PAPAIAHversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

A                                    PAPAIAH
                                          v.
                      STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

                                 AUGUST 23, 1996

B               [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

           Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 39(b) and 46.

           Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes-Weaker Sections of
C Society-Duty of State to prevent exploitation-Right to economic justice
     is a fundamental right.

           Kamataka Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of
     Transfer of Certain Land5) Act, 1978 : Sections 4 and 5.

.D         Mysore Land Revenue Code: Rule 43(8).

           Contract Act, 1872: Section 23.

         Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes-Restriction on transfer of
  land by Respondents 4 and 5 assigned five acres of agricultural land under
E Rule 43 (8)-Appellant purchasing land from assignees after the expiry of ten
  years from the date of assignment by the Govemmen~Application filed by
  assignees for restoration of land allowed by competent authority and con-
  firmed by Appellate authority-Appeal preferred before Supreme Court-Held
  alienation made by responden~Assignees was voi~Assignment of land
  having been made in furtherance of constitutional goal, any alienation, in its
F contravention, would be not only in violation of the constitutional policy but
  also opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Ac~As the
  alienation was void purchaser does not get any valid right, title or interest
  thereunder-l'lea of adverse possession against the State held not main-
  tainable-Assignee was not estopped from challenging the sale as there is no
G estoppel against the statute.
           KT. Huchegowda v.Deputy Commissioner& Ors., [1994) 3 SCC 536,
     held inapplicable.

          R Chandevarappa Etc.. Etc. v. State of Kamataka & Ors. Etc. Etc.,
H    [1995) S SCALE 620, relied on.
                                          206
                             PAPAIAH. v. STATE                          11)7

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11933 of               A
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.90 of the Karnataka High
Court in W.A No. 494 of 1990.

         P.R. Ramasesh, S.K. Kulkarni and Surya Kant for the Appellant.        B
         Kapil Sibal, V. Laxminarayan and E.C. Vidyasagar for the Respon-
dents.

         The following Order of the Court was delivered :
                                                                               c
         Leave granted.

        We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

      This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court
of Karnataka dated 19.9.1990 made in WA No. 494/90. The admitted facts D
are that the respondents 4 and 5, by name Doddaramaih and Chik-
karamaiah, sons of late Gurappa of Bangalore were granted five acres of
agricultural land under Rule 43 (8) of the Mysore Land Revenue Code on
February 13, 1940 for use and enjoyment of the Government land. Rule
43(8) reads as under :                                                     E
           "Occupancies granted to applicants belonging to Depressed Clas-
           ses under Rule 43(5) above and those granted by Government free
           of upset price or reduced upset price to poor and landless people
           of other communities or to religious charitable institutions, shall
           not be alienated and the grantees shall execute Mutchalikas in the F
           form prescribed by Government. This shall not, however, prevent
           lands granted to Depressed classes under Rule 43(5) being ac-
           cepted as security for any. loan which they may wish to obtain from
           Government or from a Co-operative Society for the bonafide
           purposes of improving the land".                                    G
      A reading of the said rule would indicate that with a view to augment
the economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
other weaker sections of the society, Government may assign the land to
them or to cooperative societies composed of them. It is not in dispute that
the appellant had purchased the land from the assignees under a registered H
     208                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

'A sale deed on December 19, 1958. The Karnataka Legislature enacted
     Karnataka Scheduled Castes & Schedules Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer
     of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 {for short, the "Act") declaring alienation by
     the assignee-Schedules Castes and Schedules Tribes, as void and inopera-
     tive. Procedure has been prescribed for restoration of the lands to the
     assignees or if they are not available, the land resumed be assigned to
 B   eligible persons from those classes. In furtherance thereof, the respondents
     4 & 5 filed an application under Sections 4 & 5 of the Act before the
     competent authority on April 22, 1985 for restoration of the land. The
     competent authority allowed the application which was confirmed on ap-
     peal and, therefore, the writ petitions came to be dismissed. Thus this
 C   appeal by special leave.

           Sri P.R. Ramasesh, learned counsel for the appellant contended that
    there was no prohibition as against the appellant, since he obtained the
    title after the expiry of ten years from the date of the assignment by the
    Government. The appellant had perfected title by adverse possession.
 D. Therefore, the Act is· inapplicable to such a situation. In support of his
    contention, he sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in
    KT. Huchegowda v. Deputy Commissioner & Ors., [1994] 3 SCC 536.

