ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.versusM/S TEJPARAS ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD.

228                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    13 S.C.R. 228              [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A                    ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
                                        v.
                 M/S TEJPARAS ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD.
                          (Civil Appeal No. 6524 of 2009)
B                                  OCTOBER 03, 2019
               [R. BANUMATHI AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]
             Limitation Act, 1963: ss.3, 5 and 14 – Arbitration Award –
      Appellant in order to assail award filed petition u/s.34 before Jaipur
      District Court – Objection by respondent that cause of action arose
C
      at Jodhpur – Jaipur District Court held the petition as not
      maintainable before it but exercised power under Or.7 r.10 and 10A
      and returned the petition to appellant with direction to appear before
      District Court Jodhpur on 2.4.2008 for presentation of petition and
      proceed with the matter – However, appellant presented the petition
D     only on 10.4.2008 instead of specified date of 2.4.2008 –
      Respondent filed application under s.3 of Limitation Act before
      District Court, Jodhpur seeking rejection of petition on the ground
      of limitation – Appellant filed application under s.14 of Limitation
      Act seeking exclusion of time spent in the proceedings before District
      Judge, Jaipur – District Court Jodhpur dismissed the petition under
E
      s.34 of the Act, 1996 on limitation point – Appeal also dismissed by
      High Court – Hence instant appeal – Held: The petition filed under
      s.34 at Jaipur was within the period of limitation – Delay was for
      the period of 8 days in re-presenting the petition beyond the date
      fixed after it was returned under Or.7 r.10 CPC – In that
F     circumstance, even if the term “sufficient cause” as contained under
      s.5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in the facts the same was not
      with reference to petition under s.34 of Act, 1996 for condonation
      of delay beyond the period prescribed under s.34(3) of Act, 1996 –
      District Court, Jaipur had ordered return of the petition for
      appropriate presentation and the date was fixed – The correctness
G
      of the said order was not assailed by the respondent seeking
      absolute rejection of the petition by raising grounds on the nature
      of findings rendered therein since that Court had not held the petition
      to be malafide – In such circumstance, the issue of delay arose only
      in the context of delay of 8 days in re-presentation as permitted by
H
                                       228
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                         229
            ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD.

Jaipur Court – Therefore, re-examination of the matter to consider       A
the entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur as malafide so as
to non-suit the appellant and deny consideration of proceedings
under s.34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated within the period of
limitation at the first instance, on its merits was not justified – In
that view, order on the application filed under s.14 and s.3 of the
                                                                         B
Limitation Act by the District Judge, Jodhpur was not sustainable –
Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Application restored
to the file of the District Judge, Jodhpur – Parties to appear before
the said Court on 15.10.2019 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –
Or.7 r.10 and 10A – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                     C

       HELD: 1. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 10A indicate that the
re-presentation of the petition in the Court which is indicated in
the order for return cannot be considered as a fresh filing in all
circumstances when, it is returned to the plaintiff for such re-
presentation. In the instant case, though the appellant had not          D
filed the application indicating the Court to which the petition
would be re-presented and did not seek for fixing the date of
hearing, the Court at Jaipur while ordering return of the petition
after consideration of the application of the respondent under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had indicated the Court to which it was to
be presented and the date for appearance on 02.04.2008 for that          E
purpose. Hence, it is not as if the proceeding came to an abrupt
end when the petition was returned so as to consider the next
filing as a fresh petition. In that circumstance when the time had
been granted and date was fixed by the District Judge at Jaipur
and if for any reason the re-presentation was not possible on that       F
date, the course open to the appellant was to file an application
under Section 148 of CPC before the Court at Jaipur which
ordered for return and fixed the time for presentation in the Court
at Jodhpur, seeking extension of time granted earlier. However,
since the same was not resorted to by the appellant and the
petition was re-presented before the District Court at Jodhpur           G
with a delay of about 8 days from the date fixed for presentation
and as no extension was also sought, condonation of such delay
ought to have been sought. Since the petition was filed with delay
and no other application had accompanied the petition, the
respondent filed the application under Section 3 of Limitation
                                                                         H
230            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     Act which prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant in filing
      the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The
      averments in the application was in the nature of an application
      seeking condonation of delay in re-presentation of the petition
      as against the date fixed by the Court for presentation in Jodhpur.
