Holding

Delay, alleged condonation, and a technical breach of natural‑justice principles without demonstrable prejudice do not invalidate the dismissal, and a severable disproved charge does not affect the sustainability of removal from service.

Summary

P.O. Agrawal, a junior manager of State Bank of India, was repeatedly accused of misbehaving with senior officers and customers, leading to suspension and a series of disciplinary proceedings. After being acquitted in criminal trials, the bank’s disciplinary authority dismissed him, despite one charge being disproved. Agrawal challenged the dismissal on grounds of delay in initiating proceedings, alleged condonation of misconduct, violation of natural‑justice principles (no show‑cause notice and no copy of the inquiry report), and the disproved charge. The Supreme Court held that delay does not vitiate disciplinary action unless prejudice is shown, the doctrine of condonation does not apply to statutory service, a technical breach of natural justice without real prejudice does not invalidate dismissal, and a severable disproved charge does not affect the validity of dismissal based on other proved charges. The Court also affirmed its limited jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The effect of a three‑year delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the validity of the proceedings and whether it amounts to condonation of misconduct.
Whether the doctrine of condonation of misconduct, developed under master‑servant law, applies to a statutory employer governed by the State Bank of India Act.
Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by the disciplinary authority (no show‑cause notice, no copy of the inquiry report) and whether such violation caused prejudice sufficient to set aside the dismissal.
Whether the disproof of one charge (charge No. 2) severs the dismissal when other charges are proved.
The extent of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 to interfere with the quantum of punishment (removal from service).
Whether the disciplinary authority was legally required to furnish the employee with a copy of the inquiry report.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 353, s. 448, s. 506
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 14(1)(b)
State Bank of India Act, 1955

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsdelaycondonation of misconductnatural justiceaudi alteram partemseverability of chargesremoval from serviceArticle 136State Bank of Indiaservice rules

Judgment

A P.O. AGRAWAL
v.
STA TE BANK OF INDIA AND ORS.

APRIL 28, 2006

B [S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

Service law

Disciplinary proceedings:
c
Delay in initiation of proceedings-Effect of-Held: Proceedings were
not vitiated as the ground of delay was not raised by employee before either
High Court or appellate authority, and before disciplinary authority, he not
only took part without any demur, but cross examined witnesses and entered
D his defence.

Misconduct-Condonation of-Held: Terms and conditions ofemployees
were governed by a statute and disciplinary authority by reason of rules
framed, was delegated with power to initiate departmental proceedings against
employee and impose suitable punishment if misconduct was proved-In such
E a case concept of contract of personal service as understood in common
parlance is not applicable and doctrine of condonation of misconduct evolved
by ordinary law of 'master and servant' is not attracted-On facts, held that
though the delinquent employee was suspended, non initiation of disciplinary
proceeding due to pendency of criminal proceedings against him did not
itself mean that there was a conscious act on part of employer to condone
F his misconduct-State Bank of India Act, 1955.

Principle of natural justice-Observance of-Disciplinary Authority
while differing with findings of inquiry officer not issuing show cause notice
to employee-Effect of-Held: Though it was a flagrant violation ofprinciples
G of natural justice, that itself did not cause prejudice to employee and his
order of dismissal from service could not be rendered a nullity for that
reason-It was not a case where there was gross violation of principles of
natural justice in the sense that no disciplinary proceeding was initiated at
all or no hearing was given.

H 454
P.O. AGRAWAL v. STATE BANK OF INDIA 455
One of several charges against employee disproved-Effect of-Held: A
Charges against employee were of similar nature in respect of misconduct on
number of occasions-Disproved charge was independent and severable
since one misconduct had nothing to do with commission of similar nature
of misconduct on all other occasions-Its disproof could not affect
sustainability of punishment of removal from service of delinquent employee. B
Quantum of punishment-Jurisdiction of court to interfere-Held: It is
limited and exercised only in very exceptional case-Article 136 of
Constitution of India, 1950.

Appellant was working with respondent-bank. For his misbehavior with
a senior officer of respondent he was placed under suspension. In disciplinary C
proceedings he was found guilty and censured, but allowed to join his duties.
However, he started misbehaving with senior officers again as also with
customers of respondent by using abusive language and passing derogatory
remarks. One Branch Manager, having been abused and threatened to be hit
by appellant, lodged First Information Reports against him. For this, he was D
placed under suspension by Disciplinary Authority. In criminal proceedings,
he was acquitted, getting benefit of doubt. Disciplinary Authority thereafter
issued a charge sheet against him for his purported misbehaviour. In domestic
inquiry conducted thereafter, appellant entered into defence, exhibited several
documents and cross examined witnesses in relation to each of the charges.
The Inquiry Officer found him guilty of all the charges except one. The E
Disciplinary Authority, however, differed with those findings as regards the
said one charge and recommended his dismissal from services. This
recommendation was accepted by Appointing Authority. Against this, appeal
of appellant before Appellate Authority was dismissed. High Court upheld
dismissal of his appeal. Hence the present appeal. F
Appellant contended that (i) respondent condoned his misconduct as
disciplinary proceedings were initiated after delay of three years from alleged
incident; (ii) prior to imposition of penalty on him, he was denied the
opportunity to represent his case to inquiry officer as he was not given copy
of enquiry report, and also when disciplinary authority disagreed with findings G
of inquiry officer as regard one of the charges; (iii) that non-observance of
principle of natural justice itself caused prejudice him.

