OM PRAKASH & ANR.versusMISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI

                             [2017] 4 S.C.R. 864



A                         OM PRAKASH & ANR.
                                       v.
                  MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED
                        BY HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI
B                      (Civil Appeal No. 4309 of 2017)
                              MARCH 21, 2017
              [ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
         U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
C Eviction) Act, 1972:
             s.21 - Application under - Also a suit for eviction by
    appellants-landlords, joint owners of property in question against
    predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (tenants) - The original
    defendant/tenant refused to acknowledge appellants as his landlords
D   though admitted tenancy under appellants' grandmother and then
    under their father - Trial court decreed the suit - High Court limiting
    itself to the aspect of proof of the Will, negated appellants' status as
    landlords, and dismissed their suit - On appeal, held: Appellants
    were joint owners by virtue of a compromise decree arrived at
    between appellants and other co-owners, having due regard to the
E   Will in question, in a suit filed by such other co-owners -The decree,
    in absence of any challenge thereto became final - More so, the
    status. of appellants as joint owners of suit premises, was not
    questioned at any stage of the proceedings by anyone interested in
    the title thereto - Thus, the dismissal of suit by High Court on the
F   sole ground that appellants had no locus to maintain the same in
    absence of formal proof of the Will was grossly misdirected -
    lmpugnedjudgments of High Court set aside - Suit of appellants
    decreed in full - Rent Control and Eviction.
         s.20(4) - Proviso -Applicability of- s.20(4) relieves the tenant
G against his liability for eviction on the ground of default if condition
  therein is fulfilled - Proviso thereto, however, predicates that this
  benefit would not be available to a tenant who inter alia has built
  any residential building in the same city - Held: Jn the instant case,
  on the basis of evidence on record it is clear that the predecessor-
  i n-interes t of the respondents had constructed his own house
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                                      864
  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                       865
                HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI

elsewhere which dis-entitled him and consequently the respondents      A
to avail the benefit of protection uls.20(4).
        s.30 - Deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances -
 When cannot be invoked as a defence against eviction - Notice by
 appellants/landlords, joint owners of property in question, to
 respondents/tenants requiring payment of rent to them as landlords B
 - On non-payment by respondents, eviction suit by appellants -
 Respondents pleaded no default in payment of rent as the rent was
 deposited in Court as required u/s.30 after appellants' father
 allegedly refused to accept the same - Held: The original defendant
 in terms of the notice was fully aware of the compromise decree and
 thus, the status of appellants as joint owners/landlords - Therefore, C
 his offer of rent to appellants father, who ceased to be the landlord,
·was not in compliance of s.30 to be availed as a defence against
 hjs/their eviction from suit premises - Thus, original defendant and
 consequently the respondents are defaulters and are liable to be
 evicted.                                                               D
      Rent Control and Eviction - Eviction suit by co-owners -
Reiterated, a suit for eviction can be maintained by one of the co-
owners without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners
do not object.
       Evidence Act, 1872 - s.116 - Estoppel - Responde,nts-tenants    E
though accepting tenancy under appellants' grandmother and then
after her death under their father, denied to acknowledge appellants
as landlords in suit for eviction - Held: A tenant during the
continuance of tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from
denying the title of his landlord through whom he claims tenancy -     F
Respondents estopped uls.116 to dispute the status of appellants as
their landlord in a suit for eviction.
       Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD:l.1 The appellants claimed ownership of the suit
premises on the basis of the Will dated 28.12.1986 executed by         G
their grandmother. A compromise was arrived at between the
appellants and other co-owners having due regard to the said
Will, whereby the ownership of the suit premises in favour of the
appellants and such co-owners was declared and a decree to that
effect was passed. This decree, indisputably, had become final, in     H
866           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A     absence of any challenge thereto before any forum. In the face of
      this compromise decree, the dismissal of the suit and the rejection
      of the application for the release under Section 21 of the U.P.
      Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
      1972 by the High Court on the sole ground that the appellants
      had no locus to maintain the same in absence of formal proof of
B     the Will dated 28.12.1976 was grossly misdirected and thus cannot
      be sustained. [Para 28] [876-D-G]
          1.2 Noticeably, the predecessor-in-interest of the
   respondents had admitted the tenancy under appellants'
   grandmother. He had admitted as well that during her lifetime,
 C rent used to be paid to her and that thereafter her elder son,
   father of the appellants used to receive the rent. It is a matter of
   record that the appellants by notice dated 19.08.1989 had
   demanded from the original defendant the arrears of rent which
   notice was admittedly received by him but not acted upon. In
 D spite thereof, according to the original defendant, he offered rent
   to appellants' father for the months of October, 1989 to January,
   1990 by remitting the same by money-orders and on the alleged
   refusal thereof, eventually deposited the rent in court under
   Section 30. [Para 29] [876-G-H; 877-A, B-C]
 E       1.3 In view of the categorical disclosure in the aforesaid
   notice issued on behalf of the appellants, requiring payment of
   rent in arrears to them as the landlords and also indicating
   determination of tenancy in case of failure in payment, the so
   called offer of rent for the months of October, 1989 to January,
   1990 to appellants' father by money-orders and thereafter deposit
 F in Co.urt under Section 30 of the Act would be of no avail to the
   original defendant and on his death, to the present respondents.
   The original defendant in terms of the aforementioned notice was
   fully aware of the compromise decree and the status of the
   appellants as the joint owners/landlords and thus his offer of rent
 G to appellants' father, who ceased to be the landlord, was not in
   compliance either of sub-section 4 of Section 20 or Section 30 of
   the Act to be availed as a defence against his/their eviction from
   the suit premises. The original defendant and consequently the
   respondents has/have therefore rendered himszlf/themselves
   defaulters within the meaning of the Act and are liable to be
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 OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                         867
               HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI

evicted thereunder. It is more so as admittedly neither the original    A
defendant nor the respondents had ever endeavoured to offer
rent to the appellants after the compromise decree dated
05.04.89. [Para 30) [877-D-G)
       1.4 Further as it is a matter of record that the original
defendant had constructed his own house elsewhere where he              B
was residing with his wife, even if the deposit of arrears of rent
in full by the original defendant at the time of institution of the
suit is construed to be valid, in the face of his own house
elsewhere, he is not entitled to the protection from eviction under
the proviso to sub-section 4 of Section 20. [Para 31) [877-H;
878-A-B)                                                                c
      2.1 A suit for eviction of a tenant can be maintained by one
of the co-owners and it would be no defence to the tenar..t to
question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the
other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. The
judicially propounded proposition is that when the property D
forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by
several co-owners, every co-owner owns every part and every
bit of the joint property along with others and thus it cannot be
said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the
property and that he can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the E
tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-
owners do not object. In the contextual facts, not only the
compromise decree, had declared the appellants to be the joint
owners of the suit premises, their status as such was not
questioned at any stage by anyone interested in the title thereto.
[Para 32) [878-G-H; 879-A-B)                                       F

       2.2 Further, the original defendant having accepted
appellants' grandmother as his landlady and having thereafter
continued to pay rent to her son, the appellants' father, he during
his life time and after his demise, the respondents are estopped
under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to dispute G
the status of the appellants as their landlord in a suit for his eviction
from the tenanted premises. A tenant during the continuance of
the tenancy is debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying
the title of his landlord through whom he claims tenancy, as is
enshrined in Section 116. [Paras 33, 341 (879-B-DI                        H
868           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017) 4 S.C.R.


A          Sri Ram Pasricha v. JagqJ1nath and Ors. (1976) 4 SCC
           184 : [1977) 1 SCR 395; Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai
           and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 : [2002) 1 Suppl. SCR 19;
           India Umberalla Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v.
           Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead} by LRs. Savitri
           Agarwalla (Smt.) and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 : [2004)
B
           1 SCR 10 - relied on.
           S. Thangappan v. P Padmavathy (1999) 7 SCC 474 :
           [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 715; Bhogadi Kannababu and
           Ors. v. Vuggina Pydamma and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 532
           : [2006) 2 Suppl. SCR 352 - referred to.
c
                                Case Law Reference
            [1977) 1 SCR 395                   relied on        Para 32
            [2002) 1 Suppl. SCR 19             relied on        Para 32

D
            [2004) 1 SCR 10                    relied on        Para 32
            [1999) 1 Suppl. SCR715             referred to      Para 34
            [2006) 2 Suppl. SCR 352            referred to      Para 34
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4309
      of 2017.
E
            From the Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2014 of the High Court
      ofAllahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 26732 of2010
                                       WITH
            C. A. No. 4310 of 2017.
 F
            Anand Varma, Kaustubh Prakash, Ramendra Mohan Patnaik,
      Advs. for the Appellants.
           R. D. Upadhyay, H. S. Sharan, G. G. Upadhyay, Ms. Asha
      Upadhyay, J. P. Tripathi, Advs. for the Respondent:
G           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            AMITAVA ROY, J. I. Delay condoned.
            2. Leave granted.
            3. The appellants/plaintiffs (for short, hereinafter to be referred
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  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                               869
        HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

to as "the appellants") are aggrieved by the dismissal of their suit and A
the application under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short, hereinafter to be referred
to as "the Act") for eviction of the respondents from the suit premises
on the ground, amongst others of default and bona fide requirement.
The suit and the application filed under Section 21 of the Act have been B
dismissed in two separate proceedings by the High Court vide orders
dated25.02.2014 in W.P.(C) No. 26732 of2010 and Civil Miscellaneous
Writ Petition No.31855 of 1998.
      4. Both these petitions were analogously heard and thus the present
adjudication would address collectively the issues involved.
                                                                               c
      5. We have heard Mr. Anand Varma, learned counsel for the
appellants and Mr. R.D. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondents.
        6. The appellants as plaintiffs instituted Suit No. 252 of 1989 in
the Court of Small Causes, Allahabad against Mishri Lal, the predecessor-
in-interest of the present respondents seeking his eviction from the suit      D
premises on the ground of default in payment of rent and sub-letting of
the suit premises without the knowledge and approval of the landlords
i.e. the appellants. The appellants claimed themselves to be the joint
owners of the suit premises since the death of their grand-mother Chameli
Devi, widow oflate Mahabir Prasad on 30.07.1985. They referred to a
will dated 28.12.1976 executed by their afore-named grand-mother in            E
support of their claim of joint ownership. They averred that the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was a tenant of the suit
premises since 1968 against payment of monthly rent of Rs. 96/- and the
same was rented out on the clear understanding that the tenant would
vacate the same on one month's notice. The appellants alleged that the         F
tenant i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents paid rent till
October, 1979 and thereafter persistently failed to make payment thereof
in spite of repeated demands. Due to such default, the relationship
between the landlords and tenant became strained, and as claimed by
the appellants, he without offering the rent to the landlords, made deposits
thereof under Section 30 of the Act, which was invalid and non est in          G
 law. Situated thus, the appellants addressed a notice dated 18.08.1989
 terminating the tenancy, demanding payment of the arrears of rent within
 the statutory period of one month with the clear indication that in case of
 failure to respond to the notice and the request for rent, the tenancy
 would stand determined and that the tenant would be liable for eviction.      H
870            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A According to the appellants the notice was served on 26.08.1989, but
  despite the same, rent was not paid and consequently the tenancy stood
  terminated.
          7. It was further alleged that the tenant also sub-let the suit
   pri~mises to one Moti Chand for conducting his business therein. It was
 B thus averred that on this ground as well, as the sub-letting was done
   without the knowledge and consent of the landlords, the tenant was
   liable for eviction. The suit was thus filed for recove1y of aJTears of
   rent, eviction of the tenant/ defendant and for damages for unauthorised
   use or occupation of the tenanted premises as well as for interest.
