OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSIONversusM/S M.C. CLELLAND ENGINEERS S.A.
- Citation
- 1999 INSC 200
- Decided
- 23 April 1999
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Arbitrators may award interest on the claim under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and such interest is not barred by Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978; a bare limitation plea cannot be entertained.
Summary
The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) appealed a decree based on an arbitral award that required M.C. Clelland Engineers to pay the principal amount plus interest at 12% and an additional interest on that interest. The appellant argued that the arbitrators had no power to award interest on interest under Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978, and that the claim was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 arbitrators may award interest on the claim, and that such interest is not "interest on interest" but interest on the damages or compensation, rendering Section 3 of the Interest Act inapplicable. The Court also found the limitation plea insufficiently pleaded before the arbitrators and therefore could not be entertained. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal of the appeal against the decree was affirmed.
Issues considered
- Whether arbitrators have the power to award interest on interest under the Arbitration Act, 1940.
- Whether Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978, bars the award of interest on interest.
- Whether the plea of limitation raised before the arbitrators was sufficient to defeat the claim.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION
v.
MIS M.C. CLELLAND ENGINEERS S.A.
APRIL 23, 1999
B [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]
Arbitration Act, 1940-Section 29-Interest upon interest-Grant a/-
Arbitration proceedings-Award for payment of balance amount claimed and
interest on delayed payment-Interest on the amount awarded-Validity of-
C Held, Arbitrators have power to grant interest-Interest on the amount of
interest may be termed as interest on damages or compensation for delayed
payment, which becomes part of the principal-Thus, interest is not granted
upon interest awarded but upon the claim made-Interest Act, 1978-
Section 3.
D limitation
Arbitration-Claim for interest on delayed payment-Plea that it was
barred by limitation-Insufficient Pleadings before the arbitrators-Held,
plea of bar of limitation cannot be entertained.
E In an Arbitration proceeding between the parties, an award was passed
directing the appellant company to pay the amount claimed along with interest
at 12% p.a. from the date of award till realisation. Subsequently a decree
was passed in terms of the award, by single Judge of High Court. Appeal
before Division Bench was also dismissed. Hence the present appeal.
F The appellant contended that what was awarded by the Arbitrators in
respect of two claims was itself interest for different periods and under
Section 3 of the Interest Act, the arbitrators could not have awarded interest
upon interest; the claim of respondent for delayed payments was barred by
limitation.
G
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. The Arbitrators have power to award interest under Section
29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
H 1.2. Interest is not granted upon interest awarded but upon the claim
830
- O.N.G.C. v. M.C. CLELLAND ENGINEERS S.A. (RAJENDRA BABU, J.]
made. The claim made in the proceedings is under two heads-One is the A
831
·balance of amount claimed under invoices and letter and the amount certified
and paid by the appellant and the second is the interest on delayed payment.
That is how the claim for interest on delayed payment stood crystallized by
the time the claim was filed before the Arbitrators. Therefore, the power of
the Arbitrators to grant interest on the amount of interest which may, in B
other words, be termed as interest on damages or compensation for delayed
payment which would also become part of the principal. In the instant case
Section 3 of the Interest Act has no relevance in the context of the matter.
The High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal against the decree
passed in terms of the award. (832-E-GI
2. Before the Arbitrator a very bald statement without setting out the
c
details was made on the point of limitation. The plea raised was not sufficient
to meet the claim on the bar of limitation. No foundation was laid in the
course of the proceedings before the Arbitrators either in the pleadings or
· in the evidence. Thus, the plea regarding bar of limitation cannot be
entertained. [833-C-DI D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 932of1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.10.88 of the Bombay High Court
in A. No. 1253 of 1988.
E
B. Datta, (R.K. Joshi) for Sushi! Kumar Jain for the Appellant.
E.C. Agrawala for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
RAJENDRA BABU, J. This appeal arises out of certain arbitration
P.roceedings between the parties to this appeal resulting in an award made on
February 29, 1988. The Arbitrators by their award directed that the appellant
shall pay to the respondent as follows :
"(i) US$ 1004.50 being interest on US$ 40, 102.97 at 12% p.a. from G
10. ~2.1985 to 16.4.1986.
