Holding

A notification under Section 28(1) need not contain exhaustive project details; stating that land is for establishment and development of industries suffices, making the notifications valid and not vague, and the subsequent procedural objections are untenable.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the validity of a preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966, which proposed to acquire 110.30 acres of land for industrial development, later reduced to 106 acres by a notification under Section 28(4). The landowners challenged the notifications, alleging that they were vague because they did not specify the detailed project (a technology park), that there was an undue delay in issuing the second notification, that the acquisition was mala‑fide and discriminatory, and that de‑notification of part of the land rendered the process invalid. The Court held that the Act does not require the preliminary notification to disclose full project details; it is sufficient that the purpose of establishing and developing industries is stated, and therefore the notifications were not vague or cryptic. The Court also found no statutory violation in the delay, no evidence of mala‑fide intent, and that de‑notification does not invalidate the acquisition. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act must disclose complete details of the proposed project and purpose of acquisition.
Whether the notifications issued were vague or cryptic, rendering them invalid.
Whether the delay of more than one year in publishing the notification under Section 28(4) invalidates the acquisition.
Whether the acquisition was mala‑fide or discriminatory.
Whether de‑notification of part of the land invalidates the acquisition process.

Legislation cited

Karnataka Land Reforms Acts. 79, s. 79A, s. 80
Land Acquisition Act

Subjects

land acquisitionKarnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Actpreliminary notificationvaguenesspublic purposemalafide acquisitionde‑notificationindustrial developmentstatutory interpretation

Judgment

A P. NARA YANAPPA AND ANR.
v.
STA TE OF KARNA TAKA AND ORS.

AUGUST 18, 2006

B [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, G.P. MATHUR AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]

Land Acquisition:

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966-Sections
C 28(/) and 28(4)-Notifications under-Challenged for not mentioning
complete details of project and purpose of acquisition-Held: At the time of
acquisition of land and issuing preliminary Notification complete details of
project and purpose of acquisition need not be mentioned-It is to be seen
whether land is acquired for development by Board or for any other purpose
D in furtherance of the objects of the Act-Notification clearly mentioned that
land was acquired for establishment and development of industries-Thus,
Notification not vague or cryptic, landowners not deprived of their right to
make proper representation-Delay of 22 months in publication of second
notification, and also de-Notification of some land does not render it invalid-
Also plea of malafide by landowners not tenable.
E
A preliminary Notification was issued under section 28(1) of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 proposing to
acquire 110.30 acres of land for establishment and development of industries
by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board. On considering the
cause of the landowners and persons interested, and giving them opportunity
F of hearing, orders were passed under section 28(3) of the Act. Thereafter,
some of the landowners challenged the preliminary notification by filing writ
petitions in the High Court. The writ petitions were allowed and the orders
under section 28(3) of the Act were quashed. The Land Acquisition Officer
gave an opportunity of hearing to the landowners. Thereafter, the notification
G under section 28(4) of the Act was issued restricting the acquisition of land
to 106 acres 12.3/4 guntas. The appellant land owners challenged both the
notifications by filing writ petitions before the High Court. The Single Judge
dismissed the writ petitions. On appeal, the Division Bench affirmed the
judgment of the Single Judge. Hence the present appeals.