Respondent contended that (i) delay in initiating disciplinary action did
not prejudice the appellant as all witnesses were available to prove charges
against him, they were fully cross-examined and appellant defended himself H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A fully before disciplinary authority; (ii) in law the disciplinary authority was
not required to furnish copy of enquiry report to appellant (iii) fact that
disciplinary aut~ority did not give him opportunity of hearing while differing
with findings of inquiry officer did not prejudice him; (v) findings of inquiry
officer in respect of one charge where he was not found guilty being severable,
punishment wool~ still be sustainable (v) quantum of punishment was not
B required to be interfered with as appellant did not reform himself despite
opportunities for same, and continued to commit similar nature of misconduct.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD 1.1. The validity of the disciplinary proceedings and/or
C justifiability thereof on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised
by the appellant before any forum. It was not his case either before the
Appellate Authority or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in
initiating the disciplinary proceeding he had been prejudiced in any manner
whatsoever. He did not raise such a question even before the Disciplinary
D Authority. He not only took part therein without any demur whatsoever, but
cross examined the witnesses and entered into the defence. 1466-F; 470-CI

1.2. It may be true that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a
finding that enquiry proceeding was initiated in the even it is shown that by
reason thereof the delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case
E was made out. 1466-GI

Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan, 119991 SCC L&S 646, relied
on.

State of MP. and Ors. v. R.N. Mishra and Anr., 1197717 SCC 644 and
F State ofMP. v. Bani Singh and Anr., (1990) Supp SCC 738, distinguished.

State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (19951 2 SCC 570,
referred to.

2.1. The order of suspension was passed as far back as, inter alia, in
G contemplation of initiation of a disciplinary proceedings. It may be true that
no disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Appellant, as a criminal
proceeding was pending against him. But, only because the criminal proceeding
was pending, the same itself may not be a ground to hold that there had been
a conscious act on the part of the respondents to condone the misconduct on
H the part of the Appellant. (467-BI
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA 457
2.2. The terms and conditions of the employees of the Respondent-Bank A
are governed by a statute. The Disciplinary Authority, by reason of the Rules
framed, was delegated with the power of the Bank to initiate departmental
proceeding against the delinquent officer and impose suitable punishment upon
him, if the misconduct is proved. In this case, concept of contract of personal
service as is understood in common parlance is not applicable. The doctrine B
of condonation of misconduct so evolved by ordinary law of 'master and servant'
is thus, not attracted in this case. [467-C, DJ

L. W. Middleton v. Harry Play/air, (1925) Calcutta 87 and District
Council, Amaroti through Secretary v. Vithal Vinayak Bapat, AIR (1941)
Nagpur 125, referred to. C
3.1. The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket
formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. [470-D]

Ajit Kumar Nagv. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd Haldia
and Ors., (2005] 7 SCC 764; Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chariman, J&K Bank Ltd D
and Ors., [2005] 5 SCC 337; State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors., JT
(2006) 1 SC 19 and Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P., referred to.

3.2. There has been a flagrant violation of principles of natural justice
in so far as no show cause notice was issued to the appellant by the Disciplinary
Authority while differing with the findings of the inquiry officer as regard E
charge no 2. (472-F]

Ranjit Singh v. Union ofIndia and Ors., (2006) 4 Scale 154 and Punjab
National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84, relied on.

3.3. Non-observance of principle of natural justice did not itself cause F
prejudice to appellant. (473-B]

3.4. The principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been
caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept
that even a small violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity.
To the principle of doctrine of audi alterem partem, a clear distinction has G
been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the
cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principal: [473-D)

State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, [1996) 3 SCC 364,
Rajendra Singh v. State ofMP. (1996) 5 M.P. 5 SCC 460; Canara Bank and
Ors. v. Debasis Das and Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 577 and Managing Director, ECIL, H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors., (199314 SCC 727, relied on.

S.l. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors., 1198014 SCC 379 and Union ofIndia
and Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (19851Supp2 SCR 131, held inapplicable.

3.5. It is not a case where there had been gross violation of principles
B of natural justice in the sense that no disciplinary proceeding was initiated
at all or no hearing was given. (475-CJ

4. It cannot be said that only because a copy of the enquiry report was
not furnished to the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, there has been a
violation of the mandatory provisions of the regulations. It was not at all
C necessary for the Disciplinary Authority, keeping in view the law as it then
stood, to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the Appellant
(472-G; 473-BJ

Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991( 1 SCC 588 held
D inapplicable.
5.1. The pattern of charges against appellant categorically point out to
the fact that the appellant had been misbehaving with the Regional Managers
and other officers, as well as the customers while he was posted in different
branches. (466-CJ

E Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu, (1960) 1 LLJ SC 518 and
Mahindra and Mahindra ltd. v. N.N. Narawade etc, JT (2005) 2 SC 583,
relied on.

5.2. The charges against the Appellant are almost identical. Primarily, ...
F charges of similar nature in respect of commission of misconduct on nine
different occasions were the subject matter of the disciplinary proceeding.
Charge no. 2 constituted an independent charge, as commission of one
misconduct had nothing to do with the commission of similar nature of
misconduct on all other occasions. The said charge was, therefore, severable.
(476-EI
G
State of Orissa and Ors. v. Bidvabhushan Mahapatra, (1963) Supp 1
SCR 648, followed.

Sawarn Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868,
relied on.

H Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR (1972) SC 1975, referred to.
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA[S.B. SINHA,J.] 459
6.1. The jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the quantum of A
punishment is limited. While exercising the said jurisdiction, the Court, only
in very exceptional case, interferes therewith. [478-D)

Chairman and MD., Bharat Pet. Corpn. Ltd & Ors. v. T.K. Raju, JT 2
SC 624 and A. Sudhakar v. Post Master General, Hyderabad and Anr., JT
(2006) 4 SC 68, relied on. B
6.2. It is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. (479-A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7686 of2004.
c
From the final Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2003 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in L.P.A. No. 363 of 1998.

