Holding

A fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be issued beyond the period prescribed in the original notification under Section 4(1); the limitation period runs from the date of that notification, not from the date of the quashing order.

Summary

The case concerned a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued before the 1984 amendment, under which a declaration under Section 6(1) was made within the three‑year period but later quashed by the High Court. The State then issued a fresh declaration and the appellants challenged its validity, arguing that the limitation for a declaration should run from the date of the original notification, not from the date of the quashing order. The Supreme Court examined conflicting precedents – A.S. Naidu and Oxford English School (limitation from the original notification) versus N. Narasimhaiah and D.C. Nanjudaiah (limitation from the quashing order). Relying on the plain language of Section 6(1) and the principle that courts cannot read into a statute, the Court overruled the latter view and held that the limitation period starts from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Consequently, the fresh declaration issued after the quashing was beyond the prescribed period and was set aside. The judgment was made prospective, so completed acquisitions with compensation already paid were not reopened.

Issues considered

The limitation period for issuing a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after a prior declaration has been quashed: does it commence from the date of the original notification under Section 4(1) or from the date of the quashing order?
Whether the Court may read into Section 6(1) a provision extending the limitation period beyond what the statute expressly provides.
Applicability of stare decisis when earlier decisions are inconsistent with later legislative amendments.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 132(11), s. 132(5)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4(1), s. 6(1)
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 6 declarationLimitation periodStatutory interpretationStare decisisAmendment ActsQuashing of declarationCasus omissus

Judgment

PADMASUNDARA RAO (DEAD) AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF T.N. AND ORS.

MARCH 13, 2002

[S.P. BHARUCHA, CJ., R.C. LAHOTI, N. SANTOSH HEGDE, B
RUMA PAL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 6, Proviso to Section 6(1)-
Declaration-Previous declaration quashed by Court-Subsequent C
declaratiort-Limitation for-Whether starts from the date of Notification uls
4(1) or from the date of quashing or order-Held, limitation would start from
the date of Notification and not from the date of order-Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984.
D
Interpretation of statutes-Court cannot read anything into a statutory
provision which is plain and unambiguous-The legislative casus omissus
cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process-Land Acquisition Act,
1894-Section 6(1).

Doctrines: E
Stare decisis-Applicability of when a judicial decision has been nulified
by Judgment laying down law-Subsequent legislation.

Ratio Decidendi-Applicability of-Courts not to place reliance thereon
without considering the applicability of fact situation. F
Notification u/s. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) was issued
before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 but
after the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967.
Notification for declaration under Section 6(1) was issued and published in
the Official Gazette within the period of three years prescribed under proviso G
thereto. The same was quashed by High Court. Thereafter subsequent
notification under Section 6 was issued. Appellants challenged the same on
the ground that it was barred by limitation as the limitation for such
notification was to be counted from the date of Notification under Section
4(1). High Court relying on Narsimiah's case held that it was validly issued H
383
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A as the limitation was to be counted from the date of order quashing the earlier
notification under Section 6. Hence these appeals.

In view of difference of opinion o~ the question of limitation under
Section 6 of the Act among the various Benches of this Court, the matter was
referred to the present Constitution Bench.
B
In A.S. Naidu's case and Oxford English School's case, the opinion was
that limitation in such cases is to start from the date of notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act, while in N. Narsimaiah's case and D.C. Nanjudaiah's
case, the Court had opined that the limitation would start running from the
c da~e of receipt of the order quashing the declaration and not from the date
of original notification under Section 4(1). ""

Appellants contended that plain reading of Section 6 shows that the
declaration has to be issued within specified time, therefore, if opinion in
Narsimaiah 's case is accepted, it would amount to legislation by the Court
D which is not permitted.

Respondents contended that opinion in Narsi111aiah 's case was in line
with the statutory intent, hence extension of time limit was permissible; that
since K. Chinnathambi Gounder 's case had held the field since long, principle
of Stare Decisis was applicable; and that since many acquisitions had become
E final and if matters were re-opened and different views taken, it would cause
hardship.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

F HELD: 1.1. Once a.declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued
beyond the prescribed period of the Notification under Section 4(1) of Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. (388-B-C; 394-H]

A.S. Naidu and Ors. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. etc., (SLP (C)
G Nos. 11353-11355/1988 and Oxford English School v. Government a/Tamil Nadu
and Ors., (1995] 5 SCC 206, affirmed.

1.2. It cannot be said that limitation of 3 years for publication of
declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the ,
High Court and not from t11e date on which the original publication under
H Section 4(1) of the Act, came to be made. (388-C-D; 394-H; 395-A]
PADMASUNDARARAOv. STATE 385
N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. Stale of Karna/aka and Ors. etc., [1996) 3 A
SCC 88 and State of Karnataka and Ors. v. D.C. Nanjudiaiah and Ors., [19961
~
10 sec 619, overruled.

Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation) New Delhi and Anr.
v. Pooran Mal and Sons and Anr., (1975] 2 SCR 104; Commissioner ofIncome
Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders, (1980] l SCC 370 aud GrindlO)'s B
Bank Ltd v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors.. (1980] 2 SCC 191, referred
to.

2.1. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no
scope for reading something into it. If the view in Narasimaiah 's case and
~
Nanjudiaiah 's case is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by c
not only clause (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non
prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. While interpreting
a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a
< provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is
for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The
D
legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.
(393-H; 394-A; 393-GJ

~
Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage., 218 FR 547 and Union of India
and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC
981, referred to.
E
N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. etc., (1996] 3
SCC 88 and State of Karnataka and Ors. v. D.C. Nanjudaiah and Ors., (1996)
, 10 sec 619, overruled.
.... 2.2. Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain
and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language
F
employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first
and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislation must
be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what
may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes
should be construed not as theorems of Euclid", "but words must be construed G
with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (393-C-D]
"
2.3. A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case
of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the
statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily
inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with
reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to
be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole >--
st3;tute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause
leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have bten
intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result,"
B "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available.

Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1996) l QB 878 and Luke v. !RC. (1966) AC
557, referred to. [394-B-D]

3. In case the notification under Section 4(1) was published after
c commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, '< ..:.
1967 (replaced by Land Acquisition) (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967
but before commencemeJtt of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the
period of limitation for declaration under Section 6 is three years.
Undoubtedly, the Notification under Section 6(1) was made and published in /
"'
D the official gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the
proviso thereto, and undisputedly, the same had been quashed by the High
Court in an earlier proceeding. It has to be noted that Explanation 1 appended
to Section 6(1) provides that in computing the period of three years, the period
....
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the
Notification under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the Court, shall be
E excluded. (390-D; F-G)

Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation) New Delhi and Anr.
v. Pooran Mal and Sons and Anr., (1975] 2 SCR 104, distinguished.
~·
4. The plea rel~ting to applicability of the stare decisis principles is
F clearly unacceptable:The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder was rendered
much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to
give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6
is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically
providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods,
G covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period
was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other ]'

period of limitation. (394-F-G]

5. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as
to how the factual situation fits in which the fact situation of the decision on
H which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech
PADMASUNDARA RAO v. STATE [ARJJJT PASAYAT, J.] 3 87

or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to A
-< be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts
of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.(391-E-FJ
Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537, referred to.

6. The matters which have attained finality should not be-opened. The B
present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where
awards have been made and the compensation have been paid, shall not be
reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. (395-B]

~ ~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2226 of C
1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.3.96 of the Chennai High Court
in W.A. No. 106 of 1996.

WITH

C.A. 2058 of 2002.
D

V. · Balachandran, S. Aravindh, Sen th ii Jagadeesan and V.
Ramasubramanian for the Appellant in C.A. No. 2226/97.

K.V. Viswanathan, K.V. Venkataraman, Atul Kumar Sinha,'
B. Raghunath, Kunwar Ajit Mohan Singh for the Appellant in C.A. No. E
2058/2002.

T.L. Viswanatha Iyer and R. Mohan, V. Balaji, P.N. Ramalingam and
V.G. Pragasam for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. Noticing cleavage in views expressed in several
decisions rendered by Benches of three learned Judges, two learned Judges
referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and by order dated 30. I 0.200 I
the matter was directed to be placed before a Constirution Bench, and that is
how the matter is before us in C.A. No. 2226/1997. Special Leave petition G
© No. 12806/2000 was directed to be heard along with Civil Appeal.

Leave granted in SLP No. 12806/2000.
The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is
whether after quashing of Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') fresh period of orie year is H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A available to the State Government to issue another Notification under Section
6. In the case at hand such a Notification issued under Section 6 was questioned >--
before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three-Judge
Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. of Karnataka and Ors etc., [1996] 3
sec 88 and held that the same was validly issued.
B Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on an un-reported
decision of this Court in A.S. Naidu and Ors. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Ors. etc., (SLP (C) Nos. 11353-11355/1988), wherein a Bench of three Judges
held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed,
fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed
c period of the Notification under Sub-section (1) ofSection4 of the Act. It has
to be noted that there is another judgment of two learned Judges in Oxford
--< -!.
English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC 206)
which takes a view similar to thatexpressed in A.S. Naidu 's case (supra).
However, in State of Karnataka and Ors. v. D.C. Nanjudaiah and Ors.,
[1996) 10 SCC 619, view in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) was followed and
D it was held that the limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would
start running from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court and not
from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to
~
be made.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a bare reading of
E
Section 6 of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, leaves no manner of
doubt that the declaration under Section 6 has to be issued within the specified
time and merely because the Court has quashed the concerned declaration an
extended time period is not to be provided. Explanation I (appended to the
~
Section) specifically deals with exclusion of periods in certain specified cases.
F If the view expressed in Narasimhaiah 's case (supra) is accepted, it would
mean reading something into the statute which is not there, and in effect
would mean legislation by the Court whereas it is within the absolute domain °
of the legislature. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State of Tamil
Nadu submitted that the logic indicated in Narasimhaiah 's case (supra) is in
line with the statutory intent. Placing reliance on the decision in Director of
G
Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation) New Delhi and Anr. v. Pooran Mal y

