ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR.versusR.K. UPPAL

                        [2011] 10 S.C.R. 218


A           ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR.
                                  v.
                             R.K. UPPAL
                   (Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2007)
                         AUGUST 11, 2011
B
              [AFTAB ALAM AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.)

        Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees
   (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1982: Regulation 17 -
C Dismissal from service for misconduct - Appeal by -
   delinquent ulregulation 17 for assailing dismissal order and
   for grant of personal hearing - Appellate authority rejecting
   the request for personal hearing and dismissing appeal -
   Justification of - Held: Regulation 17 affords to an employee
D right of appeal - The said provision does not expressly
 · provide for personal hearing to the delinquent - In the
   absence of personal hearing to the delinquent, it cannot b-u
   said that the very right of appeal is defeated ..., In the instant
   case, appellate authority addressed the points raised in the
E appeal and critical to the decision and held that on
   consideration of the inquiry record and facts and
   circumstances of the case, the findings and the order passed
   by disciplinary authority were based on evidence brought on
   record of inquiry and not founded on past record or any other
F matter not connected with inquiry as alleged by the delinquent ·
   in the appeal - The order of the appellate authority cannot
   be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons - Service law -
   Judgment/Order - Natural justice.

        Administrative law: Principle of natural justice -
G Applicability of - Held: The requirements of natural justice
   must depend on the circumstances of the. case, the nature of
   the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the
   subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth - Natural
  justice.
H                             ' 218
  ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. F.K.                  219
                   UPPAL
    Appeal: Right of appeal - Held: Is not an inherent right       A
- None of the facets of natural justice requires that there
should be right of appeal from any decision - Natural justice.

     Judgment/Order: By the appellate authority - Held: The
appellate authority must record reasons in support of its order    8
to indicate that it has applied its mind to the grounds raised
but it is not the requirement of law that an order of affirmance
by the appellate authority must be elaborate and extensive -
Appeal.

     The inquiring authority found the respondent guilty           C
of misconduct. The disciplinary authority concurred with
the findings of the inquiring authority and keeping in view
the seriousness of charges and gravity of the proved
conduct, it imposed the penalty of dismissal. The
respondent preferred an appeal under regulation 17 of              D
the Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1982 assailing his
dismissal order on diverse grounds and also requested
for grant of personal hearing. The appellate authority
rejected the respondent's request for personal hearing             E
and dismissed his appeal. The respondent filed a writ
petition before the High Court. The High Court allowed
the delinquent's writ petition partly and set aside the
order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter
back to it with a direction to pass a reasoned order after         F
giving an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. The
instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the High
Court.

     Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                   G
      HELD: 1. It is now fairly well settled that the
·requirements of natural justice must depend on the
 circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the
 rules under which~the Tribunal is acting, the subject
 matter that is being dealt with and so forth. The                 H
    220     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (2011] 10 S.C.R


A. application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of
   jurisdiction conferred on 'the administrative authority,.
   upon the character of the rights of the persons affected,
   the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant
   circumstances disclosed in the particular case. (Para 18)
B (234-B-D]

        Union of India & Anr. v. P.K. Roy & Ors. AIR 1968 SC
    850: 1968 SCR 186 - relied on.

         2. A right of appeal is not an inherent right. None of
C   the facets of natural justice requires that there should be
    right of appeal from any decision. The extent of power of
    an appellate forum and the mode and manner of its
    exercise can always be provided in the provision that
    creates such right. Insofar as provision of appeal in
D   regulation 17 of the Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer
    Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1982 is
    concerned, it must be stated that the said provision
    affords to an employee right of appeal against an order
    imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in
E   regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred
    to in regulation 12. It provides for limitation within which
    the appeal is to be preferred. As per the said provision,
    the appeal must be addressed to the appellate authority
    and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed
F   against. The authority whose order is appealed against
    is required to forward the appeal together with its
    comments and also the record of the case to the appellate
    authority. The appellate authority then proceeds with the
    consideration of the appeal and considers whether the
G   findings are justified; whether the penalty is excessive or
    inadequate and passes appropriate order confirming,
    enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or
    remitting the case to the authority that imposed the
    penalty or to any other authority with such direction as
    it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The
H
    ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. 1 R.K.                 221
                     UPPAL

