Holding

Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act imposes an absolute bar to taking cognizance of offences by police officers only when the acts are done in the discharge of official duty, and this bar cannot be overridden by Section 473 CrPC; therefore the petitioners are not protected and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The petitioners, a Sub‑Inspector and a Constable of the Kerala Police, were charged with offences of assault, grievous hurt, attempt to murder and criminal intimidation under the IPC for illegally confining and beating a shop‑keeper in a police lock‑up. They argued that the trial court should not have taken cognizance because Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act bars prosecution of police officers for offences committed in the discharge of their duty unless a complaint is filed within six months. The High Court rejected this plea, holding that the offences were not done in the discharge of official duty and that Section 473 of the CrPC could be used to condone the delay. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that Section 64(3) provides an absolute bar only for acts done in the discharge of duty, that its scope includes any offence under any law, and that Section 473 CrPC cannot override the limitation period prescribed in a special enactment. Consequently, the benefit of Section 64(3) was denied to the police officers and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act to offences alleged against police officers when the complaint is filed after six months.
Whether Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked to condone the delay and defeat the bar in Section 64(3).
The interpretation of the phrase "any offence" in Section 64(3) – does it cover offences under statutes other than the Kerala Police Act.
The comparative scope of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act and Section 197(1) of the CrPC.
Whether the alleged illegal confinement and assault constitute acts done in the discharge of official duty for which protection under Section 64(3) can be claimed.

Legislation cited

Bombay Police Acts. 161(1)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 197(1), s. 2(n), s. 468, s. 473
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 325, s. 330, s. 342, s. 506(1)
Kerala Police Act, 1960s. 64(3)

Subjects

Police officer immunitySection 64(3) Kerala Police ActSection 473 CrPCSection 197 CrPCLimitation periodIllegal confinementAssaultCriminal Procedure

Judgment

A P.P. UNIKRISHNAN AND ANR.
v.
PUTTIYOTTIL ALIKUTTY AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 5, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Kera/a Police Act, 1960 :

Section 64(3)-Scope of-Police Officer-Offences Committed by-Bar
C against taking cognizance-Held, not confined to offences specified in the
Act-Bar encompasses offences under other enactments-Period of limitation
for taking cognizance-Held, cannot be extended under Section.473 Cr.P.C.

Police Officer-Illegally confining and assaulting a person in Police
D Station-Benefit of Section 64(3) held not available to the Police Officer.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 197(1)-Section 64 of Kera/a Police Act, 1960-Dijference
between. ...
E Sectii:>n 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act, provides no court shall take
cognizance of any suit or complaint, in respect of any offence or wrong alleged
to be committed or done by a Magistrate, ~olice Officer or other person on
account of any act done in pursuance of any duty imposed or authority
conferred on him by this Act or any other law for the time being in force or
F any rule, order or direction lawfully made or given thereunder unless the
suit or complaint is filed within six months of the date on which the offence
or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done. The appellants, a Sub-
Inspector of Police and a constable, illegally confined and assaulted the
respondent, a shop keeper, in the Perambra Police Station. The respondent
lodged a complaint under Section 325, 342, 330 and 506 (1) of the Indian
G Penal Code, 1860. The preliminary objection taken by the appellants that the
Magistrate should not have taken cognizance of offences in view of the bar
contained in Section 64(3) was overruled by the trial court. The petition filed
by the appellants for quashing the criminal proceedings was dismissed by
the High Court holding that (i) the offences complained of have not been
committed in the discharge of official duties of petitioners; (ii) u/s. 473 of the
H 142 •
P.P. UNIKRISHNAN v. PUTTIYOTTIL ALIKUTTY 143
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay A
where there are sufficient reasons to do so; and (iii) the complaint filed against
the police officials cannot be thrown out under Section 64(3) of the Police
Act merely because it was filed after the lapse of six months from the date of
alleged offence.

