Holding

A judgment that does not expressly state prospective operation is deemed to have retrospective effect, so the Full Bench decision applies to the appellants and their promotions can be reversed.

Summary

The appellants, employees of the Kerala Government Press Subordinate Services, were threatened with reversion of their promotions after the Kerala High Court Full Bench upheld the constitutionality of a 1:1 promotion ratio between diploma‑holders and certificate‑holders, overruling an earlier decision (Daniel) and affirming another (Ravindran). The appellants argued that, in service matters, the doctrine of prospective overruling should apply unless expressly stated, so the Full Bench ruling should not affect them retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that prospective overruling is a discretionary tool that must be expressly declared; the Full Bench did not so state, and therefore its decision operates retrospectively. Since the appellants were not parties to the earlier proceedings and no right had been adjudicated in their favour, the law declared by the Full Bench applies to them, permitting their reversion. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The doctrine of prospective overruling applies to service matters only if expressly stated.
Whether the Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court has retrospective effect on employees not party to the earlier cases.
Whether the amended promotion rules with a 1:1 ratio are constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 16.
Whether the notices ordering reversion of the appellants are legally valid.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 141, s. Article 142, s. Article 16, s. Article 226, s. Article 32

Subjects

prospective overrulingretrospective effectservice lawpromotion rulesconstitutional validitydoctrine of stare decisisKerala High Courtemployee reversionArticle 14Article 16

Judgment

A P.V. GEORGE AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.

JANUARY 23, 2007

B [S.B. SINHA & MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

Constitution of India-Article 141-Ful/ Bench of High Court
overruling one decision and upholding another decision of Division
Bench-State ordering reversion of employees in view of changed law by
C Full Bench-Applicability of doctrine of prospective overruling in service
matters-Held, doctrine is applicable unless expressly stated-On facts,
the aggrieved employees were not parties to the overruled decision and the
applicability of the doctrine was not stated by Full Bench-Hence, the law
laid down by Full Bench will have retrospective effect.

D Appellant-employees belonged to State Press Subordinate Services.
The State issued a Government Order amending the Service Rules relating -;
to promotion between diploma-holders and certificate-holders. Thereafter,
the State issued another Government Order appending another proviso to
the promotion Rule. The High Court in Daniel v. State of Kera/a, [1985]
E KLT 1057 declared the Rule to be uhra vires, Another Division Bench of
the High Court in Ravindran v. State of Kera/a, (1992) 1 KLT 524 took
a contrary view. On reference, a Full Bench of the High Court in Subaida
Beevi v. State of Kera/a, (2005) 1 KLT 426 held that the amended Rule is
intra vires and overruled the decision in Danial and upheld the decision in
F Ravindran. A Special Leave Petition challenging the Full Court's judgment
was dir;missed by this Court.

The State issued notices to the appellants as to why they should not
be reverted back in view of the law !aid down by the Full Bench which has
attained finality. A Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High
G Court was dismissed.

In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the doctrine
of prospective ruling would ordinarily apply in service matters and hence
the law laid down by the Full Bench of the High Court is not applicable to
H them.
1198
I
)
P.V.GEORGE v. STATE 1199
)
Dismissing the appeals, the Court A
rl
HELD : 1.1. The Full Bench of the High Court did not say that the
promotion which had already been granted would not be disturbed. The
judgment of the Full Bench has attained finality as a Special Leave Petition
filed thereagainst was dismissed by this Court. If the Rules ultimately were
held to be constitutional, it was required to be given effect to. The doctrine
B
of overruling must be stated expressly. The power must be exercised in the
clearest possible term. (Paras 17, 18 & 19) [1205-B-E)

1.2. The rights of the appellants were not determined in the earlier
proceedings. Merely a law was declared which was prevailing at that point C
oftime. The appellants were not parties therein. Thus, no decision was
rendered in their favour nor any right accrued thereby. The law declared
by a court will have a retrospective effect if not otherwise stated to be so
specifically. (Paras 27 & 29) (1210-B, E-F)

L.C. GolakNath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR (1967) SC 643
D
CB; Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma & Ors. v. The Chancellor, Nagpur University
& Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 55; MA. Murthy v. State ofKarnataka & Ors., (20031
7 SCC 517; Union of India v. Madras Telephone, SC & ST Social Welfare
Association, (2006) 9 SCALE 626; Managing Director ECJL, Hyderabad
v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727; R.K. Sabharwa/ v. State of Punjab, E
(1995) 2 SCC 745; Union ofIndia & Ors. v. Virpal Singh Chauhan & Ors.,
(1995) 6 SCC 684; Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of UP. [1997) 5 SCC 201;
Ajit Singh-Jlv. State ofPunjab, [1999) 7 SCC 209; Baburam v. C.C. Jacob,
(1999) 3 SCC 362; E.A. Sathyanesan v. V.K. Agnihotri & Ors., (2004) 9
SCC 165 and M Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 10 F
SCALE 301, referred to.

