OM PRAKASH CHAUTALAversusKANWAR BHAN AND OTHERS

                    [2014] 1 S.C.R. 939


                 OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA                               A
                               v.
              KANWAR BHAN AND OTHERS
              (Civil Appeal No. 1785 of 2014)

                     JANUARY 31, 2014
                                                                   8
          [ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

       CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Art. 21 - Reputation
of a person is a noble asset - When it is hurt, man is half dead
- It is vety dear to life and deserves protection u/Art. 21 - In   C
courts, it must be safely guarded - When a court deals with a
matter that has something likely to affect a person's
reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously
and carefully adhered to - A person who is not a party in a
case, his conduct cannot be commented upon - If he asks for        D
expunction of remarks, same should not be denied.

      PARTY: Non-impleadment - Disparaging remarks
 against a person not party in a case - Held: When a person
is not a party in a case and it is not necessaty to decide his E
conduct in that case then no adverse remark should be made
 against him - In the instant case, the appellant was CM of the
 State of Hatyana - On the basis of complaint from a person
in crowd in public meeting, he suspended first respondent
fr?m service_- In a_writ petition by first respondent challenging, F
his suspension, High Court dropped the charges and further, ,
criticized the action of the appellant and held that there has
been arbitraty exercise of power which was amenable to
judicial review - The writ petition could have been decided
 without making series of comments on the appellant, who, at
 the relevant time, was the Chief Minister - The observations G
made by High Court were really not necessaty as an integral
part for the decision of the case - Therefore, adverse remarks
 are expunged - Doctrine of audi alteram partem.

                             939                                   H
    940      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A      JUDGES: Role of Judges and judicial approach - Held:
  Judges must not unduly criticize conduct of parties and others
  - Tf1ey should not be guided by any kind of notion - They must
  realize that they are not infallible and their unjust criticism
  may do harm - Judges must show judicial restraint - They
B must not do anything which blindens thinking process - They
  must show humility and chastity of thought which are bed rock
  of a Civilized Society - Judicial restraint.

        JUDGMENT/ORDER: Reasoned judgment - Held: A
  judgment may have rhetoric but the said rhetoric has to be
C dressed with reason and must be in accordance with the legal
  principles, otherwise a mere rhetoric in a judgment, may likely
   to cause prejudice to a person and courts are not expected
   to give any kind of prejudicial remarks against a person,
   especially so, when he is not a party before it.
D
      The first respondent was State Government
  employee. The appellant was Chief Minister of Haryana.
  He was attending a function on 4.2.2001 when he
  received some complaint against the first respondent
E from the crowd. On the basis of complaint, the appellant
  placed the first respondent under suspension. In due
  course, the first respondent was suspended. He
  questioned it by writ petition. A single judge of the High
  Court allowed it and also criticized the action of the
F appellant by which he ordered suspension. Aggrieved,
  the appellant filed LPA on the ground that the adverse
  remarks were not at all necessary to adjudicate upon tlie
  issue involved in the matter and further when he was not
  impleaded as a party to the writ petition recording of such
G observations was totally impermissible as it
  fundamentally violated the principles of natural justice.
  The Division Bench of the High Court rejected his plea.
  Aggrieved, the appellant filed the instant appeal.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court
H
    OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                  941


      HELD: 1. Reputation is fundamentally a glorious A
 amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man
 feel proud of his ancestry and satisfies him fo bequeath
 it as a part of inheritance on the posterity. It is a nobility
 in itself for which a conscientious man would never
 barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the B
 pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and
·vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is half-
 dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally
 preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The
 aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be c
 allowed to be sullied with the passage of time. The
  memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would
  conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to life and on
 some occasions it is -dearer than life. And that is why it
  has become an inseparable facet of Article 21 of the
                                                                0
  Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation
  dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather
  than popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has
  something likely to affect a person's reputation, the
  normative principles of law are to be cautiously and
  carefully adhered to. The advertence has to be sans E
  emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in
  accord with the doctrine of audi alteram partem before
  anything adverse is said. [para 1] [945-G-H; 946-A-D]