Against the decision of the High Court appeal was preferred before this B
•
Court.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The benefit envisaged in Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police C
Act cannot be afforded to the appellants. [152-B]

2. The view adopted by the High Court that Section 473 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 can appropriately be invoked by the complainant
for circumventing the bar contained in Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police
Act cannot be upheld. On reading Section 473 it becomes crystally clear that D
it is intended to be applied only with reference to the period fixed in Section
468 of the Code. The extension of period contemplated in Section 473 of the
Code is only by way of an exception to the period fixed as per the provisions

- of Chapter XXXVI of the Code. Section 473 of the Code therefore cannot
operate in respect of any period of limitation prescribed under any other
enactment. (148-E-D] E
3. The words "any offence" mentioned in Section 64(3) of the kerala
Police Act indicate that the provision is not restricted to the offences specified
in the Kerala Police Act. There is nothing in Section 64(3) which would
warrant a construction that the ban therein is intended only with reference
to the offences 11.1entioned in that Act. [1549-D-E] F
4. The context envisaged in Section 197(1) of the Code or the purpose of
providing a filter therein is demonstrably different from the object of Section
64(3) of the Kerala Police Act. Section 197(1) of the Code does not impose any
absolute ban against taking cognizance of the offence, but it only says that the G
sanction contemplated therein is a condition precedent for taking such
cognizance. It obviously is for preventing public servants from being subjected
to frivolous prosecutions for discharging their official duties. On the other
hand, Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act incorporates an absolute ban
against taking cognizance of the offences of the type mentioned therein on the
expiry of the period specified thereii:i. The words used in Section 197(1) of the H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Code for qualifying the offence are seemingly wider. "[149-H; 150-A-B]
5. The commission of an offence, while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty is of a wider radius when compared with an
offence committed on account of an act done in pursuance of any duty or
authority. In the latter, the act done itself should be an exercise in discharge
B of his duty or authority and that act should amount to an offence. It is not .
enough that the act complained of was only purported to be in exercise of his
duty though it may be sufficient under the former: So the scope under Section
64(3) of the Kerala Police Act is much narrower than the amplitude of Section
197(1) of the Code for public servant to claim protection. Even under Section
197 of the Code no protection has been granted to public servants for the type
C of acts alleged in the case against the appellants. [159-D-E]

D
6. If a police officer dealing with law and order duty uses force against
unruly persons, either in his own defence or in defence of others and exceeds
such right it may amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within
the amplitude of Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the Kerala
-
Police Act But if a police officer assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot
claim such act to be connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise
of his duty unless he establishes that he did such acts in his defence or in
defence of others or any property. Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully 1
confines a person in the lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the
E sanction of a Magistrate or an order of a court it would be an offence for
which he cannot claim any protection in the normal course, nor can he claim
that such act was done in exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping a -~--
person in the lock-up for more than 24 hours without authority is not merely
abusing his duty but his act would be quite outside the contours of his duty or
F authority. [151-B-D]

Mau/ud Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 38 and
K.K. Patel and anr. v. State ofGujarat & anr., [2000] 6 SCC 195, distinguished.

Matajog Dobey v. MC. Bhari, [1955] 2 SCR 925; HHB. Gillv. R, (1948)
G Law Reports 75 and Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. [1974) 1 SCR
559, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 747
of2000. ·

H From the Judgment and Order dated 5.8.99 of the Kerala High Court in
P.P. UNIKRISHNAN v. PUTTIYOTTIL ALIKUTTY [THOMAS, J.] 145

Crl.M.C. No. 1542 of 1998. A
Ms. M. Jayshree, Rajiv Mehta, L.N. Rao, A. Raghunath, Ms. Madhurima
Tatia, G. Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash and Jouthish A.P. for the appearing
parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B
THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

Two cops who are caught in the dock of a criminal court want to pre-
empt the trial on the ground of limitation. But the trial court and the High
Court did not accede to their plea. Hence they are now before the Supreme C
Court ·challenging the order of the High Court. How they got themselves
enmeshed in the cobweb of the criminal proceedings can be narrated in brief:
.. First appellant was the Sub-Inspector of Police and second appellant
was a Police Constable attached to Perambra Police Station situated in a D
moffusil centre within the Calicut district (Kerala). Firsfrespondent, a middle
aged shopkeeper of Perambra, was living with his wife and three children
within the limits of the said Police Station. On l.9 .1995 the first respondent
(hereinafter referred to as the 'complainant') filed a complaint against the two
appellants before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class Perambra complaining
that the appellants have committed offences under Sections 325, 342, 330 and E
506(1) IPC. The First Class Magistrate after examining the complaint on oath
and after taking cognizance of the said offences issued process to the
appellants. They entered appearance in the Magistrate's court and raised
preliminary objection that the magistrate should not have taken cognizance
of the offences in view of the bar contained in Section 64(3) of the Kerala
Police Act (for short 'the KP Act') which fixed a period of six months from F
the date of commission of the offence for taking cognizance thereof. The
magistrate over-ruled the objections. Appellants then moved the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (For short 'the Code')
for q~ashing the criminal proceeding initiated by the complainant. They
contended that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offences as G
the complaint was filed only after the expiry of six months c;>f the alleged
commission of the offences. A learned single judge of the High Court dismissed
the petition as per the impugned order.