H 716
P. NARAYAN APP Av. STATE OF KARN ATAKA 717
The appellant-landowners contended that the land has been acquired in A
order to benefit a company-VT for setting up a software technology park; that
in the preliminary notification, the purpose for which the company wanted
the land was not mentioned; that the appellant could not make a proper and
effective representation which deprived them ofa valuable right given to them
under the Act of showing cause against the proposed acquisition, and as such, B
the notification is vague and cryptic and is bad, that the entire acquisition
proceedings are illegal and the impugned notifications are liable to be struck
down; that there was a delay of more than 1 year and 10 months in publication
of the second notification under section 28(4); that the whole proceedings for
acquisition of the land is clearly ma/a fide; and that the de-notification of some
of the lands which had been earlier included in the preliminary notification C
under section 28(1) is discriminatory.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: I.I. A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 shows that land D
can be acquired for the purpose of (i) development by the Board, or (ii) for any
other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Sub-section (3) of
Section 28 states that after considering the cause shown by the owner and
the person interested and giving them opportunity of hearing the State
Government may pass orders. The final notification is issued under sub-section E
( 4) of Section 28. The necessary precondition for a valid notification under
sub-section (4) of Section 28 is that the State Government should be satisfied
that the land is required for the purpose specified in the notification issued
under section 28(1) of the Act. In order to judge the validity of the notification
what is·to be seen is whether the acquisition of land is being made for securing
the establishment of industrial areas or to promote the establishment or F
orderly development of industries in such areas. In view of wide definition of
the words "industrial infrastructural facilities" as contained in Section 2
(7a) of the Act, making of a technology park, research and development centre,
townships, trade and tourism centres or making provisions for marketing
and banking which would contribute to the development of industries will meet
the objectives of the Act and acquisition ofland for such a purpose would be G
perfectly valid. The impugned notification clearly mentions that the land is
sought to be acquired for establishment and development of industries by
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board. (727-8-F)

1.2. Under sub-section (8) of Section 28, the State Government is H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A empowered, after it has taken possession of land, to transfer the same to the
Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. Section 32
empowers the State Government to place at the disposal of the Board any land
vested in it and the Board is enjoined to deal with the land in accordance with
the regulations made and directions given by the State Government in this
B behalf. This stage, when the Board gets the authority to deal with the land,
comes at a later stage which is after the land has been developed by it. An
entrepreneur or a company may give a proposal to the State Government for
setting up an industry or infrastructural facility and the Government may
thereafter acquire the land and give it to the Board. It is also possible that
after the land has already been acquired and developed by the Board, it may
C be allotted to an entrepreneur or a company for setting up an industry or
infrastructural facility. Therefore, the scheme of the Act does not show that
at the time of acquisition of the land and issuing a preliminary notification
under Section 28(1) of the Act, the complete details of the nature of the
industry or infrastructural facility proposed to be set up should also be
mentioned. At that stage what is to be seen is whether the land is acquired
D for development by the Board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the
objects of the Act. (727-G-H; 728-A-Cl

1.3. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, the Court should not
only take into consideration the facts of the instant case but should also have
E in mind all possible contingencies. Therefore, on a plain reading of the
language used in the Act, it cannot be said that the impugned notification is
vague or cryptic as the complete details of the project which was proposed to
be established by the company were not mentioned and on account of the
aforesaid lacuna, the landowners were deprived of their right to make a proper
representation or to show cause against the proposed acquisition. (728-E-G)
F
1.4. The Scheme of the present Act is different and there is no similar
provision like the one contained in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act which lays down a period of limitation of one year
for making a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. In absence of any
specific provision to that effect in the Act, and the time gap being not very
G long, it is not possible to hold that the notification under Section 28(4) of the
Act is invalid. (731-F'-H)

1.5. Appellant did not lay any foundation in the writ petition to show
that the action of the State Government in acquiring their land was a ma/a
H fide one. Even assuming that the promoters of the company somehow succeeded
P.NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA 719

in getting their own land acquired in order to save it from being forfeited by A
the State Government in view of the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms
Act, that by itself cannot be a ground to strike down the impugned notifications
insofar as the land of the appellants is concerned. [732-E-F[

1.6. The fact that the lease deed has been executed only for a limited
period of 11 years clearly shows that the land after acquisition has not been B
reverted back to the company conferring proprietary rights on them but they
are merely lessees and the ownership and title thereof still vests with the
Board. Therefore, the plea of ma/a fide cannot be accepted. [733-A-B[

1.7. The acquisition of the appellants' land cannot be struck down on
the ground that some of the land which was initially included in the C
notifications issued under Section 28 of the Act was de-notified. [733-D)

Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, [1973[ 2 SCC 337 and MP.
Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi & Ors., [1992[ 2 SCC 168, distinguished.

State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors. [1996[ l SCC 250; D
Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR (1960) SC 1203; Union of India
v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar, [1996) 3 SCC 491 and Pratibha Nema & Ors. v. State
of MP. & Ors., [2003 [ (10) SCC 626, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3540 of2006. E
From the Judgment .;nd Order dated 6.4.2004 of the High Court of
. Karnataka at Banagalore in Writ Appeal Nos. 1595-96, 1598-99, 1600-1601,
1602-1604 and 1605/2004.

