Holding

Section 14(1)(b) is satisfied only when the building is bona‑fide required for the immediate, direct purpose of demolition, and the building’s condition is an essential factor; here, the condition did not warrant demolition, so eviction was unlawful.

Summary

The landlord sought eviction of the tenant under section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, claiming the building needed immediate demolition for reconstruction. The tenant contended the building was structurally sound and that the landlord’s motive was purely economic. The Rent Controller, the appellate authority and the Madras High Court upheld the eviction, but the Supreme Court held that section 14(1)(b) requires a bona‑fide, immediate, direct need for demolition, and the condition of the building is an essential factor. Since the building was sound and did not warrant demolition, the landlord’s claim was not bona‑fide. The Court set aside the eviction order, dismissed the landlord’s petition and allowed the appeal with costs.

Issues considered

The meaning of ‘bona‑fide requirement’ and ‘immediate purpose’ under section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
Whether the condition of the building is a vital consideration for invoking section 14(1)(b).
Whether a landlord’s economic motive alone can satisfy the statutory requirement for eviction.
The scope of judicial review of the Rent Controller’s findings of fact.

Legislation cited

Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960s. 1, s. 10, s. 14(1)(a), s. 14(1)(b), s. 14(2), s. 15, s. 16, s. 33(3)(b)

Subjects

Rent controlEvictionBona fide requirementImmediate purposeDemolitionTamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) ActJudicial reviewLandlord‑tenant

Judgment

- P. ORR AND SONS (P) LTD.
v.
ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS (MADRAS) LIMITED
A

NOVEMBER 9, 1990

[T. KOCHU THOMMEN, K.N. SAIKIA AND B
N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction-Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960: Sections JO and 14( /)(b) bona fide require-
ment and bona fide personal requirement demolition and reconstruction
of building-Condition of building-Prime factor-Deterioration to
crumbling state-Whether necessar}~-Absence of need for urgency by c
reason of sound condition of building-Whether negative bona fide
. character of the requirement for demolition.·

Judicial Review: Findings of competent authority-When open to
Court's interference-Appreciation of evidence and findings of facts- D
Authority empowered by statute-Final judge of facts-Court not to.sit
in judgment thereon.

Words & Phrases: 'lmmediate'-'lmmediate Purpose'-Mean-
ing of.
E
The respondent-landlord f"tled a petition before the Rent Control-
ler for eviction of the appellant-tenant under section 14(l)(b) of the
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the ground
that the condition of the bnilding compelled immediate demolition and
that the landlord wanted to put the property to the best possible use.
The appellant-tenant denied the allegations and contended that the F
building was structurally safe, and that the stand taken by the res-
pondent-landlord in the earlier proceedings under the Act falsified its
claim. On the basis of evidence on record, the Rent Controller found
that the building was structurally safe and sound. However, he held
that the condition of the building as such was not decisive in. deciding
the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord under section G
· 14(1 )(b) of the Act. Accordingly, he passed an order of eviction. The
tenant preferred an appeal. The appellate authority concurred with the
Rent Controller and confirmed the order of eviction.

Aggrieved, the tenant approached the High Court. Confirming
..; the fmdings of the authorities, the High Court held that though the H

615
6)6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) Supp. 2 S.C.R.

building was structurally sound, it was required _by the landlord for a
A
legitimate scheme of demolition and reconstruction with a view to put-
ting the property, to more profitable and better use.

Against the High Court's order, the tenant has preferred the
present appeal, by special leave, contending that the respondent-land-
s- lord has sought eviction of the appellant solely in terms of section
14(1)(b) of the Act, which relate to the condition of the building compel-
ling immediate demolition and since the condition of the building was
not as such, the eviction could not have been ordered. ....._

On behalf of the respondent-landlord it was contended that
section 14(1)(b) of the Act referred to bona fide requirement of the
c landlord for demolition and reconstruction. It was also contended that
due to various factors, if it became uneconomical to allow the old build-
ing to stand, notwithstanding its sound and safe condition, and a much
larger profit could be derived from the larger reconstructed building, a
prudent landlord would be perfectly justified in seeking eviction of the
D tenant under section 14(1)(b) of the Act.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 Section 14(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is satisfied only if the building is bona fide
E required by the landlord for the "immediate", i.e., direct, sole and
timely purpose of demolishi~g it with a view to erecting a new building
on the site of the existing building. Various circnmstances such as the
capacity of the landlord, the size of existing building, the demand for
additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage
and other factors justifying iilvestment of capital on reconstruction may
F be taken into account by the concerned authority in considering an
application for recovery; but the essential and overriding consideration
which, in the general interests of the public and for the protection of the
tenants from unreasonable eviction, the legislature has in mind the
condition of the building that demands timely demolition by reason of
the extent of damage to its structure, making it uneconomical or unsafe
G to undertake repairs. While the condition of the building by itself may
not necessarily establish the bona fide requirement under clause (b),
that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may
be taken into account by the Rent Controller but it is the essential
condition. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a
bona fide requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the
H condition of the building, in the context of the relevant circnmstances,
~\ "
-~
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS 617

requires demolition. These are matters which are to he proved by
A
evidence. [63SH; 636A·Dl

1.2 In order to satisfy the test under section 14(1)(b) the condition
of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building
being in danger of crumbling down, but the conditi11n must he such as
to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct B
purpose of domolition and reconstruction. The personal requirement of
the landlord or any member of his family for residence or business is
_, not germane to section 14, and to import that concept for the construe·
tion of that section, as the High Court appears to have done,, is to
project section 10 into section 14, and that is an exercise which has no
warrant in the law. [636E·F]
c
Meta/ware & Co. etc. v. Bansila/ Sarma & Co. etc., [1979] 3 SCC
398; Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 623 relied on.