c          8. The original defendant/tenant in his written statement though
    admitted the tenancy under Smt. Chameli Devi, the grand- mother of
    the appellants, he refused to acknowledge the appellants as his landlords. ·
  . He claimed that the tenancy had commenced from 1957 and that he had
    paid rent up to the month of September, 1989 to the landlord, Bhola
    Nath (father of the appellants) and that on his refusal to accept the
 D same thereafter, he had deposited the rent in court under Section 30 of
    the Act. The defendant/tenant admitted Smt. Chameli Devi to be the
    landlady who used to realize the rent till her life time and after her death,
    Bhola Nath, her eldest son used to collect the same. He admitted the
    receipt of the notice dated 18.08.1989, but denied that he was a defaulter
 E in payment of rent or that he was liable for eviction from the suit premises.
          9. According to him, Motichand was his nephew and partner in
   his business and that as he was like his own son, the allegation of sub-
   letting was unfounded. Elaborating on the facts preceding the deposit of
   rent in Court, the tenant reiterated that after the refusal by Shri Bhola
 F Na1h to accept the rent subsequent to September, 1989, he remitted the
   rent for the month of October and November, 1989 by money order
   dated 04.12.1989 but the same was refused again. He stated that
   thereafter, for the second time, he dispatched the rent for the months of
   October, November and December, 1989 on 26.12.1989 by money order
   but similarly the same was refused. According to the tenant, he again on
 G 12.01.1990 remitted the rent for the months of October, 1989 to January,
   1990 by money order and as the same was refused again, he started
   depositing the rent in Court, the first deposit being vi de Misc. Case No.41
   of 1990 for the months of October, 1989 to January, 1990.
             10. He denied the execution of the will dated 28.12.1976 by Smt.
 H
  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRl LAL (DEAD)"REPRESENTED BY                              871
        HIS LR. SAVlTRI DEVI [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

Chameli Devi, who had two sons Bhola Nath and Bacchanlal, but A
admitted that the eldest son Bhola Nath used to realize rent from him.
       11. Parallelly the appellants also filed an application under Section
21 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority against the original
defendant/tenant seeking release of the suit premises on the ground of
bona fide and genuine need therefor to, amongst others conduct their B
business therein. This application was contested as well by the original
defendant by filing his objection questioning the bona fide need of the
appellants.
      12. The Trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings, framed issues
and the parties adduced evidence, both oral and documentary. The              c
appellants in particular examined their father Bhola Nath as PW2, who
admittedly used to collect rent from the defendant/tenant till September,
1979, as claimed by them.
       13. The Trial Court decreed the suit, both on the ground of default
in payment ofrent and sub-letting of the suit premises. In reaching this D
conclusion, it amongst others took note of the testimony of Bhola Nath,
son of Smt. Chameli Devi, who supported the pleaded case of the
appellants and endorsed the factum of execution of will by Smt. Chameli
Devi on the basis of which they (appellants) claimed joint ownership of
the suit premises. It also noticed that such joint ownership had not been
questioned or disputed by any quarter. It also referred to a compromise E
decree between the heirs of Bhola Nath and his brother Bachan Lal,
rendered in Original Case No. 95 of 1986 qua the will, which too
authenticated the claim of the appellants of the suit premises. Noticing
the admission of the original defendant/tenant of having paid rent to
Bhola Nath, the father of the appellants, the Trial Court negated his F
challenge to their claim of joint ownership and their status of landlord
vis-a-vis the suit premises.
        14. While upholding the allegation of sub-letting, the Trial Court
as well held that the deposit ofrent made by the original defendant was
not in terms of the Act and therefore he was not entitled to the protection   G
from eviction. It held the view that though disputed, even if the rent for
the months of October, 1989 to January, 1990 had been sent to Bhola
Nath vide money order, it did not amount to offering thereof to the
appellants, the landlords, and thus the deposit in Court was not as
mandated by Section 30 of the Act. According to the Trial Court, Bhola
                                                                              H
872            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A Nath was only a collector of rent on behalf of the appellants and therefore,
  offer thereof ought to have been made to them (appellants) for a valid
  deposit under Section 30 of the Act. The suit was thus decreed in full,
  as prayed for.