     2. On the principle of natural justice, the disparaging F
 remarks and directions deserve to be annulled. From the
 order of the Division Bench, it is clear that the appellant
 was not before the single judge, and (ii) by no stretch of
 logic the observations and the directions were required
 to decide the lis. The single Judge had opined that the G
 order of suspension was unjustified and that is why it
 was revoked. He had also ruled that there has been
 arbitrary exercise of power which was amenable to
 judicial review and, more so, when the charges were
 dropped against the employee. The conclusion could H
    942     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A have been arrived at without making series of comments
  on the appellant, who, at the relevant time, was the Chief
  Minister of the State. The observations made by single
  judge were really not necessary as an integral part for the
  decision of the case as stated in *Mohammad l\!aim's
B case. Once the observations are not justified, as a natural
  corollary, the directions have to be treated as sensitively
  susceptible. [Paras 12, 13, 15) [950-F; 951-E-G; 952-A-B;
  953-F-G]

        *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim AIR 1964
C   SC 703: 1964 SCR 363; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.
    Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154: 1998 (2) SCR 693; State
    of Pun1ab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC
    570: 1995 (1) SCR 695; The State of Madhya Pradesh v.
    Bani Singh and another JT 1990 (2) SC 54; P. V. Mahadevan
D   v. MD. TN. Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636: 2005 (2)
    Suppl. SCR 474; State of MP. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4
    SCC 566: 1987 (1) SCR 1; A. M Mathur v. Pramod Kumar
    Gupta and Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 533: 1990 (2) SCR 11 O; Amar
    Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr: (2012) 6 SCC
E   491: 2012 (5) SCR 1154 - relied on.

       State of Bihar and Anr. v. P.P. Sharma, /AS and Anr.
  1992 Supp (1) SCC 222: 1991 (2) SCR 1 ; Testa Setalvad
  and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 88: 2004
F (3) SCR 1042; State of WB. and Ors. v. Babu Chakrabotthy
  (2004) 12 sec 201: 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 17; Dr. Difip
  Kumar Deka and Anr. v. State of Assam and Anr. (1996) 6
  SCC 234: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 763; Jage Ram v. Hans Raj
  Mid ha (1972) 1 sec 181: 1972 (2) SCR 409; R.K.
  Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan (1975) 2 SCC 466: 1976 (1)
G SCR 204; Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar(1986) 2 SCC
  569: 1986 (2) SCR 470 - referred to.

      3. A Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion.
  The decision making process expects a Judge or an
H adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual
   OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                943


subjectivity, make one's emotions subservient to one's A
reasoning and think dispassionately. He is expected to
be guided by the established norms of judicial process
and de_corum. A judgment may have rhetorics but the
said rhetoric has to be dressed with reason and must be
in accord with the legal principles. Otherwise a mere B
rhetoric, especially in a judgment, may likely to cause
prejudice to a person and courts are not expected to give
any kind of prejudicial remarks against a person,
especially so, when he is not a party before it. In that
context, the rhetoric becomes sans reason, and without c
root. It is likely to blinden the thinking process. A Judge
is required to remember that humility and respect for
temperance and chastity of thought are at the bedrock
of apposite expression. Thus, a Judge should abandon
his passion. He must constantly remind himself that he 0
has a singular master "duty to truth" and such truth is
to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No heroism,
no rehtorics. [Para 19, 21] [955-A-E; 956-B]

     4. Another facet gaining significance and is adverted
to is when caustic observations are made which are not E
necessary as an integral part of adjudication it affects the
person's reputation - a cherished right under Article 21
of the Constitution. Disparaging remarks, as recorded by
the single Judge, were not necessary for arriving at the
decision which he has rendered, the same being not an F
integral part and further that could not have been done
when the appellant was not a party before the court and
also he was never afforded an opportunity to explain his
conduct, and the affirmation of the same by the Division
Bench on the foundation that it has not caused any G
prejudice and he can fully defend himself when a
subsequent litigation is instituted, are legally
unacceptable. Accordingly, the extracted remarks and
also any remarks which have been made that are likely
                                                             H
    944      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A   to affect the reputation of the appellant are expunged.
    [paras 22, 28] [956-B-C; 958-C-F]

          Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.
    (2013) 10 SCC 591; Ki ran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and
B   Anr. (1989) 1 SCC 494: 1989 (1) SCR 20; Vishwanath
    Agrawal v. Sar/a Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) 7 SCC 288:
    2012 (7) SCR 607; Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of
    Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 1: 2012 (8) SCR 651;
    Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Di/ipkumar
C   Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. (1983) 1SCC124: 1983
    (1) SCR 828; State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for
    Governance Trust and Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 587: 2007 (1) SCR
    87 - Relied on.

