Supreme Court of India
P. SESHADRIversusS. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 233
- Decided
- 29 March 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B SUDERSHAN REDDY
Holding
Rule 2 excludes contract employees from the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam Service Rules, so Rule 13 does not bar the extensions; the High Court’s order is set aside.
Summary
The Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam (TTD) Board extended the service of retired Parpathedar P. Seshadri on a contract basis beyond the age of sixty. Respondent S. Mangati Gopal Reddy filed a writ petition, styled as a public‑interest litigation, alleging that the extensions violated Rule 13 of the TTD Service Rules, 1989, which he claimed barred re‑employment after superannuation. The Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside the extensions, holding them illegal and also failing to record reasons as required under Article 226. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Rule 2 expressly excludes officers appointed on contract or on deputation from the ambit of the Rules, rendering Rule 13 inapplicable to the appellant; consequently the extensions were valid. The Court also observed that the petition was not a bona‑fide public‑interest litigation and that the High Court’s order lacked the mandatory reasons, and therefore set aside the High Court judgment.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Rule 13 of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam Service Rules, 1989, to a contract employee whose service was extended beyond the age of sixty.
- Whether the writ petition filed by the respondent could be entertained as a public‑interest litigation given the petitioner’s credentials and motive.
- Whether the High Court complied with the requirement of recording reasons under Article 226 of the Constitution while disposing of the writ petition.
Legislation cited
Subjects
public interest litigationservice rulescontract employmentextension of serviceArticle 226reasoned orderTirumala Tirupathi Devasthanamadministrative law
Judgment
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 1134
A P. SESHADRI
v.
S. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 2688 of 2011)
MARCH 29, 2011
B
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]
,PUBLIC INTEREST LIT/GA TION_ :
c
Writ petition before High Court - Challenging extensions
granted to Parpathedar of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam
by TTD Board - Allowed by High Courl - Held : High Court
ought to have satisfied itself with regard to the credentials of
0 the writ petitioner before entertaining the petition as pubL
interest litigation - A pure and simple service matter has been
deliberately disguised as a public interest litigation at the
instance of some disgruntled employees - The controversy
with regard to the management of the Temple properties and
E funds, regarding which different proceedings are pending,
have been deliberately mixed up with the extension granted
to the employee - Order of High Courl set aside - Service
law·- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226.
SERVICE LAW:
F
Tl RU MALA Tl RU PA THI DEVASTHANAM SERVICE
RULES, 1989:
rr. 2 and 13 - Extensions of service of Parpathedar on
contract basis after his superannuation at the age of sixty -
G High Court holding the extensions as contrary to r.' 13 and
setting aside the order of TTD Board - Held: In terms of r.2,
officers or staff who are appointed on contract basis or are
taken on deputation from Government or other organization
H 1134
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGAT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1135
ORS.
form a separate class and are not covered by the Rules - A··
Engagement of employee concerned on contract basis would
not attract r. 13 - High Court erred in relying on r. 13 to nullify
the appointment of the employee - Order of High Court set .
aside - Public interest litigation - Constitution of India, Article
22a B
CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
Article 226 - Order disposing of writ petition - Recording
of reasons - Held: Is the fundamental to the administration
of justice - In the instant case, the order passed by High Court C
does not satisfy the bare minimum requirement of an order
disµosing of writ petition under Article 226 - Administration
of justice - Judgments/Orders.
Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition stated to be in D
public interest alleging that the various extensions given
by the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam Board to the
appellant, who had superannuated as Parpathedar from
the service of the Board w.e.f. 31-7-2006, were wholly
illegal and were in arbitrary exercise of power by the no E
Board. The last such extension challenged was dated
1.8.2009 for a period of 2 years from 2-8-2009 to 1-9-2011.
