NOOR MOHAMMEDversusJETHANAND AND ANOTHER

                        [2013) 3 S.C.R. 1146


A                        NOOR MOHAMMED
                                   v.
                   JETHANAND AND ANOTHER
          (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 25848 of 2011)
                         JANUARY 29, 2013
B
       [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- s. 100 - Second appeal
    - Abuse of process of Court - Delayed delineation of
C   controversy - Procrastination on account of frequent
    adjournments - Non-demonstration of due diligence to deal
    with the matter - Deprecated - Held: Dispensation of
    expeditious justice is the constitutional command - Whatever
    may be the nature of litigation, speedy and appropriate
D   delineation is fundamental to judicial duty - Delayed
    delineation of a controversy in a court of law creates a dent
    in the normative dispensation of justice and in the ultimate
    eventuate, thEI Bench and the Bar gradually lose their
    reverence, for the sense of divinity and nobility really flows
E   from institutional serviceability - In a democratic body polity
    governed by a written Constitution and where Rule of Law is
    paramount, judiciary is regarded as sentinel on the qui vive
    not only to protect the Fundamental Rights of the citizens but
    also to see that the democratic values as enshrined in the
F   Constitution are respected and the faith and hope of the
    people in the constitutional system are not atrophied - In the
    instant case, the High Court should not have shown
    indulgence of such magnitude by adjourning the matter when
    the counsel for the appellant was not present - It is difficult to
G   envision why the Court directed fresh notice to the appellant
    when there was nothing suggestive for passing of such an
    order - The counsel sought adjournment after adjournment
    in a nonchalant manner and the same were granted in a
    routine fashion - Duty of the counsel as the officer of the court
H                                 1146
         NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                         1147


to assist the court in a properly prepared manner and not to        A
seek unnecessary adjournments - All involved in the justice
dispensation system, which includes the Judges, the lawyers,
the judicial officers who work in courts, the law officers of the
State, the Registry and the litigants, have to show dedicated
diligence so that a controversy is put to rest - Chief Justice      B
of the High Courts to conceive and adopt a mechanism,
regard being had to the prioiity of cases, to avoid inordinate
delays in matters which can really be dealt with in an
expeditious manner - Judiciary.

    The respondent-plaintiff filed suit for injunction which        C
was dismissed by the trial court. The order was upheld
in appeal. In 2001, the respondent filed second appeal,
which remained pending for long, primarily due to
adjournments on account of non-appearance of the
counsel. The second appeal was ultimately dismissed by              D
the High Court for non-prosecution in the year 2003. In
2006, the second appeal was restored to file while the
ministerial order of restoration was recorded in 2010.
Ultimately, in the year 2011, the second appeal was
admitted on two substantial questions of law and the                E
judgment and decree of both the courts below were
stayed by the High Court by the impugned order.

     The petitioner-defendant contended before this Court
that no substantial question of law was involved and that           F
the High Court had no reason to entertain the second
appeal on the factual score.

    Disposing of the Special Leave Petition, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. In the facts and circumstances of the                G
instant case, there is no requirement to interfere with the
order of the High Court, but there is a compelling need
to say something in regard to the disturbing manner in
which the proceedings in the second appeal continued.
[Para 1OJ [1159-C-D]                                                H
    1148    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A      1.2. The proceedings in the second appeal before the
  High Court epitomizes the corrosive effect that
  adjournments can have on a litigation and how a lis can
  get entangled in the tentacles of an octopus. The
  philosophy of justice, the role of a lawyer and the court,
B the obligation of a litigant and all legislative commands,
  the nobility of the Bench and the Bar, the ability and
  efficiency of all concerned and ultimately the divinity of
  law are likely to make way for apathy and indifference
  when delay of the present nature takes place, for
c procrastination on the part of anyone destroys the values
  of life and creates a catastrophic turbulence in the
  sanctity of law. The virtues of adjudication cannot be
  allowed to be paralyzed by adjournments and non-
  demonstration of due diligence to deal with the matter.
  One cannot be oblivious to the feeling necessities of the
0
  time. It is devastating to expect infinite patience. Change
  of attitude is the warrant and command of the day. [Para
  11] [1159-E-H; 1160-A]

       1.3. The rule of law is the centripodal concern and
E delay in delineation and disposal of cases injects an
  artificial virus and becomes a vitiating element. The
  unfortunate characteristics of endemic delays have to be
  avoided at any cost. Whatever may be the nature of
  litigation, speedy and appropriate delineation is
F fundamental to judicial duty. [Paras 12, 23] [1160-C-D;
  1166-C-D]

       1.4. The anguish expressed in the past and the role
  ascribed to the Judges, lawyers and the litigants is a
  matter of perpetual concern and the same has to be
G reflected upon every moment. An attitude of indifference
  can neither be appreciated nor tolerated. Therefore, the
  serviceability of the institution gains significance. That is
  the command of the Majesty of Law and none should
  make any maladroit effort to create a concavity in the
H
         NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                   1149


same. Procrastination, whether at the individual or A
institutional level, is a systemic disorder. Its corrosive
effect and impact is like a disorderly state of the physical
frame of a man suffering from an incurable and fast
progressive malignancy. Delay either by the functionaries
of the court or the members of the Bar significantly B
exhibits indolence. [Para 27] [1167-C-E]