P.P. Rao, Prakash Shrivastava, Hari Kumar G, Miten Mahapatra and
Anuradha Mutatkar for the Appellant.
D
V.A. Bobde, Sanjay Kapur, Rajiv Kapur, Shubhra Kapur and Arti Singh
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. The Appellant herein was working as a Junior Manager, E
Grade-I in a Branch office of the 1st Respondent-Bank, herein. On or about
29.9.1984 he is said to have misbehaved with the Regional Manager of the
Bank. He was placed under suspension. Disciplinary proceedings were also
initiated against him on 26.11.1984 .. He was found guilty of the misconduct
alleged against him. On earlier occasion also, he was found guilty for F
misbehaviour wherefor, he had been censured. He was thereafter allowed to
join his duties. The Appellant, however, c;cspite imposition of the said penalties
on him, started misbehaving with the senior officers again as also with the
customers by using abusive language and passing derogatory remarks during
the period 8.9.1986 to 27.9.1986. During the said period, it may be mentioned,
he was posted in different branches. A disciplinary proceeding was started G
against him. The charges levelled against him were as under:

"Katni Market Branch

I. You created an unpleasant scene and atmosphere by using
unparliamentary language against the local authorities of the H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Branch in a calculated attempt to denigrate the said authority,
which act of yours damaged/tarnished the image of the Bank.

Churcha Branch

2 You disobeyed the lawful and reasonable orders of the superiors.
B You also crossed the boundaries of decorum and decency. You
have thus acted in a manner unbecoming of an official of the
Bank.
3. You disregarded the lawful instructions of the superiors.

Shahdol Branch
c
4.(a) By your acts you have disobeyed the lawful instructions of the

(b)
superiors. You also displayed gross negligence in perfonnance of
your duties.
By your acts you disobeyed the lawful and reasonable orders of
-
D the Bank. You also showed insubordination to the superior
authorities. Your acts are unbecoming of officer of the Bank.
(c) By your acts you intentionally showed insubordination to the
superior authorities of the Bank. You thus acted in a manner
unbecoming of an official of the Bank.
•
E (d) You created a feeling of insecurity amongst the staff members.
You have acted in a manner unbecoming of an official of the
Bank.

p
Jabalpur Regional Office

5. You failed to obey the reasonable and lawful orders of the Bank
-
and behaved in a manner unbecoming of an official of the Bank.
The above charges, if proved, are tantamount to misconduct in
contravention of Rules 32(1) and 32(4) and (5) of the State Bank of
India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules governing our services."
G One Shri R.K. Shanna, Branch Manager, having been abused and
threatened to be hit by shoes by the Appellant, lodged two First Infonnation
Reports (FIR) against the Appellant pursuant whereto two cases under Section
353 of the Indian Penal Code were initiated in respect of the incidents which
took place on 16.I0.1986 and 23.10.1986. He was placed under suspension by
H an order dated 11.11.1986 by the Disciplinary Authority stating: --
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA(S.B. SINHA,J.] 461
"It has been reported that soon after your reinstatement on 16th A
August, 1986 on conclusion of major penalty proceedings against
you, you again misbehaved with your colleagues, senior officer and
also some of the outsiders and used abusive language passing
derogatory remarks during your recent stay at different branches viz.
Katni Market, Churcha and Shahdol branches. This has tarnished the B
image of the bank and resulted in your arrest by the local police oil
16th October, 1986 and thereafter on 23rd October, 1986 under sections
353, 448 and 506 of Indian Penal Code. The nature and extent of the
misbehaviour indicates that the established authorities of the Bank
and certain other functionaries in the Regional Office and engendering
indiscipline amongst the staff." c
He was, however, acquitted of the charges levelled against him in the
criminal proceedings by a learned Judicial Magistrate by a judgment dated
7.5.1988, inter alia, on the ground that the same could not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
D
The Disciplinary Authority thereafter issued a charge sheet against him
for his purported misbehaviour during the period 8.9.1986 to 27.9.1986 to
which we have referred to hereinbefore. An Inquiry Officer was appointed to
enquire into the said charges. Before the said Inquiry Officer several witnesses
were examined. In relation to each of the charges, the witnesses, indisputably,
were cross-examined. The Appellant also entered into defence and several E
documents on his behalf were exhibited.

The Inquiry Officer considered all the materials brought on record,
including the judgment passed in his favour in the criminal case. The Appellant
was found guilty of all the .charges except the charge No. 2.
F
The Disciplinary Authority, however, differed with the findings of the
Inquiry Officer as regards the said charge No. 2 and recommended for his
dismissal from services to the Appointing Authority stating:

"2. I am in agreement with the findings of the Inquiring Authority G
in respect of all the allegation/charges except allegations/charge No.
2. In respect of allegation No. 2, on perusal of deposition of Shri K.C.
Tiwari (the maker of PEX-3) I find that DEX-I was written by him
under pressure of the charge sheeted official. Further PEX-4 was
written by Shri Tiwari on receipt of the letter of Regional Office (DEX-
3). However, nothing has been established during the course of the H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A enquiry that the letter PEX-3 was written under pressure. Therefore,
I am not in agreement with the Inquiring Authority that the letter
(PEX-3) was not written of his own volition, and placing reliance on
PEX-3, I hold the allegation and the charge as fully proved.