It was stated that the writ petition was filed to bring to the
notice of the High Court various mis-appropriations and
embezzlement of funds; that the actions of the appellant F
were doubted; and that his services were extended for
ulterior motives. The High Court allowed the writ petition
holding that as per r.13 of the Tirumala Tirupathi
Deveasthanam Service Rule, 1989, services of the
appella.,t could not have been extended beyond the age
of sixty yt. '.'\rs and as the appellant had crossed the age G
of sixty years, "r'>hibition in r. 13 against his continuation
was manifest.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A HELD: 1.1. From the pleadings of the parties, it
appears that there is a serious dispute with regard to the
management and the administration of the affairs of the
Temple. Admittedly, separate proceedings are pending in
different courts of competent jurisdiction with regard to
B those issues. Those proceedings cannot be confused or
merged with the subject matter of the writ petition filed
by respondent No.1. [para 15) [1145-G-H; 1146-A]
1.2. It is not disputed that the appellant was in the
C service of the Temple for many years. He retired from the
service of the Temple on 31st July, 2006. It appears from
the records that the Board of Trustees, keeping in v'~w
the vast experience of the appellant, his profound
knowledge of fairs and festivals and day-to-day affairs ·;f
the Temple, his public relations skill and his availability
0 round the clock for all the 365 days of the year, resolved
to utilize his services on contract basis for a period of
two years initially which was followed by further
extensions, and the last such extension being for a
period of two years through Resolution No.178 dated
E 28th July, 2009 pursuant to which a formal order was
passed on 1-8-2009 extending the services of the
appellant till 1-8-2011 on contract basis. The High Court
has nullified the said Resolution and the consequential
order holding the same to be contrary to r. 13 of the
F Tirupati Tirumala Devasthanam Rules, 1989. The High
Court failed to notice that in view of r. 2, the 1989 Rules
have no application to engagements made on contract
basis or when services of government servants or
employees of other organizations are utilized on
G deputation. [para 16-17] [1146-B-D; 1147-C-E]
1.3. A perusal of r. 2 leaves no manner of d.oubt that
the Rules apply to every employee "except to the officers
or staff taken on contract basis and officers or staff taken
H on deputation from the . Government or other
P.. SESHADRI v. S.. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND 1137
ORS.
-Drganlzatlons". Thlls, officers or staff who are appointed A
-on contract basis or are taken on deputation from the
3overnrnent or other organizations form a separate class
end are not covered by the 1989 Rules. The High Court
.vas In error, In relying on r. 13 to nullify the appointment
lllf)f the appellant. ·[para 18) [1147-G-H; 1148-A] B
2.1. The High Court has committed a serious error In
mermltting respondent No.1 to pursue the writ petition as
a public Interest litigation .. The parameters within which
a public Interest litigation can be entertained by this Court
and the High Courts, have been laid down and reiterated C
-ly this Court In a series of cases. By now It ought to be
1>lain and obvious that this Court does not approve of an
approach that would encourage petitions filed for
achieving oblique· motives on the basis of wild and
·eckless allegations made by individuals, i.e., busybodies, D
"laving little -or no interest in the proceedings. The
~redentials, the motive and the objective of the petitioner
"lave to be apparently and patently aboveboard.
)therwise, the petition is liable to be dismissed at the
•hreshold. [para 19] [1148-B·D] E
2.2. The High Court ought to have satisfied itself with
·egard to the credentials of respondent No.1 before
entertaining the writ petition, styled as public interest
litigation. Even a cursory perusal of para 2 of the affidavit F
•iled in the High Court by respondent No.1 would clearly
'how that he has no special concern with the extension
granted to the appellant. He had merely pleaded that he
moved the writ petition as he is a devotee of Lord
'enkateswara. He is an agriculturist by profession. He
nas failed to supply any specific particulars as to how he G
·S in possession of any special information. The
-;ontroversy with regard to the management and
.dministration of the Temple's properties and funds have
Deen deliberately mixed up with the extension granted to
lhe appellant by the TTD Board. It !s an admitted position H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A that different proceedings are pending with regard to the
management controversy of the Temple Trust. The
controversy had no relevance to the extension granted
to the appellant. [para 20) [1148-E-H]
B (DR.) B. Singh vs. Union of India and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC
363; Neetu vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 614;
Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State of West Bengal. (2004) 3 SCC
349; Divine Retreat Centre vs. State of Kera/a and Ors. (2008)
3 sec 542 - relied on.