      [Paras 8-9][236-B-C, F-H; 237-A-C]
B
             2. The condonation of delay sought was not for filing the
      petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for the first time. The
      petition filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 at Jaipur was
      within the period of limitation and the delay regarding which
      explanation is put forth is for the period of 8 days in re-presenting
C     the petition beyond the date fixed after it was returned under
      Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, in that
      circumstance even if the term “sufficient cause” as contained
      under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in the present
      facts the same is not with reference to petition under Section 34
      of Act, 1996 for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed
D     under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996. Though that be the position
      what is necessary to be taken note is that the application filed for
      excluding the time is under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
      [Para 11][238-B-D]
            3. Keeping in view the fact situation the petition is to be
E     returned for presentation in appropriate court, the very nature
      of consideration made by the Court at Jaipur would indicate that
      the matter required a detail consideration before exercising the
      power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the Civil Procedure
      Code and the Court during the said proceedings has not arrived
      at a conclusion that the proceedings had been initiated malafide
F     before that Court. However, keeping in view the overall facts
      and circumstance of this case the Court had ordered return of
      the petition for appropriate presentation and the date had been
      fixed. The correctness of the said order had not been assailed
      by the respondent seeking absolute rejection of the petition by
G     raising grounds on the nature of findings rendered therein since
      that Court had not held the petition to be malafide. In such
      circumstance, in the fact situation wherein the issue of delay had
      arisen only in the context of the delay of 8 days in re-presentation
      as permitted by the Court at Jaipur, re-examination of the matter
      to consider the entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur as
H     malafide so as to non-suit the appellant and deny consideration
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                          231
            ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD.

of proceedings under Section 34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated          A
within the period of limitation at the first instance, on its merits
will not be justified. In that view, the order passed on the
application filed under Section 14 and Section 3 of the Limitation
Act passed by the District Judge, Jodhpur and the order passed
by the High Court are not sustainable. They are accordingly, set
aside. Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Application           B
is restored to the file of the District Judge, Jodhpur. The parties
shall appear before the said Court on 15.10.2019 as the first date
for appearance without issue of notice/summons from that Court.
[Paras 12-15][239-B-H]
      Shri Amar Chand Inami v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC                C
      115 : [1973] 2 SCR 684 - relied on
       Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia and another (1997) 1 SCC
      502 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 221; S. Ganesharaju (dead)
      through LRs. and Anr. v. Narsamma (dead) through LRs.
      and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341; Union of India v. Popular               D
      Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470 : [2001] 3
      Suppl. SCR 619; Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union
      of India (2019) 2 SCC 455 : [2008] 5 SCR 1108;
      M/s Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. The
      Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors.
      (2008) 7 SCC 169 - referred to                                      E

                       Case Law Reference
[1973] 2 SCR 684                relied on                Para 8
[1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 221         referred to              Para 8
                                                                          F
(2013) 11 SCC 341               referred to              Para 10
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619         referred to              Para 10
[2008] 5 SCR 1108               referred to              Para 10
(2008) 7 SCC 169                referred to              Para 11          G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6524
of 2009.
      From the Judgment and Order 06.02.2009 of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodphur in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1103
of 2008.                                                                  H
232             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A            Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Advs. for the
      Appellant.
           Puneet Jain, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit Khanduja,
      Abhinav Deshwal, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
            A. S. BOPANNA, J.
             1. The appellant insurance company had issued fire insurance
      policy in respect of the plant and machinery of the respondent company.
