ORIENTAL AROMA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.versusGUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

                       [2010] 2 S.C.R. 1172


A      ORIENTAL AROMA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.
                                 v.
    GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
                       AND ANOTHER
              (Civil Appeal No. 2075 of 2010)
B
                      FEBRUARY 26, 2010
      [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

       Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5 - Condonation of delay -
C Appeal by Government Corporation against judgment and
  decree in civil suit - Also application under for condonation
  of delay of 4 years - Allowed by Division Bench - Justification
  of - Held: Not justified - Law Department of the Government
  Corporation did not approach High Court with clean hands -
D High Court committed grave error by condoning more thf]n
  four years' delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially
  accepted parameters for exercise of discretion uls. 5 - Thus,
  order of High Court set aside - Application for condonation
  of delay dismissed - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - 0 41 r.
E 3A.

      The question which arose for consideration was
  whether the Division Bench of High Court was justified
  in condoning more than four years' delay in filing of
  appeal by the respondents against judgment and decree
F passed by the Civil Judge in the Special Civil Suit.

       Allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. The law of limitation is founded on public
G policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with
  the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to
  ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek
  remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy
  must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature.
H                              1172
    ORIENTAL AROMA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v.        1173
         GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN.

  To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a A
  period within which legal remedy can be availed for
  redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts
  are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if
  sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy
  within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient B
  cause" employed in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the
· courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub
  serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule
  can be laid down in dealing with the applications for C
  condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated
  adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of
  short duration and a stricter approach where the delay
  is inordinate. [Para 8] [1184-C-E]
                                                              D
       Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji
  (1987) 2 SCC 107; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
  (1998) 7 SCC 123; Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil
  (2001) 9 sec 106, relied on.

     1.2. In dealing with the applications for condonation E
of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/
instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that
same yardstick should be applied for deciding the
applications for condonation of delay filed by private
individuals and the State, observed that certain amount F
of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because
the State represents collective cause of the community
and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a
slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files
from table to table consumes considerable time causing G
delay. [Para 8] [1184-F-H; 1185-A]

     G. Ramegowda v. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2
SCC 142; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC
                                                              H
    1174   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A 132; State of UP. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309; State
  of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635; State of
  Nagaland-v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752; State (NCT of
  Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582, relied on.

B      2.1. A reading of the impugned order makes it clear
  that the High Court did make a bald reference to the
  application for condonation of delay filed by the
  respondents but allowed the same without adverting to
  the averments contained therein and the reply filed on
c behalf of the appellant. The High Court erroneously
  assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a
  matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four
  years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High
  Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to
D controvert the averments contained in the application._for
  condonation of delay. It may have been possible for this
  Court to ignore the first error in the impugned order
  because by deleting the figures and words "4 years and
  28" in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and
E substituting the same with the figure 1067, the
  respondents misled the High Court in believing that the
  delay was of 1067 days only but it is not possible to
  fathom any reason why the Division Bench of the High
  Court omitted to consider the detailed reply which had
F been filed on behalf of the appellant to contest the prayer
  for condonation of delay. Notwithstanding this, the
  impugned order may have been set aside and remitted
  the case to the High Court for fresh disposal of the
  application filed by the respondents under section 5 of
G the Limitation Act but, it is not proper to adopt that course
  because the respondents did not approach the High
  Court with clean hands. (Para 10] [1185-A-H; 1186-A]

      2.2. It is clear that the Law Department of respondent
  No.1 was very much aware of the proceedings of the first
H as well as the second suit. In the first case, RM was
     ORIENTALAROMACHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v.        1175
         GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN.

appointed as an advocate and in the second case BR            A
was instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents,
but none of the officers is shown to have personally
contacted either of the advocates for the purpose of filing
written statement and preparation of the case and none
bothered to appear before the trial Court on any of the       B
dates of hearing. It is a matter of surprise that even
though an officer of the rank of General Manager (Law)
had issued instructions to RM to appear and file vakalat
as early as in May 2001 and Manager (Law) had given
vakalat to BR Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the       c
application filed for condonation of delay, the
respondents boldly stated that the Law Department came
to know about the ex parte decree only in the month of
January/February 2008. The respondents went to the
extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged       0
or joined hands with some employee of the corporation
and that may be the reason why after engaging
advocates, nobody contacted them for the purpose of
giving instructions for filing written statement and giving
appropriate instructions which resulted in passing of the     E
ex parte decrees. The above statement is not only
incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court
committed grave error by condoning more than four
years' delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially
accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under
section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Para,13] [1187-G-H; 1188-   F
A]
     2.3. The impugned order of the High Court is set
aside and the application for condonation of delay filed
by the respondents is dismissed. As a corollary, the G
appeal filed by the respondents against judgment and
decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred
by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal of the
instant appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries
of respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting H
    1176   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [201 O] 2 S.C.R.