            Sri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents,
 E   contended that the appellant had not pleaded adverse possession as against
     the State. He came into possession by virtue of a title obtained from
     respondents 4 and 5. The sale is void and against the public policy. His
     contention of adverse possession against respondents, though was raised
     before the primary autho;dty and the appellate authority and was negatived
 p   the same, was not canvassed before the High Court. The only contention
     raised before the High Court was as to the estoppel which was rightly
     negatived. Under those circumstances, the ratio of Hochegowda case
     (supra) has no application. In support of his conte11tion, he placed reliance
     on other judgment of this Court in the case of R. Chandevarappa Etc. Etc.
     v. State of Kamataka & Ors., Etc. Etc., [1995] 5 SCALE 620.
 G
            In view of the rival contentions raised on both sides, the questions
      that arise for consideration are: whether the respondents 5 and 6 who have
      alienated the land to the appellant are estopped to challenge the sale and
      whether the sale is valid and also whether appellant perfected his title by
 H    adverse possession as against the State?
                             PAPAIAH. v. STATE                               209

        It is seen that Article 46 of the Constitution, in terms of its Preamble,   A
 enjoins upon the State to provide economic justice to the Scheduled Castes,
 Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of the society and to prevent
 their exploitation. Under Article 39(b) of the Constitution, the State is
 enjoined to distribute its largess, land, to sub-serve the public good. The
 right to economic justice to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
                                                                                    B
 other weaker sections is a fundamental right to secure. equality of status,
 opportunity and liberty. Economic justice is a facet of liberty without which
 equality of status and dignity of person are teasing illusions. In rural India,
land provides economic status to the owner. The State, therefore, is under
 constitutional obligation to ensure to them opportunity giving its largess to
 the poor to augment their economic position. Assignment of land having             C
been made in furtherance thereof, any alienation, in its contravention,
would be not only in violation of the constitutional policy but also opposed
to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thereby, any
alienation made in violation thereof is void and the purchaser does not get
any valid right, title or interest thereunder. It is seen that Rule 43 (a)          D
specifically prohibits alienation of assigned land. It does not prescribe any
limitation of time as such. However, it is contended that the appellant has
obtained land by way of sale in 1958 long before the Act came into force
and thereby he perfected his title by adverse possession. We find no force
in contention. This Court had considered this question in similar cir-
cumstances in R Chandevarappa's case and had held thus :                            E

             "The question then is whether the appellant has perfected his
        title by adverse possession. It is seen that a contention was raised
        before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant having
        remained in possession from 1968, he perfected his title by adverse F
        possession. But the crucial facts to constitute adverse possession
        have not been pleaded. Admittedly the appellant came into pos-
        sessiop by .a derivative title from the original grantee. It is seen
        that the original· grantee has no right to alienate the land. There-
        fore, having come into possession under colour of title from
        original grantee if the appellant intends to plead adverse posses- G
        sion as against the State, he must disclaim his title and plead his
        hostile claim to the knowledge of the State and that the State had
        not taken any action thereon within the prescribed period. There-
        by, the appellant's possession would become adverse. No such
        stand was taken nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The H
    210                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A            counsel in fairness, despite his research, is unable to bring to our
             notice any such plea having been taken by the appellant."

          The ratio thereof squarely applies to the facts in this case.

          In K.T. Huchegowda's case (supra) neither this question was con-
B sidered nor the validity of the Rule has been gone into. Therein, this Court
  had gone into the question of adverse possession as against the purchaser
  but ~ot as against the State. Unless the purchaser derives valid title, the
  question of title does not arise. If he remained to be in possession in his
  own right de hors the title, necessarily he had to plead and prove the date
c from which he disclaimed his title and asserted possessory title as against·
  the State and perfected his possession to the knowledge of the reitl owner,
  viz., the State, in this case. Such a plea was neither taken nor argued nor
  was any evidence adduced! in this behalf. The plea of adverse possession
  as against the State does not arise even otherwise as the proceedings were
  laid before the expiry of a period of 30 years. The question of estoppel
D against the respondent does not arise as the Act voids the sale and thus
  there would be no estoppd against the Statute.

          The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

    T.N.A.                                                    Appeal dismissed.