     1.5. In a democratic body polity which is governed
by a written Constitution and where Rule of Law is
paramount, judiciary is regarded as sentinel on the qui        C
vive not only to protect the Fundamental Rights of the
citizens but also to see that the democratic values as
enshrined in the Constitution are respected and the faith
and hope of the people in the constitutional system are
not atrophied. The fundamental conception of democracy
can only be preserved as a colossal and priceless              D
treasure where virtue and values of justice rule supreme
and intellectual anaemia is kept at bay by constant
patience, consistent perseverance, and argus-eyed
vigilance. The foundation of justice, apart from other
things, rests on the speedy delineation of the lis pending     E
in courts. It would not be an exaggeration to state that it
is the primary morality of justice and ethical fulcrum of
the judiciary. Delayed delineation of a controversy in a
court of law creates a dent in the normative dispensation
of justice and in the ultimate eventuate, the Bench and        F
the Bar gradually lose their reverence, for the sense of
divinity and nobility really flows from institutional
serviceability. Therefore, historically, emphasis has been
laid on individual institutionalism and collective
institutionalism of an adjudicator while administering         G
justice. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction
that the collective collegiality can never be regarded as
an alien concept to speedy dispensation of justice. That
is the hallmark of duty, and that is the real measure. [Para
1] [1154-E-F, H; 1155-A-D]                                     H
    1150    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A       1.6. In a democratic set up, intrinsic and embedded
   faith in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal
   concern. Delay gradually declines the citizenry faith in the
  system. It is the faith and faith alone that keeps the
  system alive. Fragmentation of faith has the effect·
B potentiality to bring in a state of cataclysm where justice
  may become a casuality. A litigant expects a reasoned
  verdict from a temperate Judge but does not intend to
  and, rightly so, to guillotine much of time at the altar of
  reasons. Timely delivery of justice keeps the faith
C ingrained and establishes the sustained stability. Access
  to speedy justice is regarded as a human right which is
  deeply rooted in the foundational concept of democracy
  and such a right is not only the creation of law but also
  a natural right. This right can be fully ripened by the
  requisite commitment of all concerned with the system.
0 It cannot be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because
  such a thought is likely to make the right a mirage losing
  the centrality of purpose. Therefore, whoever has a role
  to play in the justice dispensation system cannot be
  allowed to remotely conceive of a casual approach. (Para
E 29] [1168-C-F]
       1.7. Everyone involved in the system of dispensation
  of justice has to inspire the confidence of the common
  man in the effectiveness of the judicial system.
F Sustenance of faith has to be treated as spinal sans
  sympathy or indulgence. If someone considers the task
  to be herculean, the same has to be performed with
  solemnity, for faith is the 'elan vital' of our system. [Para
  31) [1169-F-G]
G       1.8. In the i·nstant case, coming to the proceedings
    before the High Court from the date of presentation of the
    second appeal till the date of admission, the manner in
    which it has progressed is not only perplexing but also
    shocking. The Court should not have shown indulgence
H
        NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                   1151


of such magnitude by adjourning the matter when the A
counsel for the appellant was not present. It is difficult to
envision why the Court directed fresh notice to the
appellant when there was nothing suggestive for passing
of such an order. The matter should have been dealt with
taking a recourse to the provisions in the Code of Civil B
Procedure. It is also astonishing that the lawyers sought
adjournments in a routine manner and the court also
acceded to such prayers. When the matter stood
dismissed, though an application for restoration was
filed, yet it was listed after a long lapse of time. Adding c
to the misery, the concerned official took his own time to
put the file in order. From the Registrar General's
communication it is perceptible that some disciplinary
action has been initiated against the erring official. But
that is another matter. The fact that cannot be brushed
                                                              0
aside is that there is enormous delay in dealing with the
case. Had timely effort been made and due concern
bestowed, it could have been avoided. There may be
cases where delay may be unavoidable. But in the case
at hand, the counsel sought adjournment after
adjournment in a nonchalant manner and the same were E
granted in a routine fashion. It is the duty of the counsel
as the officer of the court to assist the court in a properly
prepared manner and not to seek unnecessary
adjournments. Getting an adjournment has never been
appreciated by the courts. All who are involved in the F
justice dispensation system, which includes the Judges,
the lawyers, the judicial officers who work in courts, the
law officers of the State, the Registry and the litigants,
have to show dedicated diligence so that a controversy
is put to rest. Shifting the blame is not the cure. G
Acceptance of responsibility and dealing with it like a
captain in the frontier is the necessity of the time.
Diligence brings satisfaction. There has to be strong
resolve in the mind to carry out the responsibility with
devotion. All concerned are required to abandon idleness H
    1152    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A and arouse oneself and see to it that the syndrome of
  delay does not erode the concept of dispensation of
  expeditious justice which is the constitutional command.
  Sagacious acceptance of the deviation and necessitous
  steps taken for the redressal of the same would be a
B bright lamp which would gradually become a laser beam.
  This is the expectation of the collective, and the said
  expectation has to become a reality. Expectations are not
  to remain at the stage of hope. They have to be
  metamorphosed to actuality. [Para 32] [1169-G-H; 1170-
C A-H; 1171-A-C]
       1.9. However, this Court restrains from issuing any
  directions, for the High Court as a constitutional Court
  has to carry the burden and live up to the requisite
  expectations of the litigants. It is also expected from the
D lawyers' community to see that delay is avoided. A
  concerted effort is bound to give results. Therefore, the
  Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court as well as the
  other Chief Justices are requested to conceive and adopt
  a mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases,
E to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can
  really be dealt with in an expeditious manner. [Para 33]
  [1171-D-E]
       Kai/ash v. Nanhku and Others (2005) 4 SCC 480: 2005
  (3) SCR 289; Sushi/ Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1
F SCC 774: 1975 (3) SCR 942; State of Punjab v. Sham/al
  Murari (1976) 1 SCC 719: 1976 (2) SCR 82; Topline Shoes
  Ltd. v. Corpn. Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33: 2002 (3) SCR 1167;
  Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast Private Limited and Others
  (2011) 9 SCC 678: 2011 (10) SCR 787; Ramon Services
G Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor and Others AIR 2001 SC 207:
  2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 550; Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks
  Aviation Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 287: 1998 '(2) Suppl. SCR
  675; Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of
  Maharashtra, Bombay and Others (1984) 2 SCC 556: 1984
H (1) SCR 414; Lt. Col. S. J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
        NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                 1153


