Holding

The Court held that the complaint did not disclose the essential elements of offences under Sections 406 and 498A against the in‑laws, leading to the quashing of those charges, while the charge against the husband under Section 498A was upheld.

Summary

Onkar Nath Mishra and others appealed against the State of Delhi challenging the framing of charges under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code based on a complaint lodged by the complainant, his wife. The trial court had discharged all accused, but the Sessions Court and High Court later ordered that charges be framed against the husband and his in‑laws. The Supreme Court examined whether, at the charge‑framing stage, the material on record disclosed the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust (Sec. 406) and cruelty/harrassment (Sec. 498A). It held that the complaint did not allege any entrustment of property or its misappropriation, nor any harassment with a view to coercing unlawful dowry, thus no prima facie case existed against the father‑in‑law and sister‑in‑law. Consequently, the charges under Sec. 406 against all appellants and under Sec. 498A against the two in‑laws were quashed, while the charge against the husband under Sec. 498A was upheld. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the material on record at the charge‑framing stage discloses the ingredients of an offence under Section 406 IPC.
Whether the material on record discloses the ingredients of an offence under Section 498A IPC.
Whether the court must assess the existence of a prima facie case or the probative value of evidence at the charge‑framing stage.
Whether the charges against the father‑in‑law and sister‑in‑law can be sustained under Sections 406 and 498A.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228, s. 239, s. 240, s. 245
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 405, s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

dowry harassmentSection 498Acriminal breach of trustcharge framingprima facie caseStridhanmatrimonial dispute

Judgment

..

A ONKAR NATH MISHRA & ORS. ...._
v.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

DECEMBER 14, 2007 .ii
B
[ASHOK BHAN AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]
\M
>
Penal Code, 1860:

c ss. 498A and 406-Framing of charges under-FIR by wife
alleging commission of offence u/s 498A and 406134 by in-laws and
,.
-
husband, on basis ofcomplaint before Women Cell-Charges framed
against in-laws and husband u/s 498A and 406134-Challenge to-
Held: There was no allegation of entrustment of property by
complainant-wife to her in-laws and husband and its misappropriation
D
by them-Also no allegation of harassment of wife by in-laws with a
view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand except husband-Thus,
charges uls 406 against in-laws and husband, and uls 498A against
in-laws quashed-However, charges framed against husband u/s 498A
E
upheld.
ss. 498 A and 406-lngredients for-Explained
-
Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973: ss 227, 228, 239, 240and 245
-Duty ofcourt while framing ofcharges-General guidelines-Held:
Court is to evaluate materials on record to find out iffacts at their 1
F face value disclose existence ofingredients for constituting the alleged
offence-It is to consider whether there is a groundfor presuming that
offence has been committed and not that the ground for convicting
the accused is made out-Probative value of materials on record
cannot be gone into.
G
There was some matrimonial dispute between the complainant-
wife and the appellant no. 3-husband. The complainant filed a
complaint in the Crime against Women Cell against appellant no 1
and 2-in laws and appellant no 3, alleging harassment by them.
H 716
ONKARNATHMISHRAv. STATE 717

However, the parties entered into a compromise and the complainant A
joined her husband. Next month the complainant came back to her
paternal home for her delivery. The complainant then filed another
complaint against the appellants. She recorded a statement alleging
misbehavior on part of her in-laws and dowry demand made by them
and that they refused to return her Stridhan. FIR was lodged under B
sections 406 and 498A I.P.C. against the appellants. The charge
I }
sheet was filed. The Metropolitan Magistrate held that no case was
made out against all the appellants u/s 406 and appellant no. 1 and
2 for offences u/s 498A and discharged all of them. In Revision
Petition, the Sessions Court held that the case u/s 406 and 498A was
made out and directed the trial court to frame charges accordingly. C
Appellants then filed Criminal Revision Petition for quashing the
charge sheet and consequential proceedings arising out of FIR. High
Court upheld the order of Sessions Court. Hence the present appeal.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court D
HELD: 1. At the stage of framing of charge the court is required
to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to
finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value,
disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the E
probative value of the material on record. What needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the
offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion
founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive F
opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the
accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
[Para 11] [723-D-F)
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, [1977) 2 SCC 699; State G
ofMaharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors., [1996] 4 SCC
659 and State ofMP. v. Mohanlal Soni, [2000) 6 SCC 338, relied on.
2. According to Section 405 I.P.C., the offence of criminal
breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A manner with the property or with any dominion over it, dishonestly
misappropriates it or converts itto his own use, or dishonestly uses t