WITH
F
C.A. Nos. 354I, 3542 and 3543/2006.

Shanti Bhushan, Mukul Rohtagi, Prashant Bhushan, K.V. Dhananjay,
Dinesh Kumar Garg, Rohit Pandey, M.A. Chinnasamy and N.L. Ganapathi for
the Appellants. G
A. Sundaram, L. Nageshwara Rao, Nalin Talwar, Shirin Khajuria (for
lndu Malhotra), Kiran Suri, G.V. Chandrasekhar, P.P. Singh, R.C. Kaushik, B.
Vijayalakshmi Menon, Ashok Kr. Upadhyay, E.C. Vidya Sagar, Sanjay R. Hegde,
Anil K. Mishra, A. Rohen ·Singh, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Vijay
Kumar, Devashish Bharuka, Dr. Sushil Balwada and Ruchi Kohali for the H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.P. MATHUR, J. Leave granted.

B 2. These appeals, by special leave, have been filed challenging the
judgment and order dated 6.4.2004 of a Division Bench of Karnataka High
Court by which writ appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed and the
judgment and order dated 28.1.2004 of the learned Single Judge dismissing the
writ petitions was affirmed. The subject matter of challenge in the writ petitions
were two notifications issued under Section 28( I) and 28(4) of Karnataka
C Industrial Areas Development Board Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act').

3. The impugned notifications were issued for acquisition of land for
establishment and development of industries by the Karnataka Industrial
Areas Development Board. Before adverting to the contention raised by the
D learned counsel for the parties, it will be convenient to reproduce the impugned
notifications. The first notification bears No.CI:289:SPQ:200 I and was issued
on I0.12.200 I, relevant part whereof, is reproduced below :

"INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE SECRETARIAT
E NOTIFICATION

NO:CT:289:SPQ:2001, Bangalore, Dated 10th Dec 2001

The below mentioned lands specified are required for the State
government for establishment and development of industries by the
F Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board.

With an intention of acquiring the lands notification is hereby
published according to Section 28( I) (Act No.18 of 1966) of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966.

G According to Section 25 of the Act ................................... .
............................................................................. (Omitted as not relevant)

From the date of publication of this notification ....................... .
............................................................................(Omitted as not relevant)\

H The map of the lands comprised therein is kept in the office of the
P.NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA [G.P.MATHUR,J.] 721
Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB." A
The second notification under Section 28(4) of the Act bears No. CPMG/
KA/BG-GP0/13/2003-05 and was issued on 23.10.2003. The relevant part of
the notification is being reproduced below :

NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 28(4) B
Where as it appears, to the State Government that the Lands are to
be acquired specified in the schedule here to likely to be needed for
the purpose stated in the notification No. CI-289 SPQ 200 I dated
10.12.200 I published in Karnataka Gazette part 3-1 page 4 to 11 in
exercise of powers conferred according to section 28(1) of the C
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (Kamataka Act No. 18
of 1966).

The State Government is satisfied that Lands specified in the
schedule of Notification be acquired for the purpose specified as such
orders are passed according to section (3). In exercise of the powers D
conferred according to section 28(4) (Act No. 18 of 1966) of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 the Karnataka
Government is acquiring said Lands below for the purpose specified
in the notification as such a declaration is made."

By the notification under Section 28(1) of the Act 110.30 acres of land E
was proposed to be acquired but by the notification under Section 28(4) of
the Act, the acquisiti.:m was restrict.ed to an extent of I 06 acres 12.3/4 guntas
of land. Some of the land owners had challenged the preliminary notification
by filing writ petitions under Article 226. of the Constitution before the
Karnataka High Court after orders had been passed under Section 28(3)ofthe p
Act. The writ petitions were allowed and the orders passed under Section
28(3) of the Act were quashed giving liberty to proceed with the acquisition
from the stage of preliminary notification. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition
Officer, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the landowners on the
objections filed by them, passed a detailed order and then the notification
under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued. G
4. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has
challenged the impugned notifications on several grounds and the principal
ground is that the land has been acquired in order to benefit a company,
namely, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) who had submitted a project H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A report for setting up a sottware technology park which included an l.T.
Training Institute/Engineering College, Research and Development Centre,
Educational Centre, Commercial and Residential Buildings and Service
Apartments, Convention Centre, Hotel, Shopping Mall, etc. In the notification
under Section 28( 1) of the Act, the purpose of acquisition, namely, the
B purpose for which the company, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. wanted the land, as
enumerated above, was not mentioned and, therefore, the appellant landowners
were kept in dark and did not get an adequate opportunity to make an
effective objection against the proposed acquisition. Learned counsel has
submitted that the notification being absolutely vague and cryptic, it deprived
the landowners of a valuable right of making an effective representation and
C in these circumstances the entire acquisition proceedings are illegal and the
impugned notifications are liable to be struck down.

5. Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel for Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Board (respondent no.2) (hereinafter referred to
as 'KIADB'), has submitted that the land was actually acquired by the State
D Government for industrial development and after acquisition of the land, the
same vests with the KIADB which has the authority to give the same on
leasehold basis or outright sale to entrepreneurs or companies for the purpose
of industrial development and the basic object of acquisition is to promote
the establishment and orderly development of industries in that area. Learned
E counsel has further submitted that the impugned notification did not suffer
from any vagueness and clearly indkated the purpose for which the land was
sought to be acquired and there is no illegality in the same. He has also urged
that the mere fact that a substantial area of the land was subsequently given
on lease to a company, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd., it was not at all obligatory to
specifically mention the details of the project which the said company wanted
F to establish. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka and also Shri A.
Sundaram, learned senior counsel for Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9)
supported the stand taken by learned counsel for KIADB and submitted that
the impugned notifications fully satisfied the requirements of the Act and the
Act did not contemplate that at the time of acquisition of the land, the details
G of the project which was to be set up by the lessees or the subsequent
purchasers from the KIADB should also be mentioned in the notifications.

6. In order to examine the contentions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties, it is necessary to notice the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial
Areas Development Act. The preamble of the Act reads as under :
H "An Act to make special provisions for securing the establishment of
P. NARA YANAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G .P. MATHUR, J.] 723

industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the A
establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for
that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and
for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid."

Some of the provisions of the Act, which are relevant for the decision
of the issue involved, are as under: - B
"Section 2 - Definitions: -

In this Act, unless the context otheiwise requires,-

(1) "amenity" includes road, supply of water or electricity, street C
lighting, drainage, sewerage, conservancy, and such other convenience,
as the State Government may, by notification specify to be an amenity
for the purposes of this Act;

(2) "Board" means the Industrial Areas Development Board established
under this Act;
D
(3) ........................................................................ .

(4) ········································································
(5) "development" with its grammatical variations means the carrying
out of levelling, digging, building, engineering, quarrying or other E
operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material
change in any building or land, and includes re-development; and "to
develop" shall be construed accordingly;

(6) "'industrial area" means any area declared to be an industrial area
by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and F
where industries are to be accommodated and industrial infrastructural
facilities and amenities are to be provided and includes, an industrial
estate;

(7) "industrial estate" means any site selected by the State Government
where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries G
or class of industries;

(7a) "industrial infrastructural facilities" _means facilities which contribute
to the development of industries established in industrial area such
as research and development, communication, transport, Banking,
Marketing, Technology parks and Townships for the purpose of H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A establishing trade and tourism centres; and any other facility as the .
~

State Government may by notification specify to be an industrial
infrastructural facility for the purposes of this Act.

Section 3 - Declaration of industrial areas: -

(I) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area in the
B State to be an industrial area for the purposes of this Act.

(2) Every such notification shall define the limits of the area to which
it relates.

Section 5 - Establishment and incorporation: -
c
(I) For the purposes of securing the establishment of industrial areas
in the State of Karnataka and generaily for promoting the rapid and
orderly establishment and development of industries and for providing
industrial infrastructual facilities and ainenity in industrial areas in the
--
State of Karnataka, there shall be established by the State Government
D by notification a Board by the name of the Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board.

(2) The said Board shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession
and a common seal, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name,
and shall subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made
E thereunder be competent to acquire, hold and dispose of property,
both movable and immovable, and to contract and do all things
necessary for the purposes of this Act.