J
Natir;mal Westminister Bank Pie v. Spectrum Plus Limited & Ors.,
(2005) UKHL 41; (2005) 3 WLR 58 and Queen (on the Application of
Ernest Leslie Wright v. Secretay of State for the Home Department, (2006)
EWCA Civ. 67, referred to. G

Lord Rodger of Earsferry - 'A Time for Everything under the law :
Some Reflections on Retrospectivity' (2005) 121 LQR 55, 77, referred to.

Subaida Beevi v. State of Kera/a, (2005) 1 KLT 426 FB and Daniel H
i
' '
f
'~
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I S.C.R. ;

~
A v. State of Kera/a, (1985) KL T 1057 and Ravindran v. State of Kera/a,
[1992) 1 KLT 524, referred to. T'

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 322 of2007

From the Judgment/Final Order dated 31.3.2006 of the High Court of
B Kerala at Emakulam in W.P.(C) No. 2487 /2006(U)
.....,'
C.S. Rajan, Sr. Adv., Ajay K. Jain, Dillep Pillai and M.P. Vinod for the r
Appellants.

Uday U. Lalit, Sr. Adv., B.V. Deepak, Mis. T.T.K. Deepak & Co. and
c G. Prakash
)

for the Respondents. \")
' ;

..,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, .J : l. Leave granted.
D·
2. Application of the doctrine of prospective overruling in service
matters is in question in these appeals which arises out of a judgment and
order elated 31.03.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court
'
whereby and whereunder on interpretation of a Full Bench decision in
Subaida Beevi v. .State of Kera la, (2005) i KLT 426 it was held to have· no
E prospective operation.

3. Appellants were working in the Government Presses, Kerala. The
Government ofKerala framed rules for the employees ofKerala Government
Presses Subordinate Services to which cadre the appellants belonged. It
consisted· of several branches. Admittedly, there are several categories and
F sub-categories of employees working therein. The mode of appointment as f
also the qualifications therefor has been prescribed in the rules. By reason
·\_·
of a Government order dated 01.07 .1980, the rule framed in tenns of SRO No.
1030 of 1976 was amended prescribing a ratio of l : I for the purpose of
...
promotion between diploma-holders and certificate-holders by adding a
G Note thereto, which reads as under :

"Note : Promotion of persons qualified under Item 2(a) and 2(b)
above shall be made in the ratio 1 : 1 starting with promotion of 1
persons qualified under Item 2(a). Ifno person qualified under Item
2(a) is available for promotion, the turn of promotion will be given
H
-- P.V.GEORGE v. STATE[SINHA,J.] 1201

to the person qualified under Item 2(b) and vice versa. A
Provided that no senior diploma holder shall be superseded by
a junior certificate holder and provided that the benefit of tum
I under the ratio of I : I forfeited by the certificate holder by virtue
of the promotion the senior diploma holder, shall be restored to the
certificate holder in the arising vacancy." B

4. A further proviso was appended thereto by a Government order
dated 30.08.1984 in term of SRO No. 1044 of 1984, which reads as follows:

"Provided further that the benefit of the ratio of l : I forfeited c
by the certificate holder by virtue of the promotion of the senior
diploma holder shall be restored to the certificate holder in the next
arising vacancy."

5. Constitutionality of the said provision was challenged before the
Kerala High Court, whereupon a Division Bench thereof in Daniel v. State
D
of Kera/a, [1985 KLT 1057), declared the same to be ultra vires, stating :

"In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in A.LR.
1974 SC I, AIR 1974 SC 163 I, 1983 KLT 987, 1983 KLT 878, 1981
(2) Kerala 527 and 1975 KLT 1, we have no doubt at all that this E
classification on microscopic distinction could not be allowed. We
would therefore strike down the notes to Branch Nos. I and 9 to
Ex.P-2"

