Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant could not rely on the subsequent HUDA resumption proceedings to overturn the eviction decree because the event was factual, no amendment of pleadings was made, and the landlord's title was not extinguished.

Summary

The appellant, a tenant, was evicted by decree for non-payment of rent. He sought relief on the ground that a subsequent event – the Haryana Urban Development Authority's (HUDA) resumption proceedings against the landlord – had been set aside, claiming that this extinguished the landlord's title and amounted to eviction by title paramount. The Supreme Court held that such a factual subsequent event could not be taken into account unless the appellant amended his pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC, which he did not do. Moreover, the landlord's title remained subsisting because HUDA's order of resumption was set aside and no eviction by title paramount was established. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the eviction decree, and ordered the tenant to vacate within three months, with costs throughout.

Issues considered

Whether a subsequent factual event, such as HUDA's resumption proceedings, can be taken into account to set aside an eviction decree.
Whether the doctrine of eviction by title paramount applies when the alleged resumption order has been set aside.
Whether the court may take judicial notice of a subsequent event or must require amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC.
Whether the landlord's title under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977, was extinguished.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 17
Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977s. 17

Subjects

evictiontitle paramountsubsequent eventCivil Procedure CodeOrder 6 Rule 17amendment of pleadingslandlord-tenantHUDAresumptionjudicial notice

Judgment

OM PRAKASH GUPTA A
v.
RA NB IR B. GOY AL

) JANUARY 18, 2002

[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Order 6, Rule 17-Subsequent events-Amendment ofpleadings, to take
cognizance of-Held, subsequent event may be one ofchange in law or founded C
on facts-Court may take judicial notice of the change in law and modify or
mould the course of litigation or relief to bring it in conformity with /aw--
Where party relies on subsequent event based on facts, it should seek
amendment ofpleadings and Court may permit such amendment-Jn the instant
case, the subsequent event being a factual event, cannot be taken cognizance D
of as brought to notice of Court in accordance with established rules of
procedure-Judicial notice.

Rent Control and Eviction :

Eviction by title paramount-Reliance of-Tenant evicted from the suit E
premises of a//ottee-Subseqently, on non-payment of instalments by a//ottee,
order ofresumption passed, which was later set aside-Held, as the proceedings
initiated by the Development Authority against the a//ottee has not achieved
\ finality, eviction by title paramount cannot be relied on.

Respondent-allottee was allotted the suit premises by Haryana Urban p
Development Authority on instalments, which was let out to appellant-
tenant who fell into arrears. Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction. High
Court dismissed the appeals, but granted time for vacating the premises.
Appellant, then filed Special Leave Petition before this Court. He later
filed an application before the High Court seeking extension of time for
vacating the premises on the grounds that SLP was yet to be taken up for G
hearing and HUDA had initiated proceedings for resumption of the suit
premises against the respondent. The application was allowed. Thereafter,
this Court granted interim relief to the appellant although the factum of
extension of time granted by the High Court and the grounds therefor were
not brought to the notice of this Court. Respondent brought these facts H
359
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] I S.C.R.

A to the notice of this Court through counter affidavit. Appellant filed
additional affidavit stating that after the filing of SLP in this Court he ..,
received notice from HUDA to vacate the suit premises. He then requested .
HUDA to allot the premises to him. In between HUDA set aside the order
of resumption against allottee. (
B Appellant contended before this Court that there has been a
subsequent event having a material bearing on the judgment under appeal
and the right of the respondent to decree.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
...
c HELD : 1. A tenant inducted into possession of the tenancy premises
is ordinarily bound to restore possession over the tenancy premises to the
landlord on the tenancy coming to an end. Such obligation comes to an
end either by actually fulfilling the obligation or by proving that the
landlord's title stands extinguished by the landlord's eviction by title
paramount. The burden of proving eviction by title paramount lies on the
D
party who sets up such defence. 1365-CI

2. Appellant-tenant is not entitled to any relief for setting aside of .i..

the decree for eviction. Firstly, there is neither any order of resumption
and forfeiture within the meaning of Section 17 of the Haryana Urban
E Development Authority Act passed by HUDA against the respondent nor
is there an allotment by HUDA directly in favour of the appellant. In view
of HUDA's order of resumption having been set aside by the Appellate
Authority under the Act the allotment made by HUDA in favour of the
respondent continues to subsist. His title, under which he had inducted
the appellant in possession of the suit premisi:s, has not come to an end. ;
F Secondly, the appellant is placing reliance on an event happening after
the institution of suit, i.e., a subsequent event and a case for taking notice
of such subsequent event by court so as to impair the judgment under
appeal, is not made out. 1366-G-Hl