it, or disposes it of, in violation of any direction oflaw prescribing
the mode in which the trust is to be discharged, or of any lawful
contract, express or hnplied, made by him touching such discharge,
B or wilfully suffers any other person so to do. Thus, in the commission
of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two distinct parts are
involved.The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation
to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the "
accused. The second is a misappropriation· or dealing with the
c properfy dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation
created. [Para 16] [724-G-H; 725-A]
.·The Superintendent and remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West
Bengal v. S.K Roy, [1974] 4 SCC 230, relied on.
D 3.1. Section 498A I.P.C. was introduced with the avowed object
to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman
at the hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the
provision should not be used as a device to achieve oblique
motives. [Para 19] (726-D-E]
E 3.2. The term "cruelty", which has been made punishable under
Section 498A I.P.C. has been defined in the explanation appended
to the said Section, to mean: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or
F physical of the woman; or(ii) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand. Therefore, the consequences of
· G "cruelty",which are either likely to drive a woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury, danger tolife, limb or health, whether
mental or physical of the woman or the harassment of a woman,
where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any unla'wful demand are required to be
H established in order to bring home an offence under Section 498A
ONKARNATHMISHRA v. STATE 719

- 't I.P.C. (Para 17] [725-C-E] A

4.1. In the instant case, from a plain reading of the second

-- complaint filed by the complainant, it is clear that the facts mentioned
in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out a prima
facie case against the appellants for having dishonestly
misappropriated the Stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed
B