A a thorough probe into the matter so that accountability
  of the defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the
  loss, if any, suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from
  them after complying with the rules of natural justice.
  [Para 14] [1188-8-C]
B
       State of Bihar and others v. Kamleshwar Prasad Singh
  and another 2000 AIR SC 2388; Sp/. Tehsildars, Land
' Acquisition, Kera/a v. K. V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750;
  Punjab Small Industries and Export Corporation Ltd. and
C others v. Union of India and others 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681;
  P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kera/a and another (1997) 7
  sec 566, referred to.
                       Case Law Reference:
D       2000 AIR SC 2388          Referred to          Para 5
       AIR 1996 SC 2750           Referred to          Para 5
       1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681 Referred to             Para 5

E      (1997) 1 sec 566           Referred to          Para 5
       (1987) 2 sec 101           Relied on            Para 8
       (1998) 1 sec 123           Relied on            Para 8
       (2001) 9 sec 106           Relied on.           Para 8
F
       (1988) 2 sec 142           Relied on            Para 8
       (1996) 3 sec 132           Relied on            Para 8
       (1996) 9 sec 309           Relied on            Para 8
G
       (1996) 10 sec 635          Relied on            Para 8
       (2005) 3 sec 752           Relied on            Para 8

       (2008) 14 sec 582          Relied on.           Para 8
H
    ORIENTALAROMACHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v.                  1177
         GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN.

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                    A
2075 of 2010.

     From the Judgment & Order dated 25.3.2009 of the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Civil Application No. 14201
of 2008 in First Appeal No. 4180 of 2008.                              B

    L.N. Rao, Nikhil Goel, Naveen Goel, Marsoak Bafaki,
Sheela Goel for the Appellant.

      Anip Sachthey, Mohit Paul, Shagun Matta, Sherin Daniel
for the Respondents.                                                   C

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted.

      2. Whether the Division Bench of Gujarat High Courtwas           Q
justified in condoning more than four years' delay in filing of
appeal by the respondents against judgment and decree dated
30.10.2004 passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Gandhinagar
(hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court") in Special Civil Suit
No.32 of 2001 is the question which arises for consideration           E
in this appeal.

     3. The appellant was allotted a piece of land for setting up
an industrial unit at Ankleshwar subject to the terms and
conditions embodied in agreement of licence dated 2.4.1976 F
which, among other things, provided for consumption of
specified quantity of water by the appellant. The agreement also
provided for payment of 70% of the cost of agreed quantity of
water irrespective of consumption. In 1982, respondent No.1
demanded non utilization charges amounting to Rs.4068/-,
which we:re deposited by the appellant. After some time, G
respondent No.1 demanded Rs.2,69,895/- towards water
charges. For next 10 years, the parties entered into long
correspondence on the issue of levy of water charges, etc.
Finally, respondent No.1 issued bill dated 13.1.1996 requiring
                                                                       H
    1178    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A the appellant to pay Rs.22,96,207/- towards water charges. The
  appellant challenged the same in Special Civil Suit No.32 of
  2001. The summons issued by the trial Court were duly served
  upon the respondents but no written statement was filed on their
  behalf to controvert the averments contained in the plaint and
B none appeared on the dates of hearing despite the fact that
  the case was adjourned on more than one occasion. The suit
  was finally decreed on 30.10.2004 and it was declared that the
  appellant is not liable to pay Rs.22,96,207/- by way of minimum
  charges for water for the period between 1978 and 16.4.2001
c and, thereafter, till the water was supplied by respondent No.1.
  After few months, the appellant filed another suit which was
  registered as Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and prayed that
  respondent No.1 be directed to issue no objection certificate
  in its favour. The summons of the second suit were also served
0 upon the respondents, but neither the written statement was filed
  nor any one appeared on their behalf. The second suit was also
  decreed on 12.12.2007 and respondent No.1 was directed to
  issue no objection certificate to the appellant. In compliance of
  the decree passed in the second suit, the concerned authority
E of the Corporation issued no dues certificate dated 9.7.2008.

