PADAM NABH & SONSversusYASH PAL

                          [2021] 12 S.C.R. 543                            543


                     PADAM NABH & SONS                                    A
                                  v.
                             YASH PAL
                   (Civil Appeal No.5976 of 2014)
                       NOVEMBER 17, 2021                                  B
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
       East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 – s.13-B –
Summary jurisdiction – Non-Resident Indian (NRI) who purchased
a building to which the Act applies, subsequent to the induction of
                                                                          C
tenant is entitled to invoke summary jurisdiction under s.13-B – If a
NRI becomes the owner of the building to which the Act applies and
the tenancy of a person in occupation is attorned in his favour, the
premises would become a premises let out by him, as otherwise the
jural relationship of landlord and tenant will not come into existence
– Once a NRI acquires a premises which is in the occupation of a          D
tenant inducted by his predecessor in title, he becomes the owner –
The moment the tenancy is attorned in his favour, then the jural
relationship of tenant landlord is created and the premises become
one let out by him – It is perhaps with a view to highlight this aspect
that the legislature has carefully used the expression “owner” in
                                                                          E
s.13-B, even while using the expression “landlord” in other places
– Rent Control and Eviction.
      Rent control legislations: Purpose of enactment – Discussed.
      Rent Control and Eviction: While the owner of a premises
may also be the landlord of the premises, a landlord, within the          F
meaning of the expression under the Rent Control legislations, need
not necessarily be the owner of the said premises.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD : 1. The shortage of housing and the exploitation of
tenants by landlords in the urban areas, in the aftermath of the          G
world wars, led to the enactment of rent control legislations in
the country. The problems created by the post war conditions
differed from State to State and hence, the solution sought to be
offered in the form of legislation also differed from State to State.
As a matter of fact the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,           H
                                 543
544            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A     1949 is an offshoot of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
      1941 and the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, both of
      which are pre-independent and pre-partition legislation. On the
      contrary, the Delhi Act of 1958 is an offshoot of the Delhi and
      Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The areas to which these acts
      applied had their own peculiar geographical features and socio-
B
      economic conditions. This is why the language employed in these
      rent control legislations differ, though they may have a common
      template. [Para 10][554-C-E]
            2. Coming to the distinguishing features between the Delhi
      Act and the East Punjab Act, it may be seen immediately that the
C     Delhi Act covers four categories of persons, namely,(i) a landlord
      in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by the
      Central Government or any local authority and who is required
      to vacate such residential accommodation; (ii) a landlord, released
      or retired from armed forces or a dependent of a member of any
D     armed forces who had been killed in action, including a member
      of the armed forces who is due to retire within one year; (iii) a
      landlord who is a retired employee of the Central Government
      or of the Delhi Administration; and (iv) a widow. But under the
      Punjab Act, the right to seek immediate possession is conferred
      in favour of only two categories of persons, namely, (i) a specified
E     landlord, meaning thereby a person entitled to receive rent in
      respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or
      has held an appointment in a public service or post in a connection
      with the affairs of the union or of a State; and (ii) an owner who is
      a non resident Indian and who returns to India. [Para 11]
F     [554-F-H; 555-A]
             3. While Section 13-A of the East Punjab Act was inserted
      by amending Act 2 of 1985, Section 13-B was inserted by Punjab
      Act 9 of 2001. Delhi Act does not contain any special provision
      for the benefit of NRI landlords. It is common knowledge that
G     the major chunk of the NRI diaspora is from three states, namely,
      Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Therefore, the legislature
      thought fit to exempt buildings owned by NRIs from the rigors of
      the Rent Restriction Act. Hence, the normal rule of interpretation
      of a legislation for the welfare of the tenants, will give way while
      interpreting the provisions as applicable to the exempted
H     categories. [Para 12][555-B-C]
             PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL                              545