Vashu Dev v. Bal Kishan, 120021 I SCR 171, relied on.
G
3.1. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties
.,
stand crystalised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore,
the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they
stood at the commencement of the lis. However, Court has power to take
H note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the
O.P. GUPTA v. R.B. GOY AL 361

following conditions being satisfied; (i) that the relief, as claimed originally A
has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be
granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed
circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being

) done to t!Je parties; (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice
of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law B
so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. (367-B-CI

Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, AIR (1975)
SC 1409; Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho & Ors., (1898) 25 Indian
Appeals 195 PC and Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedul/a Khan, AIR (1953)
,.
•
Nag 361, referred to. c
3.2. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on
facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event
and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in
law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify
or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity D
with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event,
which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their
existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of
pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. Such subsequent event the
Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of
amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of E
determining real questions in controversy between the parties.(367-G-Hl

Messers, Trojan & Co. v. R.MN.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR(1953) SC
235, relied on.

4. Appellant has stated the factum of proceedings initiated by HUDA F
against the respondent in an affidavit very casually filed by him. He has
not even made a prayer to the Court to take notice of such subsequent
event and mould the relief accordingly, or to deny the relief to the
respondent as allowed to him by the judgment under appeal much less
sought for an amendment of the pleadings. The subsequent event urged G
by appellant is basically a factual event and cannot be taken cognizance
of unless brought to the notice of the Court in accordance with established
rules of procedure which if done would have afforded the respondent an
opportunity of meeting the case now sought to be set up by the appellant.
Thus the Court would not be justified in taking notice of a fact sought to
be projected by the appellant in a very cavalier manner. The fact remains H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) I S.C.R.

A that the present one is a landlord-tenant dispute and the relief granted
by the Courts below and the High Court to the respondent cannot be upset
by relying on the doctrine of eviction by title paramount as it cannot be

B
said that the proceedings initiated by HUDA against the respondent have
achieved finality or they are such proceedings wherein the respondent
cannot possibly have any sustainable defence. (368-F-H; 369-A[

1999.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5460 of
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.98 of the Punjab and Haryana
C High Court in R.S.A. No. 3364 of 1998.

Dinesh Kumar Garg for the Appellant.
•
Neeraj Kumar Jain, Aditya Kumar Chaudhary and Bharat Singh for
U.S. Prasad for the Respondent.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. The suit premises are described as booth no.13,
Sector 8, Panchkula. These premises were let out by the plaintiff-respondent
to the defendant-appellant sometime in August, 1989 on a monthly rent of
E Rs. 2650, excluding electricity charges. Since then the defendant-appellant
has been running therein a shop of provision goods and general stores. He
fell into arrears of rent and electricity charges with effect from I st April,
1990. The plaintiff-respondent served on hil]l a notice demanding payment of
arrears and terminating his tenancy. On failure to comply with the notice a
suit for eviction was filed in the Court of Civil Judge on 12.9.1990. The '
F defendant-appellant contested the suit mainly on the ground of notice of •
ejectment being defective. The Trial Court, by its judgment dated 11th June,
1998, answered all the issues in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and directed
the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears to be decreed. First and second
appeals preferred by the defendant-appellant have been dismissed. This is an
G appeal filed by special leave.