and Sons and Anr., [1975) 2 SCR 104, it was submitted that extension of the
time limit is permissible. Apart from Pooranma/'s case (supra), reliance was
placed on two decisions rendered in relation to proceedings under the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (in short the 'IT Act'), to contend that there is scope for
H extension of time though there was fixed statutory time prescription. The
·>-
PADMASUNDARARAOv. STATE [ARIJITPASAYAT, J.) 389

• decisions relied on are Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. A
-< National Taj Traders, [ 1980) 1 SCC 370 and Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Income
Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors., [1980) 2 SCC 191. It was, however, frankly
conceded that in Grindlays 's case (supra), question of .limitation was not
necessary to be gone into. as the itnpugned action was taken within the
prescribed titne limit. It was contended that at the most, this can be considered
to be a case of casus omissus, and the deficiency, if any, can be filled up by B
purposive interpretation, by reading the statute as a whole, and finding out
the true legislative intent. Strong reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision
of Madras High Court in K. Chinnathambi Gounder and Anr. v. Government
of Tamil Nadu and Anr., AIR (1980) Madras 251 to contend that the view
in the said case has held the field since long and the principles of stare decisis c
are applicable. Residually, it was su~mitted that many acquisitions have
become final and ifthe matters are directed to be re-opened, in case a different
view is taken, it would cause hardship.

Section 6(1) of the Act so far as relevant reads as follows:

"Declaration that land is required for a public purpose:- Subject to
D
the provisions of Part Vil of this Act, when the Appropriate
Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made
under Section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed
for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made
to that effeci under the signature of a Secretary to such Government E
or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different
declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different
parcels of any land covered by the same notification. under section 4,
sub-section ( 1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports
has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-A, .sub-
section (2):
F
'
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered
by a notification under section 4, sub-section ( 1)-

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the G
'" commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the
publication of the notification; or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the H

•
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A date of the publication of the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the
compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a
company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund
controlled or managed by a local authority.
B
[Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the
first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be
taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-
section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded."

C As the factual scenario shows, in the case at hand the Notification --"'(
under Section 4( 1) of the Act was issued and the declaration was made prior
to the substitution of the existing proviso to Section 6(1) by Act 68 of 1984
with effect from 24.8.1984. In other words, the Notification under Section
4(1) was issued before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act 1984, but after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment
D and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (replaced by Land Acquisition (Amendment
and Validation) Act 1967 (Act 13 of 1967). But the substituted proviso was
in operation on the date of the impugned judgment. In terms of the pr~viso,
the declaration cannot be made under Section 6 in respect of any land covered
by the Noti~cation under Section 4(1) of the Act after the expiry of three
E years or one year from the date of its publication, as the case may be. The
proviso deals with two types of situations. It provides for different periods of
limitation depending upon the question whether (i) the notification under
Section 4( 1) w~ published after the commencement of Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before commencement of
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, or (ii) su.eh notification was issued
F after Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the former case, the period
is three years whereas in the latter case it is one year. Undoubtedly, the I-

Notification under Section 6( I) was made and published in the official gazette
within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso thereto, and I-

!
undisputedly, the same had been quashed by the High Court in an earlier
G proceeding. It has to be noted that Explanation I appended to Section 6( l)
provides that in computing the period of three years, the period during which
any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the Notification under ..'
Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the Court, shall be excluded. Under
Tamil Nadu Act 41 of 1980, w .e.f. 20.1.1967, the expression used is "action
or proceeding ... .is held up on account of stay or injunction", wh.icb is
H contextually similar.
c.