       4. After four months and fifteen days of taking action in
  furtherance of the decree passed in the second suit, the
  respondents filed an appeal against judgment and decree
  dated 30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001.
F They also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 3A of the
  Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 5 of the Limitation
  Act for condonation of delay by making the following assertions:

        "1. That this appeal is preferred against the judgment and
        decree of the learned Civil Judge (SD), Gandhinagar
G
        passed on 30.10.2004. That the suit was filed for
        permanent injunction and declaration and on the ground
        that the advocate of the GIDC has appeared but no written
        statement was filed and, therefore, the learned Judge
        resorted to Order 8 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code
H
  ORIENTAL AROMA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v.       1179
GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

  and granted the declaration as prayed for in the plaint. That      A
  after the decree being passed, the present plaintiff filed
  another suit being Civil Suit No.222 of 2005 and in which
  the decree was passed on 12.12.2007. That particular
  decree is to be challenged before this Honourable Court
  and, therefore, in 2008, after the second decree was               B
  passed, it was brought to the notice of the Legal
  Department as well as to the Executive Engineer at GIDC,
  Ankleshwar as to how this has happened and it seems that
  because of numerous transfers as well as it is also
  possible that the party might have arranged or joined hands        c
  with some employee of the Corporation and thereby after
  engaging advocate, no body has gone to the advocate for
  the purpose of giving instruction or filing the written
  statement and as a result thereof, decree is passed and
  only in the month of January/February, the law department          0
  came to know and therefore, an inquiry was made into the
  matter but the GIDC could not trace out as to at whose
  hands the mistake or mischief was done, however, when
  after inquiry everything was noticed and, therefore, the
  application for cert!fied copy was made on 17.11.2008              E
  and on 18.11.2008, the copy was ready and the same was
  sent to the advocate and thereafter the present appeal is
  preferred.

   2. That a long span from 30.10.2004 to 18.11.2008,
   practically four years time is passed and this has F
   happened only because of some mistake or mischief on
   the part of the staff and, therefore, the appeal could not be
   preferred, otherwise it is a r1 ,::itter of substantial right of the
  GIDC where the water charges are leveled in spite of water
  being used or not and when the bills were already drawn, G
  there was not intention on the part of the GIDC not to
  contest the suit. But it is difficult to trace out how this has
  hap'pened and, therefore, when the inquiry was conducted
  in detail, the facts were brought to the notice and on that
  basis the cause has arisen to file this appeal and the delay H
    1180    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 2 S.C.R.


A       of 1067 days cause in filing the appeal is required to be
        condoned in the interest of justice."

        On notice, a detailed reply was filed on behalf of the
    appellant in the form of an affidavit of its Director, Shri Sanjay
    Kantilal Shah, paragraphs 4.16, 5 and 6 whereof read as under:
8
         "4.16. That the First Appeal preferred by the appellant has
         been preferred with Civil Application No.14201 of 2008
         and the said application for condonation of delay under
         Order 41 Rule (3A) read with Section 5 of the Limitation
c       Act. As a matter of fact, the petitioner company being a
         Government Corporation is bound to follow the rules and
         regulations as it is and cannot deviate itself from the
        provisions of law. As a matter of fact in filing the present
         First Appeal there is a delay of more than 4 years.
D       Moreover, in the second suit, the decree and judgment is
        already passed and thereafter now the petitioner has no
        right to challenge the order of the Civil Suit No.32/2001.
        But for the reasons best known to the appellant the correct
        number of days has not been mentioned in the
E       condonation of delay application. As a matter of fact, the
        petitioner being a Government Corporation has to follow
        the rules and regulations strictly and is required to give
        proper explanation as to why the Appeal has not been
        preferred within the time frame and if they were so, being
F       aggrieved by the order passed by the Ld. Civil Judge (SD)
        Gandhinagar. If the condonation of delay is taken into
        consideration the said page is only a 4 pages wherein no
        proper explanation as to what the petitioner was doing for
        the past year has been given in the said and thereby also
        the said application is required to be dismissed in limine.
G
        5. With regard to para -1 of the Civil Application, I most
        humbly and respectfully submit that it is true that the decree
        passed by the Ld. Civil Judge (S.D) Gandhinagar on
        13.10.2004. It is also true that in the said Suit, the
H       advocate for the GIDC had appeared but had not filed
  ORIENTALAROMACHEMICAL INDUSTRIES ~TD. v. 1181
GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