It has been common case at the Bar that the suit premises are situated ... J
in the State of Haryana where the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
are not applicable and the rights and obligations of the parties are to be
worked out and governed under common law of the land. At the time of
H hearing it was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that no fault
O.P. GUPTA v. R.B. GOY AL [R.C. LAHOTl, J.) 363
can be found with the decree of the Trial Court as confirmed by the First A
Appellate Court and the High Court. However, the learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that there has been a subsequent event having a material
bearing on the judgment under appeal and the right of the respondent to
decree. Such subsequent event is now the core of controversy, the relevant
facts relating to which, are stated in the succeeding paragraphs.
B
It appears that the suit premises have been constructed by Haryana
Urban Development Authority (HUDA, for short), governed by the provisions
of The Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (the Act, for short).
The premises have been allotted by HUDA to th~ plaintiff-respondent and
the latter is required to pay certain instalments to HU DA and a failure in C
payment of instalments renders the allotment liable to cancellation with
recovery of arrears, imposition of penalty and resumption of possession under
Section 17 of the Act. The High Court rendered its judgment in Second
Appeal on 15.12.1998. The only contention dealt with by the High Court, in
view of the singular submission made before it, was to allow the appellant
three months' time for vacating the premises subject to an undertaking for D
vacating the premises on expiry of three months. SLP was filed on 8.3.1999.
_,_, On 30.3.1999 this Court directed a notice on SLP to be issued to the respondent
and at the same time passed an interim order staying the operation of the
decree appealed against. On 15.3.1999, the date on which the time appointed
by the High Court for vacating the premis"es was coming to an end, the E
tenant-appellant moved an application before the High Court seeking one
month's extension of time for compliance with the direction of the High
Court on two grounds: firstly, that though the SLP was filed in this Court it
was yet to be taken up for hearing; and secondly, HUDA had initiated
proceedings for resumption of the suit premises against the plaintiff-respondent.
It appears that the High Court extended the time for vacating the premises till F
20.4.1999. In the meantime, as already stated, this Court granted interim
relief to the appellant although the factum of extension of time granted by the
High Court and the grounds therefor were not brought to the notice of this
Court. All these facts were brought to the notice of this Court through an
affidavit filed (by way of counter-affidavit to the special leave petition) on G
I Ith May, 1999 by the plaintiff-respondent submitting that the conduct of the
defendant-appellant did not entitle him to any relief in the discretionary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

An additional affidavit by way of rejoinder was filed by the appellant
on 8th June, 1999 wherein it has been stated that after the filing of SLP in H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A this Court the appellant had received a notice dated 7 .4.1999 from the Estate
Officer, HUDA asking him to vacate the suit premises. On 19.5.1999 the
appellant has submitted an application to HUDA requesting them to allot the
suit premises to the appellant on the same terms and conditions or any other
terms and conditions as may be thought fit by HUDA. It was submitted that
B in these circumstances, as the plaintiff-respondent has ceased to be owner of
the suit premises, he was not entitled to execute the decree for eviction and
the same was liable to be set aside.

At the time of hearing the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent
brought to the notice of this court an order dated 22.6.2000 passed by Chief
C Administrator, HUDA, an Appellate Authority over the Estate Officer, HUDA '
whereby an appeal filed by the respondent has been allowed and the respondent
has been allowed an extension of time for payment of the arrears of instalments
to HUDA.

The relevant facts emerging from a perusal of the documents placed on
D record by the parties insofar as they relate to the proceedings before HUDA
may briefly be noticed.

On 12.2.1999 the Estate Officer, HUDA passed an order recalling the
allotment of the suit premises for failure of the respondent to pay the amount
" ..
E of instalments in arrears and the interest accrued th~reon, forfeiting the amount
already paid. On 7.4.1999 the appellant was served with a notice by the
Estate Officer to remove his unauthorized occupation of the premises. On
19.5.1999 the appellant proposed to HUDA that he was ready and willing to
pay the Authority the entire amount which was to be paid by the respondent
to it along with interest and to have the suit premises allotted to himself. In
F between, the plaintiff respondent had preferred an appeal under Section 18
of the Act, putting in issue the order of Estate Officer, which appeal came
to be allowed and the order of resumption has been set aside. It appears that
there was a dispute as to the rate at which the interest was levied by HUDA
on the amount of instalments in arrears, as to which the High Court of Punjab
G & Haryana had issued some directions which the Authority was required to
comply. The Appellate Authority directed the Estate Officer to calculate
interest consistently with the decision of the High Court and to allow 30
days' time to the respondent to make payment failing which the resumption
may follow. On 3 .11.2000 the respondent has written to the Estate Officer
inviting his attention to the appellate order, his failure to act thereon and
H expressing the willingness of the respondent to pay the amount subject to its
O.P. GUPTA v. R.B. GOY AL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 365
being calculated by the Estate Officer as per the appellate order of the A
~
Administrator. What has happened thereafter is not known.
..I
It is common case of the parties that the rights and obligations of the
] parties as landlord and tenant are not to be worked out as statutorily enacted
by Transfer of Property Act as the same is not applicable to the State of
Haryana. However, still, the learned counsel for the parties have not disputed B
that the principles flowing from the provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act may safely be taken as a guide to work out the mutual rights and
obligations of the parties under the general law. A tenant inducted into
possession of the tenancy premises is ordinarily bound to restore possession
' over the tenancy premises to the landlord on the tenancy coming to an end.
~