Mehsin Bhai v. Hale & Company G.T., Madras, [1964] 2 MLJ
147; K. Ramachandra Rao v. Krishnaswami Iyengar and Ors., [1976] 1 D
MLJ 267; K.P. Lonaopan and Sons v. S. Mohamed lq/Ja/, [1981] 1 MLJ
386 approved.

R.P. David and Anr. v. N. Denial and Ors., [1967] 1MLJ110;
V.P. Selvaraj v. V. Narasimhe Rao, [1969] 1 MLJ 587; Bharat Trading
Company v. K. Shanmughasundaram, [1982] 1 MLJ 94; Manakaya/' E
Ammal & Ors. v. V.S. Sundaram and Ors., [1984] l MLJ 310; A.S.
Sheikh Fathma and Ors. v. Omer Cloth State and Ors., AIR 1986
Madras 90 overruled.

Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, [1970]
1 sec 499 distinguished. F

Mahboob Badsha v. M. Manga DeviandAnr., [1965] 2 MLJ 209;
K,.J. Sivalingam v. S. Guruswamy and Anr:, (1983] 2 MLJ 85 referred
to.

2. In the construction of sections such as 10 and 14 of the Act, the G
Court must be guided by the overriding legislative object articulated in
the Preamble to the Act, that "the control of rents of such buildings and

. the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the state
of Tamil Nadu." [6368; 637A]

Prabhakqr/m Nair and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1987] H
4 sec 238 relied on.
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

3. Section l4(l)(b), however, does not require instant demolition,
A
but demolition within the specified time. "Immediate purpose", in the
context in which the expression appears, relates to diredness rather
than speed, although absence of the letter negative the former. It
denotes connection and timely action, but not instant actiou; yet
delayed action is a sign of remoteness of purpose. The expression must
B be understood as a directly connected and timely purpose, and not a
secondary or remote or premature purpose. Significantly, the clause
does not say "for the purpose of immediately demolishing" which
words might have denoted instant demolition. What section l4(l)(b)
says is "immediate purpose of demolishing". The legislative intent is
that the purpose should be immediate or direct and not mediate or
remote or Indirect or secondary. The condition of the building need not
c be such as to warrant instant demolition, but it must be grave enough to
need timely action and rule out undue or protracted delay. The landlord
is not expected to wait till the building is in imminent or immediate
danger of crumbling down so as to necessitate recovery of possession
for instant demolition. The purpose of demolition must of course be
D immediately or directly connected with the requirement so as not to be
separated by any intervening consideration. Demolition for the purpose
of erection of a new building must be the direct immediate, genuine and
real requirement of the landlord. The bona fide character of the
requirement is proved by the appropriateness of time and the absence
of any ulterior or irrelevant consideration separating the requirement
E from the statutory or permitted purpose. The direct and immediate
nexus between these two element is proved by the condition of the
building and other relevant circumstances. Absence of any need for
urgency by reason of the strong and sound condition of the building will
negative the bona fide character of the requirement. What is the degree
of urgency warranted by what extent of damage to the building that
F makes the requirement directly and immediately connected with the
statutory purpose is a question of fact which must be decided in each
case on evidence. But a building which is sound and safe does not
qualify for demolition in terms of section 14(l)(b). Any such building
falls totally outside its ambit. [6278-H]

G Black's Law Dioionary, 5th Edn: Concise Oxford Dictionary,
New 7th Edn., referred to.

4. The requirement for demolition can be regarded as genuine
and bona fide only when the condition of the existing building is such
that a reasonable and prudent landlord would regard it to be unecono- -
H mica! to repair it rather than demolish it and reconstruct a new building
P. OPR & SONS.;.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS

Apart from the condition of the building, the nature of the locality, the A
advantages arising from reconstruction the capacity of the landlord to
erect a new building the demand for accommodation and other factors
suggesting the bona fide character of the landlord's request for reco-
very of possession under section 14(l)(b) are relevant. Even where the
condition of the building demands demolition, it is possible that, in view
of the landlord's lack of capacity to rebuild or the futility of reconstruc- B
lion by reason of the condition of the time and place, the authority may
regard, without prejudice to "'hatever power there is to enforce repairs
or demolition in certain circumstances, that the landlord's application
lacks bona fide. The authority has to take into account the totality of the
circumstances. [6288; 629A-C]

5. The absence of any provision to compel reinduction of the c
tenant after reconstruction or to compel reconstruction after demolition
and the non-applicability of the Act for a period of five years after
reconstructfon make it imperative that the reasonableness of the land-
lord's requirement should be considered with care and caution, bearing
in mind the fundamental legislative object to protect the tenant from D
unreasonable eviction. [628E-F]

6. The over-riding consideration underlying section 14(1)(b) is the ·
bonrl fide need for demolishing the old building and erecting a new
building, once the demolition of the olil building is completed, for loss of
time means not only loss of income, but probably also increased expen- E
diture. This construction must necessarily lead to the inevitable conclu-
sion that the condition of the building is a basic and essential require-
ment of section 14(1)(b). [628G-H]