Adm;r,istration) AtR 1.984 SC 618: 1984 (2) SCR 438; O.P. A
Sharnt.a;and Others,v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana
(201·rt);:;.6 SCC 86: 20,1 (&) SCR 301; R.K. Garg, Advocate
V. State of Himachal Pradesh (1981) 3 sec 166: 1981 (3)
SCR 536; Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360: 1979 (3) SCR 169; Hussainara B
Khatoon (IV) and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
Patna (1980) 1 SCC 98: 1979 (3) SCR 532; Diwan Naubat
Rai and Others v. State through Delhi Administration AIR
1989 SC 542: 1989 (1) SCC 297; Surinder Singh v. State of
Punjab (2005) 7 SCC 387: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1172; C
Ramdeo Chauhan Alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam (2001)
5 SCC 714: 2001 (3) SCR 669 and Zahira Habibulfa H.
Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others (2004) 4
SCC 158: 2004 (3) SCR 1050 - referred to.

   My life in Court (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &    D
Company Inc., 1961) by Hizer Louis; p.213 - referred to.

                   Case Law Reference:
    2005 (3) SCR 289            referred to    Para 13
                                                           E
    1975 (3) SCR 942            referred to    Para 13
    1976 (2) SCR 82             referred to    Para 13
    2002 (3) SCR 1167           referred to    Para 14
    2011 (10) SCR 787          referred to     Para 15
                                                           F

    2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 550    referred to     Para 16
    1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 675    referred to     Para 16
    1984 (1) SCR 414           referred to     Para 18     G
    1984 (2) SCR 438           referred to     Para 19
    2011 (6) SCR 301           referred to     Para 21
   1981 (3) SCR 536            referred to     Para 22     H
    1154      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A        1979 (3) SCR 169                referred to        Para 24

         1979 (3) SCR 532                referred to        Para 24

           1989 (1) sec 297              referred to        Para 25

         2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1172        referred to        Para 26
B
         2001 (3) SCR 669                referred to        Para 30

         2004 (3) SCR 1050               referred to        Para 31

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP No. (C) No.
c   25848 of 2011.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 09.05.2011 of the High
    Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.
    207 of 2001.

D         H.D. Thanvi, Shashank Pareek, Sarad Kumar Singhania
    for the Petitioner.

         Abhinav Mukerji for the Respondents .

        .The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In a democratic body polity which is
  governed by a written Constitution and where Rule of Law is
  paramount, judiciary is regarded as sentinel on the qui vive not
  only to protect the Fundamental Rights of the citizens but also
  to see that the democratic values as enshrined in the
F Constitution are respected and the faith and hope of the people
  in the constitutional system are not atrophied. Sacrosanctity of
  rule of law neither recognizes a master and a slave nor does it
  conceive of a ruler and a subject but, in quintessentiality,
  encapsules and sings in glory of the values of liberty, equality
G and justice I n accordance with law requiring the present
  generation to have the responsibility to sustain them with all
  fairness for the posterity ostracising all affectations. To maintain
  the sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in continuum by every
  member of the collective is a categorical imperative. The
H fundamental conception of democracy can only be preserved
          NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                            1155
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

as a colossal and priceless treasure where virtue and values             A
of justice rule supreme and intellectual anaemia is kept at bay
by constant patience, consistent perseverance, and argus-eyed
vigilance. The foundation of justice, apart from other things, rests
on the speedy delineation of the lis pending in courts. It would
not be an exaggeration to state that it is the primary morality          B
of justice and ethical fulcrum of the judiciary. Its profundity lies
in not allowing anything to cripple the same or to do any act
which would freeze it or make it suffer from impotency. Delayed
delineation of a controversy in a court of law creates a dent in
the normative dispensation of justice and in the ultimate                c
eventuate, the Bench and the Bar gradually lose their reverence,
for the sense of divinity and nobility really flows from institutional
serviceability. Therefore, historically, emphasis has been laid
on individual institutionalism and collective institutionalism of an
adjudicator while administering justice. It can be stated without        D
any fear of contradiction that the collective collegiality can never
be regarded as an alien concept to speedy dispensation of
justice. That is the hallmark of duty, and that is the real measure.

