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Supreme Court of India

PANCHAYAT VARGA SHARMAJIVI SAMUDAIK SAHAKARI KHEDUT COOP. SOCIETY LTD. AND ORS.versusHARIBHAI MEVABHAI AND ORS.

Citation
1996 INSC 762
Decided
19 July 1996
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Section 96(4) does not require notice to villagers before resumption of waste land; the Collector’s order stands.

Summary

The Panchayat Varga Sharmajivi Samudaik Sahakari Khedut Co‑op Society Ltd. (appellants) sought assignment of 300 acres of waste land vested in the Gram Panchayat for the economic empowerment of its labourer and Scheduled Caste members. The Gram Panchayat passed a unanimous resolution requesting the District Collector to resume the land and assign it to the Society, which the Collector did. The respondents challenged the resumption on the ground that the Collector had not issued any notice to the villagers before resuming the land. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 96(4) of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1961 obliges the Collector to give such notice. It held that the notice requirement in the Act applies only to the discontinuation of public roads or streets under the proviso to sub‑section (2), not to the resumption of waste land under sub‑section (4). Consequently, the Collector’s order was lawful and the High Court’s direction to re‑issue notice was unwarranted. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court and Government orders and restoring the Collector’s order.

Issues considered

  • Whether Section 96(4) of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1961 mandates issuance of notice to villagers before the Collector resumes waste land vested in the Gram Panchayat.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Gram Panchayat Actland resumptionwaste landnotice requirementsocio‑economic justicescheduled castespublic purposeconstitutional lawland acquisitionsocial justice

Judgment

  PANCHAYAT VARGA SHARMAJIVI SAMUDAIK SAHAKARI                                     A
        KHEDUT COOP. SOCIETY LTD. AND ORS.
                                       v.
                   HARIBHAI MEVABHAI AND ORS.

                                JULY 19, 1996
                                                                                   B
             [K. RAMASWAMY AND Q.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

        Gram Panchayat Act, 1961: Section 96(2)-Proviso and 96(4).

      Wasteland-Resumption of-Notice to villagers-Society consisting of            C
labourers and Scheduled caste persons-Request to gram panchayat for as-
signment of wasteland for the pwpose of cultivating and augmentation of
econo111ic c111powennent of n1e111bers of Society-{]nani111ous Resolution
passed by Gram Panchayat requesting the Collector to resume land and
assign it to the Society-Collector resianing the land and assigning the san1e
to the Society--Challenge to resumption order on the ground that District          D
Collector did not issue any notice. lo the villagers before resumption of
lan~Held issuance of a notice to the villagers is not wa1r"anted by the sche111e
of Section 96(4)-In passing the Resolution as a repre>·entative body the
elected members represented the interest of Gram Panchayat effecting the
constitutional goal-Consequently there lVGS no obligation to issue notice to       E
the villagers.

        Constitution of India, 1950: A1ticles 14, 21, 39(6), 46.

      Socio Economic justice-Stale-Duty to protect interests of scheduled
castes--Econon1ic e1n1Jowennent of the poor.                                       F
      Madhu Kislnvar & 01~. v. State of Bihar & Ors., JT (1996) 4 SC 379;
Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. &Anr. v. U11i01i of India & Ors. Etc., JT [1996]
4 SCC 555; Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India
& 01~., [1995] 3 SCC 42 and Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanalh
Pandu Barde and Anr., JT (1995) 3 SC 563, referred to.                             G

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9888 of
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 24.1.94 of the Gujarat High
Court in L.P.A. No. 33/94 in S.C. Application No. 6051 of 1986.    H
                                   775
      776                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ996j SUPP. 3 S.C.R.               ..
A           R.P. Bhatt, Ms. N. Singh, Mrs. H. Wahi for the Appellants.

            Yashank A<lhyaru for J.M. Nanavati, Associates.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered :

B            Leave granted. Though notice was served on the respondents - the
      first and the fourth respondent), the 1st respondent is not appearing either
      in person or through counsel; equally, 4th respondent through counsel. We
      have heard the counsel for the appellant as well as for the Stale.