      D. F. Marion v. Davis 217 Ala 16 : 114 So 357 : 55 ALR
D 171 (1927) - referred to.


                           Case Law Reference:
          1991 (2) SCR 1              Referred to     Para 8
E
          2004 (3) SCR 1042           Referred to     Para 9
          2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 17      Referred to     Para 10
          1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 763     Referred to     Para 11
F         1964 SCR 363                Relied on       Para 11
          1972 (2) SCR 409            Referred to     Para 11
          1976 (1) SCR 204            Referred to      Para 11

G         1986 (2) SCR 470            Referred to     Para 11
          1998 (2) SCR 693            Relied on       Para 13
          1995 (1) SCR 695            Relied on       Para 13
          JT 1990 (2) SC 54           Relied on        Para 13
H
         OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                        945


         2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 474         Relied on         Para 13        A

         1987 (1) SCR 1                  Relied on         Para 16
         1990 (2) SCR 110                Relied on         Para 17

         2012 (5) SCR 1154               Relied on         Para 18        B
         (2013) 1o sec 591               Relied on         Para 22
-,       1989 (1) SCR 20                 Relied on         Para 23

         2012 (7) SCR 607                Relied on         Para 24
                                                                          c
         2012 (8) SCR 651                Relied on         Para 25
         1983 (1) SCR 828                Relied on         Para 26

         2007 (1) SCR 87                 Relied on         Para 27

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. :                D
     1785 of 2014.

          From the Judgment, order dated 19.01.2010 of the High
     Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 12384
     of 2008, LPA No. 1456 of 2009.                                       E

         P.P. Rao and Neeraj Kr. Jain, Aditya Kr. Chaudhary,
     Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the Appellant.

         Hitesh Malik, AAG, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Mridula Ray
     Bhardwaj for the Respondents.                                        F

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         DIPAK MISRA, J. Leave granted.

      1. Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and               G
 unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his
 ancestry and satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of inheritance
 on the posterity. It is a nobility in itself for which a conscientious
 man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that
 _matter all the pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both              H
    946      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014) 1 S.C.R.


A horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man
  is half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally
  preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The aroma
  of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be
  sullied with the passage of time. The memory of nobility no one
B would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied.
  It is dear to life and on some occasions it is dearer than life.
  And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of Article
  21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation
  dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather than
c popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has something
  likely to affect a person's reputation, the normative principles
  of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The
  advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist
  perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of audi
  alteram partem before anything adverse is said.
0
         2. We have commenced with aforesaid prefatory note
    because the centripodal question that has eminently emanated
    for consideration in this appeal, by special leave, is whether
    the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge of
E   the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP
    No. 12384 of 2008 commenting on the conduct of the appellant
    and further directing recovery of interest component awarded
    to the employee, the first respondent herein, from the present
    appellant and also to realize the cost and seek compensation
F   in appropriate legal forum, including civil court, though the
    appellant was not arrayed as a party to the writ petition, and
    denial of expunction of the aforesaid observations and
    directions by the Division Bench in LP.A. No. 1456 of 2009
    on the foundation that the same are based on the material
G   available on record and, in any case, grant of liberty to claim
    compensation or interest could not be held to be a stricture
    causing prejudice to the appellant who would have full
    opportunity of defending himself in any proceeding which may
    be brought by the respondent for damages or recovery of
H   interest, is legally defensible or bound to founder on the ground
      OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                     947
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
  that the appellant was not impleaded as a respondent to the       A
  proceeding. Be it noted, the Division Bench has also opined
  that the observations made by the learned single Judge are not
  conclusive and no prejudice has been caused to the appellant,
  the then Chief Minister of the State of Haryana.
                                                                    B
       3. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are to
 ·be exposited are that the first respondent was working as
  Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the State of
  Haryana. On 4.2.2001 during a state function "Sarkar Apke
  Dwar" at Jagadhari constituency the appellant received a
  complaint from some person in the public, including the elected C
  representative, about the working of the respondent No.1. The
  appellant after considering the verbal complaint announced the
  suspension of the first respondent during the press conference
  on the same day. On 06.02.2001 the first respondent was
- placed under suspension by the letter of the Financial D
  Commissioner & Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, Cooperation
  Department, Chandigarh which was followed by charge sheet
  dated 27.03.2002. The first respondent filed CWP No. 16025
  of 2001 against the suspension order which was disposed of
  on 20.03.2002 with direction to the Government. On 28.03.2002 . E
  the 1st respondent was reinstated pending inquiry. After
  issuance of charge sheet and revocation of the suspension
  order, the first respondent submitted his reply on 5.6.2002.