C 2.3. The facts placed on record in the Instant
proceeding would clearly indicate that respondent No. 1
has not come to Court with clean hands. He has failed-
to establish his credential for moving the writ petition as
public interest litigation. The High Court has failed to
D examine the matter in its correct perspective. The writ
petition was undoubtedly moved by motives other than
what was stated in the writ petition. A perusal of the
affidavit in support of the writ petition would clearly show
that the writ petition had been filed by respondent no. 1
E at the instance of some other persons who are hiding
behind the veil. In view of the assertions, in the affidavit
made by respondent no. 1, it cannot be said that he is the
actual moving spirit behind the writ petition. [para 24)
[1150-F-H; 1151 ·A-D]
F Gurpa/ Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC
136 - relied on.
2.4. Respondent No.1 had failed to satisfy any of the
criteria which would have enabled him to move the High
G Court by way of a public interest litigation. A pure and
simple service matter has been deliberately disguised as
a public interest litigation at the instance of some
disgruntled employees. [para 26) [1151-E-F] .
3.1. The High Court failed to notice that the writ
H
. P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGAT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1139
ORS. ·-
petition was not maintainable for a variety of reasons. The A
_High Court did not even care to examine all the provisions
of 1989 Rules before concluding that the appointment of
the appellant was contrary to r. 13. The appellant had
raised numerous preliminary objections with regard to the
maintainability of the .writ petition, in particular, at the B
Instance of respondent No.1. The High Court, committed
a serious arror In not analyzing all the relevant provisions
of the 1989 Rules, before concluding that the extension
In the service granted to the appellant was contrary to
r.13. [para 27] [1151-G-H; 1152-A-B]
c
3.2. This Court has, on numerous occasions,
emphasised the importance of recording reasons by the
High Court in support of the orders passed in exercise
of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Necessity for recording reasons is D
the fundamental to the administration of justice. The
recorded reasons would enable the parties to the
litigation to know the factors which weighed with the
court in determining the lis between the parties. In the
instant case, the order passed by the High Court does E
not satisfy the bare minimum requirements of an order
disposing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The impugned judgment passed by
the High Court is accordingly set aside. [para 27) [1152-
A-C; 1153-D] F
Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf vs. New Education Institute
and Ors. 1986 (4) sec 31 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
G
(2004) 3 sec 363 relied on Para 16
(2007) 10 sec 614 relied on Para 13 and 22
.
(2004) 3 sec 349 relied on Para 23
(2008) 3 sec 542 relied on Para 13 and 24 H
. ..
~
·"
' ,.
,,, .\
·,'ljJt·- ~~ .... ·.4.~
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] .3 S.C.R.
A (2005) 5 sec 136 relied on Para 13 and 25
1986 (4) sec 31 relied on Para 27
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2688 of 2011.
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 28.4.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ
Petition No. 24124 of 2009.
P.S. Narasimha, Sridhar Potaraju, D. Julius Riamei,
C Gaichangpou Gagemi for the Appellant. ·,
Atul Pandey, Tara Shankar Pandey (for Dr. Kailash
Chand), Guntur Prabhakar, Guntur Pramod Kumar for the
Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. Leave granted. i
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
E judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
rendered in Writ Petition No. 24124 of 2009 dated 28th' April,
2010 whereby the High Court set aside the extension granted
to the appellant as officer on Special Duty in the establishment
of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam (hereinafter referred to as
F "the Temple") till 1st August, 2011.
3. The aforesaid order has been passed in a writ petition
styled as a public interest litigation by S. Mangati Gopal Reddy
(hereinafter referred to as "respondent No.1"). Respondent No.