For dealing with the question raised in this appeal it is necessary to
extract, at least briefly, the allegations made in the complaint. They are the H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A following:

On the evening of 23.12.1994 the complainant was called to the police
station, he was asked to remain therein till the arrival of the first appellant.
But appellants did not arrive at the police station on that evening nor was
the complainant permitted to leave the police station. Hence he had to remain
B inside the police station overnight. On the next morning, both the appellants
reached the station. They put the complainant in the lock up room, and first
appellant asked him "did you not steal the articles from the next shop?" and
so asking he started beating the complainant. Thereafter both the appellants
together showered a volley of blows all over his body. He fell down. Appellants
C kept him inside the lock-up room and left the police station. By evening they
returned to the police station and resumed their assault operation during
which they inflicted lots of blows on different ·portions of his body by
uttering the words "if you do not tell the truth you will be killed". Thereafter
the complainant was asked to sit on the floor and then both the appellants
stood on his legs and in that posture they inflicted blows on him with hands
D as well as lathi. He again fell down and this time he became unconscious. He
was kept in the lock up room from 24th December, 95 tilJJhe morning of 27th
December, 95. He was released from the confinement of police station on the
morning of 27th after administering a warning that if he divulged to any
person outside of what happened he would be trapped in a false case. The
E above is in substance the allegations in the complaint.

Section 64 of the K.P. Act deals with initiation of legal proceedings
against police officers or magistrates. The first two sub-sections are intended
to afford protection against any penalty or action for damages on account of
any act, done by such officers in good faith in pursuance of any duty
p imposed or any authority conferred. Sub-section (3), which is relied on by the
appellants as the sheet anchor for their safety, is extracted below:

"No court shall take cognizance of any suit or complaint, in respect
of any offence or wrong alleged to be committed or done by a
Magistrate, Police Officer or other person on account of any a.ct done
G in pursuance of any duty imposed or authority conferred on him by
this Act or any other law for the time being in force or any rule, order
or direction lawfully made or given thereunder unless the suit or
complaint is filed within six months of the date on which the offence
or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done."

H Learned Single Judge of the High Court repelled the contention based
P.P. UNIKRI~HNAN v. PUTTIYOTTIL ALIKUTTY [THOMAS, J.] 147

on the sub-section on two premises. For the first premise he made the A
following observations:

"From the allegation made in the Annexure-A complaint it is clear that
the allegation made against the petitioner are with regard to the
commission of several offences punishable under the IPC. By no
stretch of imagina~ion it can be said that the offence alleged to have B
committed is in the discharge of the official duties of the petitioners
so as to attract the protection under sec.64 (3) of the Police Act in
favour of the petitioners. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners
that since Annexure-A complaint is barred by time the cognizance of
the offence taken by the learned Magistrate is illegal, is not C
. sustainable."

The second premise is based on Section 4 73 of the Code. Learned
Single Judge has observed thus on that aspect:

"Under Sec. 473 of the Cr.P.C. the courts have got jurisdiction not D
only in cases where applications are filed to condone the delay by
explaining the delay occurred properly but also in appropriate cases
even without any application to condone the delay in order to meet
the ends of justice. In this case the petitioner has alleged the reasons
for the delay in filing the complaint. It is for the trial court to consider
whether there are sufficient reasons to condone the delay in filing the E
complaint at the appropriate stage merely because of the fact that the
complaint was filed after the lapse of six months from the date of
alleged offence committed or acts done the complaint filed against the
police officials cannot be thrown out under Section 64(3) of the Police
Act. If such contention is accepted, the unscrupulous police officials F
can drag the investigation for six months and contend that the
complaint filed subsequent thereto is barred by time."