       4. As the facts would undrape, nothing happened thereafter   F
  and he stood superannuated on 31.01.2005 and was granted
  provisional pension, provident fund and amount of Group
  Insurance Claim but pension as due and other retiral benefits
  like gratuity, leave encashment, commutation of other leaves,
  etc. were withheld due to pendency of disciplinary proceedings.   G
  On 6.2.2007 the first respondent filed CWP No. 2243 of 2007
  which. was disposed of by the High Court directing the
  government to complete the enquiry within a period of six
  months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. As the
  enquiry was not concluded within the stipulated time, the
                                                                    H
    948     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A employee preferred CWP No. 12384 of 2008. The learned
  single Judge vide judgment and order dated 20.10.2009
  allowed the writ petition and set aside the charge-sheet and
  the punishment with further directions to release all the pension
  and pensionary benefits due to the first respondent within a
B period of one month with interest @ 10 % p.a. from the due
  date to the date of payment. In course of judgment the learned
  single Judge made certain observations against the appellant
  herein.

       5. Grieved by the observations and inclusive directions
C made in the judgment the appellant preferred LPA No. 1456
  of 2009. The contentions raised by the appellant in the intra-
  court appeal that the adverse remarks were not at all necessary
  to adjudicate upon the issue involved in the matter, and further
  when he was not impleaded as a party to the writ petition
D recording of such observations was totally impermissible, as it
  fundamentally violated the principles of natural justice, were not
  accepted by the Division Bench as a consequence of which
  the appeal did not meet with success.

E        6. We have heard Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel
    for the appellant and Mr. Hitesh Malik, Additional Advocate
    General appearing for the State. Despite service of notice there
    is no appearance on behalf of the private respondent, that is,
    respondent No. 1.
F      7. As has been indicated earlier, the appellant was not a
  party to the ·proceeding. It is manifest that the !earned single
  Judge has made certain disparaging remarks against the
  appellant and, in fact, he has been also visited with certain ,
  adverse consequences. Submission ofMr. P.P. Rao, learned
G senior counsel, is that the observations and the directions are
  wholly unsustainable when the appellant was not impleaded as
  a party to the proceeding and further they are totally
  unwarranted for the adjudication of the controversy that travelled
  to the Court.
H
     . OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                        949
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      8. In State of Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, /AS and          A
         1
 another  , this Court has laid down that the person against whom

 mala tides or bias is imputed should be impleaded as a party
 respondent to the proceeding and be given an opportunity to
 meet the allegations. In his absence no enquiry into the
·allegations should be made, for such an enquiry would                   B
 tantamount to violative of the principles of natural justice as it
 amounts to condemning a person without affording an
 opportunity of hearing.

     9. In Testa Setalvad and another v. State of Gujarat and
others2 the High Court had made certain caustic observations
                                                                         c /
casting serious aspersions on the appellants therein, though
they were not parties before the High Court. Verifying the record
that the appellants therein were not parties before the High
Court, this Court observed: -
                                                                         D
      "It is beyond comprehension as to how the learned Judges
      in the High Court could afford to overlook such a basic and
      vitally essential tenet of the "rule of law", that no one should
      be condemned unheard, and risk themselves to be
      criticized for injudicious approach and/or render their            E
      decisions vulnerable for challenge on account of violating
      judicial norms and ethics."