(ii) US$ 59,583 being interest on US$ 3,12,011.00 at 12% p.a. from
3.5.1983 to 5.l l.1984."
On these two items of claim the Arbitrators also awarded interest at 12% H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) 2 S.C.R.
A per annum from the date of award till realisation. The award so made by the •
Arbitrators was filed into the Court. Objections filed thereto stood dismissed 1
and decree was passed in terms of the award. Against that order made by the
learned Single Judge in his original jurisdiction an appeal was carried to a
division bench which also stood dismissed. Hence this appeal.
B Shri B. Datta, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that
what was awarded by the Arbitrators in respect of the two claims referred to
earlier in the course of this order is itself interest for different periods. He,
therefore, submitted that Arbitrators could not have further awarded interest
on the claims awarded at 12% per annum from the date of award till realisation.
C He did not dispute, and very fairly and correctly, that the Arbitrators do have
the power to grant interest on the amount claimed in the arbitration and the
power of the Arbitrators was very characteristically described by him as
'before, during and after' of the arbitration proceedings. His point is that there
cannot be interest upon interest when the claim itself is one of interest and
interest upon that amount could not have been granted by the Arbitrators
D and relied upon Section 3 of the Interest Act.
There cannot be any doubt that the Arbitrators have powers to grant
interest akin to Section 34 of the CPC which is the power of the court in view
of Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, I 940. It is clear that interest is not
E granted upon interest awarded but upon the claim made. The claim made in
the proceedings is under two heads - one is the balance of amount claimed
under invoices and letter dated February IO, 1981 and the amount certified
and paid by the appellant and the second is the interest on delayed payment.
That is how the claim for interest on delayed payment stood crystallized by
the time the claim was filed before. the Arbitrators. Therefore, the power of
F the Arbitrators to grant interest on the amount of interest which may, in other
words, be termed as interest on damages or compensation for delayed payment
which would also become part of the principal. If that is the correct position
in law, we do not think that Section 3 of the Interest Act has any relevance
in the context of the matter which we are dealing with in the present case.
G Therefore, the first contention raised by Shri Datta, though interesting, deserves
to be and is rejected.
The next contention urged by Shri Datta is that the claim made by the
appellant for interest on the alleged delayed payments made by the respondent
is barred by law of limitation. It is pointed out that the award itself notices
H that the claimants cannot lose their right to interest due on the next delayed
0.N.G.C. v. M.C. CLELLAND ENGINEERS S.A. [RAiENDRA BABU, J .] 833
payment at the end of the three years ~er each due date the claim would be A
barred and that principle was not applied on the delayed payment for the
period May 3, 1983 to November 5, 1984. On this aspect of the matter we may
notice the pleading raised before the Arbitrators. It is stated at para lO(a) as
follows:
"The present arbitration itself is barred by limitation as the alleged B
claims are relating to the work done in 1981-82"
This is a very bald statement without setting out the details as to how the
claim made by the respondent before the Arbitrators have become barred by
the limitation particularly when the stand of the respondent is that they had
running bills and payments were made from time to time and an account has C
to be taken as to what amount became due and when; the same has to be
worked out. Whether all such details have to be worked out and whether the
transactions between the appellant and the respondent did not become complete
until the payment of final amount are matters for adjudication,. Thus, it becomes
very difficult to appreciate that the plea raised before the Arbitrators was D
sufficient to meet the situation to defeat the claim on the bar of limitation.
Therefore, we do not think that we can examine the matter in the light
suggested now by the learned senior counsel for the appellant when no
foundation has been laid in the course of the proceedings before the Arbitrat-0rs
--
either in the pleadings or in the evidence. We are, therefore, of the view that
the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal against the decree E
passed in terms of the award.
The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances
-- of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
S.V.KL Appeal dismissed. F
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