Such obligation comes to an end either by actually fulfilling the obligation
c
or by proving that the landlord's title stands extinguished by the landlord's
eviction by title paramount. The burden of proving eviction by title paramount
lies on the party who sets up such defence. In a recent decision by us in
Vashu Deo v. Bal Kishan, (C.A. Nos. 5467-5468of1998 decided on January
11, 2002) we have held : D
"To constitute eviction by title paramount so as to discharge the
-/ obligation of the tenant to put his lessor into possession of the leased
premises, three conditions must be satisfied: (i) the party evicting
must have a good and present title to the property; (ii) the tenant must
have quieted or directly attomed to the paramount title holder against E
his will; (iii) either the landlord must be willing or be a consenting
party to such direct attornment by his tenant to the paramount title
holder or there must be an event, such as a change in law or passing
of decree by a competent court, which would dispense with the need
"' of consent or willingness on the part of the landlord and so bind him
"' as would enable the tenant handing over possession or attorning in
F
favour of the paramount title holder directly; or, in other words, the
paramount title holder must be armed with such legal process for
eviction as cannot be lawfully resisted. The burden of raising such a
plea and substantiating the same, so as to make out a clear case of
eviction by paramount title holder, lies on the party relying on such G
,_.. defence."

In Vashu Deo 's case (supra) the landlord-owner of the tenancy premises
was a Trust. The Trust had let out the premises to a tenant and the tenant had
inducted a sub-tenant in the premises. The Trust had instituted a suit for
eviction against the tenant subsequent to the institution of the suit by tenant H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) I S.C.R.

A against sub-tenant claiming arrears of rent and eviction of the latter.
Immediately on institution of suit by the principal owner, i.e. the Trust, the
'
sub-tenant had voluntarily attorned in favour of the principal owner and
without the consent of the tenant. Suit by the principal owner against the
tenant was still pending. This Court noticed the provisions of local rent
t
control law whereunder entitlement of the tenant to hold the suit premises as
B tenant would not come to an end unless a decree for eviction against him was
passed by a court of law in a suit for eviction instituted by the principal
owner against the tenant and then held - 'till then he would remain a tenant
of the Trust. Mere institution of a suit for eviction by the Trust, the owner
of the property, against the respondent does not bring the tenancy of the
....
c respondent to an end. The respondent cannot be said to have been evicted by
title paramount. It cannot be said that the respondent-tenant does not have
any defence nor can he lawfully resist the suit filed by the owner Trust. The
plain and simple legal position which flows is that the appellant must discharge
his statutory obligation to put his landlord, that is, the respondent, in possession
of the premises in view of the latter's entitlement to hold the tenancy premises
D until his own right comes to an end and the respondent must discharge his
statutory obligation to put his own landlord, that is, the Trust, in possession
of the tenancy premises on his entitlement to hold the tenancy premises
'
..
coming to an end. The plea of eviction by paramount title is not available to
the appellant for three reasons: firstly, it cannot be said that the Trust is
E armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted by
the tenant-respondent or to which he has no defence; secondly, the attornment
by the appellant in favour of the Trust is voluntary and not under any
compulsion; and thirdly, it cannot be said that the Trust has such good and
present title against the tenant-respondent so as to hold the appellant liable
to be evicted against his will'. .
F
For two reasons we do not think that the defendant-appellant is entitled
to any relief and for setting aside of the decree for eviction. Firstly, there is
neither any order of resumption and forfeiture within the meaning of Section
17 of the Act passed by HUDA against the respondent nor is there an allotment
by HUDA directly in favour of the appellant. In view of the order of the
G
Estate Officer having been set aside by the Appellate Authority under the Act
the allotment made by HUDA in favour of the respondent continues to subsist.
.. _;
His title, under which he had inducted the appellant in possession of the suit
premises, has not come to an end. The triple test, laid down by this court in
Vashu Deo 's case is not satisfied. Secondly, the appellant is placing reliance
H on an event happening after the institution of suit, i.e. a subsequent event and
O.P. GUPTA v. R.B. GOYAL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 367

a case for takirlg notice of such subsequent event by court so as to impair the A
judgment under appeal is not made out.