...' ~
PADMASUNDARARAOv. STATE [ARIJITPASAYAT,J.] 391

Learned counsel for the respondents referred to some observations in A
Pooranma/'s case (supra), which form the foundation for decisions relied
upon by him. It has to be noted that Pooranma/'s case (supra) was decided
on entirely different factual and legal background. The Court noticed that
assessee who wanted the Court to strike down the action of the Revenue
Authorities on the ground of limitation had himself conceded to the passing B
of an order by the authorities. The Court, therefore, held that the assessee
cannot take undue advantage of his own action. Additionally, it was noticed
that the time limit was to be reckoned with reference to the period prescribed
in respect of Section 132(5) of the IT Act. It was noticed that once the order
has been made under Section 132(5) within ninety days, the aggrieved person
has got the right to approach the notified authority under Section 132(11) C
within thirty days and that authority can direct the Income-Tax Officer to
pass a fresh order. That is the distinctive feature vis-vis Section 6 of the Act.
The Court applied the principle of waiver and inter alia held that the period
of limitation prescribed therein was one intended for the benefit of the person
whose property has been seized and it was open to that person to waive that
benefit. It was further observed that if the specified period is held to be D
mandatory, it would cause more injury to the citizens than to the Revenue.
A distinction was made with statutes providing periods of limitation for
assessment. It was noticed that Section 132 does not deal with taxation of
income. Considered in that background, ratio of the decision in Pooranmal 's
case (supra) has no application to the case at hand. E
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to
how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a
...i..... speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and
it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the F
facts of a particular case, said lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways
Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or
different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two
cases.

What appears to have weighed with the three-Judge Bench in G
Narasimhaiah's case (supra) is set out in paragraph 12 of the judgment,
which reads as under:

"Having considered the respective contentions, we are of the
considered view that if the construction as put up by the learned
counsel for the appellants is given acceptance i.e., it should be within H
392 SUPREME COURT·REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R.

A one year from the last of the dates of publication under Section 4(1 ),
"· the public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be illustrated
thus: In a given case where the notification under Section 4(1) was >--
published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and
declaration was published within one month and as the urgency in the
opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay
B of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession
was not taken due to dilatory tactics of the interested person and the
court ultimately finds after two years that the exercise of urgency
power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and
directed the Government to give an opportunity to the interested person
c and the State to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A, then the
• ~
exercise of the power pursuant to the direction of the court will be
fruitless as it would take time to conduct the enquiry. If the enquiry
is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot
be published within the limitation from the original date of the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1). A valid notification
D under Section 4(1) become invalid. On the other hand, after conducting
enquiry as per court order and, if the declaration under Section 6 is
published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order
passed by the High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes ~

valid since the action was done pursuant to the orders of the court
E and compliance with the limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii)
of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act would be made."

It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in ~·

terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role to play when the period of
limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period ~

F of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land
is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of
Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that the valuation of the r--
land has to be done on the date of publication of Notification under Section
4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the
compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be fixed with
G
reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of _.,,
the Act The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore,
peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,
[1994] I SCC 44, it was held by this Court that though no period was
prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case
H related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After
PADMASUNDARA RAOv. STATE[AR!JITPASAYAT,J.) 393

the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is ·A
fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on
issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however,
contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value
has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4(1)
of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the B
interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost
sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition
sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he
cannot be made to suffer on that count.

The rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need C
careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A
statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the Legislation must be found in the
words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed D
and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed
not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be
construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them".
(See lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-
iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vusco E
De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981. ,

In Dr. R Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
and Ors. etc., AIR (1977) SC 842 it was observed that Courts must avoid the
danger of apriori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their
own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the F
provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp
legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and
cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse
of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if G
deemed necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries ltd v. P.N.B. Capital Services
ltd, (2000) 5 SCC 515). 'The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied
by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6( I) is plain and
unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done
in Narasimhaiah's case (supra). In Nanjudaiah's case (supra), the period was
further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section
6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not >--
only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-
prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.

Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the
B other in regard to reading the statute as a whole-appear to be well settled.
I

Under the first principle a casus' omissus cannot be supplied by the Court
except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the
four comers of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should
not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section
c must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed
with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction
to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole
statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause
leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been
intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result'',
D said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) l QB 878, "is not
to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available".
Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the
legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some
violence to the words" l!nd so achieve that obvious intention and produce a
.E rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. l.R.C., (1966) AC 557 where
at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard
of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".]

The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly
unacceptable. The decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered
F on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the
Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the
declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason·why it could not
have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature
specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction
G clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there
iSi no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus
ci;iria neminem gravibit' highlghted by the Full Bench of the Madras High
Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.

The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) and Nanjudaiah's
H case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S.
PADMASUNDARA RAOv. STATE [ARIJITPASAYAT, J.] 395
Naidu 's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed. A
There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have
attained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate
prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the
compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio
of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the B
subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act
are quashed.

K.K.T. Appeals disposed of.