3. In this connection, I have also perused/examined and considered
B the past record of the official. I find that earlier also the official was
placed under suspension for similar type of acts of misconduct and
was proceeded against for major penalty. On conclusion of the enquiry
he was inflicted upon the penalty of "Censure" by the Disciplinary
Authority considering that he suffered mental agony and that the act
was the first riotous act during his service and with a view to give
c him an opportunity to reform himself. Despite this, I find that the
official has repeated such type of misconduct proving that the earlier
decision of the Disciplinary Authority did not have any reformative
impact upon the official.

4. The ingredients of the proved/partly proved allegations/charges
-
D
in the instant case are so grave that the official does not deserve to
be continued in the Bank's service. I, therefore, recommend that the
penalty of"Removal from Bank's service" as provided for in Rule No.
49(g) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staft) Service Rules may
be inflicted upon the official treating his period of suspension as
E such. Accordingly, he will not be eligible for any back wages for the
period of his suspension. The order shall be effective from the date
of its receipt by the official."

It is not disputed that the Disciplinary Authority, prior to making the
said recommendations, did not assign any reason for expressing his difference
F of opinion with the Inquiry Officer as regard the said charge No. 2, not served
the delinquent officer with a show cause nor he was served with a copy of
the enquiry report. The Appointing Authority, however, relying on or on the
basis of the said recommendations of the Disciplinary Authority, as also upon
consideration of the materials on record, while forwarding a copy of the report
G of the Inquiry Officer, imposed upon the Appellant a punishment of removal
from service stating:

"I have perused the records of the enquiry in its entirety and
concur with the reasonings/findings recorded in the "Note" of the
Disciplinary Authority. Accordingly, I am in agreement with the
H recommendations of the Disciplinary Authority that you do not deserve

•
P.O. AGRAWAL v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 463

to be continued in the Bank's service. I have, therefore, decided to A
inflict upon you the penalty of "Removal from service" in terms of
Rule No. 49(g) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff Service
Rules governing your services in the Bank read with Rule No. 50(3)(iii)
ibid., which I hereby do. Further, you will also not be paid the salary
and allowances for the period of your suspension except the B
subsistence allowance already paid to you, as the period of suspension
has been treated as such by me. The order shall be effective from the
date of receipt of this letter by you. Please note that a copy of this
order is being placed in your service file."

The Appellant herein, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Appellate C
Authority. As regards the opinion Qf the Disciplinary Authority, so far as
charge No. 2 is concerned, he stated:

"The enquiring authority held this charge disproved but the
disciplinary authority reversed the findings of El A and deemed the
charge as proved. The act of disciplinary authority having given D
weightage to the CSO pressure on BM Churcha requires to be reviewed
in the light of the fact that the Regional Manager's say in the matter
was not considered the pressure to whom BM is subordinate but an
OJM on deputation to the branch could pressurise the BM Churcha.
The perusal of relative portion of enquiry proceedings will reveal that
the entire issue was framed by BM Churcha on instance of the E
respective Regional Manager. It is, therefore, requested to your honour
to take an independent view in the matter."

No plea was raised by the Appellant that he was prejudiced in any
manner either by reason of any delay, which might have taken place in
holding the disciplinary proceeding, or by reason of the Disciplinary F
Authority's dissatisfaction as regards thereto and/or non-grant of an
opportunity of hearing to him. The said appeal, upon consideration of the
contentions raised by the Appellant herein, was dismissed by the Appellate
Authority by an order dated 16. 6.1992 stating:

"Discipline and decency will have to be maintained at all costs
G
and breach thereof will have to be severely dealt with. Further, the
official was given an opportunity to reform himself on an earlier
occasion but he failed to eschew his defiant attitude. I am, therefore,
in full agreement with the appointing Authority's decision to impose
the exemplary punishment of removal from service on Shri Agarwal. H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A However, to reduce the financial hardships faced by the appellant, I
am inclined to consider the period of suspension from 11.11.1986 to
22.7.1990 on duty."

He filed a writ petition questioning the legality of the said order, which
was dismissed. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Appellant thereagainst
B was also dismissed by a reasoned order.

Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant
has raised the following contentions in support of this appeal:

(Q The penalty of removal from service, imposed upon the Appellant
C by the Disciplinary Authority, was illegal as prior thereto a copy of the
enquiry report was not furnished to him and thus: (a) the Appellant was
denied an opportunity to present his case against the findings of the Inquiry
Officer; (b) a similar opportunity was denied to him by the Disciplinary
Authority when he differed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer as regard
-
D charge No. 2;
(ii) As violation of the principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice,
it was not necessary for the Appellant to raise the said contention expressly,
as also for the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India;

E (iii) The High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned
judgment in so far as it held that the principles of natural justice had been
complied with as the Appellant herein got an opportunity of hearing before
the Appellate Authority;

(iv) The disciplinary proceedings were initiated after delay of about
F three years from the alleged incidents, on the basis whereof the charges had
been framed against him and as such the entire disciplinary proceeding was
vitiated;

(v) In any event such inaction on the part of the Disciplinary Authority
for a long tiine would amount to condonation of the acts of alleged misconduct;
G
(vi) The disciplinary proceeding, being ma/a fide, is violated in law;

(vii) The punishment imposed upon the Appellant was disproportionate
to the gravity of the misconduct, for which the Appellant was charged, and,
thus, deserve to be set aside by this Court.
H
P.D. AGRA WAL v. STA TE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 465

Mr. V.A. Bobde, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the A
Respondents, on the other hand, would contend:

(i) The Appellant did not plead or prove any prejudice having been
caused to him before the Appellate Authority in view of the fact that he
himself invited it to deal with the matter on merit;
B
(ii) It is not a case where delay in initiating the. Disciplinary Authority
caused any prejudice to the Appellant as: (a) all witnesses were available to
prove the charges against him; (b) the witnesses were fully cross-examined;
and (c) the Appellant fully defended himself before the Disciplinary Authority.