      The sum for which it was insured was a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- (Rupees
C     Seventy Lakhs only). In respect of the policy issued on 01.12.1999, the
      claim arose on 23.04.2000 when fire accident took place in the premises
      of the respondent. In respect of the claim, the appellant insurance
      company offered a sum of Rs.7,98,019/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Ninety-
      Eight Thousand Nineteen only) to the respondent on 06.12.2000. The
      respondent having refused to accept the same, a meeting was thereafter
D     convened on 20.09.2001 wherein Vijaya Bank at whose instance the
      policy was issued was also present. In the said meeting, the appellant
      insurance company revised the offer to pay the respondent a sum of
      Rs.33,80,925/- (Rupees Thirty-Three Lakhs Eighty Thousand Nine
      Hundred Twenty-Five only). The said sum was also not acceptable to
E     the respondent but a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs
      only) was paid to the respondent through Vijaya Bank. The respondent
      therefore being aggrieved that the claim for insurance reimbursement
      was not satisfied, had approached the National Consumer Disputes
      Redressal Commission, New Delhi (“NCDRC” for short) by filing OP
      No. 146 of 2002. The said complaint came to be dismissed on the ground
F     that the claim involves complicated questions of law and the Civil Court
      would have jurisdiction to decide the matter.
             2. The matter was, however, ultimately referred to arbitration by
      an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators. In the arbitral
      proceedings, an award dated 28.06.2004 was passed, whereunder two
G     out of three arbitrators awarded the sum of Rs.44,90,000/- (Rupees Forty-
      Four Lakh Ninety Thousand only) with interest at 18% per annum also
      the costs as indicated therein. Since, a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- had already
      been paid by the appellant on 20.09.2001, the award constituted the
      entire sum of Rs. 70,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Lakhs only) for which it
      was insured. The third learned arbitrator, however, dissented from the
H
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                                233
    ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

majority award and held that the sum of Rs. 33,80,925/- offered by the          A
appellant insurance company was fair and proper. Subsequent thereto
the appellant herein filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act, 1996” for short) seeking for clarification
relating to the award dated 28.06.2004 and also with regard to the venue
of arbitration as indicated in the award. The said application filed under
                                                                                B
Section 33 of the Act was dismissed through the order dated 17.12.2004.
Pursuant thereto the appellant insurance company, in order to assail the
award dated 28.06.2004 and the order dated 17.12.2004 filed the petition
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 on 24.02.2005. Since, the award indicated
that the same was passed at Jaipur and the third learned arbitrator in his
order had declared the venue of the arbitral tribunal to be at Jaipur, the      C
appellant insurance company filed the petition on 24.02.2005 before the
learned District Judge, Jaipur.
       3. The respondent on appearing in the said proceedings had
objected to the proceedings being held at Jaipur, since according to the
respondent the entire cause of action had arisen at Jodhpur. The learned        D
District Judge at Jaipur on considering the rival contentions had through
the order dated 12.03.2008 held the petition as not maintainable before
that Court but exercised the power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10 A of
the Civil Procedure Code and returned the petition to the appellant
insurance company and directed that the parties shall be present before
the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, on 02.04.2008 for presentation of          E
the petition therein and proceed with the matter. The appellant insurance
company however presented the petition before the learned District
Judge, Jodhpur, only on 10.04.2008, instead of the specified date of
02.04.2008. In that circumstance, the respondent herein filed an
application under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, before the learned           F
District Judge, Jodhpur, in the re-presented petition under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 which was numbered as arbitration application number
18-A of 2008. Through the said application the respondent had sought
rejection of the petition on the ground of the limitation.
      4. At this stage, the appellant insurance company filed an                G
application dated 03.05.2008 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
seeking that the time spent in the proceedings before the learned District
Judge, Jaipur, be excluded and the petition be entertained on its merits.