7. The requisite circumstances warranting repairs under clause
1a) or demolition nnder clause (b) of section 14(1) are matters for f
determination by th• competent authority on the basis of relevant evi-
dence and the applicable provisions of the law. In proceedings for judi-
cial review, the Court does not*Sit in judgment over appreciation of
evidence and finding of facts by the authority empowered by the
statute. He is the final judge of facts, and so long as he has taken into
account all relevant facts and has eschewed from his mind all irrelevant G
circumstances and has correctly understood and applied the law,
including the rules of natural justice, his judgment is generally regar-
ded as final and not open to challenge. On the other hand, where he has
acted in excess of his jurisdiction or asked himself the wrong questio«:
or misunderstood or misapplied the law or failed to consider the rele-
vant circumstances, his conclusions are liable t.o be reversed as perverse H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

by a court exercising judicial review. Any repository of power must act
A
in accordance with the law and on the basis of relevant evidence. He
must he guided by reason and justice and not by private opinion. [6291>-F]

8. In the present case the Rent Controller asked himself the
wrong question. He did not think that the condition of building was
B relevant. He disregarded the clear admission of the landlord and other
evidence as regards the sound condition of the building. '.I'be crucial
condition for demolition was thus absent. The Controller was totally
misguided as to the conclusions which be reached. So were the appellate
authority and the High Court. [636F-G]

C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5226
of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.6.1990 of the Madras
High Court in C.R.P. No. 3064 of 1989.

D P. Chidambaram, Gopal Subramaniam, C.A. Sundaram and
Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant.

T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mishra and J.B.
Dadachanji for the Respondent.

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMMEN, J. Leave granted.
This appeal by a tenant arises from the judgmen~ of the Madras
High Court in C.R.P. No. 3064 of 1979 dismissing the appellant's
petition challenging the order of the appellate authority in R.C.A. No. . I "
{
F
108 of 1989 whereby the order of eviction made against the appellant
by the Rent Controller in R.C.0.P. No. 2083 of 1986 was confirmed.

The respondent-landlord filed petition for eviction of the
appellant-tenant on the ground specified under section 14( l)(b) of the
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control\ Act,_ 1960 (hereinafter
G
referred to as "the Act"). The landlord contended:

"The petitioner company as the owner of the premises had
conceived the idea of putting the said premises to better
use consistent with the locational advantages which is
en joyed by the property. The building which now exists on
H
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.l 621

the premises is admittedly more than JOO years old and is in
an old siructure which is liable to crumble on its own at any A
time. The present structure apart from being old, is not
also in a manner which is consistent with the area and the
general nature of buildings in the adjoining locality. Anna
Salai in Madras is admittedly one of the prime location
from business point of view and land in this area is scarce. B
It is, therefore, not only in the interest of the petitioner but
also in general public interest that such a location should be
put to the best use. The petitioner as the owner .of the
property is entitled to have the property put to the best
possible use".

Denying the allegation regarding the condition of the building, C
the tenant stated-

" ....... the allegtion in para 4 that the building 'is an old
structure which is liable to crumble on its own at any time'
is palpably false to the knowledge of the petitioner D
themselves and is backed up by Engineering calculations
furnished by them earlier. On earlier occasions the peti-
tioner filed H.R.C. No. 2837 of 1978 under Section 4of Act
18 of 1960 and averred in para 4 ' ........... the building
is a pucca structure built up with first Class materials.
Though the building is an old one there cannot be any E
doubt about its strength and durability and the accommo-
dation that is available to the Respondent is very spacious
and convenient'. Thiru C.R. Narayana Rao, Architect,
Engineer and (consultant) who had been engaged by the
Petitioners earlier to inspect the petition property and
submit his Valuation Report, had by his Report dated F
6.1.1983 at para 5 stated. 'The age of the building is about
106 years as on date of valuation (24.3.1982). Though the
age is 106 years the building is structurally sound'. Again
the Petitioners have stated in their petition H.R.C. No.
2450 of 1982 filed against the Respondents that 'Though
the building is an old one there cannot be any doubt about G
its strength, structure and durability ....... '. The aver-
ments of the .Petitioner made earlier would falsify the pre-
sent claim and there is no need or urgency to invoke the
provisions of Section 14(1) (b Jof the Act 18 of 1960 and as
amended subsequently and it is a clear abuse of the process
of Court and lacks in bona /ides". H1
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A On the basis of these pleadings and the evidence on record, particu-
larly the admissions made on behalf of the landlord in earlier proceed-
ings in H.R.C. No. 2837 of 1973 and H.R.C. No. 2450 of 1982, the
statutory authorities concurrently found that the condition of the
building was not unsound, as pleaded by the landlord, but it was, on
the other hand, structurally safe and sound. Though a hundred and
B more years of age, there was no doubt about its strength or durability.
However, they held that the condition of the building as such was not
decisive in deciding the question whether the building was bona fide
required by the landlord in terms of section 14 (1) (b) of the Act.
Confirming the findings of the authorities and rejecting the objections
ef the tenant, the High Court held that, though the building was
c structurally sound, the landlord required it for a legitimate scheme of
demolition and reconstruction with a view to putting the property to
more profitable and better use. The High Court stated:-

"Lack of bona fides cannot be inferred from a mere exag-
grated statement in the petition for eviction with regard to
D the condition of the building. It has to be remembered that
the language of Section 14 (I) (b) of the Act is clearly wide
enough to cover cases where the landlord bona fide
requires the building for a legitimate Proposal of scheme to
demolish an existing building and reconstruct it into a
bigger, more productive and higher income yielding one
E ....... Therefore, though the condition of the building is
not dilapidated, the respondent's claim can be certainly
entertained on the ground of putting the prgperty into a
profitable and better use".