(iii) In respect of findings of the Inquiry Officer vis-a-vis the other C
charges being severable, even if the Appellant was held to be not guilty of
.
commission thereof, the impugned order of punishment would be sustainable.
.

(iv) So far as non-furnishing of copy of the enquiry report is concerned,
having regard to the fact that the decision of this Court in Union of India D
& Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991] I SCC 588, was rendered on 20th
November, 1990, and it having only a prospective application and the impugned
order of punishment having been passed on 20th July, 1990, in law the
Disciplinary Authority was not required to furnish a copy of the enquiry
report to the Appellant;
E
(v) Compliance of principles of natural justice not only varies from case
to case, in a situation of the present nature, the same would be deemed to
have been waived as by reason of non-issuance of a show cause notice upon
the Appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, while differing with the findings
of the Inquiry Officer on charge No. 2, he was not at all prejudiced as he
himself .had called upon the Appellate Authority to decide the matter on its F
own merit and the impugned order may not be interfered with.

(vi) No case has been made out for interference with the quantum of
punishment by this Court having regard to the fact that despite opportunities
having been granted to the Appellant to reform himself, he continued to
commit similar nature of misconduct, namely, using abusive and unparliamentary G
language and threatenings to assault the senior officers and others.

The Respondent No. I is a statutory authority, having been created
under the State Bank of India Act, 1955.
H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The tenns and conditions of the employees of the Ist Respondent
herein, thus, are governed by the statutory Rules framed in this behalf
including the State Bank of India (Supervisory Staff) Service Rules (the
'Rules', for short). Rule 49 of the said Rules provides for the mode and
manner in which the disciplinary proceedings are required to be initiated. The
B said Rules also provide for imposition of minor and major penalties. In terms
of the proviso appended to Rule 50( 1)(i), where the Disciplinary Authority is
lower :n rank than the Appointing Authority in respect of the category of the
employees to which he belongs to, no order imposing any of the major
penalties can be passed, except by the Appointing Authority or an authority
higher than it on the recommendations of the Disciplinary Authority.
c The pattern of charges against the Appellant, categorically point out to
the fact that the Appellant had been misbehaving with the Regional Managers
and other officers, as well as the customers not only while he was posted in
different branches.
-
D Charge No. 2 refers to an incident, which took place on 26.9.1986. The
said charge, admittedly, was not proved. However, it is not disputed that in
respect of charge No. I witnesses were examined on behalf of the Ist
Respondent. They were thoroughly cross-examined by the Appellant.
Documentary evidences were also adduced by the parties. So far charge No.
3 is concerned, only one witness was examined on behalf of the !st Respondent.
E The Appellant therein exhibited four documents in support of his case. The
!st Respondent also exhibited some documents. Similarly, in relation to each
other charge witnesses were examined on behalf of the Ist Respondent; they
were cross-examined and documents were exhibited.

F The validity of the disciplinary proceeding and/or justifiability thereof
on the ground of delay or otherwise had never been raised by the Appellant
before any forum. It was not his case either before the Appellate Authority
or before the High Court that by reason of any delay in initiating the disciplinary
proceeding he. had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It may be true
that delay itself may be a ground for arriving at a finding that enquiry
G proceeding was vitiated in the event it is shown that by reason thereof the
delinquent officer has been prejudiced, but no such case was made out.

Mr. Rao urged that the Respondents must have condoned the misconduct
on the part of the Appellant herein as they have not taken any action and
initiated disciplinary proceeding after he was placed under suspension. Reliance
H
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA,J.] 467
in this behalf has been placed on State of MP. & Ors. v. R.N. Mishra & Anr., A
[1997] 7 sec 644.

The order of suspension was passed as far back in 1986, inter alia, in
contemplation of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding. It may be true that
no disciplinary proceeding was· initiated against the Appellant, as a criminal
proceeding was pending against him. But, only because the criminal proceeding B
was pending, the same itself may not be a ground to hold that there had been
a conscious act on the part of the Respondents herein to condone the
misconduct on the part of the Appellant herein.

The terms and conditions of the employees of the Respondent-Bank are C
governed by a statute. T)le Disciplinary Authority, by reason of the Rules
framed, was delegated with the power of the Bank to initiate departmental
proceeding against the delinquent officer and impose suitable punishment
upon him, if the misconduct is proved. In this case concept of contract of
personal service as is understood in common parlance is not applicable. The
doctrine of condonation of misconduct so evolved by ordinary law of 'master D
and servant' is thus, not attracted in this case. Under the common law, as also
the provisions contained in Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, a
master was entitled to terminate the services of an erring employee at his
sweet will. The dismissed employee could have sued his master only for
damages and not for his reinstatement in service. It is only for the purpose
of grant of damages, a declaration was required to be made that the termination E
of the service was illegal. Having regard to the said legal position, the
doctrine of condonation of misconduct evolved, in terms whereof, it was
impermissible for the master to allow an employee to continue in service for
a long time despite his knowledge that he had committed a misconduct and
then to tum round and contend that his services should have been terminated p
on the ground that he was guilty of misconduct.

We may notice some decisions cited at the Bar.

In L.W. Middleton v. Harry Play/air, (1925) Calcutta 87, the Calcutta
High Court was concerned with the terms and conditions of service governed G
by contract and not by a statute. The suit was filed by the manager of a Tea
Estate for recovery of arrears of salary and damages for beach of contract of
employment.