6. The correctness of the said decision was questioned before another
F
,, Division Bench of the said Court in Writ Appeal No.149 of 1990. By
a judgment dated 14.01.1992, Paripooman, J. (as His Lordship then was),
held:

4
"Having heard counsel at length, we are of the view, that since
the service involved in the present cases is the same as the one G
which came up for consideration in Daniel's case (1985 KLT 1057)
and the Rules are also the same, the judgments appealed against,
) do not require interference. It is agreed that the Bench decision in
Daniel's case (1985 KLT 1057) considered the identical rules in the
same service (Government Presses Subordinate Service), which in H
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A issue in these two O.Ps. as well. Even so, learned Government
Pleader, Mr. V.C. James, very forcefully submitted that the Bench
decision in Daniel's case (198:5 KL T 1057) is not good law, or, at
any rate, requires reconsideration in view of the later Bench
decision of this Court in Balakrishnan v. State of Kera/a, (1990)
1 KLT 66. We are unable to accept this plea for more reasons than
B one. The service rules, which came up for consideration in the later
decision, Balakrishnan 's case (1990 (1) KLT 66) is "Engineering
Service (Radio and Electrical Branches) Rules, 1967". The import
and impact in evaluating and upholding the reason for fixin~ the
ratio in the later case are entirely different. The perspective is also
c different. That apart, the earlier bench decision in Daniel's case
(1985 KLT 1057) does not appear to have been brought to the
notice of the learned Judges, who rendered the decision in
Balakrishnan's case (1990 (1) KLT 66)·. Prima facie, the later
decision should be considered to be one rendered per inqurium. In
these circumstances, we are satisfied that the ratio of the earlier
D
bench decision in Daniel's case (1985 KL T 1057) should govern the
fate of the present two Original Petitions. That is what has been
done by the two learned Judge of this Court.

In these circumstances, we are of the view that no interference
E is called for in these writ appeals. The judgments appealed against
are confirmed. The writ appeals are dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs."

7. It is, however, not in dispute that Jagannadha Rao, J. (as the His
F Lordship then was) in Ravindran v. State ofKera/a [1992 (1) KLT 524], took
a different view, opining : '(

"In the present case the Government has filed a counter stating that
after considering various aspects, the Government prescribed the
necessary qualification for the various supervisory posts 'according
G to the requirement of duties and functions of the post'. It is also
stated that special rules were made for the petitioner and other
similarly situated persons. It is also stated that Government
(
considered that seniors who are not diploma holders may be
prejudiced by the rules as they stood in 1976, and that the ratio of
H 1 : 1 fixed for promotion between the certificate holders and diploma
;
P.V.GEORGE v. STATE[SINHA,J.] 1203

) holders is quite reasonable and rational and hence valid. Having A
regard to the technical nature of the posts in the government

-- presses we do not think that the ratio prescribed between diploma
holders and certificate holders is in any way unreasonable. In view
of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Roop Chand' s
case, AIR 1989 SC 307, and also in view of the two judgments of
the Division Bench in Balakrishnan 's case and in Cheru 's case,
B
.. O.P. No. 1851 of 1984, we are not inclined to follow the decision of
the Division Bench in Daniel v. State of Kera/a, 1985 KLT 1057."

8. The conflict in the said decisions was noticed and eventually referred
to a Full Bench in the Subaida Beevi (supra) by another Division Bench of c
the said Court. By a judgment dated 04.11.2004, the Full Bench held that the
amended special rules for the Government Presses Subordinate Services Rules
were not suffering from any infirmity and fixation of ratio of I: l for promotion
• to higher posts between diploma-holders and certificate-holders needs no
interference. Whereas the decision in Daniel (supra) was expressly overruled,
D
the decision in Ravlndran (supra) was upheld, holding:

"We hold that the impugned amendment made in the Special Rules
' for the Government Presses Subordinate Service providing ratio of
I : 1 for promotion to higher posts between diploma holders and
certificate holders is not discriminatory and it is not violative of E
articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ofindia. Government is bound
to effect promotions on the basis of the amended Special Rules.''

9. A special leave petition filed thereagainst was dismissed by this
Court by an order dated 04.03.2005. F
r
10. Appellants were issued notices as to why they shall not be reverted
from the post of Assistant Superintendent pursuant to or in furtherance of
the said decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court. Legality of the
said notices was questioned by the appellants herein in a writ petiton. By
reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ petition has been dismissed G
by the High Court, opining :

" ... Since the Government has accepted the Full Bench decision and
has taken steps, but, did not implement the same, only because of
the stay order passed in the other writ petitions and has undertaken, H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R
l
A since the vacation of the stay order, the judgment would be
implemented, the contempt . petitions are closed recording the
undertaking that the judgment will be implemented within three
months from today.· With the above observations, all the writ
petitions are dismissed and the contempt court petitions are closed."