The building in question is generally known as "P. Orr and -(
F Sons". It is one of the landmarks of the Madras City representing a
style of architecture that was once in fashion. It stands on, what is
generally known as, the Mount Road, but now renamed as Anna Salai.
The site of the building is indeed valuable. It demolished and recon-
structed, the landlord would undoubtedly be in a position to earn
much larger profits. Any prudent businessman having sufficient funds, '·
G as the landlord undoubtedly has, will want to demolish the building for
economic gains. The question, however, is whether, as found by the
High Court, eviction can be allowed under section 14 (I) (b) solely for
the purpose ofihe landlord's economic gains and without regard to the
condition of the building or the fundamental legislative intent to pro-
tect the tenant from unresonable eviction.
H
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOC!ATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.[ 623

It is pointed out on behalf of the tenant ihat eviction has been
sought by the landlord solely in terms of section 14 (1) (b) of the Act
and not any other provision. That provision, counsel submits, is con-
cerned solely with the condition of the building. It is that condition .
which determines. whether the building is bona fide required by tht
landlord· for the purpose of demolishing it. What is material is not the
personal requirement of the landlord. If the condition of the building B
does not warrant immediate demolition, the landlord is not entitled to
seek eviction under that provision. A landlord may be possessed of
funds and the requisite sanction for reconstruction of a bigger and
economically more attractive building, but if the existing building
which ,is sought to be demolished for the purpose of reconstruction is
sound and safe and, therefore, not in need of demqlition,'the section,
which is intended to protect the legitimate interest of the tenant, c
would not permit his eviction merly to suit the economic interest of the
landlord. The sole criterion for eviction under section 14, counsel says,
is the condition of the building compelling immediate demolition. On
the other hand, counsel points out, the bona fide personal require-
ments of the landlord are protected by section 10 of the Act. Jn order- D
ing eviction under that provision, the condition of the building is
irrelevant. All that is required is for the landlord to prove his personal
requirements in terms of sub-section (3) or (3A), or, the lapses or
misdeeds or breaches on the part of the tenant as stated in sub-section
(2) of section 10. The landlord has not, however, sought relief under
section IO, but solely under section 14. Nor do the facts alleged attract E
section 10.

Counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, submits that the
condition of the building is, if at all, only one of the various factors
which will have to be taken into account by the concerned authority in
considering an application for recovery of possession under section F
14(1)(b). If other circumstances are present, the condition of the
building is not a vital or even a necessary consideration for the exercise
of power under that provision. Section 14(1)(b), counsel submits.
refers to the bona fide requirement of the landlord for demolition and
reconstruction. If by reason of the small size of the building, the grow-
ing importance of the locality, the greater demand for accommodation G
and various other factors, it has become uneconomical to allow the old
building to stand, notwithstanding its sound and safe condition, or its
impressive facade and style, and a much larger profit can be derived
from the rents which a larger reconstructed building will yield, then,
counsel says, a prudent landlord having sufficient means to erect a
larger building is perfectly justified in seeking eviction under section H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A 14(1)(b), and his requirement is, by every economic test, reasonable
and bona fide and that requirement comes well within the ambit of
clause (e) of the sub-section.

We would now refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Sec-
tion JO deals with "eviction of tenants'', while section 14 deals with
B "recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction".
Section 10 states "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution
of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of
this section or sections 14 to 16 ....... ". Section 10 allows eviction of
a tenant either because of the lapses or breaches of contract and the
like on the part of the tenant [Sub-section (2)] or because of the
personal requirements of the landlord or any member of his family
c [sub-sections (3) and (3A)J. Where eviction is sought on any of the
grounds specified under sub-ection (3) or (3A) of section 10, the claim
of the landlord must arise from his bona fide requirements. These
requirements are personal to himself or any member of his family.
They are, unlike those under section 14, not connected with the condi-
D tion of the building, but are connected with the personal need of the
landlord or a member of his family.

While the legislative object that has inspired the enactment in
question is the control of rents and prevention of unreasonable evic-
tion of tenants, the legislature seeks to balance the rival interests of the
E landlords and tenants, and to protect the legitimate interests of both.
The overriding consideration is to protect and safeguard the weaker as
against the stronger, the more affluent, the more powerful. While the
landlord is assured of a fair rent-meaning a rent which is fair to both
parties-and of reasonable opportunity for eviction of the tenant on
permissible grounds, the tenant is protected against unjustifiable
F demands for higher rent or against unreasonable eviction. - (

While section 10 refers to the bona fide requirement of the land-
lord, section 14 speaks of the building being bona fide required by the
landlord for repairs under clause (a) or for demolition under clause
(b). What section 14 speaks of is a requirement emanating from the
G condition of the building, and the bona fide character of the require-
ment is decided with reference to that condition as well as other factors
germane to that requirement, such as the ability of the landlord to
carry out the repairs or reconstruction, the location of the building,
and other conditions indicating the reasonableness of the demand for
recovery of possession for further investment; but the overriding con-
H sideration, whether it is a case of repair or reconstruction, is the condi·
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS {THOMMEN, J.] 625

tion of the building itself. Section 14, in so far as it is material, reads:
A
"14. Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for
reconstruction.-(!) Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, but subject to the provisions of sections 12 and
13, on an application made by~ landlord, the Controller
shall, if he is satisfied- B

(a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord
for carryil\g out repairs which cannot be carried out with-
out the building being vacated; or

(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord
for the immediatf"purpose of demolishing it and such de- c
molition is to be.·made for the purpose of erecting a new
building on the site of the building sought to be demolished,

pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of
the building to the landlord before a specified date. 0

(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of
the building under this section shall be passed-

- (a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1),
unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the building
shall, on completion of the repairs, be offered to the
E

tenant, who delivered possession in pursuance of an order
under sub-section ( 1) for his re-occupation before the
expiry of three months from the date of recovery of posses-
sion by the landlord, or before the expiry of such further
period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in F
writing, allow; or

(b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of sub-section(!),
unless the landlord gives an undertaking fhat the work of
demolishing any material portion of the building shall be
substantially commenced by him not later than one month G
and shall be completed before the expiry of three months
from the date he reoovers possession of the entire building
or before the expiry of such further period as the Control-
ler may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow.