  written statement and therefore, the Ld. Judge has passed        A
  the order under the provisions of the Code of Civil
  Procedure and granted declaration as prayed for in the
  plaint. It is also true that after decree was passed, the
  present respondent filed another suit being Civil Suit
  No.222/2005 and the said decree was passed on                    B
   12.12.2007. It is not true that in the year 2008 after the
  second decree was passed it was brought to the
  knowledge of the Legal Department that the earlier decree
  was required to be challenged. Lack of legal knowledge
  cannot be said to be ground to condone the delay. If the         c
  facts had not been brought well in time then for the said it
  cannot be said that the respondent company is required
  to be punished. As a matter of fact nothing has been
  mentioned on Affidavit as to who did not give proper
  instructions or as to who had possibly played the mischief
                                                                   0
  and as to who had joined the hand with the respondent
  company. It is only the blame game which is being played
  and allegations are being leveled in order to save its own
  skin but there is no truth behind the facts mentioned therein
  and thereby there is no way as to how the present
  application can ever be allowed. Moreover the respondent         E
  is not knowing any persons of the G.l.D.C. (as on today or
  at any time).

  6. With regard to para-2 of the Civil Application, I most
  humbly and respectfully say and submit that it is true that      F
  more than 4 years time has been passed from the date of
  the decree but as to who has played the mischief or
  mistake or had it been intentionally filed within the time
  frame that is for the reasons best known to the appellant
  corporation and that is something on which the petitioner        G
  company would not like to comment at this juncture. No
  proper justification or explanation has been brought on
  record as tJ what was h~ppening for the past 4 years, has
  also not given anything in detail and neither true and correct
  facts have been mentioned nor the calculation in respect         H
    1182    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [201 O] 2 S.C.R.


A       of the days have been made properly and thereby also on
        all the said counts, the present application is required to
        be dismissed with exemplary cost."

       5. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the
  judgments of this Court in State of Bihar and others v.
8
  KamleshwarPrasad Singh and another, 2000 AIR SC 2388,
  N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242,
  State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others AIR 1996 SC
  1623, Sp/. Tehsildars, Land Acquisition, Kera/a v. K. V.
C Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750, Punjab Small Industries and
  Export Corporation Ltd. and others v. Union of India and
  others 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 681, P.K. Ramachandran v. State
  of Kera/a and another (1997) 7 SCC 566 and Collector, Land
  Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji Al R 1987 SC 1353 and
  condoned the delay by making a cryptic observation that the
D cause shown by the respondents is sufficient. The relevant
  portion of the High Court's order is reproduced below:

        "Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court
        to the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that
E       sufficient cause is made out by the applicant for
        condonation of delay. Over and above, in view of the fact
        that reasons mentioned in this application have not been
        controverted by the other side and also in view of the
        principles governing the discretionary exercise of power
F       under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, we are of the
        view that sufficient cause has been stated for not filing the
        appeal in time and hence, delay caused in filing appeal is
        to be condoned and the application is required to be
        allowed."

G                                             (Emphasis supplied)

        6. Shri L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the
    appellant argued that the impugned order is liable to be set
    aside because the High Court allowed the application for
H   condonation of delay by erroneously assuming that the delay
     ORIENTALAROMACHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v.         1183
   GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

 was of 1067 days only. Learned senior counsel pointed out that        A
 appeal against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 was
 filed on 24.11.2008 i.e., after more than four years, but by
 scoring out the figures and words "4 years and 28" in
 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application and substituting the same
 with figure "1067", the respondents misled the High Court in          B
 believing that delay was of 1067 days. He then referred to
 affidavit dated 16.2.2009 of Shri Sanjay Kantilal Shah to show
 that substantial grounds had been put forward on behalf of the
 appellant for opposing the respondents' prayer for condonation
 of delay of more than four years and submitted that the Division      c
 Bench of the High Court committed serious error in condoning
 the delay by assuming that no reply had been filed by the
 appellant. Learned senior counsel also invited the Court's
 attention to affidavits dated 25.11.2009 and 4.2.2010 of Shri
 Pravin Keshav Lal Modi and Shri Harishbhai Patel respectively         0
 filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents as also the list
 of events attached with the second affidavit to show that the
 functionaries of respondent No.1 were very much aware of the
 proceedings of Special Civil Suit No.32 of 2001 and Civil Suit
 No.222 of 2005 and submitted that the High Court should not           E
 have accepted patently incorrect assertions contained in the
 application for condonation of delay, which was supported by
 an affidavit of none else than the General Manager of
 respondent No.1, Shri R.B. Jadeja, that the Law Department
 came to know about the judgment of Special Civil Suit No.32/
 2001 only in January/February, 2008.                                  F

        7. Shri Anip Sachthey, learned counsel for the
  respondents fairly admitted that the appeal was filed after lapse
  of more than four years of judgment dated 30.10.2004 but
  submitted that this Court should not interfere with the discretion   G
  exercised by the High Court to condone the delay and the
  respondents should not be penalized simply because the
. advocates appointed by the Corporation did not bother to file
  written statement and appear before the trial Court on the dates
  of hearing. Learned counsel emphasized that this Court has           H




                             -.-
    1186     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [201 OJ 2 S.C.R.