   appeal provision in regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations A
 . does not expressly provide for personal hearing to the
   appellant. In the absence of personal hearing to the
   appellant, it cannot be said that the very right of appeal
 · is defeated. One situation is, however, different. Where
   the appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty, B
   obviously, the appellate authority must issue notice to the
   delinquent asking him to show cause why penalty that
   has been awarded to him must not be enhanced and give
   him personal hearing. I\ is so because the appellate
   authority seeks to inflict such punishment for the first c
   time which was not given by the disciplinary/punishing ·
   authority. Although ther'e are no positive words in
   regulation 17, requiring that the appellant shall be heard
   before enhancement of the penalty, the fairness and
   natural justice require him b> be heard. However, personal 0
   hearing may not be required where the appellate
   authority, on consideration of the entire material placed
   before it, confirms, reduces or sets aside the order
   appealed against. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations
   does not require that in all situations personal hearing
   must be afforded to the delinquent by the appellate E
   authority. [Paras 19, 21] [234-E-H; 235-A-E; 236-B-C]

       State Bank of Patiala v. Mahendra Kumar Singhal (1994)
  Supp (2) SCC 463; Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank
  of India and Anr. (2005) 1 sec 13: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 101          F
  - relied on.

       Ram Niwas Bansal v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr. (1998)
  4 SLR 711 - referred to.

        3. The order of the appellate authority cannot be             G
    labelled as a non-speaking order. The order does not
· . suffer from the vice of non-application of mind. The
    appellate authority has addressed the points raised in the
    appeal and critical to the decision, albeit briefly. It is true
    that the appellate authority must record reasons in               H
    222     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 10 S.C.R.


A. support of its order to indicate that it has applied its mind .
   to the grounds raised but it is not the requirement of law
   that an order of affirmance by the appellate authority
   must be elaborate and extensive. Brief reasons which
   indicate due application of mind in decision making
B process may suffice. Each ground raised in the appeal
   has been dealt with briefly. The appellate authority held
   that on consideration of the inquiry record and facts and
   circumstances of the case, the findings and the order
   passed by disciplinary authority are based on evidence
c brought on record of inquiry and not founded on past
   record or any other matter not connected with inquiry as
   alleged by the delinquent in the appeal. Consequently,
   the appellate authority concurred with the view of the
   disciplinary authority and found no justffication to
   interfere with the penalty awarded by the disciplinary
0
   authority. The order of the appellate authority, by no
   stretch of imagination can be said to suffer from vice of
   lack of reasons. The High Court was clearly in error in
   setting aside and quashing the order passed by the
E appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority
   to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of
   hearing to the respondent. [Paras 22-24] [236-D-G; 239-
   E-H; 240-A]

       Ram Chander v. Union of India & Ors. (1986) 3 SCC
F 103: 1986 (2) SCR 980; Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus
  Sales Corporation (1996) 4 SCC 69: 1996 (3) SCR 894;
  Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B.
  Karunakar and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR
  576; Y. Malleswara Rao v. Chief General Manager, State
G Bank of India, Hyderabad & Ors. 2006 LAB. l.C. 1384 -
  referred to.
                         Case Law Reference:
      (1998) 4 SLR 711           referred to       Para 10, 11,
H                                                  17, 21
   ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                   223
                    UP PAL
  1986 (2) SCR 980              referred to        Para 10, 12,      A
                                                   15
  (1994) Supp (2) sec 463 relied on               Para 12
  1996 (3) SCR 894              referred to       Para 13,14,17
                                                                     B
  2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 101 relied on               Para 15, 20
  1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576 referred to             Para 15, 16,
                                                  17, 21
  2006 LAB. l.C. 1384           referred to       Para 17
                                                                     c
  1968 SCR 186                  relied on         Para 18

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 128
of 2007.                                                             D
    From the Judgment & Order 23.01.2006 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No.
19115 of 2004.