The respondent herein opposed the said application. The learned District
Judge, Jodhpur, through the order dated 15.07.2008 had considered the
                                                                                H
234             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     applications under Section 14 and 3 of the Limitation Act and dismissed
      the application filed by the appellant insurance company under Section
      14 of the Limitation Act and allowed the application filed by the respondent
      herein under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the petition
      filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was dismissed. The appellant
      insurance company therefore claiming to be aggrieved filed the appeal
B
      under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 before the High Court of judicature
      for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. The High Court after taking note of the order
      passed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, while disposing of the
      application under Section 3 & 14 of the Limitation Act has dismissed the
      appeal through the order dated 06.02.2009. The appellant insurance
C     company therefore claiming to be aggrieved by the said order dated
      06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in SP (C) Misc. Appeal No. 1103/
      2008 is before this Court in this appeal.
            5. We have heard Dr. Meera Aggarwal, learned advocate for the
      appellant, Mr. Puneet Jain, learned advocate for the respondent and
D     perused the appeal papers.
              6. As noted in the sequence of events that flowed from the point
      the policy was issued on 01.12.1999 and a claim relating to the same
      being made in view of the fire accident, the dispute essentially is with
      regard to the quantum of compensation which had led to the dispute
E     between the parties. The present proceeding has however arisen in the
      background of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 being
      dismissed on the ground of limitation. In that circumstance, though the
      appellant had also filed the appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 and
      had raised the contentions with regard to correctness or otherwise of
      the award dated 28.06.2004 and the order dated 17.12.2004 on the
F     application under Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the merits of the rival
      contentions relating to the claim would not arise for consideration at this
      stage. This is for the reason that in the proceedings under Section 34 of
      the Act, which is the remedy available to assail the award, the contentions
      on merits of the claim relating to the insurance policy has not been gone
G     into to consider the correctness or otherwise of the arbitral award and
      the proceedings has been concluded on the ground of limitation.
      Consequently, in the appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 also
      it is on examination of that aspect the appeal has been dismissed. In that
      view, the limited consideration to be made in this appeal is to determine
      whether the dismissal of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
H
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                                  235
    ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

on the ground of limitation is justified. In that regard, if the conclusion to    A
be reached by us is to the effect that in the present circumstance the
petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 was to be considered on merits,
the matter would thereafter have to be gone into on merits before the
learned District Judge, Jodhpur, to advert to the merits limited to the
consideration permissible under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
                                                                                  B
        7. While taking note of these aspects the fact that the award was
initially passed on 28.06.2004 and the third learned arbitrator disposed of
the application under Section 33 of the Act, 1996 on 07.12.2004 is the
position which emerges from the record. In that view, the petition filed
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 before the learned District Judge,
Jaipur, on 24.02.2005 is within the time frame as stipulated under Section        C
34 (3) of the Act, 1996. The position is also that the learned District
Judge, Jaipur, returned the original application through the order dated
12.03.2008 permitting the appellant to present it before the learned District
Judge, Jodhpur, on 02.04.2008. If the petition was presented on the said
date in terms of the order the need for consideration on delay would not          D
have arisen. However, as noticed the appellant insurance company re-
presented the petition before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur only on
10.04.2008. In view of the application filed by the respondent under
Section 3 of the Limitation Act seeking dismissal in that context, the
appellant herein filed the application under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. The issue that would therefore arise is as to whether the presentation       E
of the petition before the learned Judge, Jodhpur, should be considered
as a fresh petition and the explanation for the entire period from the
original limitation period i.e., from the date of the award is to be considered
for the purpose of condonation of delay for prosecuting in an alternate
jurisdiction, while considering the application under Section 14 of the           F
Act or in the present circumstance since the earlier Court had exercised
the power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the Civil Procedure Code,
the consideration should be for the delay condonation between the period
02.04.2008 to 10.04.2008 merely being the delay in re-presentation.