          15. This verdict was challenged by the original defendant/tenant
 B in revision before the District Judge, Allahabad, who reversed the same
   on the ground that the appellants have not been able to prove that they
   were the exclusive landlords owners of the suit premises.
             16: The appellants thereafter filed.a writ petition before the High
      Court, which remanded the matter to the Revisional Court by noticing, in
 c    particular the compromise decree dated 05.04.1989 in Original Case
      No. 95of1986, in which the joint ownership of the appellants in the suit
      premises had been decreed.
          17. The Revisional Court, on remand, however maintained that
   the will dated 28.12.1976, on the basis of which the appellants claimed
 D joint ownership had not been proved, as required under Section 63 of the
   Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act,
    1872. Besides, it also expressed its reservation with regard to the
   authenticity and genuineness of this document. The suit was thus
   dismissed by upturning the decree of the Trial Court. Consequently, the
   Revisional Court did not examine the other issues on merits.
 E
          18. By the impugned judgment and order as well, the High Court,
   while limiting itself to the aspect of the proof of the will, concurred with
   the Revisional Court and dismissed the suit of the appellants. Apropos,
   the proceedings based on the application under Section 21 of the Act for
   the eviction of the original defendant on the ground of bona fide
 F requirement, the High Court, by the impugned verdict, upheld the rejection
   thereof, as recorded by the Prescribed Authority by negating their status
   of that of a landlord. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court noted
   that Bhola Nath, the father of the appellants used to collect rent from
   the original defendant throughout and that they did not at any point of
 G time claim to be the owners/landlords of the suit property, pursuant to
   the will executed by Smt. Chameli Devi. It also concurred with the
   findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court
   on the issue of bona fide need and comparative hardship. The High
   Court was of the view that the will dated 28.12.1976 on the basis of
   which the appellants had claimed joint ownership was not proved as
 H
  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRJ LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                               873
        HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI [AMITAVA ROY, J.)

required in law and thus, the mere registration thereof did not either A
suggest its genuineness or its validity so as to provide the locus standi
to them to maintain the application.
       19. The learned counsel for the appellants has emphatically urged
that the issue of their joint ownership having been settled finally in view
of the compromise decree dated 05.04.1989 rendered in Original Case            B
No. 95 of 1986 and their status as the heirs of Smt. Chameli Devi
having been conclusively established, the suit filed for the eviction of the
predecessor-in- interest of the respondents in that capacity was
maintainable, more particularly in the absence of any dispute of title
inter se the other legal heirs. In the alternative, it has been argued that    C
in any view of the matter, the appellants being the sons of Bhola Nath,
who admittedly used to collect rent and was a landlord under the Act,
they were entitled to receive rent qua the suit prope11y from the tenant
as landlords under the statute and, therefore not only the predecessor-
in-interest of the respondents were estopped from denying their status
as such, but had made himselfliable for eviction therefrom by persistent       D
default in payment of rent. The learned counsel for the appellants has
submitted that the High Court in this factual background had grossly
erred in dismissing the suit and the application for release of the suit
premises filed under Section 21 of the Act on the sole purported ground
that the will executed by Smt. Chameli Devi on 28.12.1976 had not
been proved. Additionally, as the appellants have proved that the original     E
tenant had continuously defaulted in payment of rent and had sub-let the
premises without the knowledge and approval of the landlords, the Trial
Court was justified in decreeing the suit for his eviction, he urged. It
was further argued that the suit premises being required bone fide by
the appellants for their genuine need for business, the impugned judgments     F
and orders, if allowed to stand would result in s~rious miscarriage of
justice.
       20. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents has              •
maintained that the appellants in the attendant facts and circumstances
are neither the landlords nor the owners of the suit premises, which is        G
clearly borne out by the fact that the rent therefor was initially collected
by Smt. Chameli Devi and thereafter, by their father Bhola Nath, during
his lifetime. It has been argued that as Bhola Nath refused to receive
rent, it was offered to him and thereafter was deposited in court under
Section 30 of the Act and thus the original defendant/tenant by no means
                                                                               H
874            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A can be branded as defaulter. It was reiterated that Motichand was the
  nephew of the original tenant as well as a partner in his business and
  thus his stay in the suit premises did not amount to sub-letting thereof.