     K.N. Bhatt, Rajat Arora (for Rajiv Nanda) for the Appellants.   E

     Ram Lal Roy (for RN. Keshwani) for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Two questions presented for                 F
. consideration in this appeal by special leave, at the instance
  of the appellants-Oriental Bank of Commerce and its General
  Manager - are: (one) whether in terms of regulation 17 of
  Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Discipline and
  Appeal) Regulations, 1982 (for short, 'the 1982 Regulations'),     G
  the appellate authority is required to accord personal hearing
  to the respondent in a departmental appeal; and (two) whether
  the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the appellate authority
  in the appeal preferred by the respondent under regulation 17
 suffers from infirmity for want of reasons.
                                                                     H
    224     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A        2. The brief facts leading to the above questions are these
  : the respondent-R.K. Uppal (hereinafter referred to as
  'delinquent') faced departmental inquiry under regulation 6 of
  the 1982 Regulations for acts of omission and commission
  committed by him while working as Senior Manager/Incumbent
B In-charge at 19-D, Chandigarh Branch. The article of charges
  served on the delinquent contained four charges, namely : (I)
  between the period September 14, 1999 to December 20,
  1999, while recommending sanction of credit facilities and
  further enhancements in the account of Mis. Dunroll Industries
c Limited, the delinquent failed to ensure that the proposal has
  been properly appraised/processed and all the relevant
  information has been recorded in the process note; (II) the
  delinquent recommended release of working capital facilities
  aggregating to Rs. 64 lac in the account of M/s. Dunroll
D Industries Limited for the unit located at Sikandarabad (UP) at
  a distance of approximately 300 k.m. from the branch although
  the monitoring of unit at such a distant place was not possible;
  (Ill) the delinquent recommended enhancement of Rs. 175 lac
  in the Bank Guarantee limit on N.:ivember 17, 2000 in the
  account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited without ensuring
E satisfactory conduct of the account and without going into the
  details of the transactions and implications thereof and (IV) the
  delinquent released credit facilities in the account of M/s.
  Dunroll Industries Limited without complying with the terms of
  sanction.
F
         3. On March 17, 2003, Shri M.K. Ghosh, Commissioner
  for Departmental Inquiries, Central Vigilance Commission, was
  appointed inquiring authority to inquire into the above charges
  levelled against the delinquent.
G
        4. The delinquent submitted his reply and denied the
    charges. The inquiring authority after recording the evidence
    submitted its report on November 11, 2003. Charge I and
    Charge II were held to be partly proved while Charge Ill and
    Charge IV were held to be proved.
H
   ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                    225
             UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
      5. The findings and report ofthe inquiring authority were        A
· sent to the delinquent who in response submitted his
  representation on December 15, 2003. The disciplinary
  authority concurred with the findings of the inquiring authority
  and keeping in view the seriousness of charges and gravity of
  the proved conduct, it imposed the penalty of dismissal vide         B
  order dated February 14, 2004.

      6. The delinquent preferred appeal under regulation 17 of
 the 1982 Regulations assailing his dismissal order on diverse
 grounds and also requested for grant of personal hearing. The         C
 appellate authority rejected the delinquent's request for personal
 hearing and dismissed his appeal vide its order dated June 4,
 2004.

       7. The delinquent challenged the order of penalty dated
 February 14, 2004 and also the order of the appellate authority       D
 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Division
 Bench of that Court vide its order dated January 23, 2006
 allowed the delinquent's writ petition partly and set aside the
 order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter back
 to it with a direction to pass a reasoned order after giving an       E
 opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is this order which is
 impugned in the present appeal.

     8. We have heard Mr. K.N. Bhatt, senior counsel for the
 appellants and Mr. Ram Lal Roy, counsel for the respondent.
                                                                       F
 Re : Question (one}

       9.    Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations reads as
             follows:-
                                                                       G
      "17. Appeals :

       (i)   An officer employee may appeal against an order
             imposing upon him any of the penalties specified
             in regulation 4 or against the order of suspension
             referred to in regulation 12. The appeal shall lie to     H
    226           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A                  the Appellate Authority.

           (ii)     An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from
                    the date of receipt of the order appealed against.
                    The appeal shall be addressed to the. Appellate
                    Authority and submitted to the authority whose order
B
                    is appealed against. The authority whose order is
                    appealed against shall forward the appeal together
                    with its comments and the records· of the case to
                    the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall
                    consider whether the findings are justified or
c                   whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and
                    pass appropriate orders. The Appellate Authority
                    may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing
                    or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to
                    the authority which imposed the penalty or to any
D                  ·other authority with such direction· as it may deem
                    fit in the circumstances of the case .... ."
       10. The High Court has taken a view that regulation 17 of
  the 1982 Regulations impliedly requires that a delinquent who
E has preferred appeal is afforded an opportunity of personal
  hearing by the appellate authority~ While taking such view, the
  High Court relied on a decision of this Court in Ram Chander
  v. Union of India & Ors. 1 and a Full Bench decision of that
  Court in Ram Niwas Bansal v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr. 2 •
F
      11. We shall refer to the above two decisions first. In Ram
  Chander's case1 before this Court, the appellant who was
  employed as Shunter, Grade 'B' in the Railways was removed
  from service after holding disciplinary inquiry wherein his guilt
  of misconduct was held to be proved. The inquiry officer
G proceeded ex-parte against the delinquent as he did not
  appear and recorded a finding that misconduct was proved.
  The disciplinary authority (General Manager) concurred with the