Section 14 - General powers of the Board: -

F Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board shall have power:-

(a) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable
as the Board may deem necessary for the performance of any of its
activities and to lease, sell, exchange or otherwise transfer any property
held by it on such conditions as may be deemed proper by the Board;
G
(b) ........................................................................
-
(c) to provide or cause to be provided amenities, industrial
infrastructural facilities and common facilities in industrial areas and
construct and maintain or cause to be maintained works and buildings
H therefor;
P.NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[G.P. MATHUR,J.] 725
Section 28 - Acquisition of land: - A
(I) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land
is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any
other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State
Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire
such land. B
(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section ( 1), the State
Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is
not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons
known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within
thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should C
not be acquired.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the
land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such
owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government
may pass such orders as it deems fit. D
(4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State
Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the
purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (I), a
declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that
effect.· E
(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under
sub-section (4 ), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government
free from all encumbrances.

(6) ........................................................................ . F
(7) ........................................................................ .

(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State
Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer
the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been G
acquired."

Section 29 provides that where the land is acquired by the State
Government under Chapter VII (Sections 27 to 31), the compensation for
acquisition shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section
30 provides that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall mutatis H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy
Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and
payment of compensation in respect of lands acquired under this Chapter. It
is important to note that the Land Acquisition Act is not applicable at the
stage of acquisition of the land but becomes applicable only in the matter of
payment of compensation on account of Section 30 of the Act. Therefore, the
B provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act have no application
here and acquisition of land has to be done in accordance with the provisions
of the Act.

7. The Preamble of the Act shows that it has been enacted to make
C special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas and
generally to promote the establishment and the orderly development of the
industries in such industrial areas. Section 2(7a) defines industrial infrastructural
facilities. This provision was inserted on 19.2.1997 by an amendment made by
Act No. I I of 1997. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending
Act has some relevance and the same is being reproduced below :
D
"After the liberalization of economic and industrial policies in the year
1991 increased emphasis has been given for Private Sector Investment
not only in the Industrial Sector but also in the Infrastructural Sectors.
As such a number of proposals, both from indigenous and foreign
companies have been received for considerable investments in
E infrastructural areas like establishment of power projects, express
highways, ports, airports, townships, industrial parks etc. These
projects need considerable extent of land for implementation.

Therefore, it is considered necessary to amend the Kamataka
Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, to enable the Board to acquire
F land for providing Industrial Infrastructural Facilities."

As the definition shows, anything which contributes to the development
of industries in industrial areas like technology parks, townships for the
purpose of establishing trade and tourism centres and any other facility as
G the State Government may notify, will be an industrial infrastructural facility.
It, therefore, shows that the object of the Act is not only to secure
establishment of industrial areas and orderly development of industries therein,
but also to create facilities which contribute to the development of industries
which may include technology parks, townships, trade and tourism centres,
etc.
H
-
P.NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[G.P.MATHUR,J.] 727

9. The provision for acquisition of land under the Act is contained in A
Section 28 which is somewhat different from the provisions contained in
Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The legislature in its
wisdom thought it proper to make a specific provision for acquisition of the
land in the Act itself rather than to take recourse to Sections 4 and 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act. A plain reading of sub-section (I) of Section 28 would
show that land can be acquired for the purpose of (i) development by the B
Board, or (ii) for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act.
Sub-section (3) of Section 28 is similar to Section 5A of the Land Acquisition
Act and the final notification is issued under sub-section (4) of Section 28.
The necessary precondition for a valid notification under sub-section (4) of
Section 28 is that the State Government should be satisfied that the land is C
required for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section
(I), viz., for the purpose of (i) development by the Board, or (ii) for any other
purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Therefore, in order to judge
the validity of the notification what is to be seen is whether the acquisition
of land is being made for securing the establishment of industrial areas or to
promote the establishment or orderly development of industries in such areas. D
In view of wide definition of the words "industrial infrastructural facilities" as
contained in Section 2 (7a) of the Act, making of a technology park, research
and development centre, townships, trade and tourism centres or making
provisions for marketing and banking which would contribute to the
development of industries will meet the objectives of the Act and acquisition E
of land for such a purpose would be perfectly valid.

10. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has
strongly urged that as the impugned notification under Section 28(1) of the
Act did not mention that the land was sought to be acquired for a technology
park, research and development centre, shopping mall, engineering college, F
residential apartments, etc., the landowners could not make a proper and
effective representation under Section 28(2) of the Act which deprived them
of a valuable right given to them under the Act of showing cause against the
proposed acquisition and consequently the notification is bad. Learned counsel
has also submitted that the notification is very vague and cryptic. We are
unable to accept the contention raised. Sub-section (I) of Section 28 clearly G
shows that the land can be acquired for (i) development by the Board; or (ii)
for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Under sub-
section (8) of Section 28, the State Government is empowered, after it has
taken possession of land, to transfer the same to the Board for the purpose
for which the land has been acquired. Section 32 empowers the State H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Government to place at the disposal of the Board any land vested in it and
the Board is enjoined to deal with the land in accordance with the regulations
made and directions given by the State Government in this behalf. This stage
when the Board gets the authority to deal with the land comes at a later stage
which is after the land has been developed by it. An entrepreneur or a
company may give a proposal to the State Government for setting up an
B industry or infrastructural facility and the Government may thereafter acquire
the land and give it to the Board. It is also possible that after the land has
already been acquired and developed by the Board, it may be allotted to an
entrepreneur or a company for setting up an industry or infrastructural facility.
Therefore, the scheme of the Act does not show that at the time of acquisition
C of the land and issuing a preliminary notification under Section 28( I) of the
Act, the complete details of the nature of the industry or infrastructural
facility proposed to be set up should also be mentioned. At that stage what
is to be seen is whether the land is acquired for development by the Board
or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, as mentioned
in sub-section ( 1) of Section 28 of the Act. In fact, if the contention raised
D by the learned senior counsel for the appellants is accepted, it would mean
that even at the stage of preliminary notification under Section 28( I) of the
Act, the nature of the activity which may be done by some entrepreneur or
a company which may give a proposal for setting up an industry or
infrastructural facility much after land has been acquired should also be taken
E note of and specifically mentioned in the notification, which is well nigh
impossible. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, the Court should not
only take into consideration the facts of the present case but should also
have in mind all possible contingencies. Therefore, on a plain reading of the
language used in the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention of the
learned senior counsel for the appellants that the impugned notification is
F vague or cryptic as the complete details of the project which was proposed
to be established by Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) were not
mentioned and on account of the aforesaid lacuna, the landowners were
deprived of their right to make a proper representation or to show cause
against the proposed acquisition.
G 11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance
on a Three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Munshi Singh & Ors. v.
Union of India [1973] 2 SCC 337 in support of his submission that the
impugned notifications are vague and are, therefore, liable to be struck down.
In this case a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
H Act by the State Government on 16. 7.1960 declaring its intention to acquire
P. NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[G.P. MATHUR,J.) 729
34,000 acres of land in 50 villages of Ghaziabad. By a subsequent notification A
dated 9.2.1962, the proposed area was reduced from 34,000 acres to 6, 158
acres. The appellants Munshi Singh and others made an application on
4.7.1962 to the Special Land Acquisition Officer for supplying a copy of the
Scheme of the planned development to enable them to make an effective
representation at the time of hearing of the objections under Section 5A of B
the Land Acquisition Act, but the same was rejected by an order which
mentioned that "the scheme of the planned development is not necessary for
a notification under Section 4 of the Act, as such, no such scheme of the
planned development is available in this office." The Master Plan was
' sanctioned subsequently on 4.9.1962. The notification was challenged on the
ground that the words in the notification, viz. "for planned development of C
the area", gave no indication whatsoever as to the purpose for which the land
was acquired and the same was vague. It was held that there was no indication
whatsoever in the notification whether the development was to be of residential
area and building cities or of commercial and industrial plots nor was it
possible for anyone to find out what kind of planned development was under
contemplation i.e. whether the land was to be developed by the Government D
or whether the owners of the properties would be required to develop a
particular area in a specified way. It was also held that if the Master Plan
which came to be sanctioned on 4.9.1962 had been available for inspection
by the persons interested or even if the knowledge of its existence on the part
of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved, the position may have been E
different, as in that situation the landowners could not claim that they were
unable to file objections owing to the lack of any indication in the notification
under Section 4 of the nature of the development for which the area was being
acquired. In our opinion, the authority cited is clearly distinguishable on
facts. The Scheme of the planned development was not available when the
notification was issued and in fact the Master Plan itself was sanctioned F
much after the publication of the notification and in these circumstances the
words "planned development of the area" were clearly vague. Such is not the
case here as the impugned notification clearly mentions that the land is
sought to be acquired for establishment and development of industries by
KIADB. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants G
is MP. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi & Ors., [1992] 2 SCC 168. In this case,
a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to
acquire 2.298 hectares of land in city/village Mandsaur, Tehsil and Distt.
Mandsaur and in the column for purpose only "residential" was mentioned.
The notification was struck down on the ground that no khasra number,
locality or any other particulars of the land sought to be acquired was H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20061 SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A mentioned when Mandsaur city was spread over a large area of 25 sq.
kilometers. It was also held that the word "residential" was hopelessly vague
as it conveyed no idea about the purpose of acquisition. In our opinion, this
case can be of no assistance to the appellants for the obvious reason that
the no details or particular of the land like khasra number and locality had
been mentioned and the word "residential" by itself did not show that the
B acquisition was being made for a public purpose. which is essential for a valid
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The next decision
relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants is State of Tamil
Nadu & Ors. v. l. Krishnan & Ors .. [1996] I SCC 250. In this case, after
referring to some earlier decisions including that of Munshi Singh (supra), it
•
C was held that whether the public purpose stated in a particular notification
is vague or not, is a question of fact to be decided in each case and cannot
be treated as a question of law.