      2. Presently to the factual matrix. The respondent initiated
civil action by instituting Civil Suit No. 42 of 1990 for injunction     E
to restrain the defendant therein from selling or otherwise
transferring the suit land towards the southern side of the house
and further to permanently injunct him to make any construction
on the land in dispute. After the written statement was filed, a
counter claim was put forth by the defendant. Thereafter, issues         F
were framed and the parties adduced evidence to substantiate
their respective stands. On 12.9.1997, the learned Civil Judge
(Junior Division) Nohar, District Hanumangarh, Rajasthan
dismissed the suit and decreed the counter claim filed by
defendant-petitioner herein. Being grieved by the aforesaid              G
judgment and decree, the first respondent preferred Civil First
Appeal No. 59 of 1997 in the Court of the concerned Additional
District Judge, Nohar who, on 10.07.2001 dismissed the
appeal. The dismissal of appeal compelled the respondent to
                                                                         H
    1156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A   file a Civil Second Appeal No. 207/2001 in the High Court of
    Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur.

         3. Be it noted, we have not adverted to the factual
    controversy and findings returned thereon because advertence
    to the same is not necessary for our purpose.
8
         4. The chequered history of the second appeal, a tragic
    one, commenced on 27.7.2011, when memorandum of the
    appeal was presented. The appeal was listed for admission
    along with the stay application on 30.07 .2001. The petitioner
C   herein had entered caveat and was present on the date of
    admission and on the basis of the prayer m;:ide by both the
    parties, the court called for the lower courts' records.
    Subsequently, the matter was listed on 8.11.2001, 5.12.2001
    and 18.1.2002 but due to non-appearance of counsel for the
D   parties, no order was passed. On 18.2.2002, though none was
    present on behalf of the appellant therein, yet the court
    adjourned the appeal. Similarly, adjournments were granted in
    the absence of counsel on 20.01.2003 and 4.2.2003. It is
    interesting to note that when the appeal was listed on 4.2.2003,
E   the court directed issuance of notice to the appellant for making
    appropriate arrangements for his representation. It is apposite
    to note that the counsel for the respondent therein was present
    on that day. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on many an
    occasion awaiting for service of notice on the appellant. After
F   completion of service of notice, the matter was listed on
    23.9.2003 and, as usual, none was present for the appellant.
    Similar was the situation on 7.10.2003. On 10.11.2003, when
    none was present for the appellant, the appeal was dismissed
    for non-prosecution in the presence of the counsel for the
G   respondent.

          5. After the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution,
    the appellant before the High Court woke up from slumber and
    filed an application for restoration in 2004 which was eventually
    allowed vide order dated 9.1.2006. As the order sheet would
H
          NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                        1157
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

reflect, time got comatosed for more than six years and               A
eventually, ministerial order of restoration was recorded on
11.5.2010. After the formality of restoration was over breaking
the artificial arrest of time, when the file moved like a large
python, the appeal was listed before the court for admission
on 25.10.2010 on which day the learned counsel for the                B
appellant commenced the argument and ultimately sought
adjournment. The matter stood adjourned to 10.11.2010.
Thereafter, an application under Section 100 (5) read with Order
41, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the appellant
and opportunity was granted to the counsel for the respondent,        c
the plaintiff therein, to file reply to the same and the matter was
directed to be listed after two weeks. As the order sheet would
further uncurtain the appeal was listed again on 29.11.2010 and
 in the meantime, the respondent had filed an application under
 Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC.
                                                                      D
     6. On 24.2.2011, when the matter was listed for admission,
the Court directed that the matter shall be listed for admission
and all the applications would be considered on that date. On
7.3.2011, it was directed by the court to list the matter after one
week as adjournment was sought for. Similar prayer for                E
adjournment was made on 16.3.2011 and the matter was again
directed to be listed affer !wo weeks as prayed for. On
27.04.2011, the learned Single Judge passed the following
order:
                                                                      F
     "None for the appellant.

            I have perused the record. This second appeal was
     filed as back as in the year 2001 and it is now more than
     10 years that it is not yet either admitted for final hearing
     with a view to find out whether it involves any substantial      G
     question of law within the meaning of Section 100. It has
     undoubtedly caused serious concern to my conscience that
     this appeal has taken ten years to decide whether it
     involves any substantial question of law.
                                                                      H
    1158      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A             The matter is being adjourned almost on every
         occasions in the last ten years to accommodate the
         counsel regardless of the sufficient cause and only on
         mere request.

               Even today the counsel is engaged for the appellant
B
         has not appeared. Another counsel got up and said that
         the counsel engaged is not well and, therefore, the case
         be adjourned.