B 11. Mr~ C.S. Rajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants, submitted that the High Court committed a manifest error insofar
./
as it failed to take into consideration that in service matters ordinarily
doctrine of prospective overruling would apply. Reliance in his behalf has
been placed on Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar,
C (1993] 4 SCC 727], R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, [1995] 2 SCC 745,
Union of India and Others v. Virpal Singh Chauhan and Others, [1995] 6
SCC 684, Ashok Kumar Gupta v, State of U.P., [1997] 5 SCC 201, Ajit Singh-
11 v. State ofPunjab, [1999] 7 SCC209, Baburam V; CC. Jacob, [1999] 3 SCC
362, E.A. Sathy.anesan v. V.K. Agnihotri and Others, [2004] 9 SCC 165, M
D .Nagaraj & Others v. Union of India & Others, [2006]10 SCALE 301.

12. It was furthermore submitted that the promotions were given to the
appellants. when the law laid down by the Kerala High Court in Daniel ,
(supra) and Ravindran (supra) were in force and, thus, as the law was
declared by the Full Bench only in the year 2005, the same was not
E applicable in their case.

13. Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondents, would, however, support the judgment.

F 14. For the views we propose to take, it is not necessary for us to consider
all the decisions relied upon by Mr. Rajan. The legal position as regards the
applicability of doctrine of prospective overruling is no longer res integra.
This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 or Article 142 of the
Constitution of India may declare a law to have a prospective effect. The
Division Bench of the High Court may be correct in opining that having regard
G to the decision of this Court inL.C. GolakNath and Others v. State ofPunjab
and Another, AIR ( 1967) SC 1643 the power of overruling is vested only in this
Court and that too in constitutional matters, but the High Courts in exercise
of theii jurisdiction under Artfole 226 of the Constitution oflndia, even without (

applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, indisputably may grant a
limited relief in exercise of their equity jurisdiction.
y
:"""·,

P.V.GEORGE v. STATE[SINHA,J.] 1205
-J
15. We are, however, in this case not concerned with such a situation. A
~ The law was in a state of flux in the sense that as far back as in the year
1992, the two Division Benches took contrary views; while one applied the
ratio laid down in Daniel's (supra), another refused to follow the same.

16. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court upheld the views of the
Division Bench of the said Court in Ravindran (supra) and overruled Daniel
B
(supra).
)

17. The Full Bench of the High Court indisputably did not say that the
promotions which had already been granted would not be disturbed. The
judgment of the Full Bench attained finality as special leave petition filed c
thereagainst was dismissed. Rules as amended by the State of Kerala on
01.07.1980 and 30.08.1984 were upheld.

18. If the saiii Rules ultimately were held to be constitutional, it was
required to be given effect to. The law declared by a court is ordinarily
affects the rights of the parties. A court of law having regard to_ the nature
D
r of adversarial system of our justice delivery system exercises adjudicatory
role. Legal consequences are determined in respect of the matters which had
taken place in the past.
r

19. It may be true that when the doctrine of stare decisis is not adhered E
to, a change in the law may adversely affect the interest of the citizens. The
doctrine of prospective overruling although is applied to overcome such a
situation, but then it must be stated expressly. The power must be exercised
in the clearest possible term. The decisions of this Court are clear pointer
thereto.
F
20. As would be noticed by us hereafter ~n Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma
and Others v. The Chancellor, Nagpur University and Others, [1990] 4 SCC
55, this Court held :

"The second contention need not detain us long. It is based G
primarily on the provisions of Section 57(5) of the Act. The
contention is that since the provisions of that section give power
;> to the Chancellor to terminate the services of a teacher only if he
is satisfied that the appointment "was not in accordance with the
law at that time in force" and since the law at that time in force, viz., H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] l S.C.R.