1 claims to be an agriculturist and a staunch devotee of Lord
G Venkateswara since his childhood. In Paragraph 2 of the
affidavit in support of the writ petition, respondent No.1, in order
to establish his locus standi to file the public interest litigation
stated as under:-
H "I am an Agriculturist. I am a staunch devotee of Lord
· P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND 1141
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Venkateswara since my childhood. I regularly visit the A
temple to offer my prayers to God. I also have donated to
the temple as per my capacity. I am a citizen of this country
and a Hindu by religion. I am a native and a resident of
Tirupathi. I have come to know certain misdeeds,
discrepancies, Mismanagement of the T.T.D. Funds by B
some vested interests. As a citizen of India and also as a
staunch devotee of Lord Venkateswara, it is my bounden
duty to bring the said facts, which have come to my
knowledge, to the notice of this Honourable Court for
appropriate directions of this Honourble Court. I also c
submit that I have no personal interest in filing the above
writ affidavit nor I have any enmity with the persons whose
details are furnished hereunder and against the persons
·certain directions are sought in this Writ Petition. This Writ
Petition is being filed in the larger interest of the public." 0
4. He has further pleaded that the Temple was established
as a result of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam Act, 1932 (in
short 'TIO Act'). The aforesaid Act was followed in 1933 by a
special Act in 1951 whereby the administration of the Temple
was under the control of the Andhra Pradesh Government. E
According to respondent No.1, since the enactment of the
Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions Act, 1989, the
management and administration vests in the Board called "TIO
Board" constituted under Section 96 of the aforesaid Act.
F
- --- 5. It was further the case of the respondent that the
management and administration of the Temple is controlled by
the statutory provisions of the 1989 Act and the rules made
thereunder. However, the responsible officers of the TIO Board
have acted in violation of the rules framed under the aforesaid G
Act. He further stated that certain discrepancies and misdeeds
have been brought to the notice of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court by way of various writ petitions. The writ petition was filed
to bring to the notice of the Court various misappropriations and
embezzlement of funds. There is an ongoing controversy with H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A regard to embezzlement of funds and, in particular, loss of 300
gold dollars each weighing 5 gms. since August, 2008. It was
further the case of the respondent that the actions of the
appellant have been doubted in the case of missing gold
dollars as he was Bokkasam lncharge and Parpathedar of the
s Temple. His name was primarily mentioned in the reports of two
IPS officers, who had conducted two separate vigilance reports.
These reports categorically recommended that the appellant
should not be continued in office. In spite of such
recommendations of the vigilance officer, the appellant had
c been continued in service.
6. According to respondent No.1, the appellant retired on
31st July, 2006. Since then, he has been given five years
extension in the Temple. According to the respondent, the
services of the appellant have been extended for ulterior
D motives. Respondent makes a grievance that the services of
the appellant have been extended as if there is no other suitable
person in the Temple or elsewhere to perform the duties of the
appellant. The respondent further alleges that the services of
the appellant were extended on a number of occasions, vide
E order, viz; No. Roe No. BG/10949/2006 dated 31st July, 2006
for a period of two years, Roe No. BG/10949/2007 dated 5th
August 2008, for a period of two years from 2nd August, 2007
to 1st August, 2009 and Roe No. P1/308/Sri TI/ml/2009 dated
1st August, 2009 for a further period of two years i.e. from 2nd
F August, 2009 to 1st August, 2011.
7. The respondent claimed that these extensions were
wholly illegal and arbitrary exercise of power by the TTD Board.
These allegations were made relying on the recommendations
made by B.V. Ramana Kumar, IPS, the then Chief Vigilance
G and Security Officer. In his report dated 28th July, 2008 Initiation
· of disciplinary action for major penalty has been recommended
against the appellant. This report was deliberately ignored by
the TTD Board and the appellant continued to enjoy the
H patronage of the Board.
· P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND 1143
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
8. The writ petition came up for hearing before the High A
Court on 9th November, 2009. Whilst issuing notice in the writ
petition, the High Court made an interim order which was as
follows:-
" ............ And it is further ordered that there shall be 8
interim suspension of the proceedings bearing Roe. No.