    1.   (1986)3 sec 103.
H   ~-- (1_998) (4)~LR 711.
   ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                     227
             UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
  view of the inquiry officer; formed a provisional view that penalty   A
  of removal should be imposed on him and issued a show cause
  notice to the delinquent in this regard. This time, the delinquent
  did respond to the show cause notice and submitted his
  explanation. The disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the
  delinquent's response and imposed the penalty of removal. The         B
  delinquent preferred a departmental appeal before the Railway
  Board under the relevant Rules. His appeal was dismissed by
  the appellate authority. The delinquent then challenged the
  orders of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority before
  the High Court in a writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed    c
. and so also the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by him. The
  matter then reached this Court in an appeal by special leave.
  Inter alia, the contention of the delinquent before this Court was
  that it was incumbent upon the appellate authority to afford him
  personal hearing before his appeal was decided. Construing
                                                                        0
  the relevant Rules, namely, Rule 18(ii) of the Railway Servants
·(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Rule 22(2) of the said
  Rules, this Court held (at pages 117-118) as under :

      "25 ........... Such being the legal position, it is of utmost
      importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as                    E
      interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC
      398] case that the appellate authority must not only give a
      hearing to the government servant concerned but also
      pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised
      by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned          F
      decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the
      present case, will promote public confidence in the
      administrative process. An objective consideration is
      possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given
      a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders      G
      that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair
      play and justice also require that such a personal hearing
      should be given.

      26. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed.
                                                                        H
    228       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 10 S.C.R.


          The judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the
          Delhi High Court dated August 16, 1983 and that of the
          Division Bench dismissing the letters patent appeal filed
          by the appellant in limine by its order dated February 15,
          1984 are both set aside, so also the. impugned order of
B         the Railway Board dated March 11, 1972. We direct the ·
          Railway Board to hear and dispose of the appeal after
          affording a personal hearing to the appellant on merits by
          a reasoned order in conformity with the requirements of
          Rule 22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
c         Rules, 1968, as expeditiously as possible, and in any
          event, not later than four months from today."

  In our opinion, in Ram Chander's case1, this Court has not laid
  down as an absolute proposition that in matters of
  departmental appeal against the punishment order of a
D disciplinary authority, the appellate authority must invariably
  afford personal hearing to a delinquent.

       12. Insofar as, Punjab and Haryana High Court is
  concerned, it is true that in Ram Niwas BansaP while dealing
E with a similar regulation, i.e. regulation 70 of the State Bank of
  Patiala (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979, the Full Bench of
  that Court has read into such rule a provision of right of personal
  hearing to a delinquent but we find it difficult to approve that
  view. As a matter of fact, the judgment of this Court in the case
F of State Bank of Patia/a Vs. Mahendra Kumar Singha/3 was
  not brought to the notice of that Court nor that judgment was
  adverted to which lays down in clear terms that the rule of
  natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a right
  of audience at appellate stage. This is what this Court said (at
G page 464) in Mahendra Kumar Singha/3 :

          "2. Heard counsel on both sides. The respondent was
          visited with the punishment of dismissal from service. He
          filed a departmental appeal which came to be dismissed,

H   3.   (1994) Supp (2) sec 463.
     ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                   229
               UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     ·.whereupon he moved the High Court by way of a writ               A
       petition. The High Court quashed the order of the appellate
       authority on the ground that no personal hearing was given
       before the appeal was dismissed. The matter was,
       therefore, remitted to the appellate authority to dispose of
       the appeal after hearing the delinquent personally. It is        B
       against the said order that the present appeal is filed.