        8. The learned counsel for respondent in that regard has contended        G
that when a plaint is returned under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC to be filed
before the Court having jurisdiction and in that circumstance when the
plaint is presented in the Court having jurisdiction the petition can be
deemed to be instituted in the proper Court as a fresh petition when the
plaint is presented in such Court. To buttress such contention, the learned
                                                                                  H
236             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     counsel has relied on the decision in the case of Shri Amar Chand
      Inami vs. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 115 with reference to para 9
      thereof. We have carefully perused the said decision in the background
      of the said contention. Though such decision was rendered in the facts
      arising therein and the decision was rendered on 13.10.1972 in the context
      of the provision contained in Order 7 Rule 10 CPC as it existed, it is to
B
      be noted that amendment was made on 01.02.1977 whereunder Rule
      10A was substituted under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC. A perusal of the
      same will indicate that after amendment the matter is not left in a limbo
      after the plaint is returned in terms of Rule 10(2) which existed earlier.
      Presently through Rule 10A to Order 7 of CPC on an application being
C     made a date is to be specified for its presentation so as to enable the
      appearance before the Court in which it would be re-presented.
      Therefore, the re-presentation of the petition in the Court which is indicated
      in the order for return cannot be considered as a fresh filing in all
      circumstances when, it is returned to the plaintiff for such re-
      representation. This Court in the case of Joginder Tuli vs. S.L. Bhatia
D
      and another (1997) 1 SCC 502 has held that normally, when the plaint
      is directed to be returned for presentation to the proper court perhaps it
      has to start from the beginning but in the cited case, since the evidence
      was already adduced by the parties, the matter was tried accordingly.
      The High Court had in that case directed to proceed from the stage at
E     which the suit stood transferred and this Court did not find any illegality
      in such order passed by High Court to treat the same as a continuation
      of the proceedings.
             9. In the instant case though the appellant herein had not filed the
      application indicating the Court to which the petition would be re-
F     presented and did not seek for fixing the date of hearing, the Court at
      Jaipur while ordering return of the petition after consideration of the
      application of the respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had indicated
      the Court to which it was to be presented and the date for appearance
      on 02.04.2008 for that purpose. Hence, it is not as if the proceeding
      came to an abrupt end when the petition was returned so as to consider
G     the next filing as a fresh petition. In that circumstance when the time
      had been granted and date was fixed by the learned District Judge at
      Jaipur and if for any reason the re-presentation was not possible on that
      date, the course open to the appellant was to file an application under
      Section 148 of CPC before the Court at Jaipur which ordered for return
H     and fixed the time for presentation in the Court at Jodhpur, seeking
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                                 237
    ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

extension of time granted earlier. However, since the same was not               A
resorted to by the appellant and the petition was re-presented before the
District Court at Jodhpur with a delay of about 8 days from the date
fixed for presentation and as no extension was also sought as indicated
above, condonation of such delay ought to have been sought. Since the
petition was filed with delay and no other application had accompanied
                                                                                 B
the petition, the respondent filed the application under Section 3 of
Limitation Act which prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant in
filing the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Though the
said application has invoked Section 14 of Limitation Act and thereafter
supported by an additional affidavit, the averments in the application is in
the nature of an application seeking condonation of delay in re-presentation     C
of the petition as against the date fixed by the Court for presentation in
Jodhpur.
       10. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision
in the case of S. Ganesharaju (dead) through LRs. and Anr. vs.
Narsamma (dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 341 to                       D
contend that the expression “sufficient cause” as contemplated under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice and the delay should be condoned unless
the opposite party is able to show malafide in not approaching the Court
within time. It is further contended that it is held therein that the rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. The       E
learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would contend that
the said decision rendered is in the context of consideration of “sufficient
cause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which
would not be applicable to proceedings under Section 34 of the Act,
1996. In that regard, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied          F
on the decision in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction
Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein it is held that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award. Further the decision in
the case of Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 2
SCC 455 is also relied upon to contend that Section 5 of the Limitation          G
Act has no application to a petition challenging the arbitral award under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The said decision would however indicate
that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application
submitted under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 seeking for exclusion of
certain period if the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is at        H
238             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     the first instance filed within the limitation period provided under Section
      34(3) of the Act, 1996. The position of law that Section 5 of the Limitation
      Act is not applicable to condone the statutory period under Section 34(3)
      of Act, 1996 is well established and needs no reiteration.