                I could have dismissed the appeal for want of
c         prosecution but I prefer not to do so because it does not
         serve anybody's purpose. With extreme reluctance and
         against my conscience and with a view to do substantial
         justice to the appellant to give right of audience, I am
         constrained to adjourn the case to accommodate the
D        counsel (though I am not supposed to) and list the appeal
         for admission in the next week."

       7. At last, on 9.5.2011, the learned counsel for both the
  sides appeared and the matter was admitted on two substantial
E questions of law and there was direction for stay of operation
  of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the courts
  below.

         8. Mr. H.D. Thanvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has
    contended that there was no substantial question of law involved
F   and the High Court had no reason to entertain the second
    appeal only on the factual score.

         9. When the matter was listed on 21.9.2012 before us, the
    following order was passed: -
G       "Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Second
        Appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1 in 2001 was
        dismissed for non-prosecution on 10.11.2003, but later
        restored to file in January, 2006 and after almost 10 years
        of filing of the second appeal, the judgment and decree of
H
          NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                          1159
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     both the courts below have been stayed by the High Court         A
     by its impugned order dated 9.5.2011.

           Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court is
     directed to file the details of the progress of S. B. Civil
     Second Appeal No. 207 of 2001, from 2001 to 2011,
                                                                      B
     within two weeks."

      10. Jn pursuance of t~e aforesaid order, the Registrar
General has sent a report to this Court on the basis of which
we have referred to the proceedings before the High Court. At
this juncture, we may clearly state that we had not issued notice     C
to the contesting respondent as we are not inclined to interfere
with the order. But, a pregnant one, the manner in which the
proceedings in the second appeal continued, being disturbing,
compels us to say something on the said score. Not that this
Court is saying it for the first time but a reminder serves as a      D
propeller for keen introspection and paves the path of needed
rectification.

       11. The proceedings in the second appeal before the High
Court, if we allow ourselves to say so, epitomizes the corrosive      E
effect that adjournments can have on a litigation and how a lis
can get entangled in the tentacles of an octopus. The
philosophy of justice, the role of a lawyer and the court, the
obligation of a litigant and all legislative commands, the nobility
of the Bench and the Bar, the ability and efficiency of all
concerned and ultimately the divinity of law are likely to make       F
way for apathy and indifference when delay of the present
nature takes place, for procrastination on the part of anyone
destroys the values of life and creates a catastrophic turbulence
in the sanctity of law. The virtues of adjudication cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed by adjournments and non-                      G
demonstration of due diligence to deal with the matter. One
cannot be oblivious to the feeling necessities of the time. No
one can afford to sit in an ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor a
lawyer can ignore "the total push and pressure of the cosmos".
It is devastating to expect infinite patience. Change of attitude     H
     1160      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 3 S.C.R.

A is the warrant and command of the day. We may recall with
  profit what Justice Cardozo had said:

          "It is true, I think, today in every department of law that the
          social value of a rule has become a test of growing power
          and importance".
B
         12. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has to
  be given a decent burial. The sooner it takes place, the better
  it is. It is the obligation of the present generation to march with
  the time and remind oneself every moment that rule of lavt is
C the centripodal concern and delay in delineation and disposal
  of cases injects an artificial virus and becomes a vitiating
  element. The unfortunate characteristics of endemic delays have
  to be avoided at any cost. One has to bear in mind that this is
  the day, this is the hour and this is the moment, when all soldiers
D of law fight from the path. One has to remind oneself of the
  great saying, "Awake, Arise, 'O' Partha".

       13. As advised, at present, we are disposed to refer to
  certain pronouncements of this Court. A three-Judge Bench in
E Kai/ash v. Nanhku and Others, 1 while dealing with the issue
  whether Order 8 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure is
  mandatory or directory, referred to the observations in Sushi/
  Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar2 w~ich we may profitably
  reproduce: -

F               "The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles
          a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at
          the law reformer.
                The processual law so dominates in certain systems
          as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice.
G
          The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid,
          not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of
          vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito
    1.   (2005) 4 sec 4BO.
H 2. (1975) 1 sec 774.
           NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                       1161
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly   A
      inequitable .... Justice is the goal of jurisprudence -
      processual, as much as substantive."

    The Bench further referred to the pronouncement in State
of Punjab v. Sham/al Muran"3 to emphasise the approach
                                                                    B
relating to the process of adjective law. It has been stated in
the said case: -

      "Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an
      obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions
      are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a     C
      resistant in the administration of justice."