P1/308/SriITTfTml/2009, dated 01-08-2009 of the Tirumala
Tirupathi Devasthanams, Tirupathi, which was issued in ·
pursuance of Resolution No. 178 dated: 28.07.2009 of the
TTD Board, extending the service of Sri P. Seshadri
(retired employee) i.e. Respondent No.4 from 02-08-2009 C
to 01-08-2011."
9. This order was challenged by the appellant in SLP (C)
No.30517 of 2009. This Court stayed the operation of the
aforesaid order passed by the High Court. On 4th December, D
2009, this Court disposed of the special leave petition with the
following order:-
"Heard both sides.
The petitioner has challenged the ad-interim order passed E
by the High Court of Judicature of AP. whereby extension
of service of the petitioner was terminated. When the
matter was mentioned before this Court on 24.11.2009,
we had granted stay of the impugned order passed by the
High Court. As it is a service matter, the High Court is F
requested to dispose of the petition pending before It at
an early date at least within a period of two months. Till
such time, the order passed by this Court on 24.11.2009
will be in operation.
G
The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly."
10. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the High Court heard
the writ petition and allowed the same by its order dated 28th
April, 2010 in the following terms:-
H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A "Sri P. Seshadri-respondent 4, Parpathyadar in the
establishment of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams-
respondent 3 retired on superannuation on 31.07.2006. He
was accorded extension in three spells and the last one
has the effect of extending his service as Officer on
B Special Duty till 01.08.2011 which has become subject
matter of this public interest litigation. Rule 13 of the
Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams Employees Service
Rules, 1989 reads thus:
"The person or persons appointed in Tirumala
c Tirupathi Devasthanams on re-employment basis
after superannuation shall in no case be continued
beyond the completion of the age of sixty years."
Admittedly, respondent 4 has crossed the age of sixty
D years. On that count the learned counsel for respondent
4--beneficiary of the order has not joined issue. That being
so, prohibition in the rule supra against his continuation is
manifest. Situated thus he cannot be continued anymore.
We direct respondent 3 accordingly. Settled"
E
11. It is this order which is challenged by the appellant in
the present appeal.
12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
F 13. Mr. Narsimha submits that the writ petition ought to
have been dismissed at the threshold by the High Court and
controversy pertaining to a service matter which could not be
filed in a writ petition styled as a public interest litigation. In
support of the submission, the learned counsel relied on the
G following judgments of this Court:- Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and
Ors. Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra1, Gurpa/ Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and Ors. 2, Neetu Vs. State of Punjab, & Ors3• and
1. (1998) 1 sec 273.
2. (2005) 5 sec 136.
H 3. (2001) 10 sec 614
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGAT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1145
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Divine Retreat Centre Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors4. He further A
·submitted that in any event, the petition was not filed by
respondent No.1 bonafide. It has been filed at the behest of
some persons, who are ·the hidden forces pursuing the writ
petition. Last but not the least, it is the submission of Mr.
Narsimha that the High Court judgment deserves to be set B
aside on the short ground that it is based on a complete
misinterpretation of the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams
Employees .Service Rules, 1989. According to the learned
senior counsel, the aforesaid rules would not be applicable to
the petitioner as his service has been extended only on c
contractual basis. Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, counsel for the
Temple, respondent No.4 has supported the submissions made
by Mr. Narsimha. He has also relied on the judgment of Neetu's
case (supra).
14. Mr. Atul Pandey, appearing for respondent No.1 D
submitted that the services of the appellant had been extended
arbitrarily for extraneous consideration. The Board is going out
of the way to protect the appelle1nt, who is involved in serious
embezzlement of Temple property. He submits that the
extensions have been given, in spite of the recommendations E
made by the Chi""f Vigilance and security officer, B.V. Ramana
Kumar, IPS.
15. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel. In our opinion, it is not at all necessary to make F
any observations with regard to the ongoing controversy
between different groups/parties with regard to the
management of the affairs of the Temple. It ls also not necessary
to make any observations with regard to the involvement or
otherwise of the appellant in any activities which may invite G
either adverse comments or disciplinary actions. From the
pleadings of the parties, it appears to us that there is a serious
dispute with regard to the management and the administration
of the affairs of the Temple. Admittedly, separate proceedings
~· ..4.. C2.008) 3J3CC 542. H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A are pending in different Courts of competent jurisdiction with
regard to those issues. In our opinion, those proceedings
cannot be confused or merged with the subject matter of the
writ petition filed by the respondent No.1.