C        The undisputed facts are that the appellant-Society consists of
  labourers and Scheduled Caste person belonging lo the village Khardosan
  in Decsa Taluka of Banaskantha District of Gujarat State. The appellant-
  .society had requested the Gran1 Panchayat lo recommend t.o the Di.strict
  Collector for assignment of 300 acres of gaucher land (waste land) vested
  in the Ci-r<.nn Panchayat for the purpose of cultivation and augmentation of
D economic empowerment of the members of the appellant-Society. The
  Gran1 Panchayat had unanimously i;esolvcd and requested the Collector to
  resume the land and assign it to the appellant. The District Collector in
  response thereto had resumed the land and assigned lhe same to the
  appellant. Calling the order of the District Collector in question a Review
E Petition was filed before the Government by the first respondent. The
  Government by order dated August 20, 1986 set aside the order on the
  ground that District Collector did not issue any notice to the villagers
  before its resumption. When the writ petition came to be filed, while
  upholding that the waste land was required lo be resumed by the Collector
  for public purpose of assignment to the rural labourers belonging to
F backward classes and Scheduled Caslcs, the High Court directed the
  Collector to give notice lo the villagers and to consider their objections and
  to pass order afresh thereafter. On appeal, by the impugned order dated
  January 24, 1994 in Appeal No. 33/94, the Division Bench confirmed the
  same. Thus this appeal by special leave.
G            The question that arises for consideration is : whether notice to the
      villagers in mandatory under Section 96(4) of the Gram Panchayat Act.
      1961 (for short, the 'Act') ? Section 96 reads as under :

              "96. Government may vest certain lands in Panchayats - (1) for lhe
1-1           purpose of this Act, the State Government may subject lo such
-"   Pt\NC11A YATVARGASHARMAJ!VJ S.S. KHElJLTTCO.OP SUCY. LTD.1·. HAIUBHAI MEVABHAl   777

         c~Jndilions and restrictions as it n1ay think fit to irnpo~c, vest in a            A
         Pancln1.yat open sites \Vastc, vacant or grazing lands or public
         roads, streets, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, \Vellsi river-beds
         tanks, strean1s, lakes, nallas, canals, \Vatcr-courses, trees or any
         other property in the gram or nagar, as the case rnay by, vesting
         in the (Jovernment.
                                                                                            B
         (2) Sub.iecL lo any conditions anJ restrictions imposed by the State
         Government imposed by the Slate Government under sub-section
         (1) and wilh the previous sanction of the Collector, a panchayal
         may discontinue or stop up any such public roaJ or street vested
         in it by the State Government, but \vhich is no longer required as                 c
         public roaJ or streel and may lease or sell any such land therefore
         used for the purposes of such public road or street.

             Provided that one months before it is decided to stop up or
         discontinue such public road or street, the Sarpanch or Chair1nan
         as the case may be, shall, by notice signed by him and affoed in                   D
         lhe parl of the puiJiic road or street v.'hich is proposed to discon-
         tinue or stop up, and published in such other manner as is
         prescribed, inforn1 the residents of the gram or nagar as the case
         may be~ of the said proposal and consider any objections in \Vriting
         made thereto; the notice shall indicate the alternative route, if any,             E
         which it is proposed to provide or which may already be in
         existence.

         (3) Whenever any public road or street or any part thereof has
         been so discontinued or stopped up, reasonable compensation
         shall be paid lo every person who was entitled to use such road or                 F
         street or part thereof, other\vise then as a mere member of the
         public, as a means of access lo or from his property and had
         suffered dam<lge fron1 such discontinuance or stopping up, and the
         provisions in the Bombay Highways Act, 1955, (Born. LV of 1955)
         in relation to the a,ssess1nent, apportionn1ent, and payn1ent of                   G
         compensation shall, mulatis mutandis apply thereto as they apply
         in relation to the closure of a highway under section 52 of that Act.

         ( 4) Where any open site or \Vaste, vacant or grazing land vesting
         in Government has been vested by Govcrnn1ent in a pancl1ayat
         wheiher before or after the commencement of this Act, then it H
    778                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A            shall be lawful for the Stale Government to resume al any time
             such site or land, if it is required by il for any public purpose.

                 Provided that in case of any improvement of such site or land
             made by the Panchayat or any other person, the panchayat or
             person, as the case may be, shall be entitled to compensation equal
B            lo the value of such improvement and such value shall be deter-
             mined in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition
             Act, 1894."

          The land belonging to the Government was vested in the Gram
C Panchayat for one of the purposes enumerated in Section 96, which en-
    visages resumption of land for any public purpose. When the land was no
    longer needed for a public road or a street, the Sarpaneh or the Chairman,
    as the ease may be, was enjoined under proviso to sub-section (2) to cause
    a notice signed by him affixed in any part of the public road or a street
D   which was proposed to be discontinued or stopped and to give due notice
    to the villagers in the prescribed manner or indicating an alternative route,
    if available or if it has fallen to disuse. After considering the objections, if
    any, the Gram Panchayat is required to pass a resolution in writing for the
    discontinuation or disuse of the public road or a street.