Section 473 of the Code is the last of the provisions subsumed in
Chapter XXXVI of the Code. The title of that Chapter is "Limitation for taking
cognizance of certain offences." The Chapter contains a fasciculus of only G
seven sections starting with Section 467. It is necessary to extract that
commencing provision which is as under:

"467. Definitions.-For the purpose of this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires, 'period of limitation' means the period specified in
section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence." H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A It is clear from a reading of the said opening provision that the entire .
Chapter concerns only with the period of limitation prescribed in the succeeding
provisions. Of course the usual play at the j9ints is provided therein by using
the words "unless the context otherwise requires". But on reading Section 473
it would become crystally clear that it is intended to be applied only with
B reference to the period fixed in Section 468 of the Code. Now we extract below
Section 4 73 of the Code:

"473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of
this Chapter, any Court may make cognizance of an offence after the
c expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in
the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained
or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice."

The extension of period contemplated in the said Section is only by way
of an exception to the period fixed as per the provisions of Chapter XXXVI
D of the Code. Section 473 of the Code therefore cannot operate in respect of
any period of limitation prescribed under any other enactment. Hence we are
unable to uphold the view adopted by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court that Section 4 73 of ,the -Code can appropriately be invoked by the
complainant for circumventing the bar contained in Section 64(3) of the K.P.
Act.
E
Shri L.N. Rao, learned counsel for the complainant made an endeavour
to support the impugned order of the High Court by contending that the bar
contained in Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act would be restricted to the offences
specified in that Act and it cannot encompass any other offence under any
F enactments, particularly the penal code offences.

To bolster up the contention learned counsel invited our attention to
the decision of this Court in Maulud Ahmadv ..State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963]
Supp. 2 SCR 38. In that case one Police Head constable challenged his
conviction and sentence under Section 218 of the IPC. As the High Court
G confirmed the conviction he approached this Court by special leave. One of
the grounds urged in this Court was based on Section 42 of the Indian Police
Act which says that "all actions and prosecutions against any person, which
may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the
provisions of this Act, or under the general police powers hereby given shall
be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have
H been committed, and not·otherwise."
P.P. UNIKRISHNAN v. PUTTIYOTTIL ALI~UTTY [THOMAS, J.] 149

Subba Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) felt that Section A
42 of the Indian Police Act does not apply to prosecutions against any
person for anything done under the provisions of any other Act. The reasoning
for adopting the said legal position is quite obvious from the section itself.
Learned Judge has ~tated as follows:

"Under S.36 nothing contained in the Police Act shall be construed B
to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any Regulation
or Act for any offence made punishable by this Act or for being liable
under any other Regulation or Act or any other or higher penalty or
·punishment than is provided for such offence by this Act. This
section makes it clear that the provisions of the Act including s.42 do C
not preclude a person from being prosecuted for an offence under any
other Act. A combined reading of these provisions leads to the
conclusion that s.42 only applies to a prosecution against a person
for an offence committed under the Police Act."

The aforesaid provision is not identically worded as Section 64(3) of the D
K.P. Act. The words "any offence" mentioned in the said sub-section indicate
that the provision is not restricted to the offences specified in the K.P. Act.
It is advantageous in this context to refer to Section 2(n) of the Code which
is the definition for the word "offence". It means "any act or omission made
punishable by any law for the time being in force".
E
Even otherwise there is nothing in Section 64 (3) of the KP Act which
would warrant a construction that the ban therein is intended only with
reference to the offences mentioned in that Act.

Ms. M. Jayshree, learned counsel for the appellants contended that
Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act contains words which are analogous to the F
words employed in Section 197(1) of the Code and on that premise learned
counsel requested us to follow certain decisions for understanding the scope
of the sub-section concerned in the K.P. Act. Even assuming that the words
employed in those two different sub-sections (one in the K.P. Act and the
other in the Code) are the same it has to be pointed out that the context G
envisaged in Section 197(1) of the Code or the purpose of prnviding a filter
therein is demonstrably different from the object of Section 64(3) of the K. P.
Act. Section 197(1) of the Code does not impose any absolute ban against
taking cognizance of the offence, but it only says that the sanction contemplated
therein is a condition precedent for taking such cognizance. It obviously is
for preventing public servants from being subjected to frivolous prosecutions H
ISO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A for discharging their official duties. On the other hand, Section 64(3) of the
K.P. Act incorporates an absolute ban against taking cognizance of the
offences of the type mentioned therein on the expiry of the period specified
therein. .