A on March 30, 1985 when the appellants were appointed, was the law
as laid down in Bhakre's case which was decided on December 7,
1984, the termination of the appellants is beyond the powers of the
Chancellor. The argument can only be described as naive. It is
unnecessary to point out that when the court decides that the
interpretation of a particular provision as given earlier was not
B · 1egal, it in effect declares th.at the law as it stood from the beginning
was as per its decision, and that it was never the law otherwise.
This being the case, since the Full Bench and now this Court has
taken the view that the interpretation placed on the provisions of
law by the Division Bench in Bhakre's case was erroneous, it will
c have to be held that the appointments made by the University on
March 30, 1985 pursuant to the law laid down in Bhakre's case were
not according to law. Hence, the termination of the services of the
appellants were in compliance with the provisions of Section 57(5)
of the Act."
D
21. _The ratio l~id down by this Court, as noticed hereinafter, categorically
shows the effect of a decision which had not been directed to have a
prospective operation. The legal position in clear and unequivocal term was
stated by a Division Bench of this Court in MA. Murthy v. State of
Karnataka & Others, [2003] 7 SCC 517 in the following terms :
E
"Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach
of the High Court is erroneous as the law declared by this Court
is presumed to be the law at all times. Normally, the decision of this
Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases
F irrespective of its stage of pendency because it is assumed that
what is enunciated by the Supreme Co~rt is, in fact, the law from
inception. The doctrine of prospective over~ruling which is a
feature of American jurisprudence is an exception to the normal
principle of law, was imported and applied for the first time in L. C.
Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. In Managing
G Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors., the
view was ad~pted. Prospective over-ruling is a part of the principles
of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be resorted to by
this Court while superseding the law declared by it earlier. It is a
device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to prevent
H multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and avoidable
y

P.V.GEORGE v. STATE[SINHA,J.] 1207

litigation. In other words, actions taken contrary to the law declared A
prior to the date of declaration are validated in larger public interest.
The law as declared applies to future cases. (See Ashok Kumar
Gupta v. State of UP. and Baburam v. CC. Jacob. It is for this
Court to indicate as to whether the decision in question will operate
prospectively. In other words, there shall be no prospective over-
ruling, unless it is so indicated in the particular decision. It is .not B
open to be held that the decision in a particular case will be
prospective in its application by application of the doctrine of
prospective over-ruling. The doctrine of binding precedent helps in
promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and
enables an organic development of the law besides providing C
assurance to the individual as to the consequences of transactions
forming part of the daily affairs. That being the position, the High
Court was in error by holding that the judgment which operated on
the date of selection was operative and not the review judgment in
Ashok Kumar Sharma 's case No. II. All the more so when the
subsequent judgment is by way of Review of the first judgment in
D
which case there are no judgments at all and the subsequent
judgment rendered on review petitions is the one and only judgment
rendered, effectively and for all purposes, the earlier decision
having been erased by countenancing the review applications. The
impugned judgments of the High Court are, therefore, set, aside. E

22. The effect of declaration of law, the rue of stare decisis and the
consequences flowing from a departure from an earlier decision has been
considered in great details by the House of Lords in National Westminster
Bank pie v. Spectrum Plus Limited and Others, (2005) UKHL 41: (2005) 3 p
WLR 5 8, opining :

"8. People generally conduct their affairs on the basis of what
they understand the law to be. This 'retrospective' effect of
a change in the law of this nature can have disruptive and
seemingly unfair consequences. 'Prospective overruling', G
sometimes described as 'non-retroactive overruling', is a
judicial tool fashioned to mitigate these adverse consequences.
It is a shorthand description for court rulings on points of law
which, to greater or lesser extent, are designed not to have the
normal retrospective effect of judicial decisions. H
y

1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.

A 9. Prospective overruling takes several different forms. In its
simplest form prospective overruling involves a court giving
a ruling of the character sought by the bank in the present
case. Overruling of this simple or 'pure' type has the effect
that the court ruling has an exclusively prospective effect.
The ruling applies only to transactions or happenings
B occurring after the date of the court decision. All transactions
entered into, or events occurring, before that date continue to IJ
{
be governed by the law as it was conceived to be before the
court gav~ its ruling.

c IO. Other forms of prospective overruling are more limited and
'selective' in their departure from the normal effect of court
decisions. The ruling in its operation may be prospective and,
additionally, retrospective in its effect as between the parties
to the case in which the ruling is given. Or the ruling may be
prospective and, additionally, retrospective as between the
D parties in the case in which the ruling was given and also as
between the parties in any other cases already pending before
the courts. There are other variations on the same theme.