And again: -

      "Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice             F
      of making observations in judgments, unless the persons
      in respect of whom comments and criticisms were being
      made were parties to the proceedings, and further were
      granted an opportunity of having their say in the matter,
      unmindful of the serious repercussions they may entail on          G
      such persons."


1.   1992 Supp (1) sec 222.
2.: c2004) 1o sec 88.                                                    H
    950       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         10. In State of WB. and others v. Babu Chakraborthy3 the
    principle was reiterated by stating that the High Court was not
    justified and correct in passing observations and strictures
    against the appellants 2 and 3 therein without affording an
    opportunity of being heard.
B        11 . In Dr. Di lip Kumar Deka and another v. State of
    Assam and another4, after referring to the authorities in State
    of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim 5, Jage Ram v. Hans
    Raj Midha 6 , R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan' and
    Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar8, this Court opined thus:-
C
          "7. We are surprised to find that in spite of the above
          catena of decisions of this Court, the learned Judge did
          not, before making the remarks, give any opportunity to1he
          appeliants, who were admittedly not parties to the revision
D         petition, to defend themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that
          the nature of remarks the learned Judge has made, has
          cast a serious aspersion on the appellants affecting their
          character and reputation and may, ultimately affect their
          career also. Condemnation of the appellants without giving
          them an opportunity of being heard was a complete
E
          negation of the fundamental principie of natural justice."

         12. At this juncture, it may be clearly stated that singularly
    on the basis of the aforesaid principle the disparaging remarks
    and directions, which are going to be referred to hereinafter,
F   deserve to be annulled but we also think it seemly to advert to
    the facet whether the remarks were really necessary to render
    the decision by the learned single Judge and the finding

    3.   (2004) 12 sec 201.
G 4.     (1996) 6 sec 234.
    5.   AIR 1964 SC 703.
    6.   (1972) 1 sec 181.
    7.   (1975) 2 sec 466.
    8.   (1986) 2 sec 569.
H
      OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                         951
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
 recorded by the Division Bench that the observations are ba_sed        A
 on the material on record and they do not cause any prejudice,
 are legally sustainabl~. As far as finding of the Division Bench
 is concerned that they are based on materials brought on
 record is absolutely unjustified in view of the following principles
 laid down in Mohammad Naim (supra): -                                  B

       "It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of
       making disparaging remarks against persons or
       authorities whose conduct comes into consideration
       before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is C
       relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct
       is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of
       explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is
       evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying lhe
       remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision
       of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on 0
       that conduct."

       13. On a perusal of the order we find that two aspects are
  clear, namely, (i) that the appellant was not before the court, and
  (ii) by no stretch of logic the observations and the directions E
· were required to decide the lis. We are disposed to think so
  as we fi.nd that the learned single Judge has opined that the
  order of suspension was unjustified and that is why it was
  revoked. He has also ruled that there has been arbitrary
  exercise of power which was amenable to judicial review and, F
  more so, when the charges were dropped against the
  employee. Commenting on the second charge-sheet dated
  15.3.2004 the learned single Judge, referring to the decisions
  in State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan 9, State of
  Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goya/ 10, The State of G
  Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another11 and P. V.

 9.   (1988) 4 sec 154.
 10. (1995) 2 sec 570.
 11. JT 1990 (2) SC 54.                                                 H
    952       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A   Mahadevan v. M.D. T.N. Housing Board 12, thought it
    appropriate to quash the same on the ground of delay. The
    conclusion could have been arrived at without making series
    of comments on the appellant, who, at the relevant time, was
    the Chief Minister of the State.
B
        14. At this juncture, we think it apt to point out some of the
    observations made against the appellant: -

          "Arrogance of power by the Chief Minister seems to be
          at play in this case"
c
                xxx                     xxx               xxx
          "The petitioner is also justified in making a grievance that
          first the Chief Minister had suspended him on the basis
          of a loose talk in the press conference and thereafter the
D         officials of the Government have attempted to justify their
                   '
          own mistakes on the one pretext or the other. The petitioner
          would term this case to be "a proof of worst ugly look of
          Indian democracy". He may be an aggrieved person but
          his anger is justified to refer this treatment to be an ugly
E         face of democracy. Is not it dictatorial display of power in
          democratic set up? Final order is yet to be passed
          regarding this charge sheet. It is orally pointed out that the
          charge sheet is finalized on 16.9.2009. It is done without
          holding any enquiry or associating the petitioner in any
F         manner. How can this be sustained in this background?"