(3) H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A (4)
(5)

Section 14 begins with a non obstante clause. The provisions of
the section override any other provision of the Act, but subject to the
B provisions of sections 12 and 13 concerning a building in respect of
"which the Government shall be deemed to be the tenant", and with
which we are not concerned. Both the clauses of sub-section ( 1) of
section 14 open with the words "that the building is bona fide required
by the landlord". While clause (a) refers to the bona fide requirement
by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be done without
the building being vacated, clause (b) refers to the bona fide require-
c ment by the landlord for the "immediate purpose" of demolition. The
"'immediate purpose" of demolition is for the purpose of erecting a
new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished.

While section JO does not speak of anything being required to be
D done for the building, section 14 speaks only of what is required to be
done for the building. The condition of the building may be such that
repairs are required, and recovery of possession can be had for that
purpose in terms of and subject to the provisions of sections 14 and 15.

E
The tenant has a right in terms of these provisions to reoccupy the
building after repairs. This requirement of the landlord for recovery
must be bona fide in the sense that the condition of the building
justifies the requirement. Ordinarily, every building is required to be
-
repaired_ from time to time, but such repairs can be done without the
tenant vacating the building. But where the character and extent of the ·
repairs and their need and urgency are such that they cannot be done
without the building being vacated, temporary recovery of possession
F of the building is allowed under section 14(1)(a), but subject .to the
other provisions of that section and section 15. Section 14(2)(a)
required that the landlord shall give an undertaking to allow the tenant
to reoccupy the building within three months of his vacating it or
within such further time as the Controller may allow.

G Section 14( 1)(b) in terms of which a tenant is evicted-and
perhaps permanently-speaks of the "immediate purpose of demolish-
ing·· the building with a view to reconstruction. "Immediate" means
··at once; without delay". "Immediate" also means "directly connec-
ted; not secondary or remote"; "not separated by any intervening
medium" (Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition; the Concise Oxford
H Dictionary, New 7th Edition). This clause no doubt denotes urgency.
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, l.) 627

Section I4(2)(b) stipulates that the landlord should give an undertak- A
ing to substantially commence demolition of any material portion of
the building within one month and complete the same within three
months from the date of recovery of possession of the building or
within such further time as the Controller may allow. Breach of this
undertaking or a consequential order under section 16(1) will result in B'
the imposition of penalty under section 33(3)(b). Section 14(1)(b),
however, does not require instant demolition, but demolition within
the .specified time. "Immediate purpose'', in the context in which the
expression appears, relates to directness rather than speed, although
absence of the latter negatives the former. It denotes connection and
timely action, but not instant action; yet delayed action is a sign of
remoteness of purpose. The expression must be understood as a C
directly connected and timely purpose, and not a secondary or remote
or premature purpose. Significantly, the clause does not say "for the
purpose of immediately demolishing", which words might have
denoted instant demolition. What section 14(J)(b) says is "immediate
purpose of demolishing". The legislative intent is that the purpose
D
should be immediate or direct and not mediate or remote or indirect or
secondary. The condition of the building need not be such as to warrant
instant demolition, but it must be grave enough to need timely action
and rule out undue or protracted delay. The landlord is not expected
to wait till the building is in imminent or immediate danger of crumbl-
ing down so as to necessitate recovery of possession for instant demoli-
E
tion. The purpose of demolition must of course be immediately or
directly connected with the requirement so as not to be separated by
any intervening consideration. Demolition for the purpose of erection
of a new building must be the direct, immediate, genuine and real
requirement of the landlord. The bona fide character of the require-
ment is proved by the appropriateness of time and the absence of any
F
ulterior or irrelevant consideration separating the requirement from
the statutory or permitted purpose. The direct and immediate nexus
between these two elements is proved by the condition of the building
and other relevant circumstances. Absence of any need for urgency by
reason of the strong and sound condition of the building will negative
the bona fide character of the requirement. What is the degree of
urgency warranted by what extent of damage to the building that
G
makes the requirement directly and immediately connected with the
statutory purpose is a question of fact which must be decided in each
case on evidence. But a building which· is sound and safe does not
qualify for demolition in terms of section 14(1)(b). Any such building
falls totally outside its ambit. H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990) Supp. 2 S.C.R. ~---

A It may be noticed that clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 14
provides that the landlord should give an undertaking that he would,
on completion of the repairs, offer the building to the tenant who
delivered possession in terms of clause (a) of sub-section ( l) for his
reoccupation within three months or within such further time as the
Controller may allow, and when the landlord has failed to so act in
B accordance with his undertaking, section 15 authorises the Controller
to direct that the tenant be put back in possession of the building on
the original terms and conditions. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
section 14, however, only speaks of an undertaking by the landlord
that he would substantially commence the demolition of any material
•
portion of the building within one month and complete the same
c within 3 months from the date of recovery of possession or within such
further period as the Controller may allow. Section 16 allows the
tenant the right to reoccupy th.e building on the original terms and
conditions of the lease if the landlord has failed to act in accordance
with his undertaking under section 14(2)(b). But the section does not
speak of any undertaking by the landlord to reinduct the tenant in the
D new building erected by him. Nor does the Act contain any provision
for enforcement of the landlord's expressed intention to erect a build-
ing on the site of the demolished building. Once a building is totally
demolished, and a new building is erected in its place, the Act would
cease to apply to the new building for a period of fiv~ years from the
date of its completion [section 16(2)].
...
E
The absence of any provision to compel reinduction of the tenant
after reconstruction or to compel reconstruction after demolition and
the non-applicability of the Act for a period of five years after recon-
struction make it imperative that the reasonableness of the landlord's
requirement should be considered with care and caution, bearing in
F mind the fundamental legislative object to protect the tenant from "
unreasonable eviction.