.. over to them, thereby committing criminal breach of trust punishable
under Section 406 l.P.C. It is manifestly clear from the afore-
extracted complaint as also the relevant portion of the charge-sheet
that there is neither any allegation of entrustment of any kind of
property by the complainant to the appellants nor its misappropriation c
by them. Furthermore, it is also noted in the charge-sheet itself that
the complainant had refused to take articles back when this offer
' was made to her by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, the very
pre-requisite of entrustment of the property and its misappropriation
by the appellants are Jacking in the instant case. The Additional D
Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in Jaw in coming to the
conclusion that a case for framing of charge under Section 4061.P .C.
was made out. The charges framed against all the appellants under
section 4061.P.C. are quashed.
[Paras 18 and 20] [725-F-H; 726-A-F] E
4.2. As regards the applicability of Section 498A l.P.C., in the
complaint dated 8.11.1994 there is not even a whisper ofa wilful
conduct of appellants No.1 and 2 of harassment of the complainant
f at their hands with a view to coercing her to meet any unlawful
demand by them so as to attract the provisions of Section 498A read F
with Explanation thereto. The complaint refers to the talk the
complainant purports to have had with her husband, appellant No.
3, who is alleged to have told her to come to Bijnore if she apologizes
to his father; keeps him happy; obeys his sister and talks to her
father (complainant's) to give her Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. and brings G
these articles to Bijnore. The allegation of misbehaviour on the part
of appellant Nos.1and2 and the demand of Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R.
by them made by the complainant in her subsequent statement, dated
4.4.1995, was an after thought and not bona fide. Having carefully
glanced through the complaint, the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet, the H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A charge under Section 498A I.P.C. is not brought home insofar as
appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned and are quashed. However, -
charge framed against appellant No. 3 under Section 498A I.P.C. is
upheld. [Paras 19 and 20) (726-B-F)
B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1716 of2007.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 05.03.2007 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Cr! Revision Petition No. 92of1998.
Onkar Nath Mishra Appellant-In-Person.
c
Pramod Swarup, Saket Singh (for D.S. Mabra), Nalin Tripathi and
Anurag Sharma (Rameshwar Prasad Goyal) for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D I>.K. JAIN, J. l. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by the three accused arises out of the order dated
5.3.2007, passed by the High Court of Delhi, dismissing the Criminal
Revision Petition No. 92 of 1998 filed by them. In the said petition, a
E prayer was made by the appellants to quash the charge sheet and the
consequential proceedings arising out of First Information Report (F.I.R)
No. 155of1995, instituted in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate, New
Delhi. Appellants No. 1, 2 and 3 are respectively the father-in-law, sister-
in-law and the husband of the complainant.
F 3. A few facts, leading to the present proceedings and necessary to
dispose of the appeal are:
The marriage between the complainant and appellant No. 3 was
solemnized at New Delhi on 5.12.1993. After the marriage, the
complainant was residing at her matrimonial home in Delhi. It appears that
G there was some matrimonial discord between the complainant and her
husband, appellant No. 3, which resulted in filing of a complaint by the
complainant on 17 .5 .1994 in the Crime against Women ("CAW" for
short) Cell, Delhi, inter alia, alleging that she was harassed by her
husband and in-laws. However, the matter was compromised on
H
ONKAR NATH MISHRA v. STATE [D.K. JAIN, J.] 721
'J
26.6.1994 and as agreed, on 3.7.1994, the complainant joined her A
11
husband at Bijnore (U.P.), where he was posted. However, she returned
back to her parental home in Delhi in mid-August 1994, as she was
expecting a child.
4. On 8.11.1994, she lodged another complaint in CAW Cell. The
said complaint was the foundation for registration ofF.1.R. No. 155 of B
1995, alleging commission of offences by the appellants under Sections
498A, 406/34 of the Indian Penal Code ("l.P.C.", for short). For the sake
of ready reference, the same is extracted below:
I'
"I, Neetu, d/o R.P. Dixit W/o Ashutosh Misra wish to inf01m you c
that as per compromise in the Cell on 22.6.1994 with my husband
I went to Bijnore on 3.7.1994 on the suggestion of my husband I
came to Delhi along with my parents on 12.8.1994 for delivery. I
gave birth to asonon4.9.1994. My husband came to hospital on
5.9.1994 and requested me to come to Bijnore after 40 days. He D
gave me no money for expenditure. When I left Bijnore he gave
me only Rs.1/- only. I did not receive any phone from him till 7th
·November, 1994. Then I phoned him and told him that he was
required to go to Cell on 28.10.1994. He told me that he has no
time to go to Cell and to bring me to Bijnore. You can come to
E
Bijnore if you apologize to my father. Keep him happy, obey
my sister and talk to your father to give you Rs,S0,0001- and
VCR to bring with you. Then I can come to bring you. If you
. come here alone with the child, we will give you good beatings .
f
My husband came to Rajouri Garden every Saturday - Sunday in F
September - October and 9n Dushera & Diwali. This can be
verified from neighbour Hira Lal and Smt. Nirmala Sharma,
President Mahilla Jagriti Samiti. Almost 2 weeks ago, Hira Lal
informed me that l11Y husband took away all my belongings with
~
himat4A.M. G
In view of above facts, I think these three persons are conspiring.
Therefore, I request that my case may be re-opened and my father-
in-law, husband and sister-in-law may be punished."
(emphasis supplied) H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A 5. As noted above, on the basis of the said report, an F.I.R. was
registered on 4.4.1995, wherein date and hours of occurrence was
mentioned as 5.12.1993 to 12.8.1994. Before the registration of the
F.I.R., another statement of the complainant was recorded wherein she
alleged misbehaviour on the part of her father-in-Jaw, appellant No. 1. In
B the said statement, she stated that, "my father-in-law and sister-in-Jaw
clearly warned him that till the time I will not bring Rs.50,000/- cash and
V.C.R. they will not keep me". She also alleged that when she asked for
return of the Stridhan, they refused to return the same "with fraudulent
intentions". After investigation by the CAW Cell, the charge-sheet was
C filed on 15.7.1995. In the charge-sheet, it has been recorded that despite
issue of notice under Section 160 Cr.P.C. to the complainant and her father
by the ASI, neither the complainant nor her father turned up to take back
her Stridhan, which was alleged to be with the appellants. It has been noted
that the complainant does not want to take back her Stridhan.
D 6. At the time of framing of charge, the Metropolitan Magistrate came
to the conclusion that no case under Section 406 had been made out
against any of the accused and further case under Section 498A was also
not made out against the father-in-law and sister-in-law, being appellants
No. l and 2. Accordingly, he discharged all the appellants for offences
E under Section 406 I.F.C. and appellants No. I and 2 for offences under
Section 498A I.P.C.
7. Against the said order, the State preferred Revision Petition to
the Sessions Court. Vide order dated 24.1.1998, the Additional Sessions
Judge came to the conclusion that a prima facie case under Sections 498A
p' and 406 I.P.C. was made out against all the appellants. Accordingly, he
directed the trial court to proceed with the case against all the appellants
under Sections 498A/406/34 I.P.C. and frame the charges accordingly.
8. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a Criminal Revision Petition
before the High Court. As noted above, the said Revision Petition was
G dismissed. It is this order of the High Court, which is questioned in this
appeal.
9. Appellant No. I, appearing in person, argued the case on behalf
-
of all the appellants. It was vehemently contended that the Additional
Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have failed to appreciate that
H the first complaint dated 8.11.1994 lodged by the complainant on the
ONKARNATHMISHRA v. STATE[D.K.JAIN,J.] 723