12. Shri Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel for KIADB has, on the
other hand, relied upon a Constitution Bench decision in 8abu Barkya
D Thakur v. State of Bombay. AIR ( 1960) SC 1203. wherein it was held as under:
"It i5 not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition
proceedings that the statement that the land to be acquired was
needed for a public purpose should find a place in the notification
actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in
E substance, it is found on investigation, and the appropriate Government
is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed
for the purpose of a company, which would amount to a public
purpose under Part VII."

In Union of India v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar, [1996] 3 SCC 491, it was held
F that when the notification mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired
for a housing scheme but actually it is to be used for a district centre, the
public purpose does not cease to be a public purpose and the notification
could not be quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for
a commercial purpose. This authority has been cited to show that even a
G change of purpose (from residential to commercial) would not result in
invalidating the notification. Strong reliance has also been placed on Pratibha
Nema & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors.. [2003] I0 SCC 626, where the notification
was challenged on the ground that it was vague and reliance was placed on
the decisions rendered in M.P. Housing Board (supra) and Munshi Singh
(supra) where it was observed that the public purpose "needs to be
H
P. NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA [G.P. MATHUR,J.] 731
particularized" to satisfy the requirements of law. The Bench held as under A
in para 38:

"38. When no prejudice has been demonstrated nor could be
reasonably inferred, it would be unjust and inappropriate to strike
down the notification under Section 4(1) on the basis of a nebulous
plea, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Even assuming B
that there is some ambiguity in particularizing the public purpose and
the possibility of doubt cannot be ruled out, the Constitutional Courts
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 should not, as a
matter of course, deal a lethal blow to the entire proceedings based
on the theoretical or hypothetical grievance of the petitioner. It would C
be sound exercise of discretion to intervene when a real and substantial
grievance is made out, the non redressal of which would cause
prejudice and injustice to the aggrieved party. Vagueness of the public
purpose, especially, in a matter like this where it is possible to take
two views, is not something which affects the jurisdiction and it
would therefore be proper to bear in mind the considerations of D
prejudice and injustice."

It is necessary to emphasize that all the decisions cited by learned
counsel for the parties deal with notifications issued under Land Acquisition
Act and as demonstrated earlier, the Scheme of the Act under our consideration
is different. Even on the principle laid down in the authorities which were E
cited by learned counsel for the parties and which have been discussed
above, it cannot be held that the impugned notifications are vague or cryptic
or that they suffer from any infirmity. The challenge raised to the notifications
on the aforesaid grounds must fail.

13. Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that the F
notification under Section 28( 1) was published on 10.12.2001 and the
notification under Section 28(4) was published on 23.10.2003 and thus there
was a delay of more than 1 year and 10 months in publication of the second
notification. As already discussed, the Scheme of the present Act is different
and there is no similar provision like the one contained in proviso to sub- G
section ( 1) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which lays down a period
of limitation of one year for making a declaration under Section 6( I) of the
Act. In absence of any specific provision to that effect in the Act, and the
time gap being not very long, it is not possible to hold that the notification
under Section 28(4) of the Act is invalid.
H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 14. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has
also submitted that Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) were themselves
owners of nearly 90 acres of land as three members of a family who were
promoters and directors of the company had purchased agricultural land in
the year 1995-96. They being not agriculturists, proceedings under the
B Karnataka Land Reforms Act were initiated against them, whereunder the land
would have been forfeited to the State Government without payment of any
compensation. In order to save their land, they manipulated with the
Government and got their own land acquired whereunder they would be
entitled to compensation. It is thus submitted that the whole proceedings for
acquisition of the land whereunder not only the land of promoters and
C directors of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. but also the land of the appellants, who
are agriculturists, was acquired is clearly mala fide. This point has been
considered in detail by the High Court and has been repelled. Initially,
proceedings initiated under Sections 79A, 798 and 80 of the Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, I96 I against Devi Das Garg, one of the promoters of the
company were dropped by the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated
D 23.5.200 I. The Assistant Commissioner passed an order of forfeiture of the
land against Santosh Kumar Garg on 29.12.2002 and a similar order was
passed against Devi Das Garg on 31.12.2003. It may be noted that the order
for forfeiture of the land was passed much after the preliminary notification
under Section 28( I) of the Act had been issued on 10.12.200 I. That apart, the
E appellants herein are interested in saving their own land from acquisition and
have no concern with the land belonging to promoters of Vikas Telecom (P)
Ltd. They have not laid any foundation in the writ petition to show that the
action of the State Government in acquiring their land was a mala fide one.
Even assuming that the promoters of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. somehow
succeeded in getting their own land acquired in order to save it from being
F forfeited by the State Government in view of the provisions of Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, that by itself cannot be a ground to strike down the
impugned notifications insofar as the land of the appellants is concerned.

Shri Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel for KIADB has also
G submitted that the Kamataka Industrial Areas Development Board has only
executed a lease deed in favour of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. for a period of 11
years for a consideration ofRs.25,71,50,781/- and the lessee has to pay a rent
of Rs.1,000/- per annum from the date of taking over possession of the land.
The lease has been granted on stringent conditions and under clause 10( d)
the lessor has the right to terminate the lease and resume the possession of
H the scheduled property in the event the lessee fails to implement the project
P.NARAYANAPPAv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[G.P.MATHUR,J.] 733

within the stipulated period or extended period, if any. Clause 14 contains a A
condition that the lessor shall be entitled to determine the lease and resume
possession of the land if and when there is breach of any of the covenants
and obligations contained in the lease deed. The fact that the lease deed has
been executed only for a limited period of 11 years clearly shows that the land
after acquisition has not been reverted back to Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. conferring- B
proprietary rights on them but they are merely lessees and the ownership and
title thereof still vests with the Board. In such circumstances it is not possible
to accept the plea of ma/a fide raised on behalf of the appellants.

15. It is lastly submitted that the State Government had acted in a
discriminatory manner in de-notifying some of the lands which had been C
earlier included in the preliminary notification under Section 28( I) of the Act
and whosoever was in a position to approach the concerned authority of the
State Government, his land was exempted from acquisition. It has been urged
that survey no.9/4 which was earlier included in the notification under Section
28(1) of the Act was specifically de-notified. We are afraid that this plea
cannot be examined by us for want of sufficient details. The acquisition of D
the appellants' land cannot be struck down on the ground that some of the
land which was initially included in the notifications issued under Section 28
of the Act was de-notified.

16. For the reasons discussed above, there is no merit in these appeals,
which are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. E
N.J. Appeals dismissed ..