The overriding consideration underlying section 14(l)(b) is the
bona fide need for demolishing the old building and erecting a new
building in its place. Ordinarily a prudent landlord would brook no
G delay in erecting a new building, once the demolition of the old build-
ing is completed, for loss of time means not only loss of income, but
probably also increased expenditure. This construction must necessa-
rily lead to the inevitable conclusion that the condition of the building
is a basic and essential requirement of section 14( l)(b ).

H The req':'irement for demolition can be .regarded as genuine and
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS ITHOMMEN, J.l 629

bona fide only when the condition of the existing building.is such that a A
reasonable and prudent landlord would regard it to be uneeonomical
to repair it rather than demolish it and reconstruct a new building.
Apart from the condition of the building, the nature of the locality, the
advantage arising from reconstruction, the capacity of the landlord to
erect a new building, the demand for accommodation and other factors
B
suggesting the bona fide character of the landlord's request for reco-
very of possession undenection 14( 1)(b) are relevant. Even where the
condition of the building demands demolition, it is possible that, in
view of the landlord's lack of capacity to rebuild or the futility of
reconstruction by reason of the condition of the time and place, the
authority may regard, without prejudice to whatever power there is
to enforce repairs or demolition in certain circumstances, that the c
landlord's application lacks bona fide. The authority has to take into
account the totality of the circumstances.

The requisite circumstances warranting repairs under clause (a)
or demolition under clause (b) of section 14(1) are matters for
D
determination by the competent authority on the basis of relevant
evidence and the applicable provisions of the law. In proceedings for
judicial review, the Court does not sit in judgment over appreciation
of evidence and findings of facts by the authority empowered by the
statute. He is the final judge of facts, and.so long as he has taken into
account all relevant facts and has eschewed from his mind all irrelevant , E
circumstances and has correctly understood and applied the law, '
including· the rules of natural justice, his judgment is generally
regarded as final and not open to challenge. On the other hand, where
he has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or asked himself t.he wrong
questions or misunderstood or misapplied the law or failed to consider
the relevant circumstances or allowed himself to be persuaded by
F
irrelevant c~rcumstances, his conclusions are liable to be reversed as
perverse by a court exercising judicial review. Any repository of power
must act in accordance with the law and on the basis of relevant evi-
dence. He must be guided by reason such justice and not by private
opinion.

We shall now examine some of the decisions construing the G
relevant provisions. In Meta/ware & Co. etc. v. Ban$ilal Sarma & Co.
etc., [ 1979] 3 SCC 398, this Court had occasion to consider the scope of
section 14(1)(b) of the Act. The contention of the landlord that the
condition of the building was not relevant to attract that provision was
rejected. This Court stated- H
. 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R .

" ..... but we fail to appreciate how the state or condition
A
of the .building and the extent to which it could stand with-
out immediate demolition and reconstruction in future
would be a totally irrelevant factor while detennining 'the
bona fide requirement of the landlord .. ' "

B This Court then cited with approval the following observation of M.
Anantanarayanan, J. of the Madras High Court in Mehsin Bhai v.
Hale & Company G. T., Madras, I 1964] 2 MLJ 147:

"What the section really required is that the landlord must
satisfy the Court that the building was bona fide required
by him, for the immediate purpose of demolition. I am
c totally unable to see how the present state of the building,
and the extent to which it could stand without immediate
demolition and reconstruction, in the future, are not rele-
vant considerations in assessing the bona fides of the land-
lord .... "
D
This Court then concluded-

"Having regard to the abovepiscussion on the construction
of Section 14( 1)(b) of the Act, particularly in the light of its
scheme, we are dearly of the view that the existing condi- ~
E tion of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital
factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing
upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that
provision which has to be done by having regard to 'all the
circumstances' and since in the instant case all the courts
have totally ignored this vital factor we feel that their conc-
F lusion on the question of bona fide requirement of the land- ,_
lord deserves to be set aside ...... ".
(emphasis supplied)

It would be helpful to read another passage from the judgment of
Anantanarayanan, J. in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale and Company, G. T.
G Madras, [1964] 2 MLJ 147:

" .... On the other hand, it is equally possible that the
mere fact that the building is old, is taken advantage of by
the .landlord to put forward such pretext, his real object
being ulterior, and not bona fide for the purpose of recon- J.._,
H struction. The Courts have to apply several criteria, and to
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.[ 631

judge upon the totality of the facts. But the Courts cannot
A
exclude the possibility that the ancient or relatively old
. character of the building, which may nevertheless be in quite
a good and sound condition, is being taken advantage of by
a landlord in order to make such an application with an
ulterior purpose, which purpose might be, for instance, to
obtain far more advantageous terms of rent in the future. . B
What the section really contemplates is a bona fide require-
ment; that necessarily implied that it is in the interests of
the landlord to demolish and reconstruct the building, and
that the fact that the building is old is not merely a pretext
for advancing the application, with the object of evicting
the tenant, and of obtaining higher rentals ... "(Page 148)
(emphasis supplied)
c
In Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 623, this Court
had occasion to consider the scope of section 13 of the Patiala and East
Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2006 B.K. (8
of 2006 BK), the provisions of which are in pari materia with section D
14( I )(b). This Court stated-