A   but, do not consider it proper to adopt that course, because
    as will be seen hereinafter, the respondents did not approach
    the High Court with clean hands.

           11. The statement containing the list of events annexed
8 with the affidavit of Shri Harishbhai Patel shows that before filing
     suit, the appellant had issued notice dated 5.2.2001 to which
     respondent No.1 sent reply dated 13.3.2001. The summons of
     Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001 instituted by the appellant were
     served upon the respondents sometime in the month of April/
     May 2001. On 16.5.2001, General Manager (Law) instructed
G-. .Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel to appear on behalf of the respondents.
     Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar was also directed to contact
     the advocate for preparing the reply affidavit. On 23.5.2001,
     Deputy Executive Engineer, Ankleshwar forwarded the
     comments to Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel. On 18.4.2002, the
D appellant filed an application for ex parte proceedings against
     the respondents. On 30.11.2002, the trial Court directed the
     respondents to appear on 12.12.2002 with indication that if they
     fail to do so, ~x parte proceedings will be held. Thereupon,
     General Manager (Law) wrote letter dated 10.12.2002 to Ms.
E Rekhaben to remain present on the next date of hearing i.e.,
     12.12.2002. On 30th December, 2002, Deputy Executive
     Engineer, Ankleshwar wrote to the advocate in the matter of
     submission of para-wise comments. On 2.1.2003, the Executive
     Engineer is said to have sent a letter to the advocate informing
F her about the next date of hearing i.e., 10.1.2003 and asked
     her to remain present. After almost one year and ten months,
     the trial Court pronounced the ex parte judgment and decreed
     the suit. The summons of the second suit were received
     sometime in May, 2005. On 20.6.2005, Shri B.R. Sharma;·
G Advocate was instructed to appear on behalf of the
     respondents. On 10.1.2006, Deputy Executive Engineer,
     Ankleshwar informed the new advocate about the next date of
     hearing which was 23.1.2006. The second suit was decreed
     on 12.12.2007.
H
                                                            ..
   ORIENTAL AROMA CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. v. 1187
 GUJARAT INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPRN. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
     12. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the     A
respondents fairly conceded that in the second suit filed by the
appellant there was a specific mention of decree dated
30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001. He also
conceded that even though the first suit remained pending
before the trial Court for three years and five months and the     B
second suit remained pending for more than two years, none
of the officers of the Law Department or the Engineering
Department of respondent No.1 appeared before the Court.

      13. From what we have noted above, it is clear that the
 Law Department of respondent No.1 was very much aware of C
the proceedings of the first as well as the second suit. In the
first case, Ms. Rekhaben M. Patel was appointed as an
advocate and in the second case Shri B.R. Sharma was
instructed to appear on behalf of the respondents, but none of
the officers is shown to have personally contacted either of the D
advocates for the purpose of filing written statement and
preparation of the case and none bothered to appear before
the trial Court or. any of the dates of hearing. It is a matter of
surprise that even though an omcer of the rank of General
Manager (Law) had issued instructions to Ms. Rekhaben M. E
Patel to appear and file vakalat as early as in May 2001 and
Manager (Law) had given vakalat to Shri B.R. Sharma,
Advocate in the month of May 2005, in the application filed for
condonation of delay, the respondents boldly stated that the
Law Department came to know about the ex parte decree only F
in the month of January/February 2008. The respondents went
to the extent of suggesting that the parties may have arranged
or joined hands with some employee of the corporation and that
may be the reason why after engarJing advocates, nobody
contacted them for the purpose of giving instructions for filing G
written statement and giving appropriate instructions which
resulted in passing of the ex parte decree$. In our view, the
above statement contained in para 1 of the application is not
only incorrect but is ex facie false and the High Court committed
grave error by condoning more than four years' delay in filing H
___J


           11,88   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [201 OJ 2 S.C.R.


       A   of appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for
           exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

              14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order
         of the High Court is set aside and the application for
         condonation of delay filed by the respondents is dismissed. As
       8
         a corollary, the appeal filed by the respondents against
         judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed
         as barred by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal
         of this appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries of
         respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting a
       C thorough probe into the matter so that accountability of the
         defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the loss, if any,
         suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from them after
         complying with the rules of natural justice.

           N.J.                                         Appeal allowed.