  The learned counsel for the respondents also endorsed the finding of all
  the forums on the absence of bona fide need or requirement of the
B appellants of the suit premises.
         21. The competing assertions and the materials on record have
  been duly taken note of. Before adverting thereto, it would be appropriate
  to undertake a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act, which
  as the title suggests, is a legislation for regulation of letting and rent of
  and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of building, situated in
C the urban areas and for matters connected there with. The expressions
  "tenant" and "landlord" are defined as hereunder:
            3(a) "tenant" in relation to a building, means a person by whom
            its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death, his heirs.
D           3G) "landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom
            its rentis or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes,
            except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person.
          22. It would be apparent from hereinabove that a "tenant" in
   relation to a building is a person by whom rent is payable and on his
 E death, his heirs. "Landlord" vis-a-vis a building, as defined, means a
   person to whom its rent is or if the building was kt, would be payable
   and or include the agent or attorney of such person. The definition of
   "Family" being not relevant in the present context qua the expression
   "landlord" is not being dilated upon. In terms of Section 20 of the Act, a
   suit for eviction of a tenant for building after the determination of his
 F tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the grounds as enumerated
   in sub-section (2), clauses (a) to (g) which includes:
             (i) arrears ofrent for not less than four months and failure to pay
                 the same to the landlord within one month from the date of
                 service upon him of a notice of demand; and
 G
            (ii) sub-letting of the suit premises by the tenant in contravention
                of the provisions of Section 25 of the whole or any part of the
                building.
             23. Sub-section 4 of Section 20 provides that if at the first hearing
      of the suit, the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord, the
 H
   OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                                875
         HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI [AMlTAVA ROY, J.]

· entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the-building . A
  due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at
  the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of 9%
  per annum and the landlord's cost of the suit in respect thereof after
  deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under
  sub-section 1 of Section 30, the court may in lieu of passing a decree for B
  eviction, pass an order relieving the tenant against his· liability for eviction,
  on that ground. The proviso thereto being not of any consequence in the
  present case is not being referred to.
        24. Section 21 authorises the Prescribed Authority to order the
 eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified
 part thereof, ifit is satisfied, on an application by the landlord, that, amongst C
 others the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or
 after demolition and raising of new construction by the landlord for
 occupation by himself or any member of its family or any person for
 whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for
 purposes of any profession, trade or calling or ifthe landlord is a trustee D
 ofa public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust.
       25. Sub-section 4 clarifies that such an order may be made
 notwithstanding that the tenancy has not been determined with the
 exception that no such order would be made in the case of tenancy
 created for a fixed term by registered lease, before the expiry of such          E
 term.
        26. Section 30 of the Act permits deposit ofrent in court in·certain
 circumstances. It predicates that if any person claiming to be a tenant
 ofa building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its
 alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same, F
 then the tenant may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and
 continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent
 period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime
 signifies by notice in writing to the tenant, his willingness to accept it.
 Sub-section 2 elaborates that where any bona fide doubt or dispute has
 arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any .rent in respect of G
 any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the
 circumstances under which such deposit is made and may until such
 doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision
  of any competent court or by settlement between the parties, continue
  to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such H
876            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A building.