      4. While carving out an exception in favour of four categories    A
of persons, under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D, the Delhi
Act used only the word “landlord”. But the Punjab Act uses the
word “specified landlord” under Section 13-A and the word
“owner” in Section 13-B. There is a world of difference between
the expression “landlord” and the expression “owner”. While
                                                                        B
the owner of a premises may also be the landlord of the premises,
a landlord, within the meaning of the expression under the Rent
Control legislations, need not necessarily be the owner of the
said premises. Therefore, while interpreting Section 13-B of the
Punjab Act, the Court must keep in mind the distinction between
those two expressions. [Para 13][555-D-E]                               C
       5. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B which
curtails the right of the owner to invoke this provision for a period
of five years from the date of becoming the owner, makes it clear
that the words “let out by him” require a different interpretation.
The correct method of interpreting Sub-section (1) of Section           D
13-B and the proviso thereunder is to hold that irrespective of
the person by whom the tenant was inducted, a NRI owner will
have to wait for a period of five years from the date of becoming
the owner, to be entitled to invoke Section 13-B. There is
distinction between (i) inception of tenancy or induction of a person
as a tenant; and (ii) letting out a premises on lease. Section 13-      E
B(1) does not use the expression “inducted by him or her”. If
these words had been used, they would certainly refer to the
inception of the tenancy. Section 13(B)(1) uses the expression
“let out”. [Paras 14, 15, 16][555-F, H; 556-A, B]
      6. Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882           F
declares that a leasing of immovable property for agricultural or
manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year
to year (in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the
contrary). It also says that a lease of immovable property for any
other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month.        G
Once a NRI acquires a premises which is in the occupation of a
tenant inducted by his predecessor in title, he becomes the owner.
The moment the tenancy is attorned in his favour, then the jural
relationship of tenant landlord is created and the premises
become one let out by him. It is perhaps with a view to highlight
                                                                        H
546            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A     this aspect that the legislature has carefully used the expression
      “owner” in Section 13-B, even while using the expression
      “landlord” in other places. [Para 17][556-C-F]
            Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271:
            [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1141 – held inapplicable.
B           Smt. Bachan Kaur v. Kabal Singh 2011(1) RCR (Rent)
            368; S. Surjit Singh Kalra v Union of India & Anr.
            (1991) 2 SCC 87 : [ 1991] 1 SCR 364; S. Surjit Singh
            Kalra and Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak (1977) 2 SCC 814
            : [1977] 3 SCR 412; Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta
C           (2000) 9 SCC 249 – referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
      [1991] 1 SCR 364                  referred to              Para 8
      [1977] 3 SCR 412                  referred to              Para 8
D     (2000) 9 SCC 249                  referred to              Para 8
      [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1141          held inapplicable        Para 6
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5976
      of 2014.
E           From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2011 of the High Court
      of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.1571 of 2010
      (O&M).
            Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ms. Pallavi Singh, Ms. Nidhi Gupta,
      Japneet Kaur, Vriti Gujral, Tarun Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
F         Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Subhasish
      Bhowmick, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
G           1. This appeal arising out of an order of eviction passed by the
      Rent Controller, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar, Nawanshahr, under
      Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and
      confirmed on revision by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, raises
      an interesting question as to whether a Non-Resident Indian who
      purchases a building to which the Act applies, subsequent to the induction
H
                 PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL                                 547
                   [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

of the tenant, will be entitled to invoke the summary jurisdiction under       A
Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B or not.
      2. We have heard Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Pardeep Gupta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
       3. Admittedly one Shri Padam Nabh, who was the father of the            B
proprietor/partner of the appellant-concern, was inducted as a tenant in
respect of a non residential building measuring about 12’ x 12’, situate at
the Old Grain Market Nawanshahar. The induction of Shri Padam Nabh
as a tenant, was by one Sat Prakash.
       4. Claiming (i) that the original owner Sat Prakash sold the premises   C
in question to his father Brij Lal under a sale deed dated 6.2.1989; (ii)
that the property devolved upon him and his brother after the demise of
his father in the year 1991 through testamentary succession; (iii) that he
went to Australia in March-1996 and returned to India on 4.02.2004;
and (iv) that he required the tenanted premises for establishing a             D
departmental store, the respondent filed a petition for eviction under
Section 13-B of the Act. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller
by an Order dated 19.01.2010.
      5. Challenging the order of the eviction passed by the learned
Rent Controller, the appellant filed a revision before the High Court of       E
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The revision having been dismissed
by the High Court, the tenant is on appeal before us.
       6. The main contention of Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior
counsel for the appellant is that the issue raised by the appellant is no
longer res integra, but covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench      F
of this Court in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta1. However, the
High Court, in the impugned order, chose to follow the decision of the
Division Bench of the High Court in Smt. Bachan Kaur vs. Kabal
Singh2, which distinguished the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi
Devi (supra). Therefore, it is contended by Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned
senior counsel that the impugned order of the High Court requires to be        G
interfered with, by this Court, in the light of the law declared by the
Constitution Bench while interpreting an identical provision in the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “Delhi Act”).
1
    (2005) 2 SCC 271
2
    2011(1) RCR (Rent) 368                                                     H
548            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A            7. Since Nathi Devi (supra) was concerned with the interpretation
      of Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and since we are
      concerned in this case with the interpretation of Section 13-B of the
      East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, we think it would be
      appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of both the enactments in
      a tabular column for better appreciation.
B