" .... the Controller has to be satisfied about the genuine-
ness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the
Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim
made by the landlord, and this can only be established by E
looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the
condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its
being put to a more profitable use after construction, the
means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the
landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a
_, particular intention, however strongly, said to be enter- F
tained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona /ides of
the landlord, but says, on ihe other hand, that the claim of
the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction
and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in
· the circumstances. It is impossible, therefore, to hold that
the investigation by the Controller should be confined only G
to the existence of an intention to reconstruct, in the_ mind
of the landlord. This intention must be honestly held in
relation to the surrounding circumstances ....... It is well
known that Rent Restriction Acts were passed in view of
the shortage of houses and the high rents which were being
demanded by the landlords. The very purpose of the Rent H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A Restriction Acts would be defeated, if the landlord~ were
to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on ttte bare
plea that they want to reconstruct the houses, without first
establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the
circumstances viz., that the houses need reconstruction or
that they have the means to reconstruct them etc ..... .
B ... ". (Pages 629-30)
(emphasis supplied)

This Court thus held that the condition of the building
was a matter of vital consideration, and that if the building
was in a good state the landlord would not be allowed to
c recover for the purpose of demolition merely because he
had the capacity and there was the possibility of economic
gain.

· In K. Ramachandra Rao v. Krishnaswami Iyengar and Others,
D [ 1976] 1MLJ267, A. Varadarajan, J. of the Madras High Court (as he
then was) observed:

" .... In my view, it is not possible to hold that the require-
ment of a landlord who has no doubt the means and has -
E obtained the necessary licence from the concerned authori-
ties is bona fide where his case in the petition for eviction is
that the building is old and in a dilapidated condition and
that he therefore requires it for purposes of immediate
demolition has not been substantiated but has '· een found
to be otherwise in that the building has been found to be in
F a sound condition although it is about 50 years old " '·
(Page 268)

In K.P. Lonappan and Sons v. S. Mohamed Iqbal, [1981] 1 MLJ
386 P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J. followed the same line of reasoning as
was adopted by the Madras High Court in the earlier cases cited
G above. The learned Judge stated:

" .... The authorities below had applied their mind regard-
ing the existing condition of the building and had correctly
come to the conclusion that the building requires demoli-
tion and reconstruction .... " (Page 387)
H
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.J 633

This line ofreasoning of the learned Judges-0f the Madras High Court
A
seems to be consistent with what we have stated above in regard to the
vital importance of the condition of the building for the purpose of
invoking the power of the statutory authority under section 14( 1)(b) of
the Act.

However, this Court had in Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. B
Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, [1970] 1SCC499 expressed a certain view
on which much reliance is placed by the landlord's counsel. In consi-
dering section 21( l)(j) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (Mysore
Act XXII of 1961 ), this Court stated-

"The proviso to Section 21 ( 1) enumerates the various
circumstances under which a landlord may seek to recover c
possession of the property from his tenant. The require-
ment contemplated under clause (j) of the prov1So to sub-
section ( 1) is that of the landlord and it does not have any
reference to the condition of the building as such. What is
necessary under that clause is that the landlord must satisfy D
the Court that he reasonably and bonafide requires the
premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and
the demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building

- in the place of the old one. No doubt, as to whether the
landlord's requirement is reasonable and bona fida has to
be judged by the surrounding circumstances, which will E
include, his means for reconstruction of the building, and
other steps taken by him in that regard .

. . . In our opinion, it is not necessary that the land·
lord should go further and establish under this clause that
·' the condition of the building is such that it requires im- F
mediate demolition. That the condition of the property
may be such which requires immediate demolition is
emphasised in clause (k) of the proviso. When such a
specific provision has been made in clause (k) the condition
_.,. of the building cannot come into the picture nor could it
have been dealt with again in clause (j). So the requirement G
under clause (j) is that of the landlord and cannot have any
reference to the building."
(emphasis supplied)
. J-
These observations show that the Court was dealing with clause (j) of
section 21(1) of the Mysore Act which. is not in pari materia with H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990} Supp. 2 S.C.R.

section 14( 1)(b) in so far as clause (j) did not contain the ingredients of ·
A
clause (k) of that sub-section which deals with demolition by reason of
the condition of the building. It is for that reason that this Court stated
that the condition of the building was not relevant for the purpose of'
clause (j) of section 2!(1) of the Mysore Act. The observation in that
case must, therefore, be understood to be limited to be construction of
B the relevant section of the Mysore Act and it is not helpful in the
construction of section 14( l)(b) which is in question here. and which,
as we have pointed out above, is not in pari materia.

It must now be pointed out that in certain decisions of the
Madras High Court views have been expressed which do not
emphasise the overriding importance of the condition of the building
c m respect of an application for recovery under section 14( 1)(b ).