        3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires
        the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule
        of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer     C
        a right of audience at the appellate stage. That iswhat this
        Court observed in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs,
        Calcutta [1957 SCR 1151 =AIR 1957 SC 648]. We,
        therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our
        attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder
        Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi            D
        [(1978) 1 sec 405] wherein observation is made in regard
      · to the right of hearing. But that was not a case of a
        departmental inquiry, it was one emanating from Article
        324 of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, those
        observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case."      E
     13. In Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus Sa/es Corporation4,
this Court was concerned with an appeal that was filed against
the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court holding
that an oral hearing has to be given by appellate authority             F
before taking a decision under 3rd proviso to sub-section (1)
of Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947.
The Court noticed Section 4-M of that Act and in paragraph 3
at page 73 of the Report framed the question as to whether
the requirement of hearing to the appellants has to be read as          G
an implicit condition while construing the scope of 3rd proviso
tO sub-section (1) of Section 4-M. This Court held (at pages
74-75) as under:


4.    (1996) 4 sec 69.                                                  H
    230       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A         "5. The High Court has primarily considered the question
          as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to
          be heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit
          of the penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the
          principles of natural justice. In that connection, several
B         judgments of this Court have been referred to. It need not
          be pointed out that under different situations and
          conditions the requirement of compliance of the principle
          of natural justice vary. The courts cannot insist that under
          all circumstances and under different statutory provisions
c         personal hearings have to be afforded to the persons
          concerned. If this principle of affording personal hearing
          is extended whenever statutory authorities are vested with
          the power to exercise discretion in connection with
          statutory appeals, it shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many
          statutory appeals and applications are disposed of by the
D
          competent authorities who have been vested with powers
          to dispose of the same. Such authorities which shall be
          deemed to be quasi-judicial authorities are expected to
          apply their judicial mind over the grievances made by the
          appellants or applicants concerned, but it cannot be held
E         that before dismissing such appeals or applications in all
          events the quasi-judicial authorities must hear the
          appellants or the applicants, as the case may be. When
          principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be
          heard before an adverse order is passed on any appeal
F         or application, it does not in all circumstances mean a
          personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by
          affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present
          his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is
          expected to apply his judicial mind to the issues involved.
G         Of course, if in his own discretion if he requires the
          appellant or the applicant to be heard because of special
          facts and circumstances of the case, then certainly it is
          always open to such authority to decide the appeal or the
          application only after affording a personal hearing. But any
H         order passed after taking into consideration the points
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                      231
          UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
  raised in the appeal or the application shall not be held to        A
  be invalid merely on the ground that no personal hearing
  had been afforded. This is all the more important in the
  context of taxation and revenue matters. When an authority
  has determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty,
  then the requirement that before the appeal is heard such           B
  tax or penalty should be deposited cannot b.e held to be
  unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case
  of Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1993)
  1 SCC 22] it has been held by this Court that such
  requirement cannot be held to be harsh or violative of              c
  Article 14 of the Constitution so as to declare the
  requirement of pre-deposit itself as unconstitutional. In this
  background, it can be said that normal rule is that before
  filing the appeal or before the appeal is heard, the person
  concerned should deposit the amount which he has been               0
  directed to deposit as a tax or penalty. The non-deposit
  of such amount itself is an exception which has been
  incorporated in different statutes including the one with
  which We are concerned. Second proviso to sub-section
  (1) of Section 4-M says in clear and unambiguous words              E
  that an appeal against an order imposing a penalty shall
  not be entertained unless the amount of the penalty has
  been deposited by the appellant. Thereafter the third
  proviso vests a discretion in such appellate authority to
  dispense with such deposit unconditionally or subject to
  such conditions as it may impose in its discretion taking           F
  into consideration the undue hardship which it is likely to
  cause to the appellant. As such it can be said that the
  statutory requirement is that before an appeal is
  entertained, the amount of penalty has to be deposited by
  the appellant; an order dispensing with such deposit shall          G
  amount to an exception to the said requirement of deposit.
  In this background, it is difficult to hold that if the appellate
  authority has rejected the prayer of the appellant to
  dispense with the depositunconditionally or has dispensed
  with such deposit subject to some conditions without                H
    232       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A         hearing the appellant, on perusal of the petition filed on
          behalf of the appellant for the said purpose, the order itself
          is vitiated and is liable· to be quashed being violative of
          the principles of natural justice.

        14. Thus, in Jesus Sa/es Corporation4 , it was held by this
8
    Court that under the relevant rule, it was not obligatory upon the
    appellate authority to hear the appellant.