In District Council, Amraoti through Secretary v. Vithal Vinayak Bapat,
H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A AIR (1941) Nagpur 125, Vivian Bose, J., following L.W. Middleton (supra), the
Nagpur High Court held:

"Once a master has condoned any misconduct which would have
justified dismissal or a fine, he cannot after such condonation go back
upon his election to condone and claim a right to dismiss him (servant)
B or impose a fine or any other punishment in respect of the offence
which has been condoned. This rule is to be found in AIR 1925 Cal
87 and in many other cases."

In R.N. Mishra (supra), this Court, in view of the fact situation obtaining
therein opined that the employer had condoned the misconduct stating:
c
"In the present case, misconduct attributed to the respondent
came to light in the year 1976 when a preliminary inquiry was ordered
and while the inquiry was continuing, the State Government was
required to consider the case of the respondent for promotion to the
post of Assistant Conservator of Forest. Under law, the State
D Government had no option but to consider the case of the respondent
for promotion. The State Government could not have excluded the
respondent from the zone of consideration merely on the ground that
a preliminary inquiry to enquire into the allegations of misconduct
attributed to him was pending. In such a situation, the doctrine of
E condonation of misconduct carinot be applied as to wash off his acts
of misconduct which was the subject-matter of preliminary enquiry.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the promotion of the respondent
to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forest would not amount to
condonation of misconduct alleged against him which was the subject-
matter of preliminary inquiry. Consequently, the punishment imposed
F on the respondent by the State Government was valid and legal. The
decision relied upon by the Tribunal as well as by the learned counsel
for the respondent in the case of Lal Audhraj Singh v. State of MP.
is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in that case, the
employer had a choice to inflict punishment on the employee but the
G employer did not choose to punish the employee and in that context,
it was held by the High Court that the misconduct attributable to the
employee was condoned."

However, for the purpose of holding that misconduct was condoned by
the employer the Court must come to a definite finding as regard the conduct
H of the employer. It must be held that either expressly or by necessary implication
P.D. AGRA WAL v. STA TE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 469
that the employer had knowledge of th.e misconduct of the employee. It is one A
thing that despite such knowledge, the delinquent officer is promoted to
which he would not have been otherwise entitled to or if the disciplinary
proceeding had been initiated as if the misconduct was not committed for and
it is another thing to say that such a misconduct was not required to be taken
into consideration as by reason of the service Rule, promotion was to be
granted on the basis of seniority alone, and, thus, the question of condonation B
of misconduct on the part of the employer would not arise.

In State ofMP. v. Bani Singh & Anr., [1990] Supp. SCC 738, whereupon
Mr. Rao placed strong reliance, this Court opined that by reason of delay of
12 years in initiating the disciplinary proceeding, the delinquent officer could C
not defend himself properly. In that case there was no satisfactory explanation
such a long delay. There was also doubt as regards the involvement of the
delinquent officer.

In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, [1995] 2 SCC 570,
however, this Court refused to set aside those disciplinary proceeding which D
had been initiated after a delay of 5Yi years. Distinguishing the decision of
this Court in Bani Singh & Anr., (supra), it was stated:

"Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay
of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is
whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. E
It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted
soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering
the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable
time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such. delay also
makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also F
in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is
bound to give room for allegations of bias, ma/a /ides and misuse of
power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well
interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long
always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such
delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending G
himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is
raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against
the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In
other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing."

H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan, [1999] SCC (L&S) 646,
this Court held:

"In regard to the allegation that the initiation of the disciplinary
proceedings was belated, we may state that it is settled law that mere
delay in initiating proceedings would not vitiate the enquiry unless
B the delay results in prejudice to the delinquent officer. In this case,
such a stage as to examine that aspect has not arisen."

In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the Appellant did not raise the
question of delay before any forum whatsoever. He did not raise such a
question even before the Disciplinary Authority. He not only took part therein
C without any demur whatsoever, but, as noticed hereinbefore, cross-examined
the witnesses and entered into the defence.

The Principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket
formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It
D has in recent time also undergone a sea change.
In Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
Haldia & Ors., [2005] 7 SCC 764, a Three Judge Bench of this Court opined:

"We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair
trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an
E unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general
principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be
preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has
been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe
the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first
F hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did
not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity
to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R.
v. University ofCambridge".) But we are also aware that the principles
of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be
imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with
G exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and
cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated: " 'To do a great
right' after all, it is permissible sometimes 'to do a little wrong'." [Per
Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of /ndia 19 (Bhopal Gas
Disaster), SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions,
H a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA[S.B. SINHA,J.) 471
opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should A
be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire,
functional rather than format and practical rather than "precedential".

In Canara Bank & Ors. v. Debasis Das & Ors., (2003] 4 SCC 557], this
Court referred to the prejudice doctrine stating:
B
"Additionally, there was no material placed by the employee to
show as to how he has been prejudiced. Though in all cases the post-
decisionat hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing,
in the case at hand the position is different."

The question as to whether in this case there has been a gross violation C
of principles of natural justice will have to be considered from two different
angles.

Firstly, the effect of the Disciplinary Authority having not given him an
opportunity of hearing while differing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer
as has been laid down in Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kun) Behari D
Mishra, (1998] 7 SCC 84 may be noticed.