In Mah boob Badsha v. M. Mango Devi and Another, [ 1965] 2
MU 209, Ramamurti, J. expressed the view that the condition of the
building was only one of the various considerations for the purpose of
D making an order under section J4(l)(b). The learned Judge, however.
stated:

·' ... In my opinion the proper view to take of this provi·
sion is that whenever the condition of the building is not
such as to require immediate demolition the case of the
E landlord should be scrutinised to find out whether he bona
fide intends io immediately demolish the building or
whether the provision is invoked merely with a ~iew to
evict the tenant .... " (page 213)

The learned Judge thus regarded that the condition of the building was
p one of the important matters to be considered, but did not seem to '·
accept it as a vital consideration for the exercise of power under sec·
ti on 14( 1)(b)

In K.J. Siva/ingam v. S. Guruswamy and Another, [1983] 2 MU
85, Nainar Sundaram, J. stated:
G
" .... While the age and condition of the buildings are
relevant factors to be taken into account, it is not possible
to insist that the condition of the building must be such that
there is an imminent threat of the same crumbling down in
the near future and only in such a contingency, the landlord
H could resort to the process under section 14( 1)(b) of the
Act . " ( Pagdi5)
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.] • 635

The learned Judge rightly held that it was not necessary for the land- · A
lord to prove that the building was about to crumble down. He ob-
served that the condition of the building was a relevant factor, but he
did riot, however, seem to accept the view that it was a vital factor. If
these decisions are to be understood as having disregarded the overrid-
ing importance of the condition of the building, they have not correctly
laid down the law. B

In certain other decisions of the Madras High Court, an extreme
view, which is certainly the wrong view, appears to have been expres-
sed to the effect that the condition of the building, being only one of
the various circumstances which could be taken into account by the
authority acting under section !4{l){b), he co\Ild make an order for
recovery of the building even if the condition of the building did not
c
require demolition, provided the other conditions were satisfied. In
R.P. David and Another v. N. Daniel (died) and Others, [1967] 1 MU
110, Chandra Reddy, C.J., speaking for the Bench of two Judges
stated:
D
" The only requirement of section 14(l){b) is the
honest desire of the landlord to demolish the building and
such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a
new building on the site of the building sought to be
demolished. There is nothing in the language of this clause
to warrant the view that the building should be old a 0d E
decerepit .... ··(Page 111)

Similar view had been expressed by the Madras High Court in V. P.
Selvaraj v. V. Narasimha Rao, [ 1969] 1 MU 587; Bharat Trading Com-
_, pany v. K. Shanmughasundaram, [ 1982] 1 MU 94; Kanakavali Amma/
and Others v. \l.S. Sundaram and Others, [1984] I MU 310 and A.S. F
Shaik Fathima and Others v. Omer Cloth Store and Others, AIR 1980
Madras 90 and certain 0th.er cases. These decisions, in so far as they
have disregarded the vital importance of the condition of the building
as a necessary circumstance for the landlord to prove.before the Con-.
trailer could make an order under section 14( l)(b) directing the tenant
to deliver possession of the building for the purpose of demolition, G
have not correctly stated the law on the point.

We accordingly hold that section 14( l)(b) is satisfied only if the
building is bona fide required by the landlord for the "immediate",
i.e., direct, sole and timely purpose of demolishing it with a view to
erecting a new building on the site of the existing building. Various H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

circumstances such as the capacity of the landlord, the size of the
A
existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the
place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment
of capital on reconstruction may be taken into account by the con- ;
cerned authority in considering an application for recovery; but the
essential and overriding consideration which, in the general interests
B of the public and for the protection of the tenants from unreasonable
eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building
that demands timely demolition by reason of the extent of damage to
its structure making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs.
While the condition of the building by itself may not necessarily
establish the bona fide requirement under clause (b), that condition is
not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into
c account by the Controller. but it is the essential condition in the
absence of which it would not be possible for the landlord to prove that
he has a bona fide requirement which is timely, c'irectly and solely for
the purpose of demolition of the building. The Act does not accept the
reg uirement by the landlord as a bona fide requirement within the
D meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building, in the
context of the relevant circumstances, requires demolition. These are
matters which are to be proved by evidence.

In must, however, be emphasised, that in order to satisfy the test
under section 14( l)(b), the condition of the building need not have
E deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling
down, but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide
requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition
and reconstruction. The personal requirement of the landlord or any
member of his family for residence or business is not germa.ne to sec-
tion 14, and to import that concept for the construction of that section, (.
F as the High Court appears to have done, is to project section JO into
section 14, and that is an exercise which has no warrant in the law.

The Controller in the present case asked himself the wrong ques-
tion. He did not think that the condition of the building was relevant.
He disregarded the clear admission of the landlord and other evidence
G as regards the sound condition of the building. The crucial condition
for demolition was thus absent. The Controller was totally misguided
as to the conclusions which he reached. So were the appellate autho-
rity and the High Court.

We must emphasise once again that in the construction of sec-
H tions such as 10 and 14 of the Act, the Court must be guided by the
P. OPR & SONS.v.ASSOCIATED PUBLISHERS [THOMMEN, J.] 637

overriding legislative object articulated in the Preamble to the Act, A
that is "the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of
unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil
Nadu"·. It is with reference to this Preamble that Sabyasachi Mukharji,
J., as he then was, in Prabhakaran N_air and Others v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Others, (1987] 4 SCC 238 observed:
B
" .... the provisions of the Act imposed restrictions on the
landlord's right under the common law or the Transfer of
Property Act of evict the tenant after termination of his
tenancy. The rationale of these restrictions on the land-
lord's rights is the acute shortage of accommodation and
the consequent need to give protection to the tenants C
against unrestricted eviction. The nature, the form and the
exent of the restrictions to be imposed on the landlord's
right and the consequent extent of protection to be given to
. the tenants is a matter of legislative policy and judgment
"
D
Accordingly we set aside the judgment under appeal. The land-
lord's petition for eviction shall stand dismissed. The appeal is allowed
in the above terms with costs thrdughout.

G.N. Appeal allowed.

1.

I