          15. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India
    and Anr. 5 , the appellate authority proposed to enhance the
C   penalty imposed upon the delinquent by the punishing authority.
    The disciplinary authority recommended to the punishing
    authority the punishment of reduction in substantive salary at
    one stage. The punishing authority accepted the
    recommendation of the disciplinary authority and imposed the
D   punishment accordingly. The appellate authority proposed to
    enhance the penalty to an order of removal. In this context, inter
    alia, one of the contentions raised before this Court was that
    the order of removal from service could not be sustained as
    no personal hearing was given to the delinquent before the
E   enhancement of punishment even though personal interview
    was specifically asked for. The Court noticed various judgments
    of this Court including the Constitution Bench judgment in
    Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. 8.
    Karunakar and Ors. 6 and also the judgment of the Punjab and
F   Haryana High Court in Ram Niwas Bansal2. In paragraph 31
    at page 29 of the Report, it was held that the approach and
    test adopted in 8. Karunakar6 should govern all cases where
    the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no notice and
    no opportunity but one of not affording the proper hearing that
G   is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or
    requirement governing that inquiry. We have not been able to
    discern anything in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur6 that lays down
    that the appellate authority must, in all cases of departmental

    5.   c2005) 1 sec 13.
H e.     (1993) 4 sec 727
     ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                 233
               UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
appeal, afford personal hearing to the delinquent.                    A

      16. Be it noted that the principal question for consideration
in 8. Karunakar8 was whether the report of the inquiry officer/
authority who/which is appoihted by the disciplinary authority to
hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent               8
employee is required to be furnished to the employee to enable
him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority
before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to
guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any,
to be awarded to him. While dealing with this question and its
diverse facets, the Court exhaustively considered the principles      C
of natural justice in the context of furnishing the report of the
inquiry officer/authority to the delinquent employee. 8.
Karunakar8 does not deal with the question of necessity of
affording a personal hearing to a delinquent by the·appellate
authority.                                                            D

     17. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for the
appellants cited a Single Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Y. Ma/leswara Rao v. Chief General Manager,
State Bank of India, Hyderabad & Ors. 7 • In that case the            E
delinquent was visited with the penalty of removal from service.
The concerned delinquent preferred appeal before the appellate
authority and one of the contentions raised before the High
Court was that the appellate authority failed to afford a personal
hearing to the delinquent and, therefore, the order of the            F
appellate authority suffered from transgression of an essential
principle of natural justice. The Single Judge of the High Court
referred to decisions of this Court in Mahendra Kumar
Singha/3, Jesus Sales Corporation" and Ganesh Santa Ram
Sirur° and also the decision of Full Bench of Punjab and              G
Haryana High Court in Ram Niwas BansaP.. The Single Judge
also referred to few decisions of other High Courts and followed
the proposition propounded by this Court in Mahendra Kumar
Singha/3 viz; that in the absence of the specific requirement by
7.    2006 LAB l.C. 1384.                                             H
    234       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2011] 10 S.C.R.


A   the relevant rules, there is no right to a personal hearing at the
    appellate stage and the rules of natural justice do not require
    that in all cases a right of audience should be provided at the
    appellate stage.
                                               !   >




B       18. It is now fairly well settled that the requirements of
  natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case,
  the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is
  acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth.
  In the words of Ramaswami, J. (Union of India & Anr. v. P.K.
  Roy & Ors. 8) the extent and application of the doctrine of natural
C justice cannot be imprisoned within the straitjacket of a rigid
  formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the
  nature of jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority,
  upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the
  scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant
D circumstances disclosed in the particular case.

        19. A right of appeal is not an inherent right. None of the .
  facets of natural justice requires that there should be right of
  appeal from any decision. The extent of power of an appellate
E forum and the mode and manner of its exercise can always be
  provided in the provision that creates such right. Insofar as
  provision of appeal in regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations is
  concerned, it must be stated that the said provision affords to
  an employee right of appeal against an order imposing upon
F him any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 or against the
  order of suspension referred to in regulation 12. It provides for
  limitation within which the appeal is to be preferred. As per the
  said provision, the appeal must be addressed to the appellate
  authority and submitted to the authority whose order is appealed
G against. The authority whose order is appealed against is
  required to forward the appeal together with its comments and
  also the record of the case to the appellate authority. The
  appellate authority then proceeds with the consideration of the
  appeal and considers whether the findings are justified; whether

