (Ex.P-14) she had stated "I had not
taken food for days." These circumstances again are pointer to the fact that
Smt. Venkata Ramana (since deceased) was disappointed and frustrated in her
married life. It is in these circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the dying E
declaration wherein all the three appellants alleged to have committed the
crime. It is difficult to understand as to why three persons poured the
kerosene and again all the three persons burnt her with a lighted matchstick.
The above statements in the dying declaration raises a reasonable doubt as
to whether she was in a fit disposing state of mind at the time when the dying
declaration was recorded. F
11. The incident in question occurred in a thatched hut. There is nothing
to indicate in the dying declaration that Smt. Venkata Ramana (since deceased)
was held by any of these appellants and/or she was prevented from running
out of the hut or prevented from raising the shouts. Several huts were
situated adjacent to each other. There was sufficient opportunity and time to G
the injured to escape from the hut and also to ~aise shrieks. This we are
saying so after taking into account the sequence and the time factor, which
has been narrated, in the dying declaration. The conduct of A-3 is also
relevant as he tried to extinguish the fire by putting water.

12. It is unfortunate for the prosecution that the parents of the deceased H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A as well as other cl<ls~ relatives have turned hostile. A-1 is although a mother
in law, also happened to be the real grand mother of the victim. A-2 is the
daughter of A-1 and also happened to be sister of mother of the deceased.
As stated earlier, there were number of huts around the hut in question but
nobody has come forward to support the prosecution. There is also no
B evidence on record to indicate that Smt. Venkata Ramana (since deceased)
was meted out any ill treatment or there was any dowry demand. The only
grievance made in the dying declaration was that she wanted to live separately
but her husband was not prepared and on that score, the husband (acquitted)
had beaten her in the after-noon on the previous day. It was then stated
therein that her grand mother disliked her. These statements in the dying
C declaration, in our opinion, are not sufficient to substantiate the prosecution
case that Smt. Venkata Ramana (since deceased) was meted out with ill
treatment, an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal
Code.
-· ~ ..'

13. We are thus unable to share the view and reasoning.givew.by the
D courts below. Consequently, we are unable to _uphold the conviction and
sentence inflicted upon A-1, A-2 arid A-3 by the courts below. The conviction
and sentence of each of A-1, A-2 and A-3 is accordingly quashed and set
aside. ,-

E 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and
sentence dated 17th June, 1996 passed by the Second Addi. Sessions Judge,
Guntur and on appeal confirmed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh vide
its judgment. and drder dated of 26th March, 1997 are quashed and set aside
' '
and the appellants (A-1 to A-3) are acquitted of all the charges. The appellants
be set at liberty forth with, if not required in any other case. It appears that
F the frrst appellant was ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide order
dated 18th January, 1999. If she is released on bail, her bailbond to stand
cancelled.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

. '