Supreme Court of India
PANNEERSELVAMversusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 679
- Decided
- 15 May 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in misreading the dying declaration and in discarding the victim's voluntary statements to doctors, leading to the acquittal of the appellants.
Summary
Five police officials were convicted for the murder of Arunbharathi, who died from burn injuries. The trial court relied on a dying declaration recorded by a Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) four days before the victim's death, while discarding earlier statements to doctors where the victim claimed he set himself on fire. The High Court upheld the conviction of two appellants, A1 and A5, interpreting the RDO's statement as implicating them and rejecting the doctors' statements as involuntary. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the dying declaration— the victim had actually said he did not know who set him on fire— and wrongly excluded the voluntary statements to the doctors. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that a dying declaration, if true and voluntary, can be the sole basis for conviction without corroboration. The appeals were allowed and the appellants were released.
Issues considered
- Whether the dying declaration recorded by the RDO can be the sole basis for conviction without corroboration.
- Whether the statements made by the victim to doctors (PWs 3, 4 and 6) are admissible and voluntary despite the presence of a police officer.
- Whether the High Court correctly interpreted the content of the dying declaration.
- Whether the High Court erred in discarding the doctors' statements and thereby misapplying the law on dying declarations.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 374
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201 r/w 34, s. 302 r/w 34, s. 348
Subjects
dying declarationcorroborationvoluntary statementIndian Evidence Actmurder convictionappellate reviewpolice officialsadmissibility of evidence
Judgment
[2008] 8 S.C.R. 962
A PANNEERSELVAM
~ .
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2006)
MAY 15, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND DR.
MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]
"
Penal Code, 1860- ss.302 rlw 34, 348, 201and201 rlw
·c 34 - Death - Due to burn injuries - Conviction of accused-
Appellants by Trial Court·- Appeal - High Court discarded
statements made by the doctors, PWs. 3, 4 and 6, to the effect
that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he
had set himself on fire and upheld conviction of Appellants by
placing reliance on the dying declaration allegedly given by
D
deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) four days
prior to his death - Challenge to - On facts held: High Court
misconstrued the dying declaration since the deceased had
categorically stated therein that he did not know who set him
on fire - It also .erred in discarding the statements made by
E PWs 3, 4 and 6 - Conclusions were arrived at by the High
Court by misreading the evidence - Appellants accordingly
acquitted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.374.
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 - Dying declaration - Prin-
F ciples governing dying declaration summed up and re-iter-
ated.
According to the prosecution, A1 and A2 alongwith
three other accused had poured petrol on the deceased
and set him on fire. A1 to A4 were police officials and on
G the date of the incident were on duty. The Trial Court con-
victed all the five accused under s.302 rlw s.34 IPC. A1 ·•
and AS were additionally convicted under s.348 IPC. A1
was further convicted under s.201 IPC while AS were fur-
ther convicted under 5.201 r/w s.34 IPC. High Court up-
H 962
PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 963
. ,.
TAMILNADU
held the conviction of A1 and A5 i.e. Appellants but ac- A
quitted the other accused persons. It discarded the .state-
ments made by the doctors, PWs. 3, 4 and 6, to the effect
that the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that
he had set himself on fire and upheld conviction of the
Appellants by placing reliance on the dying declaration B
allegedly given by deceased to the Revenue Divisional
> Officer (PW14) four days prior to his death.
In support of the present appeals, the Appellants sub-
·mitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions
that because the statements of the deceased to PWs, 3, 4 c
and 6 were made in the presence of a Constable, there-
fore, they were not voluntary; that on the contrary at the
time when the statements were made, the relatives of the
deceased were present as evident from the evidence of
PW1 who took the deceased to the hospital. It was fur- D
ther contended that the High Court came to an errone-
ous conclusion by misreading dying declaration pur-
ported to be made before RDO that it was either A1 or A5
(the appellants) who had poured petrol on the deceased
and set him on fire. E
·The Respondent-State, on the other hand, submit-
=t ted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the dying
declaration made before the RDO and that the fact that
• police officials were present when the statements were
made by the deceased before the doctors made the posi- F
tion c'ear that the deceased was not speaking the truth.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. This is a case where the basis of convic-
tion of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation G
• in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly
solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept
the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the
requirements of oath and cross-examination are dis-
H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.
)'< •
A pensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be
excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because
the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a seri-
ous crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the
Court without a scrap of evidence. [Para 7] [969-B,C,D]
B 1.2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great
weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no
power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for
eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is
th.e reason the Court also insists that the dyiog declara-
c tion should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence
I . ~
of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard
that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of
either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination.