16. It is not disputed that the appellant was in the service
8
of the Temple for many years. He retired from the service of
the Temple on 31st July, 2006. It appears from the records that
Board of Trustees in its Resolution No.151 dated 5th/6th May,
2006 resolved to utilize the services of the appellant on contract
C basis for a period of two years initially. An order to that effect
was duly passed by the Board on 31st July, 2006. It appears
that subsequent Resolution No.263 was passed on 25th July,
2007, giving further extension to the appellant for a period of
two years from 2nd August, 2007 to 1st August, 2009. Again,
the sE1rvices of the appellant have been extended for a period
D of two years through Resolution No.178 dated 28th July, 2009.
The reason for continuing the services of the appellant are
stated in the Resolution itself, which are as under:-
1. With his vast experience and profound knowledge
E in the day to day affairs in Sri. Tirumala Temple,
particularly during festive and special occasion, his
services are very much required for successful and
timely conduct of fairs and festivals.
2. He Is well versed with the procedures of various
F sevas that are being performed in Sri. Tlrumala
Temple.
3. His services are vastly utilized during
Kalyanamasthu programs organized throughout the
G country. He could able to conduct the programs
successfully to keep up the gallery of the Institution.
4. Apart from all his role in extending honours to
various Matadhipathies/Peetadhipathles visiting
Srivari Temple Is commendable and he Is
H
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANG.AT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1147
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
maintaining a good rapport with all the Swamijis, A
Matadhipathies and Peetadhipathies which is much
essential for the religious institutions like TTD.
5. Besides, he is available round the clock for all the
365 days in a year for the administration to organize B
various programs like Bhajagovindam, Kalyanam
being conducted outside and other religious
activities."
17. Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, the Board
passed a formal order on 1st August, 2009 extending the C
services of the appellant till 1st August, 2011 on contract basis
on payment of monthly remuneration at last pay drawn. The
High Court has nullified the Resolution dated 21st July, 2009
and the consequential order dated 1st August, 2009 hoh;ling
the same to be contrary to Rule 13 of the 1989 rules. D
Undoubtedly, Rule 13 provides that re-employment of any
employee after superannuation shall in no case be beyond the
completion of age of 60 years. The High Court, however, failed
to notice that the 1989 Rules have no application to
engagements made on contract basis or when services of E
government servants or employees of other organizations are
utilized on deputation. Rule 2 of the aforesaid Rules provides
as under:-
•2. They shall apply to every employee of Tirumala 1irupathi F
Devasthanams except to the officers or staff taken on
contract basis and officers or staff taken on deputation
from the Government or other organization."
18. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule leaves no manner of
doubt that the aforesaid Rules apply to every employee "except G
to the officers or staff taken on contract basis and officers or
staff taken on deputation from the Government or other
organizations". In other words, officers or staff who are
appointed on contract basis or are taken on deputation from
the Government or other organizations form a separate class t:!
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.
A and are not covered by the aforesaid Rules. The High Court,
in our opinion, was in error, in relying on Rule 13 to nullify the
appointment of the appellant.