C




D




E




F




G




H
PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL   549
  [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

                                A




                                B




                                C




                                D




                                E




                                F




                                G




                                H
550             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A            8. In Nathi Devi, eviction was sought under Section 14-D of the
      Delhi Act by a widow landlady. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction
      summarily and High Court confirmed the same. In the special leave
      petition filed by the tenant, the decision of this Court in S. Surjit Singh
      Kalra vs Union of India & Anr.3 was relied upon in support of the
      contention that a landlady who acquired the tenanted premises by way
B
      of transfer, could not avail the remedy under Section 14-D for the eviction
      of a pre-existing tenant. However, the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of
      this Court before whom Nathi Devi (supra) first came up, doubted the
      correctness of the decision in S.Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) and, hence,
      directed the special leave petition to be placed before a three Member
C     Bench. The three Member Bench noticed the conflict between the S.
      Surjit Singh Kalra and Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak4. The conflict
      was with respect to the interpretation of the words “let out” appearing
      in the relevant provision. Due to this conflict, Nathi Devi was referred
      to the Constitution Bench by an order reported in Nathi Devi vs. Radha
      Devi Gupta5. The short order of reference reads as follows:
D
             “Specifically the issue is in relation to the meaning of the
             words” let out”. Do they mean the creation of a fresh tenancy
             or do they refer to an existing tenancy? If the former, the
             section can be resorted to only by the creator of the tenancy
             (widow or her late husband). If it is the latter, even a transferee
E            (widow) is entitled to invoke it. We find that there is some
             conflict in the views taken by two Benches of three learned
             Judges each. An observation in the judgment in Surjit Singh
             Kalra v. Union of India suggests that the words “let out”
             refer only to the creation of a tenancy. On the other hand, the
F            judgment in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak interprets the words
             “let out” in the context of Section 14-D of the Act to mean
             that even a transferee landlord can invoke the provision. It
             is, in these circumstances, necessary that this appeal should
             be heard by a Bench of five learned Judges. It shall be so
             placed after obtaining the directions of the Hon’ble the Chief
G            Justice of India in this regard.”
            9. The Constitution Bench, after referring to the provisions of
      Sections 14B to 14D as well as Section 14(6) of the Delhi Act held (i)
      3
        (1991) 2 SCC 87
      4
        (1977) 2 SCC 814
      5
H       (2000) 9 SCC 249
               PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL                                   551
                 [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