That apart the words used in Section 197(1) of the Code for qualifying
B the offence are seemingly wider. Those words are these: "any offence alleged
to have been committed by {him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty". In Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act the offence
is qualified as the offence committed by a police officer "on account of any
act done in pursuance of any duty imposed or authority conferred on him,
C by this Act or any other Jaw for the time being in force or any rule, order of
direction lawfully made or given thereunder".

The commission of an offence, while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty is of a wider radius when compared with an
offence committed on account of an act done in pursuance of any duty or
D authority. In the latter, the act done itself should be an exercise in discharge
of his duty or authority and that act should amount to an offence. It is not
enough that the act complained of was only purported to be in exercise of
his duty though it maybe sufficient under the former. So the scope under
Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act is much narrower than the amplitude of Section
E 197(1) of the Code for a public servant to claim protection.

Even under Section 197 of the Code no protection has been granted to
public servants for the type of acts alleged in the case against the appellants.
Decisions are a legion relating to the scope of the protection under Section .'
197(1) of the Code. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, [1955] 2 SCR 925 this
F Court made a slight deviation from the view adopted by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Gill's case (1948 Law Reports 75). This Court after
referring to earlier decisions summed up the scope of Section 197(1) of the
Code thus:

"There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the
G discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty
that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or
fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his
duty."

While following the said decision this Court has found, on a subsequent
H occasion, that a superior officer who assaulted his subordinate for defying
)"
P.P. UNIKRISHNAN v. PUTTIYOTTIL ALIKUTTY [THOMAS, J.] 151

his orders could not be said to have acted in the course of performance of A
his duty, (vide Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., [1974] 1 SCR 559.

If a police officer dealing with law and order duty uses force against
unruly persons, either in his own defence or in defence of others and exceeds
such right it may amount to an offence. But such offence might fall within B
the amplitude of Section 197 of the Code as well as Section 64(3) of the K.P.
Act. But if a police officer assaults a prisoner inside a lock-up he cannot claim
such act to be connected with the discharge of his authority or exercise of
his duty unless he establishes that he did such acts in his defence or in
defence of others or .any property. Similarly, if a police officer wrongfully
confines a person in the lock-up beyond a period of 24 hours without the C
sanction of a magistrate or an order of a court it would be an offence for
which he cannot claim any protection in the normal course, nor can he claim
that such act was done in exercise of his official duty. A policeman keeping
a person in the lock-up for more than 24 hours without authority is not.merely
abusing his duty but his act would be quite outside the contours of his duty
or authority. D

Ms. M. Jayshree, learned counsel for the appellants, made a last attempt
to salvage the appellant from criminal proceedings on the strength of a recent
decision rendered by this Court in K.K. Patel & anr. v. State of Gujarat &
anr., [2000] 6 SCC 195. That decision was rendered in consideration of Section E
161(1) of the Bombay Police Act. The phraseology used in that sub-section
is far wider than Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act. Under the mrmer protection
is given for "acts done under colour or in excess of duty or authority" by
providing that action should be initiated within a particular period and if it
is not so initiated within that period the action can be initiated only with the
sanction of the Government. The said decision is of no help to the appellants F
as the sub-section (3) of Section 64 of the K.P. Act is differently worded.

If sub-section (3) of Section 64 of the K.P. Act is given the interpretation
sought for by the learned counsel for the appellants, it may give rise to
calamitous consequences, e.g. if a police officer inflicts torture on a prisoner G
inside the lock up and he knows that the right of the prisoner to move within
the time prescribed for such acts would stand permanently debarred after the
expiry of six months, he might inflict such sorts of physical harm to the ·
prisoner as to disable him from moving out for the next 6 months so that the
" offending policeman would stand permanently immuned from any prosecution
proceedings in respect of the offences committed by him. This may be only H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A an illustration in fiction but such fiction may tum out to be reality, at least
in exceptional cases. So the interpretation which may lead to such dangerous
consequences should be averted.

For the aforesaid reasons we are not inclined to afford the benefit
envisaged in Section 64(3) of the K.P. Act to the appellants. The appeal is
B hence dismissed.

T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.