     14. We may note with profit that the Court had further
opined that the procedure is directory but emphasis was laid
on the concept of desirability and for the aforesaid purpose,       0
reference was made to Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corpn. Bank4.
Analysing the purpose behind it, the three-Judge-Bench,
referring to Topline Shoes Ltd. (supra), observed thus: -

      "36. The Court further held that the provision is more by
      way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal     E
      of such disputes. The strong terms in which the provision
      is couched are an expression of "desirability" but do not
      create any kind of substantive right in favour of the
      complainant by reason of delay so as to debar the
      respondent from placing his version in defence in any         F
      circumstances whatsoever."
    15. In Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto P/ast Private Limited and
Others5 this Court was dealing with a judgment passed by the
High Court in a second appeal wherein the High Court had not G
formulated any substantial question of law and further allowed

3.   (1976) 1 sec 119.
4.   c2002) 6 sec 33.
s.   c2011) 9 sec 678.                                              H
    1162     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff solely on the ground
  that the stakes were high and the plaintiff should have been non-
  suited on the basis of no evidence. This Court took note of the
  fact that after issues were framed and the matter was fixed for
  production of the evidence of the plaintiff on three occasions,
B the plaintiff chose not to adduce the evidence. The question
  posed by the Court was to the following effect: -

        "Is the court obliged to give adjournment after adjournment
        merely because the stakes are high in the dispute? Should
        the court be silent spectator and leave control of the case
c       to a party to the case who has decided not to take the
        case forward?"

    Thereafter, the Court proceeded to answer thus: -

D       "15. It is sad, but true, that the litigants seek - and the
        courts grant - adjournments at the drop of the hat. In the
        cases where the Judges are little proactive and refuse to
        accede to the requests of unnecessary adjournments, the
        litigants deploy all sorts of methods in protracting the
        litigation. It is not surprising that civil disputes drag on and
E
        on. The misplaced sympathy and indulgence by the
        appellate and revisional courts compound the malady
        further. The case in hand is a case of such misplaced
        sympathy. It is high time that courts become sensitive to
        delays in justice delivery system and realise that
F       adjournments do dent the efficacy of the judicial process
        and if this menace is not controlled adequately, the litigant
        public may lose faith in the system sooner than later. The
        courts, particularly trial courts, must ensure that on every
        date of hearing, effective progress takes place in the suit.
G
        16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure provided
        in CPC. Adjournments have grown like cancer corroding
        the entire body of justice delivery system."

H After so stating, the Bench observed as follows: -
            NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                          1163
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      "A party to the suit is not at lib~rty to proceed with the trial   A
      at its leisure and pleasure and has no right to determine
      when the evidence would be let in by it or the matter should
      be heard. The parties to a suit - whether the plaintiff or
      the defendant - must cooperate with the court in ensuring
      the effective work on the date of hearing for which the                B
      matter has been fixed. If they don't, they do so at their own
      peril."
    16. In Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor and
Others, 6 after referring to a passage from Mahabir Prasad
Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd., 7 the Court cautioned thus: -             C
      "Nonetheless we put the profession to notice that in future
      the advocate would also be answerable for the
      consequence suffered by the party if the non-appearance            !

      was solely on the ground of a strike call. It is unjust and
                                                                             0
      inequitable to cause the party alone to suffer for the self
      imposed dereliction of his advocate. We may further add
      that the litigant who suffers entirely on account of his
      advocate's non-appearance in Court, he has also the
      remedy to sue the advocate for damages but that remedy
      would remain unaffected by the course adopted in this                  E
      case. Even so, in situations like this, when the Court mulcts
      the party with costs for the failure of his advocate to appear,
      we make it clear that the same Court has power to permit
      the party to realize the costs from the advocate concerned.
      However, such direction can be passed only after affording             F
      an opportunity to the advocate. If he has any justifiable
      cause the Court can certainly absolve him from such a
      liability. n
    17. Be it noted, though the said passagewas stated in the
context of strike by the lawyers, yet it has its accent on non-              G
appearance by a counsel in the court.


6.   AIR 2001 SC 207.
7.   AIR 1999 SC 287.                                                        H
     1164       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 3 S.C.R.

A.         18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement in
     Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of
     Maharashtra, Bombay and Others, 8 wherein the Court
     observed that an advocate stands in a loco parentis towards
  the litigants and it, therefore, follows that the client is entitled to
B receive disinterested, sincere and honest treatment especially
  where the client approaches the advocates for succour in times
  of need.

        19. In Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
     Administration), 9 a three-Judge Bench, while dealing with the
C role of an advocate in a criminal trial, has observed as follows:-

           "We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be
           experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate
           is finding it difficult to attend the court from day-to-day. It
D          is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a
           criminal case to attend the trial from day-to-day. We cannot
           over-stress the duty of the Advocate to attend to the trial
           from day-to-day. Having accepted the brief, he will be
           committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails
E          to attend."

         20. In Mahabir Prasad Singh (supra), the Bench, laying
     emphasis on the obligation of a lawyer in his duty towards the
     Court and the duty of the Court to the Bar, has ruled as under:-

F                "A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall
           detract from the dignity of the Court of which he is himself
           a sworn officer and assistant. He should at all times pay
           deferential respect to the judge, and scrupulously observe
           the decorum of the Court room. (Warevelle's Legal Ethics
G          at p.182)

                  Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a

     8.   (1984) 2 sec 556.
H    9.   AIR 1984 SC 618.
          NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                         1165
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     reciprocal duty for the Court also to be courteous to the        A
     members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for
     maintaining and protecting the respect which members of
     the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well as
     from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar are the
     two inextricable wings of the judicial forum and therefore       B
     the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient
     functioning of the solemn work carried on in Courts of law.
     But that does not mean that any advocate or group of them
     can boycott the courts or any particular Court and ask the
     Court to desist from discharging judicial function. At any       c
     rate, no advocate can ask the Court to avoid a case on
     the ground that he does not want to appear in that Court."