The ordinary rule of civil Jaw is that the rights of the parties stand
crystalised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree
in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the
commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of B
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following
conditions being satisfied : (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by
reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii)
that taking note of such subsequ~nt event or changed circumstances would
shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; (iii) C
that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and
in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is
not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General
Traders, AIR (1975) SC 1409 this Court held that a fact arising after the lis,
coming to the notice of the Court and having a fundamental impact on the
right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the D
notice of the Court cannot be blinked at. The Court may in such cases bend
the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fairplay is
violated for it would promote substantial justice provided that there is absence
of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. The court speaking through
Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that court can, so Jong as the litigation E
pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial justice. However, the
court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept
the decretal remedy, (ii) rules ofproctdure may be bent if no specific provision
or fairplay is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling
resort to that course in Jaw or justice, (iii) such cognizance of subsequent
events and developments should be cautions, and (iv) the rules of fairness to F
both sides should be scrupulously obeyed.

Such subsequent event may be one purely of Jaw or founded on facts.
In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before
acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in Jaw is going to G
affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the
course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law.
In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists
of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their
impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6
Rule 17 of the CPC. Such subsequent event the Court may permit being H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary
to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between
the parties. In Messers. Trojan & Co. v. R.M NN Nagappa Chettiar, AIR
(1953) SC 235 this Court has held that the decision of a case cannot be baoed
(
on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleacied that
has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings the Court would not
B be entitled to modify or alter the relief. In Sri Mahan/ Govind Rao v. Sita
Ram Kesha & Ors., (1898) 25 Indian Appeals 195 (PC), their Lordships
observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be
granted.

C Power of the Court to take note of subsequent events, specially at the
appellate stage, came up for the consideration of a Full Bench of Nagpur
High Court presided over by Justice Sinha (as His Lordship then was) in
Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedul/a Khan, AIR (1953) Nag 361.
Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held, on a review of judicial
opinion, that an action must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action
D as it existed at the commencement of the action. No doubt, Courts 'can' and
sometimes 'must' take notice of subsequent events, but that is done merely
'inter parts' to shorten litigation but not to give to a defendant an advantage
because a third party has acquired the right and title of the plaintiff. The
doctrine itself is of an exceptional character only to be used in very special
E circumstances. It is all the more strictly applied in those cases where there is
a judgment under appeal. His Lordship quoted the statement of law made by
Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in a series of cases that merely because the plaintiff
loses his title 'pendente lite' is no reason for allowing his adversary to win
if the corresponding right has not vested in the adversary but in a th'ird party.
In the case at hand, the defendant-appellant has simply stated the factum of
F proceedings initiated by HUDA against the plaintiff-respondent in an affidavit
very casually filed by him. He has not even made a prayer to the Court to
take notice of such subsequent event and mould the relief accordingly, or to
deny the relief to the plaintiff-respondent as allowed to him by the judgment
under appeal, much less sought for an amendment of the pleadings. The
G subsequent event urged by the defendant-appellant is basically a factual event
and cannot be taken cognizance of unless brought to the notice of the Court
in accordance with established rules of procedure which if done would have
afforded the plaintiff-respondent an opportunity of meeting the case now
sought to be set up by the appellant. We do not think this Court would be
justified in taking notice of a fact sought to be projected by the appellant in
H a very cavalier manner. The fact remains that the present one is a landlord-
O.P. GUPTA v. R.B. GOYAL [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 369
tenant dispute and we cannot upset the relief granted by the courts below and A
the High Court to the plaintiff-respondent by relying on the doctrine of eviction
by title paramount as it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by
HUDA against the plaintiff-respondent have achieved a finality or are such
proceedings wherein the plaintiff-respondent cannot possibly have any
sustainable defence.
B
For the foregoing reasons the appeal is held liable to be dismissed and
is dismissed accordingly with costs throughout. The appellant is allowed
three months time to deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff
respondent subject to his filing usual undertaking and clearing all the arrears
under the decree within 3 weeks.
c
NJ. Appeal dismissed.