         27. Whereas sub-sections (4) and (5) provide forissuance ofnotice
  of the deposit to the alleged landlord or the person/persons concerned,
  sub-section (6) mandates that in respect of such a deposit being made, it
  would be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of
B such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited. Section 38
  proclaims that the provisions of that Act would have effect
  notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer
  of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
              28. It is a matter of record that Smt. Chameli Devi, widow of
c     Mahabir Prasad was the grand-mother of the appellants. As the verdict
      in original Case No. 95of1986, consistently referred to by all the Forums,
      would divulge, Mahavir Prasad and Chameli Devi had two sons Bhola
      Nath and Bachhan Lal. As noted hereinabove, the appellants are the
      sons of Bhola Nath. Incidentally, Radha Devi, wife of Bacchan Lal and
      her sons instituted the afore-mentioned suit i.e. Original Case No.95 of
D     1986 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge- VI, Allahabad seeking
      declaration of title in respect, amongst others of the suit premises. This
      was contested by Bhola Nath and the appellants and in course of the
      adjudication, the will dated 28.12.1986 executed by Chameli Devi surfaced
      for scrutiny. On the basis of this document, the appellants claimed
E     ownership bf the suit premises. As the decision rendered in that suit on
      05.04.1989 would reveal, a compromise was arrived at between the
      parties having due regard to the said will, whereby the ownership of the
      suit premises of the sons of Bhola Nath and Bacchan Lal was declared
      and a decree to that effect was passed. This decree, indisputably, has
      become final, in absence of any challenge thereto before any forum. In
 F    the face of this compromise decree, in our comprehension, the dismissal
      of the suit and the rejection of the application for the release under
      Section 21 of the Act by the High Court on the sole ground that the
      appellants had no locus to maintain the same in absence of formal proof
      of the will dated 28.12.1976 was grossly misdirected and thus cannot be
G     sustained, more particularly in view of the definition of the "landlord"
      provided in the Act.
          29. Noticeably, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents had
  admitted the tenancy under Smt. Chameli Devi. He has admitted as
  wel.l that during her lifetime, rent used to be paid to her and thereafter
H her elder son, Bhola Nath, father of the appellants used to receive the
  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                             877
        HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

rent. It is his pleaded case that as was the arrangement, he paid rent to A
Bhola Nath upto September, 1979, whereafter he refused to accept the
same. Incidentally, even assuming that the plea of the original defendant
of having paid rent to Bhola Nath up to September, 1989 is correct (the
allegation of the appellants is that the default is from October, 1979), the
default from October 1989 is incidentally subsequent to the compromise B
decree, as afore-mentioned whereunder the sons of Bhola Nath and
Bachan Lal were held to be the owners of the suit premises. It is a
matter of record that the appellants by notice dated 19 .08.1989 had
demanded from the original defendant the arrears of rent from October,
 1979 which was admittedly received by him but not acted upon. In spite
thereof, according to the original defendant, he offered rent to Bhola C
Nath for the months of October, 1989 to January, 1990 by remitting the
same by money-orders and on the alleged refusal thereof, eventually
deposited the rent in court under Section 30.
       30. In view of the categorical disclosure in the notice dated
18.08.1989, issued on behalf of the appellants, requiring payment of D
rent in arrears to them as the landlords and also indicating determination
of tenancy in case of failure in payment, we are of the view that the so
called offer ofrent for the months of October, 1989 to January, 1990 to
Bhola Nath by money-orders and thereafter deposit in Court under Section
30 of the Act would be of no avail to the original defendant and on his
death, the present respondents. The original defendant in terms of the E
aforementioned notice was fully aware of the compromise decree and
the status of the appellants as the joint owners/landlords and thus his
offer ofrent to Bhola Nath, who ceased to be the landlord, was not in
compliance either of sub-section 4 of Section 20 or Section 30 of the
Act to be availed as a defence against his/their eviction from the suit F
premises. The original defendant and consequently the respondents has/
have therefore rendered himself/themselves as defaulters within the
meaning of the Act and are liable to be evicted thereunder. It is more so
as admittedly neither the original defendant nor the respondents had
ever endeavoured to offer rent to the appellants after th~ compromise G
decree dated 05.04.89.