that these provisions carve out an exception to the normal procedure for       A
eviction; (ii) that being in the nature of exception, they must be construed
strictly and (iii) that the words “let out by him” or “let out by her”
clearly signify that the premises let out by any other person will stand
excluded from the operation of the summary procedure. Paragraphs 28
and 32 of the Constitution Bench Judgment in Nathi Devi (supra) are
                                                                               B
extracted as follows, as the entire argument of the petitioners, revolves
around the same:
        “28. The observations in the aforesaid judgments no doubt
       support the case of the appellant. This Court did clearly lay
        down that the expression, “the premises let out by him” in
        Section 14-B of the Act did mean that it is he who has let out         C
        alone could evict, and in case the landlord had been killed in
        action his dependent could seek immediate eviction of the
       premises let out by such person. It is noticeable that the
        expression, “premises let out by him” is used inSections 14-B
        and14-C, but the expression, in Section 14-D is “premises let          D
        out by her, or by her husband.”Section 14-B contemplates
        two situations, firstly, where the landlord is a released or retired
       person from any armed forces and secondly, where he was
        killed in action. In case the landlord was killed in action a
        right has been given to his dependant within one year of the
        death of the landlord, to apply to the Controller for recovering       E
        the immediate possession of the premises. Section 14C confers
        a right on a retired employee of the Central Government or
        of the Delhi Administration who requires the premises let out
        by him for his own residence. Section 14-D confers a right
        on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possession of             F
        the premises let out “by her, or by her husband”. The scheme
        of these Sections appears to be that where the landlord is
        alive and the premises have been let out by him, only he can
        make an application for immediate possession of the premises
       for his own use. Only in the case of his death his dependant
        under Section 14-A, and his widow under Section 14-D can               G
       seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the
        expression, “let out by him” in Sections 14-B and 14-C and
        the expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” in Section
        14-D have significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme
        of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises,
                                                                               H
552      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A     the legislature would not have used the term “let out by him”
      or “let out by her, or by her husband”. In interpreting a
      provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the
      legislature are redundant. Section 14-D gives a right to file
      an application under that provision only to a widow who had
      let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises.
B     Consequently, if the premises had been let out by someone
      else, Section 14-D will not apply. As pointed out in Surjit Singh
      Kalra (supra) the expression used in Section 14-B is “the
      premises let out by him”, unlike the expression used in Section
      14 (1)(e) where the legislature employed the expression “the
C     premises let out for residential purposes”. Thus in the case of
      a landlord belonging to the general category it was immaterial
      whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else,
      as long as he was the landlord of the premises at the time of
      making an application seeking eviction of the tenant. But the
      expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” conveys a
D     different meaning altogether. The widow’s right to recover
      immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises
      were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone
      else. It appears to us that the legislature has purposely
      employed a different expression in Section 14-D as also
E     in Section 14-B and 14-C. We are here concerned with an
      application filed under Section 14-D which specifies in clear
      terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has
      let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premises.
      If, as observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expression, “the
      premises let out by him” has been used only to convey the
F     idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the
      lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself
      let out the premises, the legislature would not have then used
      the expression “let out by her, or by her husband.” The very
      fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one
      which was let out by the widow or by her husband implies
G     that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by
      any other person. If the intention of the legislature was to
      confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord, the use of the
      words “the premises let out by her, or by her husband” would
      have been unnecessary and the Section would have simply
H     read as follows:-
       PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL                              553
         [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