E         Relying thereon, it is contended for the State that notice under
    sub-section ( 4) is also implicit when an open site or waste, vacant or grazing
    land vests in the Government but in the management of the panchayat is
    sought to be resumed; notice to the villagers or the affected persons is
    necessary before resumption by the Collector. Since such notice was not
F   given, the resumption of land by the Collector is bad in law. We find no
    force in the contention.

        It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the State that by
  operation of Article 46 read with Article 39(b) of the Constitution the
  material resources of the State should be so distributed as to subservc the
G common good. Article 46 enjoins that the State shall promote with special
  care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, in
  particular, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and shall protect
  them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Consequentially,
  Preamble of the Constitution assures socio economic justice to every citizen
H to provide dignity of person.
        PANCl IAYATVAROA SHARMAJIV! S.S. KHEDlJl'CO.OPSOCY. LTD.•~ HARIBHAI MEVABHAl   779

           In Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., JT (1996) 4 SC A
    379 it was held that agricultural land is the foundation of a sense of security
    and freedom from fear. Assured possession is a lasting road for develop-
    ment, intellectual, cultural and moral and also for peace and harmony.
    Agriculture is the only source of livelihood for the tribes and rural poor to
    provide them social justice and status.                                         B

           Jn Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. &Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. Etc.,
    JT (1996) 4 SC 555 a Bench of three Judges to which we were members
    had held that "Social justice is the· comprehensive form to remove social
    imbalances by law harmonising the rival claims or the interests of different
    groups and/or sections in .the social structure or indi\iduals by means of               C
    which alone it would be possible to build up a welfare State. The ideal of
    economic justice is to make equality of status meaningful and the life worth
    living at its best removing inequality of opportunity and of status - social,
    economic and political. Right to cultivation of agricultural land was held
    to be a socio- economic justice to an agriculturist as fundamental right.                D

            A Bench of three Judges of this Court in Consumer Education &
    Research Ce11tre & Ors. v. Union of India & On·., [1995] 3 SCC 42 held social
    justice is the arch of the Constitution to ensure life to everyone to be
    me;rningful and livable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye of law
    giving an insight into the environment of which it is the expression. It E
    relates the law to the spirit of the time and makes it richer. Law is the
    ultimate aim of every civilised society, as a key system in a given era, to
    meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, com-
    prehends social urge and commitment. Justice, liberty, equality and frater-
    nity are supreme constitutional values to establish that egalitarian social, F
    economic and political democracy. Social justice, equality and dignity of
    person are cornerstones of social democracy. Social justice consists of
    diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of
    personality of every citizen. Justice is the generic term and social justice is
    its facet, a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the disadvantaged G
    and to eliminate handicaps so as to elevate them to the level of equality to
    live life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea

•   of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the
    poor etc. from handicaps, penury, to ward them off from distress and to
    make their lives livable for greater good of the society at large. Social
    justice, there[ore, gives substantial degree of social, economic and political H
    780                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.                      •-

A   !..'.quality, \vhich is the constitullonal right of every citizen. In para 1.9, it \Vas
    further elaborated that social justice is one of the disciplines of justice
    which relates to the society. What is due cannot be ascertained by an
    absolute s1andard which keeps changing depending upon the time, place
    and circumstances. The constitutional concern of social justice, as an
B   elastic continuous process, is to i-ransform an<l accord justice to all sections
    uf the society by providing facilities and opportunities to remove handicaps
    and llisabilities with which the poor etc. are languishing. It aims to secure
    dignity of their person. It is the duty of the State to accord justice to all
    members of the society in all facets of human activity. The concept of social
    justice embeds equality to flavour and enlivens practical content of life.
C   Social justice and equality are complementary to each other so that both
    should maintain their vitality. Rule of law, therefore, is a potent instrument
    of social justice to bring about equality in result. Article 1 of the Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights envisions that all human beings are born free
    and equal in dignity and rights and each should act towards one another
D   in a spirit of brotherhood. In that case the question was : whether right to
    social security is a fundamental right of workman? To make the life of the
    workman worth living with health, right to health was held to be a fun-
    damental right and it is the duty of the State and the employer to provide
    facilities and opportunities for ensuring sustained good health and leisure
    to the workman as a facet of right to life under Article 21.
E
            Social democracy means a way of life which recognises liberty,
    equality and fraternity as principles of life. They are the trinity. One cannot
    diverse one from the other. Without equality, liberty would produce
    supremacy of the few over the many. Equality without liberty would denude
F   the individual of his initiative to improve excellence. Without fraternity,
    liberty and equality would not nurture as their natural habitat. Social and
    economic justice is a constitutional right enshrined for the protection of
    the society. The right to socio-economic justice in the trinity, the Preamble,
    Fundamental Rights and Directives is to make the quality of life of the
    disadvantaged people meaningful. Equal protection in Article 14, there-
G   fore, requires affirmative action by the State to those unequals by providing
    facilities and opportunities.