       31. Viz-a-vis the aspect of sub-letting, we are inclined to concur
with the finding of the Trial Court that Motichand, who was the nephew
of the original defendant, had been inducted in the suit premises as a
sub-tenant. Further as it is a matter ofrecord that the original defendant
                                                                             H
878            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A had constructed his own house elsewhere where he has been residing
  with his wife, the accommodation of his nephew Motichand in the suit
  premises did amount to sub-letting and the same having been done without
  the knowledge and approval of the landlords, this too provided a ground
  for his eviction therefrom. Additionally, even ifthe deposit of arrears of
B rent in full by the original defendant at the time of institution of the suit is
  construed to be valid, in the face of his own house elsewhere, he is not
  entitled to the protection from eviction under the proviso to sub-section 4
  of Section 20. To be elaborate, under sub-section 4 of Section 20, as
  referred to hereinabove, if a tenant, at the first hearing of the suit,
  unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord the entire amount of rent
C and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him together
  with interest thereon @ 9% per annum and the landlords' costs of the
  suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already
  deposited by the tenant under sub-section 1 of Section 30, the court may,
  in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order
D relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on the ground of default.
  The proviso thereto predicates that this benefit would not be available to
  a tenant who or any member of his family has built or has otherwise
  acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any
  residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town
  area. Apa1i from the fact that no evidence is forthcoming to attest that
E the requirements of sub-section 4 of Section 20 had been fully complied
  with, the construction of his own house elsewhere, as is evident from
  the record, did dis-entitle the original defendant and now the respondents
  to avail the benefit of such protection, as contemplated by the Act.
          32. It is no longer res integra and is settled by this Court in Sri
 F Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 184, Dhannalal
   vs. /(afawatibai and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 and India Umberalla
   Manufacturing Co. and Ors. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead)
   by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 that a
   suit for eviction of a tenant can be maintained by one of the co-owners
   and it would be no defence to the tenant to question the maintainability
 G of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as
   parties to the suit. The judicially propounded proposition is that when
   the property forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned
   by several co-owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of
   the joint property along with others and thus it cannot be said that he is
H
  OM PRAKASH v. MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED BY                               879
        HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property and that he can        A
alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other
co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In the contextual
facts, not only the compromise decree, as aforementioned, has declared
the appellants to be the joint owners of the suit premises, their status as
such has not been questioned at any stage by anyone interested in the          B
title thereto.
       33. Further, the original defendant having accepted Smt. Chameli
Devi as his landlady and thereafter continued to pay rent to her son
Bhola Nath, the father of the appellants, in terms of the definition of
"landlord" in Section 3(j) of the Act, he during his life time and after his
demise, the respondents are estopped under Section 116 of the Indian           C
Evidence Act, 1872 to dispute the status of the appellants as their landlord
in a suit for his eviction from the tenanted premises.
       34. Thal a tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is debarred
on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his landlord through
whom he claims tenancy, as is enshrined in Section 116 of the Indian           D
Evidence Act, 1872, is so well-settled a legal postulation that no decision
need be cited to further consolidate the same. This enunciation, amongst
others is reiterated by this Court in S. Thangappan vs. P. Padmavathy
(1999) 7 SCC 474 and Bhogadi Kannababu and Ors. vs. Vuggina
Pydamma and others (2006) 5 SCC 532. In any view of the matter,                E
the appellants, being the son of Bhola Nath, who at all relevant time,
was the landlord vis-a-vis the original defendant and the respondents in
terms of Section 3(j) of the Act, their status as landlords for the purpose
of eviction under the Act, could not have been questioned so as to non
suit them for want of locus.
                                                                                F
       35. To reiterate, the High Court by the decisions impugned, had
dismissed the suit and the application for release of the suit premises
under Section 21 of the Act, principally on the ground of want of standing
of the appellants. In the face of the determination made hereinabove,
the said conclusion is unsustainable on facts and in law and are thus
liable to be set aside, which we hereby do. Having regard to the               G
conclusions recorded on the aspect of default in payment of rent and
sub-letting, both statutorily recognized grounds for eviction of a tenant
under Section 20 of the Act, it is considered inessential to dilate on the
ground of bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. In the
 wake up of the above, the impugned judgments and orders of the High            H
880             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 4 S.C.R.


A     Court are set-aside and the suit of the appellants is decreed in full. The
      respondents would vacate the suit premises at the earliest and in no
      case later than three months from today. The appeals are allowed. No
      costs.


      Divya Pandey                                                Appeals allowed.