                xxx                     xxx               xxx
          "Chief Minister was bound to inform himself of the well
          known maxim "be you ever so high, the law is above you".
G
                xxx                    xxx                xxx
          "The respondents, thus, have made themselves fully

H   12. (2005) 6 sec 636.
    OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                      953
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     responsible for this plight of the petitioner on account of   A
     the illegalities that have been pointed out and which the
     respondents have failed to justify in any cogent or
     reasonable manner. They all are to be held accountable
     for this. This would include even the then Chief Minister,
     who initiated this illegal process and did not intervene to   B
     correct the illegality ever thereafter."

            xxxxxx                                 )()()(


     "The interest awardable shall be recovered from all the
     officers and including the Chief Minister, who were either    C
     responsible for placing the petitioner under suspension or
     in perpetuating the illegality and had unnecessarily
     charged and harassed the petitioner."

            xxxxxx                                 )()()(
                                                                   D
     "Liberty is, therefore, given to the petitioner to seek
     compensation for the harassment caused to him by
     approaching any appropriate Forum, including Civil Court,
     where he can seek this compensation even from the then
     Chief Minister."                                              E

      15. On a studied scrutiny of the judgment in entirety we
have no hesitation in holding that the observations made by the
learned single Judge were really not necessary as an integral
part for the decision of the case as stated in Mohammad Naim's     F
case. Needless to say, once the observations are not justified,
as a natural corollary, the directions have to be treated as
sensitively susceptible.

    16. In this context, it is necessary to state about the role
                                                                   G
of a Judge and the judicial approach. In State of M.P. v.
Nandlal Jaiswa/ 13, Bhagwati, CJ, speaking for the court
expressed strong disapproval of the strictures made by the


13. (1986) 4 sec 566.                                              H
    954       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A learned .Judge in these terms. -

          "We may observe in conclusion that judges should not use
          strong and carping language while criticising the conduct
          of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety,
          .moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to
B
          recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and
          disparaging strictures passed by them against any party
          may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do
          considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice."

C      17. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta and others14
  the Court observed that judicial restraint and discipline are
  necessary to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of
  restraint and the humility of function has to be the constant
  theme for a Judge, for the said quality in decision making is
D as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to
  protect the independence of the judiciary. Further proceeding
  the two-Judge Bench stated thus: -

          "Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called
          judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect
E
          to those who come before the court as well to other co-
          ordinate branches of the State, the executive and the
           legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these
          qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the
          judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good
F          for the judge nor for the judicial process."

       18. In Amar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
  another15, it has been emphasized that intemperate language
  should be avoided in the judgments and while penning down
G the same the control over the language should not be forgotten
  and a committed comprehensive endeavour has to be made
  to put the concept to practice so that as a conception it gets

    14. (1990) 2 sec 533.
H 15. (2012) 6 sec 491.
    OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                                 955
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
concretized and fructified.                                                     A

     19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is
not to be guided by any kind of notion. The decision making
process expects a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint,
ostracise perceptual subjectivity, make one's emotions
                                                                     8
subservient to one's reasoning and think dispassionately. He
is expected to be guided by the established norms of judicial
process and decorum. A judgment may have rhetorics but the
said rhetoric has to be dressed with reason and must be in
accord with the legal principles. Otherwise a mere rhetoric, C
especially in a judgment, may likely to cause prejudice to a
person and courts are not expected to give any kind of
prejudicial remarks against a person, especially so, when he
is not a party before it. In that context, the rhetoric becomes sans
reason, and without root. It is likely to blinden the thinking
process. A Judge is required to remember that humility and . D
respect for temperance and chastity of thought are at the
bedrock of apposite expression. In this regard, we may
profitably refer to a passage from Frankfurter, Felix, in Clark,
Tom C., 16 :
                                                                     E
     "For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate
     one's personal pulls and one's private views to the law of
     which we are all guardians - those impersonal convictions
     that make a society a civilized .community, and not the
     victims of personal rule,"                                      F