CAW Cell, which was the foundation for the registration off.LR. No. A
155 of 1995, did not contain any allegation of demand of dowry or
harassment by appellants No. 1 and 2. It was submitted that even ifthe
allegations in the statement of the complainant dated 4.4.1995 are taken
at their face value, yet the appellants cannot be connected with offences
under Sections 406 or 498A I.P.C., particularly when admittedly after B
3.7.1994, when she joined her husband at Bijnore, she had never lived
with appellants No. 1 and 2. It is asserted that the said statement was an
after thought, made after almost 8 months of the alleged occurrence.
l 0. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant and the
State supported the view taken by the High Court. C
11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required
to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding
out ifthe facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that
stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of D
the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is
a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a
ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even
strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients E
constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against
the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
12. In State ofKarnataka v. L. Muniswamy', a three judge Bench
of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the
Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any F
ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As
framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper
consideration of material warranting such order was emphasized.
13. Then again in State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath
The.pa and Ors 2, a three judge Bench of this Court, after noting three G
pairs of sections viz. (i) Sections 227 and 228 insofar as sessions trial is
concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 relatable to trial of warrant cases;
I. (1977) 2 S.C.C. 699.

2. (1996) 4 S.C.C 659.
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A and (iii) Sections 245 (1) and (2) qua trial of summons cases, which dealt
with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus:
"if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the
conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable
consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it
B differently, ifthe court were to think that the accused might have
committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction
the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed
the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge,
probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into;
C the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be
accepted as true at that stage."
14. In a later decision in State ofM.P. v. Mohan/al Soni3, this Court,
referring to several previous decisions held that the crystallized judicial
view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie
D consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
ac~used. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude
whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the
accused.
E 15. Having noted the broad guidelines to be kept in view while
deciding whether or not a charge against the accused is to be framed,
we may advert to the facts of the present case to decide whether on the
basis of the material placed before the trial court, it can reasonably be
held tl1at a case for fran1ing charges against the appellants under Sections
F 498A and 406 I.P.C. exists. However, before undertaking this exercise
it would be apposite to briefly note the essential ingredients of Sections
406 and 498A I.P.C.
16. According to Section 405 l.P.C., the offence of criminal breach
of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with
G the property or \Vith any dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it
or converts it to his own use, or dishonestly uses it, or disposes it of, in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which the trust is
to be discharged, or of any lawful contract, express or implied, made by
3. (2000) 6 S.C.C. 338.
H
ONKARNATHMISHRA v. STATE[D.K.JAIN,J.] 725