H   8.   AIR 1968 SC 850
  ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                   235
            UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
the penalty is excessive or inadequate and passes appropriate A
order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the
penalty or remitting the case to the authority that imposed the
penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may
deem fit in the circumstances of the case. The appeal provision
in regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does not expressly B
provide for personal hearing to the appellant. Is the right of
personal hearing to the appellant implicit in the provision? We
think not. In our considered view, in the absence of personal
hearing to the appellant, it cannot be said that the very right of
appeal is defeated. One situation is, however, different. Where     c
the appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty,
obviously, the appellate authority must issue notice to the
delinquent asking him to show cause why penalty that has been
awarded to him must not be enhanced and give him personal
hearing. It is so because the appellate authority seeks to inflict
                                                                     0
such punishment for the first time which was not given by the
disciplinary/punishing authority. Although there are no positive
words in regulation 17, requiring that the appellant shall be ·
heard before enhancement of .the penalty, the fairness and
natural justice require him to be heard.
                                                                     E
      20. It is true that in Ganesh Santa Ram Siruf', this Court
did not accept the contention of the delinquent relating to non-
grant of personal hearing to him by the appellate authority
before the enhancement of the punishment. But it was so in the
peculiar fact-situation of the case. First, this Court observed that F
Charge 5 of granting loan to the spouse under SEEUY Scheme
in violation of Rule 34(3) of the State Bank of India (Supervising
Staff) Service Rules was found by the appellate authority more
serious and grave in nature. Secondly and more importantly,
th~ Court noticed that delinquent in his appeal before the G
appellate authority admitted that he had committed misconduct
of disbursing the loan to his wife in a Scheme which was meant
for educated unemployed youth. To our mind, thus, there is no
inconsistency in the judgment of this Court in Ganesh Santa
Ram Siruf' and our statement above that where t~e appellate H
    236      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011] 10 S.C.R.

A authority proposes to enhance the penalty, the appellate
  authority must. issue notice to the delinquent and give him
  personal hearing.

          21. However, personal hearing may not be required where
B the appellate authority, on consideration of the entire material
  placed before it, confirms, reduces or sets aside the order
  appealed against. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does
  not require that in all situations personal hearing must be
  afforded to the delinquent by the appellate authority. The view
  taken by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in
C the case of Ram Niwas BansaP is too expansive and wide and
  cannot be held to be laying down correct law particularly in light
  of the judgment of this Court in Mahendra Kumar Singhafl. We
  answer this question accordingly.

D Re : Question (two)

        22. The High Court has faulted the order of the appellate
  authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order.
  Is it so? We have carefully perused the order of the appellate
  authority and we find that the order dated June 4, 2004 cannot
E be labelled as a non-speaking order. The order does not suffer
  from the vice of non-application of mind. The appellate authority
  has addressed the points raised in the appeal and critical to
  the decision, albeit briefly. It is true that the appellate authority
  must record reasons in support of its order to indicate that it
F has applied its mind to the grounds raised but it is not the
  requirement of law that an order of affirmance by the appellate
  authority must be elaborate and extensive. Brief reasons which
  indicate due application of mind in decision making process
  may suffice. Each ground raised in the appeal has been dealt
G with briefly as would be apparent from the following
  consideration of the matter by the appellate authority:

         "The contention of the appellant that no departmental
        .action can be taken against him during pendency of
H        criminal proceedings before the Court is not tenable; as
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                   237
          UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]

  departmental enquiry is independent of criminal                 A
  proceedings and as such there is no bar to pass the order
  of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority during the
  pendency of criminal proceedings.

  The appellant has alleged that Inquiring Authority has erred B
  in holding the imputation 2 & 3 under Article of Charge No.
  1 as proved. On carefully perusing the evidence brought
  on record of the enquiry and other related record, I find that
  Disciplinary Authority has fully considered evidence/
  submissions made by the appellant and based on that the · C
  article of charge no. 1 is held partly proved against the
  appellant. This does not, however, mean that the
  Disciplinary Authority has in anyway exonerated the
  appellant of this charge. Hence, I do not find any force/
  substance in the allegation of the appellant. I find that on
  the basis of evidence adduced in the inquiry, article of D
  charge no. 1 has been rightly held as partly proved against
  the appellant.