     20. The said learned Judge had said: -

     "What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning on the
     Court in the large area within which his individuality moves
     is his general attitude towards law, the habits of mind that G
     he has formed or is capable of unforming, his capacity for
     detachment, his temperament or training for putting his

16. Mr. Justice Frankfurter: 'A Heritage for all who Love the Law,' 51 A.BAJ.
    330, 332 (1965).                                                            H
    956       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         passion behind his judgment instead of in front of it. 17 "

         21. Thus, a Judge should abandon his passion. He must
    constantly remind himself that he has a singular master "duty
    to truth" and such truth is to be arrived at within the legal
    parameters. No heroism, no rehtorics.
8
        22. Another facet gaining significance and deserves to be
    adverted to, when caustic observations are made which are not
    necessary as an integral part of adjudication and it affects the
    person's reputation - a cherished right under Article 21 of the
C   Constitution. In Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
    another18 this Court has observed: -

          "Personal rights of a human being include the right of
          reputation. A good reputation is an element of personal
D         security and is protected by the Constitution equally with
          the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.
          Therefore, it has been held to be a necessary element in
          regard to right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the
          Constitution. The International Covenant on Civil and
          Political Rights, 1966 recognises the right to have opinions
E
          and the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 is
          subject to the right of reputation of others."

         23. In Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another19
    this Court reproduced the following observations from the
F   decision in O.F. Marion v. Davis2°:

          "25 .... 'The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation,
          unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and
          is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an
G
    17. FRANKURTER, Felix, Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson,
        55 Columbia Law Review (April, 1955) p.436.
    1s. (2013) 10 sec 591.
    19. (1989) 1 sec 494.
H   20. 217 Ala 16: 114 So 357: 55 ALR 171 (1927).
    OM PRAKASH CHAUTALA v. KANWAR BHAN                       957
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    element of personal security, aod ·is protected by the           A
    Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life,
    liberty, and property."

     24. In Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sar/a Vishwanath Agrawa/2 1,
although in a different context, while dealing with the aspect of    B
reputation, this Court has observed that reputation is not only
the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most
precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished
value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the
present as well as for the posterity."
                                                                     c
      25. In Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh
and others22 this Court has ruled that the reverence of life is
insegregably associated with the dignity of a human being who
is basically divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed
with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained.   D
The sustenance of such dignity has to be the superlative
concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of dignity can
never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that
matter, "a brief candle", or "a hollow bubble". The spark of life
gets more resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans          E
humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an honourable
life which is a splendid gift of "creative intelligence". When a
dent is created in the reputation, humanism is paralysed.

     26. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v.
                                                                     F
Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others 23, while
dealing with the value of reputation, a two-Judge Bench
expressed thus: -

      "The expression 'life' has a much wider meaning. Where
    . therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely      G
      to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person,

21. (2012) 7 sec 288.
22. (2012) 8 sec 1.
23. (1983) 1 sec 124.                                                H
    958       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         some of the finer graces of human civilization which make
          life worth living would be jeopardized and the same can
          be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair
          procedures. In this context one can recall the famous words
          of Chapter II of Bhagwad-Gita :
B
          Sambhavitasya Cha Kirti Marnadati Richyate"

         27. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in State
    of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for Governance Trust and
    others24 .
c
       28. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we have no hesitation
  in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned
  single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision
  which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and
D further that could not have been done when the appellant was
  not a party before the court and also he was never afforded an
  opportunity to explain his conduct, and the affirmation of the
  same by the Division Bench on the foundation that it has not
  caused any prejudice and he can fully defend himself when a
E subsequent litigation is instituted, are legally unacceptable.
  Accordingly, we expunge the extracted remarks hereinbefore
  and also any remarks which have been made that are likely to
  affect the reputation of the appellant. Since, the appeal is
  confined only to expunging of adverse remarks, the same is
F allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

    D.G.                                            Appeal allowed.




    24. (2007) 3 sec 587.