In Ranjit Singh v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (2006) 4 SCALE 154, following
Punjab National Bank (supra), it was held:

"In view of the aforementioned decisions of this Court, it is now well E
settled that the principles of natural justice were required to be complied
with by the Disciplinary Authority. He was also required to apply his
mind to the materials on record. The Enquiry Officer arrived at findings
which were in favour of the Appellant. Such findings were required
to be over turned by the Disciplinary Authority. It is in that view of F
the matter, the power sought to be exercised by the Disciplinary
Authority, although not as that of an appellate authority, but akin
thereto. The inquiry report was in favour of the Appellant but the
Disciplinary Authority proposed to differ with such conclusions and,·
thus, apart froip complying with the principles of natural justice it was
obligatory on' )ris part, in absence of any show cause filed by the G
Appellant, to ari~lyse the materials on records afresh. It was all the
more necessary because even the CBI, after a thorough investigation
in the matter, did not find any case against the Appellant and thus,
filed a closure report. It is, therefore, not a case where the Appellant
was exonerated by a criminal court after a full fledged trial by giving H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A benefit of doubt. It was also not a case where the Appellant could be
held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings applying the standard of
proof as preponderance of the probability as contrasted with the
standard of proof in a criminal trial, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable
doubt. When a final form was filed in favour of the Appellant, the CBI
even did not find a prima facie case against him. The Disciplinary
B Authority in the aforementioned peculiar situation was obligated to
apply his mind on the materials brought on record by the parties in
the light of the findings arrived at by the Inquiry Officer. He should
not have relied only on the reasons disclosed by him in his show
cause notice which, it will bear repetition to state, was only tentative
c in nature. As the Appellate Authority in arriving at his finding, laid
emphasis on the fact that the Appellant has not filed any objection to
the show cause notice; ordinarily, this Court would not have exercised
its power of judicial review in such a matter, but the case in hands
appears to be an exceptional one as the Appellant was exonerated by
the Inquiry Officer. He filed a show cause but, albeit after some time
D the said cause was available with the Disciplinary Authority before he
issued the order of dismissal. Even if he had prepared the order of
dismissal, he could have considered the show cause as it did not leave
his office by then. The expression "communication" in respect of an
order of dismissal or removal from service would mean that the same
E is served upon the delinquent officer. (See State of Punjab v. Amar
Singh Harika, AIR (1966) SC 1313]"

Contention of Mr. Bobde in this behalf that he was not prejudiced
thereby cannot be accepted. There has been a flagrant violation of principles
of natural justice in so far as no show cause notice was issued to the
F Appellant by the Disciplinary Authority while differing with the findings of the
Inquiry Officer as regard charge No. 2. We would deal with this aspect of the
matter a little later.

However, the contention of Mr. Rao that only because a copy of the
enquiry report was not furnished to the Appellant by the Disciplinary Authority,
G there has been a violation of the mandatory provisions of the regulations,
cannot also be accepted for the reasons stated hereinafter.

The order of punishment of removal against the Appellant was passed
against the Appellant on 22nd July, 1990. The decision of this Court in Mohd.
H Ramzan Khan (supra), as noticed herein before, was decided on 20th November,
P.O. AGRAWAL v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 473

1990 wherein the law laid down by this Court, while holding that a delinquent A
officer cannot be called upon to make a representation on the quantum of
punishment without furnishing a copy of the enquiry report, was expressly
given a prospective effect. It was, therefore, not at all necessary for the
Disciplinary Authority, keeping in view the law as it then stood, to furnish
a copy of the enquiry report to the Appellant.
B
Decision of this Court in SL. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1980] 4 SCC
379, whereupon Mr. Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non-observance
of principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not
be read "as it causes difficulty of prejudice", cannot be said to be applicable
in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, C
has undergone a sea change. In view of the decision of this Court in State
Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh
v. State of MP., [1996] 5 SCC 460, the principle of law is that some real
prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted
from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order
being rendered a nullity. To the principal doctrine of audi alterem partem, a D
clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no
hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of
the principal. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard
to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum
without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no E
unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straightjacket formula. [See Viveka Nand
Sethi v. Chairman, J. & K. Bank Ltd. & Ors., [2005] 5 SCC 337 and State of
UP. v. Neeraj Awasthi & Ors., JT (2006) I SC 19. See also Mohd. Sartaj v.
State of U.P., (2006) I SCALE 265.]

In Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [ 1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 p
: [1985] 3 SCC 398], whereupon again Mr. Rao placed strong reliance, this
Court did not lay down a law in absolute terms that violation of principle of
natural justice would be read into the equality clause contained in Article 14
of the Constitution of India. The said decision was rendered having regard
to the fact that by taking recourse to the second proviso appended to Article
311 of Constitution of India, no disciplinary proceeding was to be initiated G
at all and an order of dismissal could be passed only on the basis of subjective
satisfaction of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in rank wherefor reason was to be recorded by it in writing that
it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary proceeding. The facets
of the principle of natural justice was considered in some details in State H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364, wherein this Court
categorically held:

"Now, corning back to the illustration given by us in the preceding
para, would setting aside the punishment and the entire enquiry on
the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-dause (iii) be in the interests
B of justice or would it be its negation? In our respectful opinion, it
would be the latter. Justice means justice between both the parties.
The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be
punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion
failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles
of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice.
c They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That
would be a counter-productive exercise."

It was opined that in an appropriate case, the said right could also be
waived, stating:
D "If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders
have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting
aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is
established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference
is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may
E be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character,
whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not
insist on proof of prejudice in such cases."

It was further held:

F "Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/
statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles
of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held
to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the
Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total
violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation
G of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment.
Jn other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity"
and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/''no hearing"
and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed
would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one
H chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA(S.B. SINHA,J.] 475

Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in A
accordance with the said rule (audi alteram par/em). (b) But, in the
latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi
alteram par/em) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice;
in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in
the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did B
or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend
upon the answer to the said query."

It is not a case where there had been a gross violation of principles of
natural justice in the sense no disciplinary proceeding was initiated at all or
no hearing was given. C
In Canara Bank & Ors. (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held:

"It is to be noted that at no stage the employee pleaded prejudice.
Both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench proceeded on the
basis that there was no compliance with the requirement of Regulation D
6(18) and, therefore, prejudice was caused. In view of the finding
recorded supra that Regulation 6( 18) has not been correctly interpreted,
the conclusions regarding prejudice are indefensible."