          Gandhiji, the Father of the Nation, on the eve of independence had
    stated that "independence did not mean freedom from British Rule by
]-J breaking the bonds of slavery but it meant more than that. It meant justice .
     PANCHA YATVARGASHARMAJJVI S.S. KHEDUTCO.OP SOCY. LTD. v. HARJBHAl MEVABHAl   781

 to all citizens of India, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or language,          A
 each getting his legitimate due".

        It was held in Dabnia's case (supra) thal social and economic justice
 to the agriculturists is the fundamental right. It was further held that social
 justice forms the basis of stability in socie1y. Econon1ic justice means the
                                                                                        B
 abolition of those economic conditions which ultimately result in the ine-
 quality of economic values among men. It means to establish a democratic
 way of life built upon socio-economic structure of the society to make the
 rule of law dynamic.

         In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr., c
  JT (1995) 3 SC 563 it was held that welfare is actually a from of liberty
  inasmuch as it liberates men from social conditions which narrow their
  choices and brighten their self-development. In paragraph 17, it was held
  that "providing adequate means of livelihood for all the citizens and dis-
. tribution of the material resources of the community for common welfare, D
  enable the poor, the Dalits and tribes, to fulfil the basic needs to bring
  about a fundamental change in the Indian structure. Therefore, the State
  should see the socio-economic democracy taken strong roots and become
  a way of life. The State, therefore, is enjoined to provide adequate means
  of livelihood to the poor, weaker sections of the Society, the Dalits and
  tribes and to distribute material resources of the Community to them for E
  common welfare etc. The socio-economic justice was held to be fundamen-
  tal right of the poor. Economic empowerment was, therefore, held tn be
  basic human right and the fundamental right as a part of right to live \vith
  equality of status and of dignity.
                                                                                        F
       Economic empowerment of the poor, in particular the Schedukd
 Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as is enjoined under Article 46, is a constitu-
 tional objective as basic human and fundamental right to enable the
 labourer, Scheduled Castes and Tribes to raise their economic empower-
 ment. When the appellant-Society had requested for assignment of the G
 waste land vested in the Gram Panchayat, the Gram Panchayat undoub-
 tedly passed a unanimous resolution requesting the Collector to resume
 the land for assignment to the appellant-society. Since, the Gram
 Panchayat as a representative body passed the resolution, it would be
 obvious that the elected members represent the interest of the Gram
 Panchayat for effecting the constitutional goal. When the Gram Panchayat H
    782                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   in turn passed the resolution for the Said purpose, there \Va~ not obligation
  to i:.sue notice to th~ villagers. 'J'hat apart: the schc111~ of Section 96 is cl~ar.
  The legislature is cognizant of the fact \Vhen public ro(:l<l or street i:>: sought
  to be discontinued or closed, public is likely to be effected, Sarpanch or
  Chairman acting on behalf of Gram Panchayal etc. is enjoined by the
  proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 96 to issue notice to them. It specifi-
B
  cally enjoins the Sarpanch or the Chairman, as the case 1nay he, lo cause
  a notice to be issued in the prescribed manner, before passing a resolution
  so that the affected users would have an opportunity lo put in their
  objections for consideration by the Gram Panchayat. But when the waste
  land or open site or vacant land or grazing land vested in the State was
C sought to be resumed from the Gram Panchayat by the Collector for
  another laudable public purpose, then silence of issc1ancc of notice is
  eloquent. Requirement of hearing the villagers is not insisted. The legisla-
  ture did not intend issuance of notice to villagers. It is contended for the
  State that in a case where the Gram Panchayat sought to pass a resolution
D requesting the Collector to resume the land in the possession and enjoy-
  ment of a person and when the resumption affects such a person, the
  issuance of prior notice to such affected person should be implicit. We
  need not .go into that question since that question does not arise in this
  case. Under these circun1stances, the vie\\' of the Government, learned
  single ,ludge and the Division Bench of the High Cou!l for issuance of a
E notice to the villagers is dearly not warranted by the scheme of Section
  96(4) of the Act.

           The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court and
     the Goverrunent stand set aside and that of the District Coliector stands
     restored. No. costs.
F
     T.N.A.                                                          Appeal allowed.




              .   .


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