   “Where the landlord is a widow and the premises are            A
   required by her for her own residence, she may apply to
   the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
   such premises.”
    By expressly providing that the premises must be one let
out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly         B
excluded from the purview of the said provision “premises let
out by any other person” even if in course of time the widow
may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the
provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an
expression expressly employed by the legislature. The
expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” is not an         C
expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore,
give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is
inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a
special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who
let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before     D
his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own
use.
“32. There is another aspect of the matter. Section 14-D uses
the expression, “premises let out by her, or by her husband”
which are required by the widow for her own residence. She        E
may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate
possession of “such premises”. “Such premises” obviously is
relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It
cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may
have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find
substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant      F
that Section 14-D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow
who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention
was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided
that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the
premises owned by her and the expressions, “let out by her        G
or by her husband” and “such premises” in Section 14-
D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error
in thinking that only two conditions were required to be
fulfilled for the application of Section 14-D namely, the
landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for
her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our      H
554            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A           view, Section 14-D insists that the premises must be one let
            out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband
            who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot
            invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting
            tenant.”
B            10. But it is difficult to accept the contention that Nathi Devi
      which interpreted Section 14-D of the Delhi Act, would apply with equal
      force to the interpretation of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban
      Rent Restriction Act. There are several distinguishing features between
      the Delhi Act and the Punjab Act. Even before we take note of the
      distinguishing features, we must keep in mind the fact that the shortage
C     of housing and the exploitation of tenants by landlords in the urban areas,
      in the aftermath of the world wars, led to the enactment of rent control
      legislations in the country. The problems created by the post war
      conditions differed from State to State and hence, the solution sought to
      be offered in the form of legislation also differed from State to State. As
D     a matter of fact the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is an
      offshoot of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 and the Punjab
      Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, both of which are pre-independent
      and pre-partition legislation. On the contrary, the Delhi Act of 1958 is an
      offshoot of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The areas to
      which these acts applied had their own peculiar geographical features
E     and socio-economic conditions. This is why the language employed in
      these rent control legislations differ, though they may have a common
      template.
             11. Coming to the distinguishing features between the Delhi Act
      and the East Punjab Act, it may be seen immediately that the Delhi Act
F     covers four categories of persons, namely,(i) a landlord in occupation of
      a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any
      local authority and who is required to vacate such residential
      accommodation; (ii) a landlord, released or retired from armed forces
      or a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in
G     action, including a member of the armed forces who is due to retire
      within one year; (iii) a landlord who is a retired employee of the Central
      Government or of the Delhi Administration; and (iv) a widow. But under
      the Punjab Act, the right to seek immediate possession is conferred in
      favour of only two categories of persons, namely, (i) a specified landlord,
      meaning thereby a person entitled to receive rent in respect of a building
H
               PADAM NABH & SONS v. YASH PAL                                   555
                 [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a          A
public service or post in a connection with the affairs of the union or of
a State; and (ii) an owner who is a non resident Indian and who returns
to India.
       12. While Section 13-A of the East Punjab Act was inserted by
amending Act 2 of 1985, Section 13-B was inserted by Punjab Act 9 of           B
2001. Delhi Act does not contain any special provision for the benefit of
NRI landlords. It is common knowledge that the major chunk of the
NRI diaspora is from three states, namely, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and
Kerala. Therefore, the legislature thought fit to exempt buildings owned
by NRIs from the rigors of the Rent Restriction Act. Hence, the normal
rule of interpretation of a legislation for the welfare of the tenants, will   C
give way while interpreting the provisions as applicable to the exempted
categories.
       13. It may be of interest to note that while carving out an exception
in favour of four categories of persons, under Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-
C and 14-D, the Delhi Act used only the word “landlord”. But the               D
Punjab Act uses the word “specified landlord” under Section 13-A
and the word “owner” in Section 13-B. It is needless to mention that
there is a world of difference between the expression “landlord” and
the expression “owner”. While the owner of a premises may also be
the landlord of the premises, a landlord, within the meaning of the            E
expression under the Rent Control legislations, need not necessarily be
the owner of the said premises. Therefore, while interpreting Section
13-B of the Punjab Act, the Court must keep in mind the distinction
between those two expressions.
       14. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B which curtails       F
the right of the owner to invoke this provision for a period of five years
from the date of becoming the owner, makes it clear that the words “let
out by him” require a different interpretation .
       15. If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta on the
basis of the decision in Nathi Devi (supra) is accepted, a NRI who is          G
the owner of the building will be required to satisfy two conditions,
namely,(i) that the premises was let out by him; and (ii) that a period of
five years from the date of becoming the owner has elapsed. The proviso
to Sub-section (1) cannot be construed as imposing a condition additional
to the one prescribed in Sub-Section (1). The correct method of
interpreting Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B and the proviso thereunder        H
556              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 12 S.C.R.


A     is to hold that irrespective of the person by whom the tenant was inducted,
      a NRI owner will have to wait for a period of five years from the date of
      becoming the owner, to be entitled to invoke Section 13-B.
              16. We must also keep in mind the distinction between (i) inception
      of tenancy or induction of a person as a tenant; and (ii) letting out a
B     premises on lease. Section 13-B(1) does not use the expression “inducted
      by him or her”. If these words had been used, they would certainly
      refer to the inception of the tenancy. Section 13(B)(1) uses the expression
      “let out”.
              17. Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 declares
C     that a leasing of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing
      purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year (in the absence
      of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary). It also says that a
      lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to
      be a lease from month to month. Therefore, if a NRI becomes the owner
      of the building to which the Act applies and the tenancy of a person in
D     occupation is attorned in his favour, the premises would become a
      premises let out by him, as otherwise the jural relationship of landlord
      and tenant will not come into existence. Once a NRI acquires a premises
      which is in the occupation of a tenant inducted by his predecessor in
      title, he becomes the owner. The moment the tenancy is attorned in his
E     favour, then the jural relationship of tenant landlord is created and the
      premises become one let out by him. It is perhaps with a view to highlight
      this aspect that the legislature has carefully used the expression “owner”
      in Section 13-B, even while using the expression “landlord” in other
      places.

F            18. Therefore, the decision of the Constitution Bench in Nathi
      Devi (supra) as applicable to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent
      Act cannot be pressed into service for interpreting Section 13-B of the
      East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Hence, we find that the order
      of the High Court impugned in the present appeal is perfectly valid and
      does not call for any interference. Therefore the appeal is dismissed.
G
            19. However the tenant is granted six months’ time to vacate the
      premises, provided the usual undertaking is furnished within a period of
      two weeks. There will be no order as to costs.

      Devika Gujral                                               Appeal dismissed.
H