Even in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar
& Ors., [1993] 4 sec 727, this Court clearly held: E
" ......The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of
natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to
assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not
incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry
occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee F
or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be
considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where,
therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different
consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice
to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential
benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and G
.~
thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating
limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which
in itself is antithetical to justice."

It was further opined:
H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A " .... .If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the
conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no
difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the
Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The
Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of
punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
B regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting
to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their
judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside
or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal
appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of
c the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable
opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing
of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case
that it should set aside the order of punishment..."

What then would be the consequence of violation of principles of
D natural justice, so far as the dicta laid down by this Court in Punjab National
Bank & Ors. (supra) is concerned is the question.

The charges against the Appellant are almost identical. Primarily, charges
of similar nature in respect of commission of misconduct on nine different
occasions were the subject matter of the disciplinary proceeding. The charge
E No. 2 constituted an independent charge, as commission of one misconduct
had nothing to do with the commission of similar nature of misconduct on
all other occasions. The said charge was, therefore, severable.

A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v.
F Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, [1963] Supp.I SCR 648: AIR 1963 SC 779 opined:
"The High Court has held that there was evidence to support the
findings on heads (c) & (d) of Charge (I) and on Charge (2). In respect
of charge I (b) the respondent was acquitted by the Tribunal and it
did not fall to be considered by the Governor. In respect of charges
I(a) and I(e) in the view of the High Court "the rules ofnatural justice
G
had not been observed" .... .It is not necessary for us to consider
whether the High Court was right in holding that the findings of the
Tribunal on charges l(a) and l(e) were vitiated for reasons set out by
it, because in our judgment the order of the High Court directing the
Government to reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for
H reasons we will presently set out, be sustained. If the order of dismissal
P.D.AGRAWALv. STATEBANKOFINDIA[S.B. SINHA,J.} 477
was based on the findings on charges l(a) and l(e) alone the Court A ·
would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but
when the findings of the Tribunal relating to the two out of five li"eads
of the first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be
interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that
the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our B
view the High Court had no power to direct the Governor of Orissa
to reconsider the order of dismissal."

The Constitution Bench therein has clearly laid down that even if the
charges which have been proved, justify imposition of punishment of dismissal
from service, this Court may not exercise its power of judicial review. C
The said decision was noticed by this Court in Binny Ltd. v. Workmen,
AIR (1972) SC (1975): [1972] 3 SCC 806, in the following tenns:

" ..... .It was urged that the Court should not have assumed that the
General Manager would have inflicted the punishment of dismissal D
solely on the basis of the second charge and consequently the
punishment should not be sustained if it was held that one of the two
charges on the basis of which it was imposed was unsustainable. This
was rejected following the decision in Stale of Orissa v. Bidyabhan
Mahapatra, where it was said that if an order in an enquiry under
Article 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial E
misdemeanour for which punishment imposed can lawfully be given,
it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would
have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in
question. In our view that principle can have no application to the
facts of this case. Although the enquiry officer found in fact that the F
respondent had behaved insolently towards the Warehouse Master,
he did not come to the conclusion that this act of indiscipline on a
solitary occasion was sufficient to warrant an order of dismissal."

Yet again, in Sawarn Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1976] 2
SCC 868, this Court held:
G
"19. In view of this, the deficiency or reference to some irrelevant
matters in the order of the Commissioner, had not prejudiced the
decision of the case on merits either at the appellate or revisional
stage. There is authority for the proposition that where the order of
a domestic tribunal makes reference to several grounds, some relevant H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A and existent, and others irrelevant and non-existent, the order will be
sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have
passed the order on the basis of the relevant and existing grounds,
and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing grounds could not have
affected the ultimate decision."

B We are, tl\erefore, of the opinion that charge No. 2 being severable, this
Court can proceed on the basis that the charges against the Appellant in
respect of charge No. 2 was not proved.

In Orissa Cement Limited v. Adikanda Sahu, reported (1960) I LLJ SC
518 that a verbal abuse may entail imposition of punishment of dismissal from
c service.
The said decision has been followed in Mahindra and Mahendra Ltd.
v. N.N. Narawade etc., reported in JT (2005) 2 SC 583.

The question as regard the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with
D the quantum of punishment, it is well known, is limited. While exercising the
said jurisdiction, the Court, only in very exceptional case, interferes therewith.

In Chairman & MD., Bharat Pet. Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. v. TK. Raju, JT
(2006) 2 SC 624, this Court opined:

E "15. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr. Krishnamani
that two of the eight charges have not been found to be proved. The
charges levelled against the respondent must be considered on a
holistic basis. By reason of such an action, the respondent had put
the company in embarrassment. It might have lost its image. It received
F complaints from the Federation. There was reason for the appellant to
believe that by such an action on the part of the respondent the
appellant's image has been tarnished. In any event, neither the learned
Single Judge nor the Division Bench came to any finding that none
of the charges had been proved.

G 16. The power of judicial review in such mattes is limited. This Court
ti'mes without number had laid down that interference with the quantum
of punishment should not be one in a routine manner."

[See also A. Sudhakar v. Post Master General, Hyderabad & Anr., JT
(2006) 4 SC 68).
H
P.D. AGRAWAL v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [S.B. SINHA'1.J 479
For the reasons afore-mentioned, we are of the opinion that it is not a A
fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order
as to costs.

vs. Appeal dismissed. B

-