The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
D in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe
and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that
the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can
base its conviction without any further corroboration. It
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
E dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
is merely a rule of prudence. [Para 8] [969-D,E,F,G]
1.3. The principles governing dying declaration could
ll
be summed up as under: (i)There is neither rule of law
F nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted
upon without corroboration; (ii) If the Court is satisfied
that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base
conviction on it, without corroboration; (iii) The Court has
to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must en-
G sure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination. The deceased had an oppor-
..
tunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a
fit state to make the declaration; (iv) Where the dying dee-
laration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon with-
H out corroborative evidence; v) Where the deceased was
PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 965
TAMILNADU
.. -~
unconscious and could never make any dying declara- A
tion, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected; (vi) A
dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form
the basis of conviction; (vii) Merely because a dying dec-
laration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it
is not to be rejected; (viii) Equally, merely because it is a B
brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary,
the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth; (ix)
Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the de-
ceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where c
the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medi-
cal opinion cannot prevail; (x) Where the prosecution ver-
sion differs from the version as given in the dying decla-
ration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon; (xi)
0
Where there is more than one statement in the nature of
dying declaration, one first in point of time must be pre-
ferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [Para 8] [969-G, 970-A-H, 971-A-E]
E
1.4. In the present case, the High Court has errone-
ously discarded the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6
to the effect that the deceased voluntarily told each one
of them that he had set himself on fire. As rightly con-
)
tended by the appellant, even though one police official F
was present when the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4
and 6, yet large number of relatives of the deceased, more
particularly, PW1 who had taken him to the hospital were
present also. Additionally, the High Court has miscon-
strued the dying declaration. The deceased had categori- G
cally stated therein that he did not know who set him on
fire. The High Court observed, as if, the deceased had
said that either A1 or A5 did so. The conclusions have
been arrived at by misreading the evidence. Therefore,
the appellant in each case is acquitted of the charges. H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.
A [Para 9] [971-F-H, 972-A]
Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat AIR (1992) SC 1817;
Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2
SCR 764; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and
Ors. AIR (1985) SC 416; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar AIR
B (1983) SC 164; K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Pub-
lic Prosecutor AIR (1976) SC 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC 264; Kaka Singh v State of
MP AIR (1982) SC 1021; Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of
UP (1981) 2 SCC 654; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi
C Laxmipati Naidu AIR (1981) SC 617; Surajdeo Oza and Ors.
v. State of Bihar AIR (1979) SC 1505; Nanahau Ram and Anr.
v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR (1988) SC 912; State of UP
v. Madan Mohan and Ors. AIR (1989) SC 1519 and Mohan/a/
Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra AIR (1982) SC 839
D - relied on.
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Crimir;ialAppeal
No. 1167 of 2006
From the Judgment arid final Order dated 7.7.2006 of the
E High Court of Madras, Bench at Madurai in Crl. Appeal No. 404/
1997
WITH
Crl. A. No. 1168 of 2006
F Nagendra Rai, KV Viswanathan, S. Balaji, P.B. Suresh,
Vipin Nair, Vivek Sharma, M/s. Temple law Firm and Dr. Kailash
Chand for the Appellant.
R. Shunmugasundaram, V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotle and
G Prabu Ramasubramanian for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. These two appeals have their
matrix in a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Ma-
H dras High Court disposing of three criminal appeals preferred
PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 967
TAMIL NADU [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in A
short 'Cr.PC'}, against the judgment of the Principal Sessions
Judge, Thanjavur in Sessions case no.65 of 1994 dated
13.5.1997. Five persons had faced trial for alleged commis-
sion of murder of one Arunbharathi @ Jynarab (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the 'deceased'). They were convicted for offences B
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the In-
dian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). So far as A 1, A2 and A5
are concerned, each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for life. A 1, A2 and A5 were convicted for offence punishable
under Section 348 IPC and sentenced to one year RI each. A 1 c
was charged for commission of offence punishable under Sec-
tion 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year RI and A2 and
A5 were convicted for offence punishable under Section 201
read with Section 34 IPC and each was sentenced to undergo
RI for life.
D
2. A 1 was Head Constable, while A2 was a Constable A3
was a Writer, and A4 was a Pere Constable. All of them were
attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty on
14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. A5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil
3. After the case was committed to the Court of Sessions E
charges were framed since the accused persons pleaded in-
nocence they were put to trial. In order to substantiate the
charges 14 witnesses were examined. On consideration of the
.. material on record the Trial Court recorded the conviction and
F
imposed sentences as aforesaid.
4. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that
the deceased had put himself on fire and in fact, all the accused
persons immediately quenched the fire and had taken him to
the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where PW3 G
doctor was available. The deceased made a voluntary state-
• ment to PW3 wherein he categorically stated that he had poured
petrol on himself and set himself on fire. Thereafter the deceased
with the burn injuries was taken to the Medical College Hospital
where also he made .a similar statement to PW4 the doctor.
H
L
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.
A Subsequently, another doctor PW6 examined him where also
he made a similar statement. Therefore, it was submitted that
the Trial Court was not justified in convicting them relying on the
purported dying declaration alleged to have been given by the
deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer (PW14) on
B 16.12 .1992 i.e. four days prior to his death. The same was noth-
ing but a tutored one. The High Court held that the so called
statements made before the doctors cannot be accepted in view
of the dying declaration recorded by PW14 the RDO. The High
Court did not attach any importance to the statements purport-
C edly given before PWs, 3, 4 and 6 and also relied on the dying
declaration purportedly made by the deceased before the
PW14. The High Court found that the allegations against A2,
I
' A3 were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and they were
entitled to acquittal. Accordingly, the appeals filed by these
accused persons were allowed and those filed by the appel-
0
lants in these two appeals were dismissed.
5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appel-
lants submitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions
that because the statements of the deceased to PWs, 3, 4 and
E 6 were made in the presence of a Constable, therefore, they
were not voluntary. On the contrary at the time when the state-
ments were made, the relatives of the deceased were present
is evident from the evidence of PW1 who took the deceased to
the hospital. He had categorically admitted that he was ac-
F companied by several persons when the deceased was taken
to and was at the hospital. PW1 and others were there with
him. PW1 has categorically admitted that this was the situation
in the Ammapet hospital and Thanjavur Medical College Hos-
pital. He has categorically st~ted that several persons were
G present at the hospital. It was, therefore, submitted thatthe vol-
untary statement made right from the beginning should not have
been lightly brushed aside. It is also pointed out that the High
Court came to an erroneous conclusion by misreading dying
declaration ·purported to be made before RDO that it was ei-
ther A 1 or A5 (the present appellants) who had poured.petrol . "
H
PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 969
.
~
TAMIL NADU [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
and set him on fire. A
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the dying
declaration made before the RDO. According to him the fact
that police officials were present when the statements were
~
made by the deceased before the doctors made the position B
clear that the deceased was not speaking the truth.
,
7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the ac-
cused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person
is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and c
grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his state-
ment. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-
examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying dee-
laration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice be-
cause the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a seri-
D
ous crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court
without a scrap of evidence.
8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it
is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as E
.an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also
insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to
inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court
-:; > has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not
as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagi- F
nation. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased
was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe
and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the
declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid
G
down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration can-
not form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroboraterf.
The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.
This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles
governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as
H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.
A under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR
~ .
1992 SC 1817):
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
declaration cannot be acted upon without
corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State
8 of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 764)]
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is
true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without •
corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram
c Sagar Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and
Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The
D deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify
the assailants and was in· a !it state to make the
declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr.
v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994)]
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should
E not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
[See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(1974 (4) sec 264)1
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could
F never make any dying declaration, the evidence with
regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v
State of M.P (AIR 1982 SC 1021)]
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath
G and Ors. v. State of UP (1981 (2) sec 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain
the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
[See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi
Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617)]
PANNEERSELVAM v. STATE OF 971
TAMIL NADU [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is A
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See
Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979
SC 1505).
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the 8
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the
dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion.
But where the eye-witness said that the deceased
was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying
declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See C
Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(AIR 1988 SC 912)].
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the
version as given in the dying declaration, the said
0
declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of UP
v. Madan Mohan and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)].
(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature
of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying E
declarations could be held to be trustworthy and
reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohan/al
Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982
SC 839)]
9. We find that the High Court has erroneously discarded F
the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that the
deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set him-
self on fire. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the ap-
pellant, even though one police official was present when the
statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of G
relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW1 who had taken
him to the hospital were present also. Additionally, the High Court
has misconstrued the dying declaration.The deceased had cat-
egorically stated therein that he did not know who set him on
fire. The High Court observed, as if, the deceased had said H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.
A that either A1 or AS did so. The conclusions have been arrived .,.. .
at by misreading the evidence. Therefore, the impugned judg-
ment of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside.
The appellant in each case is acquitted of the charges. The
appellants be released from custody forthwith unless required
B in any other case. The appeals are allowed.
B.B.B. Appeals allowed.
H
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