19. The High Court has committed a serious error in
permitting respondent No.1 to pursue the writ petition as a
8
public interest litigation. The parameters within which Public
Interest Litigation can be entertained by this Court and the High
Court, have been laid down and reiterated by this Court in a
series of cases. By now it ought to be plain and obvious that
this Court does not approve of an approach that would
C encourage petitions filed for achieving oblique motives on the
basis of wild and reckless allegations made by individuals, i.e.,
busybodies; having little or no interest in the proceedings. The
credentials, the motive and the objective of the petitioner have
to be1 apparently and patently aboveboard. Otherwise the
D petiti<>n is liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
20. The High Court ought to have satisfied itself with
regard to the credentials of respondent No.1 before entertaining
the writ petition, styled as public interest litigation. Even a cursory
E per.usal of Paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in the High Court
by the respondent No.1 would clearly show that the respondent
No.1 has no special concern with the extension granted to the
appellant. Respondent No.1 had merely pleaded that he moved
the writ petition as he is a devotee of Lord Venkateswara. He
F is an agriculturist by profession. The appellant has failed to
supply any specific particulars as to how he is in possession
of any special information. The controversy with regard to the
management and administration of the Temple's properties and
funds have been deliberately mixed up with the extension
granted to the appellant by the no Board. It is an admitted
G position that different proceedings are pending with regard to
the management controversy of the Temple Trust. The aforesaid
controversy had no relevance to the extension granted to the
appellant. The writ petition seems to have been actuated by
H some disgruntled elements. He has also failed to show as to
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGAT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1149
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
how and in what manner he represents the public interest. A
'\_
. 21. This Court in the case of (DR.) B. Singh Vs. Union of
India & Ors5• quoted with approval the definition of public
interest as stated in the report of Public Interest Law, USA,
1976 by the council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford
foundation in USA. In the aforesaid report, the definition of public B
interest is given as under:-
'Public interest law is the name that has recently been
given to efforts which provide legal representation to
previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such C
efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that
ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide
such services to significant segments of the population and
to significant interests. Such groups and interests include
·the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and .ethnic o
minorities and others.'
22. This Court in the case of Neetu Vs. State of Punjab
(Supra) emphasized the need to .~nsure that public interest
litigation is not misused to unleasli a private vendetta against E
any particular person. In Paragraph 7, it is observed as follows:-
"When a particular person is the object and target of a
petition styled as PIL, the courthas to be careful to see
whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really.
intended to unleash a private vendetta, per~onal grouse F
or some other ma la fide object.".
23. Similar observations had be~n made by this Court in
the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of West Bengal'·>.
We may reiterate here the observations made in Paragraph 12 G
herein, which are as follows:-
"Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be
used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary
s. c2004) 3 sec 363.
a. (2004) 3 sec 349. H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.
A has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful
veil of public int~rest an ugly private malice, vested interest
and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as
an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering
social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of
B public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious
products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of
genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-
oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated
above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons
c or a member of the public, who approaches the court is
acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private
motive or political motivation or other obli-::ue
consideration. The court must not allow its process to be
abused for oblique considerations. Some persons w:th
vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with
D
judicial process either by force of habit or from improper
motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win
notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such
busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the
threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs."
E
24. This Court again in the case of Divine Retreat Centre
(Supra) reiterated that public interest litigation can only be
entertained at the instance of bonafide litigants. It cannot be
permitted to be used by unscrupulous litigants to disguise
F personal or individual grievances as public interest litigations.
The facts placed on record in the present proceeding would
clearly indicate that the aplpellant has not come to Court with
clean hands. He has failed to establish his credential for moving
the writ petition as public'tlterest litigation. In our opinion, the
G High Court has. failed to examine the matter in its correct
perspective. The writ petition was undoubtedly moved by
motives other than what was stated in the writ petition. A perusal
of the affidavit in support of the writ petition would clearly show
that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner at the
H instance of some other persons who are hiding behind the veil.
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGATI GOPAL REDDY AND 1151
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
In paragraph 8 of the affidavit, respondent No. 1 states: A
"Sri P. Seshadri who retired on 31. 7.2006, has been given
5 years extension in the TTD. It is ununderstandable
whether there is no other suitable person in the T.T.D. or
elsewhere to perform the duties of Sri. P. Seshadri which B
he was doing or whether he is so indispensable that he
should be given extension for 5 years. The T.T.D. has not
bothered to fill up the said post of Par Pathedar till now,
and have chosen to extend the services of Sri P.Seshadri
again and again, vide Board's proceedings roe.No.BG/ C
10949/2006 dated 31. 7.2006."
In view of the above, we are unable to accept that the
petitioner is the actual moving spirit behind the writ petition.