     21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards the
Court and the society, being a member of the legal profession,
this Court in O.P. Sharma and Others v. High Court of Punjab          D
and Haryana 10 has observed that the role and status of lawyers
at the beginning of sovereign and democratic India is accounted
as extremely vital in deciding that the nation's administration
was to be governed by the Rule of Law. The Bench emphasized
on the role of eminent lawyers in the framing of the Constitution.    E
Emphasis was also laid on the concept that lawyers are the
Officers of the Court in the administration of justice.

     22. In R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of Himachal
Pradesh," Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Court                   F
pertaining to the relationship between the Bench and the Bar,
opined thus: -

     • .... the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same
     mechanism which administers justice to the people. Mar:iy
     members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and t~~ir            G
     past association is a source of inspiration and p~iqfto
     them. It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar, It is

10. c2011i 6 sec 86.
11. (1981) 3 sec 166.                                                 H
    1166      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A        unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just
         as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with
         the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned
         instrument in the setting of a court room. But members of
         the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant
B        violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will
         only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without
         which no democracy can survive."

         23. We have referred to the aforesaid judgments solely for
  the purpose that this Court, in different contexts, had dealt with
C the malady of adjournment and expressed its agony and
  anguish. Whatever may be the nature of litigation, speedy and
  appropriate delineation is fundamental to judicial duty.
  Commenting on the delay in the justice delivery system,
  although in respect of criminal trial, Krishna Iyer, J. had stated
D thus: -
         "Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers from slow
         motion syndrome which is lethal to "fair trial", whatever the
         ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social
E        justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in
         the criminal being condignly and finally punished within a
         reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the
         inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings."

       24. In criminal jurisprudence, speedy trial has become an
F indivisible component of Article 21 of the Constitution and it has
  been held by this Court that it is the constitutional obligation on
  the part of the State to provide the infrastructure for speedy trial
  (see Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 12
  Hussainara Khatoon (IV) and Others v. Home Secretary, State
G of Bihar, Patna 13).

         25. In Diwan Naubat Rai and Others v. State through

    12. AIR 1979 SC 1360.
H   13. (1980) 1 sec 98.
            NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                                 1167
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

Delhi Administration, 14 it has been opined that right to speedy                A
trial encompasses all stages of trial, namely, investigation,
enquiry, trial, appeal and revision.
      26. In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 15 it has been
reiterated that speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and
                                                                                B
content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it has
been put at the zenith and that makes the responsibility of
everyone Eve.restine which has to be performed with Olympian
calmness.

      27. The anguish expressed in the past and the role                        C
ascribed to the Judges, lawyers and the litigants is a matter of
perpetual concern and the same has to be reflected upon every
moment. An attitude of indifference can neither be appreciated
nor tolerated. Therefore, the serviceability of the institution gains
significance. That is the command of the Majesty of Law and                     D
none should make any maladroit effort to create a concavity in
the same. Procrastination, whether at the individual or
institutional level, is a systemic disorder. Its corrosive effect and
impact is like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man
suffering from an incurable and fast progressive malignancy.                    E
Delay either by the functionaries of the court or the members
of the Bar significantly exhibits indolence and one can
aphoristically say, borrowing a line from Southwell "Creeping
snails have the weakest force". Slightly more than five decades
back, talking about the responsibility of the lawyers, Nizer                    F
Louis16 had put thus: -

     "I consider it a lawyer's task to bring calm and confidence
     to the distressed client. Almost everyone who comes to a
     law office is emotionally affected by a problem. It is only a
     matter of degree and of the client's inner resources to                    G
     withstand the pressure."
14. AIR 1989 SC 542.
15. (2005) 1 sec 387.
16. My life in Court (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961)
    p.213                                                                       H
    1168     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A       28. A few lines from illustrious Frankfurter is fruitful to
    recapitulate:

        "I think a person who throughout his life is nothing but a
        practicing lawyer fulfils a very great and essential function
        in the life of society. Think of the responsibilities on the one
B
        hand and the satisfaction on the other, to be a lawyer in
        the true sense."

          29. In a democratic set up, intrinsic and embedded faith
    in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal concern.
C   Delay gradually declines the citizenry faith in the system. It is
    the faith and faith alone that keeps the system alive. It provides
    oxygen constantly. Fragmentation of faith has the effect-
    potentiality to bring in a state of cataclysm where justice may
    become a casuality. A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from
D   a temperate Judge but does not intend to and, rightly so, to
    guillotine much of time at the altar of reasons. Timely delivery
    of justice keeps the faith ingrained and establishes the
    sustained stability. Access to speedy justice is regarded as a
    human right which is deeply rooted in the foundational concept
E   of democracy and such a right is not only the creation of law
    but also a natural right. This right can be fully ripened by the
    requisite commitment of all concerned with the system. It cannot
    be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because such a thought
    is likely to make the right a mirage losing the centrality of
F   purpose. Therefore, whoever has a role to play in the justice
    dispensation system cannot be allowed to remotely conceive
    of a casual approach.