him touching such discharge, or wilfully suffers any other person so to A
do. Thus in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two
distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an obligation
in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by
the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property
dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. (See: The B
Superintendent & remembrancer ofLegal Affairs, West Bengal v. S.K.
Roy')
17. The term "cruelty", which has been made punishable under
Section 498A l.P.C. has been defined in the Explanation appended to
the said Section, to mean: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature C
as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman;
or (ii) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or D
t
any person related to her to meet such demand. Therefore, the
consequences of"'cruelty", which are either likely to drive a woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury, danger to life, limb or health,
whether mental or physical of the woman or the harassment of a woman,
where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related E
to her to meet any unlawful demand are required to be established in order
to bring home an offence under Section 498A l.P.C.
18. In the present case, from a plain reading of the complaint filed
by the complainant on 8.11.1994, extracted above, it is clear that the facts
mentioned in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out a F
prima facie case agaisst the appellants for having dishonestly
misappropriated the Stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed over
to them, thereby committing criminal breach of trust punishable under
Section 406 I.P.C. It is manifestly clear from the afore-extracted complaint
as also the relevant portion of the charge-sheet that there is neither any G
allegation of entrustment of any kind of property by the complainant to
the appellants nor its misappropriation by them. Furthermore, it is also
noted in the charge-sheet itself that the complainant had refused to take
4. (1974) 4 S.C.C. 230.
H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A articles back when this offer was made to her by the Investigating Officer.
Therefore, in our opinion, the very pre-requisite of entrustment of the
property and its misappropriation by the appellants are lacking in the instant
case. We have no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional Sessions
Judge and the High Court erred in law in coming to the conclusion that a
B case for framing of charge under Section 406 I.P.C. was made out.
19. As regards the applicability of Section 498A I.P.C., in the
complaint dated 8.11.1994 there is not even a whisper of a wilful conduct
of appellants No. 1 and 2 of harassment of the complainant at their hands
with a view to coercing her to meet any unlawful demand by them so as
C to attract the provisions of Section 498A read with Explanation thereto.
The complaint refers to the talk the complainant purports to have had with
her husband, appellant No. 3, who is alleged to have told her to come to
Bijnore if she apologizes to his father; keeps him happy; obeys his sister
and talks to her father (complainant's) to give her Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R.
D and brings these mticles to Bijnore. We are convinced that the allegation
of misbehaviour on the part of appellant Nos. I and 2 and the demand of
Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. by them made by the complainant in her
subsequent statement, dated 4.4.1995, was an after thought and not bona
fide. Section 498A l.P.C. was introduced with the avowed object to
E combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman at the
hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the provision should
not be used as a device to achieve oblique motives. Having carefully
glanced through the complaint, the F.l.R. and the charge-sheet, we find
that charge under Section 498A l.P.C. is not brought home insofar as
F appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned.
20. Consequently, we allow the appeal partly; quash the charge
framed against all the appellants under Section 406 I.P.C.; quash the
charge framed against appellant Nos. I and 2 under Section 498A I.P.C.
and dismiss the appeal of appellant No. 3 against framing of charge under
G Section 498A I.P.C. Needless to add that the trial court shall now proceed
with the trial untrammeled by any observation made by the Additional
Sessions Judge m1d upheld by the High Court in the impugned order or
by us in this judgment.
N.J. Appeal partly allowed.
H