  The appellant has further contended that PO had not
  furnished any proof of his having recommended the               E
  proposal to the Regional Office. I have perused the
  relevant record and evidence adduced in respect of the
  charge. It is evident from Ex. MEX 10/6 (which is admitted
  document in the enquiry) that the appellant had sent letter
  dated 24-10-2000 based on which Regional Office                 F
  permitted the party to avail facility for unit at Sikandrabad
  which was 300 kms away from Chandigarh and in this
  way, it was not possible for the branch to monitor the unit
  at such a distant place. Although the appellant has not
  disputed reference of letter dated 24-10-2000 in Ex. MEX
                                                                  G.
  10/6, yet due to its non-production by the PO, the IA has
  held this charge as partly proved. On the basis of evidence
  brought on record of enquiry and after considering
  submission of appellant, I find that Disciplinary Authority
  has rightly held article of charge no. 2 as partly proved and   H
     238       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 10 S.C.R.


 A         contention of the appellant that this charge should be set
           aside is devoid of any merit.

           The appellant has contended that he had recommended
           the proposal keeping in view the General Manager's
           instructions. The appellant had neither produced any
 8
           document nor adduced any evidence in his defence to
           substantiate this fact. However, during general
           examination by the Inquiring Authority, he has admitted that
           he had no exposure of processing of the guarantees and
           proposal was analysed at Regional Office and he had just
 c         recommended it. This clearly shows that the appellant
           recommended enhancement of bank guarantee limit of Rs.
           175 lacs in the account of Mis. Dunroll Industries Ltd.
           without ensuring satisfactory conduct of the account and
           without going into details of transaction and implications
 D         thereof. After carefully analyzing the evidence adduced
           during the enquiry, I find that the article of charge no. 3
           against the appellant is rightly hP.ld proved by Disciplinary
           Authority. I therefore, do not find any meriUforce in the
           allegations of the appellant.
 E
           The Appellant has contended that common seal on all
           documents had been affixed and all the documents are
           valid. On careful perusal of documents ME-23/1/2 and after
           evaluating evidence of PW-1 during regular hearing held
 F         on 20-9-2003, I observe that article of charge no. 4 against
           the appellant in respect of releasing credit facilities in the
           account of Mis. Dunroll Industries Ltd. without complying
           with terms of sanction is rightly held proved by the
           Disciplinary Authority. Hence I do not find any force/merit
·G         in contention of the appellant that article of charge no. 4
           has been wrongly upheld by the Inquiring Authority.

           The appellant has also referred to some pending enquiry
           proceedings against him in respect of charge sheet dated
           12-8-2003 in the matter of Bankarpur Cold Storage and
 H         has contended that it is against principles of natural justice
  ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE & ANR. v. R.K.                     239
            UPPAL [R.M. LODHA, J.]
    ,to take into account past service record without valid legal A
      grounds. After perusing relevant enquiry record, I find that
      Disciplinary Authority in his order has referred to certain
      lapses/irregularities attributable to the appellant for the
      misconduct committed by him while posted as Sr.
      Manager/Incumbent In-charge, BIO 19-D, Chandigarh. B
      Having regard to imposition/inflictment of penalty of
      dismissal on the appellant w.e.f. 14-2-2004 by the
      Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 40) of Oriental
      Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Discipline &
      Appeal) Regulations, 1982 it was not open to the bank to c
      pursue pending charge sheet dated 12-8-2003 against the
     appellant as referred to in the appeal. Disciplinary
     Authority, therefore, has rightly stated in his order dated
      14-2-2004 that "no action is required to be taken at this
     stage" in relation to this charge sheet. Hence, I do--net find D
     any force/merit in the allegations of the appellant that
    · Disciplinary Authority has taken into account the matter of
     pending inquiries in respect of charge sheet dated 12-8-
     2003. As such, there is no violation of principles of natural
     justice as alleged."
                                                                      E
Having discussed the matter as above, the appellate authority
held that on consideration of the inquiry record and facts and
circumstances of the case, the findings and the order dated
February 14, 2004 passed by disciplinary authority are based
on evidence brought on record of inquiry and not founded on           F
past record or any other matter not connected with inquiry as
alleged by the delinquent in the appeal. Consequently, the
appellate authority concurred with the vi~w of the disciplinary
authority and found no justification to interfere with the penalty
awarded by the disciplinary authority.                                G

    23. The order of the appellate authority, by no stretch of
imagination can be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons.
We answer question no. (two) in the negative.

    24. In our view, the High Court was clearly in error in setting   H
    240     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A aside and quashing the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by
  the appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority
  to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing
  to the petitioner (respondent herein).
         25. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment
8
    and order dated January 23, 2006 passed by the High Court
    of Punjab and Haryana is set aside. The parties shall bear their
    own costs.

    D.G.                                          Appeal allowed.