25. In the case of Gurpa/ Singh (Supra), this Court again D
emphasized that the Court must not allow its process to be
abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who
monitor at times from behind.
26. Respondent No.1 had failed to satisfy any of the criteria
which would have enabled him to move the High Court by way E
of a public interest litigation. A pure and simple service matter
has been deliberately disguised as a public interest litigation
at the instance of some disgruntled employees who were
perhaps hopeful of occupying the seat presently occupied by
the appellant. F
27. The High Court failed to notice that the writ petition was
not maintainable for a variety of reasons. As noticed earlier,
the High Court did not even care to examine all the provisions
of 1989 rules before concluding that the appointment of the G
respondent was contrary to Rule 13. The respondent had raised
numerous preliminary objectives with regard to the
maintainability of.the writ petition, in particular, at the instance
of the respondent No.1. The High Court, in our opinion,
committed a serious error in not analyzing all the relevant H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.
A provisions of the 1989 Rules, before concluding that the
extension in the service granted to the appellant was contrary
to Rule 13. This Court has, on numerous occasions,
emphasised the importance of recording reasons by the High
Court in support of the orders passed in exercise of its extra
B ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Necessity for recording reasons is the fundamental to the
administration of justice. The recorded reasons would enable
the parties to the litigation to know the factors which weighed
with the court in determining the tis between the parties. This
C Court in the case of Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf Vs. New
Education Institute & Ors7• clearly indicated the bare essentials
of an order passed by the High Court while disposing of a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In
paragraph 14, it is observed as follows :-·
D "14. It is a cardinal principle of rule of law which governs
our policy that the court including Writ Court is required to
rec:ord reasons while disposing of a writ petition in order
to enable the litigants more particularly the aggrieved party
to know the reasons which weighed with the mind of the
E court in determining the questions of facts and law raised
in the writ petition or in the action brought. This is
imperative for the fair and equitable administration of
justice. More so when there is a statutory provision for
appeal to the higher court in the hierarchy of courts in order
F to enable the superior court or the appellate court to know
or to be apprised of the reasons which impelled the court
to pass the order in question. This recording of reasons
in deciding cases or applications affecting rights of parties
is also a mandatory requirement to be fulfilled in
G consonance with the principles of natural justice. It is no
answer at all to this legal position that for the purpose of
expeditious disposal of cases a laconic order like
"dismissed" or 'rejected' will be made without passing a
reasoned order or a speaking order. It is not, however,
H 7. 1986 (4) sec 31.
P. SESHADRI v. S. MANGAT! GOPAL REDDY AND 1153
ORS. [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
necessary that the order disposing of a writ petition or of A
a cause must be a lengthy one recording in detail all the
reasons that played in the mind of the court in coming to
the decision. What is imperative is that the order must in
a nutshell record the relevant reasons which were taken
into consideration by the court in coming to its final B
conclusions and in disposing of the petition or the cause
b~· .. :akmg the order, thereby enabling both the party
seeking justice as well as the superior court where an
appeal lies to know the mind of the court as well as the
reasons for its finding on questions of law and facts in c
deciding the said petition or cause. In other words fair play
and justice demands that justice must not only be done but
must seem to have been done."
The order passed by the High Court does not satisfy the
bare minimum requirements as indicated above. In view of the D
above, we have no option but to allow the appeal and set aside
the impugned judgment passed by the High Court.
28. Before parting, we may notice here that under the
Resolution No. 178 dated 28th July, 2007 services of the E
appellant have been extended upto 1st August, 2011. We are
informed by Mr. Narsimha that his services were discontinued
. immediately upon the judgment having been passed by the High
Court on 28th April, 2010. Consequently, the appellant has been
denied the full benefit under the Resolution and the Order dated F
1st August, 2009. Since the aforesaid benefit has been denied
to the appellant without any fault on his part, we direct the Board
to consider whether the appellant ought to be granted further
extension to compensate for the loss of service since 28th April,
2010.
G
29. With these observations, the appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
H
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