11. Recently Advocate General Jacobs suggested an even more
E radical form of prospective overruling. He suggested that the
retrospective and prospective effect of a ruling of the European
Court of Justice might be subject to a temporal limitation that
the ruling should not take effect until a future date, namely,
when the State had a reasonable opportunity to introduce
new legislation: Banco Popolare di Cremona v. Agenzia
F Entrate Uffjicio Cremona (Case C-475/03, 17 March 2005),
paras 72-88."

· [See also Lord Rodger ofEarsferry- 'A Time for Everything under the
Law: Some Reflections on Retrospectivity' [(2005) 121 LQR 55, 77].
G 23. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead speaking for the House of Lords
clearly held that the power to apply prospective overruling is available to
the House of Lords also.

24. In Queen (on the Application of Ernest Leslie Wright) v. Secretary
H of State for the Home Department, [2006] EWCA Civ. 67], it was observed:
,,.,

P. V. GEORGE v. STATE [SINHA, J.] 1209

"42. The English law in this respect is developing rapidly. A
Prospective rulings seemed anathema to Lord Wilberforce in
'
Launchbury v Morgans [ 1973] AC 127, 13 7 and Lord Goff of
Chieveley in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council,
(1999] 2 AC 349, 379. By the time of Regina v Governor of
Brockhill Prison, exp Evans (No. 2) (2001] 2 AC 19, Lord
Slynn at p. 26 H considered that the effect of judicial rulings
B
being prospective might in some situations be "desirable and
..
) in no way unjust", though Lord Steyn at p. 28 B thought the
point was a "novel one". With some perspicacity Lord Hope
of Craighead foresaw at p. 36 that "the issue ofretrospectivity
is likely to assume an added importance when the Human c
Rights Act 1998 is brought into force". Lord Hobhouse at
p.48 F would have none of it. The latest in this line of
authority seems to be Jn re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (in liquidation)
[2005) UKHL 41, [2005] 3 WLR 58 where the danger was
acknowledged that prospective overruling "would amount to
judicial usurpation of the legislative function", per Lord
D
Nicholls at para 28 but nonetheless he noted that, especially
in the human rights field, " 'Never say never' was a wise
judicial precept" (para. 42).

43. The question has attracted interest in the academic journals. E
See Arden L.J., "Prospective Overruling", (2004) LQR 7; Lord
Rodger ofEarlsferry, "A Time for Eve1ything under The Law;
Some Reflections on Retrospectivity", (2005) 121LQR57 and
Duncan Sheehan and T. T. Arvind, "Prospective Overruling
and Fixed/Floating Charge Debate", (2006) 122 LQR 20." F
25. Jn service matters, this ,Court on a number of occasions have
passed orders on equitable consideration. But the same would not mean that
whenever a law is declared, it will have an effect only because it has taken
a different view from the earlier one. In those cases it is categorically stated
that it would have prospective operation. G

26. We are not oblivious that in Union of India v. Madras Telephone
SC & ST Social Welfare Association, [2006] 9 SCALE 626, this Court
}
observed that where the rights had been determined in favour of some
employees in a duly constituted proceeding, which determination had H
y

1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1 S.C.R.
\--·
A attained finality, a subsequent judgment of a Court or Tribunal taking a
contrary view would not adversely affect the applicants in whose cases the
orders had attained finality.

27. The rights of the appellants were not determined in the earlier
proceedings. According to them, merely a law was declared which was
B prevailing at that point of time;· but the appellants were not parties therein.
Thus, no decision was rendered in their favour nor any right accrued
(
..
thereby.

28. In E.A. Sathyanesan (supra), a Division Bench of this Court) of
c which one of us was member) noticed :

"In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncement we
have no other option but to hold that the Tribunal committed a
manifest error in declining to consider the matter on merits, upon,
the premise that Sabharwal and Ajit Singh-I had been given a
D prospective operation. The extent to which the said decisions had
been directed to operate prospectively, as noticed above, has
sufficiently been explained in Ajit Singh-II and reiterated in MG.
Badappanavar (spura)."

E 29. Moreover, the judgment of the Full Bench has attained finality. The
special leave petition has been dismissed. The subsequent Division Bench,
therefore, could not have said as to whether the law declared by the Full
Bench would have a prospective operation or not. The law declared by a
court will have a retrospective effect if not otherwise stated to be so
specifically. The Full Bench having not said so, the subsequent Division
F Bench did not have the jurisdiction in that behalf.

30. We, therefore, do not find any merit in these appeals, which are
dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
there shall be no order as to costs. ....
G
B.S. Appeals dismissed.

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