             11. Having noticed the said decisions, in the instant case as already
B     indicated above the condonation of delay sought is not for filing the petition
      under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for the first time. The petition filed
      under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 at Jaipur was within the period of
      limitation and the delay regarding which explanation is put forth is for
      the period of 8 days in re-presenting the petition beyond the date fixed
      after it was returned under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure
C     Code. Therefore, in that circumstance even if the term “sufficient cause”
      as contained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken note, in the
      present facts the same is not with reference to petition under Section 34
      of Act, 1996 for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed under
      Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996. Though that be the position what is
D     necessary to be taken note herein is that the application filed for excluding
      the time is under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In addition to the very
      decisions cited above indicating that Section 14 of the Limitation Act
      would be applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act,
      1996 subject to the petition under Section 34 being filed within time, the
      learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in the
E     case of M/s Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. The Principal
      Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169 wherein
      the same position is reiterated.
             12. The learned counsel for the respondent would however, refer
      to the very same decision and contend that even if Section 14 of the
F     Limitation Act is applicable, the exclusion of time can only be of the
      proceedings which is bonafide initiated in a Court without jurisdiction. It
      is contended that in the instant case the entire cause of action had
      occurred at Jodhpur and despite the same the appellant had deliberately
      initiated the proceedings at Jaipur which cannot be considered as a
G     bonafide mistake. Though such contention is put forth, what cannot be
      lost sight in the instant facts is that the learned Judge of the Additional
      District Court, Jaipur while considering the maintainability of the
      proceedings before that Court, through the order dated 12.03.2008 has
      taken note of the very rival contentions with regard to the cause of
      action as contended and also the Court before which the proceedings
H
     ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. M/S TEJPARAS                             239
    ASSOCIATES EXPORTS PVT. LTD. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

was required to be initiated. Though at this point of time the position of   A
law has been enunciated through several decisions, and there is clarity,
at that juncture the consideration with regard to the definition of Court
as contained in the Act was required to be interpreted and on taking note
of various decision of the Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusion
that keeping in view the fact situation the petition is to be returned for
                                                                             B
presentation in the appropriate Court. The very nature of consideration
made by the Court at Jaipur would indicate that the matter required a
detail consideration before exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 10
and 10A of the Civil Procedure Code and the Court during the said
proceedings has not arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings had
been initiated malafide before that Court. However, keeping in view the      C
overall facts and circumstance of the present case the Court had ordered
return of the petition for appropriate presentation and the date had been
fixed. The correctness of the said order had not been assailed by the
respondent herein seeking absolute rejection of the petition by raising
grounds on the nature of findings rendered therein since that Court had
                                                                             D
not held the petition to be malafide.
        13. In such circumstance, in the fact situation wherein the issue
of delay had arisen only in the context of the delay of 8 days in re-
presentation as permitted by the Court at Jaipur, re-examination of the
matter to consider the entire period spent before the Court at Jaipur as
malafide so as to nonsuit the appellant and deny consideration of            E
proceedings under Section 34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated within
the period of limitation at the first instance, on its merits will not be
justified.
        14. In that view, the order dated 15.07.2008 passed on the
application filed under Section 14 and Section 3 of the Limitation Act       F
passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur
and the order dated 06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in S.B. (Civil)
Misc. Appeal No.1103/2008 are not sustainable. They are accordingly,
set aside. Consequently, the proceedings in Arbitration Application No.18-
A of 2008 is restored to the file of the Additional District Judge S.No.3,   G
Jodhpur.
       15. The parties shall appear before the said Court on 15.10.2019
as the first date for appearance without issue of notice/summons from
that Court. The proceedings thereto shall be considered on merits in an
expeditious manner. All contentions in that regard are left open.            H
240              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           16. The appeal is, accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
      All pending applications shall stand disposed of.



      Devika Gujral                                             Appeal allowed.
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