       30. In this context, it is apt to refer to a passage from
    Ramdeo Chauhan Alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam": -
G
        "22 .... The judicial system cannot be allowed to be taken
        to ransom by having resort to imaginative and concocted
        grounds by taking advantage of loose sentences

H 11. (2001) s sec 714.
            NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                         1169
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      appearing in the evidence of some of the witnesses,              A
      particularly at the stage of special leave petition. The law
      insists on finality of judgments ~nd is more concerned with
      the strengthening of the judicial system. The courts are
      enj.:iined upon to perform their duties with the object of
      strengthening the confidence of the common man in the            B
      institution entrusted with the administration of· justice. Any
      effort which weakens the system and shakens the faith of
      the common man in the justice dispensation system has
      to be discouraged."

     31. ln Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another v. State            C
 of Gujarat and Others'". emphasizing.oh the duty of Court to
 maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, this
 Court has poignantly held as follows: -

      "35 .... Courts have always been considered to have an           D
      overriding duty to maintain public confidence in the
      administration of justice - often referred to as the duty to
      vindicate and uphold the "majesty of the law". Due
      administration of justice has always been viewed as a
      continuous process, not confined to determination of the         E
      particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court
      of law in the future as in the case before it."

        Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear as day that everyone
  involved in the system of dispensation of justice has to inspire
  the confidence of the common man in the effectiveness of the         F
  judicial system. Sustenance of faith has to be treated as spinal
  sans sympathy or indulgence. If someone considers the task
  to be herculean, the same has to be performed with solemnity,
. for faith is the 'elan vital' of our system.
                                                                       G
      32. Coming to the proceedings before the High Court from
 the date of presentation of the secon.d appeal till the date of
 admission, the manner in which it has progressed is not only

 18. (2004) 4   sec 158.                                               H
    1170     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 3 S.C.R.


A   perplexing but also shocking. We are inclined to think that the
    Court should not have shown indulgence of such magnitude by
    adjourning the matter when the counsel for the appellant was
    not present. It is difficult to envision why the Court directed fresh
    notice to the appellant when there was nothing suggestive for
B   passing of such an order. The matter should have been dealt
    with taking a recourse to the provisions in the Code of Civil
    Procedure. It is also astonishing that the lawyers sought
    adjournments in a routine manner and the court also acceded
    to such prayers. When the matter stood dismissed, though an
C   application for restoration was filed, yet it was listed after a long
    lapse of time. Adding to the misery, the concerned official took
    his own time to put the file in order. From the Registrar
    General's communication it is perceptible that some
    disciplinary action has been initiated against the erring official.
    That is another matter and we do not intend to say anything in
0   that regard. But the fact that cannot be brushed aside is that
    there is enormous delay in dealing with the case. Had timely
    effort been made and due concern bestowed, it could have
    been avoided. There may be cases where delay may be
    unavoidable. We do not intend to give illustrations, for facts in
E   the said cases shall speak for themselves. In the case at hand,
    as we perceive, the learned counsel sought adjournment after
    adjournment in a nonchalant manner and the same were
    granted in a routine fashion. It is the duty of the counsel as the
    officer of the court to assist the court in a properly prepared
F   manner and not to seek unnecessary adjournments. Getting an
    adjournment is neither an art nor science. It has never been
    appreciated by the courts. All who are involved in the justice
    dispensation system, which includes the Judges, the lawyers,
    the judicial officers who work in courts, the law officers of the
G   State, the Registry and the litigants, have to show dedicated
    diligence so that a controversy is put to rest. Shifting the blame
    is not the cure. Acceptance of responsibility and dealing with
    it like a captain in the frontier is the necessity of the time. It is
    worthy to state that diligence brings satisfaction. There has to
H   be strong resolve in the mind to carry out the responsibility with
           NOOR MOHAMMED v. JETHANAND                       1171
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

devotion. A time has come when all concerned are required to        A
abandon idleness and arouse oneself and see to it that the
syndrome of delay does not erode the concept of dispensation
of expeditious justice which is the constitutional command.
Sagacious acceptance of the deviation and necessitous steps
taken for the redressal of the same would be a bright lamp which    B
would gradually become a laser beam. This is the expectation
of the collective, and the said expectation has to become a
reality. Expectations are not to remain at the stage of hope.
They have to be metamorphosed to actuality. Long back,
Francis Bacon, in his aphoristic style, had said, "Hope is good     c
breakfast, but it is bad supper". We say no more on this score.

     33. Though we have dwelled upon the issue, yet we restrain
from issuing any directions, for the High Court as a
constitutional Court has to carry the burden and live up to the
requisite expectations of the litigants. It is also expected from   D
the lawyers' community to see that delay is avoided. A
concerted effort is bound to give results. Therefore, we request
the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well
as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a
mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid      E
such inordinate delays in matters which can really be dealt with
in an expeditious manner. Putting a step forward is a step
towards the destination. A sensible individual inspiration and
a committed collective endeavour would indubitably help in this
regard. Neither less, nor more.                                     F

      34. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed
of